# 1nc alta quarters

## 1

#### Interpretation: Affirmatives must defend the desirability of the consequences of the implementation of a hypothetical policy action by a government

#### Resolved means the affirmative must defend the implementation of a policy action by a government

Parcher 1 (Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### Government

Oxford Lexico. Definition of government in English. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/government>

The governing body of a nation, state, or community. ‘an agency of the federal government’

#### First is Procedural fairness – Frame debate as a game---we’re both here to winFirst their interpretation explodes limits and creates incentives for affirmatives to race to the margins and monopolize on the moral high ground by not defending a stable mechanism or actor which allows them to radically re-contextualize the 1AC, and use competition standards like perms to erase neg ground.

#### Fairness is an intrinsic good ¬–it guarantees stasis such that both teams have an equal opportunity to adapt to the arguments made by the other side. The external impact to our form of second order testing is critical thinking, since underprepared negs cant properly test affs; debate becomes meaningless without substantive constraints ---Education matters---it provides portable skills

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating over the resolutional question. Any 2AC framework must explain why we switch sides, why there has to be a winner and a loser, and why there are structural rules. T as a rule of the game may resemble the aff’s impacts, but the only thing that makes the two materially equivalent is the ideological investment in T’s ability to do violence that they espouse.

#### Second is deliberation: The shifted balance of research that inevitably occurs under their interpretation annihilates effective dialogue regarding the topic – this shuts down the internal deliberation that is resolved by our focus on a common ground for debate. Only our inauguration of deliberation into the debate space allows for contested debate and clash which causes individuals to alter the presupposed world views—this does not limit particular styles, but only tying those to topical advocacy ensures clash

#### Third is mechanism education---Successful movement organizing is analogous to mainstream politics -- it requires skilled organization, strategic flexibility, effective management, and proto-institutionalism -- sacrificing debate as training in favor of being a revolutionary for a weekend ensures failure.

Heller 17 [Nathan Heller began contributing to The New Yorker in 2011, and joined the magazine as a staff writer in 2013. He has written on a range of subjects, including online education and the TED Conference. He is also a film and television critic, and a contributing editor, at Vogue. Previously, he was a columnist for Slate, where he was a finalist for a National Magazine Award for essays and criticism. Is There Any Point to Protesting? August 21, 2017. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/21/is-there-any-point-to-protesting]

Tufekci’s conclusions about the civil-rights movement are unsettling because of what they imply. People such as Kauffman portray direct democracy as a scrappy, passionate enterprise: the underrepresented, the oppressed, and the dissatisfied get together and, strengthened by numbers, force change. Tufekci suggests that the movements that succeed are actually proto-institutional: highly organized; strategically flexible, due to sinewy management structures; and chummy with the sorts of people we now call élites. The Montgomery N.A.A.C.P. worked with Clifford Durr, a patrician lawyer whom Franklin Roosevelt had appointed to the F.C.C., and whose brother-in-law Hugo Black was a Supreme Court Justice when Browder v. Gayle was heard. The organizers of the March on Washington turned to Bobby Kennedy—the U.S. Attorney General and the brother of the sitting President—when Rustin’s prized sound system was sabotaged the day before the protest. Kennedy enlisted the Army Signal Corps to fix it. You can’t get much cozier with the Man than that. Far from speaking truth to power, successful protests seem to speak truth through power. (The principle holds for such successful post-sixties movements as ACT UP, with its structure of caucuses and expert working groups. And it forces one to reassess the rise of well-funded “Astroturf” movements such as the Tea Party: successful grassroots lawns, it turns out, have a bit of plastic in them, too.) Democratizing technology may now give the voiceless a means to cry in the streets, but real results come to those with the same old privileges—time, money, infrastructure, an ability to call in favors—that shape mainline politics.

