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#### Text – Private Entities should maintain Large Satellite Constellations but:

* implement cooperative active debris removal measures aimed at mitigating debris from mega-constellations.
* cooperate on the development of a cloud-based infrastructure system between private and public entities with the purpose of advancing overall cyber security and create a protected mandatory reporting system for government contractors and critical infrastructure employees
* dismantle their antisatellite weapon systems and stop all development of space weapons
* adopt a system of market share liability in regard to the creation of debris in outer space by private entities in accordance with Munoz-Patchen 18
* Implement collision avoidance procedures
* dismantle their antisatellite weapon systems and stop all development of space weapons

#### First plank Solves for Mega-constellation Impacts.

Hardy 20, Brian Patrick. Long-term effects of satellite megaconstellations on the debris environment in low earth orbit. Diss. 2020. (Master of Science in Aerospace Engineering in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)//Elmer

The results of this thesis demonstrate that satellite megaconstellations have the potential to leave a significant mark on the LEO debris environment, even centuries after they cease operations. Various test cases for the Starlink megaconstellation were analyzed in a new, medium-fidelity simulation for orbital debris evolution, and a variety of PMD and ADR rates for Starlink were considered. It was shown that if Starlink adheres only to the minimum regulatory requirement of 90% PMD for large constellations, then LEO debris levels will grow almost twice as fast as the baseline scenario with no megaconstellations. Improving Starlink’s PMD rate to 95% would lead to only 19% more debris, while 99% PMD is the preferred option that prevents any significant debris contributions at all. Importantly, Starlink’s choice of PMD strategy will affect its own collision risk very little over the short term, but the impact will be noticeable on multi-century timescales by the overall LEO environment. Finally, in scenarios with 90% and 95% PMD, active debris removal of non-operating Starlink satellites yields significant, if limited, benefits. The 90% PMD scenario combined with an ADR rate of 5 Starlink satellites per year, for example, is able to reduce debris levels to those seen for the 95% PMD scenario. This result suggests that active debris removal could be a viable mitigation strategy for megaconstellations with sub-optimal PMD rates.

#### Second plank solves Cyber-Attacks.

**Robertl and Vocl 21** [Christopher Robertl and Vince Vocl. Christopher is the Senior Vice President of Cyber Intelligence and Supply Chain Security Policy at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Vince VocI is the Executive Director Cyber Policy and Operations at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 5-14-2021, accessed on 8-8-2021, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, "4 Ways U.S. Government Leaders Can Protect IP and Personal Data", <https://www.uschamber.com/on-demand/cybersecurity/how-can-the-government-help-protect-intellectual-property-and-personal-data>] Adam

During the past several months, U.S. adversaries have carried out significant cyber-enabled espionage campaigns, impacting a wide range of public and private sector targets. With our nation’s cybersecurity at risk, government leaders have quickly turned to legislative solutions to protect our intellectual property and personal data.

Protected Mandatory Reporting Can Help Thwart Increasingly Sophisticated Cyberattacks

Since the [Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015](https://www.cisa.gov/publication/cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-2015-procedures-and-guidance#:~:text=of%20Mass%20Destruction-,Cybersecurity%20Information%20Sharing%20Act%20of%202015%20Procedures%20and%20Guidance,indicators%20with%20the%20Federal%20Government.) was passed, companies facing data breaches have been encouraged to share this information with the U.S. government. Yet cyberattacks have only become more sophisticated since then, according to [Sen. Mark Warner](https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

“There is an evolving belief that the 2015 structure, on a voluntary basis, is not giving us the level of comprehensive security that we need,” said Warner. “The bad guys, when they’re focused, they’re going to have a fairly high probability of getting in.”

In response, the Committee on Intelligence is working on a bipartisan level to create a structure that would mandate reporting for government contractors and critical infrastructure employees.

“Some of the privacy and other kinds of counter-incentives don’t take place,” Sen. Warner noted, adding that affected companies would have limited immunity and anonymized information. “We can pulse the overall system in a way that will allow [the] public sector and private sector to respond in a more comprehensive way.”

The U.S. Seeks to Work With Its Allies to Establish Cyber Incident Notification Systems

After creating a limited mandatory reporting system in the country, Warner hopes that the U.S. can work with its allies to establish similar notification systems as well as multilateral cyber norms.

“If our adversaries violate these norms and we can find appropriate attribution, there will be consequences to their actions,” Warner explained. “Our failure to have norms [and] a more robust notification system in existence … has allowed, in many ways, Russia and China to launch cyberattacks with virtual impunity.”

“This is a problem of protecting intellectual property … [and] personal information,” he continued. “As long as we can provide that level of limited immunity with anonymity so that those reports are then not made public, I think we can earn industry support.”

The U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission Outlines Priorities for 2021

In 2019, the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission was chartered to manage cyber risk and significant cyber events at home and abroad. With several of the Commission’s recommendations being codified into law in 2020, this year has seen a renewed focus in engaging the private sector.

“We’re looking at ways that [we] can get to a common cloud-based environment between federal government agencies, state, local, tribal, territorial and the private sector, basically to get common visibility,” said Solarium commissioner [Frank J. Cilluffo](https://www.solarium.gov/commissioners/frank-cilluffo).

“We’re also going to be zeroing in on what we’re calling SICI (systemically important critical infrastructure) ... which will basically hone in on the most critical of our critical infrastructures, our lifeline sectors, and establish a set of … benefits and burdens to truly get to that partnership between the public and private sector,” Cilluffo added.

Public and Private Sector Collaboration Is Crucial to Cybersecurity Advancement

“We want to make sure that at the end of the day, our companies, our national security agencies and our citizens as a whole are enhancing their overall cybersecurity efforts,” stated Cilluffo. “The bottom line is, we need to follow up our ideas with the resources.”

“This is not going to be accomplished through Washington alone,” he stressed. “The private sector needs a front-row seat at his table and ultimately will be most critical to any success going forward.”

[Mark Montgomery](https://www.solarium.gov/about/staff/mark-montgomery), executive director of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, agreed that partnership between the public and private sectors would be crucial for success in 2021.

“We actually have to build, pay for and establish infrastructure for collaboration,” Montgomery noted. “Once you do that, the companies will see that their equities are protected … and their opinions matter, and then we’ll get things done.”

#### Fourth plank incentivizes sustainable use of space

**Munoz-Patchen 18** [Chelsea Munoz-Patchen, Chelsea Muñoz-Patchen is an associate in the Houston office of Latham & Watkins. While attending University of Chicago Law School, Ms. Muñoz-Patchen was an articles editor for The Chicago Journal of International Law. Her research on regulating space debris was published in 2018. Ms. Muñoz-Patchen served as a research assistant for Professors Daniel Abebe and Jonathan Masur, focusing on intellectual property and constitutional law in the US and Ethiopia. Prior to law school, Ms. Muñoz-Patchen earned her BA and BS in Geography from Arizona State University. As a graduate student, she studied political ecology and people’s relationship to urban nature, and taught Introduction to Physical Geography labs. 7-1-2018, Semanticscholar, "Regulating the Space Commons: Treating Space Debris as Abandoned Property in Violation of the Outer Space Treaty | Semantic Scholar", <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Regulating-the-Space-Commons%3A-Treating-Space-Debris-Munoz-Patchen/607eff0141f48332a69ae8c5a3301d871057a4fa> accessed 12/21/21] Adam

