### Movements DA

#### Advocacy journalism empirically strengthens movements and is inevitable

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DaLyah Jones didn’t think of herself as a movement journalist when she worked in public radio. But she had a feeling that her newsroom was failing to cover the communities that needed the most attention. During her time at KUT in Austin, Texas, from 2016 to 2019, Jones said, she often pressed for more coverage of marginalized communities, including Black Austinites who were leaving the city’s historic side for rural and suburban areas. “I was covering everyday stuff, but I would try to push folks,” said Jones, who now works for the Texas Observer. Yet she felt that her superiors didn’t share her priorities. Jones didn’t understand why she was running into resistance. That changed when she was introduced to a new concept — “movement journalism.” Movement journalism aligns with goals of social change and liberation from oppression. Its proponents strive to work with underserved communities affected by injustice, particularly those of color. Because it questions objectivity and other pillars of traditional reporting, movement journalism remains outside of the mainstream. But some journalists in public radio are finding that it can provide a valuable framework for deepening coverage of local issues. Meanwhile, Jones and others have chosen to leave public radio entirely to devote themselves to the principles of movement journalism. During her time at KUT, Jones learned more about movement journalism when she got a Freedomways fellowship with Press On, a Southern media collective that aims to catalyze change and advance justice through the practice of movement journalism. The Freedomways program supports journalists and storytellers in the South. Lewis Raven Wallace, co-founder and education program director of Press On, describes movement journalism as an alignment with community grassroots organizing and movements for social justice. For journalists, this means diversifying their sources and scope of reporting to encompass the realities of racial, classed and gendered oppression in society and making their journalism more collaborative and community-centered, rather than extractive. Wallace said he believes that movement journalism holds promise for what public media could achieve through working with communities that have been left behind by corporate media. Harnessing this promise could be a valuable asset for journalists and communities alike. “There’s been a lot of conflation with this idea that we are talking about advocacy journalism, or writing that always takes a stance. And I think that reporting always takes a stance,” he said. “Movement journalism is not so much taking a stance on a given issue — it’s about aligning with grassroots community organizing and movements for justice, trying to make things better, and recognizing that there are going to be debates within that. So it’s really about asking, how do we align ourselves and our ethical practices with communities and movements for justice?” After receiving training in movement journalism, Jones tried to work on her investigative Freedomways project at KUT, focusing on wildfires in the rural community of Bastrop southeast of Austin. But she felt that the station wasn’t hospitable to her exploration of movement journalism. This felt especially frustrating because of Jones’ background. “I’m a person who comes from a rural background, and I know and understand the importance of not having information, not being able to share it in a very succinct way, as well as what happens to a community when they don’t know much about their own community,” she said. KUT was then grappling with internal dysfunction and a toxic newsroom culture that journalists of color pressed management to address. Jones said that she became burned out and disillusioned with public media. Against the background of protests following the murder of George Floyd, Jones shared some of her experiences with racism at KUT in a Twitter thread. At the Texas Observer, she now runs a Google News–funded engagement initiative focused on communities of color across Texas, letting marginalized communities lead the way on what to report. While the Observer doesn’t explicitly endorse movement journalism, Jones said that she feels it’s more accepting of the practice. The larger problem with public radio journalism, Jones said, is that reporters see themselves as “not a part of our communities.” “I feel like we get this very hierarchical standpoint within journalism,” she said. “We think we are above the communities we report on and that’s what public radio is to me. … It’s very snobby. And if you don’t feel like the things you’re reporting on will affect you, then that’s coming from a place of privilege, for one. And also, you’re sadly mistaken.” ‘Neutrality is impossible for me’ The term “movement journalism” and the concept was formalized in a 2017 report by Project South, a Southern organization dedicated to cultivating strong social movements in the region. But Project South noted that a tradition of alternative media in the U.S. that seek to advance social movements goes back to at least 1827, when free African Americans in New York founded the newspaper Freedom’s Journal. Movement journalism also has roots in Hispanic movements for emancipation (the first Hispanic-owned newspaper in the U.S., El Mensagero Luisianés, was established in 1909), Indigenous struggles (The Cherokee Phoenix, the first Indigenous newspaper, debuted a year after Freedom’s Journal) and labor movements in the 1820s (labor journalism gave a platform to unions and people fighting for better working conditions). The work of investigative journalist and anti-lynching activist Ida B. Wells also foreshadowed the development of movement journalism. More recently, proponents of movement journalism have identified noncommercial radio as a potential seedbed for the practice. In its 2017 report, Project South pointed to low-power FM stations in the South as “a promising platform.” At the time, two Project South board members sat on the board of WRFG, a community radio station in Atlanta. The organization also had a relationship with WMXP, a low-power FM station in Greenville, N.C. Since 2016, Project South has planned a news outlet for social justice coverage that would syndicate programs to community radio. It has yet to launch that platform, but as a first step, Project South has