### T

**Interp: The aff must defend that a just government recognizes workers in general right to strike.**

**“Workers” is a generic bare plural since there are no words modifying “workers” in the text of the topic. Generics cannot be affirmed by particular instances, and bare plurals normally express generic generalization**

**Leslie 16–** (Sarah-Jane Leslie, Dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University, where she is also affiliated faculty in the Department of Psychology, the University Center for Human Values, the Program in Gender and Sexuality Studies, and the Kahneman-Treisman Center for Behavioral Science and Public Policy. She is known for her work on the cognitive underpinnings of generic generalizations); "Generic Generalizations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics>. KD

Consider the following pairs of sentences:

* **(1) a. Tigers are striped.**
* **b. Tigers are on the front lawn.**
* (2) a. A tiger is striped.
* b. A tiger is on the front lawn.
* (3) a. The tiger is striped.
* b. The tiger is on the front lawn.

The sentence pairs above are *prima facie* syntactically parallel—both are subject-predicate sentences whose subjects consist of the same common noun coupled with the same, or no, article. However, the interpretation of first sentence of each pair is intuitively quite different from the interpretation of the second sentence in the pair. In the second sentences, we are talking about some particular tigers: a group of tigers in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), some individual tiger in ([2b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex2b)), and some unique salient or familiar tiger in ([3b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex3b))—a beloved pet, perhaps. **In the first sentences, however, we are saying something *general*.** **There is/are no particular tiger or tigers that we are talking about.**

The second sentences of the pairs receive what is called an existential interpretation. The hallmark of the existential interpretation of a sentence containing a bare plural or an indefinite singular is that it may be paraphrased with “some” with little or no change in meaning; hence the terminology “existential reading”. The application of the term “existential interpretation” is perhaps less appropriate when applied to the definite singular, but it is intended there to cover interpretation of the definite singular as referring to a unique contextually salient/familiar particular individual, not to a *kind*.

There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is *upward entailing*, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” *salva veritate*, but in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) we cannot. **If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true.** However, **“tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. (**[**1a**](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)**) does not entail that animals are striped,** but ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995).

Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.)

Violation – the 1AC specifies themselves/debaters as workers, undermining the right to strike discussions we can have about the topic as it shifts out of topic lit

**Standards (choose)–**

**1. Real world discussion – Most topic literature is focused on implementable policies because they involve real-life impacts, and when we criticize actions we’re always obligated to come up with an effective solution that entails more than rejection or assuming everything fixes itself. Key to fairness since topic lit forms the basis for mutual pre-round prep. This controls the internal link since my interp forces you to come up with a way to advocate for solutions to the problem. Also key to education since it gives us an incentive to research real-world arguments that can be carried outside of the round.Your methodology link turns the kritik by presenting a simple solution to a complex problem.**

**Failure to engage the political process turns the affirmative into spectators who are powerless to produce real change. Rorty 98:**

**Rorty, Richard ~Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University~. “achieving our country”. 1998. Pp. 7-9.**