* solves global commons

Market-share liability has been suggested as a way to deal with the difficulty of identifying the individual ownership of objects and it could be put to use in the obligation to clean up debris.154 Market-share liability would allow for the apportionment of responsibility based on the respective contribution to the risk, and would not require the identification of individual pieces of space debris.155 Market-share liability has already been successfully applied where multiple parties contribute to a dangerous situation, but where it is virtually impossible to tie a particular party to the harm caused.156 Market-share liability was created in 1980 in the case Sindell v. Abbott Labororatories. 157 In Sindell, the Supreme Court of California devised the concept in response to a case in which pharmaceuticals that were marketed to pregnant women caused cancer in their children at least a decade later.158 Since the latent period was so long, the women naturally could not remember the specific pill manufacturer out of two hundred such manufacturers.159 The court found that each defendant’s market share could be determined fairly accurately, and therefore used market share as a basis for the apportionment of liability.160 While market-share liability has not been broadly adopted, this is likely because cases with fungible products and a serious causation problem are rare.161 Academics have taken this idea and sought to apply it to space debris, which has similar fungibility and causation issues, but their applications have been limited to a tort-like context.162 One author suggested that whenever a collision occurs due to an unidentifiable piece of debris and a functional space object, liability and compensation should be apportioned “among spacefaring nations equal to the percentages of the total debris population for which the particular nation is responsible.” 163 This mechanism frees the victim from having to prove causation by a specific nation, when that would be virtually impossible.164 There will be difficulties calculating the percentage with precision in such a system, but there is fairly accurate information from the U.N. including registry, sampling, mathematical models, and other records of known collisions and the resultant debris.165 Without strong buy-in, it may be challenging to get this rarely used domestic tort theory to apply in international space law, especially with the potential for disputes over the proper apportionment of market share.166 The states primarily responsible for existing debris are the U.S., Russia, and China – powerful countries unlikely to be pleased with this newfound expense. That said, though these nations would be paying the highest cost, this would be proportional to their respective contributions to the problem. Indeed, these nations may welcome this remedy, because their space activity is threatened by the proliferation of space debris and they likely value continuing their extensive and advanced use of space. This solution solves the free rider problem and would compensate any nation or company that cleans up space such that any nation (like the U.S., Russia, or China) fearing the collapse of its space program and unwilling to bear all the cleanup costs itself would see this as an attractive solution. It is even possible that liable states like the U.S. and Russia will be eager to aid in debris identification, so as to add to other states’ liability.167 This regulatory remedy would resolve the current tragedy of the commons. By assigning responsibility for the cost of cleanup, nations or companies would be incentivized to begin cleanup operations, because they would know that others will not freeride on their costly efforts. Instead, they will have guaranteed compensation from those responsible. Obtaining the funds is crucial, particularly since the high cost of deploying existing technology to destroy space debris has been a hindrance thus far.168 Using market-share liability is also a useful way to compensate victims of debris collisions and to incentivize spacefaring nations to avoid creating new debris in the future.169 However, this does not do enough to remedy the persistent existence of space debris, which is threatening the very continuation of space activity. The Outer Space Treaty creates an obligation on states to carry out space activities “for the ‘benefit and interests of all countries,’ and that outer space shall never be subject to national appropriation.” 170 To uphold their obligations under this treaty, nations should not be creating debris, because it interferes with the ability of others to conduct their space activities, or perhaps keeps them from space altogether. Due to this legal violation, and the negative externality created by property abandonment, states should be required to pay for the disposal of debris in proportion to the amount they create. While the creation of debris may be unavoidable, there are existing practices that can greatly minimize the proliferation of debris, and any debris that is nonetheless created can be dealt with through market-share liability payments. This collection of market-share disposal payments would not simply be a tax on operations or tort compensation for harmful acts. Instead, once liability is apportioned, (and this could be done on an ongoing or periodic basis to reflect new developments), nations or companies undertaking actions to clean up space would be compensated for their costs by the nations responsible according to their percentage of responsibility. The U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) could allocate the percentage of liability, drawing on its role in promoting international cooperation and the peaceful use of outer space, as well as preparing reports and studies.171 If any disputes were to arise from nonpayment, familiar procedures could be employed—perhaps by drawing from other notable space treaties that provide “established procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” 172 In many of the space treaties and conventions, including the Liability Convention, disputes and claims can be brought to the SecretaryGeneral of the U.N.173 These bodies could be utilized here to assure fairness in allocating liability and handling routine compensation disputes. This new regulatory regime can thus be grounded in the existing space treaty regime and administered by existing authorities. It would resolve the incentive problems that exist in the international commons of space through regulation that allocates the cost of debris cleanup to those who have created and continue to create it. The regime can also adapt as the outer space marketplace and the actors who comprise it shift over time, and as the registry of space objects, incidents, and tracking capabilities improves. This regulatory regime also ultimately would allocate cleanup funds to parties who would like to continue to operate in space, removing the disincentive to carry the cost in the face of potential freeriding.

#### Collision avoidance solves

Arif 17 — (Aayesha Arif, Journalist, “This Is How Satellites Avoid Colliding Into Each Other“, Wonderful Engineering, Available Online at https://wonderfulengineering.com/satellite-collision/, accessed 3-22-2022, HKR-AR)

A standard collision avoidance procedure has been established by space agencies to avoid any such accident. Every time a satellite is launched, a Collision On Launch Assessment (COLA) is performed. To make sure that the space vehicle trajectory does not take it too close to any other object in space, the launch window is set such that it has COLA blackout period, the intervals during which the spacecraft does not lift.

The purpose of COLA is to avoid the collision after launch. To avoid any debris or spacecraft collision while in orbit, the satellite performs collision avoidance maneuver also called Debris Avoidance Maneuver (DAM). The collision avoidance maneuver is usually performed to raise or lower the orbit of the craft by a few kilometers. Read more about how the Hubble Space Telescope conducts it to avoid space debris hits.

#### Last plank solves second advantage – states won’t possess asat capability to escalate

#### Private Entities include people

**Cornell Legal Information Institute No Date** [Cornell Legal Information Institute, , "6 U.S. Code § 1501," <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/6/1501#15_A> accessed 3/23/22] Adam

(15)Private entity

(A)In general

Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “[private entity](https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=6-USC-625312480-168358316&term_occur=999&term_src=title:6:chapter:6:subchapter:I:section:1501)” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.

#### any theoretical reason to reject the cp is a reason to reject the aff – cx and the text of the 1ac plan text is binding and we shouldn’t be punished for private actor fiat anything else is irreciprocal and hurts clash

#### Reject 1AR theory- A] 7-6 time skew means it’s endlessly aff biased B] I don’t have a 3nr which allows for endless extrapolation C] 1AR theory is skewed to the aff because they have a 2ar judge psychology warrant.

#### Infinite abuse claims are wrong- A] Spikes solve-you can just preempt paradigms in the 1AC B] Functional limits- 1nc is only 7 minutes long

#### Condo is good proving a CP is bad doesn’t prove the plan is good, a logical policy maker can always choose not to act. Logic outweighs – it’s the basis of all rational arguments.

### 1NC---OFF

#### India’s digital divide is increasing and has uniquely undermined economic growth.

**Beniwal 20** [Vrishti Beniwal, Vrishti is a journalist for Bloomberg and ThePrint. 12-17-20, "As digital divide widens, India risks losing a generation to pandemic disruption," ThePrint, <https://theprint.in/india/education/as-digital-divide-widens-india-risks-losing-a-generation-to-pandemic-disruption/568394/> accessed 2/9/22] Adam

Plenty of Indians are facing a similar predicament: As many as 80% of Indian students couldn’t access online schooling during the lockdown, and many might not return to classrooms when they reopen, according to a recent study by Oxfam.

That’s just one example of how the pandemic has exacerbated the country’s digital divide — the gap between those with the means and knowledge to benefit from the internet, and those without — worsening already stark levels of inequality and weighing on economic growth. While the divide isn’t unique to India, it’s especially acute in a nation where more than half the population of 1.3 billion people is under 25 years old.

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced lockdowns earlier this year, services from banking and schooling to medical consultations and job searches moved online, and in some cases remain there nine months later. Many companies see “work from home” as the new normal.

Before the pandemic, government researchers estimated India’s digital shift could unlock as much as $1 trillion of economic value over five years. But the crisis is spreading those benefits unevenly and widening socio-economic inequalities, with girls suffering more than boys and rural areas more affected than cities.

“The digital divide in India is an ongoing problem and the pandemic has definitely made it worse,” said Sumeysh Srivastava, a New Delhi-based internet-access researcher at Nyaaya, an open-access platform that provides simple and actionable legal information. “The government needs to ensure that all Indians are in position to benefit from digitization, otherwise we’re at risk of creating a new class of digitally poor citizens.”

Internet access

India has the world’s second-largest pool of internet users, about 600 million, comprising more than 12% of all users globally. Yet half its population lacks internet access, and even if they can get online, only 20% of Indians know how to use digital services, according to government data.

Every 10% increase in India’s internet traffic delivers a 3.1% increase in per-capita gross domestic product, according to a 2018 report by the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations. But the benefits of those gains aren’t reaching everyone: Srivastava said government-run digital literacy programs cover 5% or less of the population, are focused only on rural areas and suffer from various design and implementation issues.

