# 1NC

### 1NC – OFF

#### Our Interpretation is the affirmative should instrumentally defend the resolution about the WTO – hold the line, CX and the 1AC prove there’s no I-meet – anything new in the 1AR is either extra-T since it includes the non-topical parts of the Aff or effects-T since it’s a future result of the advocacy which both link to our offense.

#### “Resolved” means to enact by law.

Words & Phrases ’64

(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

**Vote neg for predictable limits and ground---allowing the aff to pick any grounds for the debate makes negative engagement impossible**

**3 Impacts -**

**1.    Accessibility and clash– Changing the topic post facto structurally favors the aff by making neg prep, which is based on the resolution, useless—the judge can only make a meaningful decision when both sides have had an equal opportunity. Only our model ensures effective clash through rigorous testing.**

**2.    Competitive equity – debate is a competitive game which loses meaning without substantive constraints- Everybody comes to debate for different reasons, but the fact that the other team is here and has presented a 1ac means they have bought into the game, and b) concedes the authority of fairness, or the judges hack against you**

**3.    Skills – Effective deliberation over IPP is necessary to foster portable skills, and improve advocacies – otherwise we fall prey to dogma and groupthink**

#### TVA – [Affirm a reduction in all IP to reduce the digital colonization of information to feed the World Computer]

**Any solvency deficits are neg ground, and the form-content distinction encompasses your offense**

**Fairness first: Debate is a game: forced winner/loser, competitive norms, and the tournament invite prove. Alternative impacts like activism or education can be pursued in other forums. This makes fairness the most important impact**

#### Metaconstraint

1. Intrinsic
2. Hack against them

#### TFW has to be drop the debater – it indicts their method of engagement and proves we couldn’t engage fairly with their aff

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary, you can’t be reasonably topical, and causes a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

**No RVIs – they’re illogical, and encourages baiting theory which is more unfair**

**Use competing interps – reasonability leads a race to the bottom and allows judge intervention**

**Ballot Paradox: Placing the decision-making potential within the ballot is violent, since no change spill out of round and makes the judge a violent arbiter of your subjectivity**

#### No impact turns—exclusions are inevitable because we only have 45 minutes so it’s best to draw those exclusions along reciprocal lines to ensure a role for the negative

### 1NC – OFF

#### Algorithmic governance as per their Beller evidence is good -- it solves crisis escalation.

Corneliu Bjola 19, Head of the Oxford Digital Diplomacy Research Group, University of Oxford, 11/10/19, “Diplomacy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence,” http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\_en/contenido?WCM\_GLOBAL\_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano\_in/zonas\_in/ari98-2019-bjola-diplomacy-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence

Taking note of the fact that developments in AI are so dynamic and the implications so wide-ranging, another report prepared by a German think tank calls on Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) to immediately begin planning strategies that can respond effectively to the influence of AI in international affairs. Economic disruption, security & autonomous weapons, and democracy & ethics are the three areas they identify as priorities at the intersection of AI and foreign policy. Although they believe that transformational changes to diplomatic institutions will eventually be needed to meet the challenges ahead, they favour, in the short term, an incremental approach to AI that builds on the successes (and learns from the failures) of “cyber-foreign policy”, which, in many countries, has been already internalised in the culture of the relevant institutions, including of the MFAs.13 In the same vein, the authors of a report prepared for the Centre for a New American Security see great potential for AI in national security-related areas, including diplomacy. For example, AI can help improve communication between governments and foreign publics by lowering language barriers between countries, enhance the security of diplomatic missions via image recognition and information sorting technologies, and support international humanitarian operations by monitoring elections, assisting in peacekeeping operations, and ensuring that financial aid disbursements are not misused through anomaly detection.14

From an AI perspective, consular services could be a low-hanging fruit for AI integration in diplomacy as decisions are amenable to digitisation, the analytical contribution is reasonable relevant and the technology favours collaboration between users and the machine. Consular services rely on highly structured decisions, as they largely involve recurring and routinised operations based on clear and stable procedures, which do not need to be treated as new each time a decision has to be made (except for crisis situations, which are discussed further below). From a knowledge perspective, AI-assisted consular services may embody declarative (know-what) and procedural knowledge (know-how) to automate routinised operations and scaffold human cognition by reducing cognitive effort. This can be done by using data mining and data discovery techniques to organize the data and make it possible to identify patterns and relationships that would be difficult to observe otherwise (e.g., variation of demand for services by location, time, and audience profile).

Case study #1: AI as Digital Consul Assistant

The consulate of country X has been facing uneven demand for emergency passports, visa requests and business certifications in the past five years. The situation has led to a growing backlog, significant loss of public reputation and a tense relationship between the consulate and the MFA. An AI system trained with data from the past five years uses descriptive analytics to identify patterns in the applications and concludes that August, May and December are the most likely months to witness an increase of the demand in the three categories next year. AI predictions are confirmed for August and May but not for December. AI recalibrates its advice using updated data and the new predictions help consular officers manage requests more effectively. As the MFA confidence in the AI system grows, the digital assistant is then introduced to other consulates experiencing similar problems.

Digital platforms could also emerge as indispensable tools for managing diplomatic crises in the digital age and for good reasons. They can help embassies and MFAs make sense of the nature and gravity of the events in real-time, streamline the decision-making process, manage the public’s expectations, and facilitate crisis termination. At the same time, they need to be used with great care as factual inaccuracies, coordination gaps, mismatched disclosure level, and poor symbolic signalling could easily derail digital efforts of crisis management.15 AI systems could provide great assistance to diplomats in times of crisis by helping them make sense of what it is happening (descriptive analytics) and identify possible trends (predictive analytics). The main challenge for AI is the semi-structured nature of the decisions to be taken. While many MFAs have pre-designed plans to activate in case of a crisis, it is safe to assume that reality often defies the best crafted plans. Given the high level of uncertainty in which crisis decision-making operates and the inevitable scrutiny and demand of accountability to occur if something goes wrong, AI integration can work only if humans retain control over the process. As a recent SIPRI study pointed out, AI systems may fail spectacularly when confronted with tasks or environments that differ slightly to those they were trained for. Their algorithms are also opaque, which makes difficult for humans to explain how they work and whether they include bias that could lead to problematic –if not dangerous– behaviours.16

#### Externally, environmental sustainability – extinction.

David Victor 19, professor of international relations at the School of Global Policy and Strategy and director of the Laboratory on International Law and Regulation, Co-Chair of the Brookings Initiative on Energy and Climate, 1/10/19, “How artificial intelligence will affect the future of energy and climate,” https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-artificial-intelligence-will-affect-the-future-of-energy-and-climate/

HOW AI WILL IMPROVE CLIMATE POLICY

Since the chief protagonist in the climate change story, CO2, has a long atmospheric lifetime, there is only a sluggish relationship between changes in emissions and the accumulated concentrations; in turn, those concentrations have a sluggish impact on the climate. Even if AI were part of some massive transformation in the energy system, the built-in inertia of that energy system, along with the inertia in the climate system, virtually guarantees that the world is in for a lot of climate change. All this is grim news and means that widely discussed goals, such as stopping warming at 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius are unlikely to be realized.

These geophysical and infrastructural realities give rise to a new policy reality: adaptation is urgent.[7] They also mean that emergency responses to extreme climate impacts—for example, solar geoengineering, might be needed as well.

Existing research shows that there is a huge difference in the impact on public welfare from scenarios where climate change affects a society that doesn’t have an adaptation plan compared with a society that takes active adaptive measures. For example, the most recent U.S. climate-impact assessment released in November 2018 demonstrates that active adaptation measures can radically reduce losses from some climate impacts—often with benefits that far exceed the costs.[8] Extreme climate change is going to be ugly and will require hard choices—such as which coastlines to protect or abandon. Without smart adaptation strategies, it will be a lot worse.

One of the central insights from the science of climate impacts is that extreme events will cause most of the damage. A world that is a bit warmer and wetter (and a bit drier in some places) is a world that societies, within reason, can probably adapt to—especially if those gradual changes are easy to anticipate. But a world that has more extreme events—put differently, climate events that have a higher variance—is a world that requires a lot more preparedness. A farming area that faces a new, significant risk of truly extreme drought for example, such as a decade-long dust bowl, will need to prepare as if that extreme event is commonplace. It will need irrigation systems, the option of planting hardier crops and other possible interventions that sit ready when the extreme events come.

