### T

**Interp: The aff must defend that a just government recognizes workers in general right to strike.**

**“Workers” is a generic bare plural since there are no words modifying “workers” in the text of the topic. Generics cannot be affirmed by particular instances, and bare plurals normally express generic generalization**

**Leslie 16–** (Sarah-Jane Leslie, Dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University, where she is also affiliated faculty in the Department of Psychology, the University Center for Human Values, the Program in Gender and Sexuality Studies, and the Kahneman-Treisman Center for Behavioral Science and Public Policy. She is known for her work on the cognitive underpinnings of generic generalizations); "Generic Generalizations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics>. KD

Consider the following pairs of sentences:

* **(1) a. Tigers are striped.**
* **b. Tigers are on the front lawn.**
* (2) a. A tiger is striped.
* b. A tiger is on the front lawn.
* (3) a. The tiger is striped.
* b. The tiger is on the front lawn.

The sentence pairs above are *prima facie* syntactically parallel—both are subject-predicate sentences whose subjects consist of the same common noun coupled with the same, or no, article. However, the interpretation of first sentence of each pair is intuitively quite different from the interpretation of the second sentence in the pair. In the second sentences, we are talking about some particular tigers: a group of tigers in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), some individual tiger in ([2b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex2b)), and some unique salient or familiar tiger in ([3b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex3b))—a beloved pet, perhaps. **In the first sentences, however, we are saying something *general*.** **There is/are no particular tiger or tigers that we are talking about.**

The second sentences of the pairs receive what is called an existential interpretation. The hallmark of the existential interpretation of a sentence containing a bare plural or an indefinite singular is that it may be paraphrased with “some” with little or no change in meaning; hence the terminology “existential reading”. The application of the term “existential interpretation” is perhaps less appropriate when applied to the definite singular, but it is intended there to cover interpretation of the definite singular as referring to a unique contextually salient/familiar particular individual, not to a *kind*.

There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is *upward entailing*, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” *salva veritate*, but in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) we cannot. **If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true.** However, **“tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. (**[**1a**](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)**) does not entail that animals are striped,** but ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995).

Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.)

Violation – the 1AC specifies themselves/debaters as workers, undermining the right to strike discussions we can have about the topic as it shifts out of topic lit

**Standards (choose)–**

**. Predictable Limits — non-T affs structurally favors the AFF by manipulating the balance of prep which is anchored around the resolution as a stasis point. Guts the ability to ever generate answers that are good enough to take out the affirmative and creates impossible research burdens to keep up. Predictable limits key to fairness because it shapes equal time and effort in prep before round. Also key to education because it ensure comprehensive understanding of research over futile attempts to keep up, it means they can have a sex workers aff, feminism aff, college profressor aff etc**

**TVA** –  be whole res, defend the same advantages with a cont ab incarcerated workers,

**Voters: Fairness is a voter because debate is an activity based off of wins and losses. Fairnes sis key for people who struggle w racismwithin debate in order to allow for an equl sttaus point. in debateEducation is a voter because debate is an educational activity, but fairness outweighs education because we can gain education in forums other than debate.eductaion mattrs, being undable to engages destroys any kritkal education from the aff. Drop the debater to deter future abuse. No RVIs 1. They don’t get to win bc they prove they are topical, 2-Because of the chilling effect, I wouldn’t initiate theory against abuse if I could lose, and 3. Because it is counter-intuitive—RVIs turn defensive counterinterps into offensive reasons to voter debaters up or down**

**Theory is competing interps since a) any brightline for reasonability is arbitrary, which forces intervention; only minimization makes sense and b) it fosters a race to the top by promoting proactively better norms for debate**

### Abolition

#### The affirmative’s call for criminal justice reform perpetuates and reinforces the systemic violence of the carceral state. Look to their evidence it says “ preserving the goals of prison officials while allowing prisoners to surface critical problems in prison conditions and our criminal justice system as a whole”

Rodríguez 19 — Dylan Rodríguez, Professor of Ethnic Studies and Chair of the Academic Senate at the University of California-Riverside, holds a Ph.D. in Ethnic Studies from the University of California-Berkeley, 2019 (“Abolition as Praxis of Human Being: A Foreword,” *Harvard Law Review*, Volume 132, April 10th, Available Online at <https://harvardlawreview.org/wp->content/uploads/2019/04/1575-1612\_Online.pdf, Accessed 03-23-2020, p. 1576-1577)

Contemporary reformist approaches to addressing the apparent overreach and scandalous excesses of the carceral state — characterized by calls to end “police brutality” and “mass incarceration” — fail to recognize that the very logics of the overlapping criminal justice and policing regimes systemically perpetuate racial, sexual, gender, colonial, and class violence through carceral power. Thus, in addition to being ineffective at achieving their generally stated goals of alleviating vulnerable peoples’ subjection to legitimated state violence, reformist approaches ultimately reinforce a violent system that is fundamentally asymmetrical [end page 1576] in its production and organization of normalized misery, social surveillance, vulnerability to state terror, and incarceration.6

It is within this irreconcilable reformist contradiction that an abolitionist historical mandate provides a useful and necessary departure from the liberal assumption that either the carceral state or carceral power is an inevitable and permanent feature of the social formation. This historical mandate animates abolition as a creative, imaginative, and speculative collective labor: while liberal-to-progressive reformism attempts to protect and sustain the institutional and cultural-political coherence of an existing system by adjusting and/or refurbishing it, abolitionism addresses the historical roots of that system in relations of oppressive, continuous, and asymmetrical violence and raises the radical question of whether those relations must be uprooted and transformed (rather than reformed or “fixed”) for the sake of particular peoples’ existence and survival as such.7

**—— Footnotes ——**

6. Professor Ruth Wilson Gilmore offers a helpful differentiation between “reformist” logics and abolitionist strategies that make tactical use of reform. See Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Foreword to DAN BERGER, THE STRUGGLE WITHIN: PRISONS, POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND MASS MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, at vii, vii–viii (2014).

