### FW

**My value is morality because the use of the word ought the resolution implies moral obligation**

**My standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.**

**Prefer it for …**

#### When one promotes societal well-being, one can ensure that a utilitarian calculus is used. As a result, the most fair and/or beneficial option is chosen, thus upholding a society’s sense of justice.

**Goodin 90.** Robert Goodin 90, [professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences], “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142 //RS

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.

#### A just government has a moral obligation to do what would improve the well-being of its citizens.

#### Promoting societal well-being provides access to other value criteria because it allows others to perform favorable actions, such as ensuring safety, fairness, etc.

**C1: Hostage Holding**

**Public sector strikes hold the public hostage**

**DiSalvo 10**

 DiSalvo, Daniel. (C. DANIEL DISALVO is professor and chair of political science in the Colin Powell School at the City College of New York–CUNY and a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. His scholarship focuses on American political parties, elections, labor unions, state government, and public policy. He is the author of Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868–2010 (Oxford 2012) and Government Against Itself: Public Union Power and Its Consequences (Oxford 2015). His articles have appeared in Political Science Quarterly, Policy Studies Journal, and American Political Thought among others. DiSalvo also writes frequently for popular publications, including The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Atlantic Monthly, National Affairs, City Journal, American Interest, The Weekly Standard, Los Angeles Times, and the New York Daily News. He was previously the co-editor of The Forum: A Journal of Applied Research in Contemporary Politics and serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Policy History. He has held visiting appointments at Princeton University's James Madison Program and the CUNY Graduate Center.) "The Trouble with Public Sector Unions." National Affairs, 49th ed., 2010,  www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-trouble-with-public-sector-unions. Accessed 1 Nov. 2021.

The emergence of powerful public-sector unions was by no means inevitable. Prior to the 1950s, as labor lawyer Ida Klaus remarked in 1965, "the subject of labor relations in public employment could not have meant less to more people, both in and out of government." To the extent that people thought about it, most politicians, labor leaders, economists, and judges opposed collective bargaining in the public sector. Even President Franklin Roosevelt, a friend of private-sector unionism, drew a line when it came to government workers: "Meticulous attention," the president insisted in 1937, "should be paid to the special relations and obligations of public servants to the public itself and to the Government....The process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service." The reason? F.D.R. believed that "[**a] strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to obstruct the operations of government until their demands are satisfied**. Such **action** looking **toward the paralysis of government** by those who have sworn to support it **is unthinkable and intolerable**." Roosevelt was hardly alone in holding these views, even among the champions of organized labor. Indeed, the first president of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, believed it was "impossible to bargain collectively with the government."

Courts across the nation also generally held that collective bargaining by government workers should be forbidden on the legal grounds of sovereign immunity and unconstitutional delegation of government powers. In 1943, a New York Supreme Court judge held: To tolerate or recognize any combination of civil service employees of the government as a labor organization or union is not only incompatible with the spirit of democracy, but inconsistent with every principle upon which our government is founded. **Nothing is more dangerous to public welfare than to admit that hired servants of the State can dictate to the government the**hours, the wages and **conditions under which they will carry on essential services vital to the welfare, safety, and security of the citizen. To admit**as true **that government employees have power to halt or check the functions of government unless their demands are satisfied, is to transfer to them all legislative, executive and judicial power.**Nothing would be more ridiculous.

**The very nature of many public services** — such as policing the streets and putting out fires — **gives government a monopoly or near monopoly; striking public employees could** **therefore** **hold the public hostage**. As long-time New York Times labor reporter A. H. Raskin wrote in 1968: "The community cannot tolerate the notion that it is defenseless at the hands of organized workers to whom it has entrusted responsibility for essential services."