Once those systems are purchased, much of the expense is borne and it makes sense to use them all the time. This has been the experience, for example, with the Thames river barrier or a similar Dutch flood barrier—these systems were designed and installed at vast expense with extreme events in mind, and now they are being used much more frequently. Climate impacts are, fundamentally, stochastic events centered around shifting medians—a warmer world, for example, is one where median temperature rises and where the whole distribution of temperatures from cold to hot shifts hotter. But the tails in that statistical distribution also probably fatten, and for some impacts, those tails get a lot fatter. Machine learning techniques will probably improve the ability to understand the shapes of those tails.

This logic of extreme events as the main drivers of climate impacts and response strategies has some big implications for how societies will plan for adaptation and how AI can help—possibly in transformative ways.

First, AI can help focus and adjust adaptation strategies. Because uncertainty is high and extreme events are paramount, policymakers, firms, and households will not know where to act nor what expense is merited. They will have a large portfolio of responses, each with an option value. Machine learning can help improve the capacity to assess those option values more rapidly. Such techniques might also make it possible to rely more heavily on market forces to weigh which options generate private and public welfare—if so, AI could help reduce one of the greatest dangers as societies develop adaptation strategies, which is that they commit vast resources to adaptation without guiding resources to their greatest value. High levels of uncertainty, along with acute private incentives that can mis-allocate resources—for example, local construction firms and organized labor might favor some kinds of adaptive responses (e.g., building sea walls and other hardened infrastructure) even when other less costly options are available—mean that adaptation needs could generate a massive call on resources and thus a massive opportunity for mischief and mis-allocation.

Second, most adaptation efforts are intrinsically local and regional affairs. As a matter of geophysics, climate change harms public welfare when general perturbations in the oceans and atmosphere get translated into specific climatological events that are manifest in specific places—specific coastlines, mountainous regions, public lands, and natural ecosystems. As a matter of public policy, the actors whose responses have the biggest leverage on local impacts are managers of local infrastructures—coastal and urban planners, developers, city managers, and the like. Politically, this is one of the reasons why, despite all the difficulties in mobilizing action to control emissions, it is likely that as communities realize what’s at stake with adaptation, they will respond. Local responses generate, for the most part, local benefits. A big challenge in all this local response, however, is that local authorities are intrinsically decentralized and usually not steeped in technical expertise. Getting the best information on climate impacts and response strategies—let alone keeping that information aligned with local circumstances and shifting odds for climate impacts—is all but impossible. AI could help lower that cost and, in effect, democratize quality climate impacts response.

### 1NC – OFF

#### Text: Vote neg to redact the 1AC - the CP does the aff but doesn't say it.

#### Solves the Aff since they have no Affirmation key warrant BUT disclosing militant strategies leads to militant crackdowns and the fracturing of undercommon collectivity which turns the case.

### 1NC – OFF

#### We advocate for the 1AC sans their Affirmative’s telos of [reducing Intellectual Property Protections for Medicine].

#### That solves the Aff – they have card zero that says reducing IPP on Medicines is necessary OR key to solve the Aff through Hapticality – ctl-F for Intellectual and Medicines shows only two results, both asserted in tag lines – hold the line on 1AR solvency deficits. Affirming Hapticality without a telos is necessary and sufficient to solve the Aff.

#### Your solvency evidence agrees with us – 1AC Mundt says attaching Hapticality to collective agreements or actions that we think will bring wholeness are BAD to their project. Affirming a particular telos attaches subjects to a an arc of redemption within Settler Logics.

**1AC Mundt 19** – Kirsten Mundt is a PHD candidate at the University of New Mexico

Kirsten E. Mundt, "(RE)INSURGENT ECOLOGIES: DWELLING TOGETHER BETWEEN QUEASY WORLDS”, pp 204-211, 2019. <https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/amst_etds/82/> // sam /Re-cut by Elmer