Unsurprisingly, this realization irks the Jacobins. Hardt and Negri, as well as Srnicek and Williams, rail at length against “neoliberalism”: a fashionable bugaboo on the left, and thus, unfortunately, a term more often flaunted than defined. (Neoliberalism can broadly refer to any program that involves market-liberal policies—privatization, deregulation, etc.—and so includes everything from Thatcher’s social-expenditure reductions to Obama’s global-trade policies. A moratorium on its use would help solidify a lot of gaseous debate.) According to them, neoliberalism lurks everywhere that power resides, beckoning friendly passersby into its drippy gingerbread house. Hardt and Negri dismiss “participating in government, respecting capitalist discipline, and creating structures for labor and business to collaborate,” because, they say, “reformism in this form has proven to be impossible and the social benefits it promises are an illusion.” They favor antagonistic pressure, leading to a revolution with no central authority (a plan perhaps more promising in theory than in practice). Srnicek and Williams don’t reject working with politicians, though they think that real transformation comes from shifts in social expectation, in school curricula, and in the sorts of things that reasonable people discuss on TV (the so-called Overton window). It’s an ambitious approach but not an outlandish one: Bernie Sanders ran a popular campaign, and suddenly socialist projects were on the prime-time docket. Change does arrive through mainstream power, but this just means that your movement should be threaded through the culture’s institutional eye.

The question, then, is what protest is for. Srnicek and Williams, even after all their criticism, aren’t ready to let it go—they describe it as “necessary but insufficient.” Yet they strain to say just how it fits with the idea of class struggle in a postindustrial, smartphone-linked world. “If there is no workplace to disrupt, what can be done?” they wonder. Possibly their telescope is pointing the wrong way round. Much of their book attempts to match the challenges of current life—a shrinking manufacturing sphere, a global labor surplus, a mire of race-inflected socioeconomic traps—with Marx’s quite specific precepts about the nineteenth-century European economy. They define the proletariat as “that group of people who must sell their labor powers to live.” It must be noted that this group—now comprising Olive Garden waiters, coders based in Bangalore, janitors, YouTube stars, twenty-two-year-olds at Goldman Sachs—is really very broad. A truly modern left, one cannot help but think, would be at liberty to shed a manufacturing-era, deterministic framework like Marxism, allegorized and hyperextended far beyond its time. Still, to date no better paradigm for labor economics and uprising has emerged.

What comes undone here is the dream of protest as an expression of personal politics. Those of us whose days are filled with chores and meetings may be deluding ourselves to think that we can rise as “revolutionaries-for-a-weekend”—Norman Mailer’s phrase for his own bizarre foray, in 1967, as described in “The Armies of the Night.” Yet that’s not to say the twenty-four-year-old who quits his job and sleeps in a tent to affirm his commitment does more. The recent studies make it clear that protest results don’t follow the laws of life: eighty per cent isn’t just showing up. Instead, logistics reign and then constrain. Outcomes rely on how you coördinate your efforts, and on the skill with which you use existing influence as help.

If that seems a deflating idea, it only goes to show how entrenched self-expressive protest has become in political identity. In one survey, half of Occupy Wall Street allies turned out to be fully employed: even that putatively radical economic movement was largely middle class. (Also, as many noted, it was largely white.) That may be because even the privileged echelons of working America are mad as hell and won’t take it anymore. But it may also be because the social threshold for protest-joining is low. A running joke in “The Armies of the Night” is that many of the people who went off to demonstrate were affluent egghead types—unsure, self-obsessed, squeamish, and, in many ways, pretty conservative. “There was an air of Ivy League intimacy to the quiet conversations on this walk—it could not really be called a March,” Mailer says. Writing of himself: “He found a friendly face. It was Gordon Rogoff, an old friend from Actors Studio, now teaching at the Yale Drama School; they talked idly about theatrical matters for a while.” This has been the cultural expectation since the late sixties, even as tactical protest has left mainstream power behind. As citizens, we get two chips—one for the ballot box, the other for the soapbox. Many of us feel compelled to make use of them both.

Would casual activists be better off deploying their best skills toward change (teachers teaching, coders coding, celebrities celebritizing) and leaving direct action in the hands of organizational pros? That seems sad, and a good recipe for lax, unchecked, uncoördinated effort. Should they work indirectly—writing letters, calling senators, and politely nagging congresspeople on Twitter? That involves no cool attire or clever signs, and no friends who’ll cheer at every turn. But there’s reason to believe that it works, because even bad legislators pander to their electorates. In a new book, “The Once and Future Liberal” (Harper), Mark Lilla urges a turn back toward governmental process. “The role of social movements in American history, while important, has been seriously inflated by left-leaning activists and historians,” he writes. “The age of movement politics is over, at least for now. We need no more marchers. We need more mayors.” Folk politics, tracing a fifty-year anti-establishmentarian trend, flatters a certain idea of heroism: the system, we think, must be fought by authentic people. Yet that outlook is so widely held now that it occupies the highest offices of government. Maybe, in the end, the system is the powerless person’s best bet.