“The digital revolution has made services more tradable and enabled India to grow rapidly with a different growth model compared to China,” said Ejaz Ghani, a former economist at the World Bank. “But this is now being restrained by the digital divide.”

The launch of online job portals for laborers and e-passes to move around during the lockdown meant Indians who aren’t digitally literate could have lost out on livelihood opportunities.

#### Mega constellations are expanding access in India now.

**Vanamali 21** [Krishna Veera Vanamali, 11-9-2021, "Starlink and OneWeb: Can satellite broadband bridge India's digital divide?," Business Standard, [https://www.business-standard.com/podcast/current-affairs/starlink-and-oneweb-can-satellite-broadband-bridge-india-s-digital-divide-121110900035\_1.html accessed 2/9/22](https://www.business-standard.com/podcast/current-affairs/starlink-and-oneweb-can-satellite-broadband-bridge-india-s-digital-divide-121110900035_1.html%20accessed%202/9/22)] Adam

70% of India’s rural population does not have Internet access Union government had launched Digital India scheme to connect rural areas with Internet 1.78 lakh gram panchayats connected with optical fibre so far The target is to provide broadband connectivity to 2.5 lakh gram panchayats Internet penetration in the country stood at around 50% in 2020 India had launched [BharatNet](https://www.business-standard.com/topic/bharatnet)project in 2011 to ensure that every village panchayat in the country has broadband Internet connectivity. But, according to a report in 2020, half of India’s population still does not have Internet access. And 70% of the country’s rural population is yet to log in to the Internet. Till date, [BharatNet](https://www.business-standard.com/topic/bharatnet)connections have been provided to 1.78 lakh gram panchayats. In June this year, the Union Cabinet approved the implementation of the project in 16 states through the Public Private Partnership Model (PPP). When it comes to wired broadband, India had only 24.3 million customers at the end of August, most of whom are urban subscribers. How satellite-based internet service works Starlink and OneWeb are among a number of companies which use Low-Earth Orbit satellites to provide high-speed broadband Internet services around the world, with a special focus on remote areas where deploying mobile towers or fiber optic cables are difficult. These satellites can beam the Internet to virtually anywhere on the earth. Starlink and OneWeb Starlink is a subsidiary of Elon Musk’s rocket company SpaceX OneWeb is owned by Sunil Mittal’s Bharti Group along with the British government Leading the race, Starlink has already deployed more than 1,700 satellites in low-earth orbit Sensing the opportunity, Starlink and OneWeb are looking to provide the unserved areas with the Internet. Starlink is a subsidiary of Elon Musk’s rocket company [SpaceX](https://www.business-standard.com/topic/spacex)and OneWeb is owned by Sunil Mittal’s Bharti Group along with the British government. Starlink is one of a growing number of companies launching small satellites as part of a low-Earth orbiting network to provide low-latency broadband Internet services around the world, with a particular focus on remote areas that terrestrial Internet infrastructure struggles to reach. [Satellite](https://www.business-standard.com/topic/satellite)broadband wars Starlink has already deployed more than 1,700 satellites in low-earth orbit, against a target of having 12,000 satellites in its constellation. Meanwhile, OneWeb has put 322 satellites into orbit and plans to have 648 of them by the middle of next year. Starlink currently serves about 100,000 users in 14 countries. Recently, Starlink established a subsidiary in India headed by former PayPal executive Sanjay Bhargava as it gears up to launch its services in the country. It has already received over 5,000 pre-orders for its devices in India. But there are some factors which could hit its Indian venture, it’s the high cost is one of them

#### Constellations will bridge digital divide – costs fall over time.

**Croshier 22** [Rose Croshier, Rose Croshier is a policy fellow at the Center for Global Development, where her work focuses on enabling low and middle-income countries’ adoption of space-based technology. Before joining CGD, Croshier was an accomplished program and operations manager with the U.S. Air Force, specializing in areas such as Space Operations, Security Cooperation, Peacekeeping, Disaster Management and Military Intelligence. 1-19-2022, "Space and Development: Preparing for Affordable Space-Based Telecommunications," Center For Global Development, [https://www.cgdev.org/publication/space-and-development-preparing-affordable-space-based-telecommunications accessed 2/9/22](https://www.cgdev.org/publication/space-and-development-preparing-affordable-space-based-telecommunications%20accessed%202/9/22)] Adam

The starting block for emerging NGSO constellations providing 4G-5G broadband in the commercial space sector has been set thus far by Starlink, costing approximately $500 for a company-subsidized all-inclusive receiver, wifi router and hardware set and about $100 per month, uncapped, broadband subscription.

A combined “first month” cost of $600 is still not realistic for the majority of the undercovered or underconnected population, as illustrated in Figure 6.[[24]](https://www.cgdev.org/publication/space-and-development-preparing-affordable-space-based-telecommunications#edn24) Using India as an example, even though a Starlink antenna and broadband subscription is steeply cheaper than traditional VSAT options on the market today, it is still seven to eight times more expensive than what is typically available in India’s urban, in-network areas.[[25]](https://www.cgdev.org/publication/space-and-development-preparing-affordable-space-based-telecommunications#edn25)[[26]](https://www.cgdev.org/publication/space-and-development-preparing-affordable-space-based-telecommunications#edn26) A MIT study examining 37 countries determined that even though Starlink’s data is unlimited, the flat fee of $100 per month is affordable for only about 15 percent of the undercovered population. Starlink’s greatest potential for early uptake is in rural areas of high-income countries, or undercovered areas of middle-income countries in South America and Southeast Asia.

Over the following decade, however, the same study suggested NGSO satellite prices may drop closer to $30 per Mbps per month, opening up affordability to about 60 percent of the population considered. While these costs are more than what many individual households can afford, civil society organizations, government, and non-governmental organizations can take action to increase sustainability and uptake. Many rural communities, frustrated by the high for-profit cost of rural internet, have successfully established small, cooperative-owned, internet service provider community networks, like the Zenzeleni network in South Africa. These networks have made impressive progress in localizing use and boosting affordability of high-speed broadband.[[27]](https://www.cgdev.org/publication/space-and-development-preparing-affordable-space-based-telecommunications#edn27)[[28]](https://www.cgdev.org/publication/space-and-development-preparing-affordable-space-based-telecommunications#edn28)

Most promising, satellite-to-cellphone constellations like Lynk provide a shorter-term jump in both accessibility and affordability. Since they are designed to be incorporated into local mobile network operator’s ecosystem, then the access problem would be addressed, and the cost at level with the local market for cellphones and mobile credit.

Several other innovative approaches, like utilizing television “white space” (TVWS), or “buffer” space between television channels in the radio frequency spectrum to provide cheap broadband internet access, or using drones and balloons to extend middle and last mile coverage, provide additional alternatives for consideration. TVWS may fade as a viable option as countries become more efficient at reducing unused spectrum. Balloons and drones require significant in situ management and maintenance, thus making them less practical for expanding telecommunications infrastructure in developing countries.[[29]](https://www.cgdev.org/publication/space-and-development-preparing-affordable-space-based-telecommunications#edn29)

#### Indian economic strength deters China along the India-China border---military buildup and signal of resolve diffuses conflict.

**Haqqani and Pande 21** [Husain Haqqani and Aparna Pande 7-10-21. Haqqani is the director for South and Central Asia at the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C. and was Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States. Pande (Ph.D) is director of the Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia at the Hudson Institute. "India has a long way to go in confronting China". The Hill. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/562397-india-has-a-long-way-to-go-in-confronting-china]