I included a large passage here from The Undercommons as an entry point for considering differences between “haptics" as a tool of neoliberalism and “hapticality” as a site that defies neoliberal management. If haptics is a neuroscientific discipline operating within agreements of what it means to be bound by skin, to be settled, to optimize human adaptation, hapticality is the feel of the political undercommons, where feeling with and for each other is the place of passage away from “self,” time, and space. Here, resilience, adaptation, and resettlement are not the point. Instead, **hapticality refuses** the terms of **collective agreements** that define who is a person, what it means to be a person, how to be a person: **It’s a feeling**, if you ride with it, that produces a **certain distance from the settled**, **from those who determine themselves in space and time**, who **locate themselves in a determined history**. Instead, **dispossessed**, affective **selves**—denied humanity—live within, between and among bodies, **refusing** terms a the liberal humanist “self” that is **whole, settled, unified**. This sympoietic state lives too far outside of bounded individualism and ways that western therapeutic technologies could possibly heal “selves” because these terms confound the goals of settler colonialism and neoliberal narratives. Not only does **hapticality** **challenge** **colonial notions** getting settled, **of “making it” on settler terms,** but life in the hold undermines all forms of bio and geo-political management: this feel of the shipped is not regulated, at least not successfully, by a state, a religion, a people, an empire, a piece of land, a totem.” By dislocating one’s body from all terms of coloniality—history as past, bodies bound by skin in present time, and private property ownership, hapticality becomes a lived feel that is simultaneously densely personal and vastly trans-personal, completely dislocated from bounded notions of place, home, and self: Though forced to touch and be touched, to sense and be sensed in that space of no space, though refused sentiment, history and home, we feel (for) each other.262 Touch, though it is a “sentiment with its own interiority,” is not born of “self,” or “soul,”263 but connected to shared histories and ancestral experiences that are heard and felt. For example, Soul music is an expression of lament for broken hapticality, created and enforced through slavery and forced separation from family, community, and land. Far from historical, these violences continue to live in the flesh as remembered ancestral violences living in our DNA. Facing the embodied legacy of violence is not merely accomplices through historicizing or naming, nor does it involve forgetting the violences of history in order to move on and adapt. Instead, (re)membering becomes a site that is so unbearable and painful that it must be shared, must be transmuted through trans-embodiments not bound by one’s skin: This is the feel that no individual can stand, and no state abide.264 The felt experience of sharing and enfleshing history becomes the field through which to forge connection and solidarity outside of colonial constructs of time, space, and “self.” It is not just the pain of this lifetime, but the felt acknowledgment of broken ancestral ties, geographies, and oppressions. The felt, living sense of history, then, becomes a crucial site for imagining self-hood beyond the confines of a body occupying a particular point in time. **Instead of managing pain as** personal trauma, as **something to be “healed**” in a lifetime, the felt sense of time stretches backward and forward, including ancestors and generations to come. From what vantage point, or what point in time, could we say that “healing” has been accomplished? And to what end? Bracha Ettinger’s The Matrixial Borderspace provides another entry point for considering hapticality, or ways that embodied, pre-verbal and non-verbal experiences of childhood, ancestral pain, and historical atrocities, continue to experience lives of their own in our flesh. She writes about the wounding of those who have come before us, who have left traces of wounded-ness on our own bodies and psyches. She argues that “the past is not past but is not present, but from scattered and animated remains of a continuing, though not continuous, trauma.”265 We access these traces not necessarily through language, but through lived intensities, embodiments, touch, and art. This embodiment often lives outside the realm of representation, and evades colonial capture that would demand wholeness, or a complete and cohesive healed “self.” By shifting attention from one’s individual knot of suffering to the shared, “matrixial web of borderlands,”266 subjectivity is enlarged and expanded beyond self. In her own embodied praxis, Ettinger uses the act of painting to access and transmute shared pain and suffering. Instead of pointing viewers toward an aesthetic experience of suffering, she considers the transmutation of trauma that happens in the border zone of endless touch and movement. “There is a transmutation of trauma that is not the same as its full and knowing articulation.”267 In other words, pain is not simply “worked through” to a logical end, but animated within co-poietic ecologies. Ettinger’s theories and painting practices provide a space to contemplate the fact that we are never fully individuated individuals.268 We can’t be, since we are connected on a psychic level that exists prior to individuation, unspeakable to the ‘I.’ “Only as broken up can the image appear.”269 Speaking of “I” or “we” is not possible here. Instead, subjectivity emerges as temporary, lived encounters within shared border spaces between partially-formed subjects, both connected and different. Instead of identity as a complete “I,” identification emerges within a space in which traumas and desires of others become our own. This view of encounter emerges as anti-oedipal; the relationships and selves that emerge are co-poietic, co-emergent and dependent instead of separate and “whole.” The matrixial borderspace is a space of matrixial difference that allows for conductive affect, able to give voice to body-psyche interacting and co-emergence with the world. Similarly, Erin Manning’s The Politics of Touch considers how touch as affect interrupts settler constructs of self-in-time and space, interrupts concrete boundaries between self and other, and the myth of secure borders. While constructivist scholarship assumes that the body is already signified, always bio-politicized, what happens when we think about touch as a political process of lived intensities between bodies as lived intensities? Manning argues that the problem of the body in western scholarship and policy is that we treat it like a distinct agent. Naturalization of the body by marking it as gendered and racialized, renders bodies recognizable and territorializable. Nation states rely on these markings to govern the larger body politic through multicultural politics of difference. A politic of touch, then, considers how bodies have agency within colonizing frames through refusing notions of the body as singular and concrete. Instead of a politic of the “narratively condemned,” bodies hold agency to shape democracy. Since bodies are simultaneously constructed, ephemeral, and changeable, the space between bodies is less an object of analysis than a gesture, a becoming-in-relation: The body is never its-self. We have several bodies, non of them “selves” in terms of subjectivity. Touch as reaching toward already alerts us to the downfall of discourses of subjectivity: if my body is created through my movement toward you, there is no “self” to refer back to, only a proliferation of vectors that emerge through contact.270 Within this co-poeitic space of becoming-in-relation, our senses reach beyond the security of what it means to be “whole,” to be human. Manning argues along with Brian Massumi and Baruch Spinoza that while we can’t know the full potential of bodies because bodies exceed our knowledge of them.271 Real sovereignty, or power, exists within this excess, or the “infinite abstract” in which a body seeks to touch what it does not yet understand but seeks to know, but cannot ever know. Instead, bodies are vectors of contact, senseurs, that are moved through affects that play on the surface of our senses. What are bodies, here, in relationship to the State? Bodies can only partially be made members (citizens) because they cannot be secured in place. In the interoceptive act of touch and being touched, of reaching for each other, we become a continuum of selves instead of a “self,” fundamentally altering settler space and time. Manning writes, “bodies are never completely enslaved to the state because bodies are never completely reducible to either Nature or the State. Bodies emerge on a continuum that evolves in relationship to pacts formed around institutions of power and compliance.”272 Within this continuum, hapticality as method and methodology provides a strong challenge to western knowledge production and the de-politicization of touch and healing. What possibilities emerge for language and scholarship of feeling with, both recognizing and evading colonial technologies? The degree to which neoliberal complicity is reinforced or undermined has much to do with conflicts that emerge when language attempts to define and manage the terms of suffering. Even the term “hapticality” is limited when attempting to access the feel of suffering since language has the power to separate experience, the actual feeling of pain, from the body. Elaine Scarry’s The Body in Pain argues that pain shatters language and the ability to speak. She argues that when pain does begin to speak, it tells a story, and yet, due to its inability to be grasped, it causes a split between one’s reality and the reality of others, making torture and structural violences effective tools of bio-political citizenship. Violence, when it is inflicted by war, torture, or structurally through institutions, affects how individuals either speak or remain in silence. Sandra Soto suggests that the process of naming, of defining, or using metaphors to “footnote the confounding manifold ways that our bodies, our work, our desires are relentlessly interpolated by inequivalent social processes,”273 is equally a trap. Instead, she suggests listening to what is not said in order to ward off “ontological impoverishment” and “epistemological disciplining”274 that comes from Western academic knowledge production. For many Indigenous and scholars of color, this is less a project of enfleshing selves in relationship to personal pain, but yoking haptical, ontological immediacy across bodies, space, time, and linguistic agreements in order to densify how histories and bodies coconstruct each other. The subject becomes not the personal self in pain, but how pain continues to be inflicted by tools of “civilization” such as scholarship and narratives of history that occlude colonial violence. For example, Ned Blackhawk’s Violence Over the Land (2006) performs a corrective to colonial versions of Native American history by rewriting history using violence as both subject and method. In other words, Blackhawk’s retelling of history through Western Shoshone eyes both reckons with the racialized violence upon which America was built, and uses language to perform violence to American historical narratives as places of comfort and innocence. Similarly, Christina Sharpe’s In the Wake: On Blackness and Being, argues that being and writing in the wake, from within the “continuous and changing present of slavery’s as yet unresolved unfolding,”275 means inhabiting history in ways that do not see the past as the past, but continuously unfolding within and around us. For these scholars, the felt sense of history, of the ancestral continuing into the present, and felt sense of responsibility for future generations, is a necessary corrective to bounded selfhood. Hapticality becomes the method, the means, and the goal of scholarship. In other words, yoking the past to the present to the future performs an ethic of care and repair within continued violences of history. If some of the more pernicious sites of epistemological disciplining rely on colonial hegemonies of language that reinforce agreements related to self, space, and time, Black and Indigenous Scholars have been at the forefront of challenging these colonial constructs. Necessarily, the question then becomes, what does hapticality look like for descendants and perpetrators of privileged colonial legacies: scientists, scholars, writers, White, mixed-race, and other orphans—for writing in the wake, embodying and employing hapticality as a challenge to neoliberal, settler subjectivities? Is it possible to imagine dispossessing ourselves of privileged positions and subjectivities associated with coloniality and whiteness to embody solidarity with de-colonial embodiments, ancestral histories, and ecological possibilities? In other words, if we consider hapticality as method, what possibilities exist for dialoguing across disciplinary/racial/ethnic/gender lines in order to imagine non-hierarchical, ecologically just futures?

#### The Net Benefit is Incompleteness – strategies of completeness are genocidal.

- modified for problematic rhetoric

Harney and Moten 11 Stephano Harney and Fred Moten March 2021 "Refusing Completion: A Conversation" <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/116/379446/refusing-completion-a-conversation/> (Stefano Harney is the Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University., Fred Moten is the professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa)//Elmer

