K – Utopia – 1NC

### **Hegemony Link**

#### **Hegemony is the foundation of transnational corporations’ power and the drive of capitalist nation’s for growth and power**

**Woodley**, D. (20**15**). GLOBALIZATION AND CAPITALIST GEOPOLITICS. Library.Oapen.Org. Retrieved November 17, 2021, from https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/id/94176c60-17ea-44e1-88e2-3961b89cc6ee/625755.pdf Daniel Woodley teaches Politics at DLD College in London, UK, and is the author of numerous books and articles on political theory and international politics, including Fascism and Political Theory (2010) and Globalization and Capitalist Geopolitics (2015). //ear

**What,** therefore, **does it mean to speak of ‘capitalist sovereignty’?** As we saw in Chapter 1, **this issue is inextricably tied to the core problematic of globalization, namely the transition from imperial state hegemony to global corporatism in a posthegemonic order where sovereign power is diffused through new structures of global capitalist integration and control necessitated by the transnationalization of production, trade and investment.** Although this economic order has its political origins in colonial relations of domination established by Europe, **the logic of corporate globalization lies not in empire building but in the diffuse articulation of capitalist sovereignty through a pluralistic structure of global governance which attempts to transcend the Hobbesian antinomy of disorder and sovereignty through the logic of synarchy, and thus to escape the ‘classical categories of political authority, resting instead on the dialectical fusion of segmental autonomy and collective policy formation’** (Chryssochoou 2009: 131). **As a response to the exhaustion of state-democratic capitalism, globalization points towards new forms of coordinated social management which originate in, yet potentially override, the prerogative power of sovereign states which collectively defined the spatial and legal order of international law and politics in the early modern period**. On the one hand, capitalist sovereignty resolves at a global level a tension between equal sovereignty and material inequality in a world system mediated by finance: sovereign equality is ‘interdependent with the historical development and universalization of capitalist social relations by which the formal separation of the purely “political” states system and the “economic” sphere (the world market) was effected’ (Spronk 2004: 1). On the other hand, it ‘deterritorializes social forms and liberates flows of desires from restrictive codes. **As it deterritorializes and decodes, it creates artificial neo-territorialities that reconcile the liberated flows from the requisites of surplus accumulation’** (Gammon 2010: 368). This problematic was examined by Hardt and Negri (2000) in a groundbreaking yet ultimately flawed study in which the authors posited an abstract conceptualization of empire as a global network of ‘biopower’, which dominates life in its entirety leading to a ‘perpetual and universal peace outside of history’. Brilliant as their intervention was, however, the authors not only prematurely announced the death of the state (failing to anticipate the enduring relevance of spatial and legal boundaries for globalization in the absence of a single binding juridical value beyond the capitalist logic of equivalence), but failed to specify **how capitalist sovereignty – as an immanent Capitalist sovereignty 23 and deterritorializing constitutive force expressed through the homogenizing, centralizing force of striation** (patterning/rendering/homogenizing) – **is reconciled with the transnationally constituted geopolitical power of the Anglosphere as it struggles to delay the inevitable transition to a multipolar global growth system presupposed by corporate globalization**. Whether advanced by cheerleaders or critics of the Washington consensus, however, accounts of global order as a seamless totality without an exterior governed by a single disciplinary logic must be rejected if we are to explain the interrelationship between state territoriality and corporate power, and the persistence of space for the valorization of financial capital (Mezzadra & Neilson 2013). **To explain the emerging institutional form of transnational corporate power it is necessary to go beyond the sweeping generalities of post-Marxism to investigate how capitalist sovereignty is instantiated at a regional and transnational level, colliding with older articulations of legal and political regulation embedded in the nation form as a fetishistically constituted territorial unit**. As Robinson argues, **states are ‘social relations that have historically been territorialized but those relations are not by definition territorial’** (Robinson 2007: 15), **yet states fulfil an indispensible function in the reproduction of capitalist power.** Contra Hardt and Negri, the **theory of capitalist sovereignty must be grounded in a more comprehensive theory of global corporate power supported by state actors**, **rather than a ‘plane of immanence’ juxtaposed to the transcendental sovereignty of states**: as the most advanced form of human social organization, **transnational corporate power constitutes an agent of globalizing capital which transgresses historic territorial sovereignties yet cannot exist in unstriated space – that is, cannot overcome barriers to accumulation in unsecured space at risk from a potential ‘deviation from the dominant that enables the generation of new subjectivities and forms of community’** (Gonzaga 2009: 34).

### **Generic Unions Link**

#### **Unions fundamentally fail at overcoming existing labor systems, furthering capitalist systems**

**Eidlin**, B. (20**20**, June 1). Why Unions Are Good — But Not Good Enough. Jacobin. Retrieved November 17, 2021, from https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/01/marxism-trade-unions-socialism-revolutionary-organizing Barry Eidlin is an assistant professor of sociology at McGill University and the author of Labor and the Class Idea in the United States and Canada. //ear

