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#### The shift to digital labor has forced the subject to become overwhelmed by the speed of process and unattuned to its environment. Global Governance is a managerial system where even in the aff’s attempt to increase access to research, it paradoxically reduces the paradigmatic function of knowledge.

Berardi, Franco. “Cognitarian Subjectivation.” E-Flux.com, November 2010, [www.e-flux.com/journal/20/67633/cognitarian-subjectivation/](http://www.e-flux.com/journal/20/67633/cognitarian-subjectivation/) |Harun|

Recent years have witnessed a new techno-social framework of contemporary subjectivation. And I would like to ask whether a process of autonomous, collective self-definition is possible in the present age. The concept of “general intellect” associated with Italian post-operaist thought in the 1990s (Paolo Virno, Maurizio Lazzarato, Christian Marazzi) emphasizes the interaction between labor and language: social labor is the endless recombination of myriad fragments producing, elaborating, distributing, and decoding signs and informational units of all kinds. Every semiotic segment produced by the information worker must meet and match innumerable other semiotic segments in order to form the combinatory frame of the info-commodity, semiocapital. Semiocapital puts neuro-psychic energies to work, submitting them to mechanistic speed, compelling cognitive activity to follow the rhythm of networked productivity. As a result, the emotional sphere linked with cognition is stressed to its limit. Cyberspace overloads cybertime, because cyberspace is an unbounded sphere whose speed can accelerate without limits, while cybertime (the organic time of attention, memory, imagination) cannot be sped up beyond a certain point—or it cracks. And it actually is cracking, collapsing under the stress of hyper-productivity. An epidemic of panic and depression is now spreading throughout the circuits of the social brain. The current crisis in the global economy has much to do with this nervous breakdown. Marx spoke of overproduction, meaning the excess of available goods that could not be absorbed by the social market. But today it is the social brain that is assaulted by an overwhelming supply of attention-demanding goods. The social factory has become the factory of unhappiness: the assembly line of networked production is directly exploiting the emotional energy of the cognitive class. I wish to pinpoint the problem of organic limits, which is often eclipsed by an emphasis on the limitless potential of technology. We should speak of technology in context, and the present context of technology is culturally oriented towards economic competition. Info-producers are neuro-workers. Their nervous systems act as active receiving terminals. They are sensitive to semiotic activation throughout the entire day. What emotional, psychic, existential price does the constant cognitive stress of permanent cognitive electrocution exact? The acceleration of network technologies, the general condition of precariousness, and the dependence on cognitive labor all induce pathological effects in the social mind, saturating attention time, compressing the sphere of emotion and sensitivity, as is shown by psychiatrists who have observed a steep increase in manic depression and suicide in the last generation of workers. The colonization of time has been a fundamental issue in the modern history of capitalist development: the anthropological mutation that capitalism produced in the human mind and in daily life has, above all, transformed the perception of time. But we are now leaping into the unknown—digital technologies have enabled absolute acceleration, and the short-circuiting of attention time. As info-workers are exposed to a growing mass of stimuli that cannot be dealt with according to the intensive modalities of pleasure and knowledge, acceleration leads to an impoverishment of experience. More information, less meaning. More information, less pleasure. Sensibility is activated in time. Sensuality is slow. Deep, intense elaboration becomes impossible when the stimulus is too fast. A process of desensitization is underway at the point where electronic cyberspace intersects with organic cybertime. The prospect of individual subjectivation, and of social subjectivation, has to be reframed in this context, and a series of radical questions arise: Is it still possible to envisage a process of collective subjectivation and social solidarity? Is it still possible to imagine a “movement” in the sense of a collective process of intellectual and political transformation of reality? Is it still possible to forge social autonomy from capitalist dominance in the psycho-economic framework of semiocapitalism? Dismantling General Intellect The refusal of work—which is better defined as a refusal of the alienation and exploitation of living time—has been the main engine of innovation, of technological development and knowledge. The organic composition of capital (as a relationship between dead labor and living labor) progressively changed throughout the twentieth century as the workers’ resistance, their sabotage and insubordination, forced capitalists to hire engineers to replace human labor with machines. Similarly, the intellectualization of human activity is—from any perspective—a consequence of the workers’ insubordination and resistance to exploitation. When the cost of labor increases (as happened in the 1960s and ’70s), the capitalist replaces worker with machine, as the machine is less costly in the long run. Since the massive wave of industrial workers’ resistance, information technology has helped to replace human toil with intelligent machines, and this has provoked the enhancement of the sphere of intellectual labor and cognitive activity linked to value production. The ’90s were a decade of alliances: cognitive labor and venture capital met and merged in the dot-com. Expectations were high, judging by the amount of investment, and creativity became an inherent feature of social labor. Then, after the dot-com bubble burst in spring of 2000, neoliberalism broke the alliance of cognitive labor and venture capital. Using technology itself, neoliberalism managed to subvert the social and political rapport de force between labor and capital. As far as we can see now, the result of neoliberal politics is a general reduction of labor cost and an impoverishment of the cognitarians. Both industrial labor, delocalized to the peripheral areas of the world, and cognitive labor, are devalued and underpaid, as precarization has fragmented and finally destroyed social solidarity. In this new context, defined by precarization of cognitive labor, we must rethink the question of subjectivation. Just after the financial collapse of spring 2000, the dot-com crash and the crumbling of big corporations like Enron and WorldCom, the Swiss philosopher and economist Christian Marazzi, a sharp analyst of the social implications of financial crises, wrote an article on the danger of privatizing the general intellect, in which he predicted the trend that ten years later is in full swing: the reduction of research financing, the manipulation and militarization of state-financed research, and the impoverishment and precarization of cognitive labor. If we look at the politics of the European neoliberal ruling class, we see that they are doing exactly this: in some countries (such as Italy) they are reducing the financing for school and for research, privatizing public schools, and provoking a large-scale de-scholarization that has already begun showing signs of producing widespread ignorance and fanaticism. In some countries (like France), they increasingly limit the public financing of research to that which can immediately translate into the politics of economic growth. Subjugating research to immediate economic interests reduces the role of research, rendering it a mere tool for governance, for the repetition of an existing framework of social activity. As cognitive workers are forced into precarity, they are also denied the possibility of deciding the scope of their own research. This obviously reduces the creativity invested by cognitarians in their work, as well as the pace of innovation and progress in technology. In the long run, this trend obliterates the progressive features of capitalism. As the cost of labor becomes so low that exploiting the physical force of a worker costs less than looking for some technological replacement, the push toward innovation slows to a halt. The interest in immediate profit prevails over the long-term development of productive force. Notwithstanding the shortsighted opinions prevailing in the field of neoliberal economics, a decrease in labor cost suggest that the progressive impulse of capitalism is fading; capitalism becomes a factor of de-civilization, of intellectual and technological regression. Cognitarians Searching for a Body Cognitarians are those who embody the general intellect in its many forms: they process information in order to give birth to goods and services. As the cognitive function of society is inscribed in the process of capital valorization, the infinitely fragmented mosaic of cognitive activity becomes a fluid process within a universal telematic network, redefining the shape of labor and capital. Capital becomes the generalized semiotic flux that runs through the veins of the global economy, while labor becomes the constant activation of the intelligence of countless semiotic agents linked to one another. Cognitarians are the social body of the soul at work in the sphere of semiocapital, but this body is dimidiated in a sphere isolated from the other’s body. The form of alienation that is spreading in the living sphere of the cognitarians is a form of psychic suffering that escapes the Freudian definition of neurosis. If Freud’s definition of neurosis lingered on repression of desire, semiocapital is pushing demand for consumerist hyper-expression: just do it. Panic, depression, and a de-activation of empathy—it is here that we find the cognitariat’s problem. Precarious cognitive workers are forced to think in terms of competition. You can become friends with another person on Facebook, but genuine friendship is difficult under conditions of virtual isolation and intense economic competition. If we want to find the way towards autonomous collective subjectivation we have to generate cognitarian awareness with regard to an erotic, social body of the general intellect. The way to autonomous and collective subjectivation starts here: from the general intellect searching for a body. Our main political task must be handled with the conceptual tools of psychotherapy, and the language of poetry—much more than the language of politics and the conceptual tools of modern political science. The political organizer of cognitarians must be able to do away with panic and depression, to speak in a way that sensibly enacts a paradigm shift, a resemiotization of the social field, a change in social expectations and self-perception. We are forced to acknowledge that we do have a body, a social and a physical body, a socioeconomic body. Cyber-optimists were fashionable in the ’90s, and they were able to interpret the spirit of an alliance between venture capitalists and artists or engineers. But the alliance was broken in the Bush years, when technology was submitted to the laws of war, and financial capitalism provoked a collapse that may still lead to the destruction of modern civilization. Today, cyber-optimism sounds fake, like advertising for a rotten product. In his recent book, You Are Not a Gadget, Jaron Lanier, the same person who engineered the tools of virtual reality, writes: true believers in the hive mind seem to think that no number of layers of abstraction in a financial system can dull the efficacy of the system. According to the new ideology, which is a blending of cyber-cloud and neo–Milton Friedman economics, the market will not only do its best, it will do better the less people understand it. I disagree. The financial crisis brought about by the U.S. mortgage meltdown of 2008 was a case of too many people believing in the cloud too much. Governance and Cognitive Subjugation In the present, agonizing phase of neoliberalism (an agony that is more ferocious and destructive than the previous phases) European governments are staging an assault on the educational system—and particularly on scientific research—as a part of a war against cognitive labor, a war aimed at its subjugation. The university system across Europe is based on a huge amount of precarious, underpaid, or unpaid labor. Researchers and students have staged protests against this trend, attempting to return the educational system to its original vocation: a place of non-dogmatic knowledge, of the public sharing of culture. Research should not be subjected to any restraining criterion of functionality, because its very function is to explore solutions that, although dysfunctional in the present paradigm, may reveal new paradigmatic landscapes. This is the role of scientific research, especially when we are facing conundrums that seem unresolvable within the capitalist paradigm. The European ruling class aims to reduce research to a method for the governance of complexity. The ideology of governance is based on the naturalization (hypostatization, I would say in Hegelian parlance) of economic reasoning. The economy has achieved the status of a universal language, of the ultimate standard of choice, whereas economics should be just a branch of knowledge among others. The normative role that the economy has acquired is unwarranted from an epistemological point of view, and devastating at the social level. If research is subjected to economic conceptualization, it is no longer research, but technical management. The so-called reform of the European educational system launched in 1999 (the year of the Bologna Charter) is aimed at the separation of applied research from the questioning of the very foundations and finalities of scientific knowledge, accompanied by the subjugation of research to standards set by economic evaluation. The epistemic implications of this move are enormous: to submit research to the laws of economic growth obliterates the most important purpose of knowledge, what Thomas Kuhn calls its “paradigmatic” function. The ability to produce paradigm shifts in the field of knowledge and in the field of experimentation depends on the autonomy of research from established standards of evaluation. Only when research can work and discover and create concepts regardless of established social interests can knowledge move beyond repetition, and open new prospects to imagination and technology. “Governance” is the keyword for this process. Governance produces pure functionality without meaning, the automation of thought and of will. It embeds abstract connections in the relation between living organisms, technologically subjecting choices to logical concatenation. It recombines compatible (compatibilized) fragments of knowledge. Governance is the replacement of political will with a system of automatic technicalities forcing reality into a logical framework that cannot be questioned. Financial stability, competitiveness, labor cost reduction, increase of productivity: the systemic architecture of EU rule is based on such dogmatic foundations that cannot be challenged or discussed, because they are embedded in the technical function of managerial subsystems. No enunciation or action is operational if it does not comply with embedded rules of techno-linguistic dispositifs of daily exchange. Governance is the management of a system that is too complex to be governed. The word “government” means the understanding (as a reduction to a rational model) of the social world, and the ability of the human will (despotic, democratic, and so forth) to control a flow of information sufficient for the control of a relevant part of the social whole. The possibility of government requires a low degree of complexity with regard to social information. Information complexity grew throughout the late modern age, and exploded in the age of the digital network. Therefore, the reduction of social information to comprehensive knowledge and political control becomes an impossible task: control becomes aleatory, uncertain, almost impossible, and an increasing number of events escape the organized will. At this point, capitalism shifts to the mode of governance. It employs abstract concatenation of technological functions in place of the conscious processing of a flow of information. It connects asignifying segments in place of dialogic elaboration. It automatically adapts in place of forming consensus, using technical language in place of shared meaning resulting from dialogue and conflict. In place of planning, it manages disruption. It assesses the compatibility of agents entering the social game in place of mediating conflicting political interests and projects. And it employs the rhetoric of systemic complexity in place of a rhetoric of historical dialectics. Looking for Autonomy As the governance model functions perfectly, in itself, it destroys the social body. Conceptualizing the field of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener argued that a system exhibiting positive feedback, in response to perturbation, increases the magnitude of perturbation. In contrast, a system that responds to a perturbation in a way that reduces its effect is said to exhibit negative feedback. A logic of positive feedback is installed in the connection between digital technology and financial economy, because this connection tends to induce technological automatisms, and psycho-automatisms too, leading to the advancement of destructive tendencies. Look at the discourse of the European political class (almost without exception): If deregulation produced the systemic collapse with which the global economy is now confronted, we need more deregulation. If lower taxation on high incomes led to a fall in demand, let’s lower high-income taxation. If hyper-exploitation resulted in the overproduction of unsold and useless cars, let’s intensify car production. Are these people insane? I don’t think so. I think they are incapable of thinking in terms of the future; they are panicking, terrorized by their own impotence; they are scared. The modern bourgeoisie was a strongly territorialized class, linked to material assets; it could not exist without a relationship to territory and community. The financial class that dominates the contemporary scene has no attachment to either territory or material production, because its power and wealth are founded on the perfect abstraction of a digitally multiplied finance. And this digital-financial hyper-abstraction is liquidating the living body of the planet, and the social body. Only the social force of the general intellect can reset the machine and initiate a paradigm shift, but this presupposes the autonomy of the general intellect, the social solidarity of cognitarians. It presupposes a process of autonomous subjectivation of collective intelligence.

#### TRIPS/compulsory licensing is a neoliberal ploy to both legitimize the WTO as a governing apparatus while covertly authorizing economic retaliation against nations who invoke it.

Ferrer ‘19

[Cory, MFA Candidate, University of Colorado Department of Communication. 2019. “THE RHETORIC OF “BALANCE”: NEOCOLONIALISM AND RESISTANCE IN THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR GENERIC DRUGS,” www.proquest.com/openview/5cbb5aa35aec157b3cdf8b03d5d269b7/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y] Harun + pat

Recall also, that compulsory licensing is only a limited solution to the problem of accessing patented drugs in poorer countries. As the Doha Declaration explains: “We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement” (2). As long as a country doesn’t have the means to produce the drugs, there is no one to whom the government could issue a compulsory license. So long as TRIPS restricts patented medicines from crossing international borders, compulsory licenses fall far short of addressing the need for patented medicines in countries that have little or no manufacturing capacity. In what is possibly the most depressing sentence of the Doha Declaration, the document goes on to offer, not a solution, but an instruction to the TRIPS Council to “find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002” (2). In other words, these negotiations were not able reach a compromise, and so they simply left this for future negotiations.

