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#### CP Text: The People’s Republic of China should

#### increase and encourage private and civil space cooperation with the United States over appropriation of outer space.

#### de-militarize its space industry.

#### dismantle and remove ASAT weapons.

#### The United States Federal Government should repeal the Wolf Amendment.

#### The Counterplan competes – it re-directs China’s commercial space industry to productive cooperation with the United States. The 1AC said that China’s government is reliant on private action meaning the Plan collapses all of the space sector meaning meaningful cooperation with the US becomes impossible.

#### It solves their US-China war scenario by making them interconnected, resolves the military-civil fusion scenario by dismantling, and solves mining because the US and China would share REMs instead of having China gatekeep them.

#### Cooperation de-escalates the Space Race, solves Sino-Russian axis, and spills-over to broader US-China relations

Marshall and Hadfield 21 Will Marshall and Chris Hadfield 4-15-2021 "Why the U.S. and China Should Collaborate in Space" <https://time.com/5954941/u-s-china-should-collaborate-in-space/> (CEO of Planet which operates 200 satellites that image the entire Earth landmass on a daily basis, and he formerly worked at NASA on lunar missions and space debris. Colonel Chris Hadfield was Commander of the International Space Station and flew both the U.S. Space Shuttle and Russian Soyuz vehicles. Prior to that he served as a fighter/test pilot with the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force.)//Elmer

While much has been made of the tense March 18 exchange between American and Chinese diplomats in Anchorage, Alaska, one area became an unlikely candidate for cooperation: outer space. During a press conference after the meeting, Jake Sullivan, the U.S. National Security Advisor, pointed out that the Perseverance rover that recently landed on Mars “wasn’t just an American project. It had technology from multiple countries from Europe and other parts of the world.” China’s top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, seized the opportunity to say that, “China would welcome it if there is a will to carry out similar cooperation from the United States with us.” Planned or not, Yang’s comment gave voice to one very smart way two geopolitical rivals sharing the same planet could work together despite their growing tensions. Space exploration has long been used to foster deep cooperation, even between adversaries. During the height of the Cold War, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. jointly undertook the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz mission, which both served as a means of political rapprochement and opened the possibility of cooperation in other areas. Those links endured. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia was invited to partner in the construction of the International Space Station (ISS). It was a multi-layered act that went beyond simple generosity; the more work former Soviet scientists had to do designing and building the ISS, the less likely they’d be to sell their expertise to other countries. Today, Sino-American space cooperation is similarly desirable. It could improve ties as it did for the U.S. and Russia, de-escalate an emerging Sino-Russian axis in space, and serve as a bargaining chip to help sustain other areas of cooperation. While China and the U.S. seem to clash on virtually every issue, space, by its nature, is different. Orbit isn’t a high-ground that one can seize. Instead, space works like a commons, where for any one state or company to be able to operate safely, all have to act responsibly. We need peaceful cooperation to enjoy its benefits. One reason not to cooperate in space with a geopolitical rival is technology transfer. There are legitimate concerns that collaboration could lead to technology sharing that unfairly advances China. Indeed, in 2011, the U.S. Congress included a passage, known as the Wolf Amendment, in an appropriations bill, forbidding NASA from cooperating in any way with China for fear of technological theft or espionage. The reasoning was straightforward: The U.S. enjoys significant leadership in some space technologies, including satellites, and much of that technology is proprietary, shared with no other countries. In the area of human spaceflight, however, things are different. The U.S. has extensively shared the entire ISS program for decades with the fourteen partner nations, including Russia. If there ever were secrets there, they are secrets no more. In fact, Russia and the U.S. as partners saved the day between 2011, after the space shuttles were grounded, and 2021, when the U.S. regained the ability to transport astronauts to space. During that decade, Russia’s Soyuz spacecraft served as the only way to get crews to and from the station. At the same time, uncrewed American resupply ships similarly helped keep the ISS viable when the Russian Soyuz fleet was grounded following mishaps. China has developed and proven a very successful human spaceflight program; adding their launch and spacecraft capability to the partnership would strengthen the overall mission. In order for China and the U.S. to work together in space, some things would have to change. First, the Wolf Amendment would have to be repealed—nothing meaningful can happen until that goes. Cooperation might then begin in lower profile areas such as sharing remote sensing data and reducing orbital debris. The United States and Europe have led the way with Landsat and Copernicus satellite programs providing free images of Earth that can be used to understand changes to our environment. The Chinese have yet to create a similar data share program for their Earth imaging systems—but they should. The United States and China could also discuss joint efforts to reduce the belt of space junk that circles the planet and threatens everyone’s satellites. Most importantly, cooperation could extend to joint human spaceflight missions; the US could invite China to conduct a crewed visit to the ISS, or to join in the human exploration of the Moon, targeted to happen in this decade and which both nations are now working on separately; the goal would be a joint Moon base rather than a space race. For decades, space travel has provided an opportunity for humans to see our world differently. Apollo 11 astronaut Michael Collins said, “The thing that really surprised me was that the Earth projected an air of fragility.” Chinese astronauts, since Yang Liwei’s first flight 18 years ago, have surely had a similar experience gazing down at our planet. Cooperating in space can give the United States and China the opportunity to change their thinking together. Bold American leadership can be a leveraged move in reducing tensions, as it was in keeping the Cold War cold—a win for all nations and our shared, blue-green planet.

#### US-China Relations key to prevent escalation – current US course turns status quo cold war hot.

Nye 21 Joseph Nye 3-3-2021 "The factors that could lead to war between the US and China" <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-factors-that-could-lead-to-war-between-the-us-and-china/> (professor at Harvard University and author)//Elmer

When China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, recently called for a reset of bilateral relations with the United States, a White House spokesperson replied that the US saw the relationship as one of strong competition that required a position of strength. It’s clear that President Joe Biden’s administration is not simply reversing Donald Trump’s policies. Some analysts, citing Thucydides’ attribution of the Peloponnesian War to Sparta’s fear of a rising Athens, believe the US–China relationship is entering a period of conflict pitting an established hegemon against an increasingly powerful challenger. I am not that pessimistic. In my view, economic and ecological interdependence reduces the probability of a real cold war, much less a hot one, because both countries have an incentive to cooperate in a number of areas. At the same time, miscalculation is always possible and some see the danger of ‘sleepwalking’ into catastrophe, as happened with World War I. History is replete with cases of misperception about changing power balances. For example, when US President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, he wanted to balance what he saw as a growing Soviet threat to a declining America. But what Nixon interpreted as decline was really the return to normal of America’s artificially high share of global output after World War II. Nixon proclaimed multipolarity, but what followed was the end of the Soviet Union and America’s unipolar moment two decades later. Today, some Chinese analysts underestimate America’s resilience and predict Chinese dominance but this, too, could turn out to be a dangerous miscalculation. It is equally dangerous for Americans to over- or underestimate Chinese power, and the US contains groups with economic and political incentives to do both. Measured in dollars, China’s economy is about two-thirds the size of that of the US, but many economists expect China to surpass the US sometime in the 2030s, depending on what one assumes about Chinese and American growth rates. Will American leaders acknowledge this change in a way that permits a constructive relationship, or will they succumb to fear? Will Chinese leaders take more risks, or will Chinese and Americans learn to cooperate in producing global public goods under a changing distribution of power? Recall that Thucydides attributed the war that ripped apart the ancient Greek world to two causes: the rise of a new power and the fear that this created in the established power. The second cause is as important as the first. The US and China must avoid exaggerated fears that could create a new cold or hot war. Even if China surpasses the US to become the world’s largest economy, national income is not the only measure of geopolitical power. China ranks well behind the US in soft power and US military expenditure is nearly four times that of China. While Chinese military capabilities have been increasing in recent years, analysts who look carefully at the military balance conclude that China will not, say, be able to exclude the US from the Western Pacific. On the other hand, the US was once the world’s largest trading economy and its largest bilateral lender. Today, nearly 100 countries count China as their largest trading partner, compared to 57 for the US. China plans to lend more than US$1 trillion for infrastructure projects with its Belt and Road Initiative over the next decade, while the US has cut back aid. China will gain economic power from the sheer size of its market as well as its overseas investments and development assistance. China’s overall power relative to the US is likely to increase. Nonetheless, balances of power are hard to judge. The US will retain some long-term power advantages that contrast with areas of Chinese vulnerability. One is geography. The US is surrounded by oceans and neighbours that are likely to remain friendly. China has borders with 14 countries, and territorial disputes with India, Japan and Vietnam set limits on its hard and soft power. Energy is another area where America has an advantage. A decade ago, the US was dependent on imported energy, but the shale revolution transformed North America from energy importer to exporter. At the same time, China became more dependent on energy imports from the Middle East, which it must transport along sea routes that highlight its problematic relations with India and other countries. The US also has demographic advantages. It is the only major developed country that is projected to hold its global ranking (third) in terms of population. While the rate of US population growth has slowed in recent years, it will not turn negative, as in Russia, Europe, and Japan. China, meanwhile, rightly fears ‘growing old before it grows rich.’ China’s labour force peaked in 2015 and India will soon overtake it as the world’s most populous country. America also remains at the forefront in key technologies (bio, nano and information) that are central to 21st-century economic growth. China is investing heavily in research and development, and competes well in some fields. But 15 of the world’s top 20 research universities are in the US; none is in China. Those who proclaim Pax Sinica and American decline fail to take account of the full range of power resources. American hubris is always a danger but so is exaggerated fear, which can lead to overreaction. Equally dangerous is rising Chinese nationalism, which, combined with a belief in American decline, leads China to take greater risks. Both sides must beware of miscalculation. After all, more often than not, the greatest risk we face is our own capacity for error.

