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### AC – Inherency

#### Currently, entrepreneurs are pushing for privatization of space travel with increasing success

Thompson 20 [(Clive, author of Coders: The Making of a New Tribe and the Remaking of the World, a columnist for Wired magazine, and a contributing writer to The New York Times Magazine) “Monetizing the Final Frontier The strange new push for space privatization,” December 3, 2020 <https://newrepublic.com/article/160303/monetizing-final-frontier>] TDI

For longtime enthusiasts of NASA’s human spacefaring, it was a singularly auspicious moment. Ever since NASA’s space shuttles were mothballed in 2011, the agency had no American-owned way of getting people into space. It had been paying the Russian government to fly U.S. astronauts up and back, on Russia’s Soyuz spacecraft. But this flight was different. It was the first time humans had flown in a rocket and a capsule made by a private-sector company: SpaceX, the creation of the billionaire Elon Musk. The launch was also a SpaceX branding bonanza. The astronauts rode up to the rocket in a Tesla, Musk’s fabled luxury electric car; when they’d reached orbit, they broadcast a live video in which they thanked SpaceX for making the flight happen, and showed off the sleek capsule—a genuine marvel of engineering, with huge touch screen control panels that looked rather like the ones inside a Tesla itself. Over the next few years, NASA will pay Musk and SpaceX $2.6 billion to ferry astronauts to and from the space station six times. For the feds, this price tag is remarkably cheaper than the space shuttle, which cost over $1 billion per flight. In his speech after the launch, Trump lauded the cost savings that SpaceX had realized on the government’s behalf. SpaceX, he announced, “embodies the American ethos of big thinking and risk-taking.... Congratulations, Elon.” For Musk, though, the launch was more than just a technical success, and is bigger even than the $2.6 billion contract. It cements him as a leading player in what might seem the unlikeliest stage of the final frontier’s exploration—the privatization of space. Private-sector activity in space travel is accelerating dramatically—rocketing, one might say. For decades, ever since people first headed for orbit in the 1960s, spaceflight had been mostly the preserve of governments. States were the only actors with the money and technical acumen to blast things into the vacuum and get them safely down again. The private sector didn’t have NASA’s know-how, nor—more important—a business plan that could rationalize the massive outlay of capital required to operate in space. In the last few years, that calculus has changed dramatically. A generation of “New Space” entrepreneurs has begun launching rockets and satellites. Some seek to flood the planet with fast, cheap mobile-phone signals; others want to manufacture new products in zero gravity, harnessing the novel physics of such conditions to engineer substances that can’t be made in Earth’s gravity. Further afield, they’re aiming to harvest water on the moon and even mine asteroids. Backing this burst of entrepreneurial fervor are many billionaires who made their money in the early Wild West of the internet, including Amazon’s Jeff Bezos, with dreams of building space colonies, and Musk, the former PayPal titan who hopes to personally make it to Mars.Barack Obama’s administration made the first major overtures to the space privatizers, signing legislation that paved the way for today’s space boom. But the real land rush has occurred under Trump, via a flurry of executive orders designed to give private firms greater access to “low-Earth orbit.” Trump officials have even touted the idea of privatizing the $100 billion space station itself—the last signature NASA-sponsored human spacecraft project still aloft. When Trump’s transition team in 2017 pondered the handoff of low-Earth orbit to the private sector, it concluded: “This may be the biggest and most public privatization effort America has ever conducted.” Or as Texas GOP Senator Ted Cruz—at the time the chairman of the Space, Science, and Competitiveness Subcommittee—put it in 2018: “I predict the first trillionaire will be made in space.” The burst of activity and high-tech acumen thrills many space fans. But it is making many others quite nervous. Opening up space to a frenzy of private actors could, they agree, produce measurable benefits back on planet Earth—making crucial scientific research, environmental monitoring, and everyday communication cheaper. But the critics are quick to note as well that the history of privatization is spotty at best, with plenty of civically brutal knock-on effects: concentrations of monopolistic power, enfeebled democratic control, and widespread environmental degradation. We’ve seen all those problems appear on Earth as all manner of traditional social goods, from education and housing to pension plans and mass transit, have been targeted for private-sector control. Next up, it seems, is the great beyond.

### AC – Exploration Advantage

#### Space exploration is essential to the survival of humanity. Two impacts—

#### First, colonization—

#### It solves a litany of existential threats – don’t put all your eggs in one basket.

Fitzgerald 3/9 [(Shanon, Assistant Websites Editor at Liberty Fund), “Why Human Space Exploration Matters,” March 9 2021, https://www.econlib.org/why-human-space-exploration-matters/] TDI

While the yields to space exploration and the development of spaceflight technology may appear minimal in the immediate future, shifting our perspective to the longer term renders the human situation vis a viz space exploration extremely clear: if humans want to survive in perpetuity, we need to establish ourselves on other planets in addition to Earth. It is as simple as that. And yet we are not doing all that much to make that happen. To be clear, I’m long on Earth, too, and hope that technological improvements will continue to allow our species to get “more from less” right here on the third rock from the sun, enabling us to keep occupying the planet that saw us evolve into consciousness. I like to imagine that the distant future on Earth has the potential to be an extremely pleasant one, as advances in our scientific understanding and bio-technical praxis should hopefully allow our descendants to clean up any of the remaining messes previous generations will have left behind (e.g., nuclear and industrial waste, high amounts of atmospheric carbon, other lingering nasties) and stable-state free societies will hopefully allow all persons (or very nearly all persons) to live free and meaningful lives in productive community and exchange with their fellows. As the previous qualification highlights, the trickiest problems here on Earth and extending to wherever humans end up in the spacefaring age will still be social and political, and their successful resolution will depend more on the future state of our governing arts than our hard sciences. But regarding the negative events that could very well happen to Earth I think we all need to be equally clear: life might not make it here. There is no guarantee that it will, and in the very long run, with the expansion and subsequent death of our sun, we know with near certainty that it will not. Consider just a few possible extinction-level events that could strike even earlier: large meteors, supervolcanic eruptions, drastic climactic disruption of the “Snowball Earth” variety. As SpaceX founder and Tesla CEO Elon Musk recently observed on the Joe Rogan Experience podcast, “A species that does not become multiplanetary is simply waiting around until there is some extinction event, either self-inflicted or external.” This statement, applied to the human species, is obviously true on its face. As doomsday events go a giant asteroid might be more shocking, since we (people living today) have never experienced one before while concerned atomic scientists warn us about the nuclear bomb all the time, but the odds that we blow ourselves up are still there. Slim, but there. It’s more plausible that a severe nuclear war and the nuclear winter it would likely trigger would leave the human population greatly reduced as opposed to completely extinct, but then the question becomes: why is that a risk we would want to take? The bomb is here to stay for now, but there is no reason that 100% of known life in the universe needs to stay here on Earth to keep it company, waiting around for something even more destructive to show up. While we’re on that happy subject: Do you have any good intuitions about our collective chances against hostile, or simply arrogant or domineering, technologically-advanced extraterrestrial lifeforms, if and/or when they decide to pay us a visit on our home turf? These scary situation sketches will suffice. At bottom, the core reason I am a believer in the need to make life—and not just human life—multiplanetary is the same basic reason I would never counsel a friend to keep all their money and valuables in one place: diversification is good. Wisdom and experience suggest we store precious resources in multiple safe(ish) places. Diversification limits our exposure to risk, and increases our resilience when bad things do happen. One reserve gets hit, two or three others survive, and you probably feel that the effort to spread things out was worth it. What I’m saying here has strong undercurrents of common sense, yet our approach to the human population itself—the universal store and font of “human capital”—does not currently prioritize diversification to the degree our technological capabilities would allow. The distribution of the human population, and of almost all human knowledge and works, is overwhelmingly local. (Let us set to one side the possibility that aliens somewhere maintain an archive of captured human information.) Establishing outposts at least as large as those we maintain in Antarctica on the Moon and Mars, or other more suitable sites, by the end of this century would be a great first step toward genuinely diversifying the physical locations of the most precious resources known to us: human consciousness and creativity, human love and human soul, the great works in which all these things are displayed. Add also to this list repositories of scientific knowledge and knowhow, seed reserves, and certain materials necessary to re-start the manufacturing of fundamental technologies. Spreading these goods to a few additional locations within the solar system would be a major species-and-civilization-level accomplishment that all living at the time could feel satisfied by, and even take some pride in. And this is something that we seem to be just on the cusp of being able to do, given our recent and rapid technological advances in rocketry, computers, and materials science and engineering, among other important fields for space exploration and settlement. Quickly the uniplanetary human situation is becoming, if it is not already, one of pure choice.

#### Second, Russia—

#### Deep space exploration is a shared goal that prevents escalation of US-Russia tensions. But privatization threatens it independent of our other internal links

CSIS 18 [(Center for Strategic and International Studies), “Why Human Space Exploration Matters,” August 21, 2018 https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/space-cooperation] TDI

U.S.-Russian space cooperation continues to be a stated mutual goal. In April 2018, President Putin said of space, “Thank God, this field of activity is not being influenced by problems in politics. Therefore, I hope that everything will develop, since it is in the interests of everyone…This is a sphere that unites people. I hope it will continue to be this way.” During his statement at a recent event at CSIS, NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine said, “[space] is our best opportunity to dialogue when everything else falls apart. We’ve got American astronauts and Russian cosmonauts dependent on each other on the International Space Station, which enables us to ultimately maintain that dialogue.” The U.S. and Russia both benefit from the ISS partnership. Russia provides transportation to the ISS for U.S. astronauts, from which Russia receives an average of $81 million per seat on the Soyuz (and recognition of its status as a space power). The U.S. also benefits from Russia’s technical contributions to the ISS while Russia benefits The U.S. and Russia signed a joint statement in 2017 in support of the idea of collaborating on deep space exploration, including the construction of the Lunar Orbital Platform-Gateway, a research-focused space station orbiting the moon. Through agreements on civilian space exploration, such as the Lunar Orbital Platform-Gateway or future Mars projects, that have clear benefits to both sides, some degree of cooperation will remain in both countries’ interest. The high price tag for pursuing space exploration alone and opportunities for sharing and receiving technical expertise encourages international partnerships like the ISS.

However, at least three factors, apart from the overall deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations, threaten this cooperation. First, growth of the private sector space industry may alter the economic arrangement between the U.S. and Russia, and ultimately lower the benefits of cooperation to both countries. The development of advanced technologies by private companies will give NASA new options to choose from and reduce the need to depend on (and negotiate with) Russia. If NASA and its Russian counterpart, Roskosmos, have no need to talk with one another, they probably won’t in the face of tense political relations. The U.S. intends to use Boeing and SpaceX capsules for human spaceflight beginning in 2020, and a Congressional plan in 2016 set a phase out date of Russian RD-180 rocket engines by 2022.

#### NASA-RSA space cooperation critical to relations—no other executive agency or domestic company can compete with the interdependence illustrated

**Pedersen et al 95** [(Kenneth, Chairman Research Professor of International Affairs Georgetown University) “Issues in U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Space”, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, April 1995] kzheng

NASA has historically conducted international cooperation on a no-exchange-of-funds basis. Since 1992, however, foreign policy and national security interests have led to a significant departure from this precedent in NASA activities with Russia. The effects of this change on NASA and on the place U, S.-Russian space cooperation occupies in the overall U.S.-Russian relationship are discussed in this section. NASA payments to Russian entities, combined with directed procurements from Russian sources under NASA contracts with U.S. industry, will likely total nearly $650 million over the FY 1993-97 period: $400 million for space-station-related goods and services,19 at least $210 million for the initial dockingmechanism purchase and the FGB procurements, $16 million for two Bion biosatellite flights, and at least $10 million in smaller procurements of goods and services. These payments do not constitute assistance from NASA to RSA or to Russian space enterprises. The $400 million NASA-RSA contract covers at least seven Shuttle-Mir rendezvous and docking missions and up to 21 months of U.S. astronaut presence on Mir. NASA expects to gain fundamental experience in joint operations, including risk reduction, command and control, docking the shuttle with large structures in space, performing technology experiments, and executing a joint research program. The contract amount includes $20 million in support for jointly peer-reviewed Russian scientists’ proposals in all space-related disciplines and $25 million toward the cost of the FGB module being purchased by Lockheed from the Khrunichev Enterprise for use in the International Space Station. The FGB procurement by Lockheed, at a cost of $190 million, includes one unit and related services; NASA and RSA have agreed that RSA will contribute to NASA, at no cost, the FGB launch and all services not covered by the Lockheed contract, with the possible exception of some command-and-control software that may be needed.20 The procurements of the docking mechanism, the Bion flights, and other, minor goods and services all involve the use of unique Russian capabilities by NASA at a low cost compared with the cost of developing them indigenously. Nevertheless, no other executive branch agency is transferring funds to Russia at anything approaching this rate. U.S. government funds obligated for assistance to Russia through September 30, 1994, total something over $3 billion,21 but over a third of that total is for in-kind goods (food shipments, principally in FY 1993), and significant funds that were obligated have been lost because of failure to spend them in time. Of the remainder, almost all have been paid to U.S. consultants and other entities to conduct assistance activities in Russia. Meanwhile, other non-NASA executive branch spending in Russia has been relatively minor.22 At the September 1993 Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meeting, the United States committed $400 million of the NASA total payments to Russia when it agreed to involve Russia in the space station and to conclude an agreement on Russian access to the commercial space-launch market, in exchange for Russia’s agreement to terminate its transfer of cryogenic-rocket-engine technology to India. NASA funding is very important to the Russian space program. Inflation, the dramatic depreciation of the ruble, and conflicting data make it difficult to quantify this impact, but one senior RSA official said that RSA actually received R450 billion from the state treasury during 1994, about half its appropriation. Arguing for more state funding, he asserted that the total of all foreign agreements and contracts “represents just a fourth of our requirements.”23 However, at an average exchange rate of R3,000 = U.S.$1.00, the NASA/ RSA contract alone yielded nearly R200 billion over that period.24 Aside from direct and indirect payments to Russian entities, NASA is committing significant budget resources to expenditures in the United States that are directly related to Russian cooperation. The totals stated by NASA in its FY 1996 budget submission are listed in table 3-1. Each item identified in the table is contained within broader program or project line items in the NASA budget, and some of the amounts in the table, such as the $100 million per year for “Russian Space Agency Contract,” are included in the discussion of transfers to Russia above. In addition, the space station expenditures shown are subsumed within the $2.1 billion/year cap for space station spending.

