**1AC**

**Our lived experiences are becoming replaced by Images. Our interaction with the world is condensed with images standing in for signs, cementing our place in the simulacra**

**Pawlett 10** [(William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

The concept of the code (le code, la grille) is an important term in Baudrillard’s early work. It is used in two related senses: firstly, to understand and critique consumer capitalism, suggesting that it is a system of control that functions by conferring illusory ‘freedoms’; and secondly, to deconstruct modern critical theories – particularly Marxism, feminism and psychoanalysis. Such theories, Baudrillard argues, cannot challenge the capitalist system because they are structured, at a fundamental level, by the code; their arguments are easily assimilated because they do not question the system’s ‘logics of value’ – the interlocking network of use values, economic exchange values and sign exchange values that constitute the code (CPS, 123). The code can be challenged, Baudrillard asserts, only by symbolic exchange, by the ‘counter-gift’ of anti-value (SED, 40). The notion of ‘the code’ is notably absent from Baudrillard’s later work; DNA ‘code’ is discussed at length (TE, 120) but the concept of the code seems to have been rejected because it remained within the orbit of modern critical theory. Nevertheless, many of the themes discussed through the concept of the code reappear in Baudrillard’s later arguments concerning ‘integral reality’. Baudrillard’s notion of the code suggests that we, as consumers, live within a far more **complete** form of social control than anything conceived under the rubric of ideological analysis. The code is a system of ‘manipulation’, ‘neutralisation’ and **assimilation** which ‘aims towards absolute social control’ (UD, 98). Though this is never achieved, the code constitutes ‘the fundamental, decisive form of social control – more so even than acquies- cence to ideological norms’ (CPS, 68). This is because the code operates, fundamentally, at a preconscious level. For Baudrillard, ‘the code itself is nothing other than a genetic, generative cell’ (SED, 58). The term code is used interchangeably with ‘the structural law of value’, that is as a feature of the third order of simulacra dominated by simulation (SED, 50). The code then is the grid or ‘generative core’ from which social signification is produced or simulated. The medium of the code is the abstracted sign; torn from symbolic relations, drained of all ambivalence and intensity, the sign becomes a ‘dead’ unit of information. The code can assimilate any meaning, idea, emotion or critical gesture by reproducing it as an abstract sign or code position within an ever-expanding field of options and pos- sibilities. All signs are, at the fundamental level of the medium, equivalent or commutable; abstract signs enable a ‘universal equivalence’ through the ‘de-sign-ating’ of everything as a term within the code. Marginal or￼simulatory differences are injected into the code, feeding consumption and sustaining the illusions of choice and diversity. It is a mistake to think of the notion of the code as exclusively semiotic. As simulation becomes prevalent, conceptual oppositions are simplified into binary code, zeros and ones are no longer meaningful oppositions but, for Baudrillard, merely tactical modulations. The code absorbs the first and second orders of simulacra (in which signs work referentially and dialectically) with a system of signs that refer only to preconceived simula- tion models. With the third order ‘the code’s signals . . . become illegible’, units or ‘bits’ of information replace signification (SED, 57). Indeed, the code is ‘the end of signification’; social control by ideology, characteristic of the second order, is supplemented by ‘social control by means of predic- tion, simulation, programmed anticipation and indeterminate mutation, all governed . . . by the code’ (SED, 60). For example, any radical potential of Marxist, feminist or ‘green’politics is defused by the code; theyare designated as coded ‘lifestyle’ positions, feedingconsumption and so presenting no fundamental challenge to the system.The code maintains a system of social relations through the ‘obligatory registration of individuals on the scale of status’ (CPS, 68) and functions covertly ‘to better prime the aspiration toward the higher level’ (CPS, 60) enforcing the competitive individualism of the system of consumption.The code simulateschoice, difference and liberation, pacifying the deep divisions in consumer societyby allowing the privileged term of binary oppositions to switch tactically or ‘float’, for example by simulating equality between terms (male/female, black/white, adult/child), so containing critical opposition.The code is ‘indifferent’ and ‘aleatory’; it controls through tolerance, solicitation and incorporation.The code encompasses far more than consumption; it includes the construction of knowledge and information through the conversion of thought into coded information flows. With the advent of DNA and genetic sciences, the code, according to Baudrillard, absorbs life itself, eliminating it as symbolic form and reproducing it as code (SED). The notion of DNA, Baudrillard suggests, was made possible by modernity as it is a social system dedicated to control. By providing a virtual map or code of life the concept of DNA reduces life to a copy or clone, destroy- ing its ‘destiny’ and enabling the elimination of certain ‘undesirable’ traits such as ‘criminality’ before a person is born (LP, 29). For Baudrillard the code, in all its forms, must be defied: [Y]ou can’t fight the code with political economy, nor with ‘revolution’ . . . can we fight DNA? . . . perhaps death and death alone, the reversibility of death, belongs to a higher order than the code. Only symbolic disorder can bring about aninterruption in the code. (SED, 3–4) For Baudrillard only suicidal death, hurled against the system as ‘counter- gift’ and so countering the simulatory gifts of liberation conferred by the consumer society, can defy the code. This argument is further explored in Baudrillard’s work on the 9/11 attacks (ST). The term code largely disappears from Baudrillard’s writings after Symbolic Exchange and Death (1993a [1976]). Is the code still operational in the ‘fourth order’, the ‘fractal stage’ of ‘haphazard proliferation’ (TE)? Baudrillard is clear that the previous phases continue to function alongside the fourth order, indeed they function even better. The concept of the code might be dead but it functions more effectively than ever, expand- ing, becoming virtual, producing ‘integral reality’: the complete and final replacement for the world as symbolic form.