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#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a[2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Lash-out causes SCS, Philippines war, Vietnam war, India border conflicts, ECS, Japan War, Taiwan invasion, and US-China War, which turn their impact

Cole 14 J. Michael Cole 7-10-2014 “Where Would Beijing Use External Distractions?” <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/where-would-beijing-use-external-distractions/> (former analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, columnist for The Diplomat and a contributor for The National Interest)//Elmer

Throughout history, embattled governments have often resorted to external distractions to tap into a restive population’s nationalist sentiment and thereby release, or redirect, pressures that otherwise could have been turned against those in power. Authoritarian regimes in particular, which deny their citizens the right to punish the authorities through retributive democracy — that is, elections — have used this device to ensure their survival during periods of domestic upheaval or financial crisis. Would the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose legitimacy is so contingent on social stability and economic growth, go down the same path if it felt that its hold on power were threatened by domestic instability? Building on the premise that the many contradictions that are inherent to the extraordinarily complex Chinese experiment, and rampant corruption that undermines stability, will eventually catch up with the CCP, we can legitimately ask how, and where, Beijing could manufacture external crises with opponents against whom nationalist fervor, a major characteristic of contemporary China, can be channeled. In past decades, the CCP has on several occasions tapped into public outrage to distract a disgruntled population, often by encouraging (and when necessary containing) protests against external opponents, namely Japan and the United States. While serving as a convenient outlet, domestic protests, even when they turned violent (e.g., attacks on Japanese manufacturers), were about as far as the CCP would allow. This self-imposed restraint, which was prevalent during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, was a function both of China’s focus on building its economy (contingent on stable relations with its neighbors) and perceived military weakness. Since then, China has established itself as the world’s second-largest economy and now deploys, thanks to more than a decade of double-digit defense budget growth, a first-rate modern military. Those impressive achievements have, however, fueled Chinese nationalism, which has increasingly approached the dangerous zone of hubris. For many, China is now a rightful regional hegemon demanding respect, which if denied can — and should — be met with threats, if not the application of force. While it might be tempting to attribute China’s recent assertiveness in the South and East China Seas to the emergence of Xi Jinping, Xi alone cannot make all the decisions; nationalism is a component that cannot be dissociated from this new phase in Chinese expressions of its power. As then-Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi is said to have told his counterparts at a tense regional forum in Hanoi in 2010, “There is one basic difference among us. China is a big state and you are smaller countries.” This newfound assertiveness within its backyard thus makes it more feasible that, in times of serious trouble at home, the Chinese leadership could seek to deflect potentially destabilizing anger by exploiting some external distraction. Doing so is always a calculated risk, and sometimes the gambit fails, as Slobodan Milosevic learned the hard way when he tapped into the furies of nationalism to appease mounting public discontent with his bungled economic policies. For an external distraction to achieve its objective (that is, taking attention away from domestic issues by redirecting anger at an outside actor), it must not result in failure or military defeat. In other words, except for the most extreme circumstances, such as the imminent collapse of a regime, the decision to externalize a domestic crisis is a rational one: adventurism must be certain to achieve success, which in turn will translate into political gains for the embattled regime. Risk-taking is therefore proportional to the seriousness of the destabilizing forces within. Rule No. 1 for External Distractions: The greater the domestic instability, the more risks a regime will be willing to take, given that the scope and, above all, the symbolism of the victory in an external scenario must also be greater. With this in mind, we can then ask which external distraction scenarios would Beijing be the most likely to turn to should domestic disturbances compel it to do so. That is not to say that anything like this will happen anytime soon. It is nevertheless not unreasonable to imagine such a possibility. The intensifying crackdown on critics of the CCP, the detention of lawyers, journalists and activists, unrest in Xinjiang, random acts of terrorism, accrued censorship — all point to growing instability. What follows is a very succinct (and by no means exhaustive) list of disputes, in descending order of likelihood, which Beijing could use for external distraction. 1. South China Sea The South China Sea, an area where China is embroiled in several territorial disputes with smaller claimants, is ripe for exploitation as an external distraction. Nationalist sentiment, along with the sense that the entire body of water is part of China’s indivisible territory and therefore a “core interest,” are sufficient enough to foster a will to fight should some “incident,” timed to counter unrest back home, force China to react. Barring a U.S. intervention, which for the time being seems unlikely, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has both the numerical and qualitative advantage against any would be opponent or combination thereof. The Philippines and Vietnam, two countries which have skirmished with China in recent years, are the likeliest candidates for external distractions, as the costs of a brief conflict would be low and the likelihood of military success fairly high. For a quick popularity boost and low-risk distraction, these opponents would best serve Beijing’s interests. 2. Jammu and Kashmir, Arunachal Pradesh Although Beijing claims that it is ready for a settlement of its longstanding territorial disputes with India, the areas remain ripe for the re-ignition of conflict. New Delhi accuses China of occupying 38,000 square kilometers in Jammu and Kashmir, and Beijing lays claim to more than 90,000 square kilometers of territory inside the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. A few factors militate against the suitability of those territories for an external distraction, chief among them the difficult access in winter, and the strength of the Indian military, which would pose a greater risk to PLA troops than those of Vietnam or the Philippines in the previous scenario. Nevertheless, memories of China’s routing of the Indian military in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 could embolden Beijing. Though challenging, the PLA would be expected to prevail in a limited conflict with Indian forces, and China would have taken on a greater regional power than Vietnam or the Philippines, with everything that this entails in terms of political benefits back home. 3. East China Sea and Japan Sparking a war with Japan, presumably over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islets, would represent a major escalation on Beijing’s part. Assuming that rational actors are in control in Beijing, a decision to begin hostilities with the modern and skilled Japan Self-Defense Forces would only be made if domestic instability were serious enough. Still, high resentment of the Japanese stemming from Japanese aggression before and during World War II and the competitive nature of the bilateral relationship make Japan the perfect candidate for an external distraction. More than any other conflict, hostilities with Japan would rally ordinary Chinese to the flag and tap into hatred that the leadership knows it could exploit if necessary. Although the chances of prevailing would be much smaller than in the South China Sea or Indian scenarios (especially if the U.S. became involved), the dividends of victory against Japan — anything from teaching Tokyo a lesson to redressing historical injustices — could be such as to become a major factor in appeasing major domestic unrest in China. Unless the CCP were on the brink of collapse, it is unlikely that the leadership in Beijing would escalate tensions with Japan beyond the disputed islets. In other words, military action probably would not extend to other parts of Japan’s territory, unless, of course, the conflict widened. Containing the conflict by limiting it to the Senkaku/Diaoyus would therefore be part of Beijing’s strategy. 4. Taiwan The “reunification” of Taiwan remains a so-called “core interest” of China and a major component of the CCP’s legitimacy with the public. Despite rapprochement in recent years, a substantial component of the PLA remains committed to a Taiwan contingency. Although the risks of war in the Taiwan Strait are low at the moment, China never shelved its plans to annex the island by force if necessary, and has vowed to do so should Taipei seek to unilaterally change the status quo by declaring de jure independence. Under Xi, Beijing has also signaled that while it is willing to be patient with Taiwanese and would prefer to use financial incentives to gradually consolidate its grip on Taiwan, it does not intend to be patient forever. In other words, foot-dragging on Taiwan’s part, or the election of a political party that is less amenable to rapprochement than the ruling Kuomintang (KMT), could prompt Beijing to choose a more aggressive course of action. Serious unrest on the island could also provide Beijing with the “justification” it needs to involve the PLA, which would be deployed to “protect” Taiwanese “compatriots.” Given that definitions of progress on “reunification” are very much Beijing’s to decide, any incident could theoretically warrant the use of force against Taiwan, especially if major domestic unrest compelled the CCP to seek an external distraction. Militating against such a decision is the fact that anything short of a full invasion of the island would probably forever kill any chance of “peaceful unification” with Taiwan, as the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis demonstrated. A limited military campaign against Taiwan is therefore probably not a good option for an external distraction, as the backlash against aggression would undo years of calibrated Taiwan policy and destroy hopes of unification, which would greatly discredit the CCP with the Chinese public, not to mention the PLA. A full invasion of Taiwan would then provide greater chances of success, at least if we measure success by its impact on public opinion amid serious unrest in China. However, the growing power imbalance in the Taiwan Strait notwithstanding, invading the island would be an extraordinarily difficult — and costly — task; talk of a “quick, clear war” remains just that, and pacifying the island would be a formidable challenge. Should the conflict drag on, as it most certainly would, whatever advantage the CCP may have accumulated by tapping into nationalist sentiment could dwindle and further contribute to resentment against the party. Consequently, unless the CCP were on the brink of collapse, Taiwan would be an extremely poor candidate for external distraction, worse even than Japan, where the chances of success in a limited campaign are higher. 5. United States The last, and least likely, candidate for external distraction would be for the PLA to turn its sights on U.S. forces in the Pacific. For obvious reasons, such a course of action would be a last resort, a last-ditch effort to prevent the complete collapse of the CCP due to domestic factors. The chances of prevailing in a direct military confrontation with U.S. forces in the region would be next to nil. A decision to attack the U.S. would qualify as irrational, a departure from the realm of calculations that would buttress decisions in any of the alternative scenarios discussed above. Still there are examples of countries that embarked on what, in hindsight, can only be described as suicidal adventures by attacking a much more powerful enemy. Japan demonstrated that this is possible during World War II. A likelier source of conflict between the PLA and U.S. forces would be indirect, such as U.S. involvement in limited hostilities between China and any of the countries mentioned above (with Japan and Taiwan as the likeliest). As the PLA is configured not to take on the U.S. military directly but rather asymmetrically, China would increase its chances of scoring domestic points by playing to its strengths — by inflicting damage on U.S. forces with its anti-access/area-denial, or A2/AD. Sinking an aircraft carrier on its way to the East China Sea or towards the Taiwan Strait, for example, could do wonders in terms of public opinion and provide temporary cover for an embattled CCP. Ultimately, however, the costs of taking on the U.S. military, added to the extremely low likelihood that Chinese troops could secure the kind of victory that would be necessary to rescue the CCP from internal strife, mean that the U.S. is an especially bad candidate for external distraction.