started working with more than 50 Black-owned noncommercial radio stations in the South. The Black Radio Project gives the stations technical assistance, informational spots and public service announcements, according to Angela Oliver, Project South’s communications coordinator. PSAs have covered topics such as COVID prevention, voting rights and the need for civic engagement beyond elections. In addition, Project South is working on a database of experts to help producers in the network find diverse sources for stories. It is also organizing events to bring together DJs, artists and activists to strategize about movement building. “The idea is to create a space for them to be able to strategize and help each other — how can radio help get the message out?” Oliver said. “How can activists provide content to the radio based on whatever work they’re doing at the time?” While public media may offer a forum for movement journalism to grow, Wallace risked his job in the system to highlight the shortcomings of traditional newsgathering. Shortly after President Trump’s inauguration, Wallace published a blog post titled “Objectivity is dead, and I’m okay with it.” In the post, Wallace reflected on his position as a white transgender journalist in public media — he was a reporter for Marketplace at the time — and pointed out journalistic objectivity’s failure to address the rise of “alternative facts.” “Neutrality is impossible for me, and you should admit that it is for you, too,” Wallace wrote. “As a member of a marginalized community (I am transgender), I’ve never had the opportunity to pretend I can be ‘neutral.’ And right now, as norms of government shift toward a ‘post-fact’ framework, I’d argue that any journalist invested in factual reporting can no longer remain neutral.” At the request of his Marketplace supervisors, who told him he had violated the show’s ethics code, Wallace took down the post. He was suspended for the rest of the week. On Friday of the same week, Wallace reconsidered his decision and told his bosses he would republish it. “Part of what I wanted to highlight in that blog post was the kind of doublespeak around diversity that happens in public media, where there’s a lot of conversation about wanting more diversity or wanting to include people of color, wanting to include trans people, but a complete ban on advocating for yourself as a trans person or as a person or color,” Wallace said. “… I ended up going public with that story largely for the purpose of highlighting this contradiction.” He learned the following Monday that he had been fired. Wallace publicly disclosed that he was dismissed for a blog post rejecting journalistic objectivity. He ultimately wrote a book on the myth of objectivity and co-founded Press On. Public media journalists are in a unique position to do journalism differently from their corporate counterparts but refuse to for fear of seeming partisan, Wallace said. “There is this idea that public media in particular serves the public and wants to represent a diverse public but refuses to stand up against racism and white supremacy because that might not be considered objective. And not only is that untenable, but it’s also not really in line with the original intent of public media,” he said. “The original intent was grounded in what you might now call a ‘media justice framework,’ of trying to counterbalance corporate monopoly in media and create platforms that would be able to represent folks who are underrepresented because of systemic exclusion.” In his book The View From Somewhere: Undoing the Myth of Journalistic Objectivity, Wallace challenges traditional approaches to journalism that fail to recognize the context of oppression and racial hatred in the U.S. He argues that the conversation about objectivity cracks open uncomfortable truths about how journalists practice cultural dominance in newsrooms. “You cannot have a successful career in public media as somebody who publicly takes a stance on racial hostility or publicly takes a stance on patriarchy or abuse, and that is obviously messed up at a moral level,” Wallace said. “But it also creates this just ridiculous conundrum for the efforts in public media to be more representative and to be more driven by the public.” During the protests that followed the killing of George Floyd, some public media organizations made clear to their employees that they could take a stance on racial injustice on their social media accounts. That may indicate change in some newsrooms, but Wallace also advocates for challenging the very concept of objectivity in journalism. “To me, the conversation about objectivity is just a wedge conversation that opens all these other issues that are really about cultural white supremacy, and cultural racism, and cultural dominance, and oppression in these spaces,” he said. “But we really can’t have an honest conversation about oppression if we are still attached to the myth that it’s possible to be neutral, so it comes out over and over, every single time.” While Wallace was working on The View From Somewhere, he met Ramona Martinez, who at the time was working as a producer for the podcast BackStory. During a conversation about journalism, Martinez said something that stuck with Wallace: “Objectivity is the ideology of the status quo.” Two years later, Martinez started producing Wallace’s podcast about the history of movement journalism, also titled The View From Somewhere. In the first episode, Martinez explained her assertion about objectivity: “… What is considered objective or neutral is really only a matter of social agreement, or the ideological consensus of the majority or the status quo.” Martinez told Current that her perspective on the myth of neutrality stems in part from her experience as an associate producer at NPR from 2012 to 2016, where she came to see the tradition of journalistic objectivity as an obstacle to news coverage. Much like Wallace, Martinez said, she believes that her colleagues’ investment in neutrality didn’t leave space for honest conversations about race and power. “Younger journalists are being courageous about speaking up about how race and power are affecting journalistic coverage,” she said. “But I don’t have a lot of faith that the people in power are going to be able to divorce themselves from these ideas, which to them is the foundation of being a good journalist. And movement journalism is a completely different way of perceiving journalism.”