#### It’s make or break for the relationship—Ukraine, decline of US moral authority on international affairs puts us at the brink of the end of Russian diplomacy and even war

Weir 21 [(Fred Weir has been the Monitor's Moscow correspondent, covering Russia and the former Soviet Union, since 1998. He's traveled over much of that vast territory, reporting on stories ranging from Russia's financial crash to the war in Chechnya, creeping Islamization in central Asia, Russia's demographic crisis, the rise of Vladimir Putin and his repeated returns to the Kremlin, and the ups and downs of US-Russia relations). “Worse than the Cold War? US-Russia relations hit new low.“ Christian Science Monitor 4-20-2021 https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2021/0420/Worse-than-the-Cold-War-US-Russia-relations-hit-new-low] TDI

Russia’s relations with the West, and the United States in particular, appear to be plumbing depths of acrimony and mutual misunderstanding unseen even during the original Cold War.After years of deteriorating relations, sanctions, tit-for-tat diplomatic expulsions, and an escalating “information war,” some in Moscow are asking if there even is any point in seeking renewed dialogue with the U.S., if only out of concern that more talking might just make things worse. Events have cascaded over the past month. Russia’s treatment of imprisoned dissident Alexei Navalny, who has been sent to a prison hospital amid reports of failing health, underlines the sharp perceived differences between Russia and the West over matters of human rights. Meanwhile, a Russian military buildup near Ukraine has illustrated that the conflict in the Donbass region might explode at any time, possibly even dragging Russia and NATO into direct confrontation. With its relations with Washington at a nadir, Russia is eyeing a more pragmatic, if adversarial, relationship with the U.S. in the hopes of getting the respect it desires. President Joe Biden surprised the Kremlin by proposing a “personal summit” to discuss the growing list of U.S.-Russia disagreements in a phone conversation with Vladimir Putin last week. He later spoke of the need for “disengagement” in the escalating tensions around Ukraine, and postponed a planned visit of two U.S. warships to Russia-adjacent waters in the Black Sea. But days later he also imposed a package of tough sanctions against Russia, for its alleged SolarWinds hacking and interference in the 2020 U.S. presidential elections, infuriating Moscow and drawing threats of retaliation. Last month, after Mr. Biden agreed with a journalist’s intimation that Mr. Putin is a “killer,” the Kremlin ordered Russia’s ambassador to the U.S. to return home for intensive consultations, an almost unprecedented peacetime move. Over the weekend, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov suggested that the acting U.S. ambassador to Moscow, John Sullivan, should likewise go back to Washington for a spell. On Tuesday, Mr. Sullivan announced he would do just that this week. And there is a growing sense in Moscow that the downward spiral of East-West ties has reached a point of no return, and that Russia should consider abandoning hopes of reconciliation with the West and seek permanent alternatives: perhaps in an intensified compact with China, and targeted relationships with countries of Europe and other regions that are willing to do business with Moscow. “Things are at rock bottom. This may not be structurally a cold war in the way the old one was, but mentally, in terms of atmosphere, it’s even worse,” says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a Moscow-based foreign policy journal. “The fact that Biden offered a summit meeting would have sounded a hopeful note anytime in the past. Now, nobody can be sure of that. A hypothetical Putin-Biden meeting might not prove to be a path to better relations, but just the opposite. It could just become a shouting match that would bring a hardening of differences, and make relations look like even more of a dead end.” Room for discussion Foreign policy experts agree that there is a long list of practical issues that could benefit from purposeful high-level discussion. With the U.S. preparing to finally exit Afghanistan, some coordination with regional countries, including Russia and its Central Asian allies, might make the transition easier for everyone. One of Mr. Biden’s first acts in office was to extend the New START arms control agreement, which the Trump administration had been threatening to abandon, but the former paradigm of strategic stability remains in tatters and requires urgent attention, experts say. “If you are looking for opportunities to make the world a safer place through reason and compromise, there are quite a few,” says Andrey Kortunov, director of the Russian International Affairs Council, which is affiliated with the Foreign Ministry. “There are also some areas where the best we could do is agree to disagree, such as Ukraine and human rights issues.” The plight of Mr. Navalny, which has evoked so much outrage in the West, seems unlikely to provide leverage in dealing with the Kremlin because – as Western moral authority fades – Russian public opinion appears indifferent, or even in agreement with its government’s actions. Recent surveys by the Levada Center in Moscow, Russia’s only independent pollster, found that fewer than a fifth of Russians approve of Mr. Navalny’s activities, while well over half disapprove. An April poll found that while 29% of Russians consider Mr. Navalny’s imprisonment unfair, 48% think it is fair. Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny, shown here during a hearing in the Babuskinsky District Court in Moscow Feb. 12, 2021, is in poor health amid his hunger strike while in prison in Russia. He was recently moved to a prison hospital. Tensions around the Russian-backed rebel republics in eastern Ukraine have been much severer than usual, with a spike in violent incidents on the front line, a demonstrative Russian military buildup near the borders, and strong U.S. and NATO affirmations of support for Kyiv. The Russian narrative claims that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy triggered the crisis a month ago by signing a decree that makes retaking the Russian-annexed territory of Crimea official Ukrainian state policy. Mr. Zelenskiy has also appealed to the U.S. and Europe to expedite Ukraine’s membership in NATO, which Russia has long described as a “red line” that would lead to war. But Russian leaders, who have been at pains to deny any direct involvement in Ukraine’s war for the past seven years, now say openly that they will fight to defend the two rebel republics. Top Kremlin official Dmitry Kozak even warned that if conflict erupts, it could be “the beginning of the end” for Ukraine. “This is a very desperate situation,” says Vadim Karasyov, director of the independent Institute of Global Strategies in Kyiv. “We know the West is not going to help Ukraine militarily if it comes to war. So we need to find some kind of workable compromises, not more pretexts for war.” Time to turn eastward? In this increasingly vexed atmosphere, the Russians appear to be saying there is no point in Mr. Putin and Mr. Biden meeting unless an agenda has been prepared well in advance, setting out a few achievable goals and leaving aside areas where there can be no agreement. “Russia isn’t going to take part in another circus like we had with Trump in Helsinki in 2018,” says Sergei Markedonov, an expert with MGIMO University in Moscow. “What is needed is a deeper dialogue. That could begin if we had a real old-fashioned summit between Biden and Putin, one that has been calculated to yield at least some positive results. We need to find a modus vivendi going forward, and the present course is not leading there.” Alternatively, Russia may turn away from any hopes of even pragmatic rapprochement with the West, experts warn. Mr. Lukyanov, who maintains close contact with his Chinese counterparts, says they felt blindsided at a summit with U.S. foreign policy chiefs in Alaska last month, when what they expected to be a practical discussion of how to overcome the acrimonious Trump-era legacy in their relations turned into what they saw as a U.S. lecture about how China needs to obey the “rules-based” international order. “It was the Chinese, in the past, who were very cautious about participating” in anything that looked like an anti-Western alliance, says Mr. Lukyanov. “We are hearing a new tone from them now. Now our growing relationship with China isn’t just about compensating for a lack of relations with the U.S. It’s about the need to build up a group of countries that will resist the U.S., aimed at containing U.S. activities and policies that are harmful to our two countries.”

#### Space weapons heighten potential for escalation and make perceptions of US-Russia space conflict key.

Alexey Arbatov et al, head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, a principal researcher at the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations and Peter Topychkanov, fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program, ‘17 “Russian And Chinese Perspectives On Non-Nuclear Weapons And Nuclear Risks” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications,* <https://www.russiamatters.org/sites/default/files/media/files/Entanglement_interior_FNL.pdf>