**The rights of striking workers should not overrule those of the greater public; legislative and judicial action are necessary**

**Feely 10**

Feely, Joseph J (C. Founded in Boston in 1815, the North American Review is the oldest literary magazine in the US. Published at the University of Northern Iowa (Cedar Falls) since 1968, on six occasions during that period, it has been a finalist for the National Magazine Award (the magazine equivalent of the Pulitzer Prize), and it has twice won the top award in the Fiction category–in head-to-head competition with The New Yorker, Harper's, The Atlantic Monthly, and so on. No other university-sponsored periodical has an equivalent record of achievement. Published five times each year, the NAR is well-known for its early discovery of young, talented fiction writers and poets. But it also publishes creative nonfiction, with emphasis on increasing concerns about environmental and ecological matters, multiculturalism, and exigent issues of gender and class.)  “The Right to Strike: Its Limitations.” The North American Review, vol. 191, no. 654, University of Northern Iowa, 1910, pp. 644–51, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25106661>.

Ordinarily, in the case of an effective strike, but two parties are primarily affected? the employer and the striking employee, though **the public is in the end the party most surely**, if but **in directly, affected by every strike**, for upon the result of the strike depends the transfer of some economic advantage. 1er instance, **if the strike be one to enforce** the familiar demand for **shorter hours or higher wages**, its success means a higher cost of the article produced, and **this higher cost**it can safely be asserted is not long borne by the employer, but **is soon shifted** by him **to the consuming public in the form of a higher price for the article produced. There is**, however, a class of **strikes in which the public is directly affected**, and in the consequence of which it has a paramount interest, as, for instance, **strikes upon public-service instrumentalities** which interrupt commerce, transportation, communication or other utilities **essential to the welfare of the public**. In such a strike the striking employees know that their unrestrained power of interference with the operation of those instrumentalities, which society has created for its welfare and convenience, supported (as are the strikers) by its patronage, and **the consequent annoyance is the most effective weapon which the strikers possess** to coerce the employer into acceding to their demands. The courts have had occasion to give but slight judicial attention to this class of cases lately so menacing to the public. One is frequently met by the statement that what one may do the many may do. That is obviously not true, for the reason that the act of the many is not the same in intention or effect as the individual act. A man may walk down the street as he chooses, but a body of men may not walk down the same street in procession without a permit from the public authorities. Here is a clear illustration that the right of the individual to walk upon the street is subject to the limitation that he may not walk in concert with large numbers, even though he wishes so to do. While the law permits the individual not under specific contract to quit his work arbitrarily and for little or no reason, his right to do this is subject to the limitation that he must not do so at such time or in such a manner as to destroy his em ployer's property or endanger the public safety. For instance, if he were engaged as engineer upon an engine, he would not be justified in quitting at a time when he had such a fire or head of steam on as might, by leaving the engine unattended, cause an explosion and so endanger the public safety or destroy his employer's property. Again, an individual under contract not terminable at will may not lawfully break his agreement, and so to cease work under such circumstances is unlawful. The character of the contract to work for another is such that except in certain peculiar instances public policy does not compel the specific performance thereof by the individual, although still branding the breach as illegal and awarding damages there for. In spite of the somewhat unsettled state of our law in this respect, it is clear that even the right of the individual to cease work is limited: (1) By the paramount right of the body politic to assure its own safety and (2) by the co-equal rights of other individuals. Notwithstanding the existence of these two general restrictions upon the individual's right, the value of freedom of movement and choice among its citizens is considered of such paramount importance to the community that the right of the individual to cease work is regarded as a right higher in degree than most of those rights with which it comes in contact, so that the single person may exercise his right for an arbitrary, absurd or illogical cause, if he will, or for any cause not affirmatively stamped by the law as illegal. At the outset we encounter this striking difference between the status of the individual and that of the group, that whereas the privilege of the individual to work or not, as he sees fit, is treated as of the greatest importance to society at large, the right of the group to strike simultaneously, containing as it does, potentialities of far-reaching harm and destruction to the whole body politic through its many citizens affected, is regarded not as of supreme importance, but only as of equal rank with the privileges of others, and since the exercise of this right almost inevitably works intentional injury to others, those who take upon themselves to invoke its aid are held strictly accountable for its use in a justifiable manner and for a justifiable end. The privilege of using this right to quit work arbitrarily, which we see in the case of the individual, no longer exists in the group, who are permitted to avail themselves of it only when such use can be justified; it cannot be said to be justified when the damage in flicted is out of all proportion to the benefit sought for or when the end striven for is