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#### The present division of labor inhibits embodiment of productive forces. This division has increased the hegemonic power of the elite. Intellectual property protection has become a fundamental power structure of modern capitalism.

Pagano 14 (Ugo Pagano, Ugo Pagano is an Italian economist and Professor of Economic Policy at the University of Siena where he is also Director of the PhD programme in Economics and President of S. Chiara Graduate School, “A Crisis of Intellectual Monopoly Capitalism”, November 2014)//RM

Labour and intellectual monopoly capitalism According to Marx, capital is more than a physical asset; it is a social relation that makes the productive forces developed by the human intellect into a power standing against the human beings that develop them: It is a result of the division of labour in manufactures, that the labourer is brought face to face with the intellectual potencies of the material process of production, as the property of another, and as a ruling power. This separation begins in simple co-operation, where the capitalist rep resents to the single workman, the oneness and the will of the associated labour. It is developed in manufacture which cuts down the labourer into a detail labourer. It is completed in modern industry, which makes science a productive force distinct from labour and presses it into the service of capital. (Marx, 1967, ch. 14, section 5) In other words, the dynamics of capitalism is characterized by an excessive upgrading of the intellectual productive forces disembodied from human beings and by a continuous degradation of the creative forces embodied in them. This view of Marx was revived by Harry Braverman and other radical economists.1 In his influential book Labor and Monopoly Capital, Braverman (1974) was able to show the power of the Marxian analysis in explaining certain features of the 'degrada tion of work in the twentieth century', which is the subtitle of his book. In the Marxian framework, men first conceive ideas and then execute them. Work, 'as purposive action guided by intelligence, is the special product of humankind' (Braverman, 1974, p. 49). However this outstanding feature of humankind can be turned into alienation and deprivation of creativity. The autonomy of conception from execution implies that most people may simply execute what other people have conceived. Under capitalism the employment contract entails that one agent agrees to execute, within certain limits, the actions conceived by another agent. Thus capitalism is one of the possible social arrangements exploiting the separation between ideation and execution, but the profit motive pushes this separation to unprecedented extreme consequences. According to Braverman, employers seek to pay as little as possible for the skills of the workers and try to make the workers work as hard as possible. For this reason they tend to reorganise occupations and trades by subdividing them into meaningless and repetitive operations. This organisation has little to do with the maximisation of 'learning by doing' that, according to Smith, characterised market economies; rather, it is related to a set of principles first spelled out by Babbage (1832) and Ure (1835)2 and later transformed into the coherent theory of scientific management advocated by Taylor and his disciples. Whereas the Smithian principles of the division of labour rely on the maximisation of the 'learning acquired by doing', the Babbage principle is based on the idea that the division of labour should be organised to minimise the 'learning and the (strength) required for doing': the more detailed the division of labour, the lower is the skill requirement for each operation. Labour power can be made cheaper by a detailed division of labour involving job deskilling. According to Braverman, 'applied first to handicrafts and then to mechanical crafts, Babbage's principle eventually becomes the underlying force governing all forms of work in capitalist society, no matter in what setting or at what hierarchical level' (Braverman, 1974, pp. 81-2). As to Taylor, he realised that the traditional system of management was ill-suited to increasing workers' effort. Traditional management relied on the knowledge of the workers in the sense that the managers believed that the workers knew better than they did how to perform their jobs. Under traditional management, the workers could work less than 'fairly' by claiming that a certain amount of time was required to perform a certain job. The situation of 'asymmetric information' existing under traditional man agement implied that the managers had no means of challenging this claim. Taylor's solution to this problem was straightforward: the managers, and not the workers, should know how the jobs could be best performed, plan how they should be executed and give the workers detailed instructions about their execution. It was only by gaining control over the labour process that the managers could reverse the situation of asymmetric information and control the workers. U. Pagano Braverman summarizes the content of Taylorism in three different principles: (i) Dissociation of the labour process from the skills of the workers. (ii) Separation of conception from execution. (iii) Use of this monopoly over knowledge to control each step of the and its mode of execution. Babbage's and Taylor's principles pertain to a consistent body of organization guide lines. The dissociation of the labour process from the skills of the workers does not only allow for greater capitalist control; it also, following Babbage, cheapens labour by decreasing learning time. In the very same way, the separation of conception and execution does not only imply greater capitalist control; it also means that fewer people should learn how to conceive and more people should become cheap executors of their decisions—this being, again, also an implication of the Babbage principle. The same