Such people find pride in American citizenship impossible, and vigorous participation in electoral politics pointless. They associate American patriotism with an endorsement of atrocities: the importation of African slaves, the slaughter of Native Americans, the rape of ancient forests, and the Vietnam War. Many of them think of national pride as appropriate only for chauvinists: for the sort of American who rejoices that America can still orchestrate something like the Gulf War, can still bring deadly force to bear whenever and wherever it chooses. When young intellectuals watch John Wayne war movies after reading Heidegger, Foucault, Stephenson, or Silko, they often become convinced that they live in a violent, inhuman, corrupt country[,] They begin to think [are] of themselves as a saving remnant-as the happy few who have the insight to see through nationalist rhetoric to the ghastly reality of contemporary America. But this insight does not move them to formulate a legislative program, to join a political movement, or to share in a national hope.  The contrast between national hope and national self-mockery and self-disgust becomes vivid when one compares novels like Snow Crash and Almanac of the Dead with socialist novels of the first half of the century-books like The Jungle, An American Tragedy, and The Grapes of Wrath. The latter were written in the belief that the tone of the Gettysburg Address was absolutely right, but that our country would have to transform itself in order to fulfill Lincoln's hopes. Transformation would be needed because the rise of industrial capitalism had made the individualist rhetoric of America's first century obsolete. The authors of these novels thought that this rhetoric should be replaced by one in which America is destined to become the first cooperative commonwealth, the first classless society. This America would be one in which income and wealth are equitably distributed, and in which the government ensures equality of opportunity as well as individual liberty. This new, quasi-communitarian rhetoric was at the heart of the Progressive Movement and the New Deal. It set the tone for the American Left during the first six decades of the twentieth century. Walt Whitman and John Dewey, as we shall see, did a great deal to shape this rhetoric.  The difference between early twentieth-century leftist intellectuals and the majority of their contemporary counterparts is the difference between agents and spectators. In the early decades of this century, when an intellectual stepped back from his or her country's history and looked at it through skeptical eyes, the chances were that he or she was about to propose a new political initiative. Henry Adams was, of course, the great exception-the great abstainer from ·politics. But William James thought that Adams' diagnosis of the First Gilded Age as a symptom of irreversible moral and political decline was merely perverse. James's pragmatist theory of truth was in part a reaction against the sort of detached spectatorship which Adams affected. For James, disgust with American hypocrisy and self-deception was pointless unless accompanied by an effort to give America reason to be proud of itself in the future. Th[is] kind of proto- Heideggerian cultural pessimism which Adams cultivated seemed, to James, [is] decadent and cowardly. "Democracy," James wrote, "is a kind of religion, and we are bound not to admit its failure. Faiths and utopias are the noblest exercise of human reason, and no one with a spark of reason in him will sit down fatalistically before the croaker's picture. "2

**3. Reciprocity – non-implementable affirmatives allow affirmatives to fiat solvency for their advocacy. This makes it impossible to make solvency deficit args and turns on their alt whereas they can still make those args on the aff. Either they are utopian in how they garner their solvency and they should lose on T or they do not fiat solvency in which case they should lose on presumption. Utopian Fiat is a independent reason to err neg.**

**TVA** –  Whole res, discussing the workers with disabilities right to strike and create new laws to protect those with disabilities and the protections they require, talk about disbailty movements of late c20th cenruty and informs labor rgths today and to strike agsint disbailty pay, being nn t scarficies that comverstaion

**Reforms are possible and desirable---tangible change outweighs the risk of cooption and is still a better strategy than the alt. Omi 13:**

**Omi, Michael (Berkeley ethnic studies professor). “Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36.6, Taylor and Francis**

In Feagin and Elias's account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the ‘white racial frame’ evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. **They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely ‘a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society’** (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call ‘surface flexibility’ to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase ‘racial democracy’ is an oxymoron – a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree**. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA, we disagree**. The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view **it is also in many respects a racial democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies**. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites – employment, health, education – persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed**, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected** by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. **It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US history.** But such **a perspective misses the** dramatic twists and turns **in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era**. Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we ‘overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about ‘racial reaction’ in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us. **While we argue that the right wing was able to ‘rearticulate’ race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape**. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of **the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone**. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his ‘interest convergence hypothesis’ effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 – ‘We have lost the South for a generation’ – count as ‘convergence’? **The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime – under movement pressure – was exercising its hegemony.** But Gramsci insists that such reforms – which he calls ‘passive revolutions’ – cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule. So yes, **we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life**. And yes, we think that **further victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society.**Indeed we have argued that in many ways **the most important accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social**. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and validation by both the state and civil society of racially-defined experience and identity**. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other ‘new social movements’: second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements among others.** By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurcge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same ‘rearticulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of ‘colourblindness’ and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various ‘backlash’ phenomena of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, reveal the transformative character of the ‘politicization of the social’. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that **it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today.**