Against this background, Russian military and technical experts are currently engaged in efforts to elaborate strategies for fighting an air-space war. The following is an attempt to frame such an integrated doctrine by one of its main theoreticians, Colonel Yuri Krinitsky from the Military Air-Space Defense Academy: “The integration of aerial and space-based means of attack has transformed airspace and space into a specific field of armed conflict: an air-space theater of military operations. United, systematically organized actions of [U.S.] air-space power in this theater should be countered with united and systematically organized actions by the Russian Air-Space Defense Forces. This is required under the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation and Air-Space Defense Plan approved by the Russian president in 2006.”6 This document goes on to list the tasks of the Air-Space Defense Forces as “monitoring and reconnaissance of the airspace situation; identifying the beginning of an aerial, missile, or space attack; informing state organs and the military leadership of the Russian Federation about it; repelling air-space attacks; and defending command sites of the top levels of state and military command authorities, strategic nuclear forces’ groupings, and the elements of missile warning systems.”7 While picking apart in detail the organizational, operational, and technical aspects of the Air-Space Defense Forces (now part of the Air-Space Forces),8 military analysts step around the basic question of what constitutes “the means of air-space attack” (SVKN in Russian, MASA in English). This term and “air-space attack” are broadly used in official documents (including the Military Doctrine) and statements, as well as in the new names of military organizations (such as the Air-Space Forces), and in a seemingly infinite number of professional articles, books, and pamphlets. If MASA refers to aircraft and cruise missiles, then what does space have to do with it? To be sure, various military communication and intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance satellites are based in space, but these assets also serve the Navy and Ground Forces without the word “space” tacked onto their names. If MASA refers to long-range ballistic missiles, which have trajectories that pass mostly through space, then this threat is not new but has existed for more than sixty years. There was—and still is—no defense against a massive ballistic missile strike, and none is likely in the future in spite of U.S. and Russian efforts at missile defense. In the past (and possibly now), one of the possible tasks of ballistic missiles was to break “corridors” in the enemy’s air-defense system to enable bombers to penetrate it. But with ballistic missiles being armed with more warheads with improved accuracy, and with the advent of longrange air-launched cruise missiles, it is increasingly unnecessary for bombers to be able to penetrate enemy air defenses. Coordination between air and notional “space” systems has apparently moved to the background of strategic planning. Anyway, this tactic was never considered as air-space warfare before now. MASA may be used in reference to potential hypersonic boost-glide weapons, which are discussed below. But their role and capabilities are not yet known, so it would clearly be premature to build the theory of air-space war on them, and even more so to start creating defenses against them. In any case, referring to those weapons as MASA is farfetched: besides a short boost phase, their entire trajectory is in the upper atmosphere at speeds greater than airplanes but lower than ballistic missiles. It is, therefore, even less apt to describe such systems as space arms than it is to refer to traditional long-range ballistic missiles as such. Finally, as for theoretically possible space-based weapons that would conduct strikes against targets on the ground, at sea, and in the air, they do not yet exist, and their future viability is far from clear. Even if the concept of air-space war is ill-defined, the military and technical experts who propound it reach a predictable conclusion with regard to the capabilities needed to fight one. They typically argue that Russia needs “to counter the air-space attack system with an air-space defense system. . . . A prospective system for destroying and suppressing MASA should be a synergy of anti-missile, anti-satellite, and air-defense missiles, and air units, and radio-electronic warfare forces. And its composition should be multilayered.”9 Such calls are being translated into policy. Most notably, the air-space defense program, for which the military’s top brass and industrial corporations lobbied, is the single largest component of the State Armaments Program through 2020, accounting for about 20 percent of all costs when the program was first announced in 2011—about 3.4 trillion rubles ($106 billion at the time).10 Along with the modernization of the missile early-warning system by the development and deployment of new Voronezh-type land-based radars and missile-launch detection satellites, the program envisages the deployment of twenty-eight missile regiments of S-400 Triumph air-defense systems (about 450 to 670 launchers), and thirty-eight battalions equipped with the next-generation S-500 Vityaz (recently renamed Prometey) systems (300 to 460 launchers).11 In total, the plan is to manufacture up to 3,000 missile interceptors of the two types, for which three new production plants were built. A new integrated and fully automatic command-and-control system is being created to facilitate operations by the Air-Space Defense Forces. The Moscow A-135 missile defense system (now renamed A-235) is being modernized with non-nuclear kinetic interceptors to engage incoming ballistic missiles (previously the interceptors were armed with nuclear warheads).12 The current Russian economic crisis, which has resulted in defense budget cuts in fiscal year 2017, may slow down the air-space armament programs and the scale of arms procurement, but the underlying momentum will be unaffected unless stopped or redirected by a major change in Russia’s defense posture. In a sense, Russian policy may be explained by the visceral desire of the military to break out from the deadlock—the “strangulating effect”—of mutual assured nuclear destruction, which has made further arms development, high-technology competition, and supposedly fascinating global war scenarios senseless (indeed, it prompted U.S. and Soviet leaders of the 1970s and 1980s to agree that, as then U.S. president Ronald Reagan put it, “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”13) During the four decades of the Cold War, several generations of the Soviet military and defense industrial elite had learned and become accustomed to competing with the most powerful possible opponent, the United States, and such competition became their raison d’être. The end of the Cold War and of the nuclear arms race in the early 1990s deprived them of this supposedly glorious quest, and opposing rogue states and terrorists was not a noble substitute. U.S. and NATO operations in Yugoslavia and Iraq, however, provided a new hightechnology challenge, defined in Russia as air-space warfare, which was eagerly embraced as a new and fascinating domain of seemingly endless competition with a worthy counterpart. Besides, this new dimension of warfare doubtless gave the military and associated defense industries an opportunity to impress political leadership with newly discovered esoteric and frightening threats, justifying the prioritization of national defense, and hence arms procurement programs and large defense budgets. In any case, the Russian strategy for air-space war is directly connected to the problem of entanglement. Astonishingly—and this makes the concept look quite scholastic—its framers shed no light on the single most important question: Is the context for air-space war a global (or regional) nuclear war, or a non-nuclear war that pits Russia against the United States and NATO? If it is the former, then in the event of the large-scale use of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads (and in the absence of effective missile defense systems), the Russian Air-Space Forces would be unlikely to function effectively. Except for issuing warnings about incoming missile attacks, they would not be able to fulfill the tasks assigned to them by Russia’s Military Doctrine, including “repelling air-space attacks and defending command sites of the top levels of state and military administration, strategic nuclear forces’ units, and elements of missile warning systems.”14 Alternatively, if air-space war assumes a non-nuclear conflict, then the concept raises serious doubts of a different nature. Russian state and military leaders have regularly depicted terrifying scenarios of large-scale conflicts being won through non-nuclear means. Former deputy defense minister General Arkady Bakhin, for example, has described how “leading world powers are staking everything on winning supremacy in the air and in space, on carrying out massive air-space operations at the outbreak of hostilities, to conduct strikes against sites of strategic and vital importance all across the country.”15 It is difficult to imagine, however, that such a conflict, in reality, would not quickly escalate to a nuclear exchange, especially as strategic forces and their C3I systems were continually attacked by conventional munitions. Right up until the mid-1980s, the military leadership of the USSR believed that a major war would likely begin in Europe with the early use by Warsaw Pact forces of hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons “as soon as [they] received information” that NATO was preparing to launch a nuclear strike.16 After that, Soviet armies would reach the English Channel and the Pyrenees in a few weeks, or massive nuclear strikes would be inflicted by the USSR and the United States on one another, and the war would be over in a few hours, or at most in a few days, with catastrophic consequences.17 After the end of the Cold War, the task of elaborating probable major war scenarios was practically shelved because such a war had become unthinkable in the new political environment. However, strategic thinking on the next high-technology global war apparently continued in secret (and probably not only in Russia). Now, at a time of renewed confrontation between Russia and the West, the fruits of that work are finally seeing the light of day. In all likelihood, the authors of the strategy imagine that over a relatively long period of time—days or weeks—the West would wage a campaign of air and missile strikes against Russia without using nuclear weapons. Russia, in turn, would defend against such attacks and carry out retaliatory strikes with long-range conventional weapons. Notably, in 2016, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that “by 2021, it is planned to increase by four times the combat capabilities of the nation’s strategic non-nuclear forces, which will provide the possibility of fully implementing the tasks of non-nuclear deterrence.”18 In other words, the basic premise is that the U.S.-led campaigns against Yugoslavia in 1999 or Iraq in 1990 and 2003 (which are often cited by experts in this context) may be implemented against Russia—but with different results, thanks to the operations of the Russian Air-Space Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Navy against the United States and its allies. The emphasis on defensive and offensive strategic non-nuclear arms does not exclude, but—on the contrary—implies the limited use of nuclear weapons at some point of the armed conflict. Sergei Sukhanov, one of the most authoritative representatives of the defense industries as the constructor general of the Vympel Corporation, which is responsible for designing strategic defense systems, has exposed the whole panorama of Russia’s contemporary strategic logic on the interactions between offensive and defensive systems and between nuclear and non-nuclear systems: If we cannot exclude the possibility of the large-scale use of air-space attacks by the U.S. and other NATO countries (i.e., if we accept that the Yugoslavian strategy might be applied against Russia), then it is clearly impossible to solve the problem by fighting off air-space attacks with weapons that would neutralize them in the air-space theater, since this would require the creation of highly effective air- and missile defense systems across the country. Therefore, the strategy for solving the air-space defense tasks faced in this eventuality should be based on deterring the enemy from large-scale air-space attacks by implementing the tasks facing air-space defense in this eventuality at a scale that would avoid escalation but force the enemy to refrain from further airspace attack.19 (Emphasis added.) In other words, because of the inevitable limitations in Russia’s ability to defend against air-space attacks, Sukhanov argues that Russia may have to resort to the limited use of nuclear weapons in order to compel the United States and its allies into backing down. This basic logic is widely accepted in Russia. Judging by the available information, the United States does not have—and is not expected to have for the foreseeable future—the technological means or the operational plans to wage non-nuclear air-space warfare against Russia. However, the fact that a major war with the United States and NATO is *seen* in contemporary Russian strategic thinking as a prolonged endeavor involving an integrated technological and operational continuum of nuclear and non-nuclear operations, defensive and offensive capabilities, and ballistic and aerodynamic weapons creates a breeding ground for entanglement. The result could be the rapid escalation of a local non-nuclear conflict to a global nuclear war. The remainder of this chapter discusses how new and emerging military technologies might contribute to such an escalation.

#### It’s existential.

Owen Cotton-Barratt 17. PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute. 2-3-2017. “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance.” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter. According to one model 9, an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns. It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.

#### Privatization of space travel kills off public space exploration.

#### Two internal links—

#### First, tradeoff—

#### Space exploration must be public-sector – entrepreneurs purposely understate the barriers to colonization, yet exploit its potential for financial gain.

Phillips 20 [(Leigh, science writer and EU affairs journalist, author of Austerity Ecology & the Collapse-Porn Addicts.) “We Don’t Need Elon Musk to Explore the Solar System,” May 8, 2021, https://jacobinmag.com/2021/05/elon-musk-space-exploration-mars-colonization] TDI

He opens the paper with a recognition that, at some point, if we stay on Earth, we will confront an eventual extinction event. “The alternative is to become a spacefaring civilization and a multi-planetary species.” He alights upon Mars as the obvious first option for establishing a “self-sustaining city — a city that is not merely an outpost, but which can become a planet in its own right.” He rejects Venus due to it being, as he correctly puts it, a super-high-pressure, hot acid bath. He rejects Mercury due to it being too close to the Sun, and the Moon for lack of atmosphere and its twenty-eight-day “day” (a Martian day, or “sol,” for comparison, is an Earthling-friendly 24.5 hours). And he rejects, at least for now, the moons of Jupiter or Saturn, as they are much harder to get to. Mars has more than its own share of habitability issues, but Musk does not mention them, other than to say that, while Mars is “a little cold” (in reality, -63ºC, or -81ºF, compared to Earth’s balmy 16ºC, or 57ºF), “we can warm it up.” The Martian atmosphere is “very helpful” because it’s primarily CO2, with some nitrogen and argon, meaning that “we can grow plants on Mars just by compressing the atmosphere.” Most cheery of all, Musk says it would be “quite fun” to be on Mars, because the gravity is about 38 percent that of Earth, making it easy to lift heavy things and “bound around.” Mars, as seen from space. (WikiImages via Pixabay) It’s all so simple. “We just need to change the populations because currently we have seven billion people on Earth and none on Mars.” And so the paper is primarily devoted to explaining how to solve that sole problem: how to lower the cost of a trip to Mars from the current roughly $10 billion per person down to the median cost of a house in the United States. By making rockets reusable, refilling in orbit, producing propellant on Mars, choosing the right propellant, and improving system design and performance, Musk reckons he can get the cost of a ticket down to $200,000, perhaps as little as $100,000. And Musk’s SpaceX has done a tremendous job so far of sharply reducing the cost of escaping Earth’s gravity well, primarily via deep vertical integration of the firm. It produces a whopping 70 percent of its components in-house, as opposed to the 1,200 different suppliers in the outsourced supply chain of its main competitor, the Boeing–Lockheed Martin partnership known as the United Space Alliance. Each of these suppliers extracts their own profit margin from every contract in the chain, jacking up the cost per launch to $460 million. SpaceX, by comparison, charges NASA and its other clients just $62 million per launch, and Musk says he has slashed the marginal cost of a reused Falcon 9 booster launch to a mere $15 million. Well done, Elon. Or, rather, well done to all the engineers, logistical experts, and other workers who have done most of the labor, allowing SpaceX to revolutionize the business model of getting to space. There is not really any mention of the enormous challenges of the atmosphere’s low pressure and toxic composition, the preponderance of deadly perchlorates in the soil, or the lack of magnetosphere to protect against solar and cosmic radiation. The current atmosphere of Mars is too thin to support most life: its pressure is only about 1 percent that of Earth. Only hypopiezotolerant microbes (those that live in low-pressure environments), such as ones that are lofted by winds into Earth’s stratosphere, would be able to survive. The atmosphere is also 95 percent carbon dioxide — fine for plants (if the pressure were able to be raised) but not for animals. Musk does say that once Mars is warmed up, “we would once again have a thick atmosphere and liquid oceans.” Bioremediation using bacteria to clean up perchlorates already occurs on Earth, but we are talking about an entire planet here. There is no discussion of how any of this might happen, over what time period, and who would pay for it. Same with the construction of an artificial magnetosphere. Dealing with the perchlorates alone would likely be profoundly more challenging and expensive than the relatively straightforward process of decarbonizing Earth’s economy. A 2018 NASA study found that there is insufficient CO2 and H2O from the Martian soil, polar ice caps, and minerals in the upper crust to get anywhere close to thickening the atmosphere and using it like a blanket to warm up the planet. All these sources combined would still only boost the pressure to about 7 percent of that of Earth. Carbon-bearing minerals deep in the crust might have enough CO2 to achieve the needed pressure, but nothing is known about their extent, and recovering them with current technology would be colossally energy intensive. Another idea is to direct comets or asteroids to crash into Mars and release their greenhouse gases that way. Again, these are fantastical ideas that will be impractical for many, many generations yet to come. NASA astronauts in space. (NASA) And there is likely no way of ever overcoming Mars’s low gravity. If you added all the mass of Venus to that of Mars, smashing the planets together, even then, you would still not quite achieve Earth’s gravity. It is true that we do not know what the physiological effects of 38 percent of Earth’s gravity are, either on humans or other life. We have two data points: Earth gravity, what we call 1G, and the 0G microgravity of the International Space Station (ISS). But from studies of astronauts who have spent extended periods aboard the ISS, we know that 0G is extremely bad for human health. Muscles atrophy. Tendons and ligaments begin to fail. Facial and finger muscles, which cannot be worked out via onboard gyms or treadmills, weaken. The spine lengthens, with astronauts gaining an inch or two in height and suffering from back pain. Bones demineralize, losing density at a rate of 1 percent per month. As Christopher Wanjek, a former NASA science writer and author of 2020 book Spacefarers — which is an optimistic volume on the viability of manned space travel — notes: “To visualize how bad that bone loss is, consider the fact that the major obstacle to fully recycling urine into drinking water on the ISS is that the filters get clogged daily with calcium deposits.” Wanjek writes how the rate of vision loss is such that a crew to Mars would need to pack eyeglasses with various prescriptions for “each phase of their gradual, inevitable, and permanent vision loss.” Kidneys get confused by blood not being where it’s supposed to be and think there is an excess, so they start to remove what they believe to be excess water. The blood thickens, driving a reduced production of red blood cells, which in turn drives anemia, shortness of breath, lethargy, and greater likelihood of infection. Perhaps worst of all, brain compression resulting from microgravity negatively impacts regions responsible for fine motor movement and executive function — deteriorations that could be permanent. A range of interventions, including exercise, drugs, and compression clothing can shave the sharp edges off some of these effects, but ultimately, the solution on a spacecraft is the simulation of gravity via centrifugal force — a spinning ship. This is not something that you can do with a whole planet. It is for this reason that Venus, with its gravity not too far off that of Earth, may actually be a better terraforming candidate than Mars — one day — despite its currently inhospitable atmosphere. The Real Business of SpaceX Isn’t Mars One has to suspect that Musk knows all this. We have a hint of this when, at one point in his paper, Musk concedes that it will be difficult to fund his vision just by slashing the cost of getting to space. He admits that SpaceX expects to generate substantial cash flow from launching lots of satellites and servicing the International Space Station for NASA. Additional help for bankrolling the Mars project might come from the emergence of a market for really fast transportation of things or people around the world by rocket: cargo could be transported anywhere on Earth in forty-five minutes, and a trip from New York to Tokyo could take a mere twenty-five minutes (so long as takeoff and landing takes place where the tremendous noise, as he puts it in hip-CEO-speak, “is not a super-big deal”). As a result, one gets the impression by reading between the lines that a self-sustaining Martian city is all just an impressive marketing maneuver taking advantage of most people’s sense of adventure and wonder; of our species’ ancient need to wander and explore. The real business of SpaceX was never a Martian colony but rather servicing a mature satellite market, stealing government space contracts from the likes of Boeing, and kicking off a terrestrial rocket transport sector. The dream of Mars is, in this case, not really any different from the adman’s fiction of romance and aspiration that sells a can of Pepsi or a Jeep. The dream of Mars is, in this case, not really any different from the adman’s fiction of romance and aspiration that sells a can of Pepsi or a Jeep. None of this is to suggest that establishing an outpost on Mars for the purposes of scientific exploration should not be attempted, even in the next couple of decades. But an outpost, as Musk himself makes clear, does not approach a self-sustaining city, and still less a multi-planetary species. Because humans do need to exit Earth at some point in order to maintain the species, if we are to establish genuinely self-sustaining colonies, then terraforming will likely be necessary one day, as well as interstellar generation ships that take us to habitable exoplanets far beyond the solar system. For all of this, we will have to figure out how to take our ecology with us. We are not really the collection of individuals we thought we were, but rather are deeply embedded within our ecosystems. Indeed, each of us is a microbial ecosystem whose edges are vague. Where does the bacterial, fungal, and viral multitude that is “me” stop and my equally microbiological environment begin? This does not mean that Earth will be the only home we ever have, but it does mean that the antiseptic, forestless, riverless Starship Enterprise would leave its inhabitants very sick before too long. How much of our ecology do we need to take with us, though? We just don’t know yet. The science of ecology is very much still a young discipline. This is where fantastical science-fiction conceptions of vast ships made from hollowed out asteroids and packed with different biomes fills the gap of what we do not know. Likewise for novels like Becky Chambers’s To be Taught, if Fortunate, in which, instead of terraforming other worlds, adapting them to our needs, we genetically alter our bodies via “somaforming” to adapt ourselves to their conditions. Plainly, then, there is no rush for any of this, even as there is a moral imperative for us, one day in the distant future, to permanently exit Earth. Our colonization of other worlds is akin to the building of the grandest cathedral we have ever envisaged: a project that will take centuries, or more likely millennia, many millennia. This is nothing that a private company can deliver. There is no near-term return on investment; indeed, there is no aim of profitability at all, but rather of our species’ survival through the eons.