Or maybe direct action is something to value independent of its results. No specific demands were made at the Women’s March, in January. The protest produced no concrete outcomes, and it held no legislators to account. And yet the march, which encompassed millions of people on every continent, including Antarctica, cannot be called a failure. At a time when identity is presumed to be clannish and insular, it offered solidarity on a vast scale.

What was the Women’s March about? Empowerment, human rights, discontent—you know. Why did it matter? Because we were there. Self-government remains a messy, fussy, slow, frustrating business. We do well to remind those working its gears and levers that the public—not just the appalled me but the conjoined us whom the elected serve—is watching and aware. More than two centuries after our country took its shaky first steps, the union is miles from perfection. But it is still on its feet, sometimes striding, frequently stumbling. The march goes on, and someday, not just in our dreams, we’ll make it home.

#### That is the difference between effective movements and ones that cement authoritarianism -- activism is not automatic, but requires learning to defend a proposal against rigorous negation to develop skills for strategy, organizing, problem-solving, using resources, and creating coalitions -- their impact turns aren’t unique because the government will inevitably try to capture public anxiety, the only question is creating alternative incentives for people to organize.

Lakey 13 [George Lakey co-founded Earth Quaker Action Group which just won its five-year campaign to force a major U.S. bank to give up financing mountaintop removal coal mining. Along with college teaching he has led 1,500 workshops on five continents and led activist projects on local, national, and international levels. Among many other books and articles, he is author of “Strategizing for a Living Revolution” in David Solnit’s book Globalize Liberation. 8 skills of a well-trained activist. June 11, 2013. <https://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/8-skills-of-a-well-trained-activist/>]

Why more training now?

The history of training is a history of playing catch-up. Very few movements seem to realize that the pace of change can accelerate so rapidly that it outstrips the movement’s ability to use its opportunities fully. In Istanbul a small group of environmentalists sit down to save a park, and suddenly there are protests in over 60 Turkish cities; the agenda expands, from green space to governance to capitalism; doors open everywhere. It would be a good moment to have tens of thousands of skilled organizers ready to seize the day, supporting smart direct action and building prefigurative institutions. But excitement alone may slacken; as with the Occupy movement, spontaneous creativity has its limits.

With the right skills, movements can sustain themselves for years against punishing, murderous resistance. The mass direct action phase of the civil rights movement pushed on effectively for a decade after 1955. Mass excitement doesn’t need to fizzle in a year. A movement thrives by solving the problems it faces.

Anti-authoritarians don’t want to count on a movement’s top leaders to be the problem-solvers, but instead to develop shared leadership by fostering problem-solving smarts at the grassroots. There’s nothing automatic about grassroots problem-solving. How well people strategize, organize, invent creative tactics, reach effectively to allies, use the full resources of the group and persevere at times of discouragement — all that can be enhanced by training.

Nothing is more predictable than that there will be increased turbulence in the United States and many other societies. Activists cause some of the turbulence by rising up; other turbulence results from things like climate change, the 1 percent’s austerity programs and other forces outside activists’ immediate control.

Increased turbulence scares a lot of people. It’s only natural that people will look around for reassurance. The ruling class will offer one kind of reassurance. The big question is: What reassurance will the movement offer?

When students in Paris in May 1968 launched a campaign that quickly moved into nationwide turbulence, with 11 million workers striking and occupying, there was a momentary chance for the middle class to side with the students and workers instead of siding with the 1 percent. The movement, though, didn’t understand enough about the basic human need for security and failed to use its opportunity. That was a strategic error, but to choose a different path the movement would have required participants with more skills. Training would have been necessary. We can learn from this, inventory the skills needed and train ourselves accordingly.

What is training ready to do for us?