But **just as unions could allow the proletariat to take shape and challenge the bourgeoisie for power, Marx and Engels also saw that they were a partial, imperfect vehicle for doing so for two reasons.** **First, unions’ fundamentally defensive role, protecting workers against employers’ efforts to drive a competitive race to the bottom, meant that they limited themselves “to a guerrilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead of** **simultaneously trying to change it.**” **Thus, even militant trade unions found themselves struggling for “a fair day’s work for a fair day’s wage” without challenging the bourgeoisie’s fundamental power, particularly the wage labor system**. And some layers of the trade union officialdom were content to fight for privileges for their small segment of the working class, leaving most workers behind. **Second, unions’ focus on wages and workplace issues tended to reinforce a division between economic and political struggles.** This division was explicit with the more conservative “old” unions in Britain, which “bar[red] all political action on principle and in their charters.” **But even with more progressive formations, such as the early nineteenth century’s Chartists, or the late nineteenth century’s “new” unions, Marx and Engels saw that the transition from workplace struggles to politics was not automatic**. For one, it varied across national contexts. Engels observed that French workers were much more likely to mobilize politically, while English workers “fight, not against the Government, but directly against the bourgeoisie.” **But beyond national variation, they saw a recurring pattern of division, separating economic and political struggles by organization.** Reflecting on the early to mid-nineteenth century English working-class movement, Engels noted a threefold divide between “socially-based” Chartists, “politically-based” Socialists, and conservative, craft-based trade unions. While the Chartists were “purely a working-men’s [sic] cause freed from all bourgeois elements,” they remained “theoretically the more backward, the less developed.” **Socialists may have been more theoretically sophisticated, but their bourgeois origins made it difficult to “amalgamate completely with the working class.” A**lthough young Engels thought an alliance of Chartism and socialism was underway, the alliance proved elusive. By **the 1870s, Marx opined that politically, the English working class was “nothing more than the tail of the great Liberal Party, i.e., henchmen of the capitalists.”** Likewise, Engels had soured on the English working class. Both saw promise in the militant worker protest in the United States at the time, seeing the seeds of a nascent labor party. But that too fell short. **Thus, unions failed in Marx and Engels’s central task: the formation of “a political organization of the working class as a whole.” Marx and Engels’s sober analyses of unions’ concrete difficulties in moving from economic to political struggles stood at odds with many of their theoretical pronouncements, where this transition seemed inevitable.** While they noted in the Manifesto that the “organization of the proletarians into a class, and, consequently, into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves,” they also asserted that “it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier.” In The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx asserted that “in the struggle . . . this mass [of people transformed by economic conditions into workers] becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself.” If they were attuned to the challenges of class formation, and the contradictory roles unions could play in that process, they never drew out the theoretical implications of their concrete analyses. **Nonetheless, in Marx and Engels’s work we can detect in embryonic form many of the core questions that would orient subsequent Marxist debates about trade unions’ role in class formation and class struggle. Marx and Engels saw that unions were inherently products of their historical period, limited by existing relations of production**. At the same time, as organizational expressions of the working class, unions could play a key role in reshaping relations of production. As for enhancing or inhibiting class struggle, they saw that unions’ focus on concrete, practical workplace questions such as wages and working hours was a necessary step in developing the proletariat’s fighting capacity, but also constrained workers within a capitalist framework, limiting their ability to fight for broader demands such as abolition of the wage system. Similarly, different types of union organization could create different class identities, from craft unions’ narrow exclusion to the “new” unions’ broader inclusivity. As for the relation between unions and politics, they understood unions’ necessary but limited role in mobilizing the working class around political demands. Still, these core insights remained fragmentary. Later theorists would flesh them out.

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#### **Capitalism has heightened dissemination of systems of social control that have colonized the mind. It has become a protection racket—it’s the root cause of every impact. Left unaddressed, it’ll cause extinction—only a revolution can solve.**

