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#### US dominance is secured in biotech now, but China’s closing the gap fast – that allows geopolitical and economic advantages

Scott **Moore** **2020** [(Director of the Penn Global China Program at the University of Pennsylvania. Previously, Moore was a Young Professional and Water Resources Management Specialist at the World Bank Group, and Environment, Science, Technology, and Health Officer for China at the U.S.) “China’s Role In The Global Biotechnology Sector And Implications For U.S. Policy” <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200427_china_biotechnology_moore.pdf>] TDI // Recut NChu

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Even by the standards of emerging technologies, **biotechnology has the potential to utterly transform geopolitics, economics**, and society in the 21st century. Yet while the United States has long been the world leader in most segments of the global biotechnology sector, **China is fast becoming a significant player**. This brief assesses the implications of China’s changing role in biotechnology for the United States, which span national security, data security, and economic competitiveness. On current trends the United States is likely to remain the world leader in most biotechnology areas. **However, the gap between China and the U.S. is narrowing in the biotechnology sector,** and U.S. policymakers must boost public investment, liberalize immigration and foreign student visa policies, and enact regulatory reforms to ensure America remains competitive. At the same time, areas like vaccine development and regulation of emerging technologies like synthetic biology present rich opportunities for Sino-U.S. cooperation. INTRODUCTION Thanks to extensive government funding for biomedical research, an unparalleled ability to translate basic research into commercial products and applications, and strong intellectual property protections, the United States has been the dominant global player in developing and commercializing biotechnology for decades.1 This dominance is reflected in the fact that United States accounted for almost half of all biotechnology patents filed worldwide from 1999 to 2013.2 However, in the intervening years, and just as in the case of artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies, other nations, including South Korea and Singapore, have invested heavily in developing their biotechnology sectors and industries. These efforts pale, however, in comparison to those of China, and the sheer size and scale of the Chinese biotechnology industry pose a range of economic, security, and regulatory issues for American policymakers. The determination of China’s one-party state to become a leading player in biotechnology is reflected by the rapid growth in investment in the sector. Some estimates claim that collectively, **China’s** central, local, and provincial **governments have invested over $100 billion in life sciences** research and development. Regardless of the true figure, official encouragement has led to a torrid place of investment. In just the two-year period from 2015 to 2017, venture capital and private equity investment in the sector totaled some $45 billion.3 The value of commercial deals concluded in the fields of biology, medicine and medical machine technology, meanwhile increased from 25.8 billion renminbi (RMB), or $3.6 billion, in 2011 to over 75 billion RMB ($10.6 billion) in 2017.4 Annual research and development expenditures by Chinese pharmaceutical firms, the foundation of the biotechnology sector, rose from some 39 billion RMB in 2014 ($5.5 billion) to over 53 billion RMB (US$7.5 billion) by 2017. Expenditure on new product development among these firms, an important indicator of future growth potential, increased from just over 40 billion RMB ($5.6 billion) to almost 60 billion ($8.4 billion).5 By Western standards, some of these figures are still low. Swiss drugmaker Roche, the world leader in biotechnology research and development, spent some $11 billion in 2018 alone.6 As these figures suggest, the development of China’s biotechnology sector paints a nuanced picture for U.S. policymakers. On one hand, the sector’s rapid growth, and high-level commitment to continued investment, means that China will inevitably become an increasingly important player in the global biotechnology sector, **with implications for national security, economic competitiveness, and regulation**. An executive from In-Q-Tel, the U.S. government’s inhouse national security venture capital fund, warned Congress in a November 2019 hearing, for example, that China “intends to own the biorevolution… and they are building the infrastructure, the talent pipeline, the regulatory system, and the financial system they need to do that.”7 The CEO of European drugmaker AstraZeneca has similarly opined that “Much of [China’s] innovation in the last three to four years has been ‘me too,’ but now on the horizon we can see firstin-class innovation.”8 Yet on the other hand, while China’s biotechnology sector will almost certainly continue to grow in scale, sophistication, and competitiveness, there is little reason to believe on current trends that the United States will lose its edge in the sector. Indeed, the biggest risk to the global competitiveness of the U.S. biotechnology industry likely comes from the prospect of declining public investment and reduced mobility for world-class researchers and industry professionals. Moreover, the COVID-19 crisis underscores both the importance of continued investment in biotechnology and the many challenges to promoting effective international cooperation on global health security. This brief first examines the key policies and actors in China’s biotechnology sector, then offers an assessment of the sector’s current capabilities and future trends, and finally further explores the implications of developments in Chinese biotechnology for U.S. policy.

#### The aff’s waiving of IP doesn’t solve but it does give away sensitive national security information that allows China to lead ahead in biotech

Josh Rogin 4-8. [(Washington Post Columnist covering National Security Issues.) “Opinion: The wrong way to fight vaccine nationalism” https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-wrong-way-to-fight-vaccine-nationalism/2021/04/08/9a65e15e-98a8-11eb-962b-78c1d8228819\_story.html ] TDI // Recut NChu

Americans will not be safe from covid-19 until the entire world is safe. That basic truth shows why vaccine nationalism is not only immoral but also counterproductive. But the simplest solutions are rarely the correct ones, **and some countries are using the issue to advance their own strategic interests**. The Biden administration must reject the effort by some nations to turn our shared crisis into their opportunity. As the inequities of vaccine distribution worldwide grow, a group of more than 50 developing countries led by India and South Africa is pushing the World Trade Organization to dissolve all international intellectual property protections for pandemic-related products, which would include vaccine research patents, manufacturing designs and technological know-how. The Trump administration rejected the proposal to waive the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) for the pandemic when it was introduced in October. Now, hundreds of nongovernmental organizations and dozens of Democratic lawmakers are pushing the Biden administration to support the proposal. But many warn **the move would result in the United States handing over a generation of advanced research** — much of it funded by the U.S. taxpayer — **to** our country’s greatest competitors, above all **China**. In Congress, there’s justified frustration with the United States’ failure to respond to China’s robust vaccine diplomacy, in which Beijing has conditioned vaccine offers to pandemic-stricken countries on their ignoring security concerns over Chinese telecom companies or abandoning diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. There’s also a lot of anger at Big Pharma among progressives for profiting from the pandemic. “We are in a race against time, and unfortunately Big Pharma is standing in the way of speedily addressing this problem,” Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.), who supports the effort to waive intellectual property protections, told me in an interview. “I think the real security issue is that while the United States balks in making sure that we help ourselves, that these adversaries will just jump right in.” Schakowsky argued that alternative measures for helping poor countries manufacture vaccines are simply not moving fast enough to save lives and that the United States has a duty to respond. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) personally conveyed her support for the waiver to President Biden, Schakowsky said. But Big Pharma is just one piece of the puzzle. Countries such as India and South Africa have been trying to weaken WTO intellectual property protections for decades. **The mRNA technology that underpins the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines was funded initially by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and has national security implications.** Inside the Biden administration, the National Security Council has already convened several meetings on the issue. The waiver is supported by many global health officials in the White House and at the U.S. Agency for International Development, who believe the United States’ international reputation is suffering from its perceived “America First” vaccine strategy. On Wednesday, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai spoke with WTO Director General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala about the waiver issue. USTR is convening its own interagency meetings on the issue, which many see as a move to reassert its jurisdiction over WTO matters. If and when this does get to Biden’s desk, he will also hear from national security officials who believe that waiving TRIPS would result in the forced transfer of national security-sensitive technology to China, **a country that strives to dominate the biotechnology** ***field*** as part of its Made in China 2025 strategy. **Once countries such as China have this technology, they will apply their mercantilist industrial models to ensure their companies dominate these strategically important industries, potentially erasing thousands of U.S. jobs.** “We would be delivering a competitive advantage to countries that are increasingly viewed as our adversaries, at taxpayer expense, when there are other ways of doing this,” said Mark Cohen, senior fellow at the University of California at Berkeley Law School. **A preferable approach would be to build more vaccine-manufacturing capacity** in the United States and then give those vaccines to countries in need, said Cohen. The U.S. pharmaceutical industry would surely benefit, but **that’s preferable to being dependent on other countries when the next pandemic hits.** “If there’s anything that the pandemic has taught us, it’s that we need to have a robust supply chain, for ourselves and for the world generally,” Cohen said. What’s more, it’s not clear that waiving the TRIPS agreement for the pandemic would work in the first place. Bill Gates and others involved in the current vaccine distribution scheme have argued that it would not result in more vaccines, pointing out that licensing agreements are already successfully facilitating cooperation between patent-holding vaccine-makers and foreign manufacturers. Critics respond that such cooperation is still failing to meet the urgent needs in the developing world. Vaccine equity is a real problem, but waiving intellectual property rights is not the solution. If the current system is not getting shots into the arms of people in poor countries, we must fix that for their sake and ours. But the pandemic and our responses to it have geopolitical implications, whether we like it or not. **That means helping the world and thinking about our strategic interests at the same time.**

#### China will convert biotechnology gains to military advantages, undermining US primacy – specifically true in the context of vaccines

Mercy A. Kuo 2017 [(Executive Vice President at Pamir Consulting.) “The Great US-China Biotechnology and Artificial Intelligence Race” <https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/the-great-us-china-biotechnology-and-artificial-intelligence-race/>] TDI // Recut NChu