Also conspicuously absent from the Doha Ministerial declaration is any language addressing the rights of countries who take advantage of these flexibilities and remain free from bilateral pressure for doing so. While one could easily argue that if the US chooses to impose sanctions on a country of their own accord, rather than initiate dispute proceedings through the WTO, then this doesn’t necessarily concern the TRIPS agreement. However, given WTO secretary general Mike Moore’s stated concern with countries “feeling secure” in taking advantage of these flexibilities, and given that the issue of “bilateral pressure” was raised as an obstacle to this security during the TRIPS Council negotiations, the absence of any language addressing this issue appears to be a hard concession to the interests of the US and its allies, allowing them to continue holding the threat of economic sanctions over any nation that takes advantage of the flexibilities granted by this declaration (Moore; “Governments”).

Overall, the Doha declaration makes some significant concessions to the demands of the Global South’s coalition yet stops well short of fully authorizing WTO Members to take full advantage of all public health policies that would put affordable medicines into the hands of their people. The declaration recognizes that it falls short and puts a pin in the issue until the next negotiation, having failed to create a suitable compromise between nations who profit from IP protection and nations who suffer from it. The results of these later negotiations will be discussed in the conclusion to this thesis. Ultimately, the Doha Declaration—and WTO policy in general—are constrained by the demand for a standard of consensus which leaves ultimate veto power in the hands of powerful nations profiting at the others’ expense.

‌Conclusion: What does “Balance” Do?

In the context of the Doha round of negotiations, we see “balance” invoked towards several different ends. The TRIPS agreement invokes “balance” as a form of strategic ambiguity, attempting to please multiple stakeholders by allowing competing interpretations of the same international law to clear the procedural hurdles of consensus. The WTO officers and the EU’s position paper invoked “balance” to build legitimacy for the TRIPS agreement, the deliberative process that produced it, and by extension, the global patent system itself. If the TRIPS agreement strikes a carefully negotiated balance between health and IP protection, then the current balance is presumed sufficient. The paper submitted by the US and its allies invoked “balance” only as a description of strong and effective IP enforcement, a passing nod to balance that ultimately served to build the moral credibility of their strong IP enforcement agenda. For the coalition of the Global South, balance means mutual advantage, but one that must be demonstrated. Their position did not presume the benefit of IP to public health outcomes and argued that when IP protection conflicted with public health outcomes, governments have a standing right to choose public health.

Balance is therefore a deeply contested signifier: both a site of neo-colonial domination, and a site of counter-colonial resistance. However, all these conceptions of balance have one thing in common. They all, in some way, reinforce the legitimacy of the TRIPS agreement and the WTO as a governing institution of the global economy. Though the DCGP openly challenged Western Hegemony of these forums, it did so by drawing on specific provisions of the TRIPS agreement and claiming a position as an authoritative interpreter of international law to which Western nations are (on paper) equally beholden. Instead of challenging the legitimacy of the WTO and TRIPS agreements, the governments of the Global South are claiming that legitimacy for themselves in a counter-colonial push to assert themselves as equal governors and rightsholder of the neo-liberal world order. Though “balance” is typically invoked as a resolution to conflict, it is in fact the very site of that conflict it’s supposed to resolve.

#### Kantianism depends on empty signs like “democracy” or “freedom” which are innately void – philosophy is reduced to tautologies like “practical reason” and self-referential a priori “truths” – this collapses to the “will to will” which is how power reasserts itself through fascist violence

Kroker ‘84

Arthur Kroker (the Great Value-brand Jean Baudrillard). “The Arc of a Dead Power: Magritte/Baudrillard/Augustine.” *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory* vol. 8, no. 1-2, 1984). Rc/Pat