**Robinson**, PhD Sociology, **16**(William I, professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis>)//RM

In these mean streets of globalized capitalism in crisis, it has become profitable to turn poverty and inequality into a tourist attraction. The South African Emoya Luxury Hotel and Spa company has made a glamorized spectacle of it. The resort recently advertised an opportunity for tourists to stay "in our unique Shanty Town ... and experience traditional township living within a safe private game reserve environment." A cluster of simulated shanties outside of Bloemfontein that the company has constructed "is ideal for team building, braais, bachelors [parties], theme parties and an experience of a lifetime," read the ad. The luxury accommodations, made to appear from the outside as shacks, featured paraffin lamps, candles, a battery-operated radio, an outside toilet, a drum and fireplace for cooking, as well as under-floor heating, air conditioning and wireless internet access. A well-dressed, young white couple is pictured embracing in a field with the corrugated tin shanties in the background. The only thing missing in this fantasy world of sanitized space and glamorized poverty was the people themselves living in poverty. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation. The "luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole. **Faced with a stagnant global economy, elites have managed to turn war, structural violence and inequality into opportunities for capital, pleasure and entertainment**. It is hard not to conclude that unchecked capitalism has become what I term "sadistic capitalism," in which the suffering and deprivation generated by capitalism become a source of aesthetic pleasure, leisure and entertainment for others. I recently had the opportunity to travel through several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around the world. Everywhere I went, social polarization and political tensions have reached **explosive dimensions.** Where is the crisis headed, what are the possible outcomes and what does it tell us about global capitalism and resistance? This crisis is not like earlier structural crises of world capitalism, such as in the 1930s or 1970s. This one is fast becoming systemic. The crisis of humanity shares aspects of earlier structural crises of world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I highlight here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a descent into chaos and uncertainty. 1) The level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented in the face of out-of-control, over-accumulated capital. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam published a follow-up to its report on global inequality that had been released the previous year. According to the new report, now just 62 billionaires -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as one half of the world's population, and the top 1% owns more wealth than the other 99% combined. Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the global power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some 95 percent of the world's wealth, while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with just 5 percent. This 20-80 divide of global society into haves and the have-nots is the new global social apartheid. It is evident not just between rich and poor countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent high-consumption sectors alongside the downward mobility, "precariatization," destabilization and expulsion of majorities. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation: The transnational capitalist class cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to stagnation in the world economy. The signs of an impending depression are everywhere. The front page of the February 20 issue of The Economist read, "The World Economy: Out of Ammo?" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing the 80 percent, co-opting some into a hegemonic bloc and repressing the rest. **Alongside the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression is heightened dissemination through the culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that depoliticize through consumerist fantasies and the manipulation of desire**. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates, another strategy of co-optation is the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled toward scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be **increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization.** Scapegoated communities are under siege, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in India, the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with its 20th century predecessor, 21st century fascism hinges on such manipulation of social anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis. **Extreme inequality requires extreme violence** and repression that lend to projects of 21st century fascism. 2) The system is fast reaching the ecological limits to its reproduction. We have reached several tipping points in what environmental scientists refer to as nine crucial "planetary boundaries." We have already exceeded these boundaries in three areas -- climate change, the nitrogen cycle and diversity loss. There have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system. We have entered what Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have transformed up to half of the world's surface. We are altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the oceans at a rate that undermines the conditions for life. The ecological dimensions of global crisis cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, The Sixth Extinction. "No other creature has ever managed this ... The Sixth Extinction will continue to determine the course of life long after everything people have written and painted and built has been ground into dust." Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible. The human-nature contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network collapsed about AD 900 due to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, **given capital's implacable impulse to accumulate profit and its accelerated commodification of nature, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system**. "Green capitalism" appears as an oxymoron, as sadistic capitalism's attempt to turn the ecological crisis **into a profit-making opportunity**, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction. 3) **The sheer magnitude of the means of violence is unprecedented**, as is the concentrated control over the means of global communications and the production and circulation of knowledge, symbols and images. We have seen the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more perturbing than that described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities. Now, however, the corporate and political powers that be force obedience even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global apartheid involves the creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where elites are insulated through new systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country. Urban areas around the world are now green zoned through gentrification, gated communities, surveillance systems, and state and private violence. Inside the world's green zones, privileged strata avail themselves of privatized social services, consumption and entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite sealed off under the protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. Green zoning takes on distinct forms in each locality. In Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City, the most exclusive residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are accessible only by helicopter and private gated roads. In Johannesburg, a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals rows of mansions that appear as military compounds, with private armed towers and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner suburbs where the country's elite could live out their aspirations and fantasies. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and shopping centers and English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles, where I live, the freeway system now has an express lane reserved for those that can pay an exorbitant toll. On this lane, the privileged speed by, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in the city's notorious bumper-to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get to and from work. There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into the exclusive lane, it is instantly recorded by this surveillance system and a heavy fine is imposed on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous. Outside of the global green zones, warfare and police containment have become normalized and sanitized for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even glamorizing war and violence as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news" channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It desensitizes, bringing about complacency and indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are prison industrial complexes, immigrant and refugee repression and control systems, the criminalization of outcast communities and capitalist schooling. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate economy, in particular, **aim to colonize the mind -- to undermine the ability to think critically and outside the dominant worldview**. A neofascist culture emerges through militarism, extreme masculinization, racism and racist mobilizations against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over. **If the capitalist system stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and faces collapse.** In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. **There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism.** Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? **With the limits to expansion comes a turn toward militarized accumulation -- making wars of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the militarization of social and political institutions so as to continue to generate new opportunities for accumulation in the face of stagnation.** 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a "planet of slums," alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to these sophisticated systems of **social control and destruction**. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced recruitment of miners at gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo, sweatshops and exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore, the global working class is experiencing accelerated "precariatization." The "new precariat" refers to the proletariat that faces capital under today's unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization, casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are uprooted everywhere, there is a rising reserve army of immigrant labor. The global working class is becoming divided into citizen and immigrant workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and therefore, exploitable. The challenge for dominant groups is how to contain the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity, the immigrant workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st century megacities become the battlegrounds between mass resistance movements and the new systems of mass repression. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside**) are at risk of genocide**, such as those in Gaza, zones in Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria. 6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy and a nation-state-based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and do not wield enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the G-8 and G-20 were unable to impose transnational regulation on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss such regulation. Elites historically have attempted to resolve the problems of over-accumulation by state policies that can regulate the anarchy of the market. However, in recent decades, transnational capital has broken free from the constraints imposed by the nation-state. The more "enlightened" elite representatives of the transnational capitalist class are now clamoring for transnational mechanisms of regulation that would allow the global ruling class to reign in the anarchy of the system in the interests of saving global capitalism from itself and from radical challenges from below. At the same time, the division of the world into some 200 competing nation-states is not the most propitious of circumstances for the global working class. Victories in popular struggles from below in any one country or region can (and often do) become diverted and even undone by the structural power of transnational capital and the direct political and military domination that this structural power affords the dominant groups. In Greece, for instance, the leftist Syriza party came to power in 2015 on the heels of militant worker struggles and a mass uprising. But the party abandoned its radical program as a result of the enormous pressure exerted on it from the European Central Bank and private international creditors. The Systemic Critique of Global Capitalism **A growing number of transnational elites themselves now recognize that any resolution to the global crisis must involve redistribution downward of income.** However, in the viewpoint of those from below, a neo-Keynesian redistribution within the prevailing corporate power structure is not enough. What is required is a redistribution of power downward and transformation toward a system in which social need trumps private profit. **A global rebellion against the transnational capitalist class has spread since the financial collapse of 2008**. Wherever one looks, there is popular, grassroots and leftist struggle, and the rise of new cultures of resistance**: the Arab Spring**; the resurgence of leftist **politics in Greece, Spain and elsewhere in Europe; the tenacious resistance of Mexican social movements following the Ayotzinapa massacre of 2014; the favela uprising in Brazil against the government's World Cup** and Olympic expulsion policies; the student strikes in Chile; the remarkable surge in the Chinese workers' movement; the shack dwellers and other poor people's campaigns in South Africa; **Occupy Wall Street, the immigrant rights movement, Black Lives Matter,** fast food workers' struggle and the mobilization around the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in the United States. This global revolt is spread unevenly and faces many challenges. A number of these struggles, moreover, have suffered setbacks, such as the Greek working-class movement and, tragically, the Arab Spring. What type of a transformation is viable, and how do we achieve it**? How we interpret the global crisis is itself a matter of vital importance** as politics polarize worldwide between a neofascist and a popular response. The systemic critique of global capitalism must strive to influence, from this vantage point, **the discourse and practice of movements for a more just distribution of wealth and power. Our survival may depend on it.**

#### **Thus, we affirm the conceptualization of a real utopia– a radical imagination of an anti-capitalist social order. We allow for imagining a perfect world which is a constituent component in being able to build one.**

**Wright ’12** (Erik Olin Wright, Transforming Capitalism through Real Utopias, American Sociological Review, 26 December 2012) - RM