Trans-Pacific View author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into the U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Eleonore Pauwels – Director of Biology Collectives and Senior Program Associate, Science and Technology Innovation Program at the Wilson Center in Washington D.C. – is the 104th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.” Explain the motivation behind Chinese investment in U.S. genomics and artificial intelligence (AI). With large public and private investments inland and in the U.S., China plans to become the next AI-Genomics powerhouse, which indicates that these technologies will soon converge in China. China’s ambition is to lead the global market for precision medicine, **which necessitates acquiring strategic tech**nological and human capital in both genomics and AI. And the country excels at this game. A sharp blow in this U.S.-China competition happened in 2013 when BGI purchased Complete Genomics, in California, with the intent to build its own advanced genomic sequencing machines, therefore securing a technological knowhow mainly mastered by U.S. producers. There are significant economic incentives behind China’s heavy investment in the increasing convergence of AI and genomics. This golden combination will drive precision medicine to new heights by developing a more sophisticated understanding of how our genomes function, leading to precise, even personalized, cancer therapeutics and preventive diagnostics, such as liquid biopsies. By one estimate, the liquid biopsy market is expected to be worth $40 billion in 2017. Assess the implications of iCarbonX of Shenzhen’s decision to invest US$100 million in U.S.-company PatientsLikeMe relative to AI and genomic data collection. iCarbonX is a pioneer in AI software that learns to recognize useful relationships between large amounts of individuals’ biological, medical, behavioral and psychological data. Such a data-ecosystem will deliver insights into how an individual’s genome is mutating over time, and therefore critical information about this individual’s susceptibilities to rare, chronic and mental illnesses. In 2017, iCarbonX invested $100 million in PatientsLikeMe, getting a hold over data from the biggest online network of patients with rare and chronic diseases. If successful, this effort could turn into genetic gold, making iCarbonX one of the wealthiest healthcare companies in China and beyond. The risk factor is that iCarbonX is handling more than personal data, but potentially vulnerable data as the company uses a smartphone application, Meum, for customers to consult for health advice. Remember that the Chinese nascent genomics and AI industry relies on cloud computing for genomics data-storage and exchange, creating, in its wake, new vulnerabilities associated with any internet-based technology. This phenomenon has severe implications. How much consideration has been given to privacy and the evolving notion of personal data in this AI-powered health economy? And is our cyberinfrastructure ready to protect such trove of personal health data from hackers and industrial espionage? In this new race, will China and the U.S. have to constantly accelerate their rate of cyber and bio-innovation to be more resilient? Refining our models of genomics data protection will become a critical biosecurity issue. Why is Chinese access to U.S. genomic data a national security concern? **Genomics** and computing research **is inherently dual-use, therefore a strategic advantage in a nation’s security arsenal.** Using AI systems to understand how the functioning of our genomes impacts our health **is of strategic importance for biodefense.** This knowledge will lead to increasing developments at the forefront of medical countermeasures, **including vaccines**, antibiotics, and targeted treatments relying on virus-engineering and microbiome research. Applying deep learning to genomics data-sets could help geneticists learn how to use genome-editing (CRISPR) to efficiently engineer living systems, but also to treat and, even “optimize,” human health, **with potential applications in military enhancements**. A $15 million partnership between a U.S. company, Gingko Bioworks, and DARPA aims to genetically design new probiotics as a protection for soldiers against a variety of stomach bugs and illnesses. China could be using the same deep learning techniques on U.S. genomics data to better comprehend how to develop, patent and manufacture tailored cancer immunotherapies in high demand in the United States. Yet, what if Chinese efforts venture into understanding how to impact key genomics health determinants relevant to the U.S. population? **Gaining access to increasingly large U.S. genomic data-sets gives China a knowledge advantage into leading the next steps in bio-military research.** Could biomedical data be used to develop bioweapons? Explain. Personalized medicine advances mean that personalized bio-attacks are increasingly possible. The combination of AI with biomedical data and genome-editing technologies will help us predict genes most important to particular functions. Such insights will contribute to knowing how a particular disease occurs, how a newly-discovered virus has high transmissibility, but also why certain populations and individuals are more susceptible to it. Combining host susceptibility information with pathogenic targeted design, **malicious actors could engineer pathogens that are tailored to overcome the immune system or the microbiome of specific populations.**

#### Maintenance of the US-led LIO is key to reduce a host of existential threats – establishes great-power peace.

Brands 18. [(Hal Brands is a Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. “America’s Global Order Is Worth Fighting For, Bloomberg Opinion, Politics & Policy,” August 14, 2018, Bloomberg. <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-14/america-s-global-order-is-worth-fighting-for>] TDI // Recut NChu

The first argument is easily disposed of. Yes, the postwar world has been thoroughly imperfect, featuring nuclear arms races, genocides, widespread poverty and other scourges. But the world has always been imperfect, and by any meaningful comparison, the last seven decades have been a veritable golden age. The liberal international economic order has led to an explosion of domestic and global prosperity: According to World Bank data, both U.S. and global per capita income have increased roughly three-fold (in inflation-adjusted terms) since 1960, with U.S. gross domestic product increasing nearly six-fold. The U.S. system of alliances and forward military deployments has contributed critically to the longest period of great-power peace in modern history, and the incidence of war and conquest more broadly have dropped dramatically. The number of democracies in the world has increased from perhaps a dozen during World War II to well over 100 today; respect for basic human rights has also reached impressive levels. As a bevy of scholarship has shown, the policies that the U.S. has pursued and the international order it has built have contributed enormously and directly to these outcomes. If the liberal international order can’t be considered a smashing success, no international order could be. The second critique is also overstated. It is true that Washington, like all great powers throughout history, has been willing to bend the rules to get its way. It is hard to reconcile Cold War-era interventions in Guatemala, Chile and other countries with a professed solicitude for human rights and democracy; the Iraq War of 2003 is only one instance in which the U.S. brushed aside the concerns of international organizations such as the U.N. Security Council. Likewise, when the U.S. government determined that the Bretton Woods system of monetary relations no longer suited its interests in the 1970s, it terminated that scheme and insisted on creating a more favorable one. But again, the proper standard here is not sainthood but reality. And the U.S. has generally enlisted its power in the service of universal values such as democracy and human rights; it has, more often than not, promoted a positive-sum international system in which like-minded nations can be secure and wealthy. This goes back to the very beginning of the liberal order: Washington did not seek to hold its defeated adversaries in subjugation after World War II; it rebuilt Japan and western Germany into thriving, democratic allies that became fierce economic competitors to the U.S. The U.S. has taken this approach not simply because it wanted to do good in the world — powerful as this motivation is — but because of a hard-headed desire to do good for itself. In an interdependent global environment, American officials have long calculated, the U.S. cannot divorce its own well-being from that of the wider world. And in contrast to how other great powers — Imperial Japan, for instance, or the Soviet Union — ruled their spheres of influence, American behavior has been positively enlightened. It is this relatively benign behavior that has convinced so many countries to tolerate American leadership — and it is the emergence of a darker form of U.S. hegemony under the Trump administration that so profoundly worries them today. As for the third critique, the premise is right, but the conclusion can easily go too far. It is always dangerous to become so enraptured by past achievements that one loses sight of the need for adaptation in the future. This is particularly true today, because the strength of the liberal order is being tested from within and without, by issues ranging from unequal burden-sharing among American allies to the ambivalence of the American people themselves. There is little evidence to suggest, however, that either American power or the liberal order it supports have eroded so dramatically that Washington’s postwar project cannot be sustained. Quite the contrary — the U.S. is likely to remain the world’s strongest power for decades to come.

## 2

#### Climate Patents and Innovation high now and solving Warming but patent waivers set a dangerous precedent for appropriations - the mere threat is sufficient is enough to kill investment.

Brand 5-26, Melissa. “Trips Ip Waiver Could Establish Dangerous Precedent for Climate Change and Other Biotech Sectors.” IPWatchdog.com | Patents & Patent Law, 26 May 2021, www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/05/26/trips-ip-waiver-establish-dangerous-precedent-climate-change-biotech-sectors/id=133964/. //sid