detailed division of labour cheapens labour power and increases capitalists' control over labour and consequently workers' effort. For this double reason, Braverman argues, deskilling jobs is a fundamental tendency of capitalism. According to Braverman, analysis ofTaylorism is essential for understanding the real life capitalist economy, because in Taylor's work there 'lies a theory which is nothing else than an explicit verbalisation of the capitalist mode of production' (Braverman, 1974, p. 86). This fundamental role ofTaylorism is contrasted with the influence of the subse quent management schools of human relations and industrial psychology, which, accord ing to Braverman, have offered little more than cosmetic adjustments to the underlying principles of capitalist organisation. Braverman observes how 'Taylorism dominates the world of production; the practitioners of "human relations" and "industrial psychology" are the maintenance crew for human machinery' (Braverman, 1974, p. 87). Braverman contrasts the state of 'human machinery' under capitalism with that of non-human machinery. He points out that capitalism is characterised 'by the incessant drive to enlarge and perfect machinery on the one hand, and to diminish the worker on the other' (Braverman, 1974, p. 228), a point that had been implicitly made by Andrew Ure (1835) and that was a key ingredient of the Marxian analysis. According to Marx, the history of machinery stands in striking contrast to the history of workers. Machines first acquire 'skills' specific to certain production processes. Then, especially after the electronic revolution, they also acquire 'general purpose' abilities. By contrast, workers, deprived of traditional, craft-specific skills, become 'general purpose' not because their abilities are enlarged but because the scope of their jobs is narrowed. Or, in other words, workers become 'general purpose' because of job deskilling: the tasks they are required to perform are so detailed and simple that each worker can be moved from one job to another without substantial training costs. In this sense the worker becomes 'a general-purpose machine operated by management' (Braverman, 1974, p. 180). Machinery is also used to control the worker indirectly through the machine. By setting the pace of the machine, the manager can control the effort and the tasks performed by the worker. Conception and execution become even physically separated: management makes machines execute tasks that require the execution of other tasks by the workers. Deskilled workers are increasingly controlled by means of 'skilled' machines: again, in the words of Marx, the 'intellectual powers of machines' make science a productive force distinct from labour and presses it into the service of capital. Whereas, according to Braverman, Babbage and Taylor provide (much better than Adam Smith) a verbalisation of the capitalist mode of production, in reality we have a dual labour market where both Babbage-type and Smith-type workers co-exist. In the mature sectors of the economy there is certainly a tendency to turn the learning-by doing Smithian workers into unskilled Babbage workers who simply execute other agents' ideas. However, in other new production processes, the skill content is higher and may easily compensate for the overall deskilling process. Moreover, different varieties of capitalism involve different mixes of the two types of workers and there has been a tendency to export Taylorism to the developing countries. However, independently of the overall long-run (de)skilling tendency, one can eas ily agree with the idea that excessive job deskilling and 'capital upskilling' are salient characteristics of capitalism insofar as it is associated with well-defined property rights on machines and ill-defined rights over labour. While the 'skills' of machines can be clearly included among the assets of firms, the firm-specific skills of workers cannot be unambiguously included among these assets nor among those of the workers. For this reason, capitalism may tend to overinvest in disembodied intellectual assets, such as machines which embody past knowledge and skills, thereby help[s] ing management to gain monopoly over knowledge of the production process. However, in spite of their considerable foresight, Marx and Braverman could not see the most extreme and most meaningful step in this monopolization process: the privatization of knowledge and its direct transformation into the most valuable proprietary asset of the firm. This process, which has characterized the last two decades, motivates our addition of the word intellectual to the term monopoly capital used by Harry Braverman. The main characteristic of intellectual monopoly capitalism is that monopoly is not simply based on the market power due to the concentration of skills in machines and management; it becomes also a legal monopoly over some items of knowledge, which extends well beyond national boundaries. In this respect, a model of capitalism based on the ownership of knowledge is fundamentally different from the one on which Marx and Braverman focused their analysis. Since machines are well-defined physical objects, private ownership can be defined and enforced on an object located in a well-defined space. As long as an individual does not interfere with the local space occupied by the objects owned by other people, respect for the property rights of others does not limit his/her liberties. Moreover, as long the objects are not visibly taken away or changed by others, an owner can safely assume that his/her ownership rights are respected. The relative legal positions have a local domain geographically limited by the position in space occupied, at a certain moment in time, by the material object over which the rights are defined. The material character of the good and its well-defined location imply a possible overcrowding by potential consumers, and they are a source of rivalry in consumption. When machines embody