#### Knowledge itself is not enough to prompt action

[Suzanne **Shelton**](https://sheltongrp.com/author/sshelton/) **09** aug 6 Drawing on her extensive knowledge of both the advertising world and the energy and environment arena, Suzanne provides unparalleled strategic insights to our clients and to audiences around North America. Suzanne is a guest columnist in multiple publications and websites, such as GreenBiz, and she speaks at around 20 conferences a year, including Sustainable Brands, Fortune Brainstorm E and Green Build. https://sheltongrp.com/posts/information-doesnt-equal-action/

So, the moral of the story here is:  **don’t confuse information with motivation**.  An “educational campaign” is likely not what’s needed to move consumers to buy a green product or adopt green behaviors.  **A “motivational campaign” is what’s needed**.  And in order to create that you must understand the deeper drivers of your specific target audience and create messaging to appeal to those drivers.  And, remember, often those deeper drivers have nothing to do with an altruistic desire to save Mother Earth.

#### Pathos comes first to accomplish action

**Magneto 10** <https://magneto.net.au/blog/persuasion-aristotle-pathos/> Favoured by brands and businesses the world over, Magento is a leading ecommerce platform that is built on open-source technology. “What beats a good argument every time? Pathos.”

**Feeling first. Thinking second**. Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio said we’re not thinking machines that feel; we’re **feeling machines** that think. Emotions are powerful **motivators** for your audience. They grab people’s attention, and make them want to **act**.

#### Prioritizing advocacy critical to key movements – proven by MeToo

Hartley 20 Jannie MøLler Hartley, Department of Communication and Arts, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark,Tina Askanius, Media and Communication Studies, School or Arts and Communication, Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden, 8-1-2020, "Activist-journalism and the Norm of Objectivity: Role Performance in the Reporting of the #MeToo Movement in Denmark and Sweden," Taylor & Francis, [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17512786.2020.1805792 //](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17512786.2020.1805792%20//) recut