The biotech industry is making remarkable advancestowards climate change solutions, and it is precisely for this reason that it can expect to be in the crosshairs of potential IP waiver discussions. President Biden is correct to refer to climate change as an existential crisis. Yet it does not take too much effort to connect the dots between President Biden’s focus on climate change and his Administration’s recent commitment to waive global IP rights for Covid vaccines (TRIPS IP Waiver). “This is a global health crisis, and the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic call for extraordinary measures.” If an IP waiver is purportedly necessary to solve the COVID-19 global health crisis (and of course [we dispute this notion](https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/04/19/waiving-ip-rights-during-times-of-covid-a-false-good-idea/id=132399/)), can we really feel confident that this or some future Administration will not apply the same logic to the climate crisis? And, without the confidence in the underlying IP for such solutions, what does this mean for U.S. innovation and economic growth? United States Trade Representative (USTR) [Katherine Tai](https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/05/05/tai-says-united-states-will-back-india-southafrica-proposal-waive-ip-rights-trips/id=133224/) was subject to questioning along this very line during a recent Senate Finance Committee hearing. And while Ambassador Tai did not affirmatively state that an IP waiver would be in the future for climate change technology, she surely did not assuage the concerns of interested parties. The United States has historically supported robust IP protection. This support is one reason the United States is the center of biotechnology innovation and leading the fight against COVID-19. However, a brief review of the domestic legislation arguably most relevant to this discussion shows just how far the international campaign against IP rights has eroded our normative position. The Clean Air Act, for example, contains a provision allowing for the mandatory licensing of patents covering certain devices for reducing air pollution. Importantly, however, the patent owner is accorded due process and the statute lays out a detailed process regulating the manner in which any such license can be issued, including findings of necessity and that no reasonable alternative method to accomplish the legislated goal exists. Also of critical importance is that the statute requires compensation to the patent holder. Similarly, the Atomic Energy Act contemplates mandatory licensing of patents covering inventions of primary importance in producing or utilizing atomic energy. This statute, too, requires due process, findings of importance to the statutory goals and compensation to the rights holder. A TRIPS IP waiver would operate outside of these types of frameworks. There would be no due process, no particularized findings, no compensationand no recourse. Indeed, the fact that the World Trade Organization (WTO) already has a process under the TRIPS agreement to address public health crises, including the compulsory licensing provisions, with necessary guardrails and compensation, makes quite clear that the waiver would operate as a free for all. Forced Tech Transfer Could Be on The Table When being questioned about the scope of a potential TRIPS IP waiver, Ambassador Tai invoked the proverb “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” While this answer suggests primarily that, in times of famine, the Administration would rather give away other people’s fishing rods than share its own plentiful supply of fish (here: actual COVID-19 vaccine stocks), it is apparent that in Ambassador Tai’s view waiving patent rights alone would not help lower- and middle-income countries produce their own vaccines. Rather, they would need to be taught how to make the vaccines and given the biotech industry’s manufacturing know-how, sensitive cell lines, and proprietary cell culture media in order to do so. In other words, Ambassador Tai acknowledged that the scope of the current TRIPS IP waiver discussions includes the concept of forced tech transfer. In the context of climate change, the idea would be that companies who develop successful methods for producing new seed technologies and sustainable biomass**,** reducing greenhouse gases in manufacturing and transportation, capturing and sequestering carbon in soil and products, and more, would be required to turn over their proprietaryknow-how to global competitors. While it is unclear how this concept would work in practice and under the constitutions of certain countries, the suggestion alone could be devastating to voluntary internationalcollaborations. Even if one could assume that the United States could not implement forced tech transfer on its own soil, what about the governments of our international development partners? It is not hard to understand that a U.S.-based company developing climate change technologies would be unenthusiastic about partnering with a company abroad knowing that the foreign country’s government is on track – with the assent of the U.S. government – to change its laws and seize proprietary materials and know-how that had been voluntarily transferred to the local company. Necessary Investment Could Diminish Developing climate change solutions is not an easy endeavor and bad policy positions threaten the likelihood that they will materialize. These products have long lead times from research and development to market introduction, owing not only to a high rate of failure but also rigorous regulatory oversight. Significant investment is required to sustain and drive these challenging and long-enduring endeavors. For example, synthetic biology companies critical to this area of innovation [raised over $1 billion in investment in the second quarter of 2019 alone](https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/Climate%20Report_FINAL.pdf). If investors cannot be confident that IP will be in place to protect important climate change technologies after their long road from bench to market, it is unlikely they will continue to investat the current and required levels**.**

#### Climate change destroys the world.

Specktor 19 [Brandon writes about the science of everyday life for Live Science, and previously for Reader's Digest magazine, where he served as an editor for five years] 6-4-2019, "Human Civilization Will Crumble by 2050 If We Don't Stop Climate Change Now, New Paper Claims," livescience, <https://www.livescience.com/65633-climate-change-dooms-humans-by-2050.html> Justin

The current climate crisis, they say, is larger and more complex than any humans have ever dealt with before. General climate models — like the one that the [United Nations' Panel on Climate Change](https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/) (IPCC) used in 2018 to predict that a global temperature increase of 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees Celsius) could put hundreds of millions of people at risk — fail to account for the **sheer complexity of Earth's many interlinked geological processes**; as such, they fail to adequately predict the scale of the potential consequences. The truth, the authors wrote, is probably far worse than any models can fathom. How the world ends What might an accurate worst-case picture of the planet's climate-addled future actually look like, then? The authors provide one particularly grim scenario that begins with world governments "politely ignoring" the advice of scientists and the will of the public to decarbonize the economy (finding alternative energy sources), resulting in a global temperature increase 5.4 F (3 C) by the year 2050. At this point, the world's ice sheets vanish; brutal droughts kill many of the trees in the [Amazon rainforest](https://www.livescience.com/57266-amazon-river.html) (removing one of the world's largest carbon offsets); and the planet plunges into a feedback loop of ever-hotter, ever-deadlier conditions. "Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and **55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of** [**lethal heat conditions**](https://www.livescience.com/55129-how-heat-waves-kill-so-quickly.html), beyond the threshold of human survivability," the authors hypothesized. Meanwhile, droughts, floods and wildfires regularly ravage the land. Nearly **one-third of the world's land surface turns to desert**. Entire **ecosystems collapse**, beginning with the **planet's coral reefs**, the **rainforest and the Arctic ice sheets.** The world's tropics are hit hardest by these new climate extremes, destroying the region's agriculture and turning more than 1 billion people into refugees. This mass movement of refugees — coupled with [shrinking coastlines](https://www.livescience.com/51990-sea-level-rise-unknowns.html) and severe drops in food and water availability — begin to **stress the fabric of the world's largest nations**, including the United States. Armed conflicts over resources, perhaps culminating in **nuclear war, are likely**. The result, according to the new paper, is "outright chaos" and perhaps "the end of human global civilization as we know it."

## 3

#### Counterplan Text: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to 1] reduce intellectual property protections for medicines except for dual-use biotechnologies and 2] offer a 3 year patent extension on dual use biotechnologies conditioned on accompanying countermeasures.

#### The counterplan incentivizes development into countermeasures and removes terrorist access to biotechnologies.

Million-Perez, H. (2016). Addressing duel-use technology in an age of bioterrorism: Patent extensions to inspire companies making duel use technology to create accompanying countermeasures. AIPLA Quarterly Journal, 44(3), 387-436. Rachael Million-Perez is an associate with Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto and a graduate of the George Washington University Law School. //sid