FM: Maybe what we always also want to be doing is operating under the assumption that when it comes to thought, rigor and generosity are not separate from one another. That “intra-action,” to use Karen Barad’s term, is intra-active with another: that of black study and black studies. That’s where it’s at, as the Godfather would say. That’s what we’re interested in. And that’s also where we’re at in our lives, in our intellectual life together, and in our social life together as friends. It’s just that the syntax and the semantics that we have been given in order to try to understand that double intra-action is inadequate for the most part. We ask ourselves, how do we understand the relation between black study and black studies, and then we have to take two months to try to overcome the fact that “relation” ain’t the right word. In other words, the **intra-action of black study** and black studies **requires** something like what Barad calls “**experimental metaphysics**.” Or, maybe another way to put it is that what’s required are some experiments in anti-metaphysics. Maybe black study is just this continual experiment in anti-metaphysics. SH: All Incomplete is also **about the next town**, about what we heard about the next town, about **the next experiment** already going on, continually as Fred says. And so, for instance, I’m very grateful to the current generation of Guyanese feminist, activist scholars such as Kamala Kempadoo and Alissa Trotz who have made more available the work of the great Guyanese feminist activist intellectual Andaiye. We’ve been studying and teaching with Andaiye’s The Point Is to Change the World, and also with Lessons from the Damned by the Damned, the latter a collectively written book about a freedom school set up by black women in the late 1960s and early ’70s in Newark. Now, Andaiye talks about the research she did as part of Red Thread, an independent cross-racial organization of women in Guyana. She talks about how the poor and working class women who are keeping diaries on their social reproductive labor were doing research that she, Andaiye, could never do as well as them. Then, from the Damned, we hear the story of a key turning point in the freedom school. The women running the school have met some middle-class, teacher-qualified black women at a Vietnam protest and invited them back to the school. Much is gained by the encounter, but after a few weeks the women who run the school say something to the effect of, we loved them, but we had to send them away because they could not believe that we—in our position as black working-class women—were better placed to theorize this world. If we take these lessons from Andaiye and the Damned seriously, maybe we can get out of some of the metaphysical assumptions of our positions and roles. What Andaiye and the Damned are saying is that **poor people, poor black and Indian and indigenous women**, in these most vital instances **were better researchers and** better **theorists** than those of us who are traditionally and institutionally trained as such and rise through the “meritocracy.” So, we have to find some other reason for doing what we are doing—cause it is not because we are the best at it—and so we have to **find some other way**, **beyond** this **metaphysics of meritocracy we inhabit.** And from there it becomes clear that we are not the ones to sit in judgment, and this means we can **practice nothing but open admissions** and open promotion in the places where we teach, whether elementary schools, universities, or art academies. And what we would do is support the primary theorists and researchers as they come through, should they wish to come through, and should they wish to stay. And isn’t this serving the people? After all, serving the people never meant serving them breakfast. It meant being at the service of the people, because the people held what we all need, precariously, with only partial access sometimes themselves to this wealth, knowledge, and practice of how to learn about society and how to analyze it because it needs to be changed. That is why it was called a party of self-defense: to defend all this, not to imagine that the party was going to generate the wealth itself. Service becomes the answer to all the anxieties about allyship and class. And service is debt, partiality, incompleteness in action. SS: Your use of **incompleteness** reminds me in certain ways of how before you talked about **debt not as this crushing condition** **but** **as something that, in being unpayable**, **is the very principle of sociality**. So debt not as IMF-backed austerity measures, but **debt as** all those **things we owe to each other**. The way you talk about incompleteness strikes me as similar in that it’s **not incompleteness as a problem**—**like there’s something lacking in myself** which is fulfilled through another person—**but rather as a permanent state which is more of a blessing**, or something to be preserved. It’s not something that needs to be dealt with as a problem. Is that a fair reading? SH: Yes, I think that’s right. FM: Have you ever seen the film Jerry Maguire? The title character is this brutal drone of individuation whose whole life ends up depending upon his exploitation of a black football player, which he accomplishes with the help of a female assistant whom he later marries. The movie begins with Jerry Maguire being a successfully individuated man who’s complete, or thinks he is, until he gets stripped of all that. In order to find himself he’s got to attach himself in a more or less straight Hegelian mode to one who’s not quite really one, this player who shows out on and off the playing field while also modeling an authentic and loving family life, all of which reveals him never to have been the kind of free subject Jerry used to be. They call this a romantic comedy. It’s the story of the man who at the end of his personal (re)development—after having the biggest night of his life because the black football player literally endangers his own health in order to make a catch that will make him a superstar so that Jerry MaFuckingGuire can exploit him and attract other superstars who he can also exploit—finds that he can’t enjoy it without the woman who has made it all possible but whom he has exploited and demeaned and overlooked. That’s when this motherfucker breaks into a feminist consciousness-raising group in order to reclaim his wife. How does he get her back? Just by saying, “Hello,” according to her, but he gets to finish his speech by saying to her, “You complete me.” Like, he was at 87 percent and she was the final 13 percent. Now, he’s fucking complete when he gets her back. Well, [**screw**] ~~fuck~~ **completeness**. Not only that, ~~fuck~~ completeness **as a way of understanding** anything about what love actually is. What they call romantic comedy is really anti-romantic tragedy. It’s amazing that something like Jerry Maguire is offered as a representation of what it’s like to fall in love. If you’ve ever fallen you know that **the other person** or persons don’t complete you. They **incomplete you**. They fuck you the fuck up. It doesn’t leave you intact. It plays you, undermines you. It disturbs and **disrupts your individuation**. It obliterates not only the possibility of but the desire for individuation. If you think about it in those terms, incompleteness is a consummation devoutly to be wished. The entire genre of the romantic comedy is usually some white dude who’s being dragged against his will into the condition of incompleteness. When, finally, he submits to it, you know that the sequel of that movie will be all about the breakup, which follow’s the idea of individuation having had a chance to rally, which the regular miseries of monogamous heterosexuality—which Samuel R. Delany teaches us is the deepest perversion—are happy to provide. The idea of **completeness** **is ridiculous and genocidal**. **There’s** just no end **to the ways it continually seeks to destroy our shared capacity to breathe and ground**. It **predicates** **and requires** the constantly asserted revision of what Robinson calls “**the terms of order**.” It predicates and necessitates the constant **brutalization** of all the people in the world who resist those terms of order and who practice modalities of **social existence** that are not predicated on those terms of order, as Robinson shows in his beautifully radical use of ethnographic and anthropological work in The Terms of Order. We advocate for incompleteness. We think such advocacy is part of what it is “to preserve,” as he says, “the ontological totality.” To preserve the totality is to refuse its completion. That’s our ongoing ante- and anti-metaphysical experiment.

## Case

### Presumption

#### Vote Negative on Presumption – this is a sequencing question to evaluating their Solvency for Offense on FW AND a reason you should Vote Neg to invert the Aff’s form of Value via Negation.

#### 1] They link back to everything thery’ve critiqued---they’ve engaged in positivist forms of communications, risk calculus followed debate evidence and line by line norms

#### 2] Voting aff maintains the world computer---inputs the “1s and 0s” on tabroom follow normal technological procedures---voting for the wrong team solves the aff better

#### 3] Hapticality always exists as a form of sociality in the status quo – no reason a ballot is key to affirm it – only a risk it results in co-option.

### Extinction Outweighs

#### Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### B] Objectivity- body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical

#### C] Comes before value-to-life.

Tännsjö 11 (Torbjörn, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” <http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf>) //BS 1-27-2018

\*\*Bracketed to avoid triggers

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all [die] commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not [die] commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I [die] kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life)..

### Hapitality Bad

#### Their re-tooling of Communication gets coopted within the university – this ev is unbelievably fire

Webb, Darren. "Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?)." Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies 40.2 (2018): 96-118. (Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield)//Elmer