Thesis: This essay is intended to recover the radical insight of contemporary structuralist theory into the existence of ABSTRACT POWER by blasting through the evasions of the structuralist discourse to its suppressed metaphysical implications. What follows, then, is in the way of a circling around from the artistic imagination of Rene Magritte and the radical semiology of Jean Baudrillard to the hidden genealogy of modern power: Augustines De Trinitate. Augustine's doctrine of the "trinity" and Baudrillard's theory of the "sign" are presented as reverse, but parallel, images of the other. And why? Simply because they represent the metaphor of a "dead power". This is the region ofNietzsche's power as a 'Perspectival appearance': Kant is reduced to a disenchanted expression of the primitive Christian doctrine of the 'will to will',` and Augustine, as the perfect embodiment ofPaul's closing of the "eye ofthe flesh "and the opening of the "inner eye" to an abstract power, is viewed as the anti-Nietzsche. And POWER? It's everywhere now, and for just the reason that Baudrillard gave in Oublier Foucault Power doesn't exist, it was always only a 'Perspectival simulation "of itself. This is a discourse, then, on the PURELY ABSTRACT UNITY which is at the centre of western experience, and on the remarkable convergence of the trinity/sign as the magical formula of the 'fictitious unity" of the modem episteme. Rene Magritte, the Belgian surrealist painter, is the artist of modern power. His work is, perhaps, the closest approximation in this century to the artistic imagination demanded by Nietzsche in The Will to Power. Magritte is the artist who deals in error, cruelty, and evil if only to work a deep reversal against the purely perspectival, and thus fictitious, unities of the "reality-principles" of western experience : judgement, truth, sociality, normativity, utility . Indeed, the paintings of Magritte are perfect texts for the study of power as a "perspectival illusion" : an abstract power which produces its (symbolic) effects through a slight trompe-I bell in which, as Nietzsche has remarked, "the conditions of (our) preservation are projected into predicates of existence".' There can, in fact, be few more searing depictions ofthe purely topographical universe of an abstract power than Magritte's The Door to Freedom. This painting, which was intended anyway to show the circular logic at work in the now obsolete representational viewpoint, is in the best of the pastoral mode. It consists simply of a landscape viewed through a window . There is, however,,an odd and disconcerting difference. The window is shattered ; and on the bits of glass - which explode inwards, not outwards - there are clear traces of the image of the image of the landscape. Now, representational art, and with it the classical (also representational) theory of power depended for its very existence on the preservation of a privileged and substantive distinction between the sign and its referent. Power, in this case, always stood for something real outside itself: a referent like use-value, sovereignty, justice, democracy which would, and this simultaneously, concretize the regression into nothingness in the will to power and provide an after-glow for a power which had already disappeared into the "vanishing-point" (McLuhan) in western consciousness . Following Nietzsche's insights into the "in vain" of the ellipse traced by the will to power, Foucault has said that power in the modern era could only function on the condition that it hide its (real) existence as a purely cynical power. When the Rene Magritte - The Door to FreedomlLa clef des champs horizon is wiped clean, who could tolerate the knowledge of a cynical freedom, an absent power, an existence falsely unified by the "fiction" of perspectival appearances? Magritte has recovered the reality ofthe non-existence of modem experience, and thus of its structural basis in the will to power, as nothing but a pure relation. i n The Door to Freedom, we are suddenly ejected from the comforting illusion of an antinomic, and thus representational, theory of power into an "empire of signs" (Barthes) which consists only of a plunging downwards through an endlessly refracted imagery . A perspectival illusion is at work here which produces an image of the real (the antinomies of window and landscape) 54 DEAD POWER only as a symbolic -effector to disguise the disappearance of the real into the endless curvature of the mirrored image. The significance of the traces of the image of the landscape on the broken glass lies, in fact, precisely in the circularity of its symbolic effect . We are very close to Nietzsche's impossible knowledge of the regressus in infinitum in modern experience when we reflect on Magritte's disclosure that the pure sign-system of The Door to Freedom reveals, after all, that the antinomic basis of western knowledge was only a perspectival trompe-l beil leading away from the reality of the mirrored language of analogy, similitude, and likeness . Signifier/signified ; unity/variety; inside/outside : the antinomies are transformed into purely perspectival sites in the mirror of power. And what unifies the antinomies of the Sign, projecting them outwards as predicates of existence and then, in a quick reversal, dissolving them from within as purely symbolic effects already on their way to disintegration, is the existence of power as a process of abstraction and disembodiment . We are in the presence of a sign-system which functions on the basis of the liquidation of the real . Magritte's imagination is surrealistic to this extent : it teases out that precise point in the curvature of the ellipse of modern power in which power, abandoning its association with the psychology of sacrifice prepares to re-enter its own cycle of disintegration in the symbolic form of the psychology of seduction This is the reverse side of Nietzsche's power/sacrifice: not the side of "conscience-vivisection and self-crucifixion" ; but the dark side of consciencecancellation and self-absorption . Like the exploding images in The Door to Freedom which collapse inwards only to reveal an endless, didactic recycling of the same image, power/seduction and power/sacrifice are reverse, but parallel, expressions of the same circuit of abstract power. It was Magritte's finest contribution to reveal that the real terrorism in Kant's antinomies has to do with the free-fall effect which they induce in the eye of power. Magritte's universe is decentered, silent, and metaphorical: his paintings, ranging from TheFalseMirror to the stereotypy of La Reproduction Interdite, point to our incarceration in the downward plunge of a structuralist experience . As Nietzsche also knew, power can exist now only in exchange. Like Marx's abstract labour before it, power has an abstract (symbolic) existence as the illusionary (and thus metaphorical) form of the imposition of the "fictititous unity" of the categories of the real . Paradoxically, the abstract value of power in circulation depends on the constant disappearance from view of that mysterious force which has always been the inner dynamic of modern power: the "will to will". In The Door to Freedom, the "will to will" has a purely perspectival existence . It is the disciplined, optical effect by which the eye traces out a smooth, unbroken curvature between the shattered image and its recycled mirror-image : the instantaneous optical operation ofdividing, and thus privileging the antinomies of foreground and background . While the imposition ofa willed continuity is, in fact, the secret form of power in the "door to freedom", there is also a reverse, cancelling motion at work in the painting . There is also the censoring of the scream of Nietzsche's "in vain" as the eye projects a reality-principle into the tautology of the mirrored image. 55 ARTHUR KROKER Magritte's insights into the tautological and metaphorical basis of power have their theoretical analogue in the radical structuralism of Jean Baudrillard . In a brilliant series of works, extending from Pour une critique de 1 economie politique du signe to Oublier Foucault to Lechange symbolique et la mort, Baudrillard has explored the meaning of a "dead power" . In Oublier Foucault, Baudrillard has sensed something of the awesome truth that power which functions as a metaphor for that which has no existence is fascist in character . It presents itself in the "aesthetic ritual of death"2 as a power which has no signification, except in purely symbolic form, outside of itself . And power can do this because it has no representational function: the secret of power's existence is quite simply, that "power does not exist" .3 Limitlessness means that power is the name given to a certain coherency of relations: the terms to the relation (the "antinomies" of modern experience) vanish; and the "radical relationalism" which is the form of power as an abstract medium works to exterminate embodied experience . For Baudrillard, at the heart of power is a "radical semiurgy" in which the real is forced to undergo a continuous process of resymbolization. The result is the spread of a "dead power", a void, which in a desperate strategy of concretization seeks to embody itself in the "reality-effects" of human speech and social action. Jean Baudrillard is then the theoretician par excellence of a dead power, of a power which owes its seduction to the "imminence of the death of all the great referents" and to the violence which is exacerbated by their last, desperate attempts at representation . This is power, not on its expanding and symbolic side (the side of a politicaland representational theory of power), but on its reverse side: the side of symbolic reversal, just where power affirms itself as void, as having only a cynical existence . This universal fascination with power in its exercize and its theory is so intense because it is a fascination with a dead power characterized by a simultaneous "resurrection effect", in an obscene and parodic mode, of all the forms of power already seen - exactly like sex in pornography . (Oublier Foucault) Oublier Foucault is Baudrillard's accusation against a purely representational theory ofpower. In this writing there is traced outa great figurative movement in which power, abandoning its association with forcerelations, agency, st DEAD POWER excellence . No, Power's secret lies in its intimate entanglement with death. It's just the existence of power as a challenge unto death, as a sign without a founding referent, which is the secret of the modern fascination with power. What Nietzsche described as the "will to will" (the abstract nucleus of a simulational model of power), Baudrillard denotes power as "challenge" . This is power, then, without a reality-principle . Indeed, in Baudrillard's estimation, Foucault's error was his almost nostalgic desire for power with a limiting term. In Oublier Foucault, Baudrillard notes that Foucault misinterprets the purely relational quality of modem power, just because he wished to tame power by closing the distance between power and its referents. The sociological vision of a normalizing society, or even the closed space of the panoptic, is not dangerous : Foucault's privileged world of the panoptic is just the postive space where power surrenders its non-existence as "challenge" and incorporates itself without a murmur of dissent into the valorized order of finalities (politics, sexuality, commodities) . For Baudrillard, the dark side of power, the site where power is made dangerous once again, is just at that moment of reversal and cancellation when power, exploding beyond its historical signification by an order of referentialities, announces itself as a simulacrum and says that to accept its "challenge" is to enter a vortex of nothingness . It's just this nihilistic expression of power that Baudrillard theorizes ; and not the positive order of representationality associated with sociological power (power/norm), economic power (power/commodity), or political power (power/sovereignty) . Baudrillard's relational theorisation of power negates the affirmative order of reason only in order to recover the mythic origins of power. This is why, perhaps, Baudrillard can relativize Foucault's writings on the modern discourse of power/sexuality as the already obsolescent description of an era that is "now in the process of collapsing entirely' . But what if Foucault spoke so well to us concerning power - and let us not forget it in real objective terms which cover manifold diffractions but nonetheless do not question the objective point of view one has about them, and concerning power which is pulverized but whose reality principle is nonethless not questioned - only because power is dead? Not merely impossible to locate because ofdissemination, but dissolved purely and simply in a manner that still escapes us, dissolved by reversal, cancellation, or made hyperreal through simulation (who knows?) Oublier Foucault In Baudrillard's world, power is always haunted by an "imaginary catastrophe" at its centre : the dilation of power now, after centuries of expansion, into a "single pure sign - the sign of the social whose density crushes US".4 And if the "redoubled simulation" of power as its passes into its own simulacrum means the imminent death of all the great referents then it may also signify that fascism 57 ARTHUR KROKER is the precursor of a purely relational power. "As the violent reactivation of a form of power that despairs of its rational foundations, as the violent reactivation of the social in a society that despairs of its own rational and contractual foundations, fascism is nevertheless the only fascinating modern form of power" . 5 And fascism's secret? It's just this : Fascist power is then the only form which was able to reenact the ritual prestige of death, but in an already posthumous and phony mode, a mode ofone-upmanship and mise-en-scene, and in an aesthetic mode -as Benjamin clearly saw -that was no longer truly sacrificial . Oublier Foucault For Baudrillard, fascism could remain the "only fascinating modern form of power" because it occupied that space in the cycle of power where politics in its sacrifical mode passes over, and instantaneously so, into the distinctly modern (cynical) region of power and seduction . And if fascism had about it an "already nostalgic obscenity and violence", if it was already passe as soon as it appeared in history, thenthis may only indicate why fascism remains the emblematic sign of modern power. "An eternal inner simulation of power, which is never already Uamais dejd) anything but the sign of what it was".6 Fascist power is, then, the political analogue of Magritte's The Door to Freedom and the paradigmatic expression of Baudrillard's "dead power". Baudrillard's world begins with the devalorisation ofthe social andwith the loss forever ofthe autonomous historical subject. It's just this collapse of a rational foundation for power, the breakdown even of rationalization and its replacement by the new sociological principles of exteriorisation and simulation of the silent masses, which makes fascist power the dominant sign of the modem century. The loss forever of an embodied subject, of power with a reality-principle, also means that a fascist power is purely structuralist. On the side of the politics of seduction, Baudrillard's dead power is structured from within like Magritte's The Door to Freedom. In both instances, power is a pure relation : its structural code is tautology, metaphor, and lack. That Baudrillard has been able to achieve such an austere desconstruction of power to its nihilistic traces may be due to the more sweeping fact that his imagination revolves around the conception of experience as a simulacrum . In his most metaphysical text, L echange symbolique et la mort, Baudrillard remarked : "L'hypereal nest au-delA de la representation que parce qu'il est tout entier dans la simulation. Le tourniquet de la representation y devient fou, mais d'une folie implosive, qui, loin d'etre excentrique, louche vers le centre, vers sa propre repetition en abyme"7 For Baudrillard, we live now in the aesthetic inversion of the secret order of surrealism. Where once surrealism offered the possibility that privileged areas of "banal experience" could be transformed into special, artistic insights into the "hallucinatory" quality of modern experience, now "toute la reality quotidienne . . . dejA incorpore la dimension simulatrice de DEAD POWER 1'hyperrealisme" a The eventual outcome of the transformation of experience into a simulacrum (a pure medium) is the introduction of an inner redoublement into the cycle of power "C'est Feuphorie meme de la simulation, qui se veut abolition de la cause et de 1'effet, de Forigine et de la fin, a quoi elle substitue le redoublement" 9 In the simulacrum, the critique of the non-reality of a "real space" between the sign and its referent reveals the "referential illusion" at work in the interstices of (abstracted) experience for what it always was: "L'hallucination pathetique du signe et 1'hallucination pathetique du reel".10 Baudrillard's simulacrum and Magritte's hallucinatory world of empty mediations en abyme spiral into one another as convergent texts because both contain a common, theoretical insight into the genealogy of modern power. Magritte and Baudrillard have, in fact, done the impossible: they have read social experience in reverse image in order to force the imaginaire of power to the surface . And they have done so by deciphering the enigmatic "code" of the deep, structural continuity in western experience : by, that is, interpreting the hieroglyphics of the "sign" as, at once, the DNA of the structural logic of experience, and the limit within which there takes place a relentless metamorphosis of embodied experience (labour, reflection, sex, death) into a language without passion . Magritte, this exemplar of Nietzsche's artist, always understood the fatalistic tendency in the nightmare that he was exploring ; and thus, there is no break in his imagination as he journeys deeper into the hidden recesses of power and the sign. The False Mirror, Hooded Lovers, Memory, The Therapeutist : these paintings are almost clinical diagnoses of the structural laws of value of a disembodied power. Magritte instructs us, and this carefully, in the invisible architecture of the binary language which forms the horizon of our imprisonment in a dead power. However, Baudrillard's project is different. His critical intention was, at first, more circumscribed : to project the radical implications ofthe theory of the sign into the domain of political economy. In TheMirrorofProduction, Baudrillard proposed to subvert Marx's Capital by showing that the sign was the structural code, the nuclear structure, of the commodity-form . For Baudrillard, the sign was the secret destiny ofthe commodity: the purely topographical structure of an "empty, symbolic exchange" within which there took place the fantastic "double-metamorphosis" in the circuit of capital . It was, in fact, Baudrillard's intention to disclose that the transformation of the commodity into the sign (mercantilist value-form into the structural law ofvalue) , I was the secret destiny of capital in the twentieth-century. This is why Baudrillard spoke of the "fetishism of the sign" and why, perhaps, so much of his early writings represent an ironic dialogue with the vanishing "object" of Capital . But it was also Baudrillard's fate to be the unwitting sorcerer of the Marxian legacy . His writings have teased out the Nietzschean regression which always existed on the dark side of Marx's "circuit of capital" . By disclosing that the theory of the sign was the morphology of the double-metamorphosis of capital, and thus the structural genesis of the "magic" and "alchemy" of the fetishism of the commodity. Baudrillard also revealed that nihilism now takes root, not in the ideal substratum of Christian 59 ARTHUR KROKER morality, but in the culture of consumption itself. The "lack" which is the imaginaire at the centre of the culture of consumption is identical to the abyss which drives on the ressentiment and howling "spirit of revenge" in Christian metaphysics . The difference between the accumulation of grace and the cyclical movement of capital is only perspectival : this is the inverted region of the surrealistic slide between the two sides of The Will to Power. On the historical side of the cycle of a nihilating power, revenge (against embodiment) is structured in the form of the psychology of sacrifice . The "signs" of sacrifice are idealistic projections of conditions of preservation: dead grace, dead love, dead spirits . On the materialistic side of the will to power, ressentiment speaks in the language of seduction. But the "signs" of seduction, which depend anyway on the "pumping out" of concrete labour into the carcass of "dead labour" (Marx) are only the camera obscura of the sickliness of a sacrificial culture hysterical consumption, charismatic technology (the new, material site of Heidegger's "will to will"), and mutilated bodies . In consumer culture, labour does not exist nor does value. The shattering forever of the chain of referential experience means, in fact, that the prime players of ontology - labour, need, use-value, utility - are the symbolic horizon of the simulacrum at the centre of the circuit of nihilism. Thus, what is the trompe-l'oeil of Capital/The Will to Power but a perspectival illusion as the single cycle of exterminism in western culture, having achieved a frenzied moment of high abstraction in the psychology of sacrifice, now hurtles back towards the original locus of power - the body - for a second colonization . This time, though, nihilism in the value-form (the "sign") of capital seduces the flesh with pleasure, not torture. But it's all the same, and it's exactly what is hinted at in Baudrillard's discourse . Capital is a grisly, almost post-modern response, to Nietzsche's haunting question: "Nihilism is standing at the door. Whence comes this uncanniest of all guests?" .1z Capital is forced to enter its own simulacrum, and to make a true confession of its continuous existence as a recitative of the "will of power". All of Baudrillard's thoughthas, as its gravitation-point, a violent and unpredictable discourse between Marx and Nietzsche : it is a brilliant reading of Marx's critique ofpolitical economy as the sign that the cycle of nihilism is entering its last, and perfect, phase of seduction . Perhaps it was Baudrillard's stubborn insistence on seeing the Nietzsche in Marx: in taking the cyclical movement between "inertia and ecstacy" in Capital for what it was, a "strategie fatale", which plays out, in banal form, the redoublement of The Will to Power? Or, perhaps, it was his fundamental insight that the sign represents the locus of disembodiment and abstraction always sought, but never achieved, through the exteriorisation of the senses in the commodityform? Whatever the reason, Baudrillard has stumbled upon the hidden reservoir of signs in western experience. In an almost mad rush of creativity - as if the sign could no longer tolerate the symbolic disguises behind which it was forced to hide its existence as a skeptical power - all of the structural canons of the simulacrum tumble out of Baudrillard's thought . This is only to say, though, that Baudrillard makes explicit at the theoretical level what Magritte recognized DEAD POWER immediately, and perhaps instinctively, in a purely artistic gesture . Magritte discloses the, optical, because metaphorical, rules by which the imaginaire constitutes the inner horizon of western experience. And Baudrillard? His writings represent a careening tour ofthe semantic norms governing the endless circulation of a bi-polar structural power. If Magritte's paintings reveal the hidden face of terror in Kant's "antinomies", then Baudrillard shows precisely the semiological code by which the antinomies transform concrete experience in the direction ofthe simulacrum. In Baudrillard's world, we are in flight through a vast, social apparatus which has, as its principle of motion, an inner, semiological transformation of every particle of experience - bodies, labour, power, money, speech - through an empty cycle of abstract, symbolic exchanges . The inner circulation of embodied experience into a downward spiral of exterminism only means that the simulacrum fulfills Nietzsche's aphorism that "nothing wants to be preserved". The rules surrounding the "cycle of liquidation" at the heart of power and the sign remain constant: a fantastic "semantic cancellation" at the centre of the exchange process ; a relentless "semiological reduction" of experience to the tautology of binary language; the "satellisation of the real" ; an "inner semiurgy" which works to impose symbols without original referents ; the sovereignty of the "structural law of value" . 13 In short, Baudrillard reveals that The Door to Freedom involves the liquidation of experience by the empty language of the sign; and that the sudden convergence in the modern century of power/sign is nothing less than the grammar of the culture of nihilism. Now, without irony, I wish to work a historical reversal of the surrealistic imagery of the sign. I wish, in fact, to complete the fantastic discovery by Baudrillard and Magritte of power as a sign of "that which never was" by tracing the genealogy of abstract power to its genesis in the structural logic of early Christian metaphysics . If the existence of power as a pure sign-system can be so accurately described by Magritte and Baudrillard, then, maybe, this is because the arc of a dead power is already in reverse motion, tracing the path of an ellipsis which takes it back to its origins in the disembodiment, and even disempowerment, of power itself. What I want to theorize concerning the history of nihilism is simply this : the "sign" is but the disenchanted expression par excellence of the trinitarian formulation in Christian metaphysics . The sign is the form assumed by the will to power on its contemporary side, the side of the psychology of seduction; the trinity is the structural code of the will to power on the sacrificial side of its cycle. There is, however, one significant difference: in the language ofthe sign, but not in that of the trinity, the presence of the "will to will" as the third term unifying the poles (the mirrored antinomies) of signifier and signified is suppressed from sight. The sign is, therefore, the trinity with its essential secret - the abstract will - made invisible . The genuine originality ofthe discourse of Baudrillard/Magritte, and I could 6 1 ARTHUR KROKER also add the great, radical insight in New French Thought, extending through the structuralism of Derrida, Kristeva, Deleuze, and Foucault, is that, however unsuspectingly, they force us beyond the rubicon of representational theory . Their work provides a quick passage right through the eye of Nietzsche's will to power; from the side of (our) disenchantment in the society of the "sign" to the dramatic inversion of power in Christian dogma. The suppressed truth of structuralist discourse is precisely this : there is no fundamental discontinuity in the history (metaphysics) of power in western experience . The "sign" is, in fact, not antinomic, but trinitarian . And it is trinitarian because the discourse of the sign is but a concretization in the direction of banality and inertia of the primitive Christian doctrine of the will . What is nihilism on the "Christian" side of the will to power? It's the (semantic) reduction of experience to the "semiological code" of the trinity : an anthropology ofthe imaginaire inthe valueform of "God", which was, anyway, only a semantic substitute for the disappearance of the embodied will . And what is nihilism in the contemporary century? It's simply this : structuralism reinvested by the will to power in the name of seduction Baudrillard's simulacrum is canonical power with the head of God exploded from within . This radical discovery of a deep continuity in the structural morphology of power commits us to follow through the Nietzschean regression which is, today, what the culture of nihilism is all about. We are plunging through the inner reversal in experience, past the nihilism of Capital, past the reality-flashes of dead money, dead status, and dead prestige, to the silent, inner reservoir of a cynical power, a cynical history, and a cynical God. The arc of a dead power traces a great trajectory back to a specific historical moment, and this not in the twentieth- but in the fourth-century, to where there took place the assasination of Christ (the elimination of embodied will) and the birth of God (the empire of abstract power) . It is, indeed, the fateful figure of Augustine who stands at the beginning of the ellipse of modern power; and it is towards his theorisation of the metaphysics ofapurely rhetorical power that society now dissolves . It is as if Augustine marks a great threshold in western consciousness : the silencing, on the one side, ofthe cynicism of the amorfati ; and the eruption, on the other, of the lack which drives forward the simulacrum . In his texts - vast regions of theoretical discourse - Kant's judgement, Nietzsche's insight into power as a "perspectival illusion", Marx's "dead labour", and Baudrillard's "dead power" - suddenly fuse together as particles in a great and common field of discourse : a discourse which has its structural genesis in Augustine's fundamental inversion of the order of western experience. Augustine's texts, ranging from the Confessions to the City of God to De Trinitate are the fundamental rupture from which everything explodes outwards in a furious burst ofnihilism: an explosion of the "in vain" which now becomes more visible to the extent that power, as a sign of nothingness, spreads out in the social form of banality . We can capture something of Augustine's importance as the limit and horizon of the modern project by understanding his theory of power for what it is : the reverse image and completion (on the side of sacrificial power) of the DEAD POWER theory of power/seduction proposed by Baudrillard and Magritte. There is, indeed, almost a family resemblance between Augustine's purely topographical world of "serenity" and Magritte's tortured, but also silent and serene, world of violently detached fragments of experience. Magritte's vivid depiction of the referential illusion at the centre of modern existence has its (philosophical) origin in Augustine's liquidation of the warring tension in the field of embodied experience. Magritte is, in fact, only releasing in the medium of painting the scream which has been suppressed in western consciousness by the cancellation of the finitude of the body (through Augustine's "conversion"), and by our reduction to the will to truth ofa vast, delusional system of signs. Thus we might say that Augustine's conversion is the philosophical anthropology of Magritte's The Door to Freedom. In Augustine's Confessions, there is an actual, written account of the exact moment at which there took place a fundamental rupture in the interstices of western consciousness . Augustine's conversion in the garden at Cassiacium marks a great threshold in the western mind: a fundamental, seismic division between the warring antinomies of classical experience, and the "serenity" of the undivided will (the "will to will") of modernism. Augustine's account of the bitter struggle of his conversion is, in fact, a metaphysical exploration of the desperate struggle of the will to overcome the finitude of the body. The "conversion" is, really, from one philosophical episteme to another : from the impossible tensions of classicism (symbolized by the skepticism of stoicism and the dogmatism of Platonic rationalism) to the "serenity" of the will breaking in upon itself in the (reified) form of its own simulation. "Thus soul-sick was I, and tormented, accusing myself much more severely than my wont, rolling and turning me in my chain, till that were wholly broken, whereby I now was butjust, but still was, held".14 Augustine's project was to close forever the "eye of the flesh" and to open the "inner eye" to a God (who was not there), to an abstract power. And thus when Augustine says, "And now it spake very faintly . For on that side whither I had set my face, and whither I trembled to go, there appeared unto me the chaste dignity of Continency, serene, yet not relaxedly, gay, honestly alluring me to come and doubt not",15 he is midway (psychologically) between the finitude of the embodied will and the imaginaire of the will to will . Augustine's conversion ("a light of serenity infused into my heart, all the darkness ofdoubt vanished away")16 marks a fundamental divide in the western mind: it is at this point, in fact, that the will to will (the sole condition of possibility for the liquidation of "doubt") is transposed into a predicate of existence . Indeed, it could even be said that Nietzsche's project of diagnosing the "sickliness" of "two thousand years of Christian morality" is in the way of a circling around to that epochal moment when Augustine "nilled" embodied experience (Nietzsche's "becoming") from within by transforming the will into a pure, abstract medium. The free-fall into the imaginaire, which Baudrillard will later identify as the "eternal, inner simulacrum" of power and which Magritte will paint as a world horizoned by a relational will to truth, has its philosophical genesis in that slight trompe-l beil of the first fall into the "inner ARTHUR KROKER eye" of power. And everything is driven on, psychologically, by a fierce "spirit of revenge" against the body: "But Thou, O Lord, are good and merciful, and Thy right hand had respect unto the depth of my death, and from the bottom of my heart emptied that abyss ofcorruption. And this Thy whole gift was, to nill what I willed, and to will what Thou willedst".1 7 From this moment on, the will, disembodied and having only a rhetorical existence, is fully implicated in a topographical empire of delusion. Having no (real) existence of its own, the will discovers its truth-value (Nietzsche's "fictions") in a dominion of signs which undergo an endless metamorphosis in a mirrored world of tautology, metaphor, and simulation

#### The alternative is to engage in a schizoanalytic framework in response to the affirmative’s call for global economic interdependency. Uncondo yo.