Although previous congressional proposals, Acts, and committees aimed to fund and incentivize countermeasures, each failed to target dual-use technology countermeasure development. This article proposes, therefore, that the USPTO offer a patent-term extension for patents directed to dual-use technology on the condition that the patent owner creates an accompanying countermeasure. This article argues for an extension of three years 251 for patent owners who meet this condition in addition to any patent-term adjustments afforded to the patent owner pursuant to Title 35 of the U.S. Code or legislative acts. A. Patent Extension for Dual-Use Technologies in Exchange for an Accompanying Countermeasure is an Appropriate and Realistic Incentive that Could Yield Significant Benefit The conditional patent-term extension proposed here provides an incentive that will: (1) reduce unbridled accessibility to dual-use technologies, (2) make countermeasure development an attractive and cost-effective business investment, and (3) take advantage of companies and individuals who currently specialize in the dual-use technology field, and who possess the necessary resources to create accompanying counter-measures. The conditional patent-term extension proposed here provides an incentive that will reduce unbridled accessibility to dual-use technologies. Although accessibility to dual-use technology is essentially ungovernable in the Internet age, providing a three-year patent-term extension to a dual-use technology will motivate companies to collaborate with the U.S. Government to identify and enjoin individuals infringing their patented dual-use technology. As a result, biohackers and terrorist organizations will have diminished access to these technologies. Dissimilar to previous and current countermeasure incentives, the conditional patent-term extension proposed here will make countermeasure development an attractive and cost-effective business investment, because it will be easily applicable, lower the financial risk of countermeasure development, and potentially lead to profits. Unlike previous incentives, a patent-term extension on a dual-use technology in exchange for creating a countermeasure to that technology presents a simple and easily-applicable business model. Private companies need not contort themselves to meet the demands of legislation, like Project BioShield. Rather, a patent-term extension on the dual-use technology will be granted when the company identifies a dual-use quality of one of its innovations and opts to develop a countermeasure to the dual use of that specific innovation. Upon successful development of a countermeasure, the USPTO will then extend the company's dual use technology patent. Because the company likely has already received approval of the dual-use technology, it need not worry about whether the extension is affected by the countermeasure's approval time. The simplicity of this proposed regime would attract companies and individuals frustrated with other complicated or inapplicable incentives. In addition, the length and specificity of this proposed extension renders it a strong incentive that will lower the financial risk of countermeasure investment. The length of patent-term extension incentive must be able to generate participation by virtually guaranteeing a return on the company's investment in countermeasure production. As discussed above, the risk of countermeasure development is incredibly high, and thus the promise that a company may recoup or even profit from developing a countermeasure will entice companies who had previously avoided countermeasure investment.253 For these reasons, this article proposes a three-year patent term extension. Recent studies showed an increase in domestic R&D investment and new pharmaceutical product development when the patent-term extension changed from seventeen years to twenty years in both the United States and Canada.254 A similar surge may occur for dual-use technology countermeasure investment under the proposed extension. Over the additional three years of the patent term, companies are likely to receive the benefit of extending their monopoly on a profitable dual-use technology such that the company will likely recoup countermeasure development costs and, potentially, profit. As a result, dual-use technology countermeasure production is likely to increase. Additionally, proponents of patent extension, like Dr. Josh Bloom, Director of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Sciences at the American Council on Science and Health, contend that three-year patent extensions are likely appropriate for patents related to the company's portfolio.255 Unlike previous and current countermeasure incentives, the extension proposed here would neither under- nor over-compensate companies. For example, the six-month to two-year extension- offered in S. 975 and S. 3-are too short in length to ensure both that small and large companies find the incentive desirable.25 6 A three-year extension, however, would further assure that any size company would recoup its investment. Furthermore, unlike a wild card patent extension, which would permit a company to extend the life of any blockbuster product and thus accrue arguably unwarranted financial gain, under this proposal a company can only extend the life of a narrowly defined dual-use technology. A dual-use technology may or may not be a blockbuster. The chances that a dual-use technology has blockbuster status, however, are slim, considering only around 30 percent of newly-introduced pharmaceutical drugs have profits that exceed average R&D costs.257 As a result, large companies do not have an unfair advantage, nor do small companies have an unfair disadvantage. Rather, if a dual-use technology is not a blockbuster, both smaller biotechnology companies, with less than $500 million in annual revenue, and large companies will need a patent extension lengthy enough to guarantee cost recoup.258 Therefore, unlike the previously proposed extensions, three-year extensions to a dual-use technology patent will afford companies a considerable, yet fair, return on their investment in countermeasure development. A conditional patent-term extension like the one proposed here will also leverage companies' expertise and resources. Because a countermeasure to a dual-use technology will likely require the same expertise and resources used to develop the dual-use technology, a company may avoid some R&D costs when it develops both. Furthermore, tapping into a company's foundation of expertise and resources may expedite production of countermeasures to dual-use technology. Unlike acquiring separate countermeasures via mergers or acquisitions, using this expertise and resources springboard for countermeasure 259 The Monsanto herbicide, Roundup@, and the Roundup Ready@ crops genetically modified to be resistant to Roundup illustrates when a patent owner could be taking advantage of her expertise and resources. In the 1970s, Monsanto created the Roundup herbicide farmers use today.260 By the mid-90's, Monsanto neared the expiration date on its patent of Roundup and faced the possibility of losing the production rights of the blockbuster.261Yet Monsanto was able to use genetic engineering to create Roundup-Ready crops resistant to Roundup in 1996.262 In particular, Monsanto was able to create these plants after working on its herbicide when one of its scientists accidentally discovered Roundup-resistant bacteria. 263 Exploiting this discovery, the company worked diligently to splice the 26 resistant gene into a working plant model. 4 Because these crops were resistant to Roundup, a farmer used the herbicide in the fields to eliminate unwanted foliage while not harming the main crop. 265 Notably, Monsanto did not make a countermeasure to its herbicide, but similar to Monsanto's ability to create two technologies from a single concept, companies producing dual-use technologies can exploit discoveries made in their pursuit of creating a dual-use technology to eventually create an accompanying countermeasure. In sum, unlike previous countermeasure incentives, the conditional patent-term extension proposed here provides an incentive that reduces terrorist or biohacker accessibility to dual-use technologies, makes countermeasure development an attractive investment, and takes advantage of companies' resources and expertise.

#### Vulnerabilities exposed by COVID have invigorated availability and interest in bioterror, but technical challenges remain as barriers to acquisition.

Koblentz and Kiesel 7/14 [Gregory D. Koblentz (Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program and Assistant Professor of Government and Politics in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University) and Stevie Kiesel (Biodefense PhD Student, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University). “The COVID-19 Pandemic: Catalyst or Complication for Bioterrorism?”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Published online 14 Jul 2021. Accessed 7/22/21. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1944023?journalCode=uter20> //Xu]

Since COVID-19 was declared a pandemic in March 2020, there has been no major bioterrorist incident that challenges or validates the core beliefs of the optimists, pessimists, or pragmatists. Extremists with violent apocalyptic or accelerationist ideologies—chiefly jihadists and far-right extremists—have sought to capitalize on the pandemic, but they still rely on conventional weapons. Based on available open-source information, terrorist interest in weaponizing SARS-CoV-2 seems limited. While some individuals and groups who subscribe to violent apocalyptic or accelerationist ideologies have shown some interest in crudely spreading the virus, most terrorists have sought to exploit the conditions the pandemic created rather than the virus itself. An increase in the risk of bioterrorism cannot be completely discounted as the equipment, knowledge, and expertise to work with high-risk pathogens is increasingly available and there are a small number of groups with the ideologies and objectives consistent with the use of biological weapons. Still, important technical barriers to acquiring and using a biological weapon capable of causing mass casualties, even far below the effects of a pandemic pathogen, will remain even after the pandemic is contained. While COVID-19 graphically demonstrated the vulnerability of modern societies to infectious diseases, the lessons learned from this experience, if properly implemented, should significantly improve the capability of governments around the world to detect and respond to future pandemics as well as deliberate disease outbreaks. Counterterrorism and biodefense efforts should not be dictated by the latest “‘risk of the month’ policies crafted in the wake of visible or highly publicized events.”117 Instead, strategies for reducing the likelihood and consequences of bioterrorism in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic should be based on a realistic appraisal of the risk and investments should be optimized to strengthen preparedness against the full spectrum of biological threats.

#### IP protections are the only limit on proliferating dual-use biotech – losing patents puts financial pressure on companies to outsource R&D, which skyrockets bioterror acquisition.

Finlay 10 [Brian Finlay (President and Chief Executive Officer of the Stimson Center, M.A. from the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, a graduate diploma from the School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University and an honors B.A. from Western University in Canada). “The Bioterror Pipeline: Big Pharma, Patent Expirations, and New Challenges to Global Security”. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 2010), pp. 51-64. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45289504?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents> //Xu]

Until recently, these investment risks were frequently mitigated by income generated from past drug development successes. In most markets, that income was guaranteed by strict patent protections that closed the window to outside competition for a set period of time. More recently, however, the uncertainty of R&D investments has been complicated not only by the global economic downturn, but more importantly by looming patent expirations that will open many of big pharma's patent-protected drugs to generic competition. Between 2007 and 2012, more than three dozen drugs will lose patent protection, removing an estimated $67 billion from big pharma's annual sales.33 With existing drug development pipelines unable to fill the gaps, biopharmaceutical companies are under intense pressure not only to cut costs - which would provide only temporary relief to the bottom line - but also to rapidly replenish their development pipelines. Some industry analysts have described this "perfect storm" as an "existential" moment for big pharma.34 Many pharmaceutical companies have approached this challenge by accelerating and widening the outsourcing and off-shoring of both R&D and manufacturing, and by aggressively buying promising assets from small biotech companies through acquisitions and strategic alliances. Interestingly, these partnerships are less frequently linked with American or even Western-owned and-operated companies than in the past. Many pharmaceutical giants like Indiana-based Eli Lilly are turning to alliances with firms in Asia and elsewhere around the world, outsourcing key technical operations. Instead of functioning as fully integrated firms, big pharma companies have found value in networked relationships with independent small to large firms, universities, and non-profit biotechnology laboratories around the globe.35 The net result has accelerated technology proliferation - for both beneficial and nefarious uses - far beyond the traditional hubs for biotech innovation. Pharma's increasingly desperate search to seed and ultimately acquire innovative new biotechnologies means that foreign (non- Western) markets are pulling ahead in biotech innovation. Indeed, the quantity of biotech companies outside the United States has grown remarkably in recent years: in Israel, the number grew from 30 in 1990 to about 160 in 2000; in Brazil, from 76 in 1993 to 354 in 2001; and remarkably, in South Korea, from one in 2000 to 23 in 2003. 36 More generally, the Asia-Pacific region has emerged as one of the world s fastest-growing biotechnology hubs, with the growth of publicly traded companies handily outpacing growth in the United States and Europe over recent years.37 As fruitful partnerships lead big pharma to increasingly generate resources, technologies, and knowledge, these capacities spin off new competitor firms in a self-executing multiplier effect. With the number of facilities and highly trained individuals increasing, the likelihood of a serious biological accident or nefarious incident will similarly rise, which will be particularly risky when dual-use technologies are introduced into insufficiently regulated markets. CONCLUSIONs In statements, U.S. officials continue to cite several countries believed to have or to be pursuing a biological weapons capability.38 But globalization exports the challenge of bioproliferation far beyond these geographic boundaries and transcends multiple societal layers well beyond government actors. As a result, it is increasingly clear that states no longer have a monopoly on dual-use biological R&D. Recent evidence suggests a growing threat of terrorist acquisition of biological weapons. As technological advancement in the life sciences is progressively pushed into countries of the Global South, some of which are also potential hotbeds for terrorist activity, the nexus of science and terrorism becomes especially acute. While far from perfect, the current system of stringent controls levied by Western governments over the biopharmaceutical sector has proven remarkably effective, especially given the diffusion of technologies and the ease of their redirection for hostile purposes. As the biotech revolution continues to widen, however, advanced industrialized governments are increasingly playing catch-up with changing technological realities. As these technologies proliferate, security analysts have become uneasy with the lack of controls in many states. The dearth of legal controls, the lack of rigor in their enforcement, and the growth in private-actor involvement in dual-use activities has sobering implications for global security.