This article presents the results of a study examining the self-perceived roles of journalists covering the #MeToo movement in Denmark and Sweden. Drawing on qualitative interviews with journalists, editors and activists (N = 20) and participant observation at various #MeToo events, we examine the professional journalism cultures underpinning differences in the coverage and the broader public debate spurred by the movement in the two countries. The analysis is informed by the theoretical framework of role performance [Mellado, C. 2015. “Professional Roles in News Content: Six Dimensions of Journalistic Role Performance”. Journalism Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2014.922276; Mellado, C., L. Hellmueller, and W. Donsbach. 2016. Journalistic Role Performance Concepts, Contexts, and Methods. Routledge) in combination with Tuchman’s (1972. “Objectivity as Strategic Ritual”. American Journal of Sociology 77 (4): 660–679) seminal work on “Objectivity as Strategic Ritual”. This combined framework enables an analysis of how journalists negotiate ideals of objective reporting and activist imperatives when covering the movement and issues of gender (in)equality more broadly. Our study shows that journalists, to a varying degree, felt torn between ideals of impartiality and objectivity and ideals of active reporting oriented towards action and problem-solving but that these experiences differed between the two countries and between newsrooms. We discuss these findings in light of differences in the political climates around issues related to gender in the two countries and partially diverging normative ideals and professional journalistic cultures regarding the extent to which journalism and activism can and should be combined. Introduction While hashtag campaigns seeking to make visible sexual harassment, rape culture and misogyny are nothing new, the hashtag #MeToo, which inundated social media in the autumn of 2017, is one of the most recent and arguably the most high-profile examples. The hashtag campaign turned into a social movement with international resonance and follows a growing trend of public protest against sexism, patriarchy and other forms of oppression via feminist uptake of digital communication (Mendes, Ringrose, and Keller 2018). The #MeToo movement resonated in different ways and with varying degrees of intensity across the world. This was the case in neighbouring Scandinavian countries Sweden and Denmark for example in which media coverage and public debate took very different routes (Askanius and Møller Hartley 2019), On the issue of gender equality and feminist advances, Scandinavia is often perceived as a homogenous area geographically, politically, socially and culturally, and the so-called Scandinavian model of gender-equal welfare states has long been an established concept in international scholarship. Sweden and Denmark are often lumped together under headings such as “Scandinavian struggles for gender equality” (Liinason 2018b) “Nordic feminism” (Liinason 2018a; reba weise 1990) and “Nordic models of gender equality” (Melby, Carlsson, and Ravn 2009). While neighbouring countries with shared histories and intertwined labour markets, fairly similar languages and similar models of liberal social democracies and welfare systems, the two countries have “grown apart” in stark ways over the last two decades, not least when it comes to policy, political activism and public debate related to issues around gender equality and feminism (Birgersson 2015; Dahlerup 2004, 2011). These differences became apparent as the #MeToo movement gained massive traction as a news story in Scandinavia in the autumn of 2017, not only in terms of the extent to which the #MeToo movement was covered in news media across the two countries but also in terms of how the issue was framed. In Sweden, 3332 stories on #MeToo were produced by the four largest national newspapers in the first three months of the movement emerging on the international scene, and in Denmark, 594 items were published in that same period. In Sweden, the campaign became a rallying cry against sexism and sexual harassment, with petition campaigns and calls to action organised within a wide range of professions. The media industry was no exception, and in November 2017, thousands of female and non-binary journalists signed an open letter and organised around the hashtag #deadline, demanding an end to sexism in the Swedish news industry (for a detailed analysis of all petitions in Sweden, see Hansson et al. 2020; Pollack 2019). In Denmark, at least in the first months following the initial breach of the hashtag, media coverage was less intense and tended to de-legitimise #MeToo by framing the movement as a witch-hunt and an illegitimate kangaroo-court (see Askanius and Møller Hartley 2019). In Sweden on the other hand, the response was immediate and media coverage largely supportive, at times even celebratory. But what today is dubbed “#MeToo journalism” by critics has since been accused of violating press ethical standards and good journalistic practice, e.g., by publishing undocumented claims from anonymous sources and naming alleged perpetrators not yet convicted. In subsequent public debate, journalists and publishers have been heavily criticised for not adhering to objectivity standards and instead sliding into the position of allies and advocates for the #MeToo movement. This article aims to shed further light on the broader context of these differences by exploring how journalists in the two countries experienced navigating different roles, ideals and normative positions in their profession while covering #MeToo. The journalistic profession is known to be guided by a set of professional norms, such as press ethics and norms of objectivity (Tuchman 1972). These norms guide journalists in their work and determine certain standards of conduct. The norms are often fluid, with room for negotiation. Journalists must, for example, negotiate between the ideal of having many and very qualified sources and the pressure to be first with the story (Møller Hartley 2011). As a spectacular media event, #MeToo is a case in which this normative navigation around a highly politicised and often divisive subject matter might stand out much more clearly than in the day-to-day workings of the newsroom. This is the case because, first, #MeToo exploded on social media as a global outpouring of personal testimonies of assault and harassment, and thus, the story came from the public rather than from the media. For example, some of the witness accounts in social media made unnamed accusations, challenging the ethical norms of not using anonymous sources in journalism. Second, being about harassment perpetrated by men against women and to a large extent directed at media and cultural industries, the #MeToo movement affected everyone, including journalists themselves, challenging the stance of objectivity or impartiality. This was particularly pronounced in Sweden where many journalists organised around the hashtag #deadline, lending support to female journalists who shared experiences of harassment or abuse by male colleagues and managers. Therefore, we investigate a case that illustrates how social media de-institutionalises news production, provides alternative channels of news circulation and, thus, challenges the roles of journalists who, in some cases, were taking on a more activist role, questioning the norm of objectivity and the rituals performed in the process of adhering to this norm e.g., by reporting on a movement in which they themselves were engaged and/or had stakes involved. The objectivity norm has been strong in the press in Western democracies since the rise of the omnibus press, and studies have shown that many journalists in Denmark still regard objectivity as an important norm. In a study conducted by Skovsgaard et al. (2013, 32), 45 per cent of Danish journalists answered that it was “very important” to be as objective as possible in their work. In the Swedish context Wiik (2014) demonstrates, using survey data, how the norm of objectivity has become an increasingly important part of journalists’ professional identity as a critical watchdog “objectively mediating information” in the past 30 years (663) . Such studies are often carried out within the theoretical framework of role theory and deal with varying role perceptions among journalists. As such, they study the manner in which journalists