#### Privatization of space travel makes it politically polarizing and drains public support.

Phillips 20 [(Leigh, science writer and EU affairs journalist, author of Austerity Ecology & the Collapse-Porn Addicts.) “We Don’t Need Elon Musk to Explore the Solar System,” May 8, 2021, https://jacobinmag.com/2021/05/elon-musk-space-exploration-mars-colonization] TDI

Elon Musk is right to dream of humanity’s future as a multi-planet species. However, the multigenerational, millennia-long project of space colonization will be a public-sector endeavor, or it will not happen. Elon Musk, the third-richest man in the world, CEO of SpaceX and Tesla (and dabbler in online edgelord provocation), issued a strange Twitter post last month in defense of his wealth. “I am accumulating resources to help make life multiplanetary & extend the light of consciousness to the stars,” he declared. And then, this week, the centibillionaire further provoked when he mentioned in an interview about Martian colonization that, while it would be a glorious experience, “a bunch of people will probably die in the beginning.” All this within days of NASA’s Perseverance Mars mission achieving the first helicopter flight on another planet and producing five grams of oxygen from the planet’s carbon dioxide–dominant atmosphere — two major milestones in space exploration. A reasonable critique of Musk’s SpaceX endeavors might begin by noting that, regardless of how noble an aim Musk may have for his centibillions, there simply should not be centibillionaires (or even regular millionaires and billionaires). One might also echo Neil Armstrong’s criticism of private space flight — a criticism that once made Elon cry when 60 Minutes asked him about his hero arguing against the privatization of space. We might note how space exploration during the Cold War, despite the militarist overtones of the Space Race, was explicitly intended to be for all mankind rather than in service of the jollies of ultrarich space tourists. A democratic and public redirection of Elon Musk’s billions might be spent differently. One might further assert that, given the non-identity of the set of all things that are beneficial and the set of all things that are profitable, space colonization will be a public-sector endeavor, or it will not happen — as such a private space travel has no near-term, medium-term, or even long-term prospect of any return on financial investment beyond servicing low-earth, medium-earth, or geostationary orbit. And, finally, we might denounce the union-busting at Musk’s factories or even argue that his “accumulation of resources” is less the product of his own efforts than it is primarily an upward redistribution of value created by his workers. That is to say that there are a raft of progressive critiques of Musk that could be made that nevertheless still value space exploration and, one day, human colonization of the cosmos. Indeed, if one values space exploration and looks forward to the time, as astronomer Carl Sagan put it, “when most human cultures will be engaged in an activity you might describe as a dandelion going to seed,” then a socialist critique is all the more necessary, given the irrational limitations markets impose on human endeavor. There are a raft of progressive critiques of Elon Musk that could be made that nevertheless still value space exploration and, one day, human colonization of the cosmos. But instead, there are thousands of snark-drenched tweets sneering at how crackpot, masculinist, and even childish Elon’s dream is. They argue that space travel is a waste of resources that would be better spent solving problems here on Earth, and that space colonization is a repetition of the colonization of the New World. Even Bernie Sanders responded to Musk by saying: “Space travel is an exciting idea, but right now we need to focus on Earth and create a progressive tax system so that children don’t go hungry, people are not homeless and all Americans have healthcare. The level of inequality in America is obscene and a threat to our democracy.” At the time of writing, the senator’s tweet had received some 95,000 likes. Bernie is, in this case, wrong. Space exploration, including space travel, is one of the grandest tasks humanity has ever set for itself. It is a false dichotomy — and an austerian one at that — to say that we do not have enough money for both a space program and social justice or environmental protection. We can more than afford to do both. NASA’s budget is but a fraction of the Pentagon’s. It should not be difficult to imagine a democratic socialist economy, or even just one a little less neoliberal, that permits much more space and much less war. We can have public health care and science. We can end homelessness and explore the cosmos. We can have unionized, family-supporting jobs for all and, one day, almost certainly some considerable time from now, colonies on other worlds. The Postcolonial Space Programs Let me offer a personal anecdote about how I came to change my mind about this. A few years ago, I was researching the space programs of developing nations in Sub-Saharan Africa and South America for a feature article for a science magazine. While I have always been a cheerleader for space science, I had heard that, in some cases, the states concerned did not really have the capacity for such activities and were doing little more than rebranding British or American satellites launched from Russian spaceports. I thought I would have a nice story of neoliberal regimes wasting what little money these countries had on vanity projects that were of dubious national provenance. So I got in touch with some of the British and American engineers that had worked on these projects and interviewed them off the record. To varying degrees, they conceded that this was more or less what was happening in some places, but not in others, where a country was more advanced and did have at least some of the capacity necessary. Off the record, they told stories of corruption and incompetence, delays and malfunctions. But they also said that there was a learning process and there absolutely was a transfer of skills and knowledge. It was a mixed bag, they said. It is a false dichotomy — and an austerian one at that — to say that we do not have enough money for both a space program and social justice or environmental protection. More than this, what told me that made me completely rethink my attitude toward developing world space programs. They said that, however much they might have questioned the priority given to a space program for a country without functioning roads or sewage systems, everywhere they went, when they said why they were in the country, ordinary people would respond by bursting with pride that their country, too, was going into space. For them, it symbolized that they were just as good as any developed nation, that modernity was coming, and that they, too, could be explorers and pioneers. I put away my story and never wrote it. Instead, I investigated the decline of mathematical training in Africa in the neoliberal era. During the postcolonial era, African socialist governments had been committed to developing a cadre of professionals schooled in advanced mathematics and science, sometimes with the assistance of the Soviet Union, sometimes with aid from the United States or France, depending on the contingencies of the Cold War. But the indifference that followed the end of the Cold War and the advent of neoliberalism had gutted such training, and now, in many countries, the aging, mathematically trained professionals were retiring or dying with no one to replace them. Such training is essential not just for scientific research but for civil engineering, national budgeting, and enterprise planning. Thankfully, a celebrated physicist, Neil Turok — also the son of the man who crafted the South African ANC’s armed struggle strategy, Ben Turok — had started a new institute expressly committed to reviving Africa’s mathematical capacity. I wrote about that instead. We can today spend on both space exploration and mathematics education — and we could have in the 1960s. We don’t only need charity, but we need vaulting ambition as well: not just social programs but science. Or, put another way: we want bread, but we want roses, too. How Venus Helped Us Understand Global Warming But even if Bernie made an unwittingly neoliberal argument by imagining there is not enough wealth in America to afford both an ambitious space program and luxuriant social programs, he did at least state that he thought space travel was exciting. It was a matter of prioritization rather than outright opposition. There were others, however, who attacked the very idea of going into space, not least at a time of climate emergency. We should focus on this living planet rather than unfathomably distant dead ones, they said. This is not a one-off; Left critics of space programs repeatedly issue calls for a focus on the environmental challenges Earth faces instead of going to space. But this is a second false dichotomy. Space science, in so many respects, is Earth science. NASA is perhaps the premier Earth science research agency in the world. Its Landsat program, originally named the Earth Resources Technology Satellite and dating back to 1972, is the longest running effort to deliver satellite imagery of the planet. Its latest iteration, Landsat 8, launched in 2013 and delivers millions of images free of charge to researchers or any member of the public, tracking forest loss and degrowth, glacier and icecap melt, land-use change and agricultural water use. Left critics of space programs repeatedly issue calls for a focus on the environmental challenges Earth faces instead of going to space. But space science, in so many respects, is Earth science. Then there is AIRS, the Atmospheric Infrared Sounder, on NASA’s Aqua satellite, which gathers infrared energy emitted from Earth’s surface and atmosphere and measurements of temperature and water vapor that are used to assess the accuracy of climate models, detect volcanic plumes, and forecast droughts. The Geostationary Carbon Observatory (GeoCarb), yet to launch, will monitor greenhouse gas emissions, and the Ice, Cloud and land Elevation Satellite-2 (ICESat-2) mission will measure ice-sheet elevation, sea-ice thickness, and tree-canopy height to track changes in Greenland and Antarctica ice and assess changes in the total mass of the world’s vegetation. As of 2021, there are some forty different current and soon-to-launch Earth science missions performed by NASA. When we send missions to other worlds, again, learning about them teaches us as much about Earth as they do about the Moon, Mars, Venus, Europa, Titan, or Enceladus. Let’s remember that climatologist James Hansen — whose 1988 congressional testimony on global warming was one of the main catalysts of early public and political awareness of the climate emergency — had his start studying the transfer of radiation through the Venusian atmosphere. It was his work investigating Venus — a planet with a runaway greenhouse effect — that led him to work on climate change on Earth. Indeed, the study of the atmospheres of both Venus and Mars is a key part of the story of how we discovered global warming. Robots vs. Humans One might respond that all of this is unmanned space exploration. Surely steady advances in robotics and miniaturization have weakened the case for manned spaceflight. Robots like the Perseverance rover (nicknamed Percy), which recently landed in Jezero Crater on Mars aiming, among other goals, to search for evidence of ancient microbial life, are much more able to access extreme environments inhospitable to humans and at a much lower cost. But while there are many things robots can do that humans cannot, there are also many things humans can do that robots cannot and will never be able to (at least until the advent of artificial general intelligence). As British planetary scientist Ian Crawford argues, humans have the advantage over robots with respect to on-the-spot decision-making and flexibility and thus increased probability of making serendipitous discoveries. There is also greater efficiency of sample collection and return with humans (382 kg of moon rocks returned by Apollo vs the 0.32 kg from the sample returns of the Soviet Union’s robotic Luna missions), and greater potential for large-scale exploratory activity, deployment, and maintenance of complex equipment. But it is the universal problem-solving capability of humans that is key. Crawford quotes Steve Squyres, the principal investigator for the Mars exploration rovers Spirit and Opportunity, who concluded in 2005: “The unfortunate truth is that most things our rovers can do in a perfect sol [a Martian day] a human explorer can do in less than a minute.” An artist’s rendering of the Perseverance rover on Mars. (Tim Tim / Wikimedia Commons) And we see this in the scientific literature. Comparing the number of refereed publications resulting from the Apollo moon missions (the only human exploration missions) with those from robotic missions to the Moon and Mars, Crawford finds the former has produced a much greater volume. Dividing the cumulative number of publications by days of fieldwork on the surface, Crawford gauges that the Apollo project was three orders of magnitude more efficient in producing scientific papers per day than its unmanned counterparts, while being about one or two orders of magnitude more expensive. He notes that the next most productive missions are the Luna sample return missions. This shows how important sample return is, and indeed, one of Percy’s goals is to collect rock and regolith (“soil”) samples that, at some point in the early 2030s, will be retrieved by a “fetch rover” mission and sent back to Earth via a Mars Ascent Vehicle, a miniature rocket whose design has yet to be agreed. One of the main reasons robotic missions have been cheaper is that they do not return. The return mission thus bumps up the cost. But the quantity and diversity of samples will not be as high as a human mission could deliver. He is keen to stress that none of this should downplay the importance of robotic Martian sample return, which is necessary until humans can safely be sent to Mars and back. The point is to correct the erroneous notion that manned space missions are merely white elephants servicing national pride in contests with geopolitical rivals such as the USSR or China but have no real scientific purpose. Even though the priority should be, and very much is, on robotic exploration, we will learn more if we do both over time than if we depend upon robotic exploration alone. Robots enhance rather than replace human exploration. The Prison of the Possible One might then argue, nevertheless, that, given the exorbitant cost of space travel, whether by human, robot, or satellite (a robot of a sort), we should still, as Bernie’s tweet stated, focus instead on hunger, homelessness, and health care on Earth. Prioritization of spending will always be necessary, but a strictly utilitarian approach that demands we cannot spend on large scientific endeavors until poverty and inequality are eradicated would likewise have to rule out other big-ticket but curiosity-driven science efforts such as the Large Hadron Collider. Indeed, it also follows that any scholarship that is not applied research with a demonstrably near-term human benefit should be halted until all other problems are solved, expensive or not. Of course, applied research would sooner or later come to a halt as well under such a utilitarian research regime as, by definition, applied research is an application of basic research. Those in the seventeenth century who thought, “Isn’t it kind of neat and weird that when I rub a piece of amber against a cat’s fur, the amber can pick up a feather? I wonder why this is,” had no notion that any investigation into the phenomenon of what we now call electricity would one day result in applications that power much of the world. And the demand that we only engage in activities with clear utility requires that all resources allocated to art and music be shifted elsewhere. How like the university administration philistines we see today slashing humanities funding to deliver more to STEM subjects, mothballing language courses and classics programs!