### 1NC – OFF

#### Cosmobiopolitics constitutes the governance of Outer Space as a shared resource mean to be used to further Human Progress. The Aff’s managerial at “saving” space merely sustains space as a common good for “joint usage” to further exploitation.

Damjanov 15, Katarina. "The matter of media in outer space: Technologies of cosmobiopolitics." Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33.5 (2015): 889-906. (Faculty of Arts, University of Western Australia)//Elmer

Long before the beginning of the Space Age, humans used the regions above the globe to facilitate mediation practices; electromagnetic waves, for example, were emitted across airspace and into the atmosphere to enable radio communication decades before the first artificial satellite confirmed its arrival in the planet’s orbit on 4 October 1957. With its possible roots in early societies’ use of the celestial bodies visible from the earth’s surface for temporal and spatial orientation, the ‘media history’ of the human use of outer space reaches a watershed moment with the launch of Sputnik. This basketball-sized metal sphere, equipped with radio transmitter and four external antennas, was the first solid object, the first functional media artefact that humans had placed outside their own world. This is not to say that Sputnik marks the event in which human mediation practices begun to materially impact outer space, erasing its original, ‘natural’ state – the radio signals that penetrated the layers of the troposphere and ionosphere, although intangible, left their own material traces, environmental alterations comparable with the material results of atmospheric pollution triggered by industrial progress. These early uses of space have entangled it in a gamut of processes of techno-mediation, initiating the extraterrestrial unfolding of a historical trajectory which Jussi Parikka (2011: 3) terms ‘medianature’ – they have extended this ‘continuum between mediatic apparatuses and their material contexts in the exploitation of nature’ into outer space. However, Sputnik’s orbital presence does represent a steppingstone in the extraterrestrial progression of human medianature: it indicates the species’ acquired ability to purposefully introduce an object of technical media into outer space. As such, Sputnik epitomises a shift in the use of non-terrestrial spaces; no longer were they incidental and remote to human media exploits, they were instead made central and essential. What the first signal that Sputnik sent to its ground control announced was that humanity’s techno-logic aspirations to transform the material world and advance its productive capacity through the logic of acquisition, investment and destruction – an intrinsic human impulse described by Karl Marx (1964) as our essence of species-being – are no longer earth-bound. Sputnik and all media devices that followed it have been gradually converting outer space into a living milieu, reinforcing it as a material–social setting of human circumstances and relations. The concept of ‘milieu’ is important for understanding the complexities involved in the cosmobiopolitical transformation of outer space. In Foucault’s work and in other influential texts such as those of his mentor Georges Canguilhem (2008) and Simondon (1980) and Stiegler (1998), although employed in different contexts, the term ‘milieu’ essentially designates a site which simultaneously conditions and is itself conditioned by the productive forces of human life – whether biological, social or technical. Courses of medianature in outer space sharpen such perspectives on mutually transforming relations between humans and their milieu, providing biopolitical focus to Simondon’s and Stiegler’s perspectives on technology as fundamental in constituting human life. Stiegler’s view of progress as human technological evolution frames technical objects as a prosthesis in whose creation humans embed their ‘interiors’ and through which they further exteriorise and mould their living milieu, a process which has been changing the idea of what it is to be human (Stiegler, 1998: 17). In the Stieglerian sense, the human ‘exteriorisation’ in technical media that are sent into space not only imbues the earth’s exterior with a reflection of the human, but itself reconstitutes the human and reconfigures human ways of life. These technologies thus radically enhance the capacity for species-being, becoming a vital part of our biopolitical capital: while altering our apparently otherwise lifeless planetary exterior into a malleable and thus governable locus of life, their mediatic operations assist humans to overcome their biological and geographical limitations and proceed as a collective towards becoming more-than-human. Our medianature has been continuously adjusting to its extraterrestrial conditions and the acceleration of our technological ‘exteriorisation’ in space has necessitated the development of an attendant governmental framework. The landmark attempt to arrange the increasing multiplicity of human relationships with outer space was to define them through the rule of law – a juridical prefiguration which, as Foucault and Giorgio Agamben (1998) suggest, is a prerequisite for governing life. In 1967, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (United Nations, 2002), or, The Outer Space Treaty (OST) entered into force. In lieu of the pending human landing on the Moon, this international legal agreement established outer space as the shared domain of a global commons, which is to be explored and used by all nation-states, but which itself is to stay outside the vagaries of territorial claims and property rights. A pre-emptive gesture aimed at securing politico-economic codification of the extraterrestrial milieu before human arrival, the OST did not specify where the administrative borders of outer space are – the border between terrestrial and extraterrestrial space has been unofficially assigned to the Ka´rma´n line, a region about 100 km above the planetary surface, where objects sent into space do not fall back but remain in orbit. Nevertheless, the Treaty designates its inhuman expanses as the precinct of human governance, and behind such legal coding stood the same politico-economic rationalities which Foucault identified as pivotal for the institution of the doctrine of the ‘Freedom of the Seas’ as a foundation of international maritime law in the seventeenth century. This legal principle that identified the ocean’s strategic importance as a jointly used resource and set it free from territorial claims, symptomatically announced two interrelated entrances onto the world stage – the rise of global capitalism and the birth of biopolitics, while its replication in the OST marked the next phase in their development. In one of his lectures at the Colle`ge de France, Foucault (2008: 51–73) provided a brief account of how the history of international law echoed the emergence of modern approaches to governance, where the primary emphasis upon territory becomes augmented with the objective to secure the vitality of the shared market. He described how the Treaty of Westphalia’s reinforcement of borders around sovereign states in 1598, which strengthened their inner autonomy yet limited their external reach, instituted each of them as a part of a collective of states gathered around the common interest of progress. This territorial reform aimed to end devastating wars between the states and ensure their political and economic stability, but it imposed the need for new domains of competition in which each of them could independently acquire and prosper, and all them could together be in a ‘state of permanent collective enrichment’ (Foucault, 2008: 55). These spaces, Foucault suggested, were inaugurated with the ‘Freedom of the Seas’ in 1609, which opened the ocean as a space which all states could use to advance through economic competition rather than rivalry over territory. While specifically related to the agenda of European colonial expansions, the establishment of the seas as shared commons was indicative of the awareness that the unlimited accumulation of wealth requires the infinitely free space of the global market. Freedom of the seas was, as Foucault (2008: 56) described, born out of this ‘new form of global rationality... a new calculation on the scale of the world’ and it marked the start of economic globalisation. The interplay between the finite room of territories and infinite possibilities for circulation and accumulation of capital was sustained indefinitely by asserting the global freedom, the commonality of the seas. Through the commons of the seas, capitalism assumed its global latitudes; while the historical enclosure of wastelands that were shared as ‘commons’ enabled the initial, ‘primitive’ accumulation of capital, the creation of the ocean’s commons enabled capitalism to articulate its processes at a global scale. This legal manoeuvre to defend territory by rethinking the spaces of the market institutes the idea of shared commonality as an Archimedean point for the governance of human societies, preparing the terrain for a biopolitical system of governance based upon its abstraction into a method of subsuming ‘life itself’ to the massifying logic of averages and estimates. The institution of the OST and its associated Agreements and Conventions2 from the mid-twentieth century was an outcome of yet another spatial crisis; it was an attempt to negotiate the many tensions that the arrival of the Space Age stirred within global affairs. It was at the time of Cold War and states’ political polarisation, in a world where rapid industrialisation and massive population increases were coupled with anxieties about limits to economic growth, that outer space was identified as a potential site of military conflicts, competing claims of sovereignty and a rapacious race for resources. The looming possibility of still deeper crisis necessitated another repositioning of states and markets around their