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but **refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job.** When Moten **describes subversion** as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), **one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.**7 Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically **short-lived**, and—as Harney and Moten warned—**there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you** into alternative spaces “**because we’ve been inside so much**” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, **meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda**, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work. If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, **it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia**. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents. What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And **we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance**. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more. The occupation Can the occupied building operate as a site of utopian possibility within the corporate-imperial university? Reflections on, and theorizations of, two recent waves of occupation—“Occupied California” 2009–2010 and the UK Occupations 2010–2011—have answered this question affirmatively. The “occupation” should not be understood here as solely or necessarily “student occupation.” It goes without saying—though sadly so often does need saying —that “faculty also have a responsibility to fight with and for students” (Smeltzer and Hearn 2015, 356). Though led by a new historical subject, “the graduate without a future” (Schwarz-WeinStein 2015, 11), the importance of faculty support for the occupations was emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic (Research and Destroy 2010, 11; Dawson 2011, 112; Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 14; Ismail 2011, 128; Newfield and EduFactory 2011, 26). Long before Occupy took shape in Zuccotti Park, “occupation” was being heralded as the harbinger of a new society and a new way of being. If we return to the notion of creating utopian spaces, the key aim for some of the occupiers was to create communes within the university walls—to communize space (Inoperative Committee 2011, 6).8 Communization here is understood as a form of insurrectionary anarchism that refuses to talk of a transition to communism, insisting instead upon the immediate formation of zones of activity removed from exchange, money, compulsory labor, and the impersonal domination of the commodity form (Anon 2010a, 5). As one pamphlet declared: We will take whatever measures are necessary both to destroy this world as quickly as possible and to create, here and now, the world we want: a world without wages, without bosses, without borders, without states. (Anon 2010d, 34) This is a revolutionary anarchism that takes the university campus as the site for a practice—communization—that not only prefigures but also realizes the vision of a free society. Heavily influenced by The Coming Insurrection (Invisible Committee 2009), but tapping into a long tradition of anarchist theory and practice from Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1985) to David Graeber’s Direct Action (Graeber 2009), occupation becomes “the creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrangement that sketches the contours of a new society” (Research and Destroy 2010, 11). It is “an attempt to imagine a new kind of everyday life” (Hatherley 2011, 123). Firth (2012) refers to these momentary openings as critical, experimental utopias: Such utopias are … simultaneously immanent and prefigurative. They are immanent insofar as they allow space for the immediate expression of desires, satisfaction of needs and also the articulation of difference or dissent. They are prefigurative to the extent that they allow one to practice and exemplify what one would like to see at a more proliferative range in the future (26) The ultimate aim is for the practice to spread beyond the campus through a dual process of provocative rupture—the idea that insurrectionary moments can unleash the collective imagination and stimulate an outpouring of creativity that blows apart common sense and offers glimpses of a future world (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007, 37)—and “contaminationism,” that is, spreading by means of example (Graeber 2009, 211). It may well have been the case that communism was realized on the campuses of Berkeley and UCL, that a momentary opening in capitalist space/time appeared through which another world could be glimpsed. The occupation, however—whether California, London, or anywhere else—is likely always to remain a localized temporary disruptive practice. A practice with utopian potency, for sure, in terms of suspending normalized forms of discipline and opening new egalitarian discursive spaces (Rheingans and Hollands 2013; Nişancioğlu and Pal 2016). In terms of wider systemic change, however, “small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic system” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 29). What “the occupation” demonstrates more than anything is the reality of the corporate-imperial university, as the institutional hierarchy, backed by the carceral power of the police and criminal justice system, inevitably disperses the occupiers—often using militarized force—and repossesses the occupied space in a strong assertion of its ownership rights not only to university buildings but also to what constitutes legitimate thought and behavior within them (on this see Docherty 2015, 90). The significance, and utopian potential, one attaches to campus occupations depends in part upon the significance one attaches to the university as a site of struggle. For the Edu-Factory Collective: As was the factory, so now is the university. Where once the factory was a paradigmatic site of struggle between workers and capitalists, so now the university is a key space of conflict, where the ownership of knowledge, the reproduction of the labour force, and the creation of social and cultural stratifications are all at stake. This is to say the university is not just another institution subject to sovereign and governmental controls, but a crucial site in which wider social struggles are won and lost. (Caffentzis and Federici 2011, 26) Clearly, if this is true, then the form the struggle takes, and the example it sets, is of immense significance. Srnicek and Williams describe as “wishful thinking” the idea that the occupation might spread beyond the campus by means of rupture or contamination (2016, 35). However, if the university really is a key site of class struggle (Seybold 2008, 120; Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 38), a site through which wider struggles are refracted and won or lost, then the transformative potential of the occupation needs to be attended to seriously. The analysis of the university offered by the Edu-Factory Collective is, however, outdated. Sounding like Daniel Bell writing in 1973 about how universities had become the “axial structures” of post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 12), the analysis does not hold water today. Moten overdoes it when he tells us that “the university is a kind of corpse. It is dead. It’s a dead institutional body” (Moten 2015, 78). What is clear, however, is that “focusing on the university as a site of radical transformation is a mistake” (Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 13). As has been widely noted, there is very little distinguishing universities from other for-profit corporations (Readings 1996; Lustig 2005; Washburn 2005; Shear 2008, Tuchman 2009). What does separate them is their inefficiency, due in large part to the fact that universities operate also as medieval guilds, with faculties “ruled by masters who lord over journeymen and apprentices in an artisanal system of production” (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, 77). If the university is a sinister hybrid monstrosity—part medieval guild, part criminal corporation—which has no role other than reproducing its own privilege, then no special status can be attributed to campus protests. In this case, “A free university in the midst of a capitalist society is like a reading room in a prison” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). A reading room in a prison. Another apposite metaphor. The occupation is a safe space, offering temporary respite, a place to hide, a refuge, a bolt-hole, a breathing space. As with the utopian classroom and the undercommons, what the occupation suggests is that “defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 48). Conclusion Zaslove was right to characterize utopian pedagogy within the corporateimperial university as the search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. He himself suggests that, “All university classes should become dialogic-experiential models that educate by expanding the zones of contact with wider communities” (2007, 102). Like so many others, Zaslove sees dialogic-experiential models of education beginning in the classroom then expanding outward. The literature is full of references to “exceeding the limits of the university classroom” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007a, 325), “extend [ing] beyond the boundaries of the campus” (Ruben 2000, 211), and “breeching the walls of the university compounds and spilling into the streets” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). This all brings to mind Giroux’s notion of academics as border crossers (Giroux 1992), but it also paints a picture of academics taking as their starting point the university and from there crossing the border into the community and the street. The University can be the site for fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility—in the classroom, the undercommons, the occupation. It cannot be the site for transformative utopian politics. It cannot even be the starting point for this. Given the corporatization and militarization of the university, academics are increasingly becoming “functionaries of elite interests” inhabiting a culture which serves to reproduce these interests (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, “radical” initiatives or movements will soon be co-opted, recuperated, commodified, and neutralized (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxvi; Seybold 2008, 123; Neary 2012b, 249; Rolfe 2013, 21). Institutional habitus weights so heavily that projects born in the university will be scarred from the outset by a certain colonizing “imaginary of education” (Burdick and Sandlin 2010, 117). And we have long known that the university is but one space of learning, and perhaps not a very important one at that.