7. To consider abolitionist praxis in the context of particular peoples’ systemic, historical exposure to institutionalized forms of dehumanization, degradation, and social oppression is to significantly rethink the premises of the United Nations’ (UN) canonized conception of “genocide,” particularly in regard to the notion that peoplehood as such (including self-defined nations, tribes, ethnic groups, and so forth) ought to be defined by cultural as well as collective physical integrity. For useful points of critical rearticulation and revision of the UN’s 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, see WARD CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE AMERICAS, 1492 TO THE PRESENT 363–92 (1997); and CIVIL RIGHTS CONG., WE CHARGE GENOCIDE (William L. Patterson ed., Int’l Publishers 1970) (1951).

#### The alternative is an abolitionist praxis of creative destruction that refuses existing systems of oppression and actively imagines radical new forms of collective power.

Rodríguez 19 — Dylan Rodríguez, Professor of Ethnic Studies and Chair of the Academic Senate at the University of California-Riverside, holds a Ph.D. in Ethnic Studies from the University of California-Berkeley, 2019 (“Abolition as Praxis of Human Being: A Foreword,” *Harvard Law Review*, Volume 132, April 10th, Available Online at <https://harvardlawreview.org/wp->content/uploads/2019/04/1575-1612\_Online.pdf, Accessed 03-23-2020, p. 1610-1612)

Consider abolition as an art form, the kind of creative truth that mixes the stuff of history into memory, survival, breath, and stubborn, vexed, and often-nourishing community that constantly escapes the guarantees of any organizing plan. In some ways, this is not the time to insist on the renewed urgency of a radical abolitionist struggle, because such a time preceded all of this, and its messengers have already presented themselves to us in the poetry, letters, manifestos, collect phone calls, and never-quite-private conspiratorial conversations we share with each other sometimes, but really, all the damn time. More than just a synonym or rhetorical cipher for revolutionary change or radical social transformation, abolition is an artful disruption of the presumed [end page 1610] futurity. Certainly, it is as Professor Ruth Wilson Gilmore says: “Abolition is a theory of change, it’s a theory of social life. It’s about making things.”116

Abolition, in such terms, is a fundamentally creative force, even and especially in those rare historical moments when a definitive destruction of oppressive structures and power relations appears possible, practical, and capable of catalyzing a (potentially) radically different social form. Within the last sesquicentennial, such periods of creative destruction and creativity from destruction have flourished through multiple genealogies of radical confrontation with the global Civilization form, resulting in the downfall of multiple apartheid orders, expulsion of colonial occupations, redistribution of life-sustaining wealth and resources, and periodic liberation of chattel-captive populations. It is imperative to apprehend such moments of victory as contradictory, imperfect, and flawed; put another way, the signature historical moments of “successful” abolitionist struggle produce utterly human historical outcomes in the most antihumanist, counter-Civilizational sense of “human” (contradictory, imperfect, flawed). Yet, it is equally imperative to critically study, teach, theorize, and narrate such historical moments as revelations of radical possibility that obliterate the cultural tendency to reify (which is to say, presume permanency and ahistorical existence of) existing systems of state violence, geographic displacement and capture, economic evisceration, and institutionalized dehumanization.117 Such a creative destruction, and creativity of thought-in-destruction, is a primary pedagogical purpose of abolitionist praxis.118

This historicized redefinition of incarceration exceeds conventional criminological notions of spatially and temporally discrete/compartmentalized, juridically sanctioned state captivity and conceptualizes steel and concrete places of containment for the “duly convicted” as centers of institutional gravity that materially reproduce, experiment with, and culturally signify a paradigm of social power that permeates social relations generally.

A genealogy of twentieth- and twenty-first-century radical thought among incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people in and beyond the United States has constructed a durable, rigorous, and dynamic critical theorization of the carceral state and social form. From George Jackson [end page 1611] and Assata Shakur to Raúl Salínas, Angela Y. Davis, Leonard Peltier, and Marilyn Buck,119 these thinkers articulate a complex urgency imperative to abolitionist praxis that pivots on its creative, collective, and transformative challenge to historical conditions of gendered, racial-colonial dominance that fundamentally relies on criminalization and systemic human immobilization to produce and reproduce a Civilizational order. Following this body of thought, abolition is a generative, imaginative, and productive concept precisely because it entails a radical reconfiguration of relations of power, community, collective identity, and sociality that does not rely on carcerality and its constitutive, oppressive forms of state and cultural violence.

Abolitionist praxis addresses carcerality as a logic of power that generates multiple, overlapping, and differently scaled carceral regimes (reservations, plantations, segregated cities/towns, prisons, military bases, and so forth). Thus, eliminating carceral-state violence via prisons, jails, police, detention centers, and military bases is but one aspect of a broader rethinking — and remaking — of collective, insurgent “power” that simultaneously asserts a liberated autonomy from and posits a radical challenge to long historical relations of gendered, racial-colonial dominance. This recognition of carcerality as an institutional logic and methodology informs abolition as a praxis of creativity — abolitionism articulates a fundamental critique of existing systems of oppression while attempting to actively imagine as it practices forms of collective power that are liberated from hegemonic paradigms, including but not limited to forms of power constituted by the logic of carcerality, patriarchy, coloniality, racial chattel, racial capitalism,120 and heteronormativity.

The following contributions must be cherished, discussed, and debated precisely because they originate from this creative imperative.