India’s decision to move [50,000](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-27/india-shifts-50-000-troops-to-china-border-in-historic-defense-shift) additional troops to its border with China bolsters its ability to protect itself against Chinese aggression. It is a belated response to China’s actions [last year](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-57234024), when the Chinese army [surprised](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-china-military-families-insight-idUSKBN2460YB) ill-prepared Indian soldiers and occupied several square miles of Indian territory in the Ladakh region to build roads and fortify military encampments. The hope of some Indian policymakers to resolve the matter diplomatically has not so far been fulfilled. Several rounds of military and diplomatic negotiations since April 2020, when the Chinese incursions started, have yielded little result. Any willingness on India’s part to deal forcefully with China would be welcomed in the U.S., where successive administrations have sought to integrate India into America’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Several years of an India-U.S. entente cordiale has been premised on India standing up to China. After all, with a population of more than one billion, India is the only country with enough manpower to match that of China. China sees India as a potential rival and covets parts of Indian territory. China [occupied](https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-43780820091108) 15,000 miles of Indian territory in the Aksai Chin section of Ladakh after war in 1962. China’s desire for influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region challenges India in its backyard, setting off [competition](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700160801886314) for the same sphere of influence. But China’s phenomenal economic growth, coupled with India’s inability to keep pace, has hampered India’s ability to respond to China strategically. Even now the moving of troops to Ladakh is a tactical maneuver not backed by a clear strategic plan. On [four](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-chinese-and-indian-troops-are-clashing-again/2020/09/11/c5939466-f402-11ea-8025-5d3489768ac8_story.html) occasions since 2012, China has indulged in salami-slicing along the largely un-demarcated India-China border. India’s response each time has been limited to diplomatic negotiations with limited military pushback. There is a co-relation between relative economic strength and China’s willingness to flex its muscle. Between 1988, when India and China signed a series of agreements to restore relations, and 2012, the border between India and China remained by and large quiet. During that period, the size of the two countries’ economies was not huge. In 1990, India’s GDP stood at $320 billion and China’s GDP at $413 billion. By 2012, China’s GDP had grown to $8.5 trillion, seven times larger than India’s $1.2 trillion economy. The [change](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-times/all-that-matters/chinas-rising-support-for-pakistan-and-their-collusion-may-affect-our-interests-says-former-nsa-shiv-shankar-menon/articleshow/82234601.cms) in China’s policy after 2012, encouraging its troops to use force against India along the border, coincided with the rise in China’s military and economic power and its impact on the relative balance of power with India. Like many in the West, India during the 1990s had bought into the view that deeper economic and diplomatic engagement with communist China would help maintain peace between the two Asian giants. But the India-China border dispute could not remain on the back burner as China became more aggressive in the wake of growing economic and military power. India can no longer rely solely on diplomacy to deal with China. It will soon have to build and deploy hard power to deter the Chinese. The recent deployment along the Ladakh border could mark the beginning of that process. With the latest addition, 200,000 of India’s more than a million strong army now face China along the 2,167-mile border. By way of comparison, 600,000 Indian troops are positioned along the 2,065-mile, fully fenced and fully demarcated border with Pakistan. It is inconceivable that any attempt by Pakistan to take territory would go unretaliated by India. While India’s attempts over the last year have been to convince China, primarily through diplomatic engagements, to return the border to status quo ante, most [military](https://www.orfonline.org/research/eastern-ladakh-the-longer-perspective/) and [strategic](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/crisis-after-crisis-how-ladakh-will-shape-india-s-competition-china) experts argue that China has no interest in resolving the border dispute with India. India has for far too long acquiesced to Chinese aggression without sufficient retaliatory military action. India may not seek to provoke China into an all-out war, but it needs to find a sweet spot between ignoring and provoking. The United States and its allies, too, would like India to act like a major power in not taking Chinese provocations lightly. Western democracies and Japan have viewed India as an ideal partner and future ally in Asia and the Indo-Pacific. India has consistently been a democracy, shares pluralist values with the United States, and its embrace of free market reforms since 1992 have created an opening for expanded economic ties. India also shares America’s concerns about China’s rising power. In developing a pivot to Asia or an Indo-Pacific policy, successive U.S. administrations have assumed that a shared concern about China makes India a natural American ally. India-U.S. relations were referred to as the “[defining](https://www.google.com/search?q=obama+india+defining+partnership+of+21st+century&rlz=1C1GGRV_enUS751US751&oq=obama+india+defining+partnership+of+21st+century&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i160j33i299.7702j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8) partnership of the 21st century” under President Obama. The Trump administration’s [2017](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf) National Security Strategy spoke of India as a “leading global power” and a strong “strategic and defense partner.” The Biden administration’s [March](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/03/interim-national-security-strategic-guidance/) 2021 “Interim National Security guidance” has described the “deepening partnership” with India as being critical to America’s “vital national interests.” But the Indo-Pacific policies of both the Trump and Biden administrations have focused on maritime security, ignoring India’s challenge from China on the continental landmass. China views India as an inward-looking democracy that has yet to focus on economic growth or military prowess. Only an expansion in India’s economy and military capability would convince China’s leaders to view it differently. Moreover, the two decades of celebrating convergence of democratic values and voicing of strategic concerns by Washington and Delhi now needs to be followed up with specific steps to counter Chinese hard power with Indian muscle.

#### That goes nuclear.

Rachman 20 “Erosion of nuclear deterrence makes India-China relations critical” GIDEON RACHMAN [Gideon Rachman became chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times in July 2006. He joined the FT after a 15-year career at The Economist, which included spells as a foreign correspondent in Brussels, Washington and Bangkok.] September 7, 2020 <https://www.ft.com/content/311694ac-d1a4-4d92-a850-97e161ad887c> SM

Erosion of nuclear deterrence makes India-China relations critical

Countries with nuclear weapons are moving closer to military confrontation

My generation grew up in the shadow of a possible nuclear war. I was born a few months after the Cuba missile crisis — the closest humanity has come to nuclear Armageddon. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was a big political force as I was growing up.

My children’s generation are much more likely to demonstrate against climate change than nuclear weapons. Leading politicians also no longer worry so much about nukes. Nuclear arms-control negotiations, a staple of the cold war, have fallen into abeyance. But this relatively relaxed attitude is having a paradoxical effect. It seems to be making countries armed with nuclear weapons more willing to risk military confrontation with each other.

There are three international rivalries where tensions between nuclear-weapons states are reaching dangerous levels. The biggest current risk is on the China-India border — where recent clashes have led to 21 Indian fatalities and an unknown number of Chinese casualties. Military tensions are also rising between China and the US in the Pacific. Meanwhile, the crisis in Belarus has led to fears of Russian military intervention, which would put Nato on alert.

The erosion of nuclear deterrence gives rise to two distinct, but related, risks. The first is of a conventional war, which could happen if two nuclear-weapons states believe they can fight each other without the risk of nuclear escalation. The second is of a nuclear war, which could happen if a conventional war escalated unexpectedly.

During the cold war, the US and the USSR were too conscious of the dangers of nuclear warfare ever to risk striking each other directly with conventional weapons. But the Chinese leadership has taken the risk of killing Indian troops, despite India's possession of nuclear weapons — and New Delhi is pushing back.

The deadly clash in the Himalayas over the summer was only the second time that two nuclear-weapons states have fought. The first was the Kargil war between India and Pakistan in 1999. That confrontation did not go nuclear. But it left world leaders profoundly shaken. Bill Clinton, the US president at the time, called the frontline where the two sides had clashed “the most dangerous place in the world”.

There are fewer nuclear-alarm sirens sounding this time around. Most experts take comfort from the fact that India and China both have a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons. But if Beijing and New Delhi’s confidence that the other side will not use nuclear weapons persuades China to press home its military advantage, then India may be tempted to alter its policy in an attempt to restore deterrence. Some experts point to the possibility of India deploying tactical nuclear weapons in the Himalayas, or formally renouncing its no-first-use policy.

Threatening to use nuclear weapons is always tempting for a country that fears it might lose a conventional war. Pakistani military doctrine envisages an early resort to nuclear weapons, in the event of an invasion by India that would otherwise lead to defeat.

### 1NC – OFF

#### Cosmobiopolitics constitutes the governance of Outer Space as a shared resource mean to be used to further Human Progress. The Aff’s managerial at “saving” space merely sustains space as a common good for “joint usage” to further exploitation.

