**Stock Neg**

### **FW**

**My value is morality because the use of the word ought the resolution implies moral obligation**

**My standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.**

**Prefer it for …**

#### **When one promotes societal well-being, one can ensure that a utilitarian calculus is used. As a result, the most fair and/or beneficial option is chosen, thus upholding a society’s sense of justice.**

**Goodin 90.** Robert Goodin 90, [professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences], “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142 //RS

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.

#### **A just government has a moral obligation to do what would improve the well-being of its citizens.**

#### **Promoting societal well-being provides access to other value criteria because it allows others to perform favorable actions, such as ensuring safety, fairness, etc.**

### **C1: Hostage Holding**

**Public sector strikes hold the public hostage**

**DiSalvo 10**

DiSalvo, Daniel. (C. DANIEL DISALVO is professor and chair of political science in the Colin Powell School at the City College of New York–CUNY and a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. His scholarship focuses on American political parties, elections, labor unions, state government, and public policy. He is the author of Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868–2010 (Oxford 2012) and Government Against Itself: Public Union Power and Its Consequences (Oxford 2015). His articles have appeared in Political Science Quarterly, Policy Studies Journal, and American Political Thought among others. DiSalvo also writes frequently for popular publications, including The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Atlantic Monthly, National Affairs, City Journal, American Interest, The Weekly Standard, Los Angeles Times, and the New York Daily News. He was previously the co-editor of The Forum: A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics and serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Policy History. He has held visiting appointments at Princeton University's James Madison Program and the CUNY Graduate Center.) "The Trouble with Public Sector Unions." National Affairs, 49th ed., 2010, www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-trouble-with-public-sector-unions. Accessed 1 Nov. 2021.

The emergence of powerful public-sector unions was by no means inevitable. Prior to the 1950s, as labor lawyer Ida Klaus remarked in 1965, "the subject of labor relations in public employment could not have meant less to more people, both in and out of government." To the extent that people thought about it, most politicians, labor leaders, economists, and judges opposed collective bargaining in the public sector. Even President Franklin Roosevelt, a friend of private-sector unionism, drew a line when it came to government workers: "Meticulous attention," the president insisted in 1937, "should be paid to the special relations and obligations of public servants to the public itself and to the Government....The process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service." The reason? F.D.R. believed that "[**a] strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to obstruct the operations of government until their demands are satisfied**. Such **action** looking **toward the paralysis of government** by those who have sworn to support it **is unthinkable and intolerable**." Roosevelt was hardly alone in holding these views, even among the champions of organized labor. Indeed, the first president of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, believed it was "impossible to bargain collectively with the government."

Courts across the nation also generally held that collective bargaining by government workers should be forbidden on the legal grounds of sovereign immunity and unconstitutional delegation of government powers. In 1943, a New York Supreme Court judge held: To tolerate or recognize any combination of civil service employees of the government as a labor organization or union is not only incompatible with the spirit of democracy, but inconsistent with every principle upon which our government is founded. **Nothing is more dangerous to public welfare than to admit that hired servants of the State can dictate to the government the** hours, the wages and **conditions under which they will carry on essential services vital to the welfare, safety, and security of the citizen. To admit** as true **that government employees have power to halt or check the functions of government unless their demands are satisfied, is to transfer to them all legislative, executive and judicial power.** Nothing would be more ridiculous.

**The very nature of many public services** — such as policing the streets and putting out fires — **gives government a monopoly or near monopoly; striking public employees could** **therefore** **hold the public hostage**. As long-time New York Times labor reporter A. H. Raskin wrote in 1968: "The community cannot tolerate the notion that it is defenseless at the hands of organized workers to whom it has entrusted responsibility for essential services."