In what follows I propose **a power- centered framework for addressing these issues anchored in the idea of “real utopias.”** At its core, this proposal **revolves around transforming power relations within the economy in ways that deepen and broaden the possibility of meaningful democracy.** I will begin by briefly discussing two foundational propositions shared by all varieties of critical and emancipatory social science. **The idea of real utopias is one response to the intellectual challenge posed by these propositions**. FOUNDATIONS **All varieties of social science** that have critical and emancipatory aspirations, whether they are anchored in values and beliefs of the left or the right, **share two foundational positions:** Foundational Proposition of Critical Social Science: **Many forms of human suffering and many deficits in human flourishing are the result of existing institutions and social structures.** Foundational Proposition of Emancipatory Social Science: **Transforming existing institutions and social structures in the right way has the potential to substantially reduce human suffering and expand the possibili- ties for human flourishing. The first proposition affirms the very general idea that significant aspects of human suffering and deficits in human flourishing are** not simply the result of human nature, acts of God, or vari- ations in people’s attributes, but are **the result of social causes.** Stated in this abstract way, this proposition is accepted by nearly all sociolo- gists, whether or not they explicitly identify with any of the traditions of critical sociology, and is thus not controversial. The proposition becomes very controversial, of course, when concrete claims are made about the specific mechanisms that generate these harms**. Writers have proposed many social sources of harms: the core structures of the capitalist economy**; unintended effects of the welfare state**; enduring social and cultural structures of racism and sex- ism**; educational institutions; changes in family structures; and particular kinds of technology. A great deal of sociological research attempts to identify these sources of harm and adjudicate among rival arguments. The second proposition should not be con- sidered a simple corollary of the first**. It could be the case that various causal processes con- nected to capitalism explain much human suf- fering, and yet any deliberate attempt at transforming the fundamental structures of capitalism could only make things worse.** The cure could be worse than the disease due to unintended and uncontrollable effects of attempts at deliberate social transformation. This is essentially Hayek’s (1988) argument in his attack on radical reformers. Following a long tradition of classical conservative thought, Hayek makes two central claims (although not stated in precisely these terms): first, **the negative unintended consequences of deliberate social change are generally greater than the positive unintended consequences; second, the larger the attempted social trans- formation, the bigger the negative unintended consequences are likely to be**.1 Taken together, these arguments suggest that even if one accepts the first proposition, in general the second proposition should be rejected. The emancipatory proposition constitutes the “fatal conceit” of intellectuals, in Hayek’s (1988:27) words, that “man is able to shape the world around him according to his wishes.” While I disagree with Hayek’s pessimism and embrace the foundational proposition of emancipatory social science, I do not think such arguments can be dismissed out of hand. **The folk aphorism “the road to hell is paved with good intentions,” has too many historical examples to be ignored, many of them ani- mated by emancipatory aspirations. The idea of real utopias is a way of thinking about alternatives and transformations that responds to these concerns. The expression “real utopia” is meant to be a provocation, for “utopia” and “real” do not comfortably go together.** Thomas Moore coined the word utopia in the early-sixteenth century as a kind of pun, combining the Greek for place—topos—with two prefixes that sound the same in English—ou meaning “not” and eu meaning “good.” **Utopia is thus both a nowhere place and a good place. It is the fan- tasy of a perfect world that fully embodies our moral ideals**. When politicians want to sum- marily discredit a policy proposal without having to provide serious arguments, they call it utopian**. Realists reject such fantasies as a distraction from the serious business of making practical improvements in existing institutions. The idea of real utopias embraces this tension between dreams and practice: utopia implies developing visions of alternatives to dominant institutions that embody our deepest aspirations for a world in which all people have access to the conditions to live flourish- ing lives; real means proposing alternatives attentive to problems of unintended conse- quences, self-destructive dynamics, and diffi- cult dilemmas of normative trade-offs.2 A real utopian holds on to emancipatory ideals with- out embarrassment or cynicism but remains fully cognizant of the deep complexities and contradictions of realizing those ideals**. The exploration of real utopias is an inte- gral part of a broad agenda of an emancipatory social science that includes four basic tasks: 1. Specifying the moral principles for judging social institutions. 2. Using these moral principles as the standards for diagnosis and critique of existing institutions. 3. Developing an account of viable alternatives in response to the critique. 4. Proposing a theory of transformation for real- izing those alternatives**.** First**, how one thinks about alternatives depends in part on one’s conceptualization of the idea of “social system.”** One metaphor for thinking about social systems depicts them as analogous to an organism whose parts are tightly integrated into a functioning whole. There is some degree of freedom and varia- bility in how the parts function, but basically they constitute a totality of functional interde- pendency. If you remove critical parts of the whole or try to dramatically transform them, the whole disintegrates. An alternative metaphor is that a social system is more like an ecosystem. Think of society like a pond. A pond contains many species of fish, insects, and plants. Sometimes an alien species is introduced to an ecosystem and it thrives; sometimes it does not. Some ecosystems are quite fragile and easily dis- rupted; others can tolerate quite significant intrusions of invasive species without being seriously affected. **If you think of society as an ecosystem, it still is the case that every- thing is interdependent, but interactions do not constitute a tightly functionalized totality. This opens up a different way of imagining alternatives. One way to transform an ecosys- tem is to introduce an alien species that ini- tially finds a niche and then gradually displaces certain other species. The idea of real utopias as a way of transforming a soci- ety is more in line with the ecosystem view of society than with the organismic view.** **The second general comment about alter- natives concerns two contrasting ways of thinking about how to make the world a better place—ameliorative reforms and real utopian transformations. Ameliorative reforms look at existing institutions, identify their flaws, and propose improvements that can be enacted. These improvements** matter—they reduce harms and enhance flourishing—but they **are limited to proposals that directly act on exist- ing structures and move one step beyond. Real utopias, in contrast, envision the contours of an alternative social world that embodies emancipatory ideals and then look for social innovation**s we can create in the world as it is **that move us toward that destination.** Some- times, this turns out to be the same as an ame- liorative reform, but often **ameliorative reforms do not constitute building blocks of an emancipatory alternative**. Consider, for example, affirmative action policies around race. Affirmative action is one of the critical policies for combating the pernicious effects of ongoing racism, not merely the legacies of racism in the past. But affirmative action is not, I would argue, a building block of a world of racial justice and emancipation. It is a nec- essary means to move toward such a world, but it is not itself a constituent element of the alternative that we seek. **To embrace real utopias in this way is not to reject ameliorative reforms. In the practical world of struggling to create the social conditions for human flourishing it is important to be a pragmatic idealist. Often this means muddling through with patchwork programs that do not prefigure emancipatory alterna- tives.** Sometimes this is the best one can do. But sometimes it is possible to move strug- gles for equality, democracy, and sustainabil- ity beyond such narrow constraints and create institutions that are constitutive of a more profound alternative.