Damjanov 15, Katarina. "The matter of media in outer space: Technologies of cosmobiopolitics." Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33.5 (2015): 889-906. (Faculty of Arts, University of Western Australia)//Elmer

Long before the beginning of the Space Age, humans used the regions above the globe to facilitate mediation practices; electromagnetic waves, for example, were emitted across airspace and into the atmosphere to enable radio communication decades before the first artificial satellite confirmed its arrival in the planet’s orbit on 4 October 1957. With its possible roots in early societies’ use of the celestial bodies visible from the earth’s surface for temporal and spatial orientation, the ‘media history’ of the human use of outer space reaches a watershed moment with the launch of Sputnik. This basketball-sized metal sphere, equipped with radio transmitter and four external antennas, was the first solid object, the first functional media artefact that humans had placed outside their own world. This is not to say that Sputnik marks the event in which human mediation practices begun to materially impact outer space, erasing its original, ‘natural’ state – the radio signals that penetrated the layers of the troposphere and ionosphere, although intangible, left their own material traces, environmental alterations comparable with the material results of atmospheric pollution triggered by industrial progress. These early uses of space have entangled it in a gamut of processes of techno-mediation, initiating the extraterrestrial unfolding of a historical trajectory which Jussi Parikka (2011: 3) terms ‘medianature’ – they have extended this ‘continuum between mediatic apparatuses and their material contexts in the exploitation of nature’ into outer space. However, Sputnik’s orbital presence does represent a steppingstone in the extraterrestrial progression of human medianature: it indicates the species’ acquired ability to purposefully introduce an object of technical media into outer space. As such, Sputnik epitomises a shift in the use of non-terrestrial spaces; no longer were they incidental and remote to human media exploits, they were instead made central and essential. What the first signal that Sputnik sent to its ground control announced was that humanity’s techno-logic aspirations to transform the material world and advance its productive capacity through the logic of acquisition, investment and destruction – an intrinsic human impulse described by Karl Marx (1964) as our essence of species-being – are no longer earth-bound. Sputnik and all media devices that followed it have been gradually converting outer space into a living milieu, reinforcing it as a material–social setting of human circumstances and relations. The concept of ‘milieu’ is important for understanding the complexities involved in the cosmobiopolitical transformation of outer space. In Foucault’s work and in other influential texts such as those of his mentor Georges Canguilhem (2008) and Simondon (1980) and Stiegler (1998), although employed in different contexts, the term ‘milieu’ essentially designates a site which simultaneously conditions and is itself conditioned by the productive forces of human life – whether biological, social or technical. Courses of medianature in outer space sharpen such perspectives on mutually transforming relations between humans and their milieu, providing biopolitical focus to Simondon’s and Stiegler’s perspectives on technology as fundamental in constituting human life. Stiegler’s view of progress as human technological evolution frames technical objects as a prosthesis in whose creation humans embed their ‘interiors’ and through which they further exteriorise and mould their living milieu, a process which has been changing the idea of what it is to be human (Stiegler, 1998: 17). In the Stieglerian sense, the human ‘exteriorisation’ in technical media that are sent into space not only imbues the earth’s exterior with a reflection of the human, but itself reconstitutes the human and reconfigures human ways of life. These technologies thus radically enhance the capacity for species-being, becoming a vital part of our biopolitical capital: while altering our apparently otherwise lifeless planetary exterior into a malleable and thus governable locus of life, their mediatic operations assist humans to overcome their biological and geographical limitations and proceed as a collective towards becoming more-than-human. Our medianature has been continuously adjusting to its extraterrestrial conditions and the acceleration of our technological ‘exteriorisation’ in space has necessitated the development of an attendant governmental framework. The landmark attempt to arrange the increasing multiplicity of human relationships with outer space was to define them through the rule of law – a juridical prefiguration which, as Foucault and Giorgio Agamben (1998) suggest, is a prerequisite for governing life. In 1967, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (United Nations, 2002), or, The Outer Space Treaty (OST) entered into force. In lieu of the pending human landing on the Moon, this international legal agreement established outer space as the shared domain of a global commons, which is to be explored and used by all nation-states, but which itself is to stay outside the vagaries of territorial claims and property rights. A pre-emptive gesture aimed at securing politico-economic codification of the extraterrestrial milieu before human arrival, the OST did not specify where the administrative borders of outer space are – the border between terrestrial and extraterrestrial space has been unofficially assigned to the Ka´rma´n line, a region about 100 km above the planetary surface, where objects sent into space do not fall back but remain in orbit. Nevertheless, the Treaty designates its inhuman expanses as the precinct of human governance, and behind such legal coding stood the same politico-economic rationalities which Foucault identified as pivotal for the institution of the doctrine of the ‘Freedom of the Seas’ as a foundation of international maritime law in the seventeenth century. This legal principle that identified the ocean’s strategic importance as a jointly used resource and set it free from territorial claims, symptomatically announced two interrelated entrances onto the world stage – the rise of global capitalism and the birth of biopolitics, while its replication in the OST marked the next phase in their development. In one of his lectures at the Colle`ge de France, Foucault (2008: 51–73) provided a brief account of how the history of international law echoed the emergence of modern approaches to governance, where the primary emphasis upon territory becomes augmented with the objective to secure the vitality of the shared market. He described how the Treaty of Westphalia’s reinforcement of borders around sovereign states in 1598, which strengthened their inner autonomy yet limited their external reach, instituted each of them as a part of a collective of states gathered around the common interest of progress. This territorial reform aimed to end devastating wars between the states and ensure their political and economic stability, but it imposed the need for new domains of competition in which each of them could independently acquire and prosper, and all them could together be in a ‘state of permanent collective enrichment’ (Foucault, 2008: 55). These spaces, Foucault suggested, were inaugurated with the ‘Freedom of the Seas’ in 1609, which opened the ocean as a space which all states could use to advance through economic competition rather than rivalry over territory. While specifically related to the agenda of European colonial expansions, the establishment of the seas as shared commons was indicative of the awareness that the unlimited accumulation of wealth requires the infinitely free space of the global market. Freedom of the seas was, as Foucault (2008: 56) described, born out of this ‘new form of global rationality... a new calculation on the scale of the world’ and it marked the start of economic globalisation. The interplay between the finite room of territories and infinite possibilities for circulation and accumulation of capital was sustained indefinitely by asserting the global freedom, the commonality of the seas. Through the commons of the seas, capitalism assumed its global latitudes; while the historical enclosure of wastelands that were shared as ‘commons’ enabled the initial, ‘primitive’ accumulation of capital, the creation of the ocean’s commons enabled capitalism to articulate its processes at a global scale. This legal manoeuvre to defend territory by rethinking the spaces of the market institutes the idea of shared commonality as an Archimedean point for the governance of human societies, preparing the terrain for a biopolitical system of governance based upon its abstraction into a method of subsuming ‘life itself’ to the massifying logic of averages and estimates. The institution of the OST and its associated Agreements and Conventions2 from the mid-twentieth century was an outcome of yet another spatial crisis; it was an attempt to negotiate the many tensions that the arrival of the Space Age stirred within global affairs. It was at the time of Cold War and states’ political polarisation, in a world where rapid industrialisation and massive population increases were coupled with anxieties about limits to economic growth, that outer space was identified as a potential site of military conflicts, competing claims of sovereignty and a rapacious race for resources. The looming possibility of still deeper crisis necessitated another repositioning of states and markets around their vital assets, and a restoring of the global equilibrium of powers. Here the OST drew upon the juridical principle of a ‘common heritage’ of humankind – a concept previously employed in the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 for comparable arrangements of international regimes of governance – and took the idea of the commons outside the globe. The treaty expanded the conceptual borders of ‘the scale of the world’ into extraterrestrial space, prescribing that its exploration ‘shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries’ and that it ‘shall be the province of all mankind’ (OST, article 1). Once again, international law established a space of commons whose exploration and exploitation would proceed as a joint enterprise through which all states could freely advance and prosper both individually and as a part of collective. Just as the ‘Freedom of the Seas’ opened routes for ships sailing in the name of nations, the OST unlocked flightpaths for spaceships and other technologies, stimulating states’ techno-scientific interests and competition and ensuring that the emerging mode of ‘high-tech’ capitalism had from its beginnings an extra-planetary, infinite prospect. This trans-national legal netting codified an idea of global commonality and framed the inhuman regions of outer space as the ‘province of all mankind’, drawing them into its global system of governance. The OST thus provided the juridical platform from which to articulate a cosmobiopolitical order; it offered a governmental framework for enacting a vision of the human race as a species-power, which will, through the techno-mediated exploration of space, direct its own cosmic progress. Almost a half century after the OST, media technologies remain crucial to the transformation of outer space into a human province. The voracious neoliberal drive of the state-industry nexus that conditions global biopolitics is so dependent upon them, that they become a target of the same systems of governance they catalyse. Their construction, launches and distribution are the subject of careful calculation, meticulous planning and complex logistics, their condition and movements are continuously being monitored, assessed and managed, and this transfer of governmental rationalities from living humans to inanimate objects changes the biopolitical approach to human species-being. If biopower emerged as concerned with bodies of human individuals and populations, and pressing environmental concerns about the ‘global body of the Earth’ augmented its application ‘from human to planetary bodies’ (Bryld and Lykee, 2000: 92–94), then space-based media technologies mark a subsequent phase in the development of its architecture. They trigger the transposition of life management onto the bodies and populations of media technologies and it is this shift which inaugurates the object-centred coordinates of the cosmobiopolitical: the governance of the human without actual humans. The legal basis of cosmobiopolitics, the OST respectively preserves the status of outer space as a globally shared domain and permits its occupation by technical media that are the legal province of particular terrestrial entities, thus accommodating the contradictory tenets of their governance. However, these governmental rationalities are defined by codes of law and ‘the law’ as Foucault (2007: 47) notes ‘works at the level of the imaginary’, and it can only imagine things which can and cannot be done; like the 0s and 1s of digital code, it only prescribes a state of presence or absence of things. It is the very presence of media technologies in outer space (and the absence of humans) which contradictorily makes possible and disturbs the cosmobiopolitical imaginary. Their remote position situates them beyond the reach of juridical rule and the policing-power of states, literally placing them outside of the ‘global grid’ of governance. While they are used as apparatus through which to enable human terrestrial enterprises, these objects themselves carry the essence of terra and of the absent presence of the human beyond the globe. The media technologies in outer space do not only reduce the incompatibility between the human and the extraterrestrial, but also introduce frictions within their exchanges. This disturbance suggests that their material realities disrupt the imaginaries implied by law and instead assert their own force, reinforcing these objects somewhat absurdly as the non-governable markers of extraterritoriality in the commons, as the non-human emissaries of humanity, and as a non-living population of objects which are managed as if they were alive. In outer space, the matter of media itself becomes code through which to define what can be propertied and what remains commons, what can be governed and what poses itself as ungovernable, where the human ends and the non-human begins, where the boundaries that distinguish governance of the living from the non-living lie and when biopolitics transmutes into a cosmobiopolitics. The media apparatus that support the metamorphosis of biopolitics in outer space are varied, and the milieus in which they function require a range of different performances. The following sections of this paper consider a number of the varying ways specific media technologies perform this extra-planetary extension of the impulse to govern life by focusing on satellites and their debris, and on the prospects of an interplanetary Internet. None of these specimens provides a complete picture of the ways in which media technologies inspire the advent of a cosmobiopolitics. Rather, each offers a different angle from which to consider the shifts in material and social arrangements that are demanded by forays beyond the earth, signs that herald a radical shift in the way humanity conceives of life and articulates its governance. What follows is a series of initial steps, the first paces in a far larger survey that aims to chart the natality of the emergent cosmic traits of biopolitics. I offer here a series of sketches, an outline of tentative trajectories suggested by contemporary mediatic excursions into outer space. By exploring how we manage an over-population of functional and defunct media objects in orbital space and imagine the utilities of interplanetary Internet networks, I suggest that human extraterrestrial medianatures necessitates a profound alteration in our relationship with the technologies, and the reframing of governmental obsessions with discourses of territory, security, and population.