**Our voracious consumption of images makes images of violence a stand in for violence itself.**

**Self 14**http://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/23/-sp-passive-consumers-pornography-violence

of the image in our lives, and the new ontology of imagery– first described by the philosopher [Jean Baudrillard](http://www.theguardian.com/news/2007/mar/08/guardianobituaries.booksobituaries) in the 1980s, and termedby him “simulation” – is the stage on to whichJihadi John and the other Islamic State murderers have made their swaggering entrance. Baudrillard’s contention was that with images so ubiquitous – and our reactions to them so instantaneous –a newworld ordering of reality had come into being: the hyperreal. Lee Rigby’s botched decapitation may have been a trailer, but the hyperreal thing – when it came – was already well prepared for: on 19 August, James Foley was murdered, on 2 September Steven Sotloff was murdered, on about 13 September David Haines was murdered, on 3 October Alan Henning was murdered and on about 16 November Peter Kassig was murdered – this much we know, because the Islamic State propagandists, whatever other dissimulations they may be engaged in, have no reason to lie about thesevery publicly orchestrated atrocities. Indeed, such was the timing of the terrorists’ threats to kill these men, their attendant demands – addressed personally to Obama and Cameron – and the subsequent uploading to the web of what appeared to be their snuffing-out videos, a media-debauched onlooker could almost be forgiven – so accustomed are we to viewing contrived suffering– for believing this was an early-season reality gameshow whose producers had relocated the action from jungle to desert. Yes, I’m an Islamic State Hostage Get Me Out of Here! was compulsive viewing; true, nobody could actually see the deserttucker trials, or hear direct and in real time about the humiliation of having to shit while handcuffed tosomebody else, but the important point is that no one who paid attention could be in any doubt that these things were actually going on. However the question remained: should one, as a conscious, compassionate and engaged person actually look at these videos? One impulse to view the atrocities could be a search for moral validation: Yes, I really am utterly revolted by this; and I can definitely tell the difference between this and entertainment; QED, I must be a decent person. But any attempt to place the beheadings within such an ethical calculus flies in the face … of our own nonplussed faces. Because we’ve already tested ourselves against the video of [Daniel Pearl](http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/daniel-pearl)’s beheading in 2002 – and should we have had any queasiness about the relation between the fictive and the real representations of this atrocity, there was a feature-length treatment of the sorry affair, directed by Michael Winterbottom and released in 2007. Even the al-Qaida operative who voiced over Pearl’s murder was savvy to our predicament; warning viewers that if their governments didn’t meet the terrorists’ demands – in this instance for the release of Guantánamo prisoners – such scenes would be repeated “again and again”.And ours is the culture of the repeat, the freeze-frame and the slow-motion action sequence; ours is the highly advanced civilisation that developed the capability to put a camera on the nose of a laser-guided bomb so that, like Major “King” Kong (the deranged cold war warrior played by Slim Pickens in Kubrick’s Dr Strangelove), we could “ride” – albeit virtually – the ordnance all the way down to its computer-selected target. It was this bizarre phenomenon, debuted on British television screens during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, that first alerted us to the full inception of an entirely new form of warfare. TheGulf war was also typified by feedback loops of mediatisation: US military planners reacting to information gleaned from CNN reporters in Baghdad, and those reporters then reporting that reaction. Baudrillard’s infamous series of essays, beginning with The Gulf War Will Not Take Place, were published in the French press in real time to coincide with the dissemination of imagery the philosopher believed constituted the hyperreal. By instantaneously controlling the collation and dissemination of imagery, the US military arrogated the power to make a movie about a global crisis at the same time as it created the crisis itself. This capacity for “fast history” was no mere prêt-a-porter propaganda, but a logical sequeltothe virtualisation of the battlefield itself: electronic warfare and the use of computer simulation were precisely what allowed General Schwarzkopf et al to presentthe conflict as “clean”, “surgical”, andinvolving remarkably little loss of life. The images of military installations disappearing in a silent puff of smoky dust were bruited about, those that might have conveyed the horror of the Iraqi conscripts strafed in their thousands during the so-called “Turkey shoot” wreaked by American and Canadian forces on Highway 80 were nowhere to be seen. Baudrillard’s main point about the Gulf war was that the only way to achieve an effective moral response – given its hyperreal nature – was to interrogate that reality, because none of its representationscould any longer be considered as value-neutral mimesis. War reporting has always exhibited biases, but these were now effectively submerged in a continuously unfolding narrative of power and money. We would’ve done well to remember this when we logged on to the Daily Mail’s website and saw Alan Henning’s face staring at us framed in the deep-blue desert sky. We would’ve done