**The rights of striking workers should not overrule those of the greater public; legislative and judicial action are necessary**

**Feely 10**

Feely, Joseph J (C. Founded in Boston in 1815, the North American Review is the oldest literary magazine in the US. Published at the University of Northern Iowa (Cedar Falls) since 1968, on six occasions during that period, it has been a finalist for the National Magazine Award (the magazine equivalent of the Pulitzer Prize), and it has twice won the top award in the Fiction category–in head-to-head competition with The New Yorker, Harper's, The Atlantic Monthly, and so on. No other university-sponsored periodical has an equivalent record of achievement. Published five times each year, the NAR is well-known for its early discovery of young, talented fiction writers and poets. But it also publishes creative nonfiction, with emphasis on increasing concerns about environmental and ecological matters, multiculturalism, and exigent issues of gender and class.) “The Right to Strike: Its Limitations.” The North American Review, vol. 191, no. 654, University of Northern Iowa, 1910, pp. 644–51, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25106661>.

Ordinarily, in the case of an effective strike, but two parties are primarily affected? the employer and the striking employee, though **the public is in the end the party most surely**, if but **in directly, affected by every strike**, for upon the result of the strike depends the transfer of some economic advantage. 1er instance, **if the strike be one to enforce** the familiar demand for **shorter hours or higher wages**, its success means a higher cost of the article produced, and **this higher cost** it can safely be asserted is not long borne by the employer, but **is soon shifted** by him **to the consuming public in the form of a higher price for the article produced. There is**, however, a class of **strikes in which the public is directly affected**, and in the consequence of which it has a paramount interest, as, for instance, **strikes upon public-service instrumentalities** which interrupt commerce, transportation, communication or other utilities **essential to the welfare of the public**. In such a strike the striking employees know that their unrestrained power of interference with the operation of those instrumentalities, which society has created for its welfare and convenience, supported (as are the strikers) by its patronage, and **the consequent annoyance is the most effective weapon which the strikers possess** to coerce the employer into acceding to their demands. The courts have had occasion to give but slight judicial attention to this class of cases lately so menacing to the public. One is frequently met by the statement that what one may do the many may do. That is obviously not true, for the reason that the act of the many is not the same in intention or effect as the individual act. A man may walk down the street as he chooses, but a body of men may not walk down the same street in procession without a permit from the public authorities. Here is a clear illustration that the right of the individual to walk upon the street is subject to the limitation that he may not walk in concert with large numbers, even though he wishes so to do. While the law permits the individual not under specific contract to quit his work arbitrarily and for little or no reason, his right to do this is subject to the limitation that he must not do so at such time or in such a manner as to destroy his em ployer's property or endanger the public safety. For instance, if he were engaged as engineer upon an engine, he would not be justified in quitting at a time when he had such a fire or head of steam on as might, by leaving the engine unattended, cause an explosion and so endanger the public safety or destroy his employer's property. Again, an individual under contract not terminable at will may not lawfully break his agreement, and so to cease work under such circumstances is unlawful. The character of the contract to work for another is such that except in certain peculiar instances public policy does not compel the specific performance thereof by the individual, although still branding the breach as illegal and awarding damages there for. In spite of the somewhat unsettled state of our law in this respect, it is clear that even the right of the individual to cease work is limited: (1) By the paramount right of the body politic to assure its own safety and (2) by the co-equal rights of other individuals. Notwithstanding the existence of these two general restrictions upon the individual's right, the value of freedom of movement and choice among its citizens is considered of such paramount importance to the community that the right of the individual to cease work is regarded as a right higher in degree than most of those rights with which it comes in contact, so that the single person may exercise his right for an arbitrary, absurd or illogical cause, if he will, or for any cause not affirmatively stamped by the law as illegal. At the outset we encounter this striking difference between the status of the individual and that of the group, that whereas the privilege of the individual to work or not, as he sees fit, is treated as of the greatest importance to society at large, the right of the group to strike simultaneously, containing as it does, potentialities of far-reaching harm and destruction to the whole body politic through its many citizens affected, is regarded not as of supreme importance, but only as of equal rank with the privileges of others, and since the exercise of this right almost inevitably works intentional injury to others, those who take upon themselves to invoke its aid are held strictly accountable for its use in a justifiable manner and for a justifiable end. The privilege of using this right to quit work arbitrarily, which we see in the case of the individual, no longer exists in the group, who are permitted to avail themselves of it only when such use can be justified; it cannot be said to be justified when the damage in flicted is out of all proportion to the benefit sought for or when the end striven for is