#### The Affirmative obfuscates the intricate connection between the “Public” sector and “Militarism” – the Aff is merely a smokescreen to hide military development of outer space in new forms.

Sheehan 7, Michael. The international politics of space. Routledge, 2007. (Nancy and Peter Meinig Family Investigator in the Life Sciences, Assistant Professor)//Elmer

The 1958 Space Act declared that the United States was keen to explore space for ‘peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind’, and allowed for ‘cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations’.30 This declaration had a dual purpose. The first statement was designed to deflect attention away from the military dimension of US space research and reduce foreign concerns that the United States was seeking to militarize outer space. The second statement’s purpose was to promote the image of the United States as a scientific leader that was willing to share the development of space with other nations, and which therefore clearly had no hidden agenda beyond space exploration for the general benefit of humanity. In this regard, it fitted in with other US policy initiatives designed to promote the image of the United States as a country eager to cooperate internationally in an open and transparent manner. The Marshall Plan, Atoms-for-Peace and the Peace Corps were all part of this general image-building approach, though all had other motivations as well, as did the space policy. The apparent separation of civilian and military activities allowed the United States considerable flexibility. By having a largely transparent civilian-dominated programme, American public insecurity was alleviated, yet at the same time the US was able to continue its military programmes away from the glare of national and international scrutiny, and often successfully camouflaged behind actual or fictitious civilian space projects. In fact, unknown to the American public, there were three, not two space programmes, white, blue and black. The white programme was the high profile civilian programme led by NASA. The blue programme was the classified military programme run by the Department of Defense. In addition, there was the ‘black programme’, the reconnaissance programme run by the intelligence agencies. The apparent separation of the elements of the US space programme made it easier for the vast majority of the American political establishment to rally behind a substantial and energetic space programme. Liberals could support it as an alternative form of competition with the Soviet Union in an era when the dangers of nuclear war were very real, while conservatives saw the programme as developing military hardware and providing capabilities that would in the long run enhance the effectiveness of US armed forces.31

#### The Impact is unending war and environmental catastrophe.

Craven 19 [Matt Craven (Professor of International Law, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom). “‘Other Spaces’: Constructing the Legal Architecture of a Cold War Commons and the Scientific-Technical Imaginary of Outer Space”. European Journal of International Law, Volume 30, Issue 2, May 2019, Pages 547–572, Accessed 1/12/22. <https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/30/2/547/5536739> //Xu]

Even in the aftermath of the pronounced ‘closure’ of the Cold War, the residue of the formation that was brought into play in space remains very much with us today. On the one hand, outer space has been progressively enveloped within the technological infrastructure of warfare and policing actions – the first Gulf War of 1990 ushering in a new era of ‘smart’ weaponry and GPS-configured surgical violence139 – anticipating, in the process, the ‘remote’ operations of the drone and cyber warfare of the contemporary era. The blurring of the demarcation between the (outer space) technologies of war and peace finds its contemporary parallels in the collapse of a range of other operative distinctions – between the virtual and the real, the combatant and the civilian, the battlefield and the battle space, the interstate and the intra-state. The juridical formations on which these depend, furthermore, have themselves become enveloped within the same strategic operations – ‘lawfare’ becoming the adjunct to a new form of totalized warfare stripped of any spatial determinacy. On the other side, outer space has increasingly become the terrain of speculative capitalism, which, following the growth of space tourism (pioneered by the Russian space administration in the 1990s140), has seen the active development of a range of commercial projects from the construction of sub-orbital ‘space planes’ to asteroid and lunar mining undertaken by both public and private agencies. The imaginative resources for such projects have come from various directions, but a common theme is that impending resource depletion on earth will soon bring such resources within commercial and technological reach, and that outer space will therefore provide a ‘spatial fix’ for a system of global capitalism that might otherwise run into the ground.141 There is, as Katarina Damjanov has noted,142 a deep parallelism here between the juridical opening of the seas (mare liberum), which served to stabilize the system of sovereignty within Europe in the 17th century by extroverting the site of conflict and competition,143 and the opening of outer space three centuries later as another prophylactic measure, even if, in this case, that which was to be guarded against was a planetary-wide, environmental catastrophe. Perhaps the deepest irony, here, is that the mode of salvation on offer is precisely the same as that which is the extant cause of crisis, which one may take to be a remorseless instrumentalization of nature.

#### The alternative is *Worldism* – the refusal of international relations and specialization as dictated by militarism in favor of epistemological interventions into the exercise of Space as a carceral apparatus.

Agathangelou and Ling 09 Anna M. Agathangelou is an Associate Professor in the Departments of Political Science and Women’s Studies at York University, Canada and co-director of the Global Change Institute, Nicosia, Cyprus, L.H.M. Ling is an Associate Professor in the Graduate Program in Inter- national Affairs at The New School, New York, USA., Transforming World Politics: From empire to multiple worlds, The New International Relations Series, 2009.