#### Bioterrorism causes Extinction – overcomes any conventional defense.

Walsh 19, Bryan. End Times: A Brief Guide to the End of the World. Hachette Books, 2019. (Future Correspondent for Axios, Editor of the Science and Technology Publication OneZero, Former Senior and International Editor at Time Magazine, BA from Princeton University)//Elmer

I’ve lived through disease outbreaks, and in the previous chapter I showed just how unprepared we are to face a widespread pandemic of flu or another new pathogen like SARS. But a deliberate outbreak caused by an engineered pathogen would be far worse. We would face the same agonizing decisions that must be made during a natural pandemic: whether to ban travel from affected regions, how to keep overburdened hospitals working as the rolls of the sick grew, how to accelerate the development and distribution of vaccines and drugs. To that dire list add the terror that would spread once it became clear that the death and disease in our midst was not the random work of nature, but a deliberate act of malice. We’re scared of disease outbreaks and we’re scared of terrorism—put them together and you have a formula for chaos. As deadly and as disruptive as a conventional bioterror incident would be, an attack that employed existing pathogens could only spread so far, limited by the same laws of evolution that circumscribe natural disease outbreaks. But a virus engineered in a lab to break those laws could spread faster and kill quicker than anything that would emerge out of nature. It can be designed to evade medical countermeasures, frustrating doctors’ attempts to diagnose cases and treat patients. If health officials manage to stamp out the outbreak, it could be reintroduced into the public again and again. It could, with the right mix of genetic traits, even wipe us off the planet, making engineered viruses a genuine existential threat. And such an attack may not even be that difficult to carry out. Thanks to advances in biotechnology that have rapidly reduced the skill level and funding needed to perform gene editing and engineering, what might have once required the work of an army of virologists employed by a nation-state could soon be done by a handful of talented and trained individuals. Or maybe just one. When Melinda Gates was asked at the South by Southwest conference in 2018 to identify what she saw as the biggest threat facing the world over the next decade, she didn’t hesitate: “A bioterrorism event. Definitely.”2 She’s far from alone. In 2016, President Obama’s director of national intelligence James Clapper identified CRISPR as a “weapon of mass destruction,” a category usually reserved for known nightmares like nuclear bombs and chemical weapons. A 2018 report from the National Academies of Sciences concluded that biotechnology had rewritten what was possible in creating new weapons, while also increasing the range of people capable of carrying out such attacks.3 That’s a fatal combination, one that plausibly threatens the future of humanity like nothing else. “The existential threat that would be most available for someone, if they felt like doing something, would be a bioweapon,” said Eric Klien, founder of the Lifeboat Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to helping humanity survive existential risks. “It would not be hard for a small group of people, maybe even just two or three people, to kill a hundred million people using a bioweapon. There are probably a million people currently on the planet who would have the technical knowledge to pull this off. It’s actually surprising that it hasn’t happened yet.”

## 4

#### India’s COVID crisis has killed Modi’s appetite for international adventurism, but increasing vaccine production reverses the trend – this also takes out the scenario 1 of their second advantage because India soft power is low now and they’re RELYING on Pakistan for Vaccines so they wouldn’t go to war

Singh ’21 (Sushant; senior fellow with the Centre for Policy Research in India; 5-3-2021; “The **End** of Modi’s **Global Dreams**”; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/03/india-vishwaguru-modi-second-wave-soft-power-self-sufficiency/; Accessed: 8-27-2021)

India’s prime minister advanced a **muscular foreign policy**, but his mishandling of the pandemic is an **embarrassing step back**. In December 2004, when an earthquake and tsunami struck Asia, then-Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh decided it was high time for India to stop accepting aid from other countries to deal with disasters and rely on itself instead. “We feel that we can cope with the situation on our own,” he said, “and we will take their help if needed.” It was a pointed political statement about India’s growing economic heft, and it wasn’t the last. Singh’s government offered aid to the United States in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and to China after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Seen as a matter of national pride, an indicator of self-sufficiency, and a snub to nosy aid givers, the practice continued under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi despite pressure to change course during floods in the southern state of Kerala in 2018. Modi, who has consistently campaigned on **virulent nationalism** captured by the slogan “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (or self-reliant India), has been forced to abruptly change policy. Last week, with images of people dying on roads without oxygen and crematoriums for pet dogs being used for humans’ last rites as the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic overwhelmed the country, his government accepted offers of help from nearly 40 other nations. Its diplomats have lobbied with foreign governments for oxygen plants and tankers, the arrival of medicines, and other supplies hailed on social media. “We have given assistance; we are getting assistance,” said Harsh Vardhan Shringla, the country’s top diplomat, to justify the embarrassing U-turn. “It shows an interdependent world. It shows a world that is working with each other.” The world may be working with each other, but it is not working for Modi in the **realm of foreign policy**. Rather, this is a moment of reckoning, triggered by the rampaging coronavirus. After seven years as prime minister, Modi’s **hyper-nationalistic** domestic agenda—including his ambition of making the country a “Vishwaguru” (or **master to the world**)—now lies in tatters. India, which has been envisaged since former U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration became the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’s lynchpin and focused other efforts in the Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China, will have to work harder to justify that role. Meanwhile, China has redoubled its efforts in India’s neighborhood since the second wave began, strengthening its existing ties with South Asian countries and contrasting its strength and reliability with India’s limitations. No doubt, New Delhi will be able to regain a certain sense of normalcy in a few months, but the **mishandling of the pandemic** has dealt it a weaker hand in **ongoing backchannel talks with Islamabad** and border negotiations with Beijing. But even **longer-lasting damage** has been done to India’s soft power, which was already dented under Modi’s authoritarian regime. This is a big problem for the government as it was soft power that allowed New Delhi to assert itself for a seat at the global high table to begin with. Front page images and video clips of constantly burning pyres and dying patients may recede from the foreground with time, but rebuilding India’s diplomatic heft and geopolitical prominence will need more than the passage of months and years. It will take a concerted effort, and S. Jaishankar, Modi’s chosen man to be India’s foreign minister, has so far appeared unequal to the task. In March, when the second wave of the pandemic started unfolding in India, Jaishankar’s ministry was busy issuing official statements and organizing social media storms against popstar Rihanna and climate change activist Greta Thunberg. On Thursday, at the peak of the health crisis, Jaishankar’s focus in a meeting with all the Indian ambassadors to various global capitals was on countering the so-called “one-sided” narrative in international media, which said Modi’s government had failed the country by its “incompetent” handling of the second pandemic wave. Until recently, Jaishankar was also the most enthusiastic promoter of the government’s Vaccine Maitri (or “Vaccine Friendship”) program, under which New Delhi supplied around 66.4 million doses of the India-made AstraZeneca vaccine to 95 countries in packing boxes marked prominently with large pictures of Modi. These vaccines were either commercially contracted, given as bilateral grants, or transferred under the World Health Organization’s COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) scheme for poorer countries. Meanwhile, India’s own vaccination rollout has been **dismal**. Around 2 percent of Indians have been fully vaccinated, despite the country being the world’s biggest vaccine manufacturer—a misstep that has emerged as one of the key culprits for India’s uncontrolled second wave. Having exported doses in a quest for personal glory, Modi is now awaiting 20 million doses of AstraZeneca vaccines from the United States after abruptly reversing 16 years of policy, as indicated in its disaster management documents, against **accepting bilateral aid**. It is bad enough that India is getting help from traditional partners like the United States and Russia, but it is also accepting supplies coming from China, with which India’s relationship has been increasingly strained under Modi. And it must have been particularly galling to the prime minister that **even Pakistan** made an offer to help with medical supplies and equipment. So woeful is India’s situation that it has started importing 88,000 pounds of medical oxygen daily from the tiny Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan. Most Indians acknowledge their country was in an economic recession last year, and accepting bilateral aid is more of a compulsion than a choice. But how will they reconcile that with the fact that work on a $2 billion project to reconstruct a government office complex in the national capital, including building a new residence for Modi, continues unabated as an “essential service” during the pandemic? Modi boasted of having made India a **Vishwaguru** and personally enhancing national prestige through his numerous global trips. His ultranationalist supporters had started assuming India was already a **global power** in the same league as the United States and China. This feeling tied in with his domestic political positioning. Hindutva, or homogenized Hindu nationalism, was offered as the ideology that had made this supremacy possible. But now Modi’s supporters find their dreams of a **global power shattered.** They must instead confront the harsh reality of being citizens of a so-called “third world country,” which is dependent once again on the largesse of others. As the Indian economy continues to be hammered by the pandemic, there is little Modi can offer economically to his base. The edifice of **nationalist** pride, prestige, and **global respect** built by Modi on his so-called foreign-policy prowess has been demolished by the pandemic. The pandemic has hurt India in other ways too. Australia, a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad), has imposed a ban on its citizens from returning home, threatening five-year prison sentences, if they have spent time in India. In its first leaders’ summit in March, the grouping decided to provide a billion doses of the COVID-19 vaccine to the Indo-Pacific region by 2022. The vaccines were to be produced in India, funded by the United States and Japan, and distributed by Australia, in what was seen as the showpiece initiative to move the Quad away from its security-centric approach and soften its reputation as an anti-China grouping. With India struggling to produce vaccines for its own citizens hit by the pandemic, it is unlikely the Quad will be able to keep its scheme on schedule. In the bargain, New Delhi’s position as the lynchpin of the Quad stands considerably diminished. If India stumbles, the American dream of the Quad can never become a reality. Beijing has already moved in to take advantage of India’s misfortune to strengthen its ties with other South Asian countries. Last Tuesday, the Chinese foreign minister held a meeting with his counterparts from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka for cooperation against COVID-19. India was absent from the meeting. And although Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have received some vaccine supplies from India and expect more, these countries are now looking toward Beijing for doses after New Delhi failed to keep up its commercial and COVAX commitments. In the race between the two Asian giants to be an attractive and reliable partner in South Asia, India seems to have finished behind China. China has also pressed its advantage along its restive border with India. After an initial disengagement in Ladakh, India, China refused to pull back any further from other Indian-held territories it had moved into last summer. It stonewalled Indian attempts to discuss these areas in the last round of talks between the two sides, and it has constructed permanent military infrastructure and deployed troops close to the disputed border. If there were ever a time for India to demonstrate its strength, it would be now. But the second wave of COVID-19 has forced **the opposite**. A similar impact will be felt during New Delhi’s ongoing backchannel talks with Islamabad, where Pakistan will likely try to take **full advantage** of any **chinks in India’s armor**. India cannot afford to walk away from those talks as it has already been forced to engage with Islamabad due to its own inability to handle a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. An economy and a country ravaged by the pandemic makes the dual threat an even more **challenging proposition** for India—and hands Pakistan an unexpected advantage in the talks.