evaluate different statements and the extent to which they believe they fill the functions of, for example being a watchdog, providing critical analysis, or of being impartial and objective. However, these studies tell us very little about specific practices involved, such as taking a side in a specific story, or of how the objectivity norm might differ in relation to different subject areas, whether some areas are influenced more by the personal opinions of journalists and how journalists straddle these passive and more active roles in their profession. Furthermore, these studies are criticised for not taking into account the significant gap between ideals and the everyday practices and realities of journalists in the newsroom, a gap which has been conceptualised as the difference between role perception and role performance (Mellado 2015). Mellado argues that the study of role performance enables an analysis that captures the so-called backstage of news production. In this article, we use the context of the #MeToo movement and the reporting around the issue of sexual harassment as a concrete case to uncover and analyse how journalists navigate, negotiate and re-negotiate various, sometimes opposing, roles. More specifically, we focus on how the normative navigation in relation to #MeToo takes place at various levels of the professional journalism cultures in the two countries and the roles that journalists adhered to in relation to the activist organising and protests mobilised around #MeToo. In the first section of the article, we present the theoretical framework of role theory, in particular the concept of role performance (Mellado 2015) and Tuchman’s (1972) work on objectivity as a strategic ritual. We then develop an empirical framework aimed at capturing journalists’ experiences and reflections on covering #MeToo across different news outlets in the two countries. Specifically, we focus on role performance, not just as a question of the agency of the individual journalist but also as entwined in the broader newsroom culture, the field of journalism and the broader media cultures in the two countries,1 themselves informed by different historical trajectories of feminist movements and political struggles for gender equality. This informs three levels of analysis, which are presented in the remaining part of the article. Finally, we discuss the findings in light of the differences in the coverage between the two countries and the different ways in which the individual journalists navigated this coverage, drawing on different normative ideals regarding the extent to which journalism and activism can and should be combined. Theoretical Framework Several models have been developed to describe how journalists navigate the various and sometimes opposing norms and purposes of their day-to-day news work. One such model focuses on professional roles—one of the key topics in journalism research (Mellado, Hellmueller, and Donsbach 2016, 3). Professional roles are also key to defining journalism as a profession. In this respect, journalistic roles are essential components of journalistic cultures. Until recently, the study of professional roles in journalism has been addressed mostly from the perspective of normative standards and journalistic ideals, while analyses through the lens of professional performance has remained in the background (Mellado 2019). Most studies of the professional roles of journalists have typically shown that journalists worldwide endorse professional roles and values that emphasise neutrality, objectivity and the scrutiny of official behaviour, holding those in power accountable (Donsbach and Patterson 2004; Hanitzsch 2011; Mellado, Hellmueller, and Donsbach 2016). However, research on journalistic role performance has also found patterns of multi-layered hybridisation in journalistic cultures across and within advanced, transitional, and non-democratic countries (Mellado 2019). Thus it is important to qualitatively examine the subtle differences of how the professional roles are negotiated inside newsrooms in different national contexts, and #MeToo provides an excellent case study for such an analytical endeavour, as the hashtag “breached” simultaneously in most countries across the world. We build our theoretical framework around Mellado’s work on role performance, a concept which aims to establish a connection between journalists’ beliefs about the role of journalism and the actual practices of news production (Mellado 2015). This conceptual framework connects the characteristics of professional roles that have been studied in comparative contexts with different journalistic discourses and reporting styles in news, considering the relationship between journalism and power, the extent to which the journalistic voice is present in a story, and the way journalism approaches the audience. We focus specifically on the tone of voice and power relations. The tone of voice deals with the active–passive stance of the journalists in their reporting. The passive stance has been associated in the literature with the neutral (Cohen 1963) and disseminator (Weaver and Wilhoit 1986) roles, while the active stance has been linked to the participant (Donsbach and Patterson 2004; Johnstone et al. 1976), advocate (Janowitz 1975) and missionary role ideals (Köcher 1986). From this perspective, the intervention dimension of role performance can be identified, dealing with concrete decisions and reporting styles regarding the presence or absence of the journalistic voice in the news product. The absence of the journalistic voice in news output refers to a kind of journalism that gives prevalence to distance between the journalist and facts (Tuchman 1972; Donsbach and Patterson 2004). Its more active counterpart is a journalist-centred role (Esser 2008), where news professionals have a voice in the story, and sometimes act as advocates for different groups in society. These two ways of reporting conform to a unidimensional structure, whereby a greater level of presence of journalistic voice implies higher levels of intervention, and vice versa. From the power relations perspective, two dimensions of role performance can be identified: the watchdog and the loyal facilitator. These dimensions are independent of each other, and the lesser presence of one does not mean the greater presence of the other. Watchdog journalism—also known as “muckraking”, investigative, adversarial or exposé reporting—seeks to hold the government, business and other public institutions accountable, serving as a “fourth estate” (Waisbord 2000). In applying the operationalisation of Mellado’s dimensions of role performances, we connect critical perspectives on the professionalism of journalistic roles with theories of news production and the sociology of news. To further theorise how objectivity was performed and negotiated at the height of the #MeToo movement, we draw on the seminal work of Gaye Tuchman on the norm of objectivity in newsrooms. She argues that there are three factors involved in journalists’ definition of an “objective fact”: form, content and interorganisational relationships. Her work shows that in discussing content and interorganisational relationships, journalists can only invoke their news judgment; however, they can claim objectivity by citing the procedures followed, which exemplify the formal attributes of a news history or newspaper. For instance, journalists can suggest that sources are quoted instead of offering their own opinions. Furthermore, Tuchman (1972) suggests that objectivity may be seen as a strategic ritual that protects journalists from the risks of their trade, including criticism from sources and audiences. When examining journalists’ experiences of reporting on the #MeToo movement, this framework is useful when seeking to understand how journalists might conceive of the balance between bringing their own opinions forward vis-á-vis quoting others, weighing out the risks, both personal and those faced by the news organisation, and when analysing how the form or genre of journalism and the newsroom culture influence normative navigation. As #MeToo was covered in the debate, culture and news sections of Danish and Swedish newspapers, we adopt a methodological design that covers the wide range of voices present in the public debate, from opinion and news journalists to NGO actors and activists. We elaborate on this research design in the following section