MAIN ASPECTS Worldism presents world politics as a site of multiple worlds. These refer to the various and contending ways of being, knowing, and relating that have been passed onto us from previous generations. Histories, languages, myths, and memories institutionalize and embody multiple worlds through simple daily acts like cooking and eating, singing and dancing, joking and playing but also through larger events like trade, development, conflict, and war. Worldism registers not only the “difference” that comes from multiple worlds (see Inayatullah and Blaney 2004) but also their entwinements. Selves and others reverberate,2 producing multi- and trans-subjectivities that leave us legacies of reinforcement and conflict, reconstruction and critique, reconciliation and resistance. Such syncretic engagements belie seeming oppositions and contradictions among multiple worlds to reveal their underlying connections despite hegemony’s violent erasures. On this basis, communities have opportunities to heal and recuperate so they can build for another day, for another generation. Worldism as everyday life enacts self–other reverberations and syncretic engagements, especially by communities at the margins. Worldism as an analytical framework theorizes about them. Both types of worldist activity expose the problematic of empire in practice and logics. Building on the postcolonial notion that all parties make history, albeit with unequal access to power, worldism leads to an undeniable conclusion: our mutual embeddedness makes us mutually accountable. One cannot escape from the other. Mutual accountability brings with it duties and responsibilities, to be sure, but also possibilities: that is, (a) an internal dialectic of constant questioning to check and problematize hegemony, so that (b) we can expand our visions, strategies, and approaches beyond the narrow, hegemonic confines of realism/liberal internationalism, in order to (c) arrive at a more inclusive, conciliatory, and democratic world politics. In brief, worldism consists of two simultaneous processes: descriptive and analytical. Worldism-as-description features the following: (a) multi- and trans-subjectivities that institutionalize the social and structural reverberations between selves and others; (b) the agency of all parties, despite inequities and injustices, to create, build, and articulate multiple worlds; (c) syncretic engagements that consolidate the entwinements of multiple worlds into concrete strategies for change, adjustment, adaptation, refor- mulation, and transformation; and (d) community-building that integrates and accretes these syncretic engagements despite denials of such efforts from hegemonic elites and their ideologies. Worldism-as-analysis draws on the struggles and learning undertaken in worldist daily life to emphasize: (a) accountability as a hallmark of worldist inquiry that ensures (b) an internal criticality to question, contest, and challenge hegemony, so that we may (c) arrive at emancipatory construction even as we critique and resist. The critical reader may interject: Couldn’t “agency” and “accountabil- ity” in worldism be taken as a fancy way of blaming the victim? Are Jews, for example, responsible for the Holocaust; slaves for their enslavement; or any oppressed people for their oppression? Worldism as a politics of multiple relations subsumes this liberal, individualist understanding of responsibility. Multiple relations produce a web of effects and consequences to any kind of decisions and/or set of practices. Accountability in worldism asks: Who’s involved, under what conditions, and through which processes can we redress or transform the violence? What kinds of understanding are generated to account for these relations and/or to make them invisible? Without the painful concession that all of us, “abusers,” “victims,” and “innocent bystanders” alike, contribute to the production of hegemonic violence, whether it results in domestic abuse (see Adler and Ling 1995) or state violence (see Ling 1994), we may never realize how violence is conceived, generated, and sustained. By extension, we will never understand ways to end it. Instead, in our injuries and (self ) alienation, we may reproduce time and again the same conditions of violence or hegemony that afflicted us in the past and which seems the only option for the present. Suspended political ideals, in this case, could also block us from action and change. Worldist agency and accountability compel us to face the complicities (including our own) that sustain violence in the making of history, so that we may, as Marx exhorted, change it. Where do these ideas come from?, our reader may ask. Let us delineate the intellectual precedents to worldism. INTELLECTUAL PRECEDENTS Worldism draws on constructivism and postmodernism but also differs from them. Worldism shares with constructivism its emphasis on intersubject- ivity, and with postmodernism its insights on asymmetrical difference: that is, the norms, institutions, practices, and behaviors that set up certain subjects and subjectivities as more privileged and protected than others. Power, then, cannot be reduced to an objectified, reified condition of who’s “on top” or who “has more” but instead results from agents contributing to macro-political structures like ideology, organization, and capitalist relations. Power redefined in these terms stems from an intersubjective consensus within a context of material conditions and relations. The crux here lies in the framing. Since narration as a process is never complete, the story can always change.3 However, worldism departs from constructivism by asking: What kinds of intersubjectivity are constructed, by whom, and for what purpose, and how do theories of subjectivity restructure the world “otherwise”? And is this how we want the world to be? Not probing into the social relations of intersubjectivity, according to worldism, effectively erases the power politics of meaning, including the political economy behind such constructions. And unlike postmodernism, worldism distinguishes power from the resistance it induces. Contra Foucault (1994), we differentiate between the colonizer and colonized in their experiences of colonial power (see Stoler 2002) and the entwinements that follow, both reinforcing and conflicting complicity (see Ling 2002b). Not doing so implicitly reinforces the imperialist assertion that “this is the way the world is”: that is, it is not open to alternative concepts, discourses, strategies, or ways of being. These gaps in constructivism and postmodernism return us to the conventional treatment of power as domination, pure and simple. Ronen Palan (2000), for instance, finds a strain of conservative realism in Alexander Wendt’s “naturalist” version of constructivism, primarily because he claims to offer a method only, and not an interpretation, of politics. Wendt (2005) himself admits as much. For similar reasons, Samir Amin (2004) calls postmodernism an “ideological accessory” to elite, bourgeois interests just as Aijaz Ahmad (1992) considers post-structuralist theories serve as alibis for imperialism. Both post- modernism and poststructuralism value critique and deconstruction over political action, thereby keeping de facto power intact. We note that although critical theories like postmodernism and con- structivism open up spaces to think about shifting power politics, they fall short of transforming the very asymmetries they critique. Inattention to structural, material interest and lack of integrating the Other analytically – that is, as a substantive maker of the world – undermines their claims of emancipatory social theory. Ultimately, the Other becomes a repository of raw materials for hegemonic actors and sites in the North to process. Worldism acknowledges a deep intellectual debt to postcolonial studies. Here, race, gender, sexuality, class, and nationality serve as analytics and substance in examinations of power relations. Postcolonial studies demystify empire’s boast, like Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden,” that the imperial Self makes the world for all Others. And that world is unidimensional (top- down state power), unilateral (center dominates periphery), and unilinear (past–present–future). Postcolonial studies record a more nuanced and multiple history by problematizing the ways colonial power is imposed on the colonized. That is, colonization involves more than a unilateral and mechanical domination of the subjugated by colonizers and their states. As documented by postcolonial studies, tensions and contradictions emerge from these relations (Said 1979; Spivak 1999), leading to adaptations and integrations between hegemonic selves and subaltern others. From this inter- action, “colonizers” and “colonized” produced something together over the course of time that neither anticipated nor perhaps desired but which all learned to live with, and eventually called their own. Divides along lines of property, race, class, language, religion, and ideology did not disappear. They fused, rather, into hybrid, creole, or mélange cultures that, nonethe- less, contested these categories constantly (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1995; Lewis and Mills 2003). In recognizing that colonizer and colonized mutually construct their sub- jectivities, postcolonial studies attribute to both the legacies of power that we face today. Note, for example, Britain’s principal instrument of colonial and imperial power: the East India Company. Sudipta Sen (1998) shows that, contrary to claims that the British brought capitalism to India, the East India Company had to adjust to pre-existing market structures and political relations to gain access to the thriving trade already in place in northern India.4 Only through this kind of entry could the East India Company later redirect the trade to its favor. L.H.M. Ling (2002b) traces how institutional elites in East Asia learned syncretically and “interstitially” between two world orders – the agrarian-based, cosmo-moral universe of Confucian governance and the Westphalian inter-state system of commerce and trade – to cumulate into what we know as Asian capitalism today. Walter Mignolo (2000) highlights the “gnosis” of thought and action, Self and Other, that comes from centuries of transgressing and reformulating the colonial boundaries that comprise Latin America. Of course, those subjected to hegemony must accommodate others more than those who perpetrate it. Yet hegemony’s very asymmetry highlights the resilience and creativity of the marginalized. Ordinary people can journey across subjectivities to engage syncretically with others, even under conditions of poverty and inequality, to rebuild, reconstruct, and reorganize communities. Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua (1983) characterize their straddling of multiple worlds as life on the “borderlands.” Typically, they point out, women of color from the South must bear the biggest burden of negotiating the multiple worlds of language, culture, class, and gender to survive white- majority society in the North despite systemic discrimination and obstacles. Still, they are able to exercise internal reserves of freedom, thought, and action to sort through hegemony, not simply surrender to it. Similarly, the indigenous populations of the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand have entered into treaties with their white majorities to retain aspects of indigenous ontologies by formalizing them in Western institutions (Shilliam 2008).