vital assets, and a restoring of the global equilibrium of powers. Here the OST drew upon the juridical principle of a ‘common heritage’ of humankind – a concept previously employed in the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 for comparable arrangements of international regimes of governance – and took the idea of the commons outside the globe. The treaty expanded the conceptual borders of ‘the scale of the world’ into extraterrestrial space, prescribing that its exploration ‘shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries’ and that it ‘shall be the province of all mankind’ (OST, article 1). Once again, international law established a space of commons whose exploration and exploitation would proceed as a joint enterprise through which all states could freely advance and prosper both individually and as a part of collective. Just as the ‘Freedom of the Seas’ opened routes for ships sailing in the name of nations, the OST unlocked flightpaths for spaceships and other technologies, stimulating states’ techno-scientific interests and competition and ensuring that the emerging mode of ‘high-tech’ capitalism had from its beginnings an extra-planetary, infinite prospect. This trans-national legal netting codified an idea of global commonality and framed the inhuman regions of outer space as the ‘province of all mankind’, drawing them into its global system of governance. The OST thus provided the juridical platform from which to articulate a cosmobiopolitical order; it offered a governmental framework for enacting a vision of the human race as a species-power, which will, through the techno-mediated exploration of space, direct its own cosmic progress. Almost a half century after the OST, media technologies remain crucial to the transformation of outer space into a human province. The voracious neoliberal drive of the state-industry nexus that conditions global biopolitics is so dependent upon them, that they become a target of the same systems of governance they catalyse. Their construction, launches and distribution are the subject of careful calculation, meticulous planning and complex logistics, their condition and movements are continuously being monitored, assessed and managed, and this transfer of governmental rationalities from living humans to inanimate objects changes the biopolitical approach to human species-being. If biopower emerged as concerned with bodies of human individuals and populations, and pressing environmental concerns about the ‘global body of the Earth’ augmented its application ‘from human to planetary bodies’ (Bryld and Lykee, 2000: 92–94), then space-based media technologies mark a subsequent phase in the development of its architecture. They trigger the transposition of life management onto the bodies and populations of media technologies and it is this shift which inaugurates the object-centred coordinates of the cosmobiopolitical: the governance of the human without actual humans. The legal basis of cosmobiopolitics, the OST respectively preserves the status of outer space as a globally shared domain and permits its occupation by technical media that are the legal province of particular terrestrial entities, thus accommodating the contradictory tenets of their governance. However, these governmental rationalities are defined by codes of law and ‘the law’ as Foucault (2007: 47) notes ‘works at the level of the imaginary’, and it can only imagine things which can and cannot be done; like the 0s and 1s of digital code, it only prescribes a state of presence or absence of things. It is the very presence of media technologies in outer space (and the absence of humans) which contradictorily makes possible and disturbs the cosmobiopolitical imaginary. Their remote position situates them beyond the reach of juridical rule and the policing-power of states, literally placing them outside of the ‘global grid’ of governance. While they are used as apparatus through which to enable human terrestrial enterprises, these objects themselves carry the essence of terra and of the absent presence of the human beyond the globe. The media technologies in outer space do not only reduce the incompatibility between the human and the extraterrestrial, but also introduce frictions within their exchanges. This disturbance suggests that their material realities disrupt the imaginaries implied by law and instead assert their own force, reinforcing these objects somewhat absurdly as the non-governable markers of extraterritoriality in the commons, as the non-human emissaries of humanity, and as a non-living population of objects which are managed as if they were alive. In outer space, the matter of media itself becomes code through which to define what can be propertied and what remains commons, what can be governed and what poses itself as ungovernable, where the human ends and the non-human begins, where the boundaries that distinguish governance of the living from the non-living lie and when biopolitics transmutes into a cosmobiopolitics. The media apparatus that support the metamorphosis of biopolitics in outer space are varied, and the milieus in which they function require a range of different performances. The following sections of this paper consider a number of the varying ways specific media technologies perform this extra-planetary extension of the impulse to govern life by focusing on satellites and their debris, and on the prospects of an interplanetary Internet. None of these specimens provides a complete picture of the ways in which media technologies inspire the advent of a cosmobiopolitics. Rather, each offers a different angle from which to consider the shifts in material and social arrangements that are demanded by forays beyond the earth, signs that herald a radical shift in the way humanity conceives of life and articulates its governance. What follows is a series of initial steps, the first paces in a far larger survey that aims to chart the natality of the emergent cosmic traits of biopolitics. I offer here a series of sketches, an outline of tentative trajectories suggested by contemporary mediatic excursions into outer space. By exploring how we manage an over-population of functional and defunct media objects in orbital space and imagine the utilities of interplanetary Internet networks, I suggest that human extraterrestrial medianatures necessitates a profound alteration in our relationship with the technologies, and the reframing of governmental obsessions with discourses of territory, security, and population.

#### The Affirmative obfuscates the intricate connection between the “Public” sector and “Militarism” – the Aff is merely a smokescreen to hide military development of outer space in new forms.

Sheehan 7, Michael. The international politics of space. Routledge, 2007. (Nancy and Peter Meinig Family Investigator in the Life Sciences, Assistant Professor)//Elmer

The 1958 Space Act declared that the United States was keen to explore space for ‘peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind’, and allowed for ‘cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations’.30 This declaration had a dual purpose. The first statement was designed to deflect attention away from the military dimension of US space research and reduce foreign concerns that the United States was seeking to militarize outer space. The second statement’s purpose was to promote the image of the United States as a scientific leader that was willing to share the development of space with other nations, and which therefore clearly had no hidden agenda beyond space exploration for the general benefit of humanity. In this regard, it fitted in with other US policy initiatives designed to promote the image of the United States as a country eager to cooperate internationally in an open and transparent manner. The Marshall Plan, Atoms-for-Peace and the Peace Corps were all part of this general image-building approach, though all had other motivations as well, as did the space policy. The apparent separation of civilian and military activities allowed the United States considerable flexibility. By having a largely transparent civilian-dominated programme, American public insecurity was alleviated, yet at the same time the US was able to continue its military programmes away from the glare of national and international scrutiny, and often successfully camouflaged behind actual or fictitious civilian space projects. In fact, unknown to the American public, there were three, not two space programmes, white, blue and black. The white programme was the high profile civilian programme led by NASA. The blue programme was the classified military programme run by the Department of Defense. In addition, there was the ‘black programme’, the reconnaissance programme run by the intelligence agencies. The apparent separation of the elements of the US space programme made it easier for the vast majority of the American political establishment to rally behind a substantial and energetic space programme. Liberals could support it as an alternative form of competition with the Soviet Union in an era when the dangers of nuclear war were very real, while conservatives saw the programme as developing military hardware and providing capabilities that would in the long run enhance the effectiveness of US armed forces.31

#### The Aff’s claims that China is uniquely likely to militarize and weaponize Space is a form of Techn-Orientalism within Arms Control – re-creates securitized logics that causes lash-out

Mathur, Ritu. "Techno-Racial dynamics of denial & difference in weapons control." Asian Journal of Political Science 26.3 (2018): 297-313. (Assistant Professor of Political Science and Geography at The University of Texas – San Antonio, PhD, Department of Political Science, York University, M. Phil. in Disarmament Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, MA in Politics specializing in international relations at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India)//Elmer