Here are a few of the key benefits that we should expect to gain from one another through training:

1. Increase the creativity of direct action strategy and tactics. The Yes Men and the Center for Story-Based Strategy lead workshops in which activist groups break out of the lockstep of “marches-and-rallies.” We need to have a broad array of tactics at our disposal, and we have to be ready to invent new ones when necessary.

2. Prepare participants psychologically for the struggle. The Pinochet regime in Chile depended, as dictatorships usually do, on fear to maintain its control. In the 1980s a group committed to nonviolent struggle encouraged people to face their fears directly in a three-step process: small group training sessions in living rooms, followed by “hit-and-run” nonviolent actions, followed by debriefing sessions. By teaching people to control their fear, trainers were building a movement to overthrow the dictator.

3. Develop group morale and solidarity for more effective action. In 1991 members of ACT UP — a militant group protesting U.S. AIDS policy — were beaten up by Philadelphia police during a demonstration. The police were found guilty of using unnecessary force and the city paid damages, but ACT UP members realized they could reduce the chance of future brutality by working in a more united and nonviolent way. Before their next major action they invited a trainer to conduct a workshop where they clarified the strategic question of nonviolence and then role-played possible scenarios. The result: a high-spirited, unified and effective action.

4. Deepen participants’ understanding of the issues. The War Resisters League’s Handbook for Nonviolent Action is an example of the approach that takes even a civil disobedience training as an opportunity to assist participants to take a next step regarding racism, sexism and the like. When we understand how seemingly separate struggles are connected, it helps us create a broader, stronger, more interconnected movement.

5. Build skills for applying nonviolent action in situations of threat and turbulence. In Haiti a hit squad abducted a young man just outside the house where a trained peace team was staying; the team immediately intervened and, although surrounded by twice their number of guards with weapons, succeeded in saving the man from being hung. Through training, we can learn how to react to emergencies like this in disciplined, effective ways.

6. Build alliances across movement lines. In Seattle in the 1980s, a workshop drew striking workers from the Greyhound bus company and members of ACT UP. The workshop reduced the prejudice each group had about the other, and it led some participants to support each other’s struggle. Trainings are a valuable opportunity to bring people from different walks of life together and help them work toward their common goals.

7. Create activist organizations that don’t burn people out. The Action Mill, Spirit in Action, and the Stone House all offer workshops to help activists to stay active in the long run. I’ve seen a lot of accumulated skill lost to movements over the years because people didn’t have the support or endurance to stay in the fight.

8. Increase democracy within the movement. In the 1970s the Movement for a New Society developed a pool of training tools and designs that it shared with the grassroots movement against nuclear power. The anti-nuclear movement went up against some of the largest corporations in America and won. The movement delayed construction, which raised costs, and planted so many seeds of doubt in the public mind about safety that the eventual meltdown of the Three Mile Island plant brought millions of people to the movement’s point of view. The industry’s goal of building 1,000 nuclear plants evaporated. Significantly, the campaign succeeded without needing to create a national structure around a charismatic leader. Activists learned the skills of shared leadership and democratic decision-making through workshops, practice and feedback. In my book Facilitating Group Learning, I share many lessons that have evolved from Freire’s day to ours.

I hope that readers of this column will add to the list of training providers in the comments, since I’ve only named some. My intention is to remind us that this could be the right moment, before the next wave of turbulence has all of us in crisis-mode again, to increase training capacity for grassroots skill-building. We’ll be very glad we did.

#### You should also filter their impacts through predictable testability and model comparison -- debate inherently judges relative truth value by whether or not it gets answered -- a combination of a less predictable case neg, the burden of rejoinder, and them starting a speech ahead will always inflate the value of their impacts, which makes non-arbitrarily weighing whether they should have read the 1ac in the first place impossible within the structure of a debate round so even if we lose framework, vote neg on presumption.

#### Additionally, if you don’t understand what the Aff does and your understanding of the Aff changes dramatically from the 1AC to the 1AR and/or to the 2AR that is a reason to vote neg right then and there. Don’t let them recontextualize their offense in later speeches since it eliminates the possibility of neg contestation since everything in the 2NR has to stem from the 1NC which is predicated off 1AC explanation.