#### The 1AC’s demand for the haptic is the very invasion of captive space of blackness which uniquely traps black women between the two-sided force of public discipline and private sexual coercion.

Spillers 17, Hortense. "Shades of Intimacy: Women in the Time of Revolution." NOTE – This was originally transcribed and cut by Greg Zoda, Presentation at the Barnard Center for Research on Women, February 16 (2017). (Professor of English at Vanderbilt University, PhD in English from Brandeis University)//Elmer

This weave of relations is partially shrouded by the public world of profit and production, just as it disappears into the shadowy remoteness of the private world with its masks of affection, sentimentality, and cruelty. The one word that crosses this ambiguous territory of public and private, light and shade, production and reproduction, could be intimacy, intimacy that registers the confusion precisely because it is, in this instance, neither fish nor fowl. What do we call children born of sexual congress between the enslaved and their owners? More precisely, the liaison between the enslaved and their masters? Douglass, in his 1845 narrative, observes a new social fact on the ground of coercive labor. The sexual work engendered in this calculus of relations has produced what Douglass calls there, as you will remember, “new people”, although, such children have appeared in the Virginia colony in the eighteenth century and even before, in the story Ira Berlin tells about communities that spring up along the African literal. Douglass draws out this strand of sociality because he wants to emphasize the other corruption of slavery’s protocols: masters who own their children. As such a subject himself, Douglass was keenly aware of the contradictions of his status—that mixed race standing did not guarantee freedom even as it enhanced the owner’s profit. An investigator is struck by the epiphenomenon of the “new people”, not only because of figures like Frederick Douglass and Sally Hemings, who was the daughter and mother of interracial crossing, but also as these particulars lead us to a broader inquiry about intimate life in a world that allows, indeed enables, both family life, in its juridical privilege and personality, and extra-familial life, as the secret heart of the family’s other. The stuff of novels and film, as for example, William Wells Brown’s Clotel; or, The President’s Daughter will attest, this familial parallelism—the family and the shadow family—is not an exception to the rule, but as it came to me not too long ago, it was as common as grass and appears to be a substantial arrangement of slavery’s generations across the color line. So it’s almost as if saying: not who was involved in such relationships but who was not involved in such relationships. So what I hope to extract from the record eventually is a redefined and refined sense of intimacy in a circumstance where flesh becomes the medium of exchange. The problematic that I am attempting to isolate in this project is how to name what appears at a depth in the century of revolution. We have a fairly good sense of the spatiotemporal sweep of the revolutionary arc, but what I am searching for attempts to evade the archives, to disappear into the world of the everyday. If the shadow families of the master class were defined by their economic relations to the master, then how did this intrusion of money matters reconfigure the whole range of structures of feeling, of intimate relations between husbands and wives, of the sibling relationship? In other words, one even begins to suspect that affection, official affection, is {?} under circumstances that allow slavery. So we are confronted here by two genres of historiography, or the historiographical record. I would call Annette Gordon-Reed’s work on *The Hemingses of Monticello*, for example, a prominent instance of positive assertion. In the triad of texts that I am sure you are familiar with that she has so far produced on Sally Hemings’s liaison with Thomas Jefferson, the overall narrative that she advances pursues the tropological fortunes of what Toni Morrison has referred to as “the American romance of race”. In this instance, Hemings and her relatives are given protective cover and a proximity to Jefferson that spares them the more brutal realities of enslavement. This mode of historiographical reflection resembles a kind of fiction-writing as in the case of Barbara Chase-Riboud’s Hemings novels that posit the seed or the seeds of intimacy between masters and the enslaved. In other words, the enslaved is constituted in those novels, more or less, as sexual objects of desire, so that what we understand as love and intimacy are not only possible between master and slave, but even likely. In the antithetical instance, the historiographical narrative paints a different picture that projects a negative assertion. For example, in a study of intimacy in the Antebellum South, Steven Stowe, author of this study, argues that even the most persistent and intense contact between masters and the bonded—as in the case of enslaved figures who, like the Hemingses, worked as domestic servants in the household of masters—did not yield intimacy between parties. As Stowe describes it, intimacy, in the Antebellum South, was aligned with public forms and perception, as expressed in rituals of courtship. Such rituals assured the acknowledgement of an intimate relation’s unfolding, so that the ritual became a kind of knowledge, we might say, or epistemology distributed to members of a class, or affiliates of a class, which bespeaks a sharing of values. This very private thing, which is a very private thing in our world, between and among lovers, which we relegate, in the sharable imaginary, to the private and public sphere, if those terms still work, is relegated in Stowe’s conceptual narrative to the world of public forms and performance. Why does the difference matter, or how does it matter? If close proximity, or constant contact, does not guarantee intimacy in this social order, then it seems to me that our notions of intimacy and shades of intimacy are thrown into crisis. This is what I mean: if proximity is not reliable as a measure of social cohesion, if sexual partners and their children can be sold off, if shadow families can assert no claim to the human dignity of official families, then sentimentality and feelings of love can be shown to be unstable, and that’s across the social order, it seems to me that we could say that justifiably. Did slavery across the western world rupture ties of kinship and filiation so completely that the eighteenth century, and possibly earlier, demolishes what Constance Classen in The Deepest Sense: A Cultural History of Touch calls a tactile cosmology? When in an earlier piece of writing I saw the distinction between body and flesh, I was attempting to isolate features of citizen belonging from alien bodies and entities. I would associate bodiedness with juridical personality, or the historical actor who has access to what our Fourteenth Amendment would call “due process”. Under its impress, at least in theory, other rights-bearing follows in its wake. Flesh describes an alien intimacy, or an alien entity—a more or less expendable figure. Not only does the alien, by race or language, or culture and custom, not have access to the protocols of due process, but perhaps its most poignant determination is the extent to which such a body cannot prevent or ward off another’s touch. For me, the single most powerful evidence of the loss of freedom is the fact that bodies lose their integrity and may be invaded or entered, so to speak, by coercive power. This touch that we associate with intimacy—the haptic that we associate with intimacy—can, under the right conditions, engender invasion and violence, and in its immediacy, in relationship to the enslaved, robs the *haptic* of its powers to heal, to bind, to cure, and becomes instead the power to wound and violate. As you know, Audre Lorde talks about this in her powerful essays on the erotic. Another note from Classen’s study of this particular sense: “In the sensory scale of ‘races’ created by the natural historian Lorenz Oken, the ‘civilized’ European ‘eye-man,’ who focused on the visual world, was positioned at the top and the African ‘skin-man,’ who used touch as his primary sensory modality, at the bottom.” I am suggesting that, under slavery’s regime, the captive body’s susceptibility to being touched places this body on the side of the flesh, so that touching, here, is not a token of social cohesion, of brotherhood or fellowship or fellow feeling, and certainly it has nothing to do with the erotic, or does it (maybe…it just occurred to me, that maybe that’s the question…okay…), but rather the very depth and breadth **of alienation**, among other things, from the laws, and perhaps even ways of distinguishing human life from bare life or animal life. The leading descriptive features of slavery’s eras tend to be economic in the most pointed sense of the term—balance sheets and accounting procedures, gains and losses, profit margins and the flow of goods—while our most sustained focus on the institution and its practices comes to rest on what Pierre Bourdieu might have called a “general science of the economy of practices”. In other words, the argument based on narrow economic considerations defines the enslaved as a species of property. By contrast, the argument that seeks to mobilize an understanding of the position of the enslaved, and of the world that unmakes him and her [them], as a cumulative instance of a general science of an economy of practices attempts to grasp the circumstance of the bonded as a type of historical subjectivity. In both the species of property and a type of historical subjectivity, we recognize, in their very naming, the ambivalence of status that would prohibit either from standing in as a pure or legible example of property, or a purely unforeclosed instance of the subject of history, which revolutionary movement seeks to create.