## Case

### WTO

#### Conceding WTO Credibility – the WTO is bad – yes the I/L is reverse causal since 1AC Meyer says collapse will happen in the Status Quo and the Plan prevents it.

#### The Hamaan Impact:

#### 1] No Brink Scenario – no explanations of conflicts/tensions that are escalating now.

#### 2] China thumps Compliance – they’ll never listen.

Webster 14, Timothy. "Paper compliance: How China implements WTO decisions." Mich. J. Int'l L. 35 (2014): 525. (Director of East Asian Legal Studies & Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University)//Elmer

Since the number of WTO cases involving China is small, certitude about China's future conduct in the DSB would be inapt. But certain patterns are clear. First, in the majority of cases, China has revised its legal and regulatory systems to comply with the DSB rulings. It has done so typically within the reasonable period of time in which it agreed to do so and has accumulated a strong record in terms of the quality of its implementation. Moreover, as of July 2013, no Chi-nese case has gone into compliance proceedings, wherein an arbitration panel determines the costs of one country's non-compliance to other WTO members. This is a significant difference from other major trading partners, such as the United States, E.U., and Japan, all of which have been respondents in compliance proceedings. n256 Some of these cases have dragged on for more than a decade, indicating a resistance to WTO rulings far and above anything that China has exhibited. Second, **China has found ways to resist WTO rulings** and norms. Inconsistent regulations remain in effect. In the three cases discussed above - DS 362 (intellectual property enforcement), DS 363 (trading rights for publications) DS 373 (financial information services) - inconsistent regulations either continue in effect or were revised so as not to ef-fectuate [\*573] the purpose of the ruling. This lacuna could be a function of institutional capacity. China's capa-cious bureaucratic institutions produce reams of regulations; it is unclear whether many of them keep close tabs on the various regulations they produce, and quite definite that some of them have not repealed regulations found to be in-consistent. Or there may be a more sinister explanation: **China wants to keep the inconsistent regulations** in place, and understands that its regulatory maze may be **too labyrinthine for** other **WTO** members **to navigate**. Whether by design or neglect, a number of inconsistent regulations continue to plague China's compliance record. Moreover, local and provincial-level regulations often amplify the effects of inconsistent national regulations. In cases such as DS 363 and DS 373, lower-level government agencies have promulgated policies that reference regulations that were either revoked or found inconsistent. This means that WTO-inconsistent regulations will cast a regulatory afterglow at various levels of the Chinese legal system. The most striking case of non-compliance, so far, has been the trading rights case (DS 363). The revisions suggest-ed by the DSB challenged China's censorship regime and long-held monopoly on cultural information. Not only did China not comply within a reasonable period of time, but it also left in place several regulations that the DSB deemed inconsistent with WTO disciplines. This suggests that, in particularly sensitive areas, China will not fulfill its implemen-tation obligations. **As China continues to gain experience with WTO litigation**, **instances of non-implementation are likely to increase**. China has, in essence, learned that it can "get away" without fully complying with DSB rulings and recommendations. Indeed, as noted above, two recent rulings show just how far China is willing to push the implemen-tation envelope. Third, reforming laws in China means less than it would in Western liberal democracies with robust legal institu-tions. One-party rule, coupled with a unitary governance structure, allow the party-state to control the passage of laws and regulations, dictate revisions to the domestic legal environment, and coordinate changes with a maximum of speed and minimum of institutional friction. **China** has tinkered with the literal letter of its law, but it **continues** to produce **a whole range of programs that violate WTO** principles. **It is** perhaps **unrealistic to think the DSB can induce compliance** more broadly, that is, outside of the regulation challenged. But it is doubtful that China's domestication of DSB rulings has meaningfully influenced the development of its political economy. Many basic norms - market capitalism, dereg-ulation, strong protection of intellectual property, limits on subsidies - remain alien to China. Fourth, many WTO violations take place in the interstices of law, areas where government officials exercise discre-tion: whether or not to register a foreign company, to issue it a business license, or to prosecute someone for IP theft. Likewise, **China distributes trade regulations to** governmental **agencies as "internal guidance"** (neibu cankao) that should be published under China's WTO transparency obligations, but in fact [\*574] never are. n257 The dispute set-tlement system provides a very rough tool by which to reshape a member's domestic legal system and to monitor its implementation of WTO commitments. A range of violations takes place, either below the radar or without meaningful recourse for investors or manufacturers outside of China. Finally, China deploys the tactical features of the dispute settlement system to buffer the ruling's impact. China settles "easy" cases early and prolongs decisions that seriously disrupt its political system, harm core economic interests, or require significant internal reform to implement. Like any other national actor, China seeks to maximize its interests and minimize disruptions that international law and institutions may inflict upon its domestic legal and regulatory sys-tems.

#### Low WTO causes regional trade – yes trade-off

Isfeld 14 Gordon Isfeld 3-17-2014 business.financialpost.com/2014/03/17/with-rise-of-shot-gun-trade-agreements-is-the-wto-even-relevant-anymore/ “With the rise of 'shot-gun' trade agreements, is the WTO even relevant anymore” //Elmer