Introduction

How has postcolonial scholarship engaged with the problem of weapons? What are the possibilities and limitations of a postcolonial engagement with acute problems of weapons control? It is impossible for a subaltern scholar to address these broader questions without taking note of the scant existing postcolonial literature on arms control and disarmament (Abraham, 1998; Biswas, 2014; Beier, 2002; Hecht, 2012; Mathur, 2014). This intellectual amnesia is noted by scholars especially with regard to the contributions of the Global South in addressing the problems of weapons control. This sense of erasure is reinforced by scholars perturbed by the decline in understanding of the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Taylor & Jacobs, 2015). On the contrary, there exists a growing circulation of civilizational discourses positing a dangerous dynamic of difference between ‘the “West and the Rest” as a civilizational mantra in arms control and disarmament’ (Mathur, 2014, pp. 332–335). It is in this context that this paper makes an effort to problematize and juxtapose a spiraling ‘dynamic of denial’ and a persistent ‘dynamic of difference’ in the field of International Relations and weapons control. It tries to demonstrate the power of these discourses with reference to the memory and representation of Hiroshima. This paper introduces the concept of ‘techno-racism’ to bring attention to the complex interplay of racial and technological considerations in the everyday practices of arms control and disarmament. In developing the concept of ‘techno racism’ this paper draws upon the writings of scholars such as Michael Adas (1989), Gabrielle Hecht (2012), Roh, Huang, and Niu (2015). The concept of techno-racism has to be historically grounded to encourage careful deliberation on practices of racial reductionism and technological determinism with regard to weapons. The deployment of technoracial discourses for political purposes can be traced from the late nineteenth century to the present with regard to weapons. The differences in weapons technology between different cultures is often reinforced with practices of racial reductionism constituting a contested hierarchy in the international order. The power of these technoracial discourses emphasizing and de-emphasizing racial reductionism and technological determinism subject to political considerations respectively has an effect on the outcome of intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial in practices of arms control and disarmament. A growing intensity of racial reductionism and technological determinism in discourses on difference and denial can generate destructive violence. It is therefore pertinent to pay attention to the growing circulation of these powerful discourses in contemporary practices of security. Thus empowered with this succinct understanding of the concept of techno-racism, this paper begins by first exploring the ‘dynamic of difference’ with help of other scholars in International Relations with particular emphasis on consideration of technology as a significant ‘criteria for comparison’ between the Orient and the Occident (Adas, 1989). This is followed by an exploration of the circulating ‘dynamic of denial’ of the Global South’s contribution towards weapons regulation and prohibition and the responsibility of the West to meet its obligations under the existing Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). These intersecting dynamics of difference and dynamic of denial then help set the stage for remembering Hiroshima as the ‘techno-racial line’ between the West and the Rest. This helps produce critical reflections on the possibilities and limits of nuclear exceptionalism and nuclear allergy in addressing the problem of weapons and the need for more alternative humanitarian discourses inclusive of the practices of Global South in weapons regulation and prohibition. Dynamic of difference In reimagining the West and articulating the problem of difference or heterology in international relations, scholars contend that ‘difference is marked and contained as international difference’ with the emergence of territorially bounded modern sovereign states that ‘defines the problem of difference principally as between and among states’ (Naeem & David, 2004). It is claimed that the insistence on the maintenance of order in the international system generates a ‘pervasive suspicion of difference’ as a source of disorder, degeneration and armed conflict. The ‘problem of difference emerges and intensifies under modern conditions of relative equality, often leading to the reassertion of (illicit or informal) forms of social hierarchy’ and the marking of others as inferior, dependent and threatening (Naeem & David, 2004, p. 23). The doubt and anxiety generated with the discovery of difference is to be contained by locating it ‘at some distance from the self’ and insisting on structural uniformity. These managerial exercises compound the problem of difference by their failure to account for the injuries suffered as a result of a violent and exploitative colonial practices of imperialism. Barkawi and Stanski (2012) further suggest that war among states is ‘a difference of opinion pursued through violent means’ (Barkawi & Stanski, 2012, pp. 2–3) It is the act of splitting of inside/outside that ‘deflect (s) our responses to difference in the direction of ‘putrefying hatred’ and constitutes the ‘political and ethical limits and possibilities of modern life’ (Naeem & David, 2004, pp. 44–45). These conditions of sovereign political community foster ‘ethically limited and tragic interactions of these separate states’ (Naeem & David, 2004, pp. 44–45). The tragic interactions during war entail ‘recognition as well as Othering’ through war propaganda (Porter, 2013). But such propaganda exercises are often undertaken as preliminary measures prior to the catalytic event that leads to the outbreak of actual war. This othering takes place through deployment of techno-racial stereotyping. It is differences in technology and race that are emphasized to produce stereotypes. John W. Dower (1986) argues that ‘portraits of the enemy’ are sketched through ‘gross simplification and reductionism’ generating two forms of stereotyping (Dower, 1986, p. 30). The ‘first kind of stereotyping could be summed up in the statement: You are the opposite of what you say you are and the opposite of us, not peaceful but warlike, not good but bad … In the second form of stereotyping, the formula ran like this: you are what you say you are, but that itself is reprehensible’ (Dower, 1986, p. 30). Postcolonial scholarship has probed at length into these cultural encounters to expose the psychology that accompanies techno-racial stereotypes of Orientalism and Occidentalism. A ‘dehumanizing picture of the West’ is painted through the prejudiced practices of Occidentalism (Buruma & Margalit, 2004). Practices of Occidentalism regard the West with ‘loathing’ as a ‘“machine civilization”, coldly rationalist, mechanical, without a soul’ (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, pp. 31, 21, 19). Occidentalism is often ‘seen as the expression of bitter resentment toward an offensive display of superiority by the West’ (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 91). Yet there is also a desire for ‘Western knowledge for practical matters, such as weaponry’ (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 39). An occidentalist exhibits awareness that it is only through practices of ‘development and modernization’ that it is possible to make any allowance for any possibility of regeneration and redemption of the Other (Naeem & David, 2004, p. 49). But ‘the problem of radical modernizers is how to modernize without becoming a mere clone of the West’ (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 39). This resistance to becoming a clone of the West is because ‘the mind of the West in the eyes of the Occidentalists is a truncated mind, good for finding the best way to achieve a given goal, but utterly useless in finding the right way’ (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 76). Buruma and Margalit assert that, ‘the mind of the West is often portrayed by Occidentalists’ as a: mind without a soul, efficient, like a calculator, but hopeless at doing what is humanly important. The mind of the West is capable of great economic success, to be sure, and of developing and promoting advanced technology, but cannot grasp the higher things in life, for it lacks spirituality and understanding of human suffering (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 75). There is also an acute awareness that ‘the overt language of race … superseded by the new development of hierarchy of modernity’ does not conceal a ‘link’ that ‘could be inferred by the more privileged observer standing in the transatlantic world’ (Jones, 2010). In an effort to generate critical self- reflexivity on practices of Orientalism and Occidentalism there has been a proliferation of discourses on ‘strategic Orientalism’, ‘techno Orientalism’ and ‘military Orientalism’ as discussed below. Keith Krause and Andrew Latham (1998) argue that practices of ‘strategic orientalism’ constitute the ‘foundation of Western security culture’ (Krause & Latham, 1998, p. 41). They assert that strategic orientalism is premised on the ‘pervasive and axiomatic belief that the West (or occasionally the United States) as a civilization has a special role to play in global security affairs’’ (Krause & Latham, 1998, pp. 41, 37). This is based on ‘a reading of the politico-strategic objectives and purposes of Third World states that is informed more by Western fears and prejudices than by the realities of politics in these states’ (Krause & Latham, 1998, p. 38). The deep-rooted fear of the attacking Asian hordes and their ability to industrialize and develop sophisticated weapons reinforces twenty-first century concerns about the ‘Rising East’. This ‘phenomenon of imagining Asia and Asians in hypo-or hypertechnological terms in cultural productions and political discourse’ is understood as ‘techno-Orientalism’ (Roh et al., 2015, p. 2). Practices of techno-Orientalism driven by ‘imperial aspirations’ and ‘appetites of consumerist societies’ are ‘infused with the languages and codes of the technological and futuristic’ and in ‘digital spaces abound with reinscribed racial tropes and stereotypes; these are sites in which racialization is more likely reinforced than challenged’ (Roh et al., 2015, p. 14). Scholars developing the concept of techno-Orientalism observe its ‘growing prevalence in the Western cultural consciousness’ and suggest that the ‘US techno Orientalist imagination has its roots in the view of Asian body … as a form of expendable technology’ (Roh et al., 2015, pp. 7–11). Nevertheless they insist that the scope of techno-Orientalism is ‘expansive and bi-directional’ and ponder on the ‘danger that Asian and Asian American creators … might internalize techno Orientalist patterns and uncritically replicate the same dehumanizing model’ (Roh et al., 2015, pp. 3, 7).