#### Second, debris—

#### Privatized space tourism increases collision risks due to orbital debris.

Tehrani 4/1 [(James, Editor in Chief of Spark Magazine) “Space Junk: A Safety and Sustainability Problem Moving at 18,000 MPH,” April 1, 2021, <https://sphera.com/spark/space-junk-a-safety-and-sustainability-problem-moving-at-18000-mph/>] TDI

Most of the current debris is found in the low Earth orbit (LEO), which is about 600 to 1,200 miles (1,000 to 2,000 kilometers) above the planet. NASA calls LEO an “orbital space junkyard.” The junk isn’t sitting idly in a landfill; it is moving around at speeds up to 18,000 mph (29,000 kph), or 23 times the speed of sound. While the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee was designed to coordinate space debris efforts, there are currently no international laws in place regarding removing space debris. Since a single satellite can cost between $50 million and $400 million, the risk of damage from space debris to a satellite is clearly significant. And as more debris is left behind, there is obviously more risk of collisions, especially when space tourism picks up. The orbiting junk was explored in the 2013 film “Gravity,” starring George Clooney and Sandra Bullock; it’s known as the Kessler Effect. Don Kessler, the former NASA scientist who studied space debris even told the Guardian back in 2011 in regard to formulating a plan to deal with space junk: “The longer you wait to do this, the more expensive it’s going to be. … This scenario of increasing space debris will play out even if we don’t put anything else in orbit,” he said. On that point, the European Space Agency has contracted with a Swiss startup called ClearSpace that plans to launch its first mission to remove space debris in 2025. The Gravity of the Situation Without a doubt, space debris is an Operational Risk; even the International Space Station has to dodge space junk at times. Former NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine even tweeted last September that the “Space Station has maneuvered 3 times in 2020 to avoid debris. In the last 2 weeks, there have been 3 high concern potential conjunctions. Debris is getting worse!” Some of the larger debris that doesn’t burn up re-entering the atmosphere (about one object per day) even crashes back on Earth. Since most of the Earth’s surface is covered in water, it’s not surprisingly that most of the junk winds up in oceans, so the risk to humans is statistically very low. That doesn’t mean nil though. For example, there is debris from Russian Proton rockets that has been found in Siberia, including that of old fuel tanks containing toxic fuel residue, which can be harmful to plants, animals and humans. The environmental risks of space junk need to be explored further. A piece of space junk floating through the ocean is certainly not nearly as concerning as our plastic problem, but it’s nothing to ignore either. LCA Leads the Way Just as more and more companies are assessing the Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) of their products and services from cradle to grave on Planet Earth, it stands to reason that LCA could be just as important in outer space. That’s especially true when you consider space tourism is poised to blast off to become a potential $1.5 billion industry by 2028. The more activity, the more debris.

#### Increased space debris makes future space exploration impossible

Webb 18 [(Amy Webb is a professor at the NYU Stern School of Business and is the chief executive of the Future Today Institute, a strategic foresight and research group in Washington, D.C.), “Space Oddities: We Need a Plan to Stop Polluting Space Before It’s Too Late” WIRED Science April 12, 2018 https://www.wired.com/story/we-need-a-plan-to-stop-polluting-space-before-its-too-late/] TDI

Space is our next dumping ground. As many as 170 million fragments of metal and astro debris necklace Earth. That includes 20,000 pieces larger than a softball, and 500,000 about the size of a marble, according to NASA. Old satellites, like Tiangong-1, are the biggest and highest-profile lumps of rubbish, but most of it comes from rocket parts and even lost astronaut tools. Size doesn’t always matter—a fleck of paint, orbiting at a high velocity, cracked the Space Shuttle's windshield. This debris will pose a navigation hazard for many centuries to come. At least 200 objects roar back into the atmosphere each year, including pieces of solar panels and antennas and fragments of metal. All of them pose dangers for future astronauts: One plum-sized piece of gnarled space trash traveling faster than a speeding bullet could rip a five-foot hole into a spacecraft. And that collision, then, would hatch its own spectacle of shrapnel, which would join the rushing river of junk already circling the planet. It’s not just Americans doing the dumping. China and Russia each have dozens of decommissioned satellites overhead, though the US certainly does it with style. Like everyone, I marveled at the successful launch of SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy rocket, whose cargo included Elon Musk’s Tesla Roaster and a mannequin driver named Starman. I’ll admit, I teared up listening to David Bowie as the rockets separated from the payload. It was an incredible technological achievement, one proving that the system could someday transport people and goods—perhaps real cars, and real people—into space. Now that Tesla and its driver are overhead, in America’s junkyard in the sky. To be sure, space is big. Really big. Most debris soars about 1,250 miles above the Earth’s surface, so you have better odds scoring a seat on Virgin Galactic’s maiden voyage than witnessing Starman crash into your next door neighbor’s house. But it’s our behavior back here on Earth—our insistence on sending things up, without really thinking how to safely contain or send them back down—that should concern you. We weren’t always so short-sighted. Ancient Native Americans lived by the Seventh Generation Principal, a way of long-term thinking that considered how every decision would affect their descendants seven generations into the future. In Japan, Buddhist monks devoted part of their daily rituals and work to ensuring the longevity of their communities, even planting and tending to bamboo forests, which would eventually be harvested, treated and used to repair temple roofs many decades hence. With each new generation, we live life faster than our ancestors. As a result, we spend less time thinking about the farther future of humanity. We now have our sights set on colonizing Mars, mining asteroids for research and commerce, and venturing out to the furthest reaches of our galaxy. Space is no longer the final frontier; we’re already exploring it. Our current approach is about getting there, rather than considering what “getting there” could mean for future generations of humans, not to mention other life in the universe. Where all that junk winds up isn’t something we can predict accurately. We could be unintentionally wreaking havoc on civilizations far away from Earth, catalyzing future intergalactic wars. Or, we might cause far less scintillating problems. Space junk could start to behave in unpredictable ways, reflecting sunlight the wrong direction, or changing our atmosphere, or impacting the universe in ways that don’t fit into our current understanding of physics. Last week—30 years after my friends and I created an imaginary net to capture space debris—SpaceX launched RemoveDEBRIS, its own prototype, an experimental net to collect junk in orbit. It’s a neat idea, but even as middle schoolers, we knew it was an impractical one. Individual nets can’t possibly scale to address the hundreds of millions of particles of debris already in orbit. The challenge is that all of our space agencies are inextricably tied to national governments and militaries. Seeking a global agreement on how to mitigate debris would involve each country divulging exactly what it was launching and when—an unlikely scenario. The private sector could collaborate to build grand-scale orbital cleaners, but their commercial interests are driven by immediate launches. Given all the planned launches in our near future, we don’t have much time to wait. We must learn to be better stewards of our own planet—and commit to very long-term thinking—before we try to colonize any others.

#### Independently, debris causes great power war.

Orwig 16 [(Jessica, senior editor at Insider. She has a Master of Science in science and technology journalism from Texas A&M University and a Bachelor of Science in astronomy and physics from The Ohio State University.) “Russia says a growing problem in space could be enough to spark a war,” January 26, 2016, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-says-space-junk-could-spark-war-2016-1] TDI

NASA has already warned that the large amount of space junk around our planet is growing beyond our control, but now a team of Russian scientists has cited another potentially unforeseen consequence of that debris: War. Scientists estimate that anywhere from 500,000 to 600,000 pieces of human-made space debris between 0.4 and 4 inches in size are currently orbiting the Earth and traveling at speeds over 17,000 miles per hour. If one of those pieces smashed into a military satellite it "may provoke political or even armed conflict between space-faring nations," Vitaly Adushkin, a researcher for the Institute of Geosphere Dynamics at the Russian Academy of Sciences, reported in a paper set to be published in the peer-reviewed journal Acta Astronautica, which is sponsored by the International Academy of Astronautics. Say, for example, that a satellite was destroyed or significantly damaged in orbit — something that a 4-inch hunk of space junk could easily do traveling at speeds of 17,500 miles per hour, Adushkin reported. (Even smaller pieces no bigger than size of a pea could cause enough damage to the satellite that it would no longer operate correctly, he notes.) It would be difficult for anyone to determine whether the event was accidental or deliberate. This lack of immediate proof could lead to false accusations, heated arguments and, eventually, war, according to Adushkin and his colleagues. A politically dangerous dilemma In the report, the Adushkin said that there have already been repeated "sudden failures" of military spacecraft in the last two decades that cannot be explained. "So, there are two possible explanations," he wrote. The first is "unregistered collisions with space objects." The second is "machinations" [deliberate action] of the space adversary. "This is a politically dangerous dilemma," he added. But these mysterious failures in the past aren't what concerns Adushkin most. It's a future threat of what experts call the cascade effect that has Adushkin and other scientists around the world extremely concerned. The Kessler Syndrome In 1978, American astrophysicist Donald Kessler predicted that the amount of space debris around Earth would begin to grow exponentially after the turn of the millennium. Kessler 's predictions rely on the fact that over time, space junk accumulates. We leave most of our defunct satellites in space, and when meteors and other man-made space debris slam into them, you get a cascade of debris. The cascade effect — also known as the Kessler Syndrome — refers to a critical point wherein the density of space junk grows so large that a single collision could set off a domino effect of increasingly more collisions. For Kessler, this is a problem because it would "create small debris faster than it can be removed," Kessler said last year. And this cloud of junk could eventually make missions to space too dangerous. For Adushkin, this would exacerbate the issue of identifying what, or who, could be behind broken satellites. The future So far, the US and Russian Space Surveillance Systems have catalogued 170,000 pieces of large space debris (between 4 and 8 inches wide) and are currently tracking them to prevent anymore dilemmas like the ones Adushkin and his colleagues cite in their paper. But it's not just the large objects that concern Adushkin, who reported that even small objects (less than 1/3 of an inch) could damage satellites to the point they can't function properly. Using mathematical models, Adushkin and his colleagues calculated what the situtation will be like in 200 years if we continue to leave satellites in space and make no effort to clean up the mess. They estimate we'll have: 1.5 times more fragments greater than 8 inches across 3.2 times more fragments between 4 and 8 inches across 13-20 times more smaller-sized fragments less than 4 inches across "The number of small-size, non-catalogued objects will grow exponentially in mutual collisions," the researchers reported.

### AC – Solvency

#### States should end commercial space exploration and tourism, ruling that they violate its non-appropriation obligations under the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and its succeeding treaties.