arbitrary or contrary to the accepted law. As the strike by a combination of individuals must be acts of individuals plus the effect of concerted action, the combination must of necessity be subject to such limitations as apply to individual action, and also to such limitations as are peculiar to the resulting action of the combination, for the reason that the power of concerted activity is essentially so different and so vast, and its use so infinitely more coercive in comparison with individual effort, that its exercise in the same manner as that allowed to individual activity would completely overshadow resisting endeavor on the part of citizens acting severally. Clearly, then, the right to use such enormous power, a power derived from the very existence of organized society, must of necessity be a qualified privilege which can only be taken justifiably or reasonably with due regard to the rights of that society which makes its exercise possible, and not in such a manner as directly or intentionally to injure or unnecessarily interfere with or oppress the public. In a recent case the Supreme Court of Massachusetts said:\* " There is a fact which puts a further limitation on what acts a labor union can legally do. That is the increase of power which a combination of citizens has over the individual citizen. Take, for example, the power of a labor union to compel by a strike compliance with its demands. Speaking generally, a strike to be successful means not only coercion and compulsion, but coercion and compulsion which, for practical purposes, are irresistible. A successful strike by laborers means in many if not in most cases that for practical purposes the strikers have such a control of the labor which the employer must have that he has to yield to their demands. A single individual may well be left to take his chances in a struggle with another individual. But in a struggle with a number of persons combined together to fight an individual the individual's chance is small, if it exists at all. It is plain that a strike by a combination of persons has a power of coercion which an individual does not have." The result of this greater power of coercion, on the part of a combination of individuals, is that what is lawful for an individual is not the test of what is lawful for a combination of individuals; or to state it in another way, there are things which it is lawful for an individual to do which it is not lawful for a combination of individuals to do. exist only for the purpose of promoting a cause in the first class and to be non-existent where the cause falls within the second division. Some instances in which such combinations were found to be for an unjustifiable end, hence an unlawful purpose, are Where the object was: 1. To secure a monopoly of a trade or calling. 2. To create or maintain a closed shop. 3. The sympathetic strike. 4. To procure the discharge of a workman because he does not belong to an organization. 5. To induce the violation of a contract on the part of a third person. 6. To violate the actor's contract. 7. To enforce the collection of a fine on an employee levied for the purpose of compelling him to join in a strike. 8. To force upon the employer rules for arbitration made wholly by the union. 9. Improper interference with the right of the employers to have access to a free labor market. It will be noticed that courts have largely had to consider such combined action as dealt with the interference of co-equal rights of the other individuals. The courts have said that "in this, as in every other case of equal rights, the right of each individual . . . may be said to end where that of another begins." The right to labor is the primitive right of man; deny it to him and the right to live is denied. The right to labor includes the right to dispose of one's labor. The right to dispose of one's ]abor with full freedom involves the correlative duty on the part of others to abstain from any obstruction of the fullest exercise of such rights. The denial of this right not only affects the individual, but is an attack upon the public welfare and so is against public policy. For both of these reasons, therefore, the court will enjoin any unjustifiable infringement of this right. Thus far have the courts gone in interpreting and applying the law for the preservation of individual rights, in defining what limitations shall be applied to combined action which interferes with co-equal rights of others as individuals. The application of the same principles would seem adequate to protect the public from the consequences of much of the hasty, inconsiderate, or improper concerted action in those cases where such action vitally affects the public welfare. Certainly the interest of the public should have as prompt and as effective consideration and protection as those of the individual or group of individuals **The right of the body politic to assure its own safety is the highest conceivable right**. Why should not the concerted action of large bodies of men deriving their income from the patronage of the public, tending directly to public injury, be subordinated to the paramount right of the body politic to assure its own safety ? **Why should the lesser rights be protected and the greater right be subjected to unrestrained attack ? Such paramount right of the public would seem to be a sufficient justification for legislative action** creating tribunals to which matters growing out of industrial disputes involving the public welfare should be left for compulsory arbitration and settlement, as soon as the creation of such a tribunal be deemed expedient. Until such a method of controlling this sort of industrial strife be created, **it will be the duty of courts to interfere**, whenever it is shown, in due course of legal procedure, that the public safety or welfare is threatened **to determine not only the legality** of the issues involved, **but also whether** in any event **the concerted action is** such as is **likely to endanger the public safety or welfare, and if**such be **found to be** a **fact**, then by their man date to **prohibit such**arbitrary **concerted action on the part of any group of men.**