### AT Racial Cap

#### Racial capitalism fails as a theory.

Go 21 – Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago (Julian, “Three Tensions in the Theory of Racial Capitalism”, Sociological Theory, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 38-47, 2021)

What Is the “Race” in Racial Capitalism? We can now turn to the three tensions in the racial capitalism literature, beginning with the issue of race. This is critical. If the term racial capitalism is to have implications for social theory, it must offer rigorously defined concepts constituting a transposable conceptual apparatus. Surely one of those concepts would have to do with “race.” But what exactly is “race”? The problem is that “race” is not typically defined in the existing literature, so it is unclear whether other categories marking difference, such as ethnicity, are more appropriate than race. Should we be thinking about “ethnic capitalism” rather than racial capitalism? Robinson’s (2000) work is a prime example. Nearly all scholars claim that one of Robinson’s key contributions is to show that capitalism was forged from precapitalist racial divisions in Europe. Capitalism is “racial,” according to Robinson, “because racialism had already permeated Western feudal society,” and capitalism was built upon that racialism (Kelley 2017; Táíwò and Bright 1996). The problem is that Robinson himself was not entirely clear that precapitalist social differences were actually “racial.” On one hand, he did use the term race in his analysis. “Racism,” Robinson (2000:2; see also pp. 26–27, 66–67) wrote, served to structure “the ‘internal’ relations of European peoples” prior to capitalism, and capitalism seized on racism as it developed. On other hand, when discussing some of the presumably “racial” groups in feudal Europe, Robinson (2000:10–11) referred to linguistic rather than phenotypical differences, thus equating racial groups with linguistic groups. In fact, when discussing how migratory and immigrant labor formed the basis for the armies of the Absolutist states and for the production of value in early agrarian capitalism, he oscillated between calling them “races” and “ethnic” groups. For instance, Robinson (2000:23) used the phrase “ethnic divisions of sixteenth century immigrant labor,” and he referred to “national” differences when presumably speaking about premodern “racial” differences. Given these ambiguities, Robinson’s argument could be read differently from how it is conventionally taken. It is not that capitalism was built on prior racial differences; rather, capitalism served to racialize the preexisting ethnic division of labor, thereby turning religious, cultural, or linguistic differences into “racial” ones to legitimate its new exploitative structure. In this view, racialization—the process of turning groups into biological entities called “races”—was a part of modern capitalism, not its precursor (cf. Omi and Winant 1986). In some passages, Robinson (2000) said this exactly: “the tendency of European civilization through capitalism was thus not to homogenize but to differentiate—to exaggerate regional, subcultural, and dialectical differences into ‘racial’ ones” (p. 26). Of course, whether “race” preexisted capitalism does not alter the larger argument of the racial capitalism approach, which is that racial differentiation and capitalism are mutually supportive. Still, the tension in Robinson’s work manifests the deeper issue of whether “racial” capitalism refers to race or other identities. This issue permeates Walzer’s (2020) recent criticism of the racial capitalism concept. Walzer points to examples such as Russia and China, where capitalism does not rely on racial differences but rather on ethnic and religious differentiation. “It may be that Muslims are among the most exploited workers in Russia,” he wrote, “but they are mostly Caucasian (some of them the original Caucasians), so we would have to talk about religious capitalism—where Orthodox Christians, not white people, are the privileged group.” On this basis, Walzer rejected the racial capitalism concept as limited at best and analytically debilitating at worse. Skeptics of Walzer have offered a rebuke: his argument misses the global dimensions of capitalism. At issue is not whether racial stratification articulates with capitalism within any single country but whether it permeates the world-capitalist system. Proponents of this argument could readily assemble evidence to show that, on a global scale, the vast majority of the world’s proletariat, subproletariat, and dispossessed—whether cultivating grapes or coffee on the farms of the Americas, cleaning up office floors in London, or making clothes in the sweatshops of New Delhi—are, to borrow DuBois’s (1935) phrase, “yellow, brown and black.” Against Walzer, this would retain the main claim of the racial capitalism approach that race and capitalism are intertwined. Yet this scaling upward of capitalism to a global level brings its own complications. It carries the danger of what Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999) called “the cunning of imperialist [racialist] reason”: an analytic operation by which U.S.-centered scholars impose presumably U.S.-centric classifications (in this case, “race”) onto the rest of the world, thereby imposing racial classifications into contexts where they might not be operative. We would be obliged, for instance, to impose racial classifications onto Latin American contexts such as Brazil, where the salience of racial classifications is debatable (Loveman 1999; Wimmer 2015). In short, if we are to insist on the global character of racial capitalism, we must assume that analysts’ racial classifications are global as well. They may very well be, but racial capitalism’s founding texts, and more recent discussions, have not sufficiently problematized this tension.2 Can this tension be resolved? One way to do so is to raise the possibility that the racial capitalism concept works best for groups that have been undoubtedly racialized, such as members of the African diaspora in North America.3 Racial capitalism would thus refer mainly to the black ex-slave population, which has suffered some of the clearest and most virulent forms of racism. This might explain why the literature on racial capitalism has focused on African Americans and transatlantic slavery rather than other groups elsewhere in the world. Yet this seeming resolution would significantly reduce the scope of the racial capitalism concept. Racial capitalism would no longer depict a global system. Perhaps the best resolution is one that arrives through more reflexive research. We can explore how “race” is connected to capitalism in diverse sites and across historical periods, but we must be more conscious about whether we are referring to analysts’ definition of race or a category of practice. Put simply, we can arrive at a resolution only through careful research that more clearly defines “race.” The Inadequacy of Existing Theory A second tension in the racial capitalism literature has to do with the relationship between this literature and existing social theories of capitalism, in particular, Marxian theories of capitalism. Animating the racial capitalism approach is the claim that Marxian theories of capitalism are inadequate because they obfuscate the racial foundations of capitalism. For Robinson (2000), “Western Marxism . . . has proven insufficiently radical to expose and root out the racialist order that contaminates its analytic and philosophic applications” (p. 317). Historians’ use of the racial capitalism approach is premised on the idea that Marxism does not adequately acknowledge slavery’s role in capitalism or the ongoing importance of colonialism and “primitive accumulation,” which Marx presumably relegated to the margins of his theory (Smallwood 2018). This is exactly why scholars in this tradition insist on the term racial capitalism: because Marxian theory fails to theorize race, we must add the qualifier race to the signifier capitalism. But what if Marxian theory does in fact take into account race, slavery, imperialism, and colonialism, and proponents of the racial capitalism approach merely misread Marx? If so, the warrant, if not the entire premise, for Robinson’s and others’ work on racial capitalism would crater by an unfortunate misreading of Marxian theory. A number of scholars, in fact, already push against the notion that Marxist thought does not account for race, slavery, or colonialism. Drawing largely on Marx’s journalistic writings, they show that Marx not only discussed race, slavery, and colonialism but saw them as central for capitalism. According to this argument, Marx saw race as so crucial for capitalism that his theory saw the true proletariat as black, brown, and yellow—directly contrary to Robinson’s claim that Marxist theory only saw the white European proletariat as the true subject of history (Anderson 2010; Foster, Holleman, and Clark 2020; Ralph and Singhal 2019). If true, the racial capitalism literature is based on a “misguided reading of Marx” (Ralph and Singhal 2019:864). How might this apparent aporia in Marxian theory be resolved, if at all? It is imperative here to register a distinction between Marx’s theory of capital and his theory of capitalism. 4 The former is sketched in Marx’s mature social theory in Capital and related writings such as The Grundrisse (Postone 1996). These writings offer a formalized and abstract representation of the inner workings of capital, its accumulation, its contradictions, and its necessary demise through a series of central categories that capture the key elements of the capitalist system. At this level of abstraction, the main categories of the theory (e.g., “value,” “surplus value,” “concrete labor,” “abstract labor,” “capital,” “socially necessary labor time”) are devoid of any historical specificity or social content and as such can be applied to distinct historical phases or social formations (e.g., capitalism in the eighteenth-century transatlantic world or Russia in 1998, or the twenty-first-century global system). Categories of race, gender, or ethnicity are therefore not central, because they are too concrete. Alternatively, a theory of capitalism refers to capitalist development and dynamics in their empirical specificity. It is meant to explain and describe specific capitalist formations and developments as they really exist in the world, not their abstract conceptual form. This theory can be extracted from Marx’s journalistic writings and other essays, and it is here where issues such as slavery and ethnicity arise: the essays refer to real events and pressing issues in actually existing capitalism, such as the Civil War or the Irish question (Anderson 2010). But these observations or statements on concrete processes and relations such as slavery in actually existing capitalism—that is, Marx’s theory of capitalism—do not disturb or reconfigure his theory of capital, which remains focused on the relations of wage labor induced to a highly abstract level from his analysis of textile production. If and when he did discuss things such as slavery, such as in “The Working Day” section in Capital, he treated slavery as a passing phase or outside capital’s inner logic, a sort of heuristic to better apprehend and illuminate the latter (Marx [1867] 1906:328–30; on slavery as a heuristic, see Smallwood 2018). This distinction between Marx’s theory of capitalism and his theory of capital helps us better approach the debate generated by the racial capitalism literature. When Robinson or other proponents of the racial capitalism idea critique Marx’s theory for eliding or deliberately occluding race, slavery, and colonialism, they are critiquing his theory of capital, not his theory of capitalism. Here proponents of the racial capitalism approach are on solid ground. Marx’s theory of capitalism does take into account race, slavery, and colonialism, but his theory of capital renders these things marginal at best.5 Hence the warrant for the racial capitalism approach: because Marx’s theory of capital does not center race, the racial capitalism concept and the research and theorizing that go under its banner can fill the void. The concept may provide the basis for an alternative theory not only of racial capitalism but also of racialized capital. Necessity, Contingency, and Difference The final tension within racial capitalism is whether the interconnectedness of racial difference and capitalism is a logical or contingent necessity.6 If, as the racial capitalism literature suggests, slavery and its associated logics of racism have been crucial for the development of capitalism, and if global capitalism today remains intertwined with racial stratification, to what extent are these relations intrinsic to capitalism or accidental? Put differently, is capitalism necessarily racist (Fraser 2019; Lemann 2020)?7 For some, the relationship is only contingent. Walzer (2020) argued that in some countries, capitalism proceeds along just fine without racial difference, and if there is racial difference on a global scale, it is historically contingent. Although the vast majority of workers are nonwhite, Walzer suggested that this is not due to any intrinsic logic of capitalism but rather the accident of demographics (because most of the world is nonwhite, the majority of the world’s workers will be nonwhite). For this reason, Walzer suggested we disavow the racial capitalism concept. Alternatively, others claim that racism is indeed intrinsic to capitalism.8 There are two versions of this claim. One is that racism is necessary to divide the working class and legitimate the rule of the bourgeoisie. Racism is an ideological necessity of capitalism, justifying its unequal relations (Camp, Heatherton, and Karuka 2019; McCarthy 2016; Taylor 2016). “Capitalism requires inequality,” suggested Gilmore (2015), “and racism enshrines it.” A very different version, coming most predominantly from Fraser (2019), is that capitalism necessarily entails relations of exploitation and expropriation that feed off each other. Exploitation is the extraction of value from “free subjects” through wage labor. But expropriation, which includes slavery and colonialism, extracts value from racialized “dependent subjects” and is what enables exploitation to happen in the first place. Expropriation is “a necessary background condition for the exploitation of ‘workers’” (Fraser 2019) and therefore for capitalism itself. Capitalism is thus logically dependent upon racism.9 So what is the answer? Again, it helps differentiate between a theory of capital and a theory of capitalism. A theory of capitalism might demonstrate that race has been historically necessary for capitalist accumulation by reference to empirical reality: historically, capitalism and race have always been intertwined. But the claim that race is a logical necessity to capitalism would have to derive from a theory of capital, not from empirics alone. One would have to deduce, from the categories of Marx’s theory, the necessity of racism or racial differentiation in society. On this score, the arguments for the logical necessity of capitalism’s entanglements with race fall short. Consider the argument that racism is necessary for capitalism because capitalism requires racist ideology to divide the working class. This is a functionalist argument that is not functionalist enough, for it effaces the logical possibility of functional substitution. We may find that racism has historically always functioned to divide the working class, but in theory other “isms” could serve the same function. There is nothing inherent to the logic of capital that requires race to be the ideology of division (Lebowitz 2006:39).10 Why not ethnicity? Why not sexuality? Consider Fraser’s argument that expropriation is intrinsic to capitalism and that racial differentiation must be too. It is plausible and indeed persuasive to claim that expropriation is necessary for capitalism, but it is less persuasive to claim that racial difference is logically necessary for expropriation. Gender could easily serve as the main axis of dependent classification (and, to feminist-Marxist thought, it has served that function), as could ethnicity, religion, sexuality, or citizenship. Fraser would have to show that expropriation, and hence capitalism, requires a racial classification as opposed to other social categories. This is a task left unfulfilled.11 A different and possibly more productive route would be to reframe the issue as one of social difference rather than race. Is racism necessary for capitalism? There are good reasons, as just mentioned, to think not. But is social difference of various types (from race to gender to ethnicity) necessary for capitalism?12 This is more demonstrable, both empirically (by reference to actually existing capitalism) and theoretically (by reference to the logic of capital accumulation). For example, Fraser’s argument about expropriation could be reformulated in the following manner: expropriation is logically necessary for exploitation, which is in turn necessary for capital accumulation, and expropriation requires differentiation among workers. This differentiation could be along racial lines, or it could be along other lines such as gender, but differentiation there must be. Note that this argument logically insinuates a racial component but remains abstract enough to account for other possible identities across different capitalist formations. It can account for racialized slave labor in the eighteenth-century transatlantic world (where “race” was a key axis of differentiation), twentieth-century Russia (where ethnicity or religion might be the important axis), or gender across all these formations. This is just one possibility. There are others. Chakrabarty (1993), for instance, seized on Marx’s categories of “abstract” and “real” labor to write difference into Marx’s theoretical architecture. “Abstract labor” generated by capitalism refers to a homogeneity among different and otherwise incommensurable labors. It is the register of the juridical free subject. But “real” labor marks have heterogeneity that registers the incommensurability of different labors. It therefore refers to a difference that stands “only as a Derridean trace of something that cannot be enclosed” (Chakrabarty 1993:1096). Exactly how persuasive is Chakrabarty’s rereading remains to be seen. The point is that this effort, and others like it, speak to theoretical possibilities that the racial capitalism literature opens up but has yet to pursue thoroughly. More could be done.13