some intellectual forces, the monopoly power that they confer is limited by the fact that similar machines can be lawfully built in other locations. Knowledge is not an object defined in a limited physical space. The same item of knowledge can be encoded in multiple languages, using many different objects exist ing in a potentially infinite number of places. For this reason, the full-blown private ownership of knowledge means a global monopoly that limits the liberty of many individuals in multiple locations. The ownership of a physical asset, such as a machine, entails some duties for the surrounding individuals, who should not interfere with the property rights of the owner and are, only in this sense, limited in the exercise of their liberty. By contrast, ownership of an item of knowledge implies that, independently of their physical location, all individuals have a duty not to interfere with that legal position. They must comply with the rights that it defines by limiting their actions their daily lives in multiple ways, irrespective of the place and the country they operate. If some individuals happen to produce (or in relevant cases have produced)3 the same knowledge on which the right is granted, their liberty results of their efforts is limited by the monopoly on knowledge that has been acquired by others. The reinforcement and the extension of intellectual property have been to the enclosure of common land that preceded the Industrial Revolution. In this case, commons were turned into exclusive private property. There is fundamental difference. In the case of land, the object of privatisation was that involved the legal positions of few individuals. By contrast, the privatization of intellectual property changes the legal positions of many individuals and implications for the international standings of different countries. Privatising only local implications. By contrast, the holders of property rights on knowledge up with rights equivalent to the imperial powers of the past. They can decide a certain production process can be undertaken in a particular country and come to own the future opportunities of firms in other countries.

#### Philosophical Inquiry shows that the conception of IPR is rooted in Capitalism. IPR is rooted in the capitalist state, but it is necessary to tear it down from within to actualize change. IPR is an unacceptable legal monopoly over knowledge differing from past forms of property rights.

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Research in recent history has neglected to address the moral foundations of particular kinds of public policy such as the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). On the one hand, nation-states have enforced a tightening of the IPR system. On the other, only recently have national government and international institutions recognised that the moral justification for stronger IPRs protection is far from being plausible and cannot be taken for granted. In this article, IPRs are examined as individual rights founded upon natural law, personality development, just reward and social utility. It is argued that these foundations cannot be philosophically sustained. IPRs constitute morally indefensible political developments which aim to reproduce the capitalist division of knowledge and labour at national, international and global levels. The need for such a critical approach to the moral foundations of IPRs has increased in importance as a consequence of their role in justifying corporate power, globalisation policies and harmonisation of such. Introduction In today’s globalising knowledge-based economies (Archibugi & Lundvall 2001; Rodrigues 2002), intangible forms of property such as intellectual property (IP) are increasingly becoming more important than traditional paradigms of tangible property such as land, houses and factories (Hughes 1988). Patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets2 are considered by their proponents to be statutory ways (WIPO 1997) of increasing innovations and boosting economic growth (Gould & Gruben 1996). For this reason, a number of countries, including the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), require the strengthening of IP systems, signing agreements to: (a) integrate new areas of protection beyond science—for example, business methods patents (EU 2002; Andersen 2003a,b); (b) introduce exclusive rights on pure discoveries—for example, genetic codes (c) increase the period of IP protection; and (d) introduce the ‘submarine patents’ scheme in the United States (Andersen 2003b).3 Stronger protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is a political decision that results in particular measures and legislation on the part of government. Is this political decision plausible? Is it possible to justify further tightening of IP regimes on moral grounds? To answer these questions, we need to examine the moral foundations of IPRs. Certainly the inquiry about the justification of IP protection is not new; it goes back to the nineteenth century. According to Machlup and Penrose (1959), between 1850 and 1875, in Western Europe, there was a serious battle for the justification of patent protection. Although the old controversy has been revived in recent years between developed and developing countries (Helpman 1993; Sell & May 2001), the IPRs literature so far has focused almost exclusively on the role of IP protection in new technological development and free competition. Thus, a number of academic works limit their investigation to the linkages between patent, trademark and copyright laws and innovation and international trade. These works, however, fail to explain the moral foundations of IPRs. As a result, there is an inadequate understanding of the complex justification of IPRs and related agreements such as the US and EU (2002) implementation of business methods patents, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Section (TRIPS)4 