#### The Impact is unending war and environmental catastrophe.

Craven 19 [Matt Craven (Professor of International Law, SOAS University of London, United Kingdom). “‘Other Spaces’: Constructing the Legal Architecture of a Cold War Commons and the Scientific-Technical Imaginary of Outer Space”. European Journal of International Law, Volume 30, Issue 2, May 2019, Pages 547–572, Accessed 1/12/22. <https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/30/2/547/5536739> //Xu]

Even in the aftermath of the pronounced ‘closure’ of the Cold War, the residue of the formation that was brought into play in space remains very much with us today. On the one hand, outer space has been progressively enveloped within the technological infrastructure of warfare and policing actions – the first Gulf War of 1990 ushering in a new era of ‘smart’ weaponry and GPS-configured surgical violence139 – anticipating, in the process, the ‘remote’ operations of the drone and cyber warfare of the contemporary era. The blurring of the demarcation between the (outer space) technologies of war and peace finds its contemporary parallels in the collapse of a range of other operative distinctions – between the virtual and the real, the combatant and the civilian, the battlefield and the battle space, the interstate and the intra-state. The juridical formations on which these depend, furthermore, have themselves become enveloped within the same strategic operations – ‘lawfare’ becoming the adjunct to a new form of totalized warfare stripped of any spatial determinacy. On the other side, outer space has increasingly become the terrain of speculative capitalism, which, following the growth of space tourism (pioneered by the Russian space administration in the 1990s140), has seen the active development of a range of commercial projects from the construction of sub-orbital ‘space planes’ to asteroid and lunar mining undertaken by both public and private agencies. The imaginative resources for such projects have come from various directions, but a common theme is that impending resource depletion on earth will soon bring such resources within commercial and technological reach, and that outer space will therefore provide a ‘spatial fix’ for a system of global capitalism that might otherwise run into the ground.141 There is, as Katarina Damjanov has noted,142 a deep parallelism here between the juridical opening of the seas (mare liberum), which served to stabilize the system of sovereignty within Europe in the 17th century by extroverting the site of conflict and competition,143 and the opening of outer space three centuries later as another prophylactic measure, even if, in this case, that which was to be guarded against was a planetary-wide, environmental catastrophe. Perhaps the deepest irony, here, is that the mode of salvation on offer is precisely the same as that which is the extant cause of crisis, which one may take to be a remorseless instrumentalization of nature.

#### The alternative is *Worldism* – the refusal of international relations and specialization as dictated by militarism in favor of epistemological interventions into the exercise of Space as a carceral apparatus.

Agathangelou and Ling 09 Anna M. Agathangelou is an Associate Professor in the Departments of Political Science and Women’s Studies at York University, Canada and co-director of the Global Change Institute, Nicosia, Cyprus, L.H.M. Ling is an Associate Professor in the Graduate Program in Inter- national Affairs at The New School, New York, USA., Transforming World Politics: From empire to multiple worlds, The New International Relations Series, 2009.

MAIN ASPECTS Worldism presents world politics as a site of multiple worlds. These refer to the various and contending ways of being, knowing, and relating that have been passed onto us from previous generations. Histories, languages, myths, and memories institutionalize and embody multiple worlds through simple daily acts like cooking and eating, singing and dancing, joking and playing but also through larger events like trade, development, conflict, and war. Worldism registers not only the “difference” that comes from multiple worlds (see Inayatullah and Blaney 2004) but also their entwinements. Selves and others reverberate,2 producing multi- and trans-subjectivities that leave us legacies of reinforcement and conflict, reconstruction and critique, reconciliation and resistance. Such syncretic engagements belie seeming oppositions and contradictions among multiple worlds to reveal their underlying connections despite hegemony’s violent erasures. On this basis, communities have opportunities to heal and recuperate so they can build for another day, for another generation. Worldism as everyday life enacts self–other reverberations and syncretic engagements, especially by communities at the margins. Worldism as an analytical framework theorizes about them. Both types of worldist activity expose the problematic of empire in practice and logics. Building on the postcolonial notion that all parties make history, albeit with unequal access to power, worldism leads to an undeniable conclusion: our mutual embeddedness makes us mutually accountable. One cannot escape from the other. Mutual accountability brings with it duties and responsibilities, to be sure, but also possibilities: that is, (a) an internal dialectic of constant questioning to check and problematize hegemony, so that (b) we can expand our visions, strategies, and approaches beyond the narrow, hegemonic confines of realism/liberal internationalism, in order to (c) arrive at a more inclusive, conciliatory, and democratic world politics. In brief, worldism consists of two simultaneous processes: descriptive and analytical. Worldism-as-description features the following: (a) multi- and trans-subjectivities that institutionalize the social and structural reverberations between selves and others; (b) the agency of all parties, despite inequities and injustices, to create, build, and articulate multiple worlds; (c) syncretic engagements that consolidate the entwinements of multiple worlds into concrete strategies for change, adjustment, adaptation, refor- mulation, and transformation; and (d) community-building that integrates and accretes these syncretic engagements despite denials of such efforts from hegemonic elites and their ideologies. Worldism-as-analysis draws on the struggles and learning undertaken in worldist daily life to emphasize: (a) accountability as a hallmark of worldist inquiry that ensures (b) an internal criticality to question, contest, and challenge hegemony, so that we may (c) arrive at emancipatory construction even as we critique and resist. The critical reader may interject: Couldn’t “agency” and “accountabil- ity” in worldism be taken as a fancy way of blaming the victim? Are Jews, for example, responsible for the Holocaust; slaves for their enslavement; or any oppressed people for their oppression? Worldism as a politics of multiple relations subsumes this liberal, individualist understanding of responsibility. Multiple relations produce a web of effects and consequences to any kind of decisions and/or set of practices. Accountability in worldism asks: Who’s involved, under what conditions, and through which processes can we redress or transform the violence? What kinds of understanding are generated to account for these relations and/or to make them invisible? Without the painful concession that all of us, “abusers,” “victims,” and “innocent bystanders” alike, contribute to the production of hegemonic violence, whether it results in domestic abuse (see Adler and Ling 1995) or state violence (see Ling 1994), we may never realize how violence is conceived, generated, and sustained. By extension, we will never understand ways to end it. Instead, in our injuries and (self ) alienation, we may reproduce time and again the same conditions of violence or hegemony that afflicted us in the past and which seems the only option for the present. Suspended political ideals, in this case, could also block us from action and change. Worldist agency and accountability compel us to face the complicities (including our own) that sustain violence in the making of history, so that we may, as Marx exhorted, change it. Where do these ideas come from?, our reader may ask. Let us delineate the intellectual precedents to worldism. INTELLECTUAL PRECEDENTS Worldism draws on constructivism and postmodernism but also differs from them. Worldism shares with constructivism its emphasis on intersubject- ivity, and with postmodernism its insights on asymmetrical difference: that is, the norms, institutions, practices, and behaviors that set up certain subjects and subjectivities as more privileged and protected than others. Power, then, cannot be reduced to an objectified, reified condition of who’s “on top” or who “has more” but instead results from agents contributing to macro-political structures like ideology, organization, and capitalist relations. Power redefined in these terms stems from an intersubjective consensus within a context of material conditions and relations. The crux here lies in the framing. Since narration as a process is never complete, the story can always change.3 However, worldism departs from constructivism by asking: What kinds of intersubjectivity are constructed, by whom, and for what purpose, and how do theories of subjectivity restructure the world “otherwise”? And is this how we want the world to be? Not probing into the social relations of intersubjectivity, according to worldism, effectively erases the power politics of meaning, including the political economy behind such constructions. And unlike postmodernism, worldism distinguishes power from the resistance it induces. Contra Foucault (1994), we differentiate between the colonizer and colonized in their experiences of colonial power (see Stoler 2002) and the entwinements that follow, both reinforcing and conflicting complicity (see Ling 2002b). Not doing so implicitly reinforces the imperialist assertion that “this is the way the world is”: that is, it is not open to alternative concepts, discourses, strategies, or ways of being. These gaps in constructivism and postmodernism return us to the conventional treatment of power as domination, pure and simple. Ronen Palan (2000), for instance, finds a strain of conservative realism in Alexander Wendt’s “naturalist” version of constructivism, primarily because he claims to offer a method only, and not an interpretation, of politics. Wendt (2005) himself admits as much. For similar reasons, Samir Amin (2004) calls postmodernism an “ideological accessory” to elite, bourgeois interests just as Aijaz Ahmad (1992) considers post-structuralist theories serve as alibis for imperialism. Both post- modernism and poststructuralism value critique and deconstruction over political action, thereby keeping de facto power intact. We note that although critical theories like postmodernism and con- structivism open up spaces to think about shifting power politics, they fall short of transforming the very asymmetries they critique. Inattention to structural, material interest and lack of integrating the Other analytically – that is, as a substantive maker of the world – undermines their claims of emancipatory social theory. Ultimately, the Other becomes a repository of raw materials for hegemonic actors and sites in the North to process. Worldism acknowledges a deep intellectual debt to postcolonial studies. Here, race, gender, sexuality, class, and nationality serve as analytics and substance in examinations of power relations. Postcolonial studies demystify empire’s boast, like Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden,” that the imperial Self makes the world for all Others. And that world is unidimensional (top- down state power), unilateral (center dominates periphery), and unilinear (past–present–future). Postcolonial studies record a more nuanced and multiple history by problematizing the ways colonial power is imposed on the colonized. That is, colonization involves more than a unilateral and mechanical domination of the subjugated by colonizers and their states. As documented by postcolonial studies, tensions and contradictions emerge from these relations (Said 1979; Spivak 1999), leading to adaptations and integrations between hegemonic selves and subaltern others. From this inter- action, “colonizers” and “colonized” produced something together over the course of time that neither anticipated nor perhaps desired but which all learned to live with, and eventually called their own. Divides along lines of property, race, class, language, religion, and ideology did not disappear. They fused, rather, into hybrid, creole, or mélange cultures that, nonethe- less, contested these categories constantly (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1995; Lewis and Mills 2003). In recognizing that colonizer and colonized mutually construct their sub- jectivities, postcolonial studies attribute to both the legacies of power that we face today. Note, for example, Britain’s principal instrument of colonial and imperial power: the East India Company. Sudipta Sen (1998) shows that, contrary to claims that the British brought capitalism to India, the East India Company had to adjust to pre-existing market structures and political relations to gain access to the thriving trade already in place in northern India.4 Only through this kind of entry could the East India Company later redirect the trade to its favor. L.H.M. Ling (2002b) traces how institutional elites in East Asia learned syncretically and “interstitially” between two world orders – the agrarian-based, cosmo-moral universe of Confucian governance and the Westphalian inter-state system of commerce and trade – to cumulate into what we know as Asian capitalism today. Walter Mignolo (2000) highlights the “gnosis” of thought and action, Self and Other, that comes from centuries of transgressing and reformulating the colonial boundaries that comprise Latin America. Of course, those subjected to hegemony must accommodate others more than those who perpetrate it. Yet hegemony’s very asymmetry highlights the resilience and creativity of the marginalized. Ordinary people can journey across subjectivities to engage syncretically with others, even under conditions of poverty and inequality, to rebuild, reconstruct, and reorganize communities. Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua (1983) characterize their straddling of multiple worlds as life on the “borderlands.” Typically, they point out, women of color from the South must bear the biggest burden of negotiating the multiple worlds of language, culture, class, and gender to survive white- majority society in the North despite systemic discrimination and obstacles. Still, they are able to exercise internal reserves of freedom, thought, and action to sort through hegemony, not simply surrender to it. Similarly, the indigenous populations of the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand have entered into treaties with their white majorities to retain aspects of indigenous ontologies by formalizing them in Western institutions (Shilliam 2008).