#### Here’s some terminal Defense to their education – we can attain the same education by being topical

#### 1. They can read their critical theory arguments as a framework for their impacts but defend government action. Even if government action alone is insufficient, changing the government is part of a strategy to combat multiple forms of oppression.

#### 2. Being Neg solves their offense. All their offense for why the topic is bad are arguments the negative can read against topical affs, which fosters the same discussion.

#### 3. A topical version of the aff solves their offense and any solvency deficits they can identify with the TVA are just pieces of negative ground---perfect Affirmatives don’t allow for testing

#### 1. TVA: Defend whole res, but they can read their critical theory arguments as a framework for their impacts but defend government action. Even if government action alone is insufficient, changing the government is part of a strategy to combat multiple forms of oppression.

#### 2. Being Neg solves their offense. All their offense for why the topic is bad are arguments the negative can read against topical affs, which fosters the same discussion.

## Case

#### Robust social psychology evidence verifies our approach – political transformations intervene in social norms can prevent the formation of implicit biases

**Matthew 15.**Dayna Bowen Matthew, William L. Matheson and Robert M. Morgenthau Distinguished Professor of Law at UVA School of Law, F. Palmer Weber Research Professor of Civil Liberties and Human Rights, previously served on the University of Colorado law faculty as a professor, vice dean and associate dean of academic affairs, J.D. from the University of Virginia (*Just Medicine: A Cure for Racial Inequality in American Health Care*, “From Inequity to Intervention,” New York University Press, pages 155-158

Evidence that **Implicit Biases Are Malleable** **Social scientists have developed a body of empirical evidence that shows implicit biases are malleable** over the past quarter century.2 **The empirical record is now well established** **and offers strong evidence that implicit attitudes are neither inaccessible nor inescapable**; **they are not impossible to control**; they are not out of reach. In fact, **implicit associations can be influenced both by the individual who unconsciously holds these stereotypes and prejudices and by external factors**. Researchers have reported and reviewed numerous studies3 that put two important misconceptions about implicit biases to rest. First, **the evidence demonstrates that unconscious implicit attitudes are responsive to the deliberate choices and influences of an individual even though that person is not consciously experiencing the bias**. Second, implicit biases are not impervious to relatively short-term change even though they arise from social knowledge that was acquired slowly, and over a lifetime. In fact, the evidence reveals that **learning can continue to take place and alter social group knowledge**, after initial attitudes and associations are formed. Take, for example, a person who developed bad driving habits over time and subconsciously incorporated those habits into driving behavior for many years. If this person chooses to be mindful of improving his or her driving, either out of a conscious decision to do so or in response to external influences, those bad habits can be altered. External authorities may incentivize improvement through a media campaign, new rules of the road, prosecution for reckless driving, or a driver’s education class. Thus, **malleability describes an ongoing learning process in which people with old, objectionable implicit biases learn to respond to newer, more appropriate attitudes and beliefs**. Put another way, **longstanding and unconscious thinking can change**. This understanding of malleability is called the “connectionist” model of implicit bias. **Unlike the prior notion that implicit associations are static and inaccessibly fixed, the empirical record reveals that stereotypes and prejudicial beliefs to which we may adhere at any given time are “states” of thinking** that form based on past experiences and current inputs. **Biases can be reviseddepending upon current informational inputs gathered and weighed with each new encounter**. **This flexible view of stereotyping replaces an outdated rigid one** and allows for the evidence that individuals can constantly update the stored group knowledge that produces implicit biases. The connectionist model explains that a stereotype is merely a pattern of activation that, at a given point in time, is jointly determined by current input (i.e., the context) and the weight of the new information’s connection to existing and underlying beliefs.4 Psychologists now conclude that “**stereotypes are quite elastic and thus any individual could hold and even change an infinite number of representations of social category’s members, when viewed across time and place**.”5 The connectionist model contrasts with **early theories of implicit bias**, which **focused on their automaticity**. “Automaticity” refers generally to the way that individuals make associations without any awareness, without intentionality, and without responsibility for the influence the associations have in directing their conduct and choices.6 **Early researchers concluded that automaticity meant inevitability**. For example, one researcher said, “a crucial component of automatic processes is their inescapability; they occur despite deliberate attempts to bypass or ignore them.”7 **This view is no longer correct**. Over the past twenty years, **researchers have collected a strong record to contradict this notion that implicit attitudes change slowly**, if at all, **simply because they develop slowly over time**. This idea has been replaced by what Dr. Irene Blair has called “the now-bountiful evidence that automatic attitudes—like self-reported attitudes—are sensitive to personal, social, and situational pressures.”8 Blair points out that “**the conclusion that automatic stereotypes and prejudice are not as inflexible as previously assumed is strengthened by the number and variety of demonstrations**. . . . The fact that the tests were conducted in the service of many different goals, and by the similarity of findings across different measures.”9 The importance of understanding that implicit biases are malleable cannot be overstated. First, **malleability means that interventions may be strategically introduced to provide current inputs that alter implicit biases**. Thus, **we can expect that implicit biases can be reduced**. To say that biased attitudes may be “reduced” is to say that current informational inputs can be adjusted so that the resulting stereotype patterns no longer conform to traditional, discriminatory, or inequitable stereotypes, but instead lead individuals and institutions to more equitable judgments and more equitable conduct. Furthermore, **malleability also means that the discriminatory impacts that result from implicit biases also may be reduced**. The research that gave rise to the connectionist model has provided important insights concerning the several methods available to individuals and institutions wishing to ameliorate the discriminatory impact of decisions and conduct informed by implicit biases, stereotyping, and prejudice. Finally, **by demonstrating that even subconscious racial biases are within reach and control, researchers have provided a sound basis for holding individuals and institutions responsible for reducing implicit racial and ethnic biases** **and for reducing the discriminatoryharms** caused by unconscious racism.