of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (1994), the Bay-Dole Act in the United States (1984) (Mazzoleni & Nelson 1998; Mowery et al. 1999), and so on. The objective of this article is to critically review the plausibility of the moral foundations of IPRs, providing the basis for examining whether stronger protection of such rights is morally defensible. It will be argued that patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets cannot be justified on moral grounds. Philosophical inquiry into the very nature of IPRs reveals that their conception as moral rights is unsustainable. This implies that the moral foundations of IPRs fail to provide justificatory basis for further tightening of IP regimes. The article is structured as follows: first it examines the concept of IP and its differences from other concepts of private ownership; then it reviews the moral foundations of IPRs and investigates their philosophical plausibility; and finally, it concludes that the strengthening of IP regimes is morally indefensible. The Concept of Intellectual Property The Meaning of Property Any attempt to analyse the particular concept of IP presupposes adequate understanding of the general concept of property. The meaning of property is not given in abstraction from history. Rather, it changes through different historical moments of economic and social development. These moments are linked with the various stages of development of the division of labour. According to Harris (1996, p. 42), different conceptions of property arose, historically, in connection with tangible things. These things can be physically held and are either movables or immovables (Bouckaert 1990, p. 789). Movables mainly include what Marx (1975, p. 339) called ‘the miracles of industry and change’—for example, movable capital. Immovables mainly include land-based products—for example, immovable capital. The question that arises is what does it really mean today to have property to tangibles? Political theorists such as Macpherson (1978, p. 2) argue that the modern concept of property has a dual meaning: in common usage, property means things, but in law it means rights in or to things. Macpherson rejects the common usage of property as misusage and stresses that property both in law and in logic means rights, not things (ibid.). This implies that for him, property is not a direct relation between persons and things, as it seems to be for legal theorists such as Bouckaert (1990). The latter defines the notion of property as something that came to be owned by somebody in a legitimate way. Although Bouckaert recognises that this is a common-sense notion that is difficult to apply to particular issues, he understands property as a direct control of movables or immovables. By contrast, for Macherson, property is a historically and logically founded political relation between persons. In capitalist societies, this relation is often defined as an enforceable individual claim to some exclusive use or benefit of something. That is what is called private property right. My private property right to a thing exists to the extent that other persons are excluded from the determination of its use. Although Macpherson’s (1962) description of the politico-theoretical legitimation of capitalism faces serious problems of anachronism (Rayan 1984; Waldron 1988), his conception of modern property as rights is correctly linked with the birth and growth of capitalism. The origins of the modern notion of property go back to the twelfth-century Roman law. An historical study by Tuck (1979) indicates that the medieval lawyer always regarded property (dominium) as a right (ius) and he was prepared to talk about property rights. This became the basis of the thirteenth-century distinction between property rights of tenants (dominium utile) and property rights of landlords (dominium directum). The recognition of ‘dominium utile’ was a breakthrough in theories of rights. Property was viewed as any right to things. According to Tuck (ibid., p. 16) ‘any right which could be defended against all other men, and could be transferred or alienated by its possessor, was a property right, and not only right of total control. The process had begun whereby all of man’s rights, of whatever kind, were to come to be seen as his property’. This process emancipated tenants from landlords and undermined the feudal system. During the Renaissance, it provided the conceptual basis for the formation of the seventeenth-century theories of ‘possessive individualism’, including those of Hobbes and Locke (Macpherson 1962). The historical approach to property sheds light on the development of the modern concept of individual property rights. Nevertheless, it does not clarify the meaning of such rights. To achieve this clarification, a philosophical approach to the notion of property rights is required. To begin with the concept of right as such, probably the most innovative work in the logical analysis of its meaning is the theory of Hohfeld. Hohfeld provided an account of the logical ambiguities in the use of phrases such as ‘P has a right to X’.5 Specifically, he argued that what is commonly referred to as ‘right’ can be broken down into a scheme of ‘opposites’ and ‘correlatives’ as follows: (right privilege power immunity Jural Opposites ( (no-right duty disability liability (right privilege power immunity Jural Correlatives ( (duty no-right liability disability. (Hohfeld 2001, p. 12) Within this analytical scheme, the phrase ‘P has a right to X’ may mean any (combination) of the following: 1). . . P has no duty (to a particular person Q or to people in general) not to do X . . . 2) Talk of P’s right to do X may be meant to indicate that Q (or everyone) has a duty to let P do X . . . 3) The third sense of ‘right’ . . . involves the ability or power of an individual to alter existing legal arrangements . . . 