Cooper 8 [Cooper, Nikhil D. "Circumventing Non-Appropriation: Law and Development of United States Space Commerce." Hastings Const. LQ 36 (2008): 457.] TDI

The latest piece of congressional legislation regulating the commercial space industry was the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA) 77 that was spurred on in part by the host of new technologies capable of commercially exploiting space. 78 The CSLA streamlined the earlier space-launch bureaucracy and mandated the DOT to issue licenses for all commercial space launch programs, 79 regulate forms of space tourism8 and space advertising, 8 ' impose minimum liability insurance and financial responsibility requirements, and82 provide for administrative and judicial review of DOT Secretariat decisions.83 Il. A Legal System? The CSLA represents the most recent and comprehensive United States space commerce legislation; but, in the years since its passage, no one has seriously questioned its consistency with United States international obligations of "non-appropriation." The issue is especially apt now, however, because the current and future capacities of commercially exploiting space seem primed to challenge non-appropriation as the guiding theme in space commerce. Therefore, the question we must ask now is whether or not the United States is circumventing the intent of non-appropriation by encouraging and protecting private commercial expansion into space. A. Treaties Versus Congressional Acts Whether the regulatory regime outlined in the CSLA conflicts with the national non-appropriation principle, as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and in its succeeding treaties, is an issue that could be reviewed by the federal judiciary under its constitutional grant of subject-matter jurisdiction over cases "arising under" treaties.8 4 The judiciary's power to interpret treaties is a power distinct from the treaty-making authority delegated to the executive and legislative branches. Article II of the United States Constitution authorizes the president to ratify treaties with the consent of two-thirds membership of the Senate. 5 Treaties entered into in this manner are the supreme law of the United States and bind state constitutions, legislatures, and judiciaries.8 6 Generally, courts employ distinct methods of interpretation when called on to perform the separate but related tasks of interpreting treaties and resolving treaty-statutory disputes. As to the former, courts generally will liberally construct a treaty "to give effect to the purpose which animates it" and will prefer that liberal construction "[e]ven where a provision of a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting, the other enlarging [of] rights which may be claimed under it."87 A preference for broad construction, however, is not a license for courts to impose any interpretation they deem appropriate. For example, although courts have a greater ability to construct treaties more broadly than private contracts, they are still precluded from interpreting a treaty beyond the "apparent intent and purport" of its language.88 in this way, determining a treaty's "intent" delineates the boundaries of how broadly or narrowly the court may interpret a treaty's provision. Courts obviously have a much easier time determining a treaty's intent where the treaty language is unambiguous. In these instances, courts expressly forbid looking beyond the language of the treaty to supply the intent of the parties at the time the treaty was drawn.89 When the language of the treaty is ambiguous, however, the court will attempt to effectuate the drafter's intent through a broader inquiry into "the letter and spirit of the instrument," and may take into account "considerations deducible from the situation of the parties; and the reasonableness, justice, and nature of the thing, for which provision has been made." 90 The United States Supreme Court summarized its interpretive process in the case Eastern Airlines Inc., v. Floyd: When interpreting a treaty, [begin] "with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used." 91 [When confronted with difficult or ambiguous passages, the Court provided that] [o]ther general rules of construction may be brought to bear[.] [And it finally noted that] treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties. 92 Treaty interpretation as described above is important when determining whether the treaty conflicts with an act of Congress. Each being the supreme law of the land, treaties and congressional acts are governed by the last-in-time rule: when they conflict, courts must privilege the last enacted treaty or congressional act over the other. 93 Still, federal courts often avoid finding such conflicts between congressional acts and treaty obligations. As Justice Marshall opined in 1804: [A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country. 94 Supreme Court jurisprudence since has largely followed the same presumption and, therefore, courts are inclined to harmonize treaties and congressional legislation that are seemingly antithetical to one another. 95 In the event that a congressional act were to supplant United States treaty obligations, courts would look for unambiguous evidence appearing “clearly and distinctly" in the text of the statute or treaty provision. 96 In other words, repeals of prior statutes or treaty provision must likely be made express. In contrast, "repeals by implication" are generally disfavored "unless the last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and, therefore, to displace the prior statute. 97 B. CSLA Versus the Outer Space Treaty Both being duly enacted, the CSLA and the Outer Space Treaty are considered the supreme law of the land. If there is a conflict between the United States space commerce provisions as outlined in the CSLA and the Outer Space Treaty, a reviewing court would first be called upon to interpret the intent of the treaty itself. Recall that in the context of treaty interpretation, a court would be at liberty to give the treaty a broad construction to effectuate its intent. The key provision of the Outer Space Treaty at issue would be the language of Article II which forecloses "national appropriation" of space by claims of sovereignty, means of use, occupation, or any other means.98 Black's Law Dictionary defines "appropriation" as "the exercise of control over property, a taking of possession." 99 If defined broadly enough, the joint enterprise nature of the United States space commerce, as implemented in the CSLA, might violate the "spirit" of non-appropriation as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The best argument one could make against the CSLA's provisions is to advocate the court to broadly interpret the "appropriation" principle of the Outer Space Treaty. The proponent of this argument would urge that in so doing, a court should look beyond the words of the treaty and examine the history, negotiations, and practical considerations at the time of the treaty's negotiation to determine its true intent. 100 One would also want to argue that the space commerce industry violates perhaps not the "letter" of the treaty, but circumvents entirely its "spirit" if a court were taking into account "considerations deducible from the situation of the parties; and the reasonableness, justice, and nature of the thing, for which provision has been made."' 01 One who attacked the CSLA's general legitimacy in this way could argue that the United States is effectively "appropriating" space through its protection and encouragement of private industry. Such an appropriation would take place not by realizing a "sovereign" right to space property or the uses of space as expressly proscribed in the Outer Space Treaty, but, instead, through the effective use of government power, services, and contracts to encourage and support the rapid development of the private space commerce industry in the United States. In essence, the result of such government encouragement might not amount to wholesale sovereign appropriation, but, at the very least, a kind of sovereign and private space activity that would cast doubt on whether the non-appropriation principle is actually being respected. Therefore, one arguing that such activities were tantamount to sovereign appropriation would highlight the interrelatedness of government and private industry and argue for a broad interpretation of "appropriation" that encompassed the practical effects of such a relationship. In addition to the regulatory interaction between the CSLA and private space commerce industries, the interrelatedness between government and private industry is clearly illustrated by the interaction between CSLA and the 1972 Liability Convention. Recall that the Outer Space Treaty and its progeny envision a "state-oriented" system of responsibility 10 2 where each member state is responsible for all actions in outer space undertaken by the state and its nationals. 10 3 The Liability Convention further binds member states by holding each strictly liable for its actions or the actions of its nationals within outer space and permits only member states to petition for remuneration under the terms of the treaty. 1 04 In its text, the CSLA cites to such international obligations,'0 5 while also mitigating the United States' liability under the Liability Convention. 0 6 The CSLA licensing program ensures overall safety of private space ventures, 0 7 raises the funds necessary to pay "potential treaty claims through its liability insurance requirement,' 10 8 and limits the United States' joint and several liability exposure through restricting private use of foreign launch and reentry facilities.'09 These provisions effectively allow the United States to pass on the financial cost and recover from their private entities the amount of damages for which they are internationally liable. 110 In this way, the government is limiting its international liability exposure by passing on the cost to the private sector. When highlighting the further interrelatedness between government and private industry, one could also note that the United States government holds something of a monopoly in launch services and currently requires that decisions regarding commercial space-launch must be approved through the CSLA. 1' In addition, one making this argument would want to highlight the highly interdependent nature of investment flowing from government to private space commerce: in a February 4, 2008 press release, NASA Deputy Administrator Shana Dale justified the agency's 2009 budget request of $17.6 billion by claiming that "[t]he development of space simply cannot be 'all government all the time[]' . . . . NASA's budget for [fiscal year] 2009 provides $173 million for entrepreneurs-from big companies or small ones-to develop commercial transport capabilities. . . [and] NASA is designating $500 million toward the development of this commercial space capability." 2

#### A public-private partnership solves none of the aff – market dynamics and hiring competition mean the two sectors are zero sum.

Davenport 2/25 [(Christian, Reporter covering NASA and the space industry, Colby College, B.A., American Studies), “As private companies erode government’s hold on space travel, NASA looks to open a new frontier,” February 25, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/02/25/nasa-space-future-private/] TDI

The four astronauts who will fly on a SpaceX mission by the end of the year will be a bunch of private citizens with no space experience. One’s a billionaire funding the mission; another is a health care provider. The third will be selected at random through a sweepstakes, and the last seat will go to the winner of a competition. In the new Space Age, you can buy a ticket to orbit — no need to have been a fighter pilot in the military or to compete against thousands of other overachievers for a coveted spot in NASA’s astronaut corps. In fact, for this mission, the first composed entirely of private citizens, NASA is little more than a bystander. It does not own or operate the rocket that will blast the astronauts into space or the capsule they will live in for the few days they are scheduled to circle Earth every 90 minutes. NASA has no say in selecting the astronauts, and it will not train or outfit them — that will all be done by Elon Musk’s SpaceX. The money to pay for the flight also will not come from NASA — or any other government account. The cost of the project is being borne by a billionaire, Jared Isaacman, who has set it up as a fundraiser for St. Jude’s Research Hospital and a promotional device for his business, Shift4Shop, which helps businesses set up websites and process payments. This is the new look of human space exploration as government’s long-held monopoly on space travel continues to erode, redefining not only who owns the vehicles that carry people to space, but also the very nature of what an astronaut is and who gets to be one. And it comes as NASA confronts some of the largest changes it has faced since it was founded in 1958 when the United States’ world standing was challenged by the Soviet Union’s surprise launch of the first Sputnik into orbit. Now it is NASA’s unrivaled primacy in human spaceflight that is under challenge. Thanks to NASA’s investments and guidance, the private space sector has grown tremendously — no entity more than SpaceX, which according to CNBC is now worth $74 billion. The commercial space industry is taking on ever more roles and responsibilities — flying not just cargo and supplies to the International Space Station, but even NASA’s astronauts there. The private sector will launch some of the major components of the space station NASA wants to build in orbit around the moon, and private companies are developing the spacecraft that will fly astronauts to and from the lunar surface. Space enthusiasts, including NASA, see enormous benefit in the shift — a new era of space exploration that will usher in a more capable and efficient space industry. But the changing dynamic also has left NASA, which for decades has set the pace for the American space project, with an uncertain role, a development NASA’s Safety Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel warns could have consequences for years to come. The growth of companies like SpaceX has "tremendous upside potential — and are accompanied by equally tremendous challenges for managing the risk of human space exploration,” it said in its annual report, released last month. “NASA leadership in human space exploration is still preeminent, but the agency’s role is evolving with critical implications for how risk and safety will be managed.” So far, NASA has done well “as it shifts from principally executing its programs and missions to commercially acquiring significant key elements and services,” it said. But as the agency continues to evolve, “NASA must make some strategically critical decisions, based on deliberate and thorough consideration, that are necessary because of their momentous consequences for the future of human space exploration and, in particular, for the management of the attendant risks.” In an interview, Steve Jurczyk, NASA’s acting administrator, said the agency is well aware of how its identity and role are changing, and he likened the agency’s role to how the U.S. government fostered the commercial aviation industry in the early 20th century. NASA’s predecessor, NACA, or the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, “did research, technology development to initially support defense … but also later on supporting a burgeoning commercial aircraft industry and aviation industry,” he said. “So that may be how we evolve, moving forward on the space side. We’re going to do the research and the technology development and be the enablers for continuing to support the commercial space sector.” NASA has not ceded all ground. It still leads major exploration and science programs that no company could match. Last week, for example, it landed a rover the size of a car on Mars, hitting a precise landing target after traveling nearly 300 million miles. Later this year, it is scheduled to launch the James Webb telescope, which is designed to look back in time to the origins of the universe. And it also recently snagged a sample of rocks and soil from an asteroid 200 million miles from Earth to return them to Earth for study. “NASA works," Rob Manning, the chief engineer at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, said after the Perseverance landed safely on Mars. “When we put our arms together and our hands together and our brains together, we can succeed. This is what NASA does.” Those big, daring, push-the-envelope missions is where NASA’s future lies, agency and industry officials agree. Not in looking for financial gain, but blazing the trail and opening new frontiers, and then allowing private industry to take over in the way homesteaders expanded into the West. Within NASA, there is still some resistance to that paradigm shift. “NASA feels like that’s our domain,” said Phil McAlister, NASA’s director of commercial spaceflight. “And my response is, the solar system is a big place. We at NASA should always be doing the next thing, the thing where the profit motive is not as evident and where the barriers to entry are still too high for the private sector to really make a compelling business case.” Jan Worner, the outgoing general director of the European Space Agency, agrees. “I believe space agencies have to change,” he said in an interview. “If you are fixed permanently to the same thing that you did in the past, you will lose.” But NASA officials are concerned that much of the future workforce is going to be attracted to a growing number of commercial companies doing amazing things. There is Planet, for example, which is putting up constellations of small satellites that take an image of Earth every day. Or Relativity Space, which is 3-D printing entire rockets. Or Axiom Space, which is building a commercial space station. Or Astrobotic, which intends to land a spacecraft on the moon later this year. The question NASA faces, then, is an urgent one: “How do you maintain that NASA technical expertise?” Jurczyk said. The agency does not know. “It may mean people are hiring more midcareer from industry or having people come to NASA, then go to industry, and come back. Or a different model where maybe you’re not coming to NASA and staying for your 35-, 40-year career,” he said. “We’re still thinking through that.” The workforce predicament was not on NASA’s mind when it embarked on this road in 2006. That is when it awarded relatively small contracts to see whether the private sector could develop spacecraft capable of taking cargo to the International Space Station. At the time, SpaceX, which won an award, was largely unknown and on the verge of bankruptcy, with just one successful flight to orbit for its Falcon 1 rocket after three failures. Outside of what Musk once called “the weird rebels within NASA,” few thought the program would work. It was not taken seriously by the mainstream aerospace industry or even by NASA’s leadership. “Let’s just give these annoying commercial people enough money so that they can fail, and we can say, ‘That was dumb. We don’t have to do that again,'” Musk once told The Washington Post. But it did work. And now NASA is relying on the private sector not only to deliver supplies and science experiments to the surface of the moon, but also its most precious cargo — its astronauts — there. Turning over human spaceflight to the private sector was a line many thought NASA would never cross. But l