Berardi 17, Franco "Bifo.". Soul At Work. AAKAR Books, 2017 |harun|

The political and economic knowledge we have inherited from modern rationalist philosophy is now useless, because the current collapse is the effect of the infinite complexity of immaterial pro-duction and of the incompatibility or unfitness of the general intellect when confronted with the framework of capitalist governance and private property. Chaos (i.e. a degree of complexity which is beyond the ability of human understanding) now rules the world. Chaos means a reality which is WO complex to be reduced to our current paradigms of understanding. The capitalist paradigm can no longer be the uni-versal rule of human activity. We should not look at the current recession only from an eco-nomic point of view. We must see it as an anthropological turning point that is going to change the distribution of world resources and of world power. The model based on growth has been deeply interiorized, since it pervaded daily life, perception, needs, and consumption styles. But growth is over and will never be back, not only because people will never be able to pay for the debt accumulated during the past three decades, but also because the physical planetary resources are close to exhaustion and the social brain is on the verge of collapse. Catastrophe and morphogenesis The process underway cannot be defined as a crisis. Crisis means the destructuration and restructuration of an organism which is nonetheless able to keep its functional structure. I don't think that we will see any re-adjustment of the capitalist global structure. We have entered a major process of catastrophic morphogenesis. The capitalist paradigm, based on the connection between revenue and work performance is unable to frame (semiotically and socially) the present configuration of the general intellect. In the 1930s the opportunity for a New Deal rested on the availability of physical resources and in the possibility of increasing individual demand and consumption. All that is over. The planet is running out of natural resources and the world is heading towards an environmental catastrophe. The present economic downturn and the fall in oil prices ate feeding the depletion and exhaustion of planetary resources. At the same time, we cannot predict any boom in individual consumption, at least in the Western societies. So it is simply non- sensical to expect an end to this crisis, or a new policy of full employment. There will be no full employment in the future. The crash in the global economy is not only an effect of the bursting of the financial bubble. It is also and primarily an effect of me bursting of the work bubble. We have been working too much during the last five centuries, this is the simple truth. Working so much has implied an abandonment of vital social functions and a commodification of language, affections, teaching, therapy and self-cate. Society does not need more work, more jobs, more competition. On the contrary: we need a massive reduction in work-time, a prodigious liberation of life from the social factory, in order to reweave the fabric of the social relation. Ending the connection between work and revenue will enable a huge release of energy for social tasks that can no longer be conceived as a part of the economy and should once again become forms of life. As demand shrinks and factories close, people suffer from a lack of money and cannot buy what is needed for everyday life. This is a vicious circle that the economists know very well but are completely unable to break, because it is the double bind that the economy is doomed to feed. The double bind of over-production cannot be solved by economic means, but only by an anthropological shift, by the abandonment of the economic framework of income in exchange for work. We have simultaneously an excess of value and a shrinking of demand. A redistribution of wealth is urgendy needed. The idea that income should be the reward for a performance is a dogma we must absolutely get rid of. Every person has the right to receive the amount of money that is needed for survival. And work has nothing to do with this. Wages are not a natural given, but the product of a specific cultural modeling of the social sphere: linking survival and subordination to the process of exploitation was a necessity of capitalist growth. Now we need to allow people to release their knowledge, intelligence, affects. This is today's wealth, not compulsive useless labour. Until the majority of mankind is free from the connection between income and work, misery and war will be the norm of the social relationship. How to heal a depression? Although they seldom, if ever, used the "D" word, Felix Guattati and Gilles Deleuze say very interesting things on the subject in their last books, Chaosmosis, and What is philosophy.' In the final chapter of What is philosophy? they speak of Chaos. Chaos, in their woods, has very much to do with the acceleration of the semiosphere and the thickening of the info-crust. The acceleration of the surround-ing world of signs, symbols and info-stimulation is producing panic, as I have already said in the previous parts of this book. Depression is the deactivation of desire after a panicked acceleration. When you are no longer able to understand the flow of information stimulating your brain, you tend to desert the field of communication, disabling any intellectual and psychological response. Let's go back to a quote that we have already used: "Nothing is more distressing than a thought that escapes itself, than ideas that fly off, that disappear hardly formed, already eroded by forgetfulness or precipitated into others that we no longer master. », We should not see depression as a mere pathology, but also as a form of knowledge. James Hillman says that depression is a condition in which the mind faces the knowledge of impermanence and death. Suffering, imperfection, seniliry, decomposition: this is the truth that you can see from a depressive point of view. In the introduction to What is philosophy? Ddeuze and Guattari speak of friendship. They suggest that friendship is the way to overcome depression, because friendship means sharing a sense, sharing a view and a common rhythm: a common reftain (ritournelle) in Guattari's parlance. In Chaosmosis Guattari speaks of the "heterogenetic comprehension of subjectivity" : "Daniel Stern, in The Interpersonal World of the Infant, has notably explored the pre-verbal subjective formations of infants. He shows that there are not at all a matter of 'stages' in the Freudian sense, but of levels of subjectivation which maintain themselves in parallel through life. He thus rejects the overrated psychogenesis of Freudian complexes, which have been presented as the structural 'Universals' of subjectivity. Furthermore he emphasizes the inhetently trans-subjective character of an infant's early experiences:J2 The singularity of psychogenesis is central in Guattari's schizoanalytic vision. This implies also the singularity of the therapeutic process. it's not simply a matter of remodeling a patient's subjectivity—as it existed before a psychotic crisis—but of a production sui genesis... these complexes actually offer people diverse possibilities for recomposing their existential corporeality, to get WI of their repetitive impasses and, in a certain way to resin-gularize themselves." These few lines must be read, in my opinion, not only as a psychotherapeutic manifesto but also as a political one. The goal of schizoanalysis is not, in Guattari's words, to reinstall the universal norm in the patient's behavior, but to singularize him/her, to help him/her becoming conscious of his or her differ-ence, to give him/her the ability to be in good stead with his being different and his actual possibilities. When dealing with a depression the problem is not to bring the depressed person back to normality, to reintegrate behavior in the universal standards of normal social language. The goal is to change the focus of his/her depressive attention, to re-focalize, to deterrito-rialize the mind and the expressive flow. Depression is based on the hardening of one's existential refrain, on its obsessive repetition. The depressed person is unable to go out, to leave the repetitive refrain and s/he keeps going back into the labyrinth. The goal of the schizoanalyst is to give him/her the possibility of seeing other landscapes, to change focus, to open new paths of imagination. I see a similarity between this schizoanalytic wisdom and the Kuhnian concept of paradigmatic shift which needs to occur when scientific knowledge is taken inside a conundrum. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) Kuhn defines a paradigm as "a con-stellation of belies shared by a group of people." A paradigm may therefore be seen as a model which gives way to the understanding of a certain set of realities. A scientific revolution in Kuhn's vision is the creation of a new model which fits the changing reality better than the previous epistemic models. The word aepisteme" in the Greek language means to stand in front of something: the epistemic paradigm is a model that allows us to face reality. A paradigm is a bridge which gives friends the ability to traverse the abyss of non-being. Overcoming depression implies some simple steps: the deterrito-rialization of the obsessive refrain, the re-focalization and change of the landscape of desire, but also the creation of a new constellation of shared beliefs, the common perception of a new psychological environment and the construction of a new model of relationship. Deleuze and Guactari say that philosophy is the discipline that involves creating concepts. In the same way, they argue that schizo-analysis is the discipline that involves creating percepts and affects through the deterritorialization of obsessive frameworks In the current situation, the schizoanalytic method should be applied as political therapy: the Bipolar Economy is falling into a deep depression. What happened during the first decade of the cen-tury can be described in psychopathological terms, in terms of panic and depression. Panic happens when things start swirling around too quickly, when we can no longer grasp their meaning, their eco-nomic value in the competitive world of capitalist exchange. Panic happens when the speed and complexity of the surrounding flow of information exceed the ability of the social brain DJ decode and pre-dict. In this case desire withdraws its investments, and this withdrawal gives way to depression. Here we are, after the subprime crack and the following global collapse. Now what? The economic collapse cannot be solved with the tools of nomic thought, because economic conceptualization is in fact problem and not the solution. The strict correlation between income and labot, the tartatic. pursuit of growth, the dogmas of compatibility and cOlmpetiltiollS these are the pathogenic features that our social culture must get rid of, if we want to come out of our depression. In the nc'mlin.nt) political discoutse, the overcoming of a depression means re';ta':tirtg.' the dynamics of growrh and consumption: this is what they "recovery." But this will be impossible both because the colle,othre:. debt cannot be paid and because the planet cannot support a new phase of capitalist expansion. The economy of growth is itself poison. It cannot be the antidote. Over the last ten years, the French anthropologist Serge Latouche has been talking of dicroissance (Degrowth) as a political goal. But now dissonance is simply a fact: when the Gross National Product is falling everywhere, entire sections of the industrial system are crumbling and demand is plummeting, we can say that degrowth is no longer a program for the future. Degrowth is here. The problem is that social culture is not ready for this, because Our social organization is based on the idea of the interminable expansion of consumption, and the modern soul has been shaped by the concept of privatization and by the affects of an unending increase in consumption. The very notion of wealth has to be reconsidered: not only the concept of wealth, but the perception of being rich. The identification of wealth with purchasing power is deeply embedded in the social psyche and affectivity. But a different understanding of wealth is possible, one that is not based on possession, but on enjoyment. I'm not thinking of an ascetic turn in the collective perception of wealth. I think that sensual pleasure will always be the foundation of well-being. But what is pleasure? The disciplinary culture of modernity has equated pleasure and possessing. Economic thinking has created scarcity and has privatized social need, in order to make possible the process of capitalist accumulation. Therein lies the source of the current depression. The interminable process of therapy We should not expect a swift change in the social landscape, but rather the slow surfacing of new trends: communities will abandon the field of the crumbling economy; more and more individuals will abandon their job searches and will start creating extra-economic networks of survival. The very perception of well being and of being rich will change in the direction of frugality and freedom. The de-privatization of services and goods will be made possible by this much-needed cultural revolution. This will not happen in a planned and uniform manner. It will be the effect of the withdrawal of Singular individuals and communities and of the creation of an economy based on the sharing of common things and services and on the liberation of time for culture, pleasure and affection. The identification of well-being with private property is so deeply rooted that we cannot absolutely rule out the eventuality of a barbarization of the human environment. But the task of the general intellect is precisely this: to escape from paranoia, to create zones of human resistance, to experiment with autonomous forms of production based on high-tech/low-energy models, to interpellated the people with a language that is more therapeutic than political. In the days to come, politics and therapy will be one and the same. The people will feel hopeless and depressed and panicked, because they can't deal with the post-growth economy and they will miss our dissolving modern identity. Our cultural task will be to attend to these people and to take care of their trauma showing them the way to pursue the happy adaptation at hand. Our task will be the creation of social zones of human resistance, zones of therapeutic contagion. Capitalism will not disappear from the global landscape, but it will lose its pervasive, paradigmatic role in our semiorization, it will become one of possible form of social organization. Communism will never be the principle of a new totalization, but one of the possible forms of autonomy from capitalist rule. In the 1 960s, Castoriadis and his friends published a magazine whose title was: Socialism or Barbarism. Bur you will recall that in Rhizome, the introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the disjunction (or. .. or. .. or) is precisely the dominant mode of Western Metaphysics that we are trying to forget. They oppose this disjunctive model with a conjunctive approach: "A rhizome has no beginning or end, bur it is always a middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, bur the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb 'to be: but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, 'and ... and ... and .. .' This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb 'to be' [ ... J to establish a logic of the AND, overthrow ontology, do away with foundations, nullifY endings and beginnings.'" The process of autonomy should not be seen as Aufhebung, but as Therapy. In this sense, it is neither totalizing and nor it is intended to destroy and abolish the past. In a letter to his master, Sigmund Freud, the young psychoanalyst Fliess asked when it is possible to consider a therapy to be over and the patient be told, "you are ok." Freud answered that the psychoanalysis has reached its goal when the person understands that therapy is an interminable process. Autonomy is also a process without end.

#### Current securitization against biological warfare uses the 1AC’s call for an expansion of medicine as fuel to expand a tool of biopolitical control that ensures a shift from “national security” to “human security” which makes their impact inevitable, all while forwarding Western colonialism under the guise of relief efforts.

Thacker, E.. “The global genome - biotechnology, politics, and culture.” (2005). |Harun|