OTTAWA — It’s getting awfully crowded out there in the free-trading world. The seemingly endless hunt for new global partners is redefining the traditional and hard-fought rules of engagement between nations. So much so, observers say, the old world order — remember the WTO, and GATT before it — has increasingly become a sideshow to the proliferation of bilateral, **trilateral** **and**, often, **multi-lateral** agreements. Even the term “free trade” no longer accurately describes the “new world” of negotiations — one that encompasses far more than what and how products are permitted to slide under domestic tariff radars. For Canada, we can now add South Korea and the European Union — deals long in the making but only weeks in the signing — after a string of minor agreements since the landmark free trade act 25 years ago with the United States, and later to include Mexico. Now, as the growing mass of country-to-country, region-to-region agreements has made apparent, it’s open season on anything that moves between borders — not only products, investments and intellectual property, but also new rules on competition, and the inclusion of labour laws and environmental guidelines. These are just some of the areas of possible disputes that the World Trade Organization “does not deal with,” said Debra Steger, a professor of law at University of Ottawa, specializing in international trade and development. “These are new models. These are not traditional trade agreements, per se.” Ms. Steger, who worked for the federal government on the Uruguay Round of negotiations that led to formation of the WTO, said the framework of recent deals goes “way beyond subjects that NAFTA dealt with.” “Trade, even in the WTO, isn’t only about tariffs. It’s not just about customs and border measures,” she said. “But it’s not about behind-the-border regulatory matters, like environmental regulation and labour standards, competition policy and human rights, corruption, and on and on it goes.” Free trade, between where ever, has become the go-to issue for politicians, business leaders, public-policy makers and private interest groups. Note, this month’s sudden but long-rumoured announcement by the Harper government of a free-trade deal with South Korea, nearly 10 years after talks began and stumbled, and resumed again. Arguably, the deal was finally done as a result of the resolution to Canada’s drawn-out dispute with Seoul over our beef exports — the so-called “mad cow” disease leading to a ban in that county and others. Of course, the United States, the European Union and Australia, among others, already had agreements in hand with South Korea. A few months earlier, Ottawa inked its EU deal — the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement — which was again the outcome of a seemingly endless circle of negotiations that still left Canada trailing similar pacts by the U.S. and others. Even so, these pacts “affect the WTO and WTO negotiations for a number of reasons. That’s a major problem,” said Ms. Steger. “The major developed countries have gone off and started these efforts to negotiate these big FTAs [free trade agreements] as a response to the declining situation in the Doha Round. The WTO — reborn in 1995 out of the General Agreement and Tariffs and Trade, the original body created in 1948 — has been struggling to maintain its relevance as the global arbiter of trade agreements and dispute resolution. The cachet of the 159-member body, however, has been diminished in recent years as countries moved to seal their own free-trade deals with major partners in the absence, some would argue, of any significant movement by the WTO on its own 2001 trade liberalization initiative, launched in Doha, Qatar. Late last year, members managed to agree to only limited movement on trade under the Doha Round of talks. Even now, details remain to be worked out. “One of the reasons why we’re seeing this sort of shot-gun approach [to trade agreements outside of the WTO] is because a number of countries are concerned that the big global deals are probably next to impossible at this stage, given how the Doha Round went and what we ended up with there, which was next to nothing,” said Douglas Porter, chief economist at BMO Capital Markets in Toronto. “They did manage to reach a tiny deal when all was said and done, but it was very modest in terms of its scope.” The move toward bilateral or multi-lateral agreements “is a symptom of the problems that we were running into at the WTO,” Mr. Porter said. “Important players are probably quietly questioning the future for the WTO…. Is it that death knell for the WTO? I don’t think so. [But] it just means we might not be able to accomplish grand, global deals in the future.” However, “there’s really no other way to approach trade disputes with, say, a country like China, then through that body at this point.” “Even 10 years ago, I think it was more straightforward to come to global trade rules. You had two major players, Europe and the U.S., and a few next tier players, including Japan,” Mr. Porter said. “Now, though, you have all kinds of important big players that have a huge chunk of global trade, and have very different goals and aims, and it might be the nature of the global economy now — the reality that we have many different groups in many different regions. “It might be impossible to square that circle.” Over the course of 25 years, Canada has piled on more than a dozen free trade agreements. The first — taking effect on Jan. 1, 1989 — was with the United States. A heated political issue in the 1988 federal election, which Brian Mulroney’s Conservatives won, the FTA was expanded in 1994 to include Mexico and rebranded as NAFTA. Other free trade deals, though much smaller, were signed in subsequent years, some yet to take effect: Israel, Jordan and Chile, followed later by Costa Rica, Peru, Panama, Honduras and Colombia, leading up to the pacts with EU and South Korea. Negotiations are ongoing for at least another dozen agreements. For countries such as Colombia, which has had an agreement in effect with Canada since 2011, the goal is “to insert our economy into the world economy,” said Alvaro Concha, trade commissioner of Proexport Colombia, based in Toronto. “At the beginning of this decade, we had only our preferential access to over 500 million consumers,” Mr. Concha said. “With all the potential FTAs we’ve been signing with potential markets and with potential partners, we believe that not just the potential buyers of our products, but also the potential investors in our country, we have opened our preferential access to over 1.5 billion consumers.” Likely to push the WTO further into the shadows of global trade will be the Trans Pacific Partnership. “In many ways, the Trans Pacific Partnership will be, if it is successful, an updating of the NAFTA, because the U.S. and Mexico are involved, as well as some [trading] partners we already have within Latin America, like Peru,” said Ms. Steger, at the University of Ottawa. “But [there are] also some key countries in Asia that we don’t have agreements with yet. And some other developed countries in that regional, New Zealand and Australia, that we don’t have agreements with,” she adds. “So that [TPP] agreement is very, very important. It’s also the first major plur-lateral agreement that the world has seen.”

#### Regionalism promotes trade and stops war – avoids their impact because our regionalism is different than protectionist blocs.

Brkić 13, Snježana, and Adnan Efendic. "Regional Trading Arrangements–Stumbling Blocks or Building Blocks in the Process of Global Trade Liberalization?." 5th International Conference «Economic Integration, competition and cooperation», Croatia, Opatija. 2013. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2239275 (Economics Prof at U of Sarajevo) //Elmer

Besides those advocating the optimistic or pessimistic view on regionalism effect on global trade liberalization, some economists, such as Frankel and Wei, hold a neutral position, in a way. Frankel and Wei believe that forms and achievements of international economic integrations can vary and that, for this reason, regionalism can be – depending on circumstances – linked to greater or smaller global trade liberalization. In the years-long period of regional integration development, four periods have been identified during which the integration processes were becoming particularly intensive and which have therefore been named "waves of regionalism". The first wave was taking place during the capitalism development in the second half of the 19th century, in the course of British sovereign domination over the world market. Economic integrations of the time primarily had the form of bilateral customs unions; however, owing to the comparative openness of international trading system based on the golden standard automatism, this period is called the "era of progressive bilateralism". The next two waves of **regionalism** occurred in the years following the world wars. Since the disintegration processes caused by the wars usually spawned economic nationalisms and autarchic tendencies, it is not surprising that post-war regionalisms were marked by discriminatory international economic integrations, primarily at the level of so-called negative integration, with expressedly “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies that resulted in considerable trade deviations. This particularly refers to the regionalism momentum after the First World War, which was additionally burdened by the consequences of Big Economic Crisis. The current wave of regionalism started in late 1980s and spread around the world to a far greater extent than any previous one did: it has covered almost all the continents and almost all the countries, even those which have mis to join all earlier regional initiatives, such as the USA, Canada, Japan and China. Integration processes, however, do not show any signs of flagging. Up till now, over 200 RTAs have been registered with GATT/WTO, more than 150 of them being still in force, and most of these valid arrangement have been made in the past ten years. Specific in many ways, this wave was dubbed "new regionalism". The most specific **characteristics** of new regionalism **include: geographic spread** **of RTAs** **in** terms of **encompassing entire continents;** **greater speed**; integration forms success; deepening of integration processes; **and**, the most important for this theoretical discussion, generally **non-negative impact on outsiders, world economy as a whole, and** the **multilateral liberalization** process. Some theorists (Gilpin) actually distinguish **between** the "**benign**" **and** "**malign**" **regionalism**. On the one hand, **regionalism can advance** the **international economic stability**, multilateral liberalization **and world peace**. On the other, it can have mercantilist features leading to economic well-being degradation and increasing international tensions and conflicts. Analyses of trends within the contemporary integration processes show that they mainly have features of "benign" regionalism. Reasons for this are numerous. **Forces driving** the **contemporary** **regionalism** development **differ from** those that used to drive **earlier** regionalism periods in the 20th century. The **present regionalism emerged in** the period characterized by the **increasing economic inter-dependence** between different world economy subjects, countries attempts to resolve trade disputes and multilateral framework of trade relations. As opposed to the 1930s episode, contemporary regional initiatives represent **attempts to make** the members' **participation in the world economy easier**, rather than make them more distant from it. As opposed to 1950s and 1960s episode, new **initiatives** are **less frequently motivated** **exclusively by political interests**, and are **less frequently** being used **for mercantilist purposes**. After the Second World War, more powerful countries kept using the economic integration as a means to strengthen their political influence on their weaker partners and outsiders. The examples include CMEA and European Community arrangements with its members' former colonies. As opposed to this practice, the new regionalism, mostly driven by common economic interests, yielded less trade diversion than previous one, and has also **contributed to** the **prevention of military conflicts of greater proportions**. Various analyses have shown that many regional integrations in earlier periods resulted in trade deviations, particularly those formed between less developed countries and between socialist countries. In recent years, however, the newly formed or revised regional **integrations** primarily seem to **lead to trade creation**. Contrary to the “beggar thy- neighbor” model of former international economic integrations, the integrations now offer certain advantages to outsiders as well, by stimulating growth and spurring the role of market forces. The analyses of contemporary trends in world economy also speak in favor of the "optimistic" proposition. The structural analysis shows that the world trade is growing and that this growth results both from the increase in intra-regional and from the increase in extra-regional trade value (Anderson i Snape 1994.)28. Actually, the intraregional trade has been growing faster, both by total value and by its share in world GDP. The extra-regional trade share in GDP was increasing in some regions – in North America, Asia-Pacific and Asian developing countries. However, the question arises as to whether the extra-regional trade would be greater without regional integrations or not? The answer would primarily depend both on the estimate of degree of some countries' trade policy restrictedness in such circumstances, and on factors such as geographic distance, transport communications, political relations among states. One should also take into account certain contemporary integration features – the primarily economic, rather than strategic motivation, and continuous expansion, which mostly includes countries that are significant economic partners. With respect to NAFTA, many believe that the negative effects on outsiders will be negligible, since the USA and Canada have actually been highly integrated economies for a long time already, while the Mexican economy is relatively small. The same view was pointed out by the EU, with respect to its expansion. It particularly refers to the inclusion of the remaining EFTA countries, because this will actually only complete, in institutional terms, the EU strong economic ties with these countries. Most EFTA countries have been part of the European economic area (EEA), i.e. the original EC-EFTA agreement, for a few years already, and conduct some 70% of their total international exchange with the Union countries. EU countries are also the most significant foreign-trade partners of Central and East Europe countries, and the recent joining the Union of several of them is not expected to cause a significant trade diversion. Besides, according to some earlier studies, during the previous wave of regionalism, in the 1967-70 period, the creation of trade in EEC was far greater than trade diversion: trade creation ranged from 13 to 23% of total imports, while trade diversion ranged from 1 to 6%. In Latin America, the new regionalism resulted in the faster growth of intra-regional trade, while the extra-regional exports and imports also continued to grow. Since early 1990s, the value of intra-regional imports registered the average annual growth of 18%. In the same time, the extra-regional exports were also growing, although at a lower rate of 9% average a year; its share in the total Latin America exports at the end of decade amounted to 18% as compared to 12% in 1990. In the 1990-1996 period, the intraregional imports grew by some 18% a year. The extra-regional imports were also growing very fast, reaching the 14% rate. These data reflect a great unbalance in the trade with extra-regional markets, since the imports from countries outside the region grew much faster the exports.30 Since the described trends point to the continued growth of extra-regional imports and exports, they also show that regional integration in Latin America has had the open regionalism character. Besides, the pending establishment of FTAA – Free Trade Area of Americas will gather, in the same group, the so-called "natural" trade partners – countries that have had an extremely extensive mutual exchange for years already, and the outsiders are therefore unlikely to be affected by strengthening of regionalism in this part of the world. Contemporary research shows that intra-regional trade is growing, however, same as interdependence between North America and East Asia and between the EU and East Asia. It can also be seen that the biggest and the **most powerful** countries, i.e. **blocs**, **are extremely dependent** **on the rest of the world in terms of trade.** For the EU, besides the intra-European trade, which is ranked first, foreign trade has the vital importance since it accounts for 10% of European GDP. In early 1990s, EU exchanged 40% of its foreign trade with non-members, 16% out of which with North America and East Asia together. EU therefore must keep in mind the rest of the world as well. The growing EU interest in outsiders is confirmed by establishing "The Euro-Med Partnership", which proclaimed a new form of cooperation between the EU and the countries at its South periphery32. Besides, the past few years witnessed a series of inter-regional agreements between the EU on the one hand, and certain groups from other regions on the other (MERCOSUR, CARICOM, ASEAN and GCC). In case of North America the ratio between intra-regional and inter-regional trade is 40:60, and in East Asia, it is 45:55. Any attempt to move towards significantly closed blocs ("fortresses") would require overcoming the significant inter-dependence between major trading blocs. Besides the analysis of contemporary trends in extra- and intra-regional trade, other research was conducted that was supposed to point to the reasons why the **new regionalism has** mainly a **non-negative impact on** outsiders and **global liberalization**. The distinctive features of new regionalism were also affected to characteristics of international economic and political environment it sprouted in. In the 1980s, economic nationalisms were not so expressed as in the interventionism years following the Second World War; however, the neo-liberalism represented by GATT activities did not find the "fertile ground” in all parts of the world. Regionalism growth in the circumstances of multilateral system existence is, among other things, the consequence of distrust in multilateralism. „The revival of the forces of regionalism stemmed from frustration with the slow pace of multilateral trade liberalization... If the world trade regime could not be moved ahead, then perhaps it was time for deeper liberalization within more limited groups of like-minded nations... Such efforts would at least liberalize some trade... and might even prod the other nations to go along with multilateral liberalization.“33 Kennedy's round and Tokyo round of trade negotiations under GATT auspices brought a certain progress in the global trade liberalization. However, the 1980s witnessed significant changes in the world economy that the GATT trade system was not up to. Besides. GATT had not yet managed to cover the entire trade in goods, since there were still exceptions in the trade in agricultural and textile products that particularly affected the USA and developing countries. GATT system of conflict resolutions, and its organizational and administrative mechanism in general also required revision. In this vacuum that was created in promoting trade and investment multilateralism from the point when GATT inadequacy became obvious until the start of the Uruguay round and the establishment of World Trade Organization, the wave of regionalism started spreading across the world again. Prodded by the Single European Act and the success of European integration, many countries turned to an alternative solution – establishment of new or expansion and deepening of the existing economic integrations. Even the USA, the multilateralism bastion until then, made a radical turn in their foreign-trade policy and started working on designing a North American integration.