well to have considered its full consequences before, elsewhere, we directed one little arrow-point to another little arrow-point and started the film running. As it was, by watching the videos of the hostages’ decapitations we laid ourselves open to the most profound and viciously circular revulsion: our chain was most definitely being yanked – on one end were western politicians decrying barbarity, on the other the Islamic State terrorists performing it; the trouble is, was, and will remain: they’re pulling in the same direction. What is it we think about when we see a man about to have his head severed? Why is it that this particular form of execution so utterly disturbs and revolts us – surely any kind of premeditated murder is equally evil, and the suffering incurred in its enactment can only ever be open to a lesser charge? If truth is the first casualty of war then conviction must be the second; I don’t imagine all of the men-in-black who strike attitudes for the camera in the Syrian desert are genuine believers. According to hostages who’ve been freed, the English-accented Jihadi John is the leader of a small gang of western-born jihadists who act as jailers and video producers; a grotesque sidebar to all of this is that his accomplices have, of course, been dubbed Paul, George and Ringo. John himself is, apparently, highly ideological, intelligent, and – which perhaps goes without saying – brutal. Besides orchestrating the hostages’ humiliation, torture and execution, Jihadi John has also been responsible for negotiating with possible ransom-payers; and it’s when operating in this capacity, surely, that any religious motivation for his actions must melt away to be replaced by the hyperreal dictates of Baudrillard’s simulacrum. And yet, when we see a man about to have his head severed what we feel, surely, is the recrudescence of our own dormant Judaeo-Christian worldview. The idea that the head is the seat of reason is almost universal in human cultures, but perhaps only in thewest are we quite so wedded to a conception of our heads as repositories of a non-material reality more significant than the external world. This dualism may have become uncoupled from religious belief, but it remains fundamental to the western philosophic tradition; so much so, that when we fixate on thosevulnerable heads, we cannot help suspecting the Islamic State’s evil Beatles of intuitingourthoughts and bespoke tailoring their grotesque mise-en-scène for us, and us alone. For they know this is thedisincorporation we most fear: the separation of the sphere of mindfrom that of the body – along with Descartes we retain certain knowledge only of this: I think, therefore I am. Moreover, when we accept that just as our meting out of violence on their co-religionists is ideologically motivated, so is theirs on us, the very headiness of decapitation still distracts us from just how many correspondences between us and them come together in a single action: the serrated blade drawn across the windpipe. We can be forgiven, surely, for wishing to sweep to one side our own long history of beheading; one that begins with swords and axes, develops through the invention of the Halifax Gibbet (the first medieval mechanical method of decollation), and ends 37 years ago when the guillotine fell for the last time in Beaumettes prison in Marseilles, severing the head of convicted murderer Hamida Djandoubi. Our own twisted conceptions of this method of execution stretch all the way from prehistory into the present: even as Charles Stuart knelt on the scaffold erected outside the Banqueting Hall in Whitehall in 1649, the regicides still believed that by beheading him they were symbolically – as well as actually – toppling the state. For they know this is the disincorporation we most fear: the separation of the sphere of mind from that of the body – along with Descartes we retain certain knowledge only of this: I think, therefore I am. Moreover, when we accept that just as our meting out of violence on their co-religionists is ideologically motivated, so is theirs on us, the very headiness of decapitation still distracts us from just how many correspondences between us and them come together in a single action: the serrated blade drawn across the windpipe. 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The unwillingness of our governments to follow through and actually rule the populations they seek to subjugate is surely a correlate of our own passivity: they, like us, prefer to watch a simulacrum of imperialism rather than do the real thing. The collision between the most primitive and visceral violence and the most up-to-date media make us profoundly queasy: ever since these beheadings began, the twittersphere has been full of chirruping about Islamic State’s “sophisticated” use of camerawork and their information technology skills. It’s as if by emphasising the high production values of these snuff movies we somehow manoeuvre their makers back into our own pixellated fold, making of them just another group of innovative webheads. In all the scores of news stories I’ve read or heard about the beheadings, the emphasis on the technology of their visualisation has been egregious – yet surely it’s our own uneasiness that this registers: we know we need to get out more; we know we should stop slumping and staring and toggling and swiping and key-stroking. The jihadists get out – and they take their iPads with them; the use of the web to radicalise young British Muslims and recruit them to the cause is an established fact: if the medium is the message, the message in this case is a general blurring between the virtual and the actual; between thoughts and speech acts, between words and deeds.