Michel Foucault refers to this nexus of biology, politics, and war as a form of “biopolitics.” It not only results in a permanent state of emergency, but also induces widespread societal fear, an imperative on health surveillance, and a culture of body anxiety. Although there is no question that terrorism generally and bioterrorism specifically represent a threat to peace efforts, it is also important to understand the forms of power engendered by these threats and by this biological security. In a sense, the hegemonic role of genetic science represents two sides of this current biopolitical condition. On the one hand, the beginning of the twenty-first century saw the completion of the sequencing of the human genome, which many lauded as a landmark in scientific endeavor. This is what we might call the “honorific body,” the body—or rather genome—built up from the accumulation of knowledge and aided by technological advance. On the other hand, a string of bioterrorist attacks worldwide—several by unidentified terrorists in the United States, by the Iraqi government against the Kurds, by a religious cult in Japan—points to a “horrific body,” a body that is suddenly and unexpectedly rendered vulnerable by invisible bioweapons. Chapter 6 212 On the one hand, we see the honorific body celebrated in the boom of the biotech industry—new discoveries, new tools, new drugs, and so on. On the other hand, we see the horrific body manifest itself in popular culture (e.g., the television serial 24), military wargames (e.g., Homeland Security’s Dark Winter), and actual terrorist attacks. This polarized view of the role of science vis-à-vis politics and war has led a number of government agencies, nonprofits, and professional associations to talk about a “new type of threat.” For instance, the WHO released a series of agenda items and memos in 2002 relating to the ways that local and international governments can strengthen their defenses against bioterrorism.8 The WHO pointed to two main strategies: increased or tighter regulations on agriculture, food, and livestock, and the development of information systems for tracking outbreaks, be they natural or artificial. For some years, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) have been developing the latter, including the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS), which gathers medical data on patients nationwide as a means of profiling worst-case scenarios and potential bioterrorist targets.9 This concern for deterring potential attacks has also been expressed by the British Medical Association (BMA). In one report, published prior to September 11, the BMA authors noted the possibility that information derived from the human genome could be used to target specific populations.10 In short, there is a growing tendency to acknowledge the specificity of the threat that biowar generally and bioterrorism specifically represent. But at the same time that governments install preparedness protocols, surveillance systems, preemptive vaccinations, and defensive research programs, it is also important to ask how the “new threat” represented by biowar is changing the relationship between politics, war, and biology. If Foucault broadly describes biopolitics as the moment in which “biological existence is reflected in political existence,” then it is also important to ask how bioterrorism, genomics, data networks, and health organizations constitute a type of biopolitics in which the twofold character of biology and informatics is foregrounded. As a step toward exploring this question, let us first consider biowar in all its complexity. Weaponizing the Body: Levels of Biological Warfare A point of clarification: throughout this chapter, I use the term biowar to refer broadly to all forms of biological warfare as well as to bioterrorism. My intention is to identify a term that emphasizes the way in which some knowledge of biology or biological thinking pervades and conditions thinking about war, especially in an instrumental sense. At other times, I distinguish quite sharply between biological warfare and bioterrorism. Each arguably has a different conceptual core—the former defined by what Foucault calls a “race war,” and the latter by the vulnerability of biology or “life itself.” There are, certainly, many other differences between them, one of which is that biological warfare has been traditionally defined as a war between nations, whereas bioterrorism is not a nation-to-nation war, but a war waged against nations by non-nation-state actors. What makes biowar unique is that it is not simply another way to wage war or to destroy large groups of soldiers, civilians, or regions; it is the direct application of biology to the practice of war. In one sense, this is already apparent: the very definition of biotechnology—from premodern techniques of breeding to modern gene therapy—is the use of natural, biological processes for human ends. Unlike chemical warfare, biowar uses living elements and life forms, most often bacteria and viruses, as the agents or weapons themselves. These biological agents are effective, however, only when they act upon other life forms, other biologies. This is the unique character of biowar: biology is both the weapon and the target, biological life acting upon biological life (or, rather, biological “life itself” acting upon biological “death itself”). This means that the extent of the damage inflicted and the range of effects that can be achieved are significantly expanded. An effective, infectious agent can cover much more ground than a single explosion, especially when we take into account transportation technologies such as air travel. The presence of some biological agents have a longer incubation period, which makes it more difficult to detect biological agents when they are released. An outbreak may already be well under way before it is identified as a biological attack. This is one of the greatest points of anxiety within all discussions of biowar and biotechnology generally: the irresponsible or maliciously motivated implementation of novel biotechnologies and the range of unforeseen, possibly devastating results that may arise from integrating engineered organisms into the human body, into human communities, into livestock, into plants, or into the environment. There is, to be sure, good cause to fear the potential effects of the new bioweapons, and their descriptions are often accompanied with a great deal of dramatic flair. Richard Preston, a writer known for his fictional works, describes a near outbreak of Ebola in a Washington, D.C., Chapter 6 214 suburb in his book The Hot Zone. Again, the descriptions of real events are rendered in Preston’s familiar, fictional style. Here is a description of an individual named Charles Monet undergoing the terminal stages of an Ebola infection: He appears to be holding himself rigid, as if any movement would rupture something inside him.... The intestinal muscles are beginning to die, and the intestines are starting to go slack. He doesn’t seem to be fully aware of pain any longer because the blood clots lodged in his brain are cutting off blood flow. His personality is being wiped away by brain damage. This is called depersonalization, in which the liveliness and details of character seem to vanish. He is becoming an automaton. The higher functions of consciousness are winking out first, leaving the deeper parts of the brain stem . . . still alive and functioning. It could be said that the who of Charles Monet has already died while the what of Charles Monet continues to live.11 Preston’s Ebola description, a fictional description of a nonfictional event, feeds on the deep-seeded body anxiety that biowar elicits. Death is not instant, but protracted and disturbingly transformative. The virus’s only aim is to transform the human body into a viral replicator—in effect, to transform the body into a virus itself. It is this “nonhuman” aspect of biological agents that, perhaps, instills the greatest fear. Once a bioweapon is set loose, the intention is in a sense irrelevant. A wide range of factors—how good the bioweapon is, how infectious it is, how quick people are to respond, how effective countermeasures are, even the weather conditions—affects the largely chance outcome of a bioagent. If nuclear arms were feared for their massive scale and expediency (at the push of a button), biological weapons are both more extreme and more subtle. Because biological weapons operate through microorganisms, they not only destroy or harm, but literally take control of and occupy the body. This microbial “occupation” of the population offers something more valuable than total annihilation. It offers a means of precise targeting and control of a given population’s level of health—that is, their veritable dependence on health standards set by the nation possessing biological weapons (even if this nation is one’s own). Quarantine and confinement here become both political and medical, just as demography and statistics become military tactics. In 1999, the BMA published a report that outlined three general stages in the history of biowar: a first generation, which includes all premoderm examples of biowar (mostly dealing with sabotage); a second generation, which includes chemical warfare in World Wars I and II; and a current, third generation, which may include molecular genetics and genetic engineering.12 This historiography has been similarly echoed by publications from a number of U.S. government offices, including the Department of Health and Human Services, the CDC, and the Department of Homeland Security.13 Biowar is understood to proceed in distinct stages akin to the progress of technology, and “doomsday scenarios” begin to read much like the speculative fiction of the medical thriller genre. Although such historiography is for the purposes of education, it also serves to draw out a narrative of scientific progress in the practice of war. Current documentaries, such as the Nova special Bioterror, locate bioterrorism as the latest phase in this progression, complete with a plethora of scare tactics, ambitious journalists, and a replaying of the Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.14 However, such histories make little mention of the long and extensive history of offensive biological warfare programs in the United States that extend back to the American Revolution. In addition, each instance of biowar takes place within a social, political, and scientific milieu and is not exclusively a technical narrative. This blindness to the interconnections between political power struggles and scientific-technological research enables many popular accounts of biowar to read as a very one-sided story, in which the threat or the attack always seems to happen for no apparent reason and from without. This historical conservatism takes different forms. For instance, the account given by the BMA report is dedicated almost exclusively to biological warfare between nations, and the Nova special portrays biowar as a struggle between First World democracies (meaning the United States) and shadowy terrorist networks in the Middle East. The differences in context and the diversity of the ways that biology, war, and politics intertwine are often dropped in favor of historical narratives with a single punch line: the impeding threat of a war through biology. In addition, it is important to recognize that the rise of biowar does not mean that nuclear arms are now simply out of fashion, just as the demonstration of “infowar” during the Kosovo crisis did not mean that all war simply became “virtual.” If anything, the narratives of scientific and technological progress told by the United States create a picture of a military-industrial (and military-medical) complex that multiplies its forces and proliferates its means of security. Nuclear arms races, biological warfare, chemical warfare, infowar, and good old-fashioned air, sea, and ground combat are all at the disposal of these military superpowers. Thus, in thinking about biowar generally, we might do better to think about concurrent but historically differentiated levels of conflict that proceed through the knowledge and know-how of biology. Thus, we can outline several “layers” or “levels” of biowar, all of which are present to varying degrees in any event or identified threat. First Level: Biological Sabotage Accounts of early examples of biological warfare in antiquity already outline three main components of biowar: the use of substances that make the body ill, the sabotage of food and water resources, and attempts to create “modern” biological weapons.15 Examples include forms of sabotage of food, water, or animals among the Greeks.16 The use of poisons directly or indirectly (“weapons” composed of venomous snakes or scorpions) was not uncommon in Greek and Roman warfare. Examples of the second kind are found in Thucydides’ account of possible pollution of wells during the Peloponnesian War.17 In his account of the outbreak of plague in Attica following the invasion of the Peloponnesian army, Thucydides notes the patterns of infection and the disastrous political effect that the plague had in the battle: “Athens owed to the plague the beginnings of a state of unprecedented lawlessness.”18 Although Thucydides’ account concerning pollution of food and water is conjecture, what is relevant is that he consciously juxtaposes war and epidemic, as if the two become naturally coexisting phenomena (in this case, the latter determining the former). The development of perhaps the first “modern” biological weapons is found during the first outbreak of the Black Death during the Middle Ages.19 The adjective modern is in quotes because, although the Black Death did not result in a formalized, scientific knowledge of infectious disease, it did demonstrate a moment in which war was consciously thought of in terms of biological death. As is known, the Black Death first spread throughout Europe between 1347 and 1351, by some estimates destroying nearly half of Europe’s population. Trade routes, trading posts and towns, religious conflict, and the use of military organizations in facilitating trade are known to have had a significant effect in the transmission of the plague. One event is of particular note, and it is thought to have occurred around the early part of 1346. Historical records are lacking for this Bioinfowar: Biologically Enhancing National Security 217 often-mythologized event, except for one Italian chronicler, Gabriele de Mussis, a lawyer from Piacenza, whose Historia de Morbo remains one of the important accounts of the early stages of the Black Death.20 According to de Mussis, in September 1345 the Black Death crossed into European territory. How did this happen? At an Italian trading settlement in Caffa, on the northern coast of the Black Sea, a skirmish broke out between the Italian Christian merchants and local Muslims. The skirmish escalated into a gang war, involving a small Tartar army and military exchanges from both sides. The Tartar army attempted to siege Caffa but was hit with the Black Death, which had then been spreading throughout the Mongol region. Before retreating, the Tartar commander ordered troops to take soldiers’ diseased corpses and catapult them over the walls of Caffa, where the Christian armies were entrenched. Days later the Black Death was reported in Caffa, and by 1351 it had traveled through Asia Minor, Greece, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and southern Europe.21 Historians continue to debate the accuracy of the events at Caffa and the degree to which it may be exaggerated. Even if exaggerated, the case of the Black Death is interesting for several reasons. First, it very literally demonstrates the weaponizing of the body, in which biology becomes both weapon and target, a propagator of disease and death. But more than this, the siege at Caffa demonstrates something that is at the core of biowar: the application of knowledge in the service of war. The very idea that a diseased cadaver could have biological and strategic effects beyond its own lifelessness is itself a significant moment in biowar thinking. In fact, even in contemporary contexts, the concurrence of disease and war is striking (bioterrorist threats alongside new infectious diseases such as SARS), and the events at the siege of Caffa illustrate the basic strategy of biowar: that, metaphors aside, disease is war. These early examples of biowar place an emphasis on the uses of disease or toxins to affect an enemy or target indirectly; they did not yet include direct militaristic methods of attack, and certainly did not yet have access to the new technologies of genetic engineering. They made a rudimentary and fairly uncontrolled use of disease and toxins, most often as a means of sabotage. In contrast, the controlled sabotage of food and water systems is a top concern for the U.S. FDA, whose responsibility within the 2002 Bioterrorist Act is to monitor and prepare for possible terrorist attacks in the food and water supply.22 Unlike direct combat, sabotage occurs invisibly and in secret; its effects are often not immediately felt or are noticed only after a delay. Biological saboChapter 6 218 tage operates in this indirect manner, even more indirectly than the dispersal of a biological agent. Infection happens not directly through the air or blood, but through the metabolic process of food and water—the very substances that maintain the body. In addition, in our contemporary context, the preparation, distribution, and processing of food constitutes a complex network of farms, slaughterhouses, train cargo, food handlers, and so on, which can make the backtracking of sabotage a difficult task. It is for these reasons that biological sabotage continues to be one of the primary concerns in terrorist preparedness programs in the United States. Indeed, in 1984 an attack such as this was carried out on a small scale within the United States. Followers of the Bagwan Shree Rajneesh cult living in Oregon contaminated salad bars in several restaurants with salmonella.23 In an effort to thwart a local election, cult leaders had intended this act as a precursor to a more extensive act of sabotage that would be carried out at a later date. More than 700 cases of food poisoning were reported, some of which required hospitalization. In addition, early-twenty-first-century scares over the nonterrorist outbreaks of mad cow disease, bird flu, and monkey pox have further heightened fears about the possibility of a terrorist attack through biological sabotage.24 Second Level: Biological Weapons Biological sabotage was made “more scientific” through the application of microbiology and germ theory during World War I. The antiplant and antianimal campaigns carried out in the two world wars are an important aspect of biowar, for they not only demonstrate the systematic application of the life sciences to war, but also show an awareness of the network properties of infectious agents, be they in food, water, or distribution systems.25 This second level of biological weapons extends from the scientifically driven sabotages of World War I to the emergence of recombinant DNA, genetic engineering, and a biotech industry during the 1970s. Here, a scientific knowledge of disease and lethal biological agents is more closely fused with contemporary tactics and strategies of war (including the chemical bomb or nerve gas bomb). The most common approaches were mobilizing pathogenic agents toward targeted areas, biological resources, and both the military and civilian populations.26 A greater effort is made on this level to control the biological weapon and its desired impact (its target area, carriers, lethal rate and dose, infected perimeter, modes of protecting soldiers). Bioinfowar: Biologically Enhancing National Security 219 During 1915 and 1916, the German army initiated a number of antiplant and antianimal biological warfare campaigns against Allied forces.27 The primary agents developed were anthrax and glanders, and the primary targets were grain stocks and livestock such as horses and cows. Pathogens were cultured in the lab, then distributed by German operatives within the United States to various distribution points, in which horses and other livestock would be injected with infected needles. In addition, some evidence also exists that the French also had an antianimal biological warfare program during the war.28 Though by most estimates the effects of these attacks were minimal, the alarm they caused, along with the specter of chemical weapons, led to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which was, in effect, a “no-first-use” agreement between the signatory nations.29 However, although the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, it did not prevent the further research, development, and weaponizing of biological weapons. This major weakness in the agreement left the door open to a number of offensive biological warfare programs, including those in the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. One of the most harrowing examples of offensive biological warfare programs involves the Japanese experiments on Chinese prisoners during World War II. Known by the name Unit 731, this top-secret program began in 1936 in occupied Manchuria, under the leadership of Ishii Shiro.30 Over