ast year, SpaceX successfully flew two crewed missions to the space station, and Boeing, the other company with the human spaceflight contract, is hoping to fly its first later this year. NASA has been eager to build on that success and hire private-sector companies to build and operate the spacecraft that would take astronauts to and from the surface of the moon. And while NASA’s flagship rocket, the Space Launch System, would be used to fly astronauts to the moon and be the most powerful ever built, it has suffered all sorts of cost overruns and technical delays. A test of its engines that was supposed to last as long as eight minutes was cut short after just one because of a technical problem. And the redo of the test was recently postponed by NASA, which said it was looking into a problem with one of the valves. Recently, the NASA inspector general said the total cost of the rocket would reach $27 billion through 2025. That enormous cost has outraged critics of the space program, who have derided the effort as little more than a jobs program for select congressional districts and dubbed it the “Senate Launch System.” Recently, the Bloomberg editorial board called for the Biden administration to “scrap the Space Launch System,” asking, “Why is the U.S. government building a space rocket?” “No doubt, the era of government spacefaring had its glories,” the editorial read. “But space is now a $424 billion business, with U.S. companies at its forefront. The new administration should embrace this revolution — and bring the power of private enterprise to bear in crossing the next cosmic frontier.” Some high-level NASA officials, including former NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine, have indicated that if the commercial sector can develop lower-cost alternatives, the space agency would have no choice but to consider those instead. NASA has already shifted one major mission from SLS — recently it announced that a commercial rocket, and not SLS, as Congress had mandated for years, would launch the Europa Clipper spacecraft that would study Jupiter’s moon. That alone would save NASA “over $1.5 billion compared to using an SLS rocket,” according to NASA’s fiscal year 2021 budget request. NASA has always relied on contractors to build its hardware — from the Apollo lunar module built by Grumman to the space shuttle, built largely by North American Rockwell. But NASA defined the precise requirements, took ownership of the spacecraft and operated them. That is not the case with many of its programs today. It works alongside the companies to validate their rockets and spacecraft and ensure they meet the agency’s safety standards. But the hardware and the launch procedures remain in private hands. The private astronaut mission, dubbed Inspiration4, marks the next iteration in this transition. Isaacman, the billionaire founder and chief executive of Shift4Shop, a payments technology company, paid an undisclosed sum for the SpaceX flight. Isaacman, an accomplished pilot, will occupy one of the four seats. Another will go to Hayley Arceneaux, a 29-year-old physician assistant at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital. The third is to be raffled off as part of a fundraising effort for the hospital. And the fourth seat will go to the winner of a competition among entrepreneurs who use Shift4Shop’s platform. Isaacman has donated $100 million to St. Jude and hopes the fundraising effort will match that. “We will, of course, coordinate this with NASA,” Musk said on a call with reporters earlier this month to discuss the mission. “NASA has been briefed on this and is supportive.” But it will be SpaceX and the crew that will determine the flight parameters and training requirements, not NASA. “Wherever you want to go, we’ll take you there,” Musk said to Isaacman on the call. Meet the people paying $55 million each to fly to the space station That mission will be followed by a second flight made up entirely of civilians — three wealthy business executives, who are each paying $55 million, in addition to the commander, Michael Lopez-Alegria, a former NASA astronaut who now serves as a vice president at Axiom. Instead of spending a few days inside SpaceX’s Dragon spacecraft, which has about as much interior room as a large SUV, they will fly to the International Space Station. They will spend eight days there before flying back. Ultimately, Axiom’s goal is even bigger — to build a space station of its own. The ISS is getting old and will need to come down at some point. NASA has said that it would eventually get out of the space station business — and outsource that to the private sector as well. Axiom is one of the leading candidates to build the successor. If Axiom is successful, it could then proceed to its ultimate goal: charter missions of private citizens, flying on private rockets to a private space station with little to no involvement from NASA.

### AC — Framing

#### The standard is minimizing suffering.

#### 1. Government policy is constrained by limitations on resources. Any government decision must account for tradeoffs, which only utilitarian ethics can quantify.

#### 2. Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. People consistently regard pleasure and pain as good reasons for action, despite the fact that pleasure doesn’t seem to be instrumentally valuable for anything.

Moen 16 [(Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo) “An Argument for Hedonism,” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281, <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10790-015-9506-9>] TDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable.** **On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues.** This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have.** “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so**, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but **for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable.** You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” **If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.**3 As Aristotle observes**: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.**”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### Moreover, *only* pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.

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I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, **I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable.** Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, **there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values** that counts in hedonism’s favor**: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain.** To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, **wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly.** **Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after.** To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if **the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain** (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), **then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts.** **The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists.** The challenge can be phrased as the following question: **If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?**27

#### 3. Making impactful contributions demands causal policy relevance AND methodological pluralism -- that is the only way to draw accurate contextual conclusions and prevent violent, imprecise reification.