#### **Anticapitalism does not represent an unattainable utopia but challenges common myths about capitalism.**

**Rogers 14** (Chris Rogers, author, *Capitalism and Its Alternatives: A Critical Introduction*, Zed Books, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lib/umichigan/detail.action?docID=1758713>.) AM //Recut RM

*A note on terminology* The book will draw on four core concepts. The first of these is capitalism. The term capitalism is used throughout the book to refer to the prevailing form of social organization. While acknowledging that the ways in which capitalism operates and the implications of these operations are contested, this book defines capital ism in terms of one commonly accepted distinguishing feature: that capitalism is a system that organizes the production, distribution and exchange of goods, on the basis of private property, with a view to realizing profit and therefore increasing wealth. The second term is alternative capitalism, which is used to describe a system where the capitalistic relationship between state and market is re-regulated, but not fundamentally reformed, in order to try to produce optimal social and economic outcomes. The aim of an alternative capitalism is to maximize wealth and profit by introducing a different structure of rules to govern capitalism. The third concept is that of an alternative to capitalism. An alternative to capitalism is distinct from capitalism because it places an emphasis on social and civic goals, rather than purely focusing on pecuniary gain. In contrast to capitalism, an alternative to capitalism is founded on collective or community property rights, rather than individual property rights, although the form and extent of collective or community property rights may vary. Where the book is referring to either an alternative capitalism or an alternative to capitalism, it uses the form ‘alternative (to) capitalism’. The final concept the book uses is anti-capitalism. It uses the term anti-capitalism to refer to the act of resisting capitalism, whether this occurs by attempting to influence the state, taking control of the state, or actions taken independently or outside of the state. An individual who pursues or wishes to pursue an alternative to capitalism can therefore be described as an anti-capitalist.

Traditions of Resistance   
In its consideration of capitalism and its alternatives, this book accepts that it is possible to perceive capitalism and its con sequences in different ways. Furthermore, it acknowledges that the way in which capitalism and its consequences are perceived will have a fundamental impact on whether people deem capitalism to be desirable, whether they would prefer an alternative capitalism or an alternative to capitalism, and therefore whether they believe that it is important and worthwhile engaging in resistance to capitalism through the social act of anti-capitalism. However, the central argument of this book is that **capitalism displays intrinsic tendencies towards crisis that make an alternative to capitalism desirable, and so justifies anti-capitalist action**. In doing so, it argues that capitalism is a product of social interaction between people, and that it is remade or resisted through our social action. This emphasis on social constitution challenges common assertions about the inevitability of capitalist logic, and in the process shows that the prospect of realizing an alternative to capitalism is more than wishful thinking. In its discussions of alternatives to capitalism, however, this book guards against thinking of alternative forms of social organization as outcomes or utopias. Rather, it shows how various forms of alternative social and economic organization have shown a tendency to degenerate over time, or to reproduce injustices of capitalist social relations. It therefore suggests that **alternatives to capitalism should be thought of as processes that need to be continually made and remade if they are not to degenerate or reproduce the injustices of capitalist social relations, and if desirable outcomes are to be realized**. Reflecting the book’s emphasis on the social constitution of economy and society, it rejects ‘top-down’ attempts to impose an alternative to capitalism by political means, and argues that anticapitalist action should take a ‘bottom-up’ form, which requires democratic and pluralistic experimentation with different models of social and economic organization to expand the space in which non-capitalist activity takes place.

The arguments of the book therefore fit with a long tradition of anti-capitalist resistance. One of the most well-known instances of this kind of resistance was the insurrections of 1968, typified by the student revolts in Paris in May of that year. However, as Michael Watts (2001: 167) noted, the events of 1968 were far more than a local phenomenon; over seventy countries ‘had major student actions during that year [and between] October 1967 and July 1968 there were over 2000 incidents worldwide of student protest alone’. Furthermore, it was not just students engaged in the act of protest, the act of anti-capitalism. According to Watts’ (ibid.: 167) study, ‘if one were to add the related worker and other nonstudent demonstrations each country in the world would, on average, have had over 20 “incidents” over the nine-month period’. Nor was the substance of the protest uniform; 1968 had what Watts (ibid.: 171– 2) has described as its Eastern, Western and Southern moments. In the first, typified by the Prague Spring and the Cultural Revolution in China, the focus of protests was anti-bureaucratic, and directed against the ‘Old Left’ and the corruption people perceived in it. In the second, typified by student protests in Paris and Berkeley, the focus of protests was opposition to consumerism and the pursuit of civil and social rights. In the third, the focus was the rejection of authority in the first generation of independent states in Africa and Latin America, where military dictatorship had displaced democratic rule.

Luc Boltanski (2002: 6) also highlights the diversity of the 1968 movement by distinguishing between its social and artistic critiques, where the former focused on inequality and poverty stemming from capitalism, and the latter on liberation, individual autonomy and authenticity. Michael Löwy (2002: 95) links this distinction between the social and artistic critique of capitalism to romanticism, which he defines as ‘rebellion against modern capitalist society, in the name of past or premodern social and cultural values, as a protest against the modern disenchantment of the world’. Therefore, the significance of 1968 can be seen not just across space, but also as a reflection of long-established traditions of resistance to prevailing social, political and economic forms or organization. On such readings, the events of 1968 can be interpreted as a demonstration of long-standing anti-capitalist feeling that rested on a critique of the world we live in and the injustices it creates, and in turn motivated action in order to try to address them.

#### **Pedagogical spaces like debate are the crucial staging ground for a radical interrogation of capitalism. The debate space is a crucial educational plane in resisting capitalism and imagining crucial alternatives—the ROB is to vote for the best methodology to resist capitalism**

**McLaren**, Distinguished Fellow – Critical Studies @ Chapman U and UCLA urban schooling prof, and Scatamburlo-D’Annibale, associate professor of Communication – U Windsor, **‘4**

(Peter and Valerie, “Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’,” Educational Philosophy and Theory Vol. 36, Issue 2, p. 183-199)//RM