## Case

#### Top level Megaconstellations do not appropriate – they aren’t permanent or exclusive

Johnson 20 [Chris Johnson is the Space Law Advisor for Secure World Foundation and has nine years of professional experience in international space law and policy. He has authored and co-authored publications on international space law, national space legislation, international cooperation in space, human-robotic cooperative space exploration, and on the societal benefits of space technology for Africa. "The Legal Status of MegaLEO Constellations and Concerns About Appropriation of Large Swaths of Earth Orbit." https://swfound.org/media/206951/johnson2020\_referenceworkentry\_thelegalstatusofmegaleoconstel.pdf]

No, This Is Not Impermissible Appropriation

An opposite conclusion can also be reasonably arrived at when approached along the following lines. The counter argument would assert that the deployment and operation of these global constellations, such as SpaceX’s Starlink, OneWeb, Kepler, etc., are aligned with and in full conformity with the laws applicable to outer space. These constellations are merely the exercise and enjoyment of the freedom of exploration and use of outer space and do not constitute any impermissible appropriation of the orbits that they transit.

Freedom of Access and Use Permits Constellations

Rather than being a violation of other’s rights to access and explore outer space, the deployment of these constellations is more correctly viewed as the exercise and enjoyment of the right to access and use outer space. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes a right to access and use space without discrimination.

Not allowing an actor to deploy spacecraft, regardless of their number or destination, would be infringing with the exercise of their freedom. It would be discriminatory. Additionally, actors do not need permission from any other State, or group of States, to access and explore outer space.

Aligned with the Intentions of the Outer Space Treaty

This use of outer space by constellations in LEO, while not explicitly mentioned by the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty or other space law, actually is the fulfillment of their visions for the use of outer space. The preamble to the Outer Space Treaty (which contains the subject matter and purpose of the treaty and can be used for interpreting the operative articles of the treaty) speaks of the aspirations of humanity in exploring and using outer space. It is easy to see constellations that will provide Internet access to the world as fulfilling the visions of the drafters:

The States Parties to this Treaty, Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer space, Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development, Desiring to contribute to broad international cooperation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, Believing that such cooperation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples, As such, subsequent article of the Outer Space Treaty should be read in a permissive light, as permitting constellations, rather than a restrictive light which only sees potential negative aspects of constellations. Due Regard and Harmful Contamination Will be Addressed

Operators in LEO are well aware of the challenges to space sustainability that their constellations will pose and will be taking efforts to mitigate the creation of debris. OneWeb is keenly focused on space sustainability and has even argued that the current norm, whereby spacecraft are not in space for longer than 25 years and are deorbited from lower orbits at the end of their lifetime (aka post mission disposal), is not sufficient to keep outer space clean and that shorter lifespan limits should be imposed on operators, especially operators in LEO, and operators of small satellites.

Additionally, these systems will be able to cooperate with emerging space safety and space traffic management plans and can operate in ways that do not restrict or impinge on other users of the space domain. Because due regard is therefore displayed for the space domain, and to the interests of others, these constellations do not prejudice or infringe upon the freedoms of use and exploration of the space domain and are therefore not occupation, or possession, much less appropriation.

This Does Not Constitute Possession, or Ownership, or Occupation

The use of LEO by satellite constellations is substantially similar to the use of GSO, and therefore permissible. In each region, individual actors are given permission - either from a national administrator or from an international governing body (the ITU) via a national administer–to use precoordinated subsections of space. In a way that is overwhelmingly similar to the use of orbital slots in GSO, the placement of spacecraft into orbits in LEO or higher orbits does not constitute possession, ownership, or occupation of those orbits. This is because States (and their companies) have been occupying orbital slots in GSO for decades, and these uses of GSO have never been accused of “appropriating” GSO. The users have never claimed to be appropriating GSO, and their exercising of rights to use GSO is respected by other actors in the space domain. This is the same situation for other orbits, including LEO and other non-Geostationary orbits.

And while GSO locations are relatively stable (subject to space weather and other perturbations, and require stationkeeping), spacecraft in LEO are actually moving through space and are not stationary, so it is even more difficult to see this use by constellations as occupation, much less appropriation. Moreover, Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Traffic Management (STM) will allow other uses to use these orbits, and nothing about the use of any one user necessarily precludes others. Lastly, there is no intention by operators of constellations to exclusively occupy, must less possess or appropriate, these orbits. Would not the appropriation of outer space be an intentional, volutional act? No such intention can be found in the operators of global constellations.

#### Satellite positioning is de facto appropriation, not appropriation proper.

Matignon 19 [Louis de Gouyon Matignon, PhD in space law from Georgetown University, “ORBITAL SLOTS AND SPACE CONGESTION,” 06/03/19, *Space Legal Issues*, https://www.spacelegalissues.com/orbital-slots-and-space-congestion/, EA]

Near-Earth space is formed of different orbital layers. Terrestrial orbits are limited common resources and inherently repugnant to any appropriation: they are not property in the sense of law. Orbits and frequencies are res communis (a Latin term derived from Roman law that preceded today’s concepts of the commons and common heritage of mankind; it has relevance in international law and common law). It’s the first-come, first-served principle that applies to orbital positioning, which without any formal acquisition of sovereignty, records a promptness behaviour to which it grants an exclusive grabbing effect of the space concerned. Geostationary orbit is a limited but permanent resource: this de facto appropriation by the first-comers – the developed countries – of the orbit and the frequencies is protected by Space Law and the International Telecommunications Law. The challenge by developing countries of grabbing these resources is therefore unjustified on the basis of existing law. Denying new entrants geostationary-access or making access more difficult does not constitute appropriation; it simply results from the traditional system of distribution of access rights. The practice of developed States is based on free access and priority given to the first satellites placed in geostationary orbit.

### 1NC---AT: Debris

private entities will just reclassify constellations as something else to circumvent the plan – large satellite constellations arent a term of art

#### Russian ASAT Tests thump

Panda 2021 (Ankit, STANTON SENIOR FELLOW NUCLEAR POLICY PROGRAM Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., The Dangerous Fallout of Russia’s Anti-Satellite Missile Test, November 21, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/17/dangerous-fallout-of-russia-s-anti-satellite-missile-test-pub-85804)-TL

Russia has tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile against a live satellite target, the third test of its kind by a country since 2007. The test, and the resulting orbital debris, have focused international attention on the rapidly declining sustainability of near-Earth space and the need to constrain this kind of weapons testing. On November 15, a Russian PL19 Nudol interceptor missile launched in northern Russia struck the now-defunct Soviet-era COSMOS 1408 satellite at an approximate altitude of 480 kilometers (about 300 miles). The intercept has generated a massive debris field in low-Earth orbit (LEO); according to U.S. Space Command, “more than 1,500 pieces of trackable orbital debris” have already been detected, and “hundreds of thousands of smaller [fragments]” are likely to surface. The test represents a serious challenge to space sustainability and immediately increases the collision risk that other human-made objects in LEO face, including human-inhabited objects like the International Space Station and China’s Tiangong space station. This test underscores the pressing need to develop new international norms and rules of behavior in space. It should further galvanize international efforts to ban this sort of weapons testing, which has significant negative consequences for the space environment near Earth.

### 1NC---AT: Hacking

#### No UQ about who is going to hack constellations

No IL to nuclear war none of your evidence says it

#### Hacking of SATs by the government nonuniques this advantage– we’ve inserted in blue

Akoto 20 “Hackers could shut down satellites -- or turn them into weapons” February 13, 2020 William Akoto [a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Denver.] <https://www.upi.com/Top_News/Voices/2020/02/13/Hackers-could-shut-down-satellites-or-turn-them-into-weapons/4091581597502/> SM

This scenario played out in 1998 when hackers took control of the U.S.-German ROSAT X-Ray satellite. They did it by hacking into computers at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland. The hackers then instructed the satellite to aim its solar panels directly at the sun. This effectively fried its batteries and rendered the satellite useless. The defunct satellite eventually crashed back to Earth in 2011. Hackers could also hold satellites for ransom, as happened in 1999 when hackers took control of the U.K.'s SkyNet satellites.

Over the years, the threat of cyberattacks on satellites has gotten more dire. In 2008, hackers, possibly from China, reportedly took full control of two NASA satellites, one for about two minutes and the other for about nine minutes. In 2018, another group of Chinese state-backed hackers reportedly launched a sophisticated hacking campaign aimed at satellite operators and defense contractors. Iranian hacking groups have also attempted similar attacks.