**Empirical Evidence: University labor strikes have an overwhelmingly negative impact on students**

**Wickens 11**

Wickens, Christine M (C. Dr. Christine Wickens is an Independent Scientist in the Institute for Mental Health Policy Research at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health. In addition to her appointment as Associate Professor in the Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology, Dr. Wickens also holds appointments in the Dalla Lana School of Public Health (DLSPH) and the Institute of Health Policy, Management and Evaluation. She currently serves as Director of the Master of Science in Community Health program in Addiction and Mental Health at DLSPH. Dr. Wickens has served on the Board of Directors of the Canadian Association of Road Safety Professionals (CARSP), and is a two-time recipient of CARSP’s Dr. Charles Miller Award for top-ranking research presented at their annual national conference). "The academic and psychosocial impact of labor unions and strikes on university campuses." Higher education: Teaching, internationalization and student issues, NOVA Science Publishers, 2011: 107-133.

It is evident from the available literature that **the overall psychosocial impact of a university labor dispute on students has generally been negative**. **Although** **students may have experienced a sense of gratification** or exaltation **early on in a dispute**, **they**have generally **developed a sense of apathy towards their studies as a strike continued**(Albas & Albas, 2000). Although some students have expressed a positive change in their self-concept as they discovered a sense of altruism during a strike (Albas & Albas, 2000), **most students have generally experienced feelings of anger over being caught in the midst of a dispute, as well as feelings of anxiety concerning financial implications of a strike and powerlessness over the situation**(Albas & Albas, 2000; Grayson, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1999; Greenglass et al., 2002; Wickens et al., 2006; York University Sub-Committee, 2002)**.**Students have abandoned their daily routines: spending more time with friends, sleeping in, and increasing their consumption of alcoholic beverages (Wickens et al., 2006). **During a dispute, their satisfaction with their academic programs and their overall ratings of the university have declined**(Amos et al., 1993; Grayson, 1997b, 1997c; Wickens et al., 2006). Likewise, **opinions about faculty and staff have been found to be more negative during a strike**(Amos et al., 1993), although these attitudes can be reversed if students are accommodated in the post- strike period (Grayson, 1997c). **Overall, the emotional, cognitive, behavioral, and health- related consequences of a labor strike for students are detrimental**; and although some of these effects may be short-lived or reversed in the post-strike period, **these consequences should be minimized or avoided by future parties to a university labor disruption**.

**Empirical evidence: Public sector unionism leaves cities in peril**

**Siegel 11**

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     Jan. 2021, www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703909904576052150177439350. Accessed 1 Nov.

     2021.

In the 1970s, government-worker unions became a political venue for New Leftist, feminist and black activists hoping to carry on in the militant spirit of the 1960s. The divisions within organized labor over the Vietnam War allowed Wurf and his allies to take on the declining private unions of the AFL-CIO, whose leader Meany backed the war. Wurf made himself a key player in George McGovern's 1972 presidential campaign, and public employees have had a lead role in Democratic Party politics ever since. Public-employee unionism seemed to be moving from success to success—Afscme was gaining a thousand (mostly female) workers a week—until the summer of 1975. At that point, there was a surge in strikes, and the government unions began to threaten Democratic officeholders. As Georgetown University historian Joseph McCartin has noted, **New York sanitation workers walked off the job on July** 1, **1975, allowing garbage to pile up in the streets of a Gotham already in the throes of fiscal crisis**. In short order, **cops objecting to furloughs imposed by the city's** liberal Democratic **Mayor** Abe Beame **shut down the Manhattan side of the Brooklyn Bridge, with marchers carrying signs that read "Cops Out, Crime In" and "Burn City Burn.**" On that same day, **76,000 Pennsylvania state workers went on strike against** liberal Democratic **Gov. Milton Shapp's austerity measures**. **Afscme's leader in Pennsylvania, Gerald McEntee, told his members "Let's go out and close down this God-damned state."**And in Seattle, the fireman's union initiated a recall ballot on July 1 directed against the one-time union favorite, Mayor Wes Uhlman, who held back pay hikes in the midst of rising deficits. Mr. Uhlman narrowly survived and he, like Beame and Shapp, calmed the situation by largely caving in to the striker's demands. But a line had been crossed: **With New York's near-bankruptcy a visible marker, the peril posed by public-sector unionism became a problem** for Democrats as well as Republicans.