For well over two decades we have witnessed the jubilant liberal and conservative pronouncements of the demise of socialism. Concomitantly, history's presumed failure to defang existing capitalist relations has been read by many self-identified ‘radicals’ as an advertisement for capitalism's inevitability. As a result, the chorus refrain ‘There Is No Alternative’, sung by liberals and conservatives, has been buttressed by the symphony of post-Marxist voices recommending that we give socialism a decent burial and move on. Within this context, to speak of the promise of Marx and socialism may appear anachronistic, even naïve, especially since the post-al intellectual vanguard has presumably demonstrated the folly of doing so. Yet we stubbornly believe that the chants of T.I.N.A. must be combated for they offer as a fait accompli, something which progressive Leftists should **refuse to accept**—namely **the triumph of capitalism** and its political bedfellow neo-liberalism, which have worked together to naturalize suffering, undermine collective struggle, and obliterate hope. We concur with Amin (1998), who claims that such chants must be defied and revealed as absurd and criminal, and who puts the challenge we face in no uncertain terms: humanity may let itself be led by capitalism's logic to a **fate of collective suicide** or it may pave the way for an alternative humanist project of global socialism. The grosteque conditions that inspired Marx to pen his original critique of capitalism are present and flourishing. The inequalities of wealth and the gross imbalances of power that exist today are leading to abuses that exceed those encountered in Marx's day (Greider, 1998, p. 39). Global capitalism has paved the way for the obscene concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands and created a world increasingly divided between those who enjoy opulent affluence and those who languish in dehumanizing conditions and economic misery. In every corner of the globe, we are witnessing social disintegration as revealed by a rise in abject poverty and inequality. At the current historical juncture, the combined assets of the 225 richest people is roughly equal to the annual income of the poorest 47 percent of the world's population, while the combined assets of the three richest people exceed the combined GDP of the 48 poorest nations (CCPA, 2002, p. 3). Approximately 2.8 billion people—almost half of the world's population—struggle in desperation to live on less than two dollars a day (McQuaig, 2001, p. 27). As many as 250 million children are wage slaves and there are over a billion workers who are either un- or under-employed. These are the concrete realities of our time—realities that **require a vigorous class analysis**, an **unrelenting critique** of capitalism and an oppositional politics capable of confronting what Ahmad (1998, p. 2) refers to as ‘capitalist universality.’ They are realities that require something more than that which is offered by the prophets of ‘difference’ and post-Marxists who would have us relegate socialism to the scrapheap of history and mummify Marxism along with Lenin's corpse. Never before has a Marxian analysis of capitalism and class rule been so desperately needed. That is not to say that everything Marx said or anticipated has come true, for that is clearly not the case. Many critiques of Marx focus on his strategy for moving toward socialism, and with ample justification; nonetheless Marx did provide us with **fundamental insights** into class society that have held true to this day. Marx's enduring relevance lies in his indictment of capitalism which continues to wreak havoc in the lives of most. While capitalism's cheerleaders have attempted to hide its sordid underbelly, Marx's description of capitalism as the sorcerer's dark power is even more apt in light of contemporary historical and economic conditions. Rather than jettisoning Marx, decentering the role of capitalism, and discrediting class analysis, radical educators must continue to engage Marx's oeuvre and extrapolate from it that which is useful **pedagogically, theoretically, and**, most importantly, **politically** in light of the challenges that confront us. The urgency which animates Amin's call for a collective socialist vision necessitates, as we have argued, moving beyond the particularism and liberal pluralism that informs the ‘politics of difference.’ It also **requires** challenging the **questionable assumptions** that have come to constitute the core of contemporary ‘radical’ theory, **pedagogy** and politics. In terms of effecting change, what is needed is a cogent **understanding** of the systemic nature of exploitation and oppression based on the precepts of a radical political economy approach (outlined above) and one that incorporates Marx's notion of ‘unity in difference’ in which people share widely common material interests. Such an understanding extends far beyond the realm of theory, for the manner in which we choose to interpret and explore the social world, the **concepts and frameworks** we use to express our sociopolitical understandings, are more than just abstract categories. They imply intentions, organizational practices, and political agendas. Identifying class analysis as the basis for our understandings and class struggle as the basis for political transformation implies something **quite different** than constructing a sense of political agency around issues of race, ethnicity, gender, etc. Contrary to ‘Shakespeare's assertion that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet,’ it should be clear that this is not the case in political matters. Rather, in politics ‘the essence of the flower lies in the name by which it is called’ (Bannerji, 2000, p. 41). The task for progressives today is to seize the moment and plant the seeds for a political agenda that is grounded in historical possibilities and informed by a vision committed to overcoming exploitative conditions. These seeds, we would argue, must be derived from the tree of radical political economy. For the vast majority of people today—people of all ‘racial classifications or identities, all genders and sexual orientations’—the common frame of reference arcing across ‘difference’, the ‘concerns and aspirations that are most widely shared are those that are rooted in the common experience of everyday life shaped and constrained by political economy’ (Reed, 2000, p. xxvii). While post-Marxist advocates of the politics of ‘difference’ suggest that such a stance is outdated, we would argue that the categories which they have employed to analyze ‘the social’ are now losing their usefulness, particularly in light of actual contemporary ‘social movements.’ All over the globe, there are large anti-capitalist movements afoot. In February 2002, chants of ‘Another World Is Possible’ became the theme of protests in Porto Allegre. It seems that those people struggling in the streets haven’t read about T.I.N.A., the end of grand narratives of emancipation, or the decentering of capitalism. It seems as though the struggle for basic survival and some semblance of human dignity in the mean streets of the dystopian metropoles doesn’t permit much time or opportunity to read the heady proclamations emanating from seminar rooms. As E. P. Thompson (1978, p. 11) once remarked, sometimes ‘experience walks in without knocking at the door, and announces deaths, crises of subsistence, trench warfare, unemployment, inflation, genocide.’ This, of course, does not mean that socialism will inevitably come about, yet a sense of its nascent promise animates current social movements. Indeed, noted historian Howard Zinn (2000, p. 20) recently pointed out that after years of single-issue organizing (i.e. the politics of difference), the WTO and other anti-corporate capitalist protests signaled a turning point in the ‘history of movements of recent decades,’ for it was the issue of ‘class’ that more than anything ‘bound everyone together.’ History, to paraphrase Thompson (1978, p. 25) doesn’t seem to be following Theory's script. Our vision is informed by Marx's historical materialism and his revolutionary socialist humanism, which must not be conflated with liberal humanism. For left politics and pedagogy, a socialist humanist vision remains crucial, whose fundamental features include the creative potential of people to challenge collectively the circumstances that they inherit. This variant of humanism seeks to give expression to the pain, sorrow and degradation of the oppressed, those who labor under the ominous and ghastly cloak of ‘globalized’ capital. It calls for the transformation of those conditions that have prevented the bulk of humankind from fulfilling its potential. It vests its hope for change in the development of critical consciousness and social agents who make history, although not always in conditions of their choosing. The political goal of socialist humanism is, however, ‘not a resting in difference’ but rather ‘the emancipation of difference at the level of human mutuality and reciprocity.’ This would be a step forward for the ‘discovery or creation of our real differences which can only in the end be explored in reciprocal ways’ (Eagleton, 1996, p. 120). Above all else, the enduring relevance of a radical socialist pedagogy and politics is the **centrality** it accords to the interrogation of capitalism. We can no longer afford to remain indifferent to the horror and savagery committed by capitalist's barbaric machinations. We need to recognize that capitalist democracy is unrescuably contradictory in its own self-constitution. Capitalism and democracy cannot be translated into one another without profound efforts at manufacturing empty idealism. Committed Leftists must unrelentingly cultivate a democratic socialist vision that refuses to forget the ‘wretched of the earth,’ the children of the damned and the victims of the culture of silence—a task which requires more than abstruse convolutions and striking ironic poses in the agnostic arena of signifying practices. Leftists must illuminate the little shops of horror that lurk beneath ‘globalization’s’ shiny façade; they must challenge the true ‘evils’ that are manifest in the tentacles of global capitalism's reach. And, more than this, Leftists must search for the cracks in the edifice of globalized capitalism and shine light on those fissures that **give birth to alternatives.** Socialism today, undoubtedly, runs against the grain of received wisdom, but its vision of a vastly improved and freer arrangement of social relations beckons on the horizon. Its unwritten text is nascent in the present even as it exists among the fragments of history and the shards of distant memories. Its potential remains untapped and its promise needs to be redeemed.