## Case

### AT China

#### Naval power fails

* Empirics prove
* Blockades rarely affect land power
* Doesn’t coerce morale – it’s invisible to governments and populations

Hooda 18 [DS Hooda, Lt. Gen., former Northern Commander, Indian Army, under whose leadership India carried out surgical strikes against Pakistan in 2016. Navy, Air Force Are Key But Land Power Will Decide Victory in Future Wars, Writes Lt Gen DS Hooda. July 25, 2018. https://www.news18.com/news/opinion/opinion-navy-and-air-force-key-fronts-but-land-power-will-decide-indias-victory-in-future-wars-writes-lt-gen-ds-hooda-1822721.html]

In September 2017, speaking at a seminar, Army Chief General Bipin Rawat said that the “supremacy and primacy” of the Army must be maintained. “The Navy and Air Force will play a very major role in support of the Army which will be operating on the ground, because no matter what happens, we may be dominating the area or the air, but finally war will be won when we ensure territorial integrity of the nation,” he explained.

This kicked up a stormy debate that the Army, in seeking primacy, does not understand the transformation in the nature of warfare. There are today five equally important dimensions – land, sea, air, space and cyberwarfare, which will contribute to success in war. The emphasis in future will be on non-contact warfare and the clash between large armies is a thing of the past.

Looking at China, our main strategic competitor, it is argued that the main focus on warfighting must switch to the Indian Ocean, through which flow 80 percent of China’s energy supplies. The Chinese “Malacca Dilemma” must be fully exploited. Along the land borders, the Himalayan barrier precludes large-scale land operations and reliance must be on the air force. In fact, one expert has recently stated that the air force and not the army would lead the land war against China.

None of these arguments are completely incorrect, but in questioning the primacy of land power, they ignore both history and geography, as well as the psychological aspect of warfare. There is no example in military history where a major conflict between strong powers has been decisively won only on the basis of a naval or air campaign.

The Allied strategic bombing campaign against Germany in World War 2 was unprecedented in scale. According to The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, published after the war, almost 2,700,000 tons of bombs were dropped, with more than 1,440,000 bomber sorties and 2,680,000 fighter sorties being flown. An estimated 300,000 civilians were killed and 780,000 wounded while almost 7,500,000 were rendered homeless. However, as the survey pointed out, “The mental reaction of the German people to air attack is significant…Their morale, their belief in ultimate victory or satisfactory compromise, and their confidence in their leaders declined, but they continued to work efficiently as long as the physical means of production remained.” Ultimately it required a ground offensive for Germany to capitulate.

There is a similar trend in the employment of naval power. For Alfred Mahan, the imposition of a blockade to choke a country’s economy was the ultimate manifestation of sea power. However, as John J. Mearsheimer points out in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, “First, blockades alone cannot coerce an enemy into surrendering. The futility of such a strategy is shown by the fact that no belligerent has ever tried it…Second, blockades rarely do much to weaken armies, hence they rarely contribute in important ways to the success of a ground campaign.”

Julian Corbett, a famous British naval strategist, reinforces this view when he writes, “Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided…either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.”

There are two more domains of modern warfare, space and cyber. While important, these are by themselves are not sufficient to force victory. Non-contact warfare is a good term to use, and while countries would like to win victories without much cost, it would be poor strategy to plan our force structure on this assumption.

War is essentially a human endeavour and a clash of wills between two adversaries. Past campaigns have shown that air or sea power has rarely impacted morale of the population to an extent that they force the government to submit. It is only when territories are conquered, and population subjugated that governments surrender. Mearsheimer makes a critical observation, “Armies are of paramount importance in warfare because they are the main military instrument for conquering and controlling land, which is the supreme political objective in a world of territorial states. Naval and air forces are simply not suited for conquering territory.”

#### No US China war

Henry Bienen and Jeremiah Ostriker 21. Former James S McDonnell Distinguished University Professor and Dean of Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, former President of NU. Astrophysicist whose academic positions have been divided among Princeton University, Cambridge University and Columbia University. “How the United States can chart a new path that avoids war with China”. Bureau of Atomic Scientists. Feb 3 2021. <https://thebulletin.org/2021/02/how-the-united-states-can-chart-a-new-path-that-avoids-war-with-china/>

Relations between China and the United States have degenerated so far that some foreign policy experts now believe that war between the countries is possible. While this is a minority view, it is a dangerous one. In the past, a US-China war was often considered unlikely for reasons of mutual economic interdependence and nuclear deterrence, not to mention the huge costs of war. Moreover, it has been said, ideological conflict and regional and international striving for advantage are not reasons enough for war. But now more pessimistic voices are also being heard. Citing pre-World War I analogies, in which it was (quite inaccurately) said that economic interdependence among European powers made war impossible, and noting what Harvard University’s Graham Allison has called the “Thucydides Trap,” in which there is a drift towards war when an emerging power threatens to displace an existing leading power, some believe war between China and the United States is becoming more conceivable and even probable.

We are concerned with the current direction of US-China’s policies, but we believe that the pessimists both overstate the possibility of a US-China war and understate the consequences of possible armed conflict. The production of so-called “small” nuclear weapons is given as a reason for the possibility of war without massive destruction. Nuclear war among nuclear powers has not occurred since the spread of nuclear weapons precisely because destruction would be huge and ghastly. But even lower-yield nuclear weapons nonetheless are quite deadly; each has the destructive potential of thousands of WWII airplane bombs. We cannot tell how limited the use of such weapons would be in advance of armed conflict, and, since Chinese missiles can reach our shores, we do not know if such a conflict could be contained.