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I want to reiterate that I am not arguing that scholarship that is formal or quantitative is by definition irrelevant. Indeed, one can point to examples of both that are. When applied to economic issues, the discipline of economics has managed to be both highly “scientific” and, at times, quite relevant, though for both good and ill. Likewise, there are examples of highly quantitative political science that policymakers have found useful.1 Finally, there is much nonquantitative scholarship, particularly but not exclusively in the humanities that, is jargon laden and otherwise inaccessible to a wider audience, including government policymakers.2 This is by no means an anti-social science methods screed, just a reminder of the tensions between rigor and relevance that need to managed rather than assumed away. Nor is this in any way a brief against theory. Former State Department official Roger Hilsman reminded us that everyone, including policymakers, uses theory. Paraphrasing John Maynard Keynes, he concluded that “it seems obvious that all thinking involves notions of how and why things happen. Even the ‘practical’ man who despises theory has a number of assumptions and expectations which lead him to believe that when certain things are done, certain results follow.. . .It is this ‘theory’ that helps a problem solver select from the mass of facts surrounding him those which he hopes are relevant.”3 Given that, I fully associate myself with Hans Morgenthau’s balanced view that “theory without verification is metaphysics, but empiricism without theory is aimless.”4 Since policymakers implicitly use theory in analyzing situations and assessing their alternatives, such theories should be stated explicitly and analyzed systematically, which is a comparative advantage of the scholars. Instead, what I offer is simply a critique of the increasing tendency of many social scientists to embrace methods and models for their own sake rather than because they can help us answer substantively important questions. This inclination is in part the result of the otherwise normal and productive workings of science, but is also reinforced by less positive factors such as organizational self-interest and intellectual culture. As a result of the latter, many political scientists have committed themselves to particular social science methods not so much because they believe they will illuminate real-world policy problems but because they serve a vested interest in disciplinary autonomy and dovetail with a particular image (mathematized and model-based) of what a “science” of politics should look like. In other words, the professionalization of social science is the root of the enduring relevance question. This tendency to equate rigor with technique imposes costs on the rest of society as well as the discipline, especially when it excludes a more balanced approach to rigor and relevance of the sort that characterized the subfield of security studies in the past. On the former, as diplomat George Kennan rightly observed, policymakers need academic expertise because they have to make decisions about issues and areas of the world “about which they cannot be expert and learned.”5 They depend on the academy for the raw data—whether quantitative or historical—that they use in decision making. They also rely on the social sciences for the theories they use to analyze and make sense of this data. The problem with relying exclusively on in-house government research to make up for the lack of policy-relevant academic research is that it is often of low quality. The role of the “independent policy analyst” is essential for three reasons: 6 He or she can challenge basic policy assumptions. As RAND’s Hans Spier put it, they can undertake “research which does not necessarily take the mission of the military for granted and admits the possibility U.S. may be wrong”7 And academic social scientists are particularly well suited to this role by virtue of the fact that they both conduct research and also teach future policymakers. Academics have some other advantages over policymakers. They have the time to develop greater depth of knowledge on issues and regions than most policymakers can. The institution of tenure also gives them, at least in theory, the freedom to explore controversial issues and take unpopular stands. And while peer review can homogenize and narrow scholarship, it also plays an indisputably positive role in advancing it. Finally, university-based scholars have less of a vested interest in certain policies and programs than do policymakers, though of course that is not to deny that they have their own institutional interests and biases.9 I am not suggesting, of course, that scholars would make better policy than bureaucrats and elected officials. They lack inside knowledge, have little actual power, and are often politically out of step with the rest of American society.10 They also come to policy issues with a markedly different intellectual orientation than policymakers.11 Rather, my point is simply that our democratic political system depends on the successful functioning of the marketplace of ideas and checks and balances in which individuals and groups with various strengths and weaknesses and offsetting biases participate in the larger policy debate, thereby compensating for each other’s limitations.12 We run into trouble when we lack one of these perspectives in policy debates. Indeed, there are instances—the war in Vietnam and the recent Iraq War—in which had the majority consensus of scholars in academia influenced policy, the country’s national interest would have been better served. As the flawed Iraq War debate demonstrates, our nation’s marketplace of ideas is bankrupt, particularly in national security affairs.13 Of course, our political problems run much deeper than just the Beltway/Ivory Tower gap, but closing it would represent an important step in the country’s intellectual recapitalization. This nation’s universities need to reclaim their place as one of society’s main sources of independent ideas about the problems that it faces.14 Less widely recognized, and perhaps more controversial given the prevailing sentiments in the Academy for a sharp distinction between “science” and “policy,” is my contention that the growing gap is ultimately bad for the generation of new knowledge. There are at least two reasons why greater attention to policy relevance produces better scholarship. First, it leads to more realistic theorizing. As John Kenneth Galbraith warned his economics colleagues nearly forty years ago, “No arrangement for the perpetuation of thought is secure if that thought does not make contact with the problems that it is presumed to solve.”15 Second, a focus on manipulatable variables makes it more likely that they are testable because the analyst can ensure variation on them. Also, the hyperspecialization of knowledge today makes it difficult for even scholars in related disciplines to understand each other, much less the general public. Such intellectual fragmentation makes the application of scholarly knowledge to policymaking extremely difficult. Therefore, a deeper and more regular engagement between the Ivory Tower and the Beltway will be mutually beneficial for both sides.16 Ultimately, even the most sophisticated social science will be judged by what it tells us about things that affect the lives of large numbers of people and which policymakers therefore seek to influence and control.17 The recurrent congressional debates about National Science Foundation funding for political science highlight the direct costs to the discipline of not being able to justify itself in terms of broader impact on the rest of society. Harkening back to the debate about the Mansfield Amendment, an article in Science cautioned that “to the extent that the research community disdains work on major national missions or behaves self-servingly in mission-oriented work, anti-intellectualism will increase its influence on the fate of American science.”18 Also, public and philanthropic community support for investment in academia generally reflects the belief that it will produce work that will speak to problems of broader importance. When the academy fails on that score, it can undermine that support.19 Political science’s subfield of international security studies can plausibly claim to save large amounts of money and even lives and so its increasing marginalization is a self-inflicted wound on the discipline. Response to Objections There are at least eight reasonable, though ultimately unpersuasive, objections to my argument that we should consider. First, some point to the influence of the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) on the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations as evidence that one of the most scientific of social science theories in international relations was both useful and influential among policymakers.20 The argument that democracies are unlikely to go to war with each other gained currency among social scientists based on statistical analysis of every major interstate war since 1815. In the words of Rutgers political scientist Jack Levy, the Democratic Peace Theory is “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.”21 Two scholars argued that the theory became relevant outside of the academy precisely “because of the law-like status of a particular empirical finding.”22 Others hold it up as a model of how basic research in political science can contribute to policymakers.23 It is not clear, though, that the influence of the DPT on recent U.S. foreign policy was due to its unassailable social scientific standing. While former Defense Department official and Ohio State political scientist Joseph Kruzel conceded that DPT “had substantial impact on public policy,” he attributed its attractiveness to policymakers to its simplicity rather than its social scientific rigor.24 It clearly identifies America’s enemies (nondemocratic states) and prescribed a simple response to them (make them democratic). It is also likely that the much less methodologically sophisticated articulation of the theory in the work of Michael Doyle was far more influential.25 And the process by which DPT entered the Clinton White House did not involve sophisticated social science. Rather, the key administration proponent of the democratic peace was National Security Advisor (and former college professor) Anthony Lake.26 It is clear, however, that to the extent that Lake was drawing support for the democratic peace from academic sources, it was not from statistically based research, but rather from the qualitative work of scholars like Harvard’s Samuel Huntington.27 The results of a survey of senior national security policymakers found that more than half of those familiar with the methodologically sophisticated democratic peace theory reported not being influenced by it in their government work.28 Finally, one could argue that U.S. policymakers have embraced the democratic peace because of its compatibility with our political culture rather than its scientific standing.29 A second, and in some ways, flip side of the first critique, is that the relevance problem with contemporary security studies is the result of the subfield’s domination by realism, and particularly its most abstruse and theoretical manifestation, neorealism.30 Critics point particularly to neorealist arguments that tout the virtues of nuclear proliferation as examples of theoretically elegant but politically unacceptable social science.31 Despite its respectability among scholars, neorealist proliferation optimism has reportedly had little influence on actual policy.32 While that particular policy issue may not have been influenced by realist thinking, as this book has shown realists have remained committed to policy relevance at times when the rest of the discipline has eschewed it. And they have more often been on the right side of policy debates as well.33 A third potential challenge to my argument is that many social scientists believe that they should avoid offering policy recommendations in favoring of focusing on basic research tasks such as identifying empirical regularities and offering generalizations to explain them.34 As Dartmouth political scientist Kalman Silvert warned, “It is not the legitimate role of the social scientist as scholar to advocate specific courses of governmental action or to act as implementer of government decisions.”35 Another rationale is that doing so is unnecessary given that the applied implications of basic research tend to trickle down by themselves.36 Policy engagement—particularly offering explicit policy recommendations—is both unwise and unnecessary in the view of many social scientists. Neither of these views, however, are shared by policymakers. Most believe that in addition to providing basic research findings, “scientists must explicitly define the linkage, whether immediate or remote, of the knowledge acquired or being acquired, to specific operational problems and continually assess the import of such knowledge to solution of the problems.”37 Nor are current and former policymakers sanguine about the trickle-down (or bubble-up in which senior policymakers get the results of scholarly work through their methodologically savvy staffs) process. As John K. Plank of the Brookings Institution, a former DoD official, recollected, “There is presumably a process whereby the research product is filtered up to [senior policymakers], but in point of fact very little of operational usefulness is transmitted.”38 Fourth, some political scientists believe that there are now so many new outlets for scholars to engage in the policy debate, it is both easier for them to do so and also unnecessary for them to concern themselves with doing so in their scholarship.39 Academics can now publish basic research in scholarly venues and then disseminate its applied implications through the new media. George Washington political scientist and blogger Marc Lynch effused that with the rise of the new media “this is in most ways a golden age for policy-relevant public spheres.”40 Indeed, many see the proliferation of new media outlets as the answer to political science’s perennial problem: its diminished public profile.41 The assumption here is that political scientists are simply not communicating their results effectively. There are three problems with these arguments: Until recently, we had no idea whether blogs and other new media reached policymakers. As one optimist conceded, we have “no solid statistics” on our impact.42 But we do now and it suggests that blogs and other new media are in fact not an important source of information for policymakers and therefore are unlikely to effectively convey the implications of basic research to policymakers, the media, or the general public.43 Moreover, even if a few blogs get some attention, many others do not, simply making more noise in an already cacophonous marketplace of ideas.44 And suggesting that the failure of communication argument misses the mark, Social Science Research Council president Craig Calhoun noted that scholarly “engagement with public constituencies must move beyond a dissemination model” that assumes that “pure research” will naturally triclde down, even with better communication.45 In other words, it is not the medium that matters as much as the message. And the message must be made more intelligible and useful to policymakers and the general public. Finally, there is systematic evidence that academic bloggers and scholars who utilize other new media venues receive little professional credit for them in the critical areas of promotion and tenure.46 In short, despite the explosive growth of new media outlets, professional incentives still do not encourage scholars to use them. A fifth conceivable objection is that advanced social science techniques and basic research will eventually become more useful to policymakers as they (or at least their staffs) become more sophisticated in their understanding of them. One optimist, for example, noted that most graduate public policy schools now include one or two required courses in economics and social science methods in their curricula. As these increasingly methodologically savvy young bureaucrats become senior policymakers, so this argument goes, they will be more adept at using them and more appreciative of their policy relevance.47 However, this argument assumes that training in advanced research techniques is a recent development. Policy schools, however, have long had methods courses as part of their required curriculum. Even prior to this, many national security policymakers came out of academic Ph.D. programs in which they were exposed to the latest innovations in social science methodology. It also ignores that the security studies subfield played a leading role in developing many of these sophisticated social science techniques, particularly at RAND in the 1950s.48 An example of the reverse flow of ideas from the policy world to the Academy was the “unquestionably” leading role that RAND mathematicians and other social scientists played in the development of game theory, a mathematical framework for strategizing under uncertainty.49 Despite early enthusiasm, many at RAND concluded that game theory had an Achilles Heel in its application to national security policy: how to assign the numerical values that were to be plugged into its formulas. That was not a trivial limitation, which led Hitch to confess that “for our purposes, Game Theory has been quite disappointing.”50 It also assumes that today’s aspiring policymakers come away from these methods courses with an unqualified appreciation of their usefulness. My experience after ten years in teaching in such schools, and familiarity with the evaluations students give these courses, leaves me skeptical. They often do not see the usefulness of such courses and suspect they are being forced to take them for academic, not professional, reasons.51 Other colleagues at professional schools share this impression.52 Finally, an earlier survey of current and former national security policymakers reveals that the more highly educated the policymaker, the greater the skepticism about their utility.53 This is consistent with the argument that familiarity with advanced techniques instills greater appreciation not only for their promise but also their limits. Even proponents of modern social science methods in international relations concede that “the emerging science of international relations has a long way to go before it can be of direct use to policy makers.”54 It is hard to find much evidence that the most sophisticated approaches to international relations are of much direct use to policymakers, and there are ample reasons for caution about how much of the discipline’s “basic” research is really trickling down to indirectly influence policymakers. Sixth, some point to the post-9 /11 resurgence of interest among younger social scientists as a harbinger of another renaissance of interest in policy relevance. Others suggest that changes in the nature of the “new paradigm of knowledge production,” which is “socially distributed, application-oriented, trans-disciplinary, and subject to multiple accountabilities” constitute grounds for optimism about a broader return to relevance among the social sciences.55 To be sure, there are reasons for optimism on this score but also for continuing caution. As we have seen, previous periods of optimism about answering the relevance question have given way to disappointment. Moreover, many scholars have claimed to be policy relevant even though policymakers did not find them so.56 As one CIA analyst warned, “Social scientists commonly define policy-relevant research far more broadly than the foreign policy community does.”57 A seventh potential criticism of my argument is there are other forms of “relevance” beyond just influencing government policymakers by offering policy recommendations to which scholars should aspire.58 Especially in a democratic political system, a scholar’s vocation for politics can also involve educating students and informing the wider public about pressing issues of policy. Moreover, an engaged scholar could serve with nongovernmental and private organizations rather than just through government service. While there is no doubt that policy influence is broader than just affecting government policy, that is ultimately the goal of the enterprise, either directly through policymakers or indirectly through the media or the public. Moreover, it is the clearest and most demanding standard of relevance available. So if we want to understand when and how social science matters to policymakers that is the most important, if not the only, aspect of it to consider.59 Finally, many political scientists share Daniel Drezner’s view that economics has solved the relevance question in being both rigorous and relevant. 60 The logical implication of such a belief is that the rest of social sciences should follow that discipline’s lead in terms of its approach and methodology. This economics envy is based on a misapprehension that academic trends in economics have not also created a relevance problem. For example, a recent review of research at the World Bank by leading academic economists raised questions about how much of the scholarship of bank analysts that was written for publication in academic journals was of any use to the bank.61 Their answer was not much. They blamed intellectual trends in the discipline because it encouraged research that was “too academic, too focused toward the previously existing academic agenda, and too directed towards technical rather than pressing policy issues.”62 Behind this economics envy lies an even deeper inferiority complex visa- vis the natural sciences. Many social scientists believe that the physical sciences have two advantages over the “softer” social sciences: more reliable data and a consensus on how to analyze it. Quantifiable data, in this view, is more persuasive, because it is clearer and less subject to dispute.63 This view of the superiority of the physical over the social sciences is widespread, with many of the former reveling in their preeminence and some of the latter manifesting two classic symptoms of an inferiority complex: resentment or reflexive emulation. Neither of these responses is healthy. It is simply not true that expressing propositions mathematically ensures that they are clearer and more transparent than conveying them in English. Economist Paul Romer admitted that “with enough math, an author can be confident that most readers will never figure out where FWUTV [facts with unknown truth values] is buried. A discussant or referee cannot say that an identification assumption is not credible if they cannot figure out what it is and are too embarrassed to ask.”64 On the latter, one would think that the 2008 Great Recession, in which the misguided belief that quantitative models of the economy could be used to guide investment decisions on the grounds they could reveal “the truth” about what drives the market, would temper confidence that such scientific approaches could ensure effective policy.65 In a much discussed essay in the New York Times Magazine, Princeton economist Paul Krugman concluded that “the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth.. . . The central cause of the profession’s failure was the desire for an all-encompassing, intellectually elegant approach that also gave economists a chance to show off their mathematical prowess.”66 It is not even clear that natural scientists have been most influential when they have employed their most rigorous and mathematically sophisticated approaches, at least in the national security realm. Indeed, there is more evidence that they have been most influential when they have offered practical solutions to real-world problems. These solutions have often come from scientifically uncertain and incomplete data.67 These are the hallmarks of much of the best of qualitative social science. Social scientists also ought to take heart that they not only can make an important contribution using their own distinct approaches, but also that in some instances they might even be superior to those of the physical scientists. For example, many of the nuclear scientists involved in the Manhattan Project soon came to regret their role in the escalating nuclear arms race of the Cold War. Reflecting a collective sense of guilt, chemist and peace activist Linus Pauling got almost nine thousand scientists to sign a January 1958 petition to end nuclear testing as first step toward universal disarmament.68 Talcing an equally impractical tack, Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard wrote to Franldin Delano Roosevelt’s science adviser Vannevar Bush in January 1944, “This weapon is so powerful that there can be no peace if it is simultaneously in the possession of any two powers unless these two powers are bound by an indissoluble political union.”69 While not all of the atomic scientists harbored doubts—recall the famous debates between Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller—the majority became advocates of international control of nuclear weapons, a policy that in retrospect was politically unrealistic. In comparing the assessments and policy recommendations of the physical scientists in the Golden Age, with those of social scientists like Jacob Viner, Bernard Brodie, and William T. R Fox, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the latter’s views of the nuclear problem (that the genie of nuclear weapons could not be stuffed back in the bottle), and their recommendations for dealing with that situation (nuclear deterrence), were far more “realistic” than those of the nuclear “one world” physical scientists. What Is to Be Done? There are, of course, some nuts-and-bolts issues that scholars should be mindful of if they want to participate in the broader policy debate. Since policymakers have short attention spans given the number and breadth of issues they have to deal with, scholarly efforts to engage them need to be brief in conveying their ideas.70 This explains why Op/Eds are particularly influential and why so many are optimistic that blogs could play a similar role. Moreover, policymakers find much current scholarly work—from across the methodological spectrum—inaccessible. The common sentiment animating their views is that scholars should cut the jargon. Policymakers don’t want scholars to write in Greek or French, but rather just plain English.71 There are also some much bigger issues undergirding the relevance question.72 To begin with, political science needs to rethink how it balances scholarly rigor with practical application. There is a middle ground between policy analysis and journalism, on one side, and scholastic irrelevance on the other.73 The best approach to balancing scholarly rigor with continuing policy relevance is methodological pluralism, which includes a commitment to using not any particular method (or all of them) but rather just the approach most appropriate for the question at hand. But methodological pluralism, by itself, is not sufficient. The latest trend in political science requiring the simultaneous use of multiple methods could, ironically, prove to be even more limiting of policy relevance. Indeed, given the need to employ all of these methods simultaneously, it is potentially even more constraining in terms of the problems it can address because it has to be limited to those which can be quantified, modeled, and studied in depth at the same time.74 Therefore, reinforcing methodological pluralism must also be a commitment to problem-, rather than method-, driven research agendas. It is only the combination of these two principles that will ensure that policy-relevant security studies can not only survive, but thrive, in political science.75 Scholars also need to think carefully about the role of theory in policyrelevant security studies scholarship. While there is no doubt that theory is important to policymakers, scholars need to be aware that as with many other things, too much of it can be a bad thing. In particular, the effort to cram the rich complexity of the social world into universal models can do intellectual violence to the phenomenon under study as well as produce suboptimal policy. Paul Nitze, then the director of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, readily conceded policymakers’ need for theory but also noted that “there is the opposing consideration .. . that [theoretical] oversimplification presents great dangers.”76 Albert Wohlstetter advocated a balanced approach to theory, noting that the key to his success throughout his career “was the practical experience I had in working with engineers. I worked with them from two sides, so to speak, as someone who had been concerned with very abstract theory more basic than that familiar to design engineers, but on the other hand, I was also concerned with production, and therefore generally trying to get them to do things more practical than they wanted to do.”77 Theory is a powerful tool of statecraft, but when scholars embrace universal models they also risk irrelevance or worse. Likewise, the transmission belts conveying scholarly findings to the policy world must be repaired. Kennan envisioned the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff in the late 1940s serving this function, and in some respects it continues to do so to this day.78 However, there are limits to how effectively a part of the bureaucracy can serve as an honest research broker. A plethora of think tanks in Washington are also supposed to translate knowledge into action, though the trend in recent years has been toward the establishment of overtly political and advocacy organizations, rather than nonpartisan, translational research centers.79 Reinventing the role of think tanks as bridges between the Ivory Tower and the beltway is long overdue. While nonacademic transmission belts can mediate between the Ivory Tower and the Beltway, they are no substitute for the scholars who produce knowledge to themselves serve as their own translators of it into policy. To be sure, scholars should not stop writing scholarly books and monographs utilizing the most sophisticated techniques of their discipline, if appropriate. In addition to doing these things, scholars should address pressing real world problems, not just chase after disciplinary fads. No one is in a better position to highlight the policy implications of a given piece of research than the individual who conducted it. Academic social scientists, if they want to be heard by senior policymakers, and heard correctly, need to be their own policy “transmission belts.”80 The role of the Democratic Peace Theory in the recent Iraq war demonstrates the problems with scholars not specifying the concrete policy implications of their research.81 Drawing on DPT, some officials in the George W. Bush administration justified the invasion of Iraq as part of a larger strategy to bring peace to the region by spreading democracy.82 Democratic Peace proponent Bruce Russett objected to this conclusion after the fact though his voice had been largely mute in the run up to the war.83 Had he and other democracy scholars participated more actively in the prewar debate, this rationale may have been less credible. Academics also need to develop a more nuanced appreciation of the various influences on policy. Many, even in democratic political systems, tend to have an unrealistically “technocratic” attitude toward policymaking. 84 They often underestimate the role of politics in government decision making. Scholars must therefore understand that the policymaking process is inherently political and that without such an appreciation of the political considerations associated with any policy choice, even a good one may not be implemented.85