**Large-scale threats of future suffering perpetuate capitalist violence and the hegemonic power of the elite, endlessly prolonging suffering. The only response is to interrupt the system, insisting that the urgent bodies across the globe cannot wait**

**Olson ‘15** (Elizabeth Olson, prof of geography @ UNC Chapel Hill ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting and Urgency,’ *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)//RM

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the body is increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially **large-scale future events of forecasted suffering**. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can **distort moral reasoning**. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be **bypassed** because there are **bigger scales to worry about**:¶ What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they nec essitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006)¶ In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). **Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent**, because they are **excluded from the potential collectivity** that could be **suffering everywhere in some future time**. Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014).¶ As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city.¶ In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the **assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency**, the urgent body becomes **literally nonsense, a non sequitur** within societies, states and worlds that will **always be more urgent**.¶ If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency.¶ In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, **depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards infinity’** (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any value. Waiting, like urgency, can **undermine the possibility of self-care** two-fold, first by making people wait for essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123).¶ Waiting can therefore function as a potentially important spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of **governing individuals**, but also to **retain claims over moral urgency**. But there is **growing resistance** to the capture of claims of urgency by the elite, and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of **reclaiming urgency for the body**. In detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps, geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view, and also reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of struggle.¶ In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked – by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when the urgent body is rendered as only waiting, both materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006). Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as **private, apolitical and mundane’** (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply **political, public, and exceptional** as other forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that **a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait**, has the **ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional scope of large-scale futures**. It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate scale of normative priority and social care.¶ In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body. This bias also justifies the production of new waiting places in our material landscape, places like the detention center and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others, the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g. Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that **moral reasoning is important** both because it **exposes normative biases against subjugated people**, and because it potentially **provides routes toward struggle where claims to urgency seem to foreclose** the **possibilities** of alleviation of suffering. **Saving the world still should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires a debate about what really cannot wait**. My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning.¶ I conclude, however, by pulling together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an acknowledgement that the **temporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism** can be interrupted in creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future concerns. **Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions** and the disruption of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though **calls for urgency will** certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also **serve as fertile ground for radical critique**, a truly fierce **urgency for now.**

CASE:

### **A2: Util – T/L**

#### **Reject their ethical predisposition to utilitarianism**

#### **Future-oriented impact calculus privileges high magnitude low probability scenarios which occludes urgent bodies and is terrible for minorities.**

#### **Reject util – Extend Olson from the 1NC**

#### **A) Universalism – their claims are based in a project of planetary homogenization and a form of psychological warfare – the assumption that the entire planet can be fit under a single integer is part and parcel with imperialism. Colonized subjects are already undergoing micro-extinctions locally, but their impact calculus attempts to usher violence under the umbrella of extinction when it threatens elite survival,**

#### **b) Temporality – the ongoing violence of the present is always ignored for a mythic future tragedy. You should arbitrarily shift your concerns in favor of everyday, ongoing violence under Capitalism.**

#### **C) Urgent bodies – Olson evidence internal link turns consequentialism and is solved by the alternative to focus on the everyday becoming of Capitalism. They create a “bias for futurity” that favors the unlikely and depoliticizes insurrectionary possibilities of the present by endlessly delaying to a future moment – all in the name of securing the futurity of the elite. It distorts moral reasoning which occludes util because it backdoors biases that privilege future threats over current suffering which destroys the possibility of ethical politics.**

#### **All of this turns their offense of extinction outweighs & collapse to Util.**

## **1NC – Hege bad**

#### **Heg is unstainable. Trying to expand Heg when it’s failing triggers resentment, which link turns their offense.**

Maher 11 – Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department at Brown University