**This violence is of a culture of spectatorship. Rather than participate or resist, the populace is fine with sitting back to images of catastrophe, letting the state take care of it for “moral” reasons. This spills over to the real where violence becomes inevitable. When images that exist in the hyperreal serve as an impetus for us to conduct real violence, acts of killing are confounded with simulated violence, removing any inhibition or moral response.**

**Mohebbi 16**http://www.regardingspectatorship.net/the-greatness-%C2%AD%C2%AD-and-also-the-abyss-of-human-potentiality-is-that-it-is-first-of-all-potential-not-to-act-potential-for-darkness/

The greatness — and also the abyss — of human potentiality is that it is first of all potential not to act, potential for darkness1. The mission nights were the busiest for the painters. While the fighters fought across the front lines, the paramedics wiggled amongst the tanks and artillery, back in the tents the artists were making portraits of the fallen men. A former front line painter told me once the story of a very young shahid whose picture landed on his desk in the trenches of the Iran-Iraq battle-filed. Usually the artists would contact the family of the martyr asking about his hobbies and interests, his favorite places, his heroes, so that his image will be in the company of things that were dear to him. This particular young man was obsessed with candles from a very young age, his mourning family told the artist. The painter started working later that evening, drawing carefully the outlines of his face, the contours of his eyes, his lips outlined by his short groomed beard, the collar of his uniform, his hard hat. Then he started adding the candles around his head, flying around him like angles, floating in the negative space of the paper. He meticulously works on the candles through the small hours of the night. As he was adding the finishing touches, deeply immersed in his world, the world of the painting, he notices something hitting against the picture, banging against his concentration. Back in the ‘real world’ he realized that it’s the moth that are diving into the picture, they were drew to candles, as they are attracted to the flame. It was the drops of his tears that rained down the image that drew them away. These images that the moth, or people fly and step into, are not unique to the Iranian battlefields of the 1980s, where the cold war was hot. Birds and humans were equally drawn into images painted in a competition between Zeuxis and Parrhasios around 500 BC. The former painted a cluster of grapes that attracted a flight of birds, which took it for real edible fruit. When Parrhasios presented his competitor with his work, a veil was still hanging over the painting, which Zeuxis tried to take it off only to realize the cover was the painting. This story suggests that human vision is a particular construction, and the way we seeandconceive the world is conditionedbythe apparatus of vision, by what makes seeing possible. That is, darknessis not the absence of light, rather it istheabsence of the ability to see, which is contingent upon the technologies of seeing. For one thing, the moth have not come that farsince the time of ancient Greek, and together with birds, they are still caught flying into human made images. Though we are less likely to try and pull a painted curtain from an easel, we often walk into images, live in them , burn them andat times bomb them. The NATO interventionin Bosnia, as writer and theorist Boris Buden has shown, was authorized via a staged image published in the Daily Mailthat showed Muslims behind barbed wire, pointing to an iconic image from a WWII concentration camp. A few years later, the war in Iraq was authorized after Collin Powellshowedimagesof supposed Iraqiammunition factories and storage units among other visual material that supported the existence of WMD related activities. Syrian rebelsmeticulouslydocumenttheir battleswith multiple cameras and upload them on the internet, and show them to their backers in the US and elsewhere to secure more funding and weapons. If the moth banging themselves against a portrait of a shahid sounds like fables of the non-moderns, the missilesthatflythroughimages at non existent military facilities have crossed the fourth wall and exploded on the other side and shattered many times over the membrane that separated images from the real – if such boundary ever existed. It is said that the viewers ran away when they saw the train leaving the station in the first public presentation of cinema. Now, the bullets that flew into an image of a Syrian soldier shooting a rebel documenting the shooting of a rebel by the soldier, killed the rebel. If the audience of the Lumiere brothers could not tell image from reality, many years later, a man stepped out of the screen in a showing of Batman in a theater in Colorado and went on a shooting spree, blood was shed before the audience realized that it was time to leave the theater. The tragedy in Colorado, which is part of an ongoing failure of dealing with gun violence in the US,highlightsthe crisis of spectatorshipinour age of image saturation– I am hesitant to call it saturation, as we have reached a point where the earth is covered with images. The question that we are faced with is when to leave the building and the constant failure to do so. In other words, the issue is no longer whether something is real or a representation, but rather when not to watch, when to leave the theater, when to look elsewhere, turn our head around and close our eyes. We cannot restore the pre-digital mode of spectatorship and reinstitute the traditional theater line between the actors and the viewers, as Ranceire seems to suggest, but yet still have the “emancipated spectator’s” power of “associating and dissociating.” Perhaps – following Agameben’s formulation in the essay On Potentiality – we can imagine spectatorship as potentiality. “[I]f poteniality were, for example, only the potentiality for vision and if it existed only as such in the actuality of light, we could never experience darkness,” but we experience darkness, and therefore we have the “potential not to see, the possibility of privation.2” The image, therefore becomes visible againtst its absence, it differenciates itself from its lack and puts itself forth through darkness into visibility. Here, we can imagine the “emancipated spectator” as the one who not only can refuse to watch, but considersspectatorshipas the “potentiality of darkness,” the other of the image. The spectacle, not spectatorship, is totalizing, it casts over representation. The subject needs to be redeemed from representation, that is the task of the emancipated spectator. The landscapes that airborne creatures, human made or otherwise, fly through provide the ground for an architectonic image that, in turn, provides the foundation for a discourse of spectatorship built on top of the surface of the image. It is no longer that the image renders the real flat, but rather that the image expands into time and space3. The image is thus a site of a construction that we step into as viewers, and we have to preserve the potentiality to step outside of it and watch the building from without. Spectatorship as such is not only the passive position in front of the spectacle or the event, but it is as set of relations that as Ranciere says “link[s] what we see to what we have seen and said, done and dreamed,” (to which we need to add heard and read, and the total knowledge of living). It is seeing the spectacle over the ground of this knowledge that spectatorship is understood as a potentiality. In Little History of Photography, Walter Benjamin calls the phtographer the decendent of augurs and haruspices and in grants him the power to predict the future, to read the outcome of a course of action and at times even decide or dictate such course4. The images of violence have revealed what they contain, the question is what futures these images can produce, and how the spectators can contribute to a production of a future where these images go beyond reducing the subject of violence to representation.