**CASE:**

**Even the most coercive strikes have brought little progress; a right to strike is a scapegoat to not face the reality that is capitalistic violence: the root cause of oppressive labor conditions**

**White 18**Ahmed White, Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 1065, available at <https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/1261/>.

One of the most important statutes ever enacted, the National Labor Relations Act envisaged the right to strike as the centerpiece of a system of labor law whose central aims included dramatically diminishing the pervasive exploitation and steep inequality that are endemic to modern capitalism[and]. These goals have never been more relevant. But they have proved difficult to realize via the labor law, in large part because an effective right to strike has long been elusive, undermined by courts, Congress, the NLRB, and powerful elements of the business community. Recognizing this, labor scholars have made the restoration of the right to strike a cornerstone of labor law scholarship. Authorities in the field have developed an impressive literature that stresses the importance of strikes and strongly criticizes the arguments that judges, legislators, and others have used to justify their degradation of the right to strike. But this**literature has developed without its authors ever answering**a fundamental question, which is **whether an effective right to strike is a viable aspiration in the first place.** This Article takes up this question. It documents**the crucial role that strikes have played**in building the labor movement, [and] legitimating the labor law itself, and indeed validating the New Deal and, with this, the modern administrative state; and it**confirms the integral role that strikes play in contesting the corrosive power capitalism accords employers over** the workplace and the spoils of**production. But this**Article**also shows how the strikes that were effective in these crucial ways were not conventional strikes**, limited to the simple withholding of labor and the advertisement of workers’ grievances. Instead**, they inevitably embraced disorderly, coercive tactics like mass picketing and sit-down strikes to a degree that suggests that**tactics such as**these are** indeed**essential if strikes are to be effective. Yet** strikes that have featured **these tactics have never enjoyed any legitimacy**beyond the ranks of labor, radical activists, and academic sympathizers. **Their inherent affronts to property and public order place them well beyond the purview of what could ever constitute a viable legal right in liberal society**; and they have been treated accordingly by courts, Congress, and other elite authorities**. From this vantage, it becomes clear that an effective right to strike is not only an impossible distraction but a dangerous fantasy that prevents labor’s champions from confronting the broader, sobering truths that this country’s legal and political system are, at root, anathema to a truly viable system of labor rights**and that **labor**’s **salvation must be sought elsewhere.**

**Strikes hurt class unity; workers comparing themselves to each other when strikes in certain sectors inevitably fail and succeed in others**

**Smith 78** Michael R. Smith, Mcgill University (PhD, Brown University, 1976) with research areas in Economy and Society, Labour Markets, Inequality.The Effects of Strikes on Workers: A Critical Analysis, The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie Vol. 3, No. 4 (Autumn, 1978), pp. 457-472 (16 pages) Published By: Canadian Journal of Sociology, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3339777> CD