#### The ballot fails

Ritter 13. JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with nonapplicable rhetorical theory that fails to account for the unique aspects of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: “Can debate cause social change?” Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen not to prove this fundamental assumption, which—as this article argues—is merely a fiction that is harmful in most, if not all, respects. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterize5d as a fiction than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is not provable by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be incredibly critical of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes

#### Saving the greatest number of lives should be your first ethical priority

Cummisky 96. David, professor of philosophy at Bates, “Kantian Consequentialism”, p. 131

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hill's example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.8

#### **Psychoanalysis is not falsifiable**

Gordon 1 [Paul Gordon, psychotherapist, “Psychoanalysis and Racism: The Politics of Defeat,” RACE & CLASS v. 42 n. 4, 2001, pp. 17-34.]

But in the thirty years since Kovel wrote, that attempt to relate mind and society has been fractured by the advent of postmodernism, with its subsumption of the material/historical, of notions of cause and effect, to what is transitory, contingent, free-¯oating, evanescent. Psychoanalysis, by stepping into the vacuum left by the abandonment of all metanarrative, has tended to put mind over society. This is particularly noticeable in the work of the Centre for New Ethnicities Research at the University of East London, which purports to straddle the worlds of the academy and action by developing projects for the local community and within education generally.28 But, in marrying psychoanalysis and postmodernism, on the basis of claiming to be both scholarly and action oriented, it degrades scholarship and under- mines action, and ends in discourse analysis a language in which meta- phor passes for reality. Cohen's work unavoidably raises the question of the status of psycho- analysis as a social or political theory, as distinct from a clinical one. Can psychoanalysis, in other words, apply to the social world of groups, institutions, nations, states and cultures in the way that it does, or at least may do, to individuals? Certainly there is now a considerable body of literature and a plethora of academic courses, and so on, claim- ing that psychoanalysis is a social theory. And, of course, in popular discourse, it is now a commonplace to hear of nations and societies spoken of in personalised ways. Thus `truth commissions' and the like, which have become so common in the past decade in countries which have undergone turbulent change, are seen as forms of national therapy or catharsis, even if this is far from being their purpose. Never- theless, the question remains: does it make sense, as Michael Ignatieff puts it, to speak of nations having psyches the way that individuals do? `Can a nation's past make people ill as we know repressed memories sometimes make individuals ill? . . . Can we speak of nations ``working through'' a civil war or an atrocity as we speak of individuals working through a traumatic memory or event?' 47 The problem with the application of psychoanalysis to social institutions is that there can be no testing of the claims made. If someone says, for instance, that nationalism is a form of looking for and seeking to replace the body of the mother one has lost, or that the popular appeal of a particular kind of story echoes the pattern of our earliest relationship to the maternal breast, how can this be proved? The pioneers of psychoanalysis, from Freud onwards, all derived their ideas in the context of their work with individual patients and their ideas can be examined in the everyday laboratory of the therapeutic encounter where the validity of an interpretation, for example, is a matter for dialogue between therapist and patient. Outside of the con- sulting room, there can be no such verification process, and the further one moves from the individual patient, the less purchase psycho- analytic ideas can have. Outside the therapeutic encounter, anything and everything can be true, psychoanalytically speaking. But if every- thing is true, then nothing can be false and therefore nothing can be true. An example of Cohen's method is to be found in his 1993 working paper, `Home rules', subtitled `Some re¯ections on racism and nation- alism in everyday life'. Here Cohen talks about taking a `particular line of thought for a walk'. While there is nothing wrong with taking a line of thought for a walk, such an exercise is not necessarily the same as thinking. One of the problems with Cohen's approach is that a kind of free association, mixed with deconstruction, leads not to analysis, not even to psychoanalysis, but to . . . well, just more free association, an endless, indeed one might say pointless, play on words. This approach may well throw up some interesting associations along the way, connections one had never thought of but it is not to be confused with political analysis. In `Home rules', anything and everything to do with `home' can and does ®nd a place here and, as I indicated above, even the popular ®lm Home Alone is pressed into service as a story about `racial' invasion.