**Voters: Fairness is a voter because debate is an activity based off of wins and losses. Fairnes sis key for people with disaabilties within debate in order to allow for an equl sttaus point. in debateEducation is a voter because debate is an educational activity, but fairness outweighs education because we can gain education in forums other than debate.eductaion mattrs, being undable to engages destroys any kritkal education from the aff. Drop the debater to deter future abuse. No RVIs 1. They don’t get to win bc they prove they are topical, 2-Because of the chilling effect, I wouldn’t initiate theory against abuse if I could lose, and 3. Because it is counter-intuitive—RVIs turn defensive counterinterps into offensive reasons to voter debaters up or down**

**Theory is competing interps since a) any brightline for reasonability is arbitrary, which forces intervention; only minimization makes sense and b) it fosters a race to the top by promoting proactively better norms for debate**

### arbitration

#### Counter advocacy, debaters ought to present these three demands to the toc committee and the nsda board using the process of arbitration, the demands are as follows. It gives them a bindign agreement that creates chnage

#### 1] Permanently create 2 online TOC bid tournaments per topic. Allowing for 2 online bid tournaments per topic presents all debaters with an opportunity to qualify while removing on site accessibility and travel obstacles.

#### 2] A creation of standards for handling mental health concerns. There is a need for procedures to help students with anxiety, PTSD, depression, etc. This should include the designation of quiet areas at tournaments, for students with sensory issues or anxiety.

#### 3] Increasing the number and diversifying the location of bid tournaments. Local bid tournaments reduce traveling which allows for disabled debaters to have easy access to medical devices and support systems.

#### There are better alternatives to striking that don’t harm education or disrupt work, arbitration, the procress of comin got a compromise in the presence of a nuteral arbitrater, is one such way.

**Chaykowski 19** , Richard P. "Time to Tweak or Re-boot? Assessing the Interest Arbitration Process in Canadian Industrial Relations." Assessing the Interest Arbitration Process in Canadian Industrial Relations (April 4, 2019). CD Howe Institute Commentary 539 (2019). <https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/Commentary_539.pdf>

Arbitration, as a form of dispute resolution, is widely used in a variety of workplace contexts, both unionized and nonunionized. In labour relations, arbitration is used to resolve disputes between employers and their employees (and their union) over the terms and conditions of employment as they relate to an existing collective agreement – referred to as rights arbitration. Arbitration is also used to resolve impasses in disputes over the substantive terms and conditions of employment that are normally determined through collective bargaining as the collective agreement expires – referred to as interest arbitration, the focus of this Commentary. (Hereafter, “arbitration” refers to interest arbitration.)

#### Not only is it a better alternative, but it works, looking to Canada we can see the success of arbitration in allowing for drisuptive strikes to end

**Chaykowski 19** , Richard P. "Time to Tweak or Re-boot? Assessing the Interest Arbitration Process in Canadian Industrial Relations." Assessing the Interest Arbitration Process in Canadian Industrial Relations (April 4, 2019). CD Howe Institute Commentary 539 (2019). <https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/Commentary_539.pdf>

The significance of arbitration in industrial relations and, indeed, in terms of determining labour market outcomes – including wages – is amply exemplified by its use to resolve high-profile disputes in key sectors. For example, arbitration was used in 2017 to settle a dispute between Ontario colleges and the Ontario Public Service Employees Union, ending a strike that affected 12,000 employees across 24 colleges and disrupted the studies of approximately half a million students (see Kaplan 2017; Pelley 2017). In Ontario healthcare, negotiations between the province and the Ontario Medical Association (OMA) over compensation began in 2017 and, for the first time, the process included both mediation and binding arbitration in the event of an impasse

#### Net benefits

* Reolsves the t shell, we can resist and still be topical
* Is better because allows for actual discussion of policy change and how to change
* Solves the aff, allows for the advocating of rights while preserving the debate space