arbitrary or contrary to the accepted law. As the strike by a combination of individuals must be acts of individuals plus the effect of concerted action, the combination must of necessity be subject to such limitations as apply to individual action, and also to such limitations as are peculiar to the resulting action of the combination, for the reason that the power of concerted activity is essentially so different and so vast, and its use so infinitely more coercive in comparison with individual effort, that its exercise in the same manner as that allowed to individual activity would completely overshadow resisting endeavor on the part of citizens acting severally. Clearly, then, the right to use such enormous power, a power derived from the very existence of organized society, must of necessity be a qualified privilege which can only be taken justifiably or reasonably with due regard to the rights of that society which makes its exercise possible, and not in such a manner as directly or intentionally to injure or unnecessarily interfere with or oppress the public. In a recent case the Supreme Court of Massachusetts said:\* " There is a fact which puts a further limitation on what acts a labor union can legally do. That is the increase of power which a combination of citizens has over the individual citizen. Take, for example, the power of a labor union to compel by a strike compliance with its demands. Speaking generally, a strike to be successful means not only coercion and compulsion, but coercion and compulsion which, for practical purposes, are irresistible. A successful strike by laborers means in many if not in most cases that for practical purposes the strikers have such a control of the labor which the employer must have that he has to yield to their demands. A single individual may well be left to take his chances in a struggle with another individual. But in a struggle with a number of persons combined together to fight an individual the individual's chance is small, if it exists at all. It is plain that a strike by a combination of persons has a power of coercion which an individual does not have." The result of this greater power of coercion, on the part of a combination of individuals, is that what is lawful for an individual is not the test of what is lawful for a combination of individuals; or to state it in another way, there are things which it is lawful for an individual to do which it is not lawful for a combination of individuals to do. exist only for the purpose of promoting a cause in the first class and to be non-existent where the cause falls within the second division. Some instances in which such combinations were found to be for an unjustifiable end, hence an unlawful purpose, are Where the object was: 1. To secure a monopoly of a trade or calling. 2. To create or maintain a closed shop. 3. The sympathetic strike. 4. To procure the discharge of a workman because he does not belong to an organization. 5. To induce the violation of a contract on the part of a third person. 6. To violate the actor's contract. 7. To enforce the collection of a fine on an employee levied for the purpose of compelling him to join in a strike. 8. To force upon the employer rules for arbitration made wholly by the union. 9. Improper interference with the right of the employers to have access to a free labor market. It will be noticed that courts have largely had to consider such combined action as dealt with the interference of co-equal rights of the other individuals. The courts have said that "in this, as in every other case of equal rights, the right of each individual . . . may be said to end where that of another begins." The right to labor is the primitive right of man; deny it to him and the right to live is denied. The right to labor includes the right to dispose of one's labor. The right to dispose of one's ]abor with full freedom involves the correlative duty on the part of others to abstain from any obstruction of the fullest exercise of such rights. The denial of this right not only affects the individual, but is an attack upon the public welfare and so is against public policy. For both of these reasons, therefore, the court will enjoin any unjustifiable infringement of this right. Thus far have the courts gone in interpreting and applying the law for the preservation of individual rights, in defining what limitations shall be applied to combined action which interferes with co-equal rights of others as individuals. The application of the same principles would seem adequate to protect the public from the consequences of much of the hasty, inconsiderate, or improper concerted action in those cases where such action vitally affects the public welfare. Certainly the interest of the public should have as prompt and as effective consideration and protection as those of the individual or group of individuals **The right of the body politic to assure its own safety is the highest conceivable right**. Why should not the concerted action of large bodies of men deriving their income from the patronage of the public, tending directly to public injury, be subordinated to the paramount right of the body politic to assure its own safety ? **Why should the lesser rights be protected and the greater right be subjected to unrestrained attack ? Such paramount right of the public would seem to be a sufficient justification for legislative action** creating tribunals to which matters growing out of industrial disputes involving the public welfare should be left for compulsory arbitration and settlement, as soon as the creation of such a tribunal be deemed expedient. Until such a method of controlling this sort of industrial strife be created, **it will be the duty of courts to interfere**, whenever it is shown, in due course of legal procedure, that the public safety or welfare is threatened **to determine not only the legality** of the issues involved, **but also whether** in any event **the concerted action is** such as is **likely to endanger the public safety or welfare, and if** such be **found to be** a **fact**, then by their man date to **prohibit such** arbitrary **concerted action on the part of any group of men.**