**The reality of violence is comprised of a system of signs – This distracts us from reality itself, and shifts our focus to our perception of it. The code is able to control these signs in order to control us- also means we control the internal link to subject formation**

**Pawlette 8** [(William, senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “**HATE/CODE**” Kritikos Volume 5, September-October 2008] AT

The Code as form is preconscious, or, in Baudrillard’s terminology “precessional”; that is, as grid or network it precedes individualexperience, perception, choice. The medium of this grid is the abstract, arbitrary sign. Signs, visual and linguistic, are the medium of coding, of the ordered exchange between coded elements. Composed to two sets of inter-locking relations, the sign-referent and signifier-signified, the sign is the universal form constructing the oppositions of subject and object, of real and representation, of self and other: the building blocks of ‘reality’ itself.The ordered exchange of signs produces identity and difference: every ‘thing’ is semiotic; every ‘thing’ is a ‘thing’ because it is not some other ‘thing’. Baudrillard calls this the “logic of equivalence”. Signs produce social meanings and values on a scale or grid whereby all points can be compared, contrasted and exchanged. To clarify, it is not that every ‘thing’ can be converted into sign form, it rather that the very process of transcription or coding produces ‘things’, essences, identities and differences.[2] Though the Code encompasses every ‘thing’ it cannot process ambivalence (or becoming) as these are not ‘things’ with identity but relations, always “in transit” or metamorphosis. The Code then does not merely express particular aspects of the consumer capitalist system such as media, fashion or advertising: it is far more fundamental.  At the fundamental level the Code is what prevents symbolic exchange by breaking its cycles or by seizing and diverting its potential. Symbolic exchange, as relation of ambivalence and becoming, is not a ‘thing’, it has no identity (and strictly speaking no ‘definition’ either) it occurs or rather “effracts” only when the Code is annulled, reversed or suspended. Symbolic exchange traverses all oppositions, it is neither one thing nor another, it prevents the emergence of fixed or stable positions or power relations. The most common example of symbolic exchange is the gift. The meaning of the act of giving a gift, in the consumer society as much as the tribal societies interpreted by Mauss (1990), is in no sense reducible to the object given, it depends on if and how it is accepted. The giving, receiving and reciprocating of gifts are intensely volatile relations, the meaning of the gift never settles into fixity or identity. The meaning of the gift can be transformed at any moment in the on-going relation between parties; indeed this relation is of the gift and the gift is of this relation: relation and gift flourish together, and die together. Baudrillard was particularly interested in the moment of the “counter-gift” (contre don), that is the refusal of the gift or its return with interest to the giver in a kind of status war (the latter often referred to, rather imprecisely, as “potlatch” (1993: 125-194). Baudrillard defines the Code as the “structural law of value”; a “generalised metaphysics” synthesising social values, social production, social identities. His early emphasis was the Code’s “ obligatory registration of individuals on the scale of status” (1981: 68). The Code produces a “hierarchy of differential signs” and, crucially, “constitutes the fundamental, decisive form of social control – more so than acquiescence to ideological norms” (ibid.). It makes no difference whether we, as individuals, endorse the consumer capitalist system or not, since we are all positioned by the Code, and are positioned through it by others. We all know the value of a professional career, an elite education or a cute butt whether we like it or not. Further each of these ‘sign-values’ are classifiable and comparable through the sign’s logic of equivalence: traditionally wealthy businessmen trade on their financial wealth to offset their ailing physique and secure the affections of a younger and more physically attractive partner, that businesswomen now do the same only demonstrates the universalisation of the Code’s sign system. The Code breaks, blocks and bars ambivalence and in the barring produces equivalence – the regulated play of identity and difference characterised by oppositions such as true/false, good/evil, self/other, male/female. The standard dimensions of consumer status positioning flow from this source: rich/poor, young/old, fat/thin, attractive/unattractive. Binary oppositions are central features of Baudrillard’s first and second orders of the sign (or “orders of simulacra”). The third order, of the Code proper, simulates choice, difference, freedom and diversity by allowing the privileged term to switch, fuse or “implode” (1983: 95-110). For example ‘fat’, ‘poor’ and ‘old’ can be beautiful too – if only within the confines of fashion and cosmetics advertising or pop music video. The Code operates in “total indifference” to content; everything is permitted in sign form, that is as “simulation”. In his early studies, The Object System and The Consumer Society Baudrillard depicts the Code as performing a pacifying effect on society; it soothes away once clear-cut, binary divisions of class and status by registering all people as individual consumers on a single universal scale. Everyone becomes a consumer, though some, of course, consume far more than others. As universal form the status of consumer confers a kind of democratic flattening of social relations: but an illusory one. If class conflict was, to some extent, pacified, Baudrillard did not contend that other forms of violence and dissent would be deterred by the Code. Indeed he wrote of the emergence of new “anomalous” forms of violence, less intelligible, less structured, not binary but post-dialectical (Baudrillard 1998: 174-185). He later proposed the term “disembodied hate” or simply “the hate” to express aspects of this process (1996: 142-147). The later sections of the paper explore “the hate” in some detail.