#### Inequality magnifies existential risks.

CSER ’21 [Center for the Study of Existential Risk; 2021; interdisciplinary research center at Cambridge University; CSER, “Global Justice and Global Catastrophic Risk,” <https://www.cser.ac.uk/research/global-justice-gcr/>]

Many global risks are not exogenous to human civilisation, they are the products of choices and decisions taken (or not taken) at all levels of human society. The backdrop to these decisions is one characterised by global injustice: profound inequality, corruption, and structural discrimination (such as anti-Black racism and White supremacy). The Centre for the Study of Existential Risk is working to understand how issues of distributive, procedural and relational justice at the global level act as drivers of global risk. It is also committed to foregrounding critical perspectives from postcolonialism and anti-racism in its work in this area.

A key focus of our research will be on the creation of better institutions for promoting global justice and responding to global risk concurrently. Who should participate in discussions about governing global catastrophic risks, for instance within intergovernmental organisations, public-private fora, or industry discussions? What are the ways in which the activities of international financial institutions such as multilateral development banks contribute to global risk? What are the systemic interactions between the reinforcement of global inequalities and the exacerbation of global risk within these institutions?

Global injustice as a driver of risk

Global injustice is not only a direct driver of hazards, like climate change, discriminatory AI systems, and global conflict, it also increases civilizational vulnerabilities and exposures to these hazards:

* Global injustice prevents appropriate risk management actions and policies being taken and affects how risks are perceived, as is the case with industry-funded ‘merchants of doubt’ sowing disinformation on nuclear winter, ozone depletion and climate science.
* It disempowers those at the risk frontlines, such as communities who are most affected by climate change or most at risk from diseases due to poverty, healthcare inequalities and racial descrimination.
* It has led to structural inertia and risk management strategies which protect the interests of the elites who create them. When this is the case, attempts to address global risks can exacerbate rather than alleviate injustices.
* It creates the potential for difficult and unnecessary dilemmas and constraints in achieving the twin goals of human development and the management of global risk, such as in cases where states rely on subsistence emissions to meet basic energy needs.
* Finally, injustice and inequality slow the process of recovery from disasters. This is a key finding of over a century of disaster studies. It is expected that global injustice would create significant barriers to recovery from potential future global catastrophes.

## Disclosure theory

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose the plan text and standard text to their new AC on the NDCA wiki

#### Violation: I asked and you chose not to disclosure – check the doc

#### [1] Limits -- Unbroken standard are unpredictable because they can plan any part of the resolution making it impossible to know which part he’s going to specify, which means the neg has to prep every single one of thousands of different standards to have a shot at engaging whereas the aff only has to prep one, creating a massive prep skew. Turns aff flex, even if affirming is harder, which I will contest, you shouldn’t be able to eliminate 99 percent of neg prep. My interpretation is key to me being able to have any shot at engaging.

#### [2] Argument quality: standard text text disclosure discourages cheap shot aff’s with frings authors and shoddy solvency. If the aff isn’t inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, the case should lose. They had a month to prep – the neg is entitled to some research time to make sure the AFF is inherent, topical, and controversial. Otherwise bad AFF’s can win on purely surprise factor, which is a bad model b/c it encourages finding the most fringe surprising case possible instead of a well researched and defensible aff. Also impacts to evidence ethics, without any disclosure you could have an aff where you make up everything about the authors evidence ethics comes before any impact of the ac It calls into question everything else. If they would lie about their evidence then anything else they may have said could be a lie as well and should be disregarded.

**Fairness is a voter—debate is a competitive activity that requires objective evaluation and ow other voters on irriversibilty we cant get education from cutting cards but we will never get a level playingfield without theory. Drop the debater—the abuse has already occurred and my time allocation has shifted—also the shell indicts your whole aff—justifies severance which skews my strat. Use competing interps—leads to a race to the top since we figure out the best possible norm and avoids judge intervention since there’s a clear briteline. No RVIs—**

**a. Baiting—they’ll just bait theory and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse and results in a chilling effect**

**b. its not logical—you don’t reward them for meeting the burden of being fair. Logic is a meta constraint on all args because it definitionally determines whether an argument is valid.**

#### Interp- the aff can’t force the neg to defend advocacy over objectivity aka the squo [bc otherwise it means affirming]

#### Violation-right under your advocacy

#### Negate-nullify; make ineffective. Oxford languages

#### This means no, I don’t need to defend advocacy over objectivity because my burden is simply to show the aff is ineffective or bad in the face of the neg

#### Prefer this

#### 1]ground-it literally cuts all prog neg ground… it forces me into a whole res situation

#### 2]topic ed-breadth over depth- it means we have greater knowledge overall, we rarely need in depth knowledge of things in the real world, it’s more realistic to have an overall coverage of an infinite amount of possibilities

#### 3]strat skew-means that we can’t read the k, leads to lack of education about serious topics

#### 4]cuts ks- specifically means we can’t have discussions about ontological problems or anything with real world impacts

#### DTD, anything else means I can barely debate

#### No RVIs-1]just because you prove your fair doesn’t mean you should win, you’ve done the bare minimum for the round to keep going 2]means the aff can just bait theory and only go for that 3]chills debaters from reading shells, keeping the debate space corrupt

# Case

### No aff rvi

#### A point-you shouldn’t have been abuse in the fist place then, you put yourself in that situation

#### -teaches decision making

#### B point-same thing, if you weren’t untopical then it wouldn’t be a problem

#### -no reason that t and rvi are equivalent to each other

**Objectivity**-not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts. **Oxford languages**

Means objectivity is also about bias not just truths, this takes out sonnemaker 15, let me explain after the card