There are other reasons for thinking war between China and the United States not only should be but will be avoided. We have past experience to warn us. The United States and China fought in the Korean War when US forces pushed to the Yalu River on China’s border. We know how that turned out. We also note that the United States did not send a land army to North Vietnam after China warned that the first US troops in North Vietnam would be met by Chinese “volunteers.” Lesson learned.

What points of conflict does the United States have with China that could actually lead to war? We can find only one, and it has nothing to do with trade, economic competition, ideology, human rights violations by China, or struggle for relative power in Asia or elsewhere. Taiwan is the critical point of conflict. China asserts its historical right to Taiwan as an integral part of China. The United States is committed to the principle that Taiwan’s relationship with China cannot be changed by force. Thus, how much military assistance to give to Taiwan, if China uses blockades or applies military force, is a critical issue for US policy. How and in what way to defend Taiwan loom as large questions. To do nothing in the face of Chinese military threats would not only call into question US commitments everywhere but might well lead to nuclear proliferation in Asia. What lessons would Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, perhaps Vietnam and Indonesia take? Taiwan itself has the capacity to build nuclear weapons and could do so, if the United States made clear that it would not respond to threats against Taiwan.

We do not minimize the difficulty of the Taiwan issue. There needs to be both clarity and ambiguity in how the United States deals with Taiwan. The United States needs to make clear that if China uses force against Taiwan there will be severe consequences. But we cannot in advance specify the consequences. We do not think war with China is probable over Taiwan. But we admit to the difficulties of finding the right policies in this area. We propose the following: As Joseph Nye noted recently in the Wall Street Journal, in consultation with China, the Biden administration should review policies for accident avoidance, crisis management, and high-level communications. Military-to-military relations already exist, and we do not know the details of them. But we suspect that the Trump administration let lapse, or weakened, constant communications and accident-avoidance protocols. These must be maintained and strengthened.

Arms sales to Taiwan are sensitive. Our aim is to avoid an invasion of Taiwan, and thus sales of missiles and technologies for defensive purposes seem right. We must make clear that we would work to circumvent a blockade of Taiwan. But obviously, Taiwan is not Berlin during the Cold War, and airlifts would have limited utility. Thus, it is the avoidance of a blockade that must be worked toward. And here, we need allies and friends in Asia and beyond to support the position that such a blockade would be disastrous for China’s economy and trade worldwide.

We can find no other issues where war could plausibly arise between China and the United States. And we reassert that any armed conflict could lead to a global catastrophe. In a more positive vein, the United States should be finding new paths to both cooperate and compete with China. The demonization of China—as per Donald Trump’s “China virus” and Secretary of State Pompeo’s bellicose language—are misguided and counterproductive. The two countries need to cooperate on climate and environmental issues and on the pandemic and other health matters.

Decoupling the economies of the United States and China would be very difficult, very expensive, and very foolish, as the Trump administration found out. It continued to want to export agricultural goods to China, and where it imposed tariffs, they raised costs to US consumers and manufacturers. We need to challenge China over its trade policies, but the best way to do that is to strengthen the US domestic economy and invest in education and technology innovation and research. So much of our vaunted technological progress has come from government investment. We should renew our government support for advanced research and technology, rather than faulting the Chinese for imitating our past actions. For but one example, consider how the internet was developed in the 1970s.

### Warming

#### Turning this Advantage – concede China gets to Mining first – they’ll use REMs for Green Tech Transition due to commitment to Green Tech – that spills-over globally due to Chinese leadership.

Chiu 17, Dominic. "The East is green: China’s global leadership in renewable energy." New Perspectives in Foreign Policy 13 (2017): 3-12. (Dominic Chiu was a research intern with the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at CSIS.)//Elmer

President Xi Jinping’s speech at the World Economic Forum’s meeting in Davos argued for globalization and the international community’s need to pro-actively manage globalization while mitigating its negative effects.1 He highlighted how China’s past decades of reforms are in line with the trend of globalization, and that China is not only its beneficiary but also its benefactor. Most importantly, Xi stated that China is committed to “a fundamental policy of opening-up,” pledging explicitly to keep China’s doors open to foreign investment and greater economic integration with the world. Although he did not openly advocate for a Chinese role in global leadership, Xi’s desire for China to be at the helm of the push towards globalization is implicit throughout his speech.2 His host, Klaus Schwab, echoed this open secret by remarking that “in a world marked by great uncertainty and volatility the world is looking to China.”3 Countries, however, are skeptical of Xi’s claim that China can become an active global economic leader through open trade and investment. China is increasingly willing to use economic coercion in conventional sectors such as retail, tourism, and manufacturing to promote its own national objectives.4 Critics have also pointed to the country’s protectionist policies that speak against its claim to continued openness.5 China has used a “negative list” to bar foreign investment in various sectors for many years6 and abused ill-enforced trademark laws to discriminate against foreign firms.7 Nevertheless, the international community should be assured that China is genuinely interested in leading the world in one particular sector: deployment and investment in renewable energy.8 China is already leading in renewable energy production figures. It is currently the world’s largest producer of wind and solar energy,9 and the largest domestic and outbound investor in renewable energy.10 Four of the world’s five biggest renewable energy deals were made by Chinese companies in 2016. As of early 2017, China owns five of the world’s six largest solar-module manufacturing companies and the world’s largest wind turbine manufacturer.11 This article will argue for the case of China’s future leadership in the sector by examining domestic incentives for the Chinese government to reduce carbon emissions and pollution, China’s ambitious targets in renewable energy investment, the international community’s consensus on climate change, geopolitical implications of transitioning to renewable energy, and current government policy towards inbound investment in the sector. In contrast to the United States government’s retreating commitment to the industry under President Donald Trump,12 China has the political incentive, economic capability, and moral consensus needed to lead the global renewable energy sector.

#### We flip U/Q – the reason for lack of transition is lack of REMs writ large on Earth NOT just because China is hoarding – proves only Chinese Mining to continue their Renewables transition can solve.

#### China Terrestrial Mining slipping – no more incentive to gate-keep

CPT 21 China Power Team. "Does China Pose a Threat to Global Rare Earth Supply Chains?" China Power. July 17, 2020. Updated May 12, 2021. Accessed December 19, 2021. <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-rare-earths/> //Elmer

Growing Global Competition While China maintains a commanding presence within the global rare earth industry, Beijing’s capacity to unilaterally disrupt supply chains is likely to be eroded in the coming years. A number of initiatives are underway that may prove successful at establishing new rare earth suppliers outside of China. Shifting market dynamics are likely to aid these efforts. There are already signs that other players have started to chip away at China’s dominance in certain areas. Mining of raw rare earth materials outside of China has ramped up significantly in recent years as the US’ Mountain Pass mine, and other mines around the world, have increased their output. China’s share of global mining production has slipped as a result, from a high of 97.7 percent in 2010 to 62.9 percent in 2019 – the lowest point since 1995. China’s share of global rare earth reserves has likewise fallen from 50 percent to 36.7 percent over the same period.3 China’s status as the preeminent supplier of oxides, metals, and permanent magnets has not been similarly diminished – but it may be in the coming years. In the US, the company MP Materials is working to bring online facilities at Mountain Pass that would allow it to process its mined minerals, instead of sending them to China for processing. The company aims to accomplish this in 2021 and to establish the ability to refine and separate rare earth metals in the coming years. International efforts are also underway. In April 2020, the US DoD green-lit initial funding for a joint venture between Australia’s Lynas Corporation and US-based Blue Line Corporation to construct a processing facility in Texas. If successful, it would allow Lynas to ship rare earth materials from its processing facility in Malaysia to the US for final processing – rather than to China. The Japanese government (through JOGMEC) is looking to invest in US and Australian initiatives, likely including the new facility in Texas. These steps are part of Tokyo’s announced goal of further reducing Japan’s reliance on Chinese rare earth imports to less than 50 percent by 2025. Due to growing demand for rare earths, these ventures will likely be more successful than previous attempts to establish rare earth suppliers outside of China. Much of this new demand is being driven by rapid growth of the renewable energy and electric vehicle industries, which utilize large quantities of rare earth permanent magnets. From 2007 to 2017, China’s production of renewable and nuclear energy more than tripled, accounting for roughly 51 percent of the global increase in production over this period. China’s electric vehicle market is growing even faster. Between 2014 and 2019, the number of electric vehicles in China swelled from approximately 90,000 to nearly 3.4 million.