**Traditional Affirmatives use images of violence and disaster to fake a nonexistent policy as a trade for the ballot. This trading of catastrophe for academic captital is unethical because the constant search for a new spectacle dooms the disasters to repetition. In other words, the suffering of others is transformed into politico intellectual capital.**

**Baudrillard 94**[Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71]

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental **exploitation** of that poverty - charity cannibalism being **worse** than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure **playground**. Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of **reproduction** of the catastrophe market); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for **itself**,in order to meet its need for spectacle and that **voracious appetite** for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbered in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case, the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. The argument here is that there is a line of objective progress and everyone is supposed to pass through its various stages (we find the same eyewash with regard to the evolution of species and in that evolutionism which unilaterally sanctions the superiority of the human race). In the light of current upheavals, which put an end to any idea of history as a linear process, there are no longer either developed or under-developed peoples. Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity. In actual fact, it is their good fortune to be able to escape from evolution just at the point when we no longer know where it is leading. In any case, a majority of these peoples, including those of Eastern Europe, do not seem keen to enter this evolutionist modernity, and their weight in the balance is certainly no small factor in the West's repudiation of its own history, of its own utopias and its own modernity. It might be said that the routes of violence, historical or otherwise, are being turned around and that the viruses now pass from South to North, there being every chance that, five hundred years after America was conquered, 1992 and the end of the century will mark the comeback of the defeated and the sudden reversal of that modernity. The sense of pride is no longer on the side of wealth but of poverty, of those who - fortunately for them - have nothing to repent, and may indeed glory in being privileged in terms of catastrophes. Admittedly, this is a privilege they could hardly renounce, even if they wished to, but natural disasters merely reinforce the sense of guilt felt towards them by the wealthy – by those whom God visibly scorns since he no longer even strikes them down. One day it will be the Whites themselves who will give up their whiteness. It is a good bet that repentance will reach its highest pitch with the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of the Americas. We are going to have to lift the curse of the defeated - but symbolically victorious - peoples, which is insinuating itself five hundred years later, by way of repentance, into the heart of the white race. No solution has been found to the dramatic situation of the under-developed, and none will be found since their drama has now been overtaken by that of the overdeveloped, of the rich nations. The psychodrama of congestion, saturation, super abundance, neurosis and the breaking of blood vessels which haunts us - the drama of the excess of means over ends – calls more urgently for attention than that of penury, lack and poverty. That is where the most imminent danger of catastrophe resides, in the societies which have run out of emptiness. Artificial catastrophes, like the beneficial aspects of civilization, progress much more quickly than natural ones. The underdeveloped are still at the primary stage of the natural, unforeseeable catastrophe. We are already at the second stage, that of the manufactured catastrophe - imminent and foreseeable - and we shall soon be at that of the pre-programmed catastrophe, the catastrophe of the third kind, deliberate and experimental. And, paradoxically, it is our pursuit of the means for averting natural catastrophe - the unpredictable form of destiny - which will take us there. Because it is unable to escape it, humanity will pretend to be the author of its destiny. Because it cannot accept being confronted with an end which is uncertain or governed by fate, it will prefer to stage its own death as a **species**.

**Any ethical system based on images of disaster makes every impact inevitable**

**Smith 10** [(Richard G. Smith, Associate Professor of Geography at Swansea university) “The Baudrillard Dictionary” under “Code” Edinburgh University Press, 2010] AT

According to Baudrillard, a ‘perverse’ logic (SC, 97) drives consumer societies. A logic that fuels, not just the use and abuse of drugs, but also the growth of other phenomena: terrorism, violence, depression, fascism and so forth. These phenomena are all, says Baudrillard, the product or outcome of ‘an excess of organization, regulation and rationalization within a system’ (SC, 97). In other words, those societies which are defined and ‘saturated’ by their system of consumption tend to suffer from an excess of systemic rationalisation (logic and rationality, surveillance and control), which perversely leads to the emergence– for no apparent reason – of ‘internal pathologies’, ‘strange dysfunctions’, ‘unforeseeable, incurable accidents’, ‘anomalies’ (SC, 97), which disrupt the system’s capacity for totality, perfection and reality invention. It is the logic of an excessive system to fuel the growth of anomalies, which along with AIDS and cancer are pathologies in that they have not come from elsewhere, from ‘outside’ or from afar, but are rather a product of the ‘over-protection’ of the body – be it social or individual. The system’s overcapacity to protect, normalise and integrate is evidenced everywhere: natural immunity is replaced by systems of artificial immunity – ‘hygienic, chemical, medical, social and psychological pros- thetics’ (SC, 98) – in the name of science and progress.