### objectivity impossible

#### Objectivity is not even possible

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Marcel Gelauff says he doesn’t want his editorial team to take a position on the news. Let me be the first to say that, alas, it’s a vain hope. Describing the world with no idea of what’s good or bad, relevant or trivial, **true or false is literally impossible**. Behind every report, every feature, every news item, lies a worldview rooted in **assumptions** ontological (what’s real?), epistemological (what’s true?), methodological (how do we find out?), and moral (why does it matter?). Or, to put it in Gelauffian terms, **all news comes from a position.** Why doesn’t the evening newscast ever lead with crop circles made by UFOs? Because the editorial department takes the position that UFOs don’t exist. Why doesn’t the news ever lead with a delayed train between St. Petersburg and Novosibirsk? Because the editors take the position that a late Russian train doesn’t matter here. Why does the news never open with the biggest, most powerful Dutch company [Correspondents Maurits Martijn and Tomas Vanheste have written about Vitol: “Nobody’s ever asked a question in Parliament about this Dutch oil giant” (in Dutch only).](https://decorrespondent.nl/438/over-deze-nederlandse-oliereus-is-nog-nooit-een-kamervraag-gesteld/96941604870-00bd17df)in the world, the oil and gas trader Vitol? Because the editors take the position that Vitol isn’t doing anything wrong. **The reverse is true too**: why does the news open with a Trump tweet, a bombing in Syria, a domestic policy proposal, chaos at a national transportation hub? Because the editors take the position that statements by a US president, wars in the Middle East, our own leaders’ plans, and travel snafus in our own country matter. And why does the news always call bombings by ISIS “terrorist attacks” and those by Western governments “bombardments”? Because the editors take the position that that’s what they are. Why does the news always frame the growth of the economy as something positive and not as a disaster for the climate, the environment, or the corals in the ocean? Because the editors take the position that economic growth is good. So **when an editor claims not to take a position** on the news, he or she is making the most basic **misrepresentation** possible. And it’s also the worst [Even worse than making your anchors deliver the news standing up, which Gelauff called “an important moment in the history of NOS news” (in Dutch only).](https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/01/02/ik-wil-de-wereld-bij-jou-thuis-brengen-zoals-ie-is-1575235-a890960)instruction you can give your editorial team.

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A major new survey of public opinion about the news **media is being misinterpreted** by its sponsors to suggest that Americans don’t think there’s enough objectivity in journalism anymore. The [survey](https://knightfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/American-Views-2020-Trust-Media-and-Democracy.pdf) from the Knight Foundation and Gallup, Inc., did indeed find increasing complaints about bias in the news media. But a [blog post](https://knightfoundation.org/articles/americans-are-losing-faith-in-an-objective-media-a-new-gallup-knight-study-explores-why/) from Knight interpreted that to mean “that Americans’ hope for an objective media is all but lost.” And Sam Gill, the senior vice president of the Knight Foundation, [declared on NPR](https://the1a.org/segments/journalism-trust-media-public/) on Monday that “People really do not think media is doing its job as a democratic institution.” If you look at the data just a bit more closely, though, you see that the bias concerns are **primarily from Republicans**, who after three years of Trump overwhelmingly and increasingly distrust the mainstream media, with a not insignificant number — 12% — actually believing it is “trying to ruin the country.” **That’s not a failure of “objectivity**” by the mainstream media; that’s a willful departure from reality by a large chunk or the population. If anything, it suggests to me that the mainstream media “objectivity” hang-up has **resulted in a** [**failure to successfully champion the truth**](https://presswatchers.org/2020/07/the-failed-promise-of-objective-political-reporting/). The survey finds that Democrats, by contrast, remain quite positive about the role the media plays. And while 28% of them said they consider bias a “major problem,” it’s reasonable to assume that many had outlets like Fox News in mind when they said that. That’s not a failure of objectivity by the mainstream media, either. That’s a reasonable expression of concern – and arguably one that the reality-based media is not adequately confronting. **The survey did not define what it meant by “news coverage” or “media,” leaving open a huge world of possibilities. Nor did it define what it meant by “objective**” or “neutral” – even while using those terms favorably in its questions. The two key bias prompts, which respondents were asked to rate as “a major problem, a minor problem, or not a problem with news coverage today”

conservative audiences (like Fox News).

### Peace journalism

#### The opponent drastically undermines the idea of peace journalism through advocacy that helps deescalate conflicts

Michael **Greenwell 17** nov 29 Lecturer, School of Arts & Humanities, Centre for Broadcasting and Journalism, Nottingham Trent University <https://theconversation.com/how-peace-journalism-can-deescalate-conflict-in-the-age-of-trump-and-north-korea-88182> “How Peace Journalism can deescalate conflict in the age of Trump and North Korea”