the next four years, the respected scientists and physicians of Unit 731 would intentionally infect Chinese prisoners with a range of diseases, including anthrax, cholera, and bubonic plague. Other experiments involved the use of biological sabotage, bacteriological bombs, and insect disease vectors on the unsuspecting civilians of local Chinese towns. Historians estimate that some 10,000 people were killed as a direct result of Unit 731’s experiments. As the war came to an end, Unit 731 members came into U.S. hands. The U.S. government brokered a deal with the Unit 731 members, granting them immunity from war crimes prosecution in exchange for the knowledge they had gained from their experiments.31 Following World War II, the awareness of the extent of Unit 731’s program led a number of leading nations, including the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, to more aggressive research into offensive biological warfare. Much of this research centered around field tests, either in populated, civilian areas with nonlethal forms of a biological agent or in Chapter 6 220 unpopulated areas with lethal agents and animal subjects.32 In 1942 and 1943, the British government tested an anthrax bomb (N-bomb) on Gruinard Island off the coast of Scotland.33 The most extensive of these activities was that of the U.S. biological warfare program, initiated in 1942 by the War Research Service.34 Between 1949 and 1969, field tests led by the Committee on Biological Warfare in the Defense Department were conducted in more than 200 populated areas within the United States, totally unknown to the civilians who lived in those areas. Examples of such field tests include a 1950 Serratia marcescens and Bacillus globigii test off the shore of San Francisco; a 1951 Aspergillosis test at a shipping center in Virginia; a 1955 test of Hemophilus pertussis in the Gulf Coast of Florida; as well as urban field tests in Minneapolis (1953), St. Louis (1953), and New York City (1966).35 In the examples of Unit 731 and the field tests conducted in the United States, we see a noticeable shift away from an ad hoc, tentative deployment of biological sabotage (in World War I) to the development of specifically funded, government-mandated research programs. In addition, in the case of the U.S. program and a bit later in the Soviet germ warfare program, we also see the use of the civilian population as a kind of testing ground for the theoretical effectiveness of bioweapons. This level of biowar might be said to close with the BWC, which was signed by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Japan, and many other countries in 1972 and was ratified by the United States in 1975. Numerous reviews, policy modifications, and suggestions have been made to the original BWC since its inception date, including more stringent methods of verification. To this day, an agreed upon, workable protocol for biological weapons monitoring and verification remains one of the central weak points of the BWC.36 Third Level: Genetic Warfare Whereas the biowar programs of the previous level were dedicated primarily to the analysis and experimental use of already existing biological agents, another level—that of genetic warfare—takes a further step into the possibility of engineering and designing novel biological weapons. The controversy over the Soviet germ warfare program is but one example. A 1979 outbreak of anthrax in the city of Sverdlovsk resulted in the death of approximately 70 civilians and the illness of many more.37 It was not until 1992 that inspectors were allowed to visit the city, but their visit was presaged by the Bioinfowar: Biologically Enhancing National Security 221 defection of a number of Soviet scientists such as Ken Alibek, who publicly testified to his and other scientists’ government research into a genetically altered “superplague.” Thus, this layer of genetic warfare is dominated by the recent advances in molecular genetics and biotechnology, in examples such as the HGP and the HGDP. This level involves the use of techniques in genetic engineering, gene therapy, medical genetics, and genomics to design, for the first time, biological weapons that may be able to target specific regions, ethnic groups, populations, or biological resources. One hypothetical example is the use of the information from human genome projects and the HGDP, to develop novel pathogens to target ethnic groups, which would use a gene therapy–based carrier.38 However, the concept of engineering biological weapons has to be understood also in light of the history of eugenics in the United States and Germany. Modern eugenics follows upon the work of Francis Galton, who in the 1880s coined the term and had proposed applying Darwinian principles of artificial selection to human beings. Galton’s eugenics took hold in a United States grappling with mass immigration, population growth, rising urban poverty, and a looming economic depression. The idea that science could be used to prevent social degeneration was formalized in a number of institutions, primary among them the Eugenics Record Office, founded and run by Charles Davenport, a respected biology professor at the University of Chicago.39 The Eugenics Record Office generated an immense amount of survey data, including studies of “feeblemindedness.” Such studies feed into the perceived social need to exercise a “negative eugenics,” or a set of restraints on population growth and reproduction, in order to prevent a range of ills—from criminality to “imbecility”—from spreading across the United States generally.40 By the late 1920s, nearly half of the states had passed eugenic sterilization laws. In the 1927 case Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court ruled that such laws were constitutional, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes punctuating the decision by noting that “three generations of imbeciles were enough.” American eugenic legislation paved the way for the German programs, that began in the early 1920s. In 1923, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Research in Psychiatry established a chair for race hygiene. Other institutes would follow suit, including the Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity, and Eugenics and the Society for Racial Hygiene, also in Germany, as well as the Galton Laboratory for National Eugenics in London, headed by population Chapter 6 222 biologist Karl Pearson. Eugenics in Germany took up many of the Americans’ racial policies.41 Together, the American and German movements helped to introduce Mendelian heredity (then recently rediscovered by biologists) into the field of eugenics and social policy. Involuntary sterilization laws led to thousands of sterilized individuals in the United States, not to mention the extremes to which the eugenics movement would go in the Nazi regime. In 1933, Hitler decreed the Heredity Health Law, directly inspired by eugenics. At the same time, U.S. societies, such as the Genetics Society of America debated about whether or not to condemn the Nazi policies. According to some accounts, they were never able to reach a decision on the topic; in addition, following the war, many Nazi scientists and physicians were never prosecuted and in fact returned to university posts within Germany. As Daniel Kevles notes, there is a strong continuity between the American eugenics movement and the emergence of modern genetics in the 1940s and 1950s in the United States and Great Britain.42 Following the atrocities to which the Nazi program led, so-called reform eugenicists such as Ronald Fisher and J. B. S. Haldane aimed to bring a more scientific view to eugenics study, purged of its racism and doctrine of racial hygiene. To do so, molecular biologists began focusing on early techniques in genetic mapping and linkage analysis. One result was a wave of innovations in the use of this more “scientific” eugenics in the diagnosis and prognosis of a range of illnesses. This emphasis on the medical aspect of genetics—without the rhetoric of social degeneration—led the way to the late-twentieth-century emphasis on genetic testing and hereditary study of the transmission of disease. Although quite different from the negative eugenics of the early part of the century, this “new eugenics” was instead characterized by a consumer model for health care, hightech testing, and an emphasis on prevention.43 The context of eugenics helps to frame this layer of genetic warfare, in which largely defensive measures are taken to protect either the military body of the soldier or the social body of a population. The level of genetic warfare is both preventive and preemptive at the same time. Several real-world examples give further credence to this third level: first, the Gulf War demonstrated that biological warfare was continuing to make its way steadily into the standard armament of modern war, as revealed by Gulf War Syndrome and the experimental vaccines given to soldiers prior to battle.44 Second, examples of intranational genocide—in Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda—suggest that the possibility of targeting ethnic groups through genetics could offer a Bioinfowar: Biologically Enhancing National Security 223 potentially powerful tool in the hands of regimes bent on ethnic cleansing or racial war. Fourth Level: Biocolonial Mission A more directed use of biowar as a tool of ethnic and political conflict occurred during the eighteenth century, in which we find documented instances of biowar used within a colonial context. One example is British Soldiers’ intentional use of smallpox to infect Native American tribes. In 1763, Jeffery Amherst, the British commander in chief in North America, gave an order for the presentation of smallpox-infected blankets to Native American tribes in the Delaware region.45 The blankets were to be taken from infected patients in the infirmary and given to the Indians as a peacemaking gesture. As General Amherst emphasized, the aim was “to try every other method that can serve to extirpate this execrable race.”46 It can be argued that colonialism is unthinkable without medicine. Without an ability to ensure the health of a colonial army or the health of colonizing populations, the colonial project is compromised from the start. As David Arnold notes in his analysis of British colonial medicine in India, there is “a sense in which all modern medicine is engaged in a colonizing process.”47 Yet, as Arnold points out, this notion of “medicine in the service of empire” is also two sided. On the one hand, there are instances in which the spread of a disease has worked to the advantage of the colonizer or explorer. On the other hand, there are also instances in which disease—“native disease”—has served to obstruct the colonialist or expansionist enterprise.48 Malaria, yellow fever, sleeping sickness, and a host of other “native diseases” often served to impede European expansionism as much as other illnesses indirectly furthered its cause. As medical historian Roy Porter notes, “without disease, European intruders would not have met with such success or found indigenes so feeble in their resistance. Yet endemic diseases also held back European expansion into Africa.”49 Recent efforts to provide assistance in the fight against AIDS in Africa— most notably by the Gates Foundation as well as by the U.S. government— is undoubtedly a positive sign of an awareness of global health issues.50 But it is also important to assess how such financial aid is spent and whether financing alone is enough in a situation where education, communication, and the complexities of the physician-patient relationship are still primary issues. Furthermore, it is also important to ask whether the global health-care industry or the pharmaceutical industry stands to gain from such relief efforts. Although it is clear that AIDS and malaria in countries such as Africa do constitute serious health crises, it is also important to recall the tangled history of colonialism and medicine, as well as the often one-sided narrative of British “medical missionaries” in India and Africa during the nineteenth century.51 Today the logic of this level of biocolonial war is, strictly speaking, not war at all, but rather the establishment of a naturalized, permanent link between “developed nations” and a Western health-care paradigm based on costly prescription drugs. Although such treatments are often quite effective and life saving, their benefits are always abetted by what Frantz Fanon describes as a structure of indebtedness.52 A number of pharmaceutical companies have noted the potential market for generics in developing nations, and controversies still ensue over the corporate patenting of genetic material and cell lines from diverse regions around the world. A multifactorial health-care approach—including environment, diet, cultural context, poverty, education, and drugs—is clearly what such health crises demand. Of course, the limit of this biocolonial level is when it is turned inward, within the United States itself. This is what Paul Virilio and Sylvère Lotringer call “endocolonization,” in which the social body is invaded internally through genetic screening, in vitro fertilization, medical prostheses, and so forth.53 If it is true that the newest biotechnologies will be field tested in the United States—DNA chips, tissue engineered skin or organs, stem cell therapies— then this testing will be preceded by efforts by the “medical missionaries” of the biotech industry to establish biotechnology as safe, desirable, beneficial, and, above all, natural. Fifth Level: Bioinfowar Thus far I have covered four levels, each existing simultaneously, but to varying degrees depending on historical, social, and political context: a first level of biological sabotage, a second level of biological weapons, a third level of genetic warfare, and a fourth level of biocolonial mission. A fifth and final level is that represented by the integration of molecular genetics and computer science in the biotech industry: bioinfowar. Bioinfowar is not yet a reality, but it is, arguably, quickly becoming one. It includes what has for some time been the practice of “infowar,” or the military conflict played out on the level of computer codes, databases, Internet Bioinfowar: Biologically Enhancing National Security 225 servers, electronic wiretapping, computer viruses, firewalls, and physical communications infrastructures.54 The development of infowar does not occur as a technological feat, but takes place in the development of military use of information technologies, most explicitly demonstrated in the Gulf War and the Kosovo conflict. Recent discussions on the intersections of war, global politics, and technology have raised the issue of how the increasing importance of computer and information technologies have transformed the field of combat into a logistical, screenal Sega System (or PS2).55 This entrance of both spectaclebased technologies (media-based infowar) and information technologies (communications and hacking) into the domain of war has meant, in part, that the enemy ceases to be a body or mass of bodies, but rather coordinates among other coordinates on a pixel plane. These “wars which did not happen,” as Jean Baudrillard states, show two fundamental changes occurring in postmodern war. First, the physical encounter of hand-to-hand combat is increasingly being replaced by the mediated encounter of vision machines. The model here is Orson Scott Card’s novel Ender’s Game, in which a young video game wiz unsuspectingly becomes the futuristic military’s top combat pilot. Second, war is increasingly coming to be seen as so much more than actual battlefield combat; during every modern war, there are several other levels of combat: media war, encryption and decryption, finances, the business of production for war, the opportunities for revitalizing nationalism, the dark opportunities for genocide and ethnic cleansing, and the use of new media such as networks, computers, and databases of automated war machines. At the most extreme end of this war business, we enter a condition that Paul Virilio and Sylvère Lotringer call “pure war,” or the situation of infinite preparedness for an always deferred war. 56 Juxtapose this scenario of infowar with current developments in biotechnology: the automation of genome sequencing, the rise of bioinformatics and gene discovery software, DNA microarrays and microfluidic “labs on a chip,” data mining software, DNA encryption, and other developments show that biotech is becoming thoroughly computerized, and that the biotech patient of the future will be less an anatomical, individuated body than a computerized profile of gene patterns and statistical predispositions analyzed by bioinformatic expert systems. Yet, for all this, biotechnology remains resolutely material in the drugs, therapies, and diagnostics that regularly rub up against the patient’s body. Chapter 6 226 Biotechnology currently plays a number of roles in biological warfare. One recent area of application has been in portable hazardous bioagent detection systems. Nanogen, for example, has a hand-held biochip device for the detection of aerosolized agents such as anthrax. Another area is in the use of genetic engineering for the design of vaccines to potential pathogens such as anthrax, ricin, or smallpox. As noted previously, the U.S. Project BioShield has as one of its priorities the development of “next-generation medical countermeasures”—that is, new drugs produced by the American-based global pharmaceutical industry. Finally, a third area of application has been in medical surveillance systems for the monitoring of potential outbreaks of a naturally occurring or terrorist type. The WHO and the CDC have such networks currently in place.57 What would a merger between infowar and the new computerzied biotech look like? Is the answer here nanotechnology? The use of nanomedical particle systems? The use of robotic drones to disperse engineered pathogens to ethnically targeted regions and populations? Will we see the horrific hybrid of the biological suicide bomber? Bioinfowar seems at once less material than the catapulting of diseased cadavers and more material than the targeted military release of computer viruses on an enemy subnetwork. To recap: a history of biowar cannot be told from one perspective, be it technological development, scientific progress, or the culture of fear and paranoia. A critical account of biowar would have to take into account the social and political dynamics that enframe the transition from military application to civilian use. In the case of biowar, we can see (at least) five coexistent levels at play in any given event, each of which raises fundamental issues concerning the way in which biological “life itself” is instrumentalized in political, military, and ideological conflict. Targeting the Body In any consideration of these different but coexisting levels of biowar, it is important to note also how the concept and the practice of biowar has historically changed. We might ask: How does biowar “target” the body? In biowar, biology is both the weapon and the target, a form of “life itself” that targets “death itself” through the use of a range of pathogens, epidemic infections, and, in some cases, engineered life forms. Bioinfowar: Biologically Enhancing National Security 227 As discussed in other chapters in this book, one key historical transition in the concept of “life itself” involved a “taking charge of life, more than the threat of death” in the development of a wide range of medicopolitical practices during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: the application of statistics and demographics to account for the “health” of populations, the attempts to reform hospitals in terms of management and infections, urban hygiene programs, the establishment of professional societies dedicated to maintaining and monitoring health standards for a population, and the notion of a “medical police” or a managerial apparatus for ensuring the health of the body politic. Michel Foucault refers to such practices as a form of “biopolitics,” a form of power in which the health of the population is also the health of the nation, and vice versa. In these and other instances, “biological existence was reflected in political existence,” and the medical often dovetailed into the governmental.58 Biopolitics “tends to treat the ‘population’ as a mass of living and coexisting beings who present particular biological and pathological traits and who thus come under specific knowledge and technologies.”59 At the center of biopolitics is a concern over the “population,” defined in terms that are both biological and informatic—an attempt “to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race.”60 In the context of biowar, the health of the population takes on a distinctive character in light of concerns over national security. The population must be protected or secured in two ways: against the threat of an attack from nature, in the form of disease and epidemics, and against the threat of an attack from a political entity, in the form of biological weapons or sabotage. The first type of security metaphorizes disease as a war, whereas the second treats war as an attack on the biology of the population, as an attack on “life itself.” The