4) Oddly, we sometimes use the term ‘right’ to describe not only a power but also the correlate of the lack of power—an immunity from legal change. (Waldron 1984, pp. 6–7) Hohfeld’s account refers to legal rights and does not explain the concept of duty. Other moral philosophers such as Hart (1984) and Lyons (1984) have proposed ‘choice’ and ‘interests’ theories of rights respectively, departing from the special Hohfeldian relation between duties and right-bearers. Nevertheless, if we apply Hohfeld’s account to property right, his famous phrase becomes: ‘P has a property right to X’. This may mean any (combination) of the following: 1) P has no duty (to a particular person Q or to people in general) not to acquire X. This implies that P is free to exercise his property right to X without interference from person Q or people in general. 2) Talk of P’s right to acquire X may be meant to indicate that Q (or everyone) has a duty to let P acquire X. This means that P has a claim-right against Q to acquire X.6 3) If P acquires X, P has a right to sell X to someone else. In doing so, P changes legal relations: someone else now acquires all the rights involved in ownership and P now acquires only duties to someone else. 4) If P has immunity with regard to the acquisition of X, then Q (or may be everyone) has no power to alter his legal position in regard to X (Waldron, 1984, p. 7).7 The conception of private property in terms of Hohfeld’s abstract account implies that the property rights and duties one has partly determine whether one is permitted to access and control tangible resources. This particular view of liberty (Wolff 1997)8 is crucial because tangible resources are scarce. In political philosophy, scarcity is a resupposition of all liberal theories of property. ‘If this assumption were ever to fail (as Marx believed it some day would) then the traditional problem of the nature and justification of rival types of property system would probably disappear’ (Waldron 1988, pp. 31–32). Given the current condition of scarcity, only some concrete arrangement of property rights in society can distribute power over scarce resources in order to secure social reproduction. Bouckaert here distinguishes between natural and artificial scarcity. According to him, ‘Scarcity is natural when it is possible to conceive of it before any human, institutional, contractual arrangement. Artificial scarcity, on the other hand, is the outcome of such arrangement’ (Bouckaert 1990, p. 798). Bouckaert correctly stresses that although natural scarcity provides justification to legal framework, artificial scarcity can hardly serve as a justification for institutional development. However, he also links the distinction between natural and artificial scarcity with a distinction between real rights and personal rights. The latter distinction has its origins in the medieval law that divided property into land and everything else (Penner 1997, p. 107). Real rights imply rights in rem—for example, complete physical control of tangibles. By contrast, personal rights imply rights in personam—for example, a specific obligation of some person(s) to transfer things under legitimate control, to perform a specific action or to refrain from a specific action (Bouckaert 1990, p. 794). Bouckaert argues that real rights are related to natural scarcity while personal rights are arranged to create artificial scarcity. This argument appears to be epistemologically problematical. Bouckaert relates reality with nature and connects personality with contract. The relationship between personality and reality is not clarified in his argument. Nevertheless, both real and personal rights are sustained as arrangements intended to resolve the problem of resource allocation. This problem is fundamental in political economy. However, a number of theorists such as Hayek (1948, 1960, 1967, 1978), Mises (1949, 1960) and Menger (1981), members of the so-called Austrian School of Economics, believe that the problem of resource allocation is resolved through the spontaneous and evolutionary process of the market and not through rational arrangements of property rights. It might be said that this position is theoretically and historically problematical. As Papaioannou (1998, 2003) points out, the Austrian School, and especially Hayek, lacks any theory of individual rights due to its epistemologically founded sceptical rationalism. Therefore, it fails to see private property rights as a historically developed political solution to the problem of resource allocation. Intellectual Property as a Right to Ideas If Macpherson’s conception of private property as a historically and philosophically founded political relation between persons is correct, then the question is whether it can be extended to intangible entities. Is it plausible to speak of IPRs in the same way we speak of private property rights to tangibles? What does it mean to have property in ideas? Legal theorists argue that the historical and philosophical development of IP is different from that of classical property. According to Bouckaert (1990), IP is rooted in the state intervention and not in the spontaneity of the continental legal tradition. This argument overemphasises the role of spontaneity in law without taking into account the political, social and economic context within which the continental legal tradition emerged. Law cannot be separated from social, political and economic struggles which constitute the process of legislation (Hunt 1993).9 However, Bouckaert correctly stresses that in the case of the development of IPRs, the state had crucial involvement. Although there were some pre-legislative attempts to organise the control of valuable ideas (Sell & May 2001, p. 475), the decisive step was made with the formalisation of patents in the 1624 Statute of Monopolies and with copyrights in the Act Anne of 1709. England was the first country to follow the attempts of the (city) state of Venice in introducing legislation for the protection of IPRs (Prager 1952; Nance 1990). Sell and May explain the history of IPRs through the triangulