**Control has shifted from the administration of death to the production of life – the affs restructuring of global medical intervention is the new logic of biopolitical governance – no longer is imperialism a question of borders and military power, but rather the protection of bodies.**

**Ahuja 16** [Neel Ahuja, Associate professor of feminist studies and a core faculty member of the Critical Race and Ethnic Studies Program at the University of California, De Gruyter, "Bioinsecurities," 03/31/16, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9780822374671/html]

One element common to this biopolitics of empire is an anxiety about the dependence of the human body on forces that appear inhuman, even inhumane: medical technologies to extend, optimize, or end life; markets and institutions that unequally distribute resources for sustaining life; environmental processes that support, deprive, or injure bodies. Such concerns were, of course, entirely common to twentieth-century modernist fears of alienation from nature, as well as to liberal, socialist, and fascist states that each proclaimed to defend the life of the people in the major imperial wars. Yet due to the ongoing expansion of government into life through technological, economic, and environmental interventions, a growing number of crises that advertise dreaded risks to life as we know it—climate change, nuclear toxicity, disease pandemics, biological weapons, and financial speculation, to name a few—have recently pressed critical studies of empire to think politics and agency at queer scales of relation, from the grand vantage of planetary geology and climate, through the lively migrations of commodities and animals, all the way down to the microbial, molecular, and quantum worlds of matter in which advanced sciences produce new technologies and knowledge. In an era in which excessive hope is invested in the idea that empire’s so-called free markets will inevitably deliver resources for improving life, discussions of risk and security increasingly provoke concern about how bodies are either threatened or safeguarded in links to other species, to ecology, and to technology. Public fears and hopes are thus invested in questions about how bodies interface beyond the skin of the organism. The living body is not only an ecology reproduced by constituent species (think of the life-sustaining work of gut bacteria or the ingested flesh of animals or plants). It is also an assemblage crosscut by technological, economic, and environmental forces (medical technologies, insurance markets, agricultural systems, toxic pollution) that render the body vulnerable as they reproduce its conditions of possibility.

Yet there remains a sense of tension concerning how social theorists frame the vulnerability of human life between biopolitics and these emerging posthumanist ideas. While biopolitical analysis foregrounds the contested figure of the human, emphasizing that the human body is an effect of power crafted through the social reproduction of nationality, race, sex, and/or class factors conjoined in inhuman fields of power, emerging posthumanist and newmaterialist fields including animal studies, environmental humanities, and object-oriented ontology more often emphasize the agency of the nonhuman and the surprising liveliness of physical matter. As such, despite the avowed critique of the human, they may take for granted the apparent universality of the human lifeworld from which they flee, foreclosing attention to the processes that anthropomorphize the human in order to characterize the human’s sovereign domination of the nonhuman. This move allows some posthumanist critics to project upon an outside, the nonhuman (in the form of environment, animal, machine, or other object), the possibility of resistance to anthropocentrism. Such thinking might be seen as a ruse of transcendence—an assumption that turning attention from the human to the nonhuman could bypass Marxist, feminist, critical race, and postcolonial critiques of imperial systems that proliferate inequality under the guise of universal human freedom. Despite this liberal, idealist trend among posthumanists (which is more pronounced in the humanities than it is in the social sciences), studies of empire increasingly confront the fact that the apparent exteriority of the subject (the worlds of body, physical matter, and interspecies exchange) has more often formed the center of the politics of empire rather than its excluded outside. It is thus my hope that the collision of biopolitical and posthumanist thought may be salvaged in a practical if unexpected crossing: a more robust accounting of the ways in which politics, including the liberal and neoliberal politics of empire, is embedded in living bodies and planetary environments, which are themselves constituted as objects of knowledge and intervention for imperial science. Such an understanding goes beyond an assertion that life is controlled by human government, which would embrace the strong postEnlightenment division between government and life, human and nonhuman. I instead hope to explore the queer hypothesis that the adaptability, risk, and differentiation central to life increasingly constitute the very matter of politics. This book is about how disease outbreaks, medical technologies, and the relations between humans, animals, bacteria, and viruses galvanized racialized fears and hopes that determined the geopolitical form of US empire during the long twentieth century, following the continent-wide establishment of Euro-American settler networks. Before explaining that argument, however, this brief preface explores how—in addition to established methods of postcolonial study that define empire through histories of conquest, settlement, and the exploitation of labor and resources—the inequalities and violences of imperialism can productively be understood from the vantage of species, the field of life itself. Research on colonial environmental history and disease control is long established in postcolonial studies, even as today there is growing attention to Global South environmental activism, advanced biotechnologies, and human-animal and human-plant interactions as significant concerns in the planetary routes of European and US empire. Yet my sense of an interspecies politics is still relatively unfamiliar from even the vantage of these studies. Extant studies have long highlighted questions of representation, agency, influence, and domination, explaining the unequal distribution of the privileges accorded for being anthropomorphized, for being made human through colonial ideological and social processes. While maintaining focus on such racialized inequalities fracturing the figure of the human in the worldwide routes of European and US imperialisms, it is the aim of this book to articulate an additional sense of the political as a lively zone of embodied connection and friction. “Interspecies relations form the often unmarked basis upon which scholarly inquiry organizes its objects, political interventions such as ‘human rights’ stake their claims, and capitalist endeavors maneuver resources and marshal profit.” A critique of the interspecies zone of the political—which at its broadest would expand beyond the human-animal and human-microbial relations discussed in this book to include the diversity of living species, matter, energies, and environmental systems that produce everyday life out of biosocial crossings—helps us understand the persistence of empire in a postcolonial age precisely because it conjoins power to forces that retreat into the seemingly natural and ahistorical domains of body and matter. From this vantage, empire appears not only as a process of territorial and economic accumulation across international divisions of labor and sovereignty, but also as a reproductive process managing bodies in unequal planetary conjunctions of life and death. Tracing this second phenomenon requires analysis of biosocial forms of exchange among microbes, plants, animals, and humans, as well as models of power and representation recognizing that bodies are not empty containers of human political subjects, but are lively, transitional assemblages of political matter. There are risks in attempting to theorize a political process like empire via the material shape it takes in life and matter, anticipated in long-standing liberal and Marxist distinctions between human and natural history. Must such a move necessarily turn away from issues of interest, hegemony, violence, representation, and inequality that often define organized decolonial struggles? I would argue that this need not be so, and that vitalizing colonial discourse studies through an accounting of empire’s living textures may actually give a more grounded account of imperial power as well as the strategies of representation that have persistently masked its material articulations. To this end, I explore empire as a project in the government of species. Broadly, this idea refers to how interspecies relations and the public hopes and fears they generate shape the living form and affective lineaments of settler societies, in the process determining the possibilities and foreclosures of political life. In practice, the government of species has historically optimized and expanded some life forms (human or otherwise) due to biocapital investments in national, racial, class, and sex factors. Operating through interspecies assemblages known as bodies, such investments selectively modify and reproduce life forms and forms of life, extracting “the human” out of the planetary field of interspecies relation. Once securitized, this form is constantly under pressure from the unpredictable and inhuman risks of life in a world of ecological, economic, and political complexity. These forces in turn contribute to the ways publics experience and interpret their futures as more or less livable. An account of the government of species thus explains that empire can be understood as a project in the management of affective relations—embodied forms of communication and sensation that may occur independently of or in tandem with sentient forms of thought and discourse. These affective relations cross the divisions of life and death, human and animal, media and bodies, and immune and environmental systems. In the process of forming the human out of cacophonous biosocial relations, empire often persists—even after the formal conclusion of colonial occupation or settlement—in part because it invests public hope in the management of bodily vulnerability and orients reproductive futures against horizons of impending risk, a phenomenon I call dread life. In such processes by which bodily vulnerability is transmuted into political urgency, techniques proliferate for managing the relations of populations and the living structures of species (human, animal, viral). As such, empire involves the control of life through accumulation of territory and capital, which may be securitized by activating life’s relational potential. Lauren Berlant describes a “lateral agency” that moves across bodies and populations rather than in the top-down fashion of sovereign power; it may, then, be possible to understand empire’s force of securitization not only through conventional dramas of domination and resistance, but rather through embodied processes of coasting, differentiating, adapting, withering, transition, and movement. These are processes that subtly determine how bodies take form, and to what extent they are able to reproduce themselves in space-time relation. They also more radically stretch the body beyond the organic lifetime and into evolutionary, environmental, and informational domains where life/death distinctions blur. However, the intimate connection between the governmental imperatives to make live and to make die, which Jasbir Puar names “the bio-necro collaboration,” has long been obscured in social and political theories. It thus remains commonplace for biopolitical analyses to view power as either repressive or productive in essence. In his classic work on the topic, French philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault argued that by the eighteenth century, a political form had emerged in Europe targeting the human as biological species as the central object of power. Power was no longer simply about the repressive force of the state and its controlling interests wielding the right to kill. Power was increasingly vested in the productive reshaping of the biological life of human organisms by institutions such as clinics, prisons, and asylums and their related forms of scientific knowledge; power meant letting live, albeit in constrained form. Foucault recognized the embedding of biopower across species, calling for a social history that incorporated “the evolution of relations between humanity, the bacillary or viral field, and the interventions of hygiene, medicine, and the different therapeutic techniques.” In the notes to his late lectures, he even speculated that neoliberalism involved a governmentality that can “act on the environment and systematically modify its variables.” Foucault’s description of the rise of biopower is the inspiration for a number of studies in sociology and anthropology that assess new biopolitical shifts involving advanced biomedical technologies. Given that these biopolitical studies focus largely on the United States, western Europe, China, and India— states that have built biotechnology sectors as engines of unequal neoliberal growth—it is perhaps not surprising that a concomitant line of critique has emerged acknowledging vast and growing world sectors of biological and economic precarity. Building on a number of key postcolonial/feminist studies of the 1990s exploring Foucault’s theory beyond European borders, these necropolitical critiques announce that politics today often emerges as the specter of death. The world’s poor, as well as a growing “precariat” carved from shrinking national bourgeoisies, appear less often as the objects of technological uplift than as the human surplus of the political order of things, populations at risk for displacement, dispossession, captivity, and premature death. The precaritization of sweated labor, the subjection of agrarian populations to the twin scourges of neoliberal structural adjustment and environmental devastation, the proliferation of deterritorialized war and ethnic cleansing, and the growth of predatory industries and rents to recycle capital from surplus populations all reveal that those humans targeted for biopolitical optimization constitute a shrinking population who reproduce through the cannibalistic appropriation of life elsewhere. But necropower is not simply about the distribution of death; it is also about the accumulation of social or economic capital through death and precarity. For example, when suicide passes on social force through the deathly body, or when life insurance capitalizes death, death itself thus gives form to life.

**The role of the ballot is to resist methods of control. Prefer this**

**[1] Systemic methods of control kill any value to debate. It's incompatible with fairness, education etc. Debate is totally stifled through control, the exploitation of power relations necessitates the silencing of the concept of an alternative.**

**[2] Resistance must be a grassroots movement. Debate is the perfect forum to cultivate a dedicated intellectual resistance but it must be in line with the purpose of debate - that means the ballot must defend resistance.**

**[3] It's the natural conclusion of the beliefs you already hold.**

**The affs view of COVID views life in its proximity to death, turning the living into the undead**

**Till 10/02** [Chris Till, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Leeds Beckett University, Cost Of Living | Cost of Living: the politics, economics and sociology of health and health care, "Living under the medical gaze in a time of pandemics," 10/02/21, https://www.cost-ofliving.net/living-under-the-medical-gaze-in-a-time-of-pandemics/]

The “medical gaze” is a concept originally taken from [Michel Foucault’s](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_Foucault) 1963 book [The Birth of the Clinic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Birth_of_the_Clinic). It refers to the power wielded by medical institutions to look at and into human bodies and define their reality and what constitutes normal and pathological. When the characters in It’s a Sin were denying the reality of the disease or desperately attempting dangerous or ineffective home-made treatments they were not only trying to battle a destructive and terrible illness but also to wriggle out from underneath the medical gaze. We sometimes welcome the eye, hand or ear of the medic and crave the certainty of their verdict on our painful or troubling experience. This gives us access to a potential route out to a better, more comfortable or satisfying life but no one wants their whole existence to be defined by a medical condition. This is even more so when the definitional gaze of the doctor might mean a death sentence (as it did for many in the time covered on the TV series). Central to Foucault’s thesis is that it is only through incorporating death, specifically the dead body, into medical practice that the body becomes subject to the “medical gaze”. This is because, in an era before X-ray, MRI or CT scans, the only way to reveal the workings of the human body was to cut it open and this could only be done extensively to corpses. But prior to the 18th-century this was rarely permitted due to legal and religious constraints. After doctors heeded the call to “open up a few corpses” their professional gaze could permeate deep into the body and subsequently the living body came to be seen through the lens of the dead. [As Foucault claims](https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/The_Birth_of_the_Clinic/YSwk_A87B3AC?hl=en): “[When] seen in relation to death, disease becomes exhaustively legible, open without remainder to the sovereign dissection of language and of the gaze. It is when death became the concrete a priori of medical experience that death could detach itself from counter-nature and become embodied in the living bodies of individuals” While Foucault’s concern here was with the professional knowledge of medics perhaps something similar can be said for the role of death in how we experience the application of the medical gaze onto ourselves. Such deadly conditions as AIDS encourages us to integrate the medical gaze more comprehensively into our assessments of ourselves and others. Our bodies, behaviours, relationships and social networks come to be seen through their potential proximity to death. In one of the final scenes of the series a character suggests that many people continue to engage in risky behaviours because of the shame internalised from the stigmatising views of others partly the result of their fear of lives they don’t understand and the perceived proximity to the illness. We are currently facing a different pandemic but one which has also encouraged us to accept a medical gaze onto many areas of our lives; to see our behaviours, relationships, workplaces and homes in relation to the biomedical risks they might pose. We have started to let death become incorporated into the bodies of the living in order to protect ourselves and others; lets hope we can soon let it retreat.

**The global free market is not free – its maintenance requires violent and biopolitical state action – undesirable populations are left to die in the name of species evolution guided by the invisible hand of the market. Reject the aff’s attempts to paint themselves as the savior of the global south while their ideology keeps billions in perpetual poverty**

**Nally 11** [David Nally, Department of Geography at Cambridge University, Royal Geographical Society (with IBG), "Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers - Wiley Online Library," 01/01/11, https://rgs-ibg.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2010.00413.x]

These developments are critical to what Foucault describes as a nascent ‘ideology of freedom’ associated with European liberalism and ‘capitalist forms of the economy’ (2007, 48). The physiocrats’ conceptualisation of market forces is principally an extended critique of customary food entitlements – now considered unnatural, even dangerous– as well as a prescriptive programme for a radically different kind of provisioning economy. For this reason Foucault is keen to point out that laissez-faire economics does not imply that ‘everything is left alone’. The liberalisation of the food system –‘not interfering, allowing freedom of movement, letting things take their course’– only succeeds by reformulating ‘the permitted and the forbidden’ (Foucault 2007, 45–6) to produce a novel social order and a new level of working on reality called ‘the economy’. Furthermore, the imposition of free markets will require the active collusion of state forces: ‘anti-scarcity systems’ will have to be dismantled; legislative assistance will be needed to place grain markets in private hands; the repressive powers of the police may be called upon to quell revolt, and so on. In other words, free markets emerge from the intimate connections forged between the state and capital. The assumption that markets are ‘natural systems’ operating outside of power and politics is itself an invention of the 19th century that takes for granted the violent manner in which the state must eliminate all behaviour that is now deemed aberrant or undesirable. The transition to a free-trade economy also does not mean that famines and other catastrophes will in future be prevented. As mentioned above, re-ordering the food system will in some instances require an increase in repressive measures as artisans, small-holders and agricultural labourers are forced to bear the costs of market regulation (Block’s introduction to Polanyi 2001, xxvii). In Foucault’s words, there will no longer be any scarcity in general, on condition that for a whole series of people, in a whole series of markets, there was some scarcity, some dearness [in price], some difficulty in buying wheat, and consequentially some hunger, and it may well be that some people die of hunger after all … the scarcity that caused the death of individuals not only does not disappear, it must not disappear. (2007, 42, emphasis added) Put another way, the old problem of ‘hunger amidst scarcity’ will give way to the distinctly modern crisis of ‘hunger amidst abundance’ (Araghi 2000, 155). Finally,to legitimise this new biopolitics of provision an ideological distinction between ‘peoples’ and ‘populations’ must be introduced. According to Foucault, the population includes those who conform or adapt to the new economic order; they fall in line with market regulation, even promoting it as a means to attain greater security. The people, on the other hand,are those who ‘disrupt the system’ and ‘throw themselves on the supplies’. They reject the new regime of planned scarcity, and therefore ‘do not really belong to the population’ (2007, 44). For Foucault the act of ‘letting die’ is profoundly connected to the classification of undesirables – what Giorgio Agamben (1995) would later term homines sacri– who are now represented as ‘threats, either external or internal, to the population’ (Foucault 2003, 256). In a liberal biopolitical economy, he concludes, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and improvement of the species or race. (2003, 256; see also Minca 2006)

**The aff’s narrative of the global north-south health divide and desire for expanding Western medicine creates a Medical Gaze which objectifies Aboriginal bodies and continues colonialism**

**Bradley 16** [Elaine Bradley, Faculty of Medicine at the University or Toronto, PubMed Central (PMC), "Changing perspectives: attempting to de-colonize the gaze of a Canadian medical student," 12/01/16, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5342885/#]

Gaze theory, originating in both psychoanalytic and feminist theory, postulates the idea of “gazing” as a “one way event that denies the agency of the perceived object.”11 In Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema (1989), Laura Mulvey describes the concept of the “male gaze” in film;she describes how the male, as both the creator and observer of the film, uses his position of power and privilege to oppress and objectify the female subjects on screen.14 Foucault (1994) describes the historical emergence of the “medical gaze;” describing how patients in Paris in the 18th Century were transformed into objects to be studied as they entered the physician’s office.5 Foucault suggested that the “medical gaze” established a power relationship between the physician (the “gazer”) and the patient (the object of this “gaze”).5 Foucault was not the first to reference this power imbalance, David T. Goldberg (1993) observes that “the neutrality and objectifying distantiation of the rational scientist” creates “the theoretical space for a view to develop subjectless bodies”.8 He expands upon this to say, that once a person is “objectified” they could be “analyzed, categorized, classified, and ordered with the cold gaze of scientific distance.”8 The “study” of Indigenous people in Canada by the medical system has a long and difficult history, including the extensive experimentation that occurred as part of the residential school system, as “bureaucrats, doctors, and scientists... increasingly came to view Aboriginal bodies as “experimental materials.”14 In more recent years, epidemiological studies of Indigenous communities have examined the inequities in health for Indigenous Canadians, but have “depicted Aboriginal and Native American peoples as sick, powerless, and lacking in capacity, information that is used to reinforce unequal power relations, paternalism, and dominance and to undermine their aspirations for sovereignty” resulting in communities expressing concern and resistance to outsider research.12nBut at least some of the activists were able to make the connection between the lack of democracy that they objected to at the WTO, and the suspension of civil rights caused by the invocation of the state of emergency in the city. Media images of "robocops" using violence against demonstrators suggested a militarized new world order as the violent face of the WTO and reminded those who may have forgotten that the contemporary liberal economic order was built on the basis of military power (Latham, 1997). Enforcement of its mandate apparently required the violent removal of human obstacles to its agenda. Once again people in the way of globalization have to be forcefully removed. Television pictures of bus loads of arrested people who were refusing to cooperate with the police in allowing themselves to be processed through the arrest procedure suggested both the limits of carceral strategies, and the importance of such forms of resistance in contemporary struggles. While surveillance is effective in monitoring street behavior, the territorial strategies of control require other legal and administrative procedures to be completely effective. This suggests once again the limits of the preferred territorial strategies of police power (Herbert, 1997).