#### That outweighs—multilateral trade causes wars with a larger impact

Thoma 7 Mark Thoma July 2007 “Trade Liberalization and War” <http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/07/trade-liberaliz.html> (Economics Professor at the University of Oregon)//Elmer

Globalisation is by construction an increase in both bilateral and multilateral trade flows. What then was the net effect of increased trade since 1970? We find that it **generated an increase in the probability of a bilateral conflict by** around **20%** for those **countries separated by less than 1000kms,** the group of countries for **which the risk of disputes that can escalate militarily is the highest.** The effects are much smaller for countries which are more distant. Contrary to what these results (aggravated by our nationality) may suggest, we are not anti-globalisation activists even though we are aware that some implications of our work could be (mis)used in such a way. The result that bilateral trade is pacifying brings several more optimistic implications on globalisation. First, if we think of a world war as a war between two large groups or coalitions of countries, then globalisation makes such a war less likely because it increases the opportunity cost of such a conflict. Obviously, this conclusion cannot be tested but is a logical implication of our results. From this point of view, our work suggests that globalisation may be at the origin of a change in the nature of conflicts, less global and more local. Second, our results do confirm that increased trade flows **created by regional trade agreements** (such as the EU) are indeed **pacifying** as intended. Given that most military conflicts are local, because they find their origins in border or ethnic disputes, **this is not a small achievement**. These beneficial political aspects of regional trade agreements are not usually considered by economists who often focus on the economic distortions brought by their discriminatory nature. Given the huge human and economic costs of wars, this political effect of regional trade agreements should not be discounted. This opens interesting questions on how far these regional trade agreements should extend – a topical issue in the case of the EU. The entry of Turkey in the EU would indeed pacify its relations with EU countries (especially Greece and Cyprus), but also increase the probability of a conflict between Turkey and its non-EU neighbours. However, our simulations suggest that in this case, the first effect dominates the second by a large margin. More generally, our results should be interpreted as a word of caution on some political aspects of globalisation. As it proceeds and weakens the economic ties of proximate countries, those with the highest risk of disputes that can escalate into military conflicts, local conflicts may become more prevalent. Even if they may not appear optimal on purely economic grounds, regional and bilateral trade agreements, by strengthening local economic ties, may therefore **be a necessary political counterbalance to economic globalisation**.

### Economies

#### Answered scenario 1 on the disad

#### Africa Scenario -

#### 1] Absolutely zero risk of spill-over – 1AC Egwu is entirely about South Africa.

#### 2] Multiple Alt-Causes to African instability – we’ll insert a re-cutting

1AC Mead 13. [(Walter Mead is a James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities, Bard College) “Peace in The Congo? Why the World Should Care,” The American Interest, December 15, 2013. <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/12/15/peace-in-the-congo-why-the-world-should-care/> //Re-cut by Elmer

One of the biggest questions of the 21st century is whether this destructive dynamic can be contained, or whether the demand for ethnic, cultural and/or religious homogeneity will continue to convulse world politics, drive new generations of conflict, and create millions more victims. The **Congo conflict** is a disturbing piece of evidence suggesting that, in Africa at least, there is potential for this kind of conflict. The Congo war (and the long **Hutu-Tutsi conflict** in neighboring countries) is not, unfortunately alone. The **secession of South Sudan** from Sudan proper, the wars in what remains of that unhappy country, the secession of **Eritrea** from Ethiopia and the **rise of Christian-Muslim tension right across Africa** (where religious conflict often is fed by and intensifies “tribal”—in Europe we would say “ethnic” or “national”—conflicts) **are** strong **indications that** the **potential for** huge and destructive **conflict across Africa is very real**. But one must look beyond Africa. The Middle East of course is aflame in religious and ethnic conflict. The old British Raj including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka offers countless examples of ethnic and religious conflict that sometimes is contained, and sometimes boils to the surface in horrendous acts of violence. Beyond that, rival nationalisms in East and Southeast Asia are keeping the world awake at night. The Congo war should be a reminder to us all that the foundations of our world are dynamite, and that the potential for new conflicts on the scale of the horrific wars of the 20th century is very much with us today. The second lesson from this conflict stems from the realization of how much patience and commitment from the international community (which in this case included the Atlantic democracies and a coalition of African states working as individual countries and through various international institutions) it has taken to get this far towards peace. Particularly at a time when many Americans want the US to turn inwards, there are people who make the argument that it is really none of America’s business to invest time and energy in the often thankless task of solving these conflicts. That might be an ugly but defensible position if we didn’t live in such a tinderbox world. Someone could rationally say, yes, it’s terrible that a million plus people are being killed overseas in a horrific conflict, but the war is really very far away and America has urgent needs at home and we should husband the resources we have available for foreign policy on things that have more power to affect us directly. The problem is that these wars spread. They may start in places that we don’t care much about (most Americans didn’t give a rat’s patootie about whether Germany controlled the Sudetenland in 1938 or Danzig in 1939) but they tend to spread to places that we do care very much about. This can be because a revisionist great power like Germany in 1938-39 needs to overturn the balance of power in Europe to achieve its goals, or it can be because instability in a very remote place triggers problems in places that we care about very much. Out of Afghanistan in 2001 came both 9/11 and the waves of insurgency and instability that threaten to rip nuclear-armed Pakistan apart or with trigger wider conflict India. Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends. Africa, and the potential for upheaval there, is of more importance to American security than many people may understand. The line between Africa and the Middle East is a soft one. The weak states that straddle the southern approaches of the Sahara are ideal petri dishes for Al Qaeda type groups to form and attract local support. There are networks of funding and religious contact that give groups in these countries potential access to funds, fighters, training and weapons from the Middle East. A war in the eastern Congo might not directly trigger these other conflicts, but it helps to create the swirling underworld of arms trading, money transfers, illegal commerce and the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced fighters—and know no other way to make a living. It destabilizes the environment for neighboring states (like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us.