#### Strategic humanism is good—their author

**Scott and Wynter 2000 (**Professor emerita in the Department of Spanish and Portuguese and the Department of Afro-American Studies at Stanford University; interviewed by David Scott, Professor of Anthropology at Columbia University [“The Re-Enchantment of Humanism: An Interview with Sylvia Wynter,” *Small Axe*, Vol. 8, September 2000, p. 119-207, https://trueleappress.files.wordpress.com/2017/10/wynter-the-re-enchantment-of-humanism.pdf]

DS: Right. But what you recognize - as, of course, Cesaire and Fanon recognize - is that there is an **inner lining of humanism**, in which the degradation of man is part and parcel of the elevation of man. SW: We can see the reality of this for the indigenous peoples once Columbus arrives in the Caribbean. We can see it today in the degradation of the jobless, of the incarcerated, the homeless, the archipelago of the underdeveloped\ the expendable throwaways. DS: But my question is this, that recognizing the false humanity of the humanism of Europe **leads many people to abandon the hope for a new humanism. You have not abandoned that hope**. SW: Not at all. DS: You want - if I might put it this way — to **re-enchant the human in humanism**. What justifies this? **Why not abandon humanism? Why not leave humanism to Europe**? SW: Because we have to recognize the dimensions of the **breakthroughs that these first humanisms made possible** at the level of human cognition, **and** therefore of **the possibility of our eventual emancipation, of our eventual full autonomy, as humans**. Let me tell you of a point that Nicholas Humphrey recently made in his book on the history of the mind, since it can perhaps best explain why **we simply can’t discard these first humanisms, or just leave them to Europe**. 8 Reality, Humphrey reminds us, comprises two sets of facts: one of these is objective, the other is subjective. Now, the first set of facts existed from the very origin of the universe, but the second came into existence only with the emergence of sentient life, which took place a billion or so years ago. This was so, because for any physical event to exist as a subjective feeling, it could only do so for some entity for which that event “mattered”. For which, in effect, that was what it meant. So truth came into the world at the same time also. But it could only do so as truth-for. Since every sentient form of life, every living species, would now be able to know its reality only in terms of its specific truth-for; that is, in terms that were/are of adaptive advantage to its realization, survival and reproduction as such a form of life - to know its reality only adaptively. Now, this is no less the case with our **culture-specific genres of being human**. So the breakthroughs I am referring to are breakouts , if only still partial and incomplete ones, from that adaptive truth-for imperative. For example, before the voyages of the Portuguese and Columbus we can say that all geographies, whatever their great success in serving human needs, had been ethnogeographies — geographical truth-for a genre of the human. Before Copernicus, the same. And all astronomies by means of which humans had regulated and legitimated their societies had been, in the last instance, ethnoastronomies. Before Darwin, again t