population, then, is doubly vulnerable: it is vulnerable as a biological entity, subject to disease, famine, and overpopulation; and it is vulnerable as a political entity, related to national and international regulatory policies, military research programs, and a range of social anxieties concerning the level of threat. In the context of biowar, the population is defined by vulnerable biologies. The role of “population” moves Foucault to ask a broader historical question: “How, when, and in what way did people begin to imagine that it is war that functions in power relations, that an uninterrupted conflict Chapter 6 228 undermines peace, and that the civil order is basically an order of battle?”61 In a series of lectures given at the Collège de France in 1976, Foucault addressed this question within a biopolitical context. His analyses distinguish between three general ways of “targeting the body”: a politics of sovereignty, an anatomo-politics (or discipline), and a biopolitics (or governmentality). Each of these approaches defines three types of targeted bodies: the body of the sovereign, the docile body of the individual subject, and the regulated social body of the population. The context of war—war that is the continuation of politics by other means—frames these three bodies as vulnerable biologies in need of an “apparatus of security” to provide protection from threatening forces of nature or artifice, epidemics or weaponry. The body politic is defined by its vulnerable biologies. It will be helpful, then, to situate Foucault’s lectures within our own context of biowar. As is well known, Foucault argues that a shift in the historical character of power occurred during the eighteenth century, in which structures of power based on sovereignty gradually receded in the face of a disciplinary power. The doctrine of absolute sovereignty, which Foucault analyzes in the formation of nation-states in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe, is a notion of power that is legitimized through the sovereign’s right to rule. As Giorgio Agamben and others have noted, this notion of sovereignty is also a right to the exception from the rule: the sovereign is that power that exists above, yet is included within its domain of rule.62 As Foucault notes, “the essential function of the technique and discourse of right is to dissolve the element of domination in power and to replace that domination, which has to be reduced or masked, with two things: the legitimate rights of the sovereign on the one hand, and the legal obligation to obey on the other.”63 However, Foucault also suggests that sovereignty is not simply a “topdown” model, for the sovereign’s effectiveness is measured only by the effectiveness of its “truth” in the daily lives of the citizens who are ruled. Here he distinguishes between sovereignty and domination: “by domination I do not mean the brute fact of the domination of the one over the many, or of one group over another, but the multiple forms of domination that can be exercised in society.”64 Sovereignty, in this early modern sense, not only is exercised from on high, but takes effect throughout the social body. This shift in emphasis helps Foucault lead into his discussion of the emergence of a disciplinary power in the eighteenth century. Focusing on the development of social institutions—military, medical, educational, penal, and governmental—he suggests that a new type of power emerges, in which the “operators of domination” that had been implicit in sovereignty take on a more explicit form. Rather than sovereignty’s focus on territory and land, discipline focused on individuals’ bodies and on their limited “rights,” especially their political and property rights. Rather than extracting commodities and wealth, it extracted time and labor, shifting the state’s emphasis from the wealth of territory to the wealth derived from the individual subject. Rather than exercise itself through discontinuous taxation and obligation, it exercised itself through continuous surveillance, even self-surveillance. Finally, rather than relying on the self-legitimizing presence of the sovereign ruler, it established a set of coercions that materialized in a range of social institutions (hospitals, schools, mills, prisons, military barracks, and so forth). Rather than a focus on the divine, “living body of sovereignty,” we have a focus on the citizen’s, anatomical, physiological body, a focus that Foucault calls an anatomo-politics. What is of interest in this broad transition is that sovereignty did not simply disappear. Rather, sovereign power, formerly embodied in the king, was further incorporated into the workings of discipline. The combination of an emphasis on political subjects’ individual rights and a set of institutions for rendering subjects docile as subjects produced a different, more attenuated form of sovereignty—the sovereignty of the social body, of the political subject. Foucault refers to this process as a “democratization of sovereignty”: “In other words, juridical systems... allowed the democratization of sovereignty, and the establishment of a public right articulated with collective sovereignty, at the very time when, to the extent that, and because the democratization of sovereignty was heavily ballasted by the mechanisms of disciplinary coercion.”65 This newer form of the soereignty of political subjects, however, produces a certain tension, for, inasmuch as sovereignty is based on an exception to the rule (formerly embodied in the monarch) and is exercised in a blanket way over the citizenry, the democratization of sovereignty claims no exception— or, it claims only the exception not to be ruled by an all-powerful, absolute sovereign. Foucault, in his later work, analyzes this relation as the core of “liberalism”—the suspicion of too much government. In the shift into disciplinary power, then, we see a sort of sovereignty that has been distributed throughout the social body and which is a kind of negative sovereignty, the right of political subjects to exist as subjects.66 But, as Foucault notes, Chapter 6 230 resolving this tension requires a mediation between sovereignty and disciplinary modes of power: I think that normalization, that disciplinary normalizations, are increasingly in conflict with the juridical system of sovereignty; the incompatibility of the two is increasingly apparent; there is a greater and greater need for a sort of arbitrating discourse, for a sort of power and knowledge that has been rendered neutral because its scientificity has become sacred. And it is precisely in the expansion of medicine that we are seeing . . . a perpetual exchange or confrontation between the mechanics of discipline and the principle of right. The development of medicine, the general medicalization of behavior, modes of conduct, discourses, desires, and so on, is taking place on the front where the heterogeneous layers of discipline and sovereignty meet.67 It is here that Foucault begins to outline the emergence of what he calls a “non-disciplinary” power, a biopolitics, in which the role of medicine plays a central role. As we have seen, this biopolitical power is predicated on treating the biological traits of the population as opposed to the individualized body of the political subject. What is the difference between discipline, or an anatomo-politics, and biopolitics? One technique is disciplinary; it centers on the body, produces individualizing effects, and manipulates the body as a source of forces that have to be rendered both useful and docile.... And we also have a second technology which is centered not upon the body but upon life: a technology which brings together the mass effects characteristic of a population, which tries to control the series of random events that can occur in a living mass, a technology which tries to predict the probability of those events (by modifying it, if necessary), or at least to compensate for those effects.... Both technologies are obviously technologies of the body, but one is a technology in which the body is individualized as an organism endowed with capacities, while the other is a technology in which bodies are replaced by general biological processes.68 Thus, to summarize, Foucault makes a distinction between an anatomopolitics, or disciplinary power, and a biopolitics, or a form of governmentality. Anatomo-politics is a form of power applied to the individualized human body of the subject. Its means include discipline, drilling, testing, routines, habit, and measures that instill a degree of docility in the subject. To this end, it employs an anatomical, physiological, and organismic approach to the body of the subject to be disciplined. The sites of anatomo-politics are often institutions such as the prison, the hospital, the school, the military, and so forth. The aims of anatomo-politics are docility, coercion, and self-surveillance—the internalization of disciplinary measures, an “anatomo-politics of the human body.” Biopolitics, by contrast, is a form of power applied to the massified, human population as biological species. Its means include the use of statistical averaging, demographics, forecasting, and a general quantification of the social and political body. To this end, it employs the biological sciences of species and a medicalization of the social. The sites of biopolitics are often medical fields or instances in which medicine is used in the service of other interests. The aims of biopolitics are regulation, modulation, and control—the homeostatic regulation of the population species as a whole, a “biopolitics of the human race.” (See table 6.1.) Thus, we have three broad historical shifts in the way power is materialized within society: a politics of sovereignty, an anatomo-politics, and a biopolitics. Now, it is precisely in this last shift toward a biopolitics that we Chapter 6 232 Table 6.1 Targeting the Body Anatomo-politics (“An Biopolitics (“A biopolitics of anatomo-politics of the human the human race”) body”) Mode of control Governmentality, regulation, Discipline, docility, massification subjectification Effect Collectivizing, universalizing Individualizing, singularizing Object of control Population, group, body politic Person, individual, subject Interpretive lens Biology, evolution, medicine Anatomy, physiology, physics Unit of control Species Body Tools Statistics, demographics, Mechanics, mechanism, informatics engineering Examples Hygiene, criminality, heredity, Prison, school, military barracks, eugenics, neurasthenia, hysteria, hospital, sanatorium, workplace degeneracy, birth control, sexually transmitted disease, welfare, insurance, social security Result Life, war, security Organism, institutions, surveillance see the role of war significantly change. I noted previously how Foucault saw the role of medicine as crucial to balancing the tension in the “democratization of sovereignty.” The issue can be put another way. The rise of biopolitics implies a kind of biologization of politics. As Foucault notes, the emergence of biopolitics indicates “the acquisition of power over man insofar as man is a living being, [where in] the biological came under State control, [and] there was at least a certain tendency that leads to what might be termed State control of the biological.”69 This relation between power and life is, then, to be distinguished from an earlier relation, that of sovereignty. Sovereignty claims the right to take life or let live (die and let live), whereas biopower claims the right to foster life or let die (live and let die).70 In sovereignty, power is exercised by the right to kill, to take life, to deprive the subject of his or her most basic attribute. The subject is therefore neither alive nor dead, unless qualified by the sovereign. By contrast, biopolitics, a new type of power, poses the question of life in a different way.71 If sovereignty is predicated on an absolute power, even the power to command the death of another, then biopolitics takes the opposite track: it undertakes the ongoing monitoring and fostering of “life itself.” So, again, Foucault’s question: “How can a power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings?... How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centered on biopower?” Foucault offers a response that is in many ways unexpected: “It is at this moment that racism is inscribed as the basic mechanism of power, as it is exercised in modern States.”72 In this context, Foucault uses the term racism in a different sense than it is often used. Racism is here an ism in that it is, in Foucault’s usage, a way in which relations within a single species—a population—are thought of in terms of conflict. Racism in this sense is a biologically inflected political relation in which war is rendered as fundamentally biological: The war that is going on beneath order and peace, the war that undermines our society and divides it in a binary mode is, basically, a race war. At a very early stage, we find the basic elements that make the war possible, and then ensure its continuation, pursuit, and development: ethnic differences, differences between languages, different degrees of force, vigor, energy, and violence; the differences between savagery and barbarism; the conquest and subjugation of one race by another. The social body is basically articulated around two races. It is this idea that this clash between two races runs through society from top to bottom which we see being formulated as early as the seventeenth century.73 What is needed, then, is a set of measures for ensuring the security of the population: not only welfare programs, health insurance, health-care policies, and an industry for the development and distribution of medicines, but, in addition, new means of monitoring health, both at the macrolevel (disease surveillance networks) and at the microlevel (individual monitoring of cholesterol, blood pressure, red blood cell count). “In a word, security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in the population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life.”74 Although such practices have many beneficial aspects, they also introduce new levels of discipline and regulation that become increasingly normalized and naturalized. New scientific paradigms—such as genetics—play an important role is the redesignation of medical normativity and health as being predicated on information, sequence, and code. In fact, the role of informatics is a key part of biopolitics. As Foucault and others have noted, the mathematical and informatic approaches of statistics, demographics, the census, and the field of classical political economy constitute approaches in which the biology of the population—birth, death, marriage, migration, disease—is accounted for through information. There is a sense that this accounting has only magnified in the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries: the increasing quantification of medical diagnosis (X rays, urinalysis, magnetic resonance imaging [MRI], blood pressure), the introduction of computers into medical and health-care management, the development of molecular genetics and genetic engineering, and, most recently, nascent fields in the biotech industry: bioinformatics, genetic testing with microarrays, and computer-aided drug discovery.75 As Scott Montgomery suggests, “bioinformationalism, to no small degree, provides the discourse of combat with a new, inner layer of action and intent.”76 In molecular genetics, then, health and illness become a matter of conflicting, combating genetic codes in which it follows that the key for successful medical therapy is code breaking or cryptography. “Here, health or disease would be defined as one or another state of control over the body’s informational systems.”77 In addition, the combination of anatomo-politics and biopolitics diversifies the domain of control, encompassing both the individual subject as patient Chapter 6 234 and the collective population as a body politic. According to Foucault, “We are, then, in a power that has taken control of both the body and life or that has, if you like, taken control of life in general—with the body as one pole and the population as the other.” It is in this nexus that medicine and biology come to play a diversifying function, exhaustively accounting for the patient and the population. “Medicine is a power-knowledge that can be applied to both the body and the population, both the organism and biological processes, and it will therefore have both disciplinary effects and regulatory effects.”78 Foucault’s comments on the race war should be understood in this context. Not only is health increasingly mediated by and understood through the terminology of informatics, but this informatic view operates in a nonreductive manner, actually proliferating and diversifying the types of medical subjects and collective biological entities that can be studied, analyzed, and treated. “Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital... the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population.”79 Despite the new forms that power takes—anatomo-politics or biopolitics—sovereignty persists, though in a modified form. What Foucault’s work suggests to us is that, in a sense, all war is biowar, not only in the obvious confrontation it elicits with death, but also in the sense that war conditions the ongoing efforts to establish the population’s security. In the current biopolitical context, it is war that mediates between biology and politics, but a war thoroughly informed by medicine and biology. Genome Bomb or Genome Message? or, Affection by Infection If war mediates between biology and politics, it is important to ask, What kind of war? If all war is in some sense biowar, then how are we to understand the specificity of the different levels of biowar I referred to earlier, or how are we to understand the specific bioterrorist attacks in the United States in the early twenty-first century? In his analysis of sovereignty in the work of Hobbes, Foucault makes a distinction between the “ideal war” and “real battles,” the former being the largely fictional state of nature without government, and the latter being the Bioinfowar: Biologically Enhancing National Security 235 actual conflicts that ensue between governments.80 We can take Foucault’s distinction between the ideal war and real battles and look at a particular case study of biowar: the 2001 bioterrorist anthrax attacks in the United States. Again, this chapter considers both biological warfare and bioterrorism as instances of a more general “biowar,” or the biologically driven mode of political conflict that may include, but is not exclusive to nation-state entities. At the same time, the 2001 anthrax attacks demonstrate the difference between biological warfare and bioterrorism, as seen through the lens of Foucault’s distinction between the ideal war and real battles. The legitimation of sovereignty is readily apparent in both instances, but in different ways. The 2001 anthrax attacks are still, as of this writing, in recent memory for many in the United States. The general facts of the event are well known, though with some gaps.81 On September 18, 2001, letters containing a “weaponized,” powdered form of anthrax were mailed to the offices of NBC and the New York Post, and possibly to the National Enquirer. The letters contained a hand-written note expressing anti-U.S. sentiments and Islamic fundamentalist views. The letter arriving at NBC was opened by Erin O’Conner, an assistant to Tom Brokaw (to whom the letter was addressed). Some ten days later, after falling ill, O’Conner was diagnosed with cutaneous anthrax. Other similar cases were reported by employees at CBS and ABC. By early October, the first reports of anthrax inhalation cases in Florida, and on October 5 the first death from anthrax occurred. On October 9, letters were mailed to government officials, including Senator Tom Daschle. In addition, prior to and after the first mailed anthrax letters, several “hoax” letters containing a harmless powder were sent to the New York Times, NBC, Fox News, and the St. Petersberg Times. On October 12, the media released the first reports of the anthrax letters. The response in some situations was to close down offices (as happened in Washington, D.C.), whereas in other instances investigations into the Postal Service revealed the letters’ origin. In addition, investigative reporting over the next year revealed other, disturbing conclusions. A Los Angeles Times column noted that “the strain and properties of the weaponized anthrax found in the letters show that it originated within the U.S. biodefense program.”82 The particular strain of anthrax found in the letters was identified as the same strain in the Northern Arizona University database (the AMES strain). After two years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was still not able to provide any suspects of the anthrax attacks, though it is estimated that of Chapter 6 236 the 200 or so scientists involved in the U.S. biodefense program, only 50 would have had the knowledge to produce weaponized anthrax.83 The discovery of secret bioweapons programs in the United States and the relative disappearance of the anthrax investigation led many—scientists, politicians, and journalists—to criticize the government’s handling of the