Drawing clear conclusions about the existence of such a cycle – a relationship between the actions of dominant actors, subsequent media coverage, and consequential actions potentially influenced by that media coverage – is extremely challenging. But analysing the coverage (and behaviour) of a bombastic Trump in previous press conferences, while establishing its impact on subsequent **events, is enabled by the discipline of** [**Peace Journalism**](http://www.peacejournalism.org/Peace_Journalism/Welcome.html). Close analysis of events through the lens of Peace Journalism can help theorise when media coverage may have helped escalate or deescalate conflict. Peace **Journalism aims to improve the conditions for peace** through a considered editorial approach and practice. It is a means to peace. [Johan Galtung](https://www.galtung-institut.de/en/home/johan-galtung/) first theorised the notion of Peace Journalism in **contrast to the notion of “War Journalism**”. War Journalism foregrounds violence and body counts. Today, [Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick](https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/Peace_Journalism.html?id=iiobAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y) are leading proponents of Peace Journalism and adopt a critical, realist perspective when looking at the drivers of War Journalism. [Lynch practices journalism](http://www.peacejournalism.org/Peace_Journalism/Welcome.html) that **foregrounds marginalised voices** in favour of dominant actors, provides accurate context and history – instead of polarised, short-term narratives – and presents **peaceful options** over grievances and violence. The format of rolling news, journalistic convention, and the (perceived) demand for war reporting, makes change hard. But the media could have a powerful role to play. [Propaganda on the radio](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3257748.stm), and specifically [Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines](http://www.rwandanstories.org/genocide/hate_radio.html), fuelled genocide in Rwanda, while child soldiers in Liberia imitated [warlords on the news](http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2480784/). Perhaps it’s time that Peace Journalism enabled constructive analysis when framing conflict coverage and identified relationships between the media and escalation. Trump’s cataclysmic rhetoric, for now, has diminished, and studying any influence by the media (if the heat of conflict turns up or down) is important. Indeed, it could be crucial with this [media fixated, tweet-happy President](https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor). What to do… So how can the media provide coverage that supports peaceful ends and addresses structural inequalities? There could be hope in [Manuel Castells’ “network society”](https://www.umass.edu/digitalcenter/research/pdfs/JF_NetworkSociety.pdf), whereby consumers increasingly drive digital content. Could journalists and audiences adapt in unison to more constructive narratives about conflict and the path to peace? Lynch and McGoldrick [have evidence](https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=iiobAQAAIAAJ&q=mcgoldrick+and+lynch&dq=mcgoldrick+and+lynch&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjLv4SbpeLXAhXJD8AKHXvDDsgQ6AEIKDAA) of **positive audience responses to more conflict-sensitive coverage**, so could audiences dictate supply through demand? Conflicts and coverage vary. There is no possibility of repeating conflicts and comparing influential factors and consequential results. Conflict contexts are not amenable to controlled study. Drivers and events cannot be studied empirically. Media owners (and dominant interests) diverting from that old adage of [“if it bleeds, it leads”](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-schwartz/if-it-bleeds-it-leads_1_b_5407863.html), social media, finding a responsible journalistic model, and consumers bolstering demand for it could all help. But currently news institutions are falling short when it comes to constructive peace coverage. However, there is hope, as some recent [coverage of South Korea](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/19/world/asia/south-korea-trump.html) shows, and it continues with deeper ethical discussion and teaching around hybrid forms of journalism, as at the [Centre for Broadcasting and Journalism](https://www4.ntu.ac.uk/hum/journalism/index.html) at Nottingham Trent University. **Peace Journalism opposes War** Journalism, but does not oppose quality journalism. There needs to be more commitment to its implementation and understanding of its purpose. Peace Journalism demands a multi-disciplinary approach, enriches studies and **seemingly appeals to the next generation**. And after all, it is they who will inherit the legacy of Trump and the society that is defined by its 6media.

### AT dem

Just refer to the K… dem bad

#### Democracy causes great power nuclear war – backsliding solves.

Muller ’15 – director of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, professor of International Relations at Goethe University (Harald, Democracy, Peace, and Security, Lexington Books pp. 44-49)

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). turns the issue upside down: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to act aggressively against non-democracies. We note that—apart from self-defense where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——democratic states go to war—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold international law (or their own interpretation thereof), to prevent anarchy through state failure, to “save strangers” when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to promote democracy. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War other than for self-defense thus can only be fought by democracies against non-democracies because against a fellow democracy justification would fail. Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, major powers with the capability to project power into the region of concern. The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a fairly ambivalent relation with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, it is predictable that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct a multi- pronged nuclear arms race (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of Serbia in 1914— a ‘spoiler” state with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove Europe into World War I a century ago. and it contains a nuclear component. To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation needs quite a lot of optimism Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for a worsening of relationships. While democracy is useful in excluding certain conflict dyads in the whole complex, such as India and the United States. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies. To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less moral-emotional inclination to demonize non-democracies once they dis agree, and to feel a missionary drive to turn them democratic. This might exacerbate the existing, more interest-based conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, and it creates fears in the hearts of autocratic leaders that they might be up for democratization sooner or later. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace tends to produce, in turn, only exacerbate these fears as democracies tend to be rich, well organized, and powerful and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to exacerbate the security dilemma which exists between democracies and non-democracics an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in our political systems. But democratic militancy is the Siamese twin of democratic peace as the Bush Administration unambiguously taught us (Gels et al. 2013: Müllcr 2014b).