**We advocate stepping out of the room. Rather than viewing these signs as the basis for reality, the aff advocates destroying our perception of the hyperreal and becoming an emancipated spectator.**

**Mohebbi 16**http://www.regardingspectatorship.net/the-greatness-%C2%AD%C2%AD-and-also-the-abyss-of-human-potentiality-is-that-it-is-first-of-all-potential-not-to-act-potential-for-darkness/

in Colorado, which is part of an ongoing failure of dealing with gun violence in the US, highlights the crisis of spectatorship in our age of image saturation– I am hesitant to call it saturation, as we have reached a point where the earth is covered with images. The question that we are faced with is when to leave the building and the constant failure to do so. In other words, the issue isno longer whether something is real or a representation, but rather when not to watch,when to leave the theater, when to look elsewhere, turn our head around and close our eyes. We cannot restore the pre-digital mode of spectatorship and reinstitute the traditional theater line between the actors and the viewers, as Ranceire seems to suggest, but yet still have the “emancipated spectator’s” power of “associating and dissociating.” Perhaps – following Agameben’s formulation in the essay On Potentiality – we can imagine spectatorship as potentiality. “[I]f poteniality were, for example, only the potentiality for vision and if it existed only as such in the actuality of light, we could never experience darkness,” but we experience darkness, and therefore we have the “potential not to see, the possibility of privation.2” The image, therefore becomes visible againtst its absence, itdifferenciates itself from its lack and puts itselfforth through darkness into visibility. Here, we can imagine the “emancipated spectator” as the one whonot only can refuse to watch, but considers spectatorship as the “potentiality of darkness,” the other of the image. The spectacle, not spectatorship, is totalizing, it casts over representation.

**By refusing our identities as passive consumers and accumulators of images of catastrophe, we return the “gifts” of life and consumption back to the system. The system can only respond with its collapse, and by creating this symbolic exchange we dismantle structures and possibilities of power.**

**Pawlette 7** [(William Pawlett,senior lecturer in media, communications and cultural studies at University of Wolverhampton) “The 'Break' with Marxism”] AT

The 'ultimate aim of the system', of seizing 'control of death' (1993a: 48 n. 24), makes it highly vulnerable to any defiance of its control over death, since for Baudrillard the entire edifice of power is built on this foundation. Death, then, is the ultimate weapon against the system because it is capable of re-engaging the **symbolic exchange** of life and death.As we are condemned to a 'slow death' of labour and survival by the system according to Baudrillard, . We must therefore displace everything onto the sphere of the symbolic where the challenge, reversaland overbidding are the law, so that we can respond to death only by an equal or superior death. There is no question here of real violence or force . . . only the challenge and the logic of the symbolic. (1993a: 36) Baudrillard clearly feels that 'real' acts of violence are pointless and counterproductive because they feed into the system, justifying its methods of control, and ultimately serve as commodity-sign or entertainment value for its media networks. To defy the system, Baudrillard argues, we must be prepared to 'die', in the sense of surrendering the 'life' (or living-death) that the system has given us.We must, he asserts, throw the gift of living death back in the face of the system and **demand** either an 'immediate death' or **a new 'life'**freed of the barring of symbolic exchange (1993a: 36-7). The **self as given by the system cannot liberate itself**from the system because it is of the system. This self must be annulled or sacrificed and the system is then put in the position of having to respondto this symbolic exchange:To defy the system with a gift to which it cannot respond save by its own collapse and death. Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of catastrophe for the capital remains. (1993a: 37) In modernity, suicide has such a subversive force: 'through suicide, the individual tries and condemns society ... by inverting the author- ities and reinstating reversibility' (1993a: 175, emphasis added). So, for example, the high rate of suicide in prisons is understood as a symbolic exchange, 'an infinitesimal but inexpiable breach' in the system of control. Suicide is a 'challenge that society cannot reply to' (1993a: 180), it seizes back control of (the individual's) death and, further, it subtracts 'capital' or value from a system based on the accumulation and real- isation of value. In the act of suicide we remove ourselves as a quantity of capital. Moreover, Baudrillard insists, 'if every suicide becomes subversive in a highly integrated system, all subversion of and resistance to the system is reciprocally, by its very nature, suicidal' (1993a: 176). Baudrillard does not only meansuicide in the literal sense, but any behaviour that challenges or opposes the maximizing of performance, growth, accumulation, success. He includes neurotic behaviours by which 'sufferers' can prevent their full integration into the code and also street demonstrations that have no other goal than to provoke the authorities to 'real' violence, to shame and humiliate them. Baudrillard does not develop examples at this stage, but he cites briefly the student demonstrations of May 1968 where students 'sacrificed' their gift of a higher education, throwing it back at the system such that the system 'loses its footing'. The anti-Poll Tax riots of July 1990 in London seemed to undermine the Thatcher government as people rejected the secure life of (signs of) prosperity and instead risked life and limb in pitched battles with the police. But in both cases any fractures in the system were soon repaired, or at least papered over; particular politicians are removed but the system continues. Yet this does not necessarily undermine Baudrillard's argument as he asserts that the system has the power 'to displace the time of exchange, substitut- ing continuity and mortal linearity for the immediate retaliation of death' (1993a: 40). In other words the system has time on its side, or rather linear time is the time of the system. Baudrillard's point becomes painfully obvious in cases where corporations are found by the courts, or increasingly by the media, to have risked the health of consumers by negligence. This occurred when Coca-Cola marketed 'Dasani' purified water as a health drink when it was in fact ordinary tap water with various pollutants added by the company, and when Cadbury-Trebor- Bassett UK sold chocolate laced with salmonella. On both occasions the companies' PR spokespersons announced that since the unfavourable findings were made their company had already introduced the most stringent safety improvements: in other words your critique is already long out of date, time is on our side. To summarise, the system (political economy) has 'possession' of death such that it 'gives' us ournatural, biological death, just as it gives us the gifts of a self and identity in consumer society. It gives us the gift of welfare, security and finally a painless 'natural' death in hospital. We may well try to resist these gifts, by driving fast without a seatbelt, heavy smoking, over-eating or starving ourselves. We may deliberately refuse to maximise ourselves, to realise our potential, or our refusal may be beyond conscious volition as in Baudrillard's examples of impotence and anorexia (1990a: 119-28). In each of these cases failure is equal to symbolic death in our competitive, performance-obsessed societies. However, an effective 'counter-gift' of potlatch-style destruction can only occur through suicide. The system gives and dominates by giving unilaterally, its power is based in the cessation of the cycle of symbolic exchanges. According to Baudrillard 'the worst repression , . . consists in dispossessing you of your own death' (1993a: 177). Suicidegives back, returns or counters the gift of life/death given by the system: symbolic exchange is once more put into play, the cycle continues and unilateral powerand authority crumble by lacking a symbolic response. Domination is never total. The system cannothunt down or neutralise every aspect, every fragment of our livesand thoughts; we remain 'free', at least free to challenge the system. We cannot and will not be made to identify fully with our individual interests, needs, desires and 'potential' that the system promotes as coded options within an integrated system. Baudrillard's conviction is that people will never acquiesce to the system and resign themselves to being merely 'the capitalist of their own lives' (1993a: 179-80).