Workers in an industry are no doubt aware that their managers earn substantially more than them; they exist in a work environment where supervision and, increasingly, the design of work itself circumscribe their capacity for discretion; they may well feel insecure in the context of an unpredictable labor market. **Going on strike** as Blackburn has argued, and as the Vauxhall incident tends to show, **is likely to lead them to focus** **the discontent associated with this condition on their employers**. That is an increased sense of opposition. **But the consequences of such an action for a sense of identity are likely to be problematic.** **Those consequences will depend upon the extent to which their strike is supported by other workers.** **In North America in particular** where many unions do seem to operate with a business union philosophy (cf. Bell, 1962; Laxer, 1976) with decentralized bargaining (cf. Task Force, 1968), **significant support will often fail to materialize**. If consciousness "explodes" in a strike **the result is likely to be an acute sense of inequality, but by no means necessarily a sense of a fate shared with a class**. On the contrary, **it is often likely to be a sense that the workers in a particular plant (or sometimes, industry) should look after themselves.** That, of course, would constitute an obstacle to a shift to the level of consciousness that Mann calls totality. **Moreover, the political configuration in capitalist societies with universal suffrage will not only depend upon the consciousness of workers who strike but also on the reaction to strikes of workers who, because conditions are not favorable, themselves rarely strike**. **These kinds of workers are likely to be increasingly unenthusiastic about the strikes of their more fortunate fellow workers.** Both groups, of course, are less privileged in comparison to employers and managers but, as Runciman (1966) has shown**, much of the working class compares its own condition with other members of the working class rather than with capital**. The consequence of the extant distribution of strikes is, then, to reduce the sense of identity of a good part of the working class.12 The Gallup Poll data suggest that it is not simply a question of identity which is at issue. In Mann's view, the most advanced stage of development of consciousness involves "The conception of an alternative society" which develops "through the struggle with the opponent" (Mann, 1973:13). The opponent that Mann has in mind is employers. But the analysis that has been presented in this paper suggests that intra-working class antagonisms may be equally important in determining workers' conceptions of an alternative society. Sentiment on the part of many trade unionists seems to be linked to a conception of an alternative society in which the government acts as an authoritative arbiter in industrial relations. For these trade unionists, its role is just as much to keep wage increases (of other workers) moderate as to keep price increases moderate. The anti free collective bargaining sentiments that appear in Table 6 tend to support this interpretation. In his conclusion to Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class, Mann argues that: Coexisting with a normally passive sense of alienation is an experience of (largely economic) interdependence with the employer at a factual, if not normative level. Surges of class consciousness are continually undercut by economism and capitalism survives. (1973:68) In this paper I have accepted the view that **strikes are quite likely to generate surges of class consciousness on the part of the strikers. But the actual distribution of strikes, the fact that the bulk of man-days lost from strikes are accounted for by a better off section of the labor force, means that those same strikes are an additional obstacle to the development of class consciousness.** This is true not only because of their effect on workers' sense of identity: it is also true because the reaction of many workers to the maldistribution of strikes

**Strikes rely on public opinion for success**

**Maynard 12** Melissa Maynard, Public Strikes Explained: Why There Aren't More of Them, PEW, We are driven by the power of knowledge to solve today's most challenging problems. Pew applies a rigorous, analytical approach to improve public policy, inform the public, and invigorate civic life. September 25, 2012 <https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2012/09/25/public-strikes-explained-why-there-arent-more-of-them> CD

**Strikes often end without an agreement but come with significant costs for both sides.** They **can damage public opinion toward both elected leaders and the public employees**involved, **and bring real financial consequences for the strikers**. Strikes have been especially rare in the budget-cutting environment that has been the reality in most states for the past few years. This isn't because labor relations are generally rosy — far from it. But **striking public workers tend not to fare well in the court of public opinion because the public expects them to share in the widespread economic pain**. **“Strikes tend to be won or lost on public support more than anything else,**" says Joseph Slater, professor at the University of Toledo College of Law. **“[Workers] may rightly feel put upon, but they have to be very leery of alienating the public.”**Few politicians have been thrown out of office for supporting cuts to public employee pay and benefits in recent years, despite the toll those cuts have taken on labor relations. **Many public sector union contracts include “no strike clauses” as a condition of employment, even in states where strikes are legal.** In some cases, the terms of the prior agreement remain in force even after a contract expires until a new agreement is reached,**giving workers little incentive to negotiate but also little motivation to strike.**