situation, which is ongoing.84 On October 25, 2001, House Democrats introduced a $7 billion “bioterrorism bill” (later to become the 2002 Bioterrorism Act), which would call for increased spending on a national health-care surveillance effort, as well as an increase in the national stockpile of vaccines and antibiotics. The day prior to this, health officials announced that a “deal” had been struck with Bayer to purchase large amounts of Cipro (Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride), the anthrax antibiotic of choice.85 During this time, several government buildings, including post offices, Senate offices, and business offices, were either temporarily or indefinitely closed off for testing and decontamination. The week of October 8, 2001, Newsweek ran a cover story on bioterrorism, the title reading “How Scared Should You Be?” in front of a close-up of a gas mask. It appeared on newsstands the same time that a mechanical fault in a New York subway car inadvertently released smoke into a subway station, causing the panic-led rush of crowds toward the exits. By 2003, one biotech company, Human Genome Sciences, announced the promising preclinical results of its anthrax drug ABthrax, a engineered, human monoclonal antibody intended for the “prevention and treatment” of anthrax infections. Although a number of Human Genome Science’s drug candidates have been in clinical trials for a much longer time, the FDA granted ABthrax a “fast-track” designation because of its promising use in bioterrorist response programs such as those outlined in the 2002 Bioterrorism Act. But ABthrax was not the only drug to receive widespread attention; immediately following the anthrax attacks, there were reports of hundreds of individuals in the United States purchasing gas masks, decontamination suits, and Cipro—online. The overwhelming demand for Cipro has also had a backlash. There is at least one class-action suit against Bayer for its ambiguous marketing of Cipro for anthrax; accusations are that Bayer knew its drug was not successful in treating anthrax, but owing to demand did not discourage its use in anthrax treatment.86 If, for a moment, we take the two waves of terrorist “attacks” launched within the United States—the events of September 11 and the anthrax-tainted Bioinfowar: Biologically Enhancing National Security 237 letters sent through the mail—we are presented with a troubling juxtaposition. As we know, the first wave of attacks resulted in a large-scale tragedy that encompassed thousands of human lives, New York’s urban infrastructure, the airline industry, and the nation’s economy. The second wave of bioterrorism included, most prominently, a letter sent to the U.S. Senate majority leader Tom Daschle in Washington, D.C. On the one hand, we have an event with no warning and no precautions, which resulted in a tragedy that claimed many lives and brought the airline industry and economy to a standstill. On the other hand, we have an “event,” if that is the right word, which has been framed by an excess of warnings, precautions, and concern, and which—thus far—has resulted in several deaths in localized buildings. Both events have been treated with the exhaustive, even obsessive reportage we have come to expect from (American) global media networks. But one cannot help but sense the strange incongruities between these two types of “attacks.” And that is perhaps the point: that they are two different types of terrorist actions, each defining the “event” in a different way. It would be wrong simply to conclude that the September 11 attacks were effective, whereas the anthrax attacks were not effective. Understanding what effective or noneffective means is the key to understanding the strategy of bioterrorist attacks such as the anthrax scare. Again, the question: How do we assess “effectiveness” in such contexts? From a purely militaristic-scientific perspective, bioterrorism’s effectiveness is in the number of people in a targeted area who come into contact with, are infected by, and either become ill or die owing to a pathogenic biological agent (most often a bacteria or virus). However, if we consider the cultural, social, and political environment into which a pathogen is introduced, the effectiveness of bioterrorism has to do with much more than biological contamination; it also has to do with a political contamination of national security. This is the moment in which the biological body becomes inescapably political; politics becomes biopolitics. To the perspective that says the bioterrorist activities involving anthrax were not successful, we can reply that, on the contrary, they were very successful in generating a state of immanent preparedness on the governmental level, accompanied by a state of “biohorror” on the cultural and social level. This accompanying state of biohorror may or may not have anything to do with the “reality” of biowarfare, and that is its primary quality. That anthrax is not a “contagious” disease matters less than the very fact that an engineered biological agent infiltrated those components of the social fabric we take for Chapter 6 238 granted—the workplace, the mail system, even subways and city streets. If there is one way in which the bioterrorist anthrax attacks “targeted” the body, it was in its very presence in proximity to our bodies, which triggered a heightened cultural and social anxiety about the threat of an immanent contagion. This anxiety is related closely to a certain horror of the body, or, more specifically, to a horror of what biological warfare (whether for defense or for acts of bioterrorism) is able to do to the body. Events such as the 2001 anthrax attacks elicit fearful images of a new type of war, one in which conventional weaponry will be augmented by more precise, more long-lasting, and more comprehensive genetic weapons or bombs. In fact, this image of the “genetic bomb” is what Paul Virilio points to as the likely outcome of the current “militarization of science” in biotechnology and genetics.87 For Virilio, the “genetic bomb” is both a literal and metaphorical configuration. It is, quite literally, a new type of weapon, but, as noted previously, a weapon that makes use of biology as its payload (be it viruses, bacteria, or an engineered biological agent). Like all bombs, this genetic bomb will attain its effectiveness through explosion, dispersal, and destruction. But the genetic bomb is also a bomb in a more metaphorical sense in that it serves to proliferate an awareness of the possibility of exterminating the species in a new way. Paraphrasing Einstein, Virilio distinguishes between three types of bombs: the atomic bomb, the information bomb, and, finally, the genetic bomb. Whereas the atomic bomb “sets off the question of a possible end of the human species through extinction of a way of life,” the information bomb, produced from research in military mainframe computing, not only makes possible the atomic bomb, but also “allow[s] one to decode the encoding of the human genome map.”88 The idea of a genetic bomb is not new—indeed, it was concretely imagined by postwar field tests conducted by the United States and the United Kingdom, if not foreshadowed by the deployment of American eugenics policies, which later inspired Nazi medicine. But the doomsday scenario is also a powerful image, having been applied not only to genetics, but also to information technologies (infowar, cyberwar, and the information bomb). Indeed, if the atomic bomb makes possible the idea of total specieswide extermination, then the genetic bomb would appear to follow upon that, but with more refinement: the extermination of genetically targeted populations within a given region. As Virilio notes, the genetic bomb is a more updated term for the population bomb, the demographic explosion that was seen to occur in Bioinfowar: Biologically Enhancing National Security 239 the United States during the 1950s, noted by Einstein and many sociologists of the postwar era. But Virilio discounts the population bomb thesis and suggest that, now, the genetic bomb is in the process of engineering new divisions within the species, a “super-humanity that has been ‘improved,’ a eugenic humanity, by virtue of the decoding of the genome.”89 Indeed, the 2001 anthrax attacks would seem to illustrate Virilio’s comments, if in a more attenuated form. A literal genetic bomb—a package of weaponized anthrax—triggered a wave of genetic and medical interventions in the body of the population, from new antibiotics and vaccines to biohazard equipment and clothing, to immunization-boosting for soldiers. According to Virilio’s scenario, a kind of preemptive, neoliberal eugenics would soon follow: gene therapy, customized drugs, consumer devices for monitoring an environment. This attitude of genetic preemption is the result of a new neoliberal eugenics that is combined with the national security concerns of the militarization of science. With such a doomsday scenario, we should also theoretically situate Virilio’s comments in relation to their interest in the accident: “the accident is the new form of warfare.” Virilio’s unique take on the history of technology is that it is a history of technological accidents: “Each time we invent a new technology, whether electronic or biogenetic, we program a new catastrophe and an accident that we cannot imagine.” With each innovation in technology comes an unintended innovation in the form of the accident. “When we invented electricity, we didn’t imagine Chernobyl. So, in the research on the living organism, on the ‘book of life,’ we cannot imagine the nature of the catastrophe.”90 But we can ask: Is what we are dealing with in biowar generally really the apocalypse of the “bomb,” be it atomic, informational, or genetic? Virilio’s reliance on the tropes of World War II imply that each new militarized science happens as a catastrophic event: Hiroshima (nuclear war), the Gulf War (infowar), and so on. But it is difficult to find such an event, a singularity, for biowar. Should we consider the 2001 anthrax attacks as such an event, a singularity that demonstrates the genetic bomb? We might do so, except that the temporal nature of biowar is quite a bit different from that of nuclear war or infowar. Those living in the United States are, arguably, still feeling the effects of the anthrax attacks. Not, of course, from direct infection, but in terms of national security and Homeland Security initiatives, new restrictions on the movement of biological samples and knowledge within the scientific community, new “fast-track” drugs and other therapies designed for preemptive uses, and the presence of epidemic motifs in popular film and television. It is clear that biowar builds no bombs—or it builds not only bombs—but that it feeds on a series of microevents, brief appearances, failed weapons inspections, and botched attempts. These are not events, but more happenings, situations, even forecasts and speculations. But from them issue significant changes that extend throughout the governmental, health-care, and cultural sectors. The fact that the anthrax attacks utilized the mail system—perhaps the earliest “Internet”—is not without meaningful implications. Certainly there are other means of conducting such as an attack—germ bombs, crop-dusting planes—but they are less technically feasible than a technology that connects groups of individuals in a network for distributing information. The folding of biological pathogens onto an information network such as the postal system shows us what molecular biologists have been suggesting for years—that DNA is information and that genomes (bacterial and viral included) are computers. The layering of one network—a biological one—onto another network—an informatic one—gives us an uncanny example of the pathogenic qualities of information. In short, Virilio’s rhetoric is constrained by his reference point, which is modern warfare between nation-states. The bomb, of whatever type, is the key negotiator in such conflicts, either in the way it settles conflicts (Hiroshima) or in the way it serves to dictate the terms of diplomacy (in the Cold War). But the example of biowar—and, arguably, the example of emerging infectious disease—illustrates the network properties of biology, as it affects many by infecting a few. In this sense, it would more appropriate to refer to biowar as utilizing not a grandiose, genetic bomb, but rather as deploying a number of genome “messages.” It is no accident that anthrax, ricin, and other toxins are most often spread via the mail, accompanied by a letter. It is the message, not the bomb, that is the guarantee of the continuing effectiveness of the threat of biowar. The message—in a letter, a vial, a package, even a computer file—attempts to have the best of both worlds. It is able to create microevents in which the reality of the threat is substantiated, and, in doing so, it creates a condition of permanent threat and an ongoing “state of exception.” Furthermore, the network properties of biowar illustrate the degree to which it is able to affect so many by infecting the few. And here the distinction between biowar and emerging infectious diseases begins to collapse. Bioinfowar: Biologically Enhancing National Security 241 Whether it is the 2001 anthrax attacks or the 2003 SARS epidemics, the network properties of the genome message propagates itself via three layers of the network: the transportation networks of air and road travel, the communications networks of medical databases and disease surveillance, and, of course, the biological networks of infection and mutation. Therefore, we can say that biowar generally and the genome message specifically emerge from the intersection between militarization and the accident. Indeed, in the case of bioterrorism, in which the weapon is an uncontrollable and uncontrolled bacteria or virus, the aim is precisely to effect an implosion between war and accident. This is why the language of post-2001 U.S. legislation often makes no distinction between naturally occurring, emerging infectious diseases and intentional acts of bioterrorism. It is disease or war; the results amount to the same difference from a medical and political point of view. Coda:“Life Is Just a Shadow of Death” I began this chapter by contemplating a political shift, from the BWC in 1972 to the Bioterrorism Act of 2002.91 I also noted how a permanent “state of exception” has become the rule, with regard to the way biowar targets the body. Add to these factors another disturbing element. In July 2001, the Bush administration, after some failed negotiations with other member nations, pulled the United States out of the BWC altogether.92 In a statement to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons Convention States Parties, Ambassador Donald Mahley, the United States special negotiator, stated that the United States would be unable to continue to support the BWC on three grounds: first, the lack of any protocol for enforcing the BWC meant that it could not adequately detect covert proliferation (e.g., terrorist activities). Second, the monitoring and inspection procedures outlined in the BWC could be a financial risk to U.S. pharmaceutical companies in that their proprietary knowledge may be compromised by inspections. Finally, it was argued that the BWC would negatively impact the U.S. biodefense program and its classified defensive research. The decision by the Bush administration came as a surprise to U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom. With more than 140 countries signed to the BWC and more than 50 ready to sign in favor of a prompt completion of the BWC protocols, the U.S. decision brought the process to a standstill. Chapter 6 242 The curious move by the United States to pull out of the BWC was, possibly, answered in a New York Times article just days before the September 11 attacks. The article, which others have corroborated, reported that the United States had under way three top-secret bioweapons programs, programs that, for all intents and purposes, could be classified as offensive and not defensive research. They included field-testing anthrax bombs in the Nevada desert (conducted by the CIA), the assembly of bioweapons labs using commercially available products (conducted by the Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency), and the intent to engineer genetically an antibiotic-resistant strain of anthrax (also by the Pentagon, under the Defense Intelligence Agency). In 2003, President Bush secured almost $8 billion for biodefense alone. The next round of BWC negotiations is not set to take place until 2006. Within such a context, in what ways are the biopolitical concerns expressed by government agencies (such as the BWC) over a “genetic bomb” themselves weapons, under the guise of “national security”? A more cynical rephrasing of this question might suggest that we will never, in fact, see the kind of biological weapons of which the BWC speaks. Instead, what we will see is the use of this rhetoric of crisis, the political structure of the exception, and a biopolitical targeting of the body to gain an unprecedented control over the nation’s population on the medical and genetic levels. What might such a near future look like? I conclude this chapter with three theses, followed by three scenarios. Three Theses Thesis One The discourse of biowar is one in which war is biology, and biology is war. War is biology in the sense that the constitution of the body politic is as much a concern of national security as the attack on the body politic from outside forces. The militaristic function of eugenics is to be found here, but, arguably, it is present in Plato’s Republic, which authorizes selective breeding for the ruling classes.93 But biology is also war, and there is an equally long tradition of regarding the medical fight against disease as a war carried out on the level of cells, germs, and microbes. In modern times, anthropologists such as Emily Martin have analyzed modern immunology’s predilection for war metaphors in describing the antibody-antigen response, a metaphor that, interestingly enough, breaks down in the face of autoimmune Bioinfowar: Biologically Enhancing National Security 243 diseases such as those caused by HIV.94 The questions that remain open is how to do away with the hegemony of war metaphors in relation to biology and medicine, and whether alternative models—symbiosis, autopoiesis, network science—can offer a way of doing this. Thesis Two In the twenty-first century, national security is increasingly expressed as the implosion of emerging infectious disease and bioterrorism. As noted several times in this chapter, a defining characteristic of the twentyfirst-century response to biowar has been the nondistinction in policy and legislation between naturally occurring and artificially occurring instances of biowar. The operative term in the plans for Project BioShield in the United States is or: emerging infectious diseases or bioterrorism. It matters not which, for the end results are seen to be the same: the infection and degeneration of the body politic. Of course, from the perspective of their causes, they are very different: whereas emerging infectious diseases ask us to consider our actions within a network of relations with the environment globally, bioterrorism challenges us with a fundamentalist view of biology. Thesis Three The integration of biotechnology and informatics in national security concerns culminates in a more general, pervasive biological security. The 2003 RAND report The Global Threat of New and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases specifically notes how globalization has transformed both biological boundaries and national boundaries, rendering them vulnerable in terms of infectious disease.95 This transformation has prompted the authors to suggest a shift in policy outlook, from national security to what they call “human security.” Whereas national security places its emphasis on the national population, human security would place its emphasis on the individual (but the individual as a participant in an ideal global citizenship). What seems to be replacing national security in such examples is a form of biological security, or a security so pervasive that there is no outside; it is simply a security against biology, against biological “death itself” (the conceptual inverse of biological “life itself”). This biological security is the use of biotechnology to defend against biology itself, in a kind of surreal war against biology. Genetic screening, preemptive vaccination, new medical countermeasures, Web sites posting disease alerts: the body is under attack on all fronts, and in the confrontation of biology against biology we see the spectrum of responses, from antibiotics to cosmetic surgery. Chapter 6 244 These three points—the discourse of war and biology, the implosion of epidemic and war, and the notion of biological security—can serve as conceptual tools for the further analysis of biowar as it exists alongside governmental national security, the biotech and pharmaceutical industries, and the presence of nonstate terrorist actors. It is thus not difficult to imagine several possible scenarios—not doomsday scenarios, but rather scenarios involving an increasing naturalization of the state of emergency that biowar elicits.