### AT Cap

#### 1] Growth is sustainable – we’re decoupling BUT degrowth unleashes global disaster.

Bailey 18 [Ronald; February 16; B.A. in Economics from the University of Virginia, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, citing a compilation of interdisciplinary research; Reason, “Is Degrowth the Only Way to Save the World?” https://reason.com/2018/02/16/is-degrowth-the-only-way-to-save-the-wor; RP]//Re-cut by Elmer

Unless us folks in rich countries drastically reduce our material living standards and distribute most of what we have to people living in poor countries, the world will come to an end. Or at least that's the stark conclusion of a study published earlier this month in the journal Nature Sustainability. The researchers who wrote it, led by the Leeds University ecological economist Dan O'Neill, think the way to prevent the apocalypse is "degrowth." Vice, pestilence, war, and "gigantic inevitable famine" were the planetary boundaries set on human population by the 18th-century economist Robert Thomas Malthus. The new study gussies up old-fashioned Malthusianism by devising a set of seven biophysical indicators of national environmental pressure, which they then link to 11 indicators of social outcomes. The aim of the exercise is to concoct a "safe and just space" for humanity. Using data from 2011, the researchers calculate that the annual per capita boundaries for the world's 7 billion people consist of the emission of 1.6 tons of carbon dioxide per year and the annual consumption of 0.9 kilograms of phosphorus, 8.9 kilograms of nitrogen, 574 cubic meters of water, 2.6 tons of biomass (crops and wood), plus the ecological services of 1.7 hectares of land and 7.2 tons of material per person. On the social side, meanwhile, the researchers say that life satisfaction in each country should exceed 6.5 on the 10-point Cantril scale, that healthy life expectancy should average at least 65 years, and that nutrition should be over 2,700 calories per day. At least 95 percent of each country's citizens must have access to good sanitation, earn more than $1.90 per day, and pass through secondary school. Ninety percent of citizens must have friends and family they can depend on. The threshold for democratic quality must exceed 0.8 on an index scale stretching from -1 to +1, while the threshold for equality is set at no higher than 70 on a Gini Index where 0 represents perfect equality and 100 implies perfect inequality. They set the threshold for percent of labor force employed at 94 percent. So how does the U.S. do with regard to their biophysical boundaries and social outcomes measures? We Americans transgress all seven of the biophysical boundaries. Carbon dioxide emissions stand at 21.2 tons per person; we each use an average of 7 kilograms of phosphorus, 59.1 kilograms of nitrogen, 611 cubic meters of water, and 3.7 tons of biomass; we rely on the ecological services of 6.8 hectares of land and 27.2 tons of material. Although the researchers urge us to move "beyond the pursuit of GDP growth to embrace new measures of progress," it is worth noting that U.S. GDP is $59,609 per capita. On the other hand, those transgressions have provided a pretty good life for Americans. For example, life satisfaction is 7.1; healthy life expectancy is 69.7 years; and democratic quality stands at 0.8 points. The only two social indicators we just missed on were employment (91 percent) and secondary education (94.7 percent). On the other hand, our hemisphere is home to one paragon of sustainability—Haiti. Haitians breach none of the researchers' biophysical boundaries. But the Caribbean country performs abysmally on all 11 social indicators. Life satisfaction scores at 4.8; healthy life expectancy is 52.3 years; and Haitians average 2,105 calories per day. The country tallies -0.9 on the democratic quality index. Haiti's GDP is $719 per capita. Other near-sustainability champions include Malawi, Nepal, Myanmar, and Nicaragua. All of them score dismally on the social indicators, and their GDPs per capita are $322, $799, $1,375, and $2,208, respectively. The country that currently comes closest to the researchers' ideal of remaining within its biophysical boundaries while sufficient social indicators is…Vietnam. For the record, Vietnam's per capita GDP is $2,306. "Countries with higher levels of life satisfaction and healthy life expectancy also tend to transgress more biophysical boundaries," the researchers note. A better way to put this relationship is that more wealth and technology tend to make people happier, healthier, and freer. O'Neill and his unhappy team fail drastically to understand how human ingenuity unleashed in markets is already well on the way toward making their supposed planetary boundaries irrelevant. Take carbon dioxide emissions: Supporters of renewable energy technologies say that their costs are already or will soon be lower than those of fossil fuels. Boosters of advanced nuclear reactors similarly argue that they can supply all of the carbon-free energy the world will need. There's a good chance that fleets of battery-powered self-driving vehicles will largely replace private cars and mass transit later in this century. Are we about to run out of phosphorous to fertilize our crops? Peak phosphorus is not at hand. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports that at current rates of mining, the world's known reserves will last 266 years. The estimated total resources of phosphate rock would last over 1,140 years. "There are no imminent shortages of phosphate rock," notes the USGS. With respect to the deleterious effects that using phosphorus to fertilize crops might have outside of farm fields, researchers are working on ways to endow crops with traits that enable them to use less while maintaining yields. O'Neill and his colleagues are also concerned that farmers are using too much nitrogen fertilizer, which runs off fields into the natural environment and contributes to deoxygenated dead zones in the oceans, among other ill effects. This is a problem, but one that plant breeders are already working to solve. For example, researchers at Arcadia Biosciences have used biotechnology to create nitrogen-efficient varieties of staples like rice and wheat that enable farmers to increase yields while significantly reducing fertilizer use. Meanwhile, other researchers are moving on projects to engineer the nitrogen fixation trait from legumes into cereal crops. In other words, the crops would make their own fertilizer from air. Water? Most water is devoted to the irrigation of crops; the ongoing development of drought-resistant and saline-tolerant crops will help with that. Hectares per capita? Humanity has probably already reached peak farmland, and nearly 400 million hectares will be restored to nature by 2060—an area almost double the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. In fact, it is entirely possible that most animal farming will be replaced by resource-sparing lab-grown steaks, chops, and milk. Such developments in food production undermine the researchers' worries about overconsumption of biomass. And humanity's material footprint is likely to get smaller too as trends toward further dematerialization take hold. The price system is a superb mechanism for encouraging innovators to find ways to wring ever more value out less and less stuff. Rockefeller University researcher Jesse Ausubel has shown that this process of absolute dematerialization has already taken off for many commodities. After cranking their way through their models of doom, O'Neill and his colleagues lugubriously conclude: "If all people are to lead a good life within planetary boundaries, then the level of resource use associated with meeting basic needs must be dramatically reduced." They are right, but they are entirely backward with regard to how to achieve those goals. Economic growth provides the wealth and technologies needed to lift people from poverty while simultaneously lightening humanity's footprint on the natural world. Rather than degrowth, the planet—and especially its poor people—need more and faster economic growth.

#### 2] Yes Transition Wars and they cause Extinction

Nyquist 5 J.R. Nyquist 2-4-2005 “The Political Consequences of a Financial Crash” [www.financialsense.com/stormw...2005/0204.html](http://www.financialsense.com/stormw...2005/0204.html) (renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations)//Elmer

Should the United States experience a severe economic contraction during the second term of President Bush, the American people will likely support politicians who advocate further restrictions and controls on our market economy – guaranteeing its strangulation and the steady pauperization of the country. In Congress today, Sen. Edward Kennedy supports nearly all the economic dogmas listed above. It is easy to see, therefore, that the coming economic contraction, due in part to a policy of massive credit expansion, will have serious political consequences for the Republican Party (to the benefit of the Democrats). Furthermore, an economic contraction will encourage the formation of **anti-capitalist** majorities and a turning away from the free market system. The danger here is not merely economic. The political left openly favors the collapse of America’s strategic position abroad. The withdrawal of the **U**nited **S**tates from the Middle East, the Far East and Europe would **catastrophically impact an international system that presently allows 6 billion** people to live on the earth’s surface in relative peace. Should anti-capitalist dogmas overwhelm the global market and trading system that evolved under American leadership, the planet’s economy would contract and untold **millions would die of starvation**. Nationalistic totalitarianism, fueled by a politics of blame, would once again bring war to Asia and Europe. But this time the war would be **waged with mass destruction weapons** and the United States would be blamed because it is the center of global capitalism. Furthermore, if the anti-capitalist party gains power in Washington, we can expect to see policies of appeasement and unilateral disarmament enacted. American appeasement and disarmament, in this context, would be an admission of guilt before the court of world opinion. Russia and China, above all, would exploit this admission to justify aggressive wars, invasions and mass destruction attacks. A future financial crash, therefore, must be prevented at all costs.