(Richard, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, world politics has been unipolar, defined by American preponderance in each of the core components of state power—military, economic, and technological. Such an imbalanced distribution of power in favor of a single country is unprecedented in the modern state system. This material advantage does not automatically translate into America’s preferred political and diplomatic outcomes, however. Other states, if now only at the margins, are challenging U.S. power and authority. Additionally, on a range of issues, the United States is finding it increasingly difficult to realize its goals and ambitions. The even bigger challenge for policymakers in Washington is how to respond to signs that America’s unquestioned preeminence in international politics is waning. This decline in the United States’ relative position is in part a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the U.S. position both internationally and domestically may actually be strengthened once this period of unipolarity has passed. On pure material terms, the gap between the United States and the rest of the world is indeed vast. The U.S. economy, with a GDP of over $14 trillion, is nearly three times the size of China’s, now the world’s second-largest national economy. The United States today accounts for approximately 25 percent of global economic output, a figure that has held relatively stable despite steadily increasing economic growth in China, India, Brazil, and other countries. Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent. When one takes discretionary spending into account, the United States today spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. This imbalance is even further magnified by the fact that five of the next seven biggest spenders are close U.S. allies. China, the country often seen as America’s next great geopolitical rival, has a defense budget that is one-seventh of what the United States spends on its military. There is also a vast gap in terms of the reach and sophistication of advanced weapons systems. By some measures, the United States spends more on research and development for its military than the rest of the world combined. What is remarkable is that the United States can do all of this without completely breaking the bank. The United States today devotes approximately 4 percent of GDP to defense. As a percentage of GDP, the United States today spends far less on its military than it did during the Cold War, when defense spending hovered around 10 percent of gross economic output. As one would expect, the United States today enjoys unquestioned preeminence in the military realm. No other state comes close to having the capability to project military power like the United States.1 And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America’s growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America’s closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil’s growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America’s vast power is not translating into America’s preferred outcomes. As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one’s preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one’s predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one’s friends just as much as in one’s rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily American predominance that produces unease but rather American predominance. Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries’ own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country’s economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America’s own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one’s role and purpose is acceptable and one’s power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics. As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America’s position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the ‘‘post-unipolar’’ world.

#### **Pursuit of hegemony prevents multilateral cooperation on the world’s greatest threats, making extinction inevitable – disease spread, climate change, terrorism, and nuclearization**

**Beinart 18** (Peter Beinart is a contributing editor at The Atlantic and a professor of journalism and political science at the City University of New York, “America Needs an Entirely New Foreign Policy for the Trump Age,” 9/16/18, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/09/shield-of-the-republic-a-democratic-foreign-policy-for-the-trump-age/570010/>, sg)

Morally, Americans must also consider something else: Risking conflict to deny great powers a sphere of influence in their own neighborhoods undermines the chances of cooperating with them everywhere else. Over the past decade, **American cooperation with China and Russia has proved crucial to mitigating** some of **the world’s greatest threats**. In 2010, China, along with Russia, backed the United Nations sanctions that helped pave the way for the Iran nuclear deal. In 2014, Beijing and Washington cooperated to quell the Ebola crisis, which experts warned might infect 1.4 million West Africans. In 2016, U.S.-Chinese cooperation proved crucial to the **ratification of the Paris climate-change agreement** (from which Trump has subsequently withdrawn). The more America challenges Beijing and Moscow on their borders, the harder it will be to sustain, let alone deepen, this cooperation. Only U.S.-Russian diplomacy can extend the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expires in 2021, and thus avert a **costly and dangerous nuclear-arms race**. Only great-power cooperation can end **Syria’s monstrous civil war**. The United States has some influence over the Kurds and Gulf-backed Sunni Arab rebel groups. But only Moscow, along with Iran, can deliver concessions from Bashar al-Assad’s regime. It’s the same in **Afghanistan**. The United States enjoys more leverage over the government in Kabul, but Russia enjoys more influence over the Taliban and China wields more influence over Pakistan. Great-power cooperation is also crucial to easing the crisis on the Korean peninsula. No matter what he tells Trump, Kim Jong Un is unlikely to give up his nuclear weapons. But preventing further nuclear and missile tests would reduce the chances of war and facilitate the reconciliation with South Korea that could improve North Korean lives. The U.S. can’t do that alone. It can tempt Kim by promising an end to North Korea’s diplomatic and economic isolation. But it can’t fully reassure him that the United States—which turned on Qaddafi after he abandoned his own nuclear program—won’t do the same to him. Only Beijing—North Korea’s longtime ally—can do that. The more protected North Korea feels by China, the less it may feel the need to advance its nuclear program. The Naval War College’s Lyle Goldstein has suggested that Pyongyang might be more likely to permit inspection of its nuclear program if China takes part. This defies the logic of unipolarity, which mandates that the U.S. try to reduce China’s influence on the Korean peninsula. But here, too, **America can better serve the cause of peace and human dignity by cooperating with great powers than seeking to supplant them.** What america needs from its foreign policy has not changed since the nation’s founding: to promote the external conditions that give Americans the best chance to become prosperous and free. What has changed, at key moments, is the strategy the United States pursues to realize those goals. In the early-19th century, via the Monroe Doctrine, the United States entered a de facto alliance with Britain—the world’s greatest naval power—to prevent Europe’s land powers from establishing beachheads in the Americas. Beginning in the early-20th century, as Britain’s ability to enforce the Monroe Doctrine waned, the United States entered two European wars, and then fought the Cold War, to prevent adversaries from dominating Europe and Asia. Now, to achieve its enduring goals, America needs to change strategy once again. The unipolar strategy that America has pursued since the Soviet Union’s demise—of preserving if not extending American dominance in every region of the world—is increasingly insolvent. It is insolvent because America lacks the power to quell uprisings in the countries it has invaded. It is insolvent because America lacks the power to deny Russian influence over the countries on its border. It is insolvent because America lacks the power to enforce a status quo in East Asia established when China’s economy was slightly larger than Holland’s. And, above all, it is insolvent because **it lacks support from the American people, who** for good reason largely **do not believe it has served their needs.** In this regard, Trump’s election—which followed anti-interventionist rebellions by Ross Perot, Jerry Brown, Pat Buchanan, Ralph Nader, Ron Paul, and Bernie Sanders—was a disastrous response to a legitimate and enduring discontent. The choice facing Democrats in the Trump era is whether to join a hawkish alliance that aims to suppress that discontent or whether to channel it in a progressive direction. Hawks will denounce any foreign policy that abandons unipolarity as defeatist, a harbinger of national decline. But the progressive activists remaking the Democratic Party suspect, with good reason, that the pursuit of global dominance has been not an alternative to national decline but one of its causes. If in the coming years those activists articulate an agenda for shielding the republic—in which the U.S. protects the dignity and freedoms of its people, grants other powerful nations deference near their borders, and works with them to the solve the common problems that plague humanity—they will not be retreating from America’s best foreign-policy traditions. They will be ushering in their long overdue return.