**Empirical Evidence: University labor strikes have an overwhelmingly negative impact on students**

**Wickens 11**

Wickens, Christine M (C. Dr. Christine Wickens is an Independent Scientist in the Institute for Mental Health Policy Research at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health. In addition to her appointment as Associate Professor in the Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology, Dr. Wickens also holds appointments in the Dalla Lana School of Public Health (DLSPH) and the Institute of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation. She currently serves as Director of the Master of Science in Community Health program in Addiction and Mental Health at DLSPH. Dr. Wickens has served on the Board of Directors of the Canadian Association of Road Safety Professionals (CARSP), and is a two-time recipient of CARSP’s Dr. Charles Miller Award for top-ranking research presented at their annual national conference). "The academic and psychosocial impact of labor unions and strikes on university campuses." Higher education: Teaching, internationalization and student issues, NOVA Science Publishers, 2011: 107-133.

It is evident from the available literature that **the overall psychosocial impact of a university labor dispute on students has generally been negative**. **Although** **students may have experienced a sense of gratification** or exaltation **early on in a dispute**, **they** have generally **developed a sense of apathy towards their studies as a strike continued** (Albas & Albas, 2000). Although some students have expressed a positive change in their self-concept as they discovered a sense of altruism during a strike (Albas & Albas, 2000), **most students have generally experienced feelings of anger over being caught in the midst of a dispute, as well as feelings of anxiety concerning financial implications of a strike and powerlessness over the situation** (Albas & Albas, 2000; Grayson, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1999; Greenglass et al., 2002; Wickens et al., 2006; York University Sub-Committee, 2002)**.** Students have abandoned their daily routines: spending more time with friends, sleeping in, and increasing their consumption of alcoholic beverages (Wickens et al., 2006). **During a dispute, their satisfaction with their academic programs and their overall ratings of the university have declined** (Amos et al., 1993; Grayson, 1997b, 1997c; Wickens et al., 2006). Likewise, **opinions about faculty and staff have been found to be more negative during a strike** (Amos et al., 1993), although these attitudes can be reversed if students are accommodated in the post- strike period (Grayson, 1997c). **Overall, the emotional, cognitive, behavioral, and health- related consequences of a labor strike for students are detrimental**; and although some of these effects may be short-lived or reversed in the post-strike period, **these consequences should be minimized or avoided by future parties to a university labor disruption**.

### **C2: Union Discrimination**

**The aff increases the ability for unions to organize effectively increasing their power-**

**Racial segregation lingers in unions even if it is no longer enforced**

<https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/unions-ignore-long-history-of-excluding-minorities-from-jobs/article_ef58bccd-f04a-5172-8dbd-18b8ee5eb9e2.html>

Dogan, Shamed. “Unions Ignore Long History of Excluding Minorities from Jobs.” STLtoday.com, 21 Nov. 2017, https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/unions-ignore-long-history-of-excluding-minorities-from-jobs/article\_ef58bccd-f04a-5172-8dbd-18b8ee5eb9e2.html.