**There’s no value to life in a biopolitical framework—everyone is exposed to the possibility of being reduced to bare life in the name of instrumentality**

**Agamben 98** [Giorgio Agamben, professor of philosophy at University of Verona, "Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 139-140," 1998]

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain countries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and provokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicaliry with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of “life devoid of value” (or “life unworthy of being lived”) corresponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction—to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every “politicization” of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even possible that this limit, on which the politicization and the exception of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.

**Biopower naturally tends toward endless war and nuclear extinction - the power to guarantee life belies the power to end it**

**Foucault 84** [Michel Foucault, French turtleneck dude, "The Foucault Reader," 09/01/84]

Since the classical age, the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. "Deduction" has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocaust on their own populations. But this formidable power of death-and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits-now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise Controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage somany wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence.z

**The aff is an extension of biopower, the alt is to reject the aff now, or risk becoming an institution for juridical state power.**

**Foucault 84** [Michel Foucault, French turtleneck dude, "The Foucault Reader," 09/01/84]

I wonder if this isn’t bound up with the institution of monarchy. This developed during the Middle Ages against the backdrop of putting an end to war, violence, and pillage and saying no to these struggles and private feuds. It made itself acceptable by allocating itself a juridical and negative function albeit one whose limits it naturally began at once to overstep. Sovereign, law and prohibition formed a system of representation of power which was extended during the subsequent era by the theories of right: political theory has never ceased to be obsessed with the person of the sovereign. Such theories still continue today to busy themselves with the problem of sovereignty. What we need, however, is a political philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the king’s head: in political theory that has still to be done. 63

**Trade spreads disease**

**Hays 15** (Brooks Hays, “Study: Infectious disease spread is fueled by international trade” Dec 22 2015, http://www.upi.com/Science\_News/2015/12/22/Study-Infectious-disease-spread-is-fueled-by-international-

trade/1431450812571/)

TEMPE, Ariz., Dec. 22 (UPI) -- A new study published [in the journal Food Security](http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12571-015-0523-0) suggests the growth of international trade has spurred the spread of infectious disease. The paper also contends most governments are ill-prepared to manage outbreaks and curb the spread of disease. Lead study author Charles Perrings, a professor of environmental economics at Arizona State, wants policy makers to heed the warnings offered by recent outbreaks of infectious disease among both human and livestock populations. Of course, international trade is not going away. In fact, economies are increasingly reliant upon global trade. Perrings wants governments to do more to protect people and animals against the spread of disease, and to protect economies from the disruption caused by outbreaks. "The more trade grows as a proportion of global production, the more likely it is that diseases will be spread through trade, and the higher the economic cost of resulting trade bans," Perrings explained in a press release. "In addition many infectious diseases that affect animals also affect people," he added. "Zoonoses like SARS, MERS, [HIV](http://www.upi.com/topic/HIV/) AIDS, or highly pathogenic avian influenza, all originated in wild animals and were then spread person to person through trade and travel." Perrings says part of the problem is that the risk of disease is currently unaccounted for in economic markets. There are few incentives for the companies that engage in and encourage international trade to better protect consumers.

**Disease spread causes extinction**

**Keating 09** (Joshua, “The End of the World”, 11-13, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/13/the\_end\_of\_the\_world?page=full, ldg)

How it could happen: Throughout history, plagues have brought civilizations to their knees. The Black Death killed more off more than half of Europe's population in the Middle Ages. In 1918, a flu pandemic killed an estimated 50 million people, nearly 3 percent of the world's population, a far greater impact than the just-concluded World War I. Because of globalization, diseases today spread even faster - witness the rapid worldwide spread of H1N1 currently unfolding. A global outbreak of a disease such as ebola virus -- which has had a 90 percent fatality rate during its flare-ups in rural Africa -- or a mutated drug-resistant form of the flu virus on a global scale could have a devastating, even civilization-ending impact.How likely is it? Treatment of deadly diseases has improved since 1918, but so have the diseases. Modern industrial farming techniques have been blamed for the outbreak of diseases, such as swine flu, and as the world’s population grows and humans move into previously unoccupied areas, the risk of exposure to previously unknown pathogens increases. More than 40 new viruses have emerged since the 1970s, including ebola and HIV. Biological weapons experimentation has added a new and just as troubling complication.