**The Role of the Ballot is to vote for the debater that best dismantles and destroys the gratuitous consumption and production of images of violence. hyperreality means challenging the gratuitous production of images is a prerequisite to critical awareness and education,**

**Crews 98** [(john, author) “Baudrillard and the Scandal Effect” Cyberspace and Critical Theory, Spring 1998] AT

Having restated what I personally believe many people are aware of, that one cannot believe everything one sees, what is frightening as we look toward the future is the potential for mass manipulation through the use, abuse, production, and reproduction of images. Especially when these images are positioned by agencies of the media, such as the television, radio, print (newspapers, periodicals), electronic hypertext and so on... Baudrillard's project in his book Simulacra and Simulation is to invest a great deal of cynicism, and concern in thinking about the hegemonic effects of what may as well be called a 'logic of simulation'. The scandal effect is one idea of Baudrillard's that I find relevant in thinking about the political situation in the United States. The scandal effect could be articulated as follows : Accepting that the difference between what is real and non-real becomes fuzzy... then **how is one to believe in the power**or utility **of government**. For the most part, one's knowledge of what government is, and how it works is carried through some media. It is mediated, and in effect what the American public understands as the reality of government is suspect to manipulation.The pattern that has developed with the executive branch of government, specifically the President, seems dangerously along the lines of what Baudrillard is talking about. Same operation, tending to regenerate through scandal a moral and political principle, through the imaginary, a sinking reality principle. p. 14 The reality principle is articulated by Baudrillard in a rather vague way. How does this work? What is reality here? What could be obscured by President Clinton's troubles with allegations of either sexual impropriety or abuse of his office? Our ability to know what is happening in the world, to take some active role in what happens slowly disappears as the reality principle -- I understand it as participating in a sort of naturalism -- is confused in an endless exchange of images that don't inform us, but instead allow us to feel informed. Matters of the President's conduct are important concerns, and they touch upon the legitimacy of our system of government, but the gratuitous production of images deadens any sort of **critical awareness**into what is actually going on. There are other priorities we must have. The economic situation in Asia is sparcely reported on. Our negotiations with Iraq, Israel... . Brushed under the rug. As citizens we do have other concerns. Funny how like in the movie Wag the Dog a Presidential scandal is averted, subverted... public attention toward scandal is quickly fed into a war machine. We can see this now, in the present day situation.

**Were also a prerequisite to politics. The hyperreal system of consumer capitalism means that decisions are abstracted away from the political and evaluated in an innaccseaible economic sphere. Traditional policymaking cant do anything about this, so the aff is a literal prerequisite to any type of solvency.**

**Bifo 11**[(Franco Berardi, Italian Marxist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism) “After the Future” 09/20/11]

The lesson that we must learn from the first year of the global recession is sad: neoliberal folly is not going away, the financial plungers will not stop their speculation, and corporations will not stop their exploitation, and the political class, largely controlled by the corporate lobbies, is unwilling or unable toprotect society from the final assault. In 1996 J. G. Ballard (1996: 188) wrote: “the most perfect crime of all – when the victims are either willing, or aren’t aware that they are victims”. Democracy seems unable to stop the criminal class that has seized control of the economy, because thedecisions are no longer made in the sphere of political opinion, but in the inaccessible sphere of economic automatism.The economy has been declared the basic standard of decision, and theeconomistshave systematically identified Economy with the capitalist obsession ofgrowth. No room for political choice has been left, as the corporate principleshave been embedded inthe technical fabric oaf language and imagination.

**Weigh the AFF against T**

**a. Don’t let them say that I needed to change the aff for them to engage. Even if they cant engage the offense from reading the 1AC outweighs their lack of agonism because if I did read a “T” version of the aff it wouldn’t be a good cultural critique**

**b. Also means that their reading of T is a net DA to the methodology of the T version. Identifying with the state is what causes us to repeat images of disaster.**

**2.“Fairness” is not an absolute truth, regard their arguments with heavy skepticism-Means them reading T is an independent reason to vote them down**