**Dogan 17**

Herbert Hill, the labor director of the NAACP, wrote about this fact in 1959. In his seminal article “Labor Unions and the Negro: The Record of Discrimination,” he noted, “the Negro worker’s historical experience with organized labor has not been a happy one. ... Trade unions practice either total exclusion of the Negro, segregation (in the form of ‘Jim Crow’ locals or ‘auxiliaries’), or enforce separate, racial seniority lines which limit Negro employment to menial and unskilled classifications.” One such tool wielded against minorities was prevailing wage laws. In the 1930s, New York Congressman Robert Bacon, angry that black Americans were competing with white workers for jobs, introduced the Davis-Bacon Act, which requires contractors on federally funded construction projects to pay the “local prevailing wage.” This policy has been implemented in many states as well, including Missouri, to force governments to only negotiate with white-dominated unions. This policy remains as a vestige of a racist past, and it harms American workers and taxpayers to this day. In addition, minimum wage laws were instituted a century ago in large part to prevent white workers from having to compete with cheaper labor from immigrants and African-Americans. Even though today’s “Fight for $15” effort to raise the minimum wage to $15/hour is supported by many minority groups with good intentions, it would likely have the unintended consequence of replacing young low-wage workers with older workers, disproportionately hurting minority youth.

**Unions prioritize white workers**

<https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2010/1/cj30n1-4.pdf>

Unions and Discrimination - Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2010/1/cj30n1-4.pdf.

**Moreno 10**

In addition to the direct impact of union discrimination, union power had many indirect effects that harmed black (as well as other nonunion) workers. Unionization of American’s “core” industries (such as autos and steel) ultimately reduced employment, reducing black opportunities to rise from the lower-paid “periphery” to the good core jobs. When unionization drove up labor costs in the coal- mining industry, for example, owners substituted capital for labor, and black workers bore the brunt of this “technological unemploy- ment” (Woodrum 2007). Organized labor lobbied for higher mini- mum wage laws, which further increased black unemployment. (The black unemployment rate, previously about the same as the white rate, became regularly twice as high after World War II.) When they unionized unskilled jobs, unions made these jobs more attractive to white workers, who often took them though they pos- sessed greater skills than the jobs required. While the impact of union power was clearer in the structure of job lines, promotion, seniority, and training, union leaders often claimed that discrimina- tion in hiring—an employer prerogative—was the real culprit. But unionization raised the cost of labor and thus reduced the number of jobs, which was just the obverse way to control the labor supply (Simons 1944). Labor economist W. H. Hutt had seen the power of white work- ers to transfer employment and income from excluded minorities to themselves in South Africa. He noted that “majorities under union protection are notoriously unconcerned about the harm wrought to those excluded, or the reduction caused in the aggregate income of the community” (Hutt 1973: 54). All of these union or union-related interventions increased the need for race-based remedial intervention. Trumka was repeating one of the hoariest myths in the history of the American labor movement. Usually calling it the “divide and con- quer” tactic, labor leaders claim that employers have deliberately fomented racial animus among their workers, in order to keep the “working class” disunited and weak. Trumka’s UMW is particularly proud of having established a successful interracial union in the face of such employer tactics. He is not likely to tell stories like those of the Illinois coal strike of 1898. When an agreement between the UMW and the mine owners expired, the UMW went on strike, and violently prevented black workers from taking their former jobs. The union had the full support of Illinois Governor John R. Tanner, who swore that he would use the state militia to “shoot to pieces with Gatling guns” any train bringing in black workers. The militia captain in Pana, Illinois, pledged his support. “If any Negroes are brought into Pana while I am in charge, and they refuse to retreat when ordered to do so, I will order my men to fire,” he pledged. “If I lose every man under my command no Negroes shall land in Pana.” Several black miners were murdered in the ensuing weeks. The AFL passed a resolution praising Governor Tanner (who had been indicted by a grand jury for allowing the situation to get out of control), and “Remember Pana” became a UMW slogan. Mother Jones asked to be buried nearby those “responsible for Illinois being the best organized labor state in America” (Moreno 2006: 61–63, Gorn 2001: 289). While it is true that the UMW succeeded in many places in establishing interracial unions—and in Alabama, at least, in the face of genuine “divide and conquer” tactics by the mine owners—in Illinois the “near invisibility” of blacks in UMW offices “served as a reminder to black miners of just how successful whites had been in blocking their entry into the coal- fields above the Ohio River” (Lewis 1987: 100). The Illinois UMW was just one example of the fact that race was much less often used against as by organized labor. Race was a con- venient way to do what unions do. Unions are, in economic terms, cartels. Their goal is to insulate their members from competition, to increase the price of their product (wages) and lower its output (hours). Unions do this by “controlling the labor supply.” And one of the most convenient ways to do this is to exclude easily identified groups like racial minorities (Becker 1971, Posner 1984, Reynolds 1984). The South African economist W. H. Hutt was among the first to observe this phenomenon. While racial animus certainly was a fac- tor in labor-market discrimination, “We do not, however, find color prejudice as such the main origin—nor, perhaps, even the most important cause—of most economic color bars. The chief source of color discrimination is, I suggest, to be found in the natural determi- nation to defend economic privilege” (Hutt 1964: 27). South Africa’s Mines and Works (Colour Bar) Act of 1911 was passed to appease white union members’ demand to abate black competition. When the owners continued to employ black miners, the “Rand Rebellion” of 1922 ensued, “one of the bloodiest labor disputes ever to occur anywhere in the world,” followed by more restrictive legislation to reserve jobs for white unionists in 1924 (Sowell 1990: 27).

**Interest Arbitration CP**

#### CP Text: Employees should have the right to request a government-mandated interest arbitration session, to renegotiate contracts and wages.

#### Arbitration is the resolving of a conflict through a neutral arbitrator

American Bar, A. **American Bar Association.** **(n.d.).** https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute\_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProcesses/arbitration/.

**Arbitration is a private process where disputing parties agree that one or several individuals can make a decision about the dispute after receiving evidence and hearing arguments**. Arbitration is different from mediation because **the neutral arbitrator has the authority to make a decision about the dispute**. The arbitration process is similar to a trial in that the parties make opening statements and present evidence to the arbitrator. **Compared to traditional trials, arbitration can usually be completed more quickly and is less formal.** For example, often the parties do not have to follow state or federal rules of evidence and, in some cases, the arbitrator is not required to apply the governing law.

#### Interest Arbitration is a legislative reworking of contracts

**Anderson**, A., & **Krause**, L. A. (19**87**). Interest Arbitration: The Alternative to the Strike. Fordham Law Review, 56(2), 153–179.

**Interest arbitration is a process in which the terms** and conditions **of the employment contract are established by a final and binding decision of the arbitration panel**.' It differs from grievance arbitration, which involves the interpretation of the employment contract to determine whether the conditions of employment have been breached.2 Thus, **interest arbitration** essentially is **a legislative process**, while grievance arbitration essentially is a judicial process. The following anecdote is a useful starting point for understanding the significance of interest arbitration.

#### Either the right to strike or interest arbitration is needed for collective bargaining, and interest arbitration doesn’t link to the disadd or solvency deficit

**Anderson**, A., & **Krause**, L. A. (19**87**). Interest Arbitration: The Alternative to the Strike. Fordham Law Review, 56(2), 153–179.

It is our view that **either the right to strike or interest arbitration is needed to make collective bargaining work**. The success of collective bargaining requires only one of these alternatives**. The fact that the right to strike is banned' 6 in all cases where interest arbitration is required by statute 17 bears out this point**. **In those states that have adopted interest arbitration, illegal strikes are virtually nonexistent.** Undeniably, in some cases the strike weapon can be extremely effective in obtaining bargaining rights for employees as well as in achieving contract gains. Unfortunately, however**, a strike can result in the self-immolation of those employees without the power to strike effectively."**8 Moreover, even **states** that **have sanctioned the right to strike for some public employees** **have not done so** for police, firefighters and other **categories of employees who have the power to threaten** seriously **the health and safety of the community** if they strike. 9 We submit that **interest arbitration enables all employees to achieve favorable employment contract terms** 20 by offering an alternative to the strike that similarly stimulates bargaining.

#### NET BENEFIT: 1 - No link to the DA, no shutdowns of work 2 - No link to the solvency deficit, arbitrators are neutral and federally protected 3 - Also prevents unreasonable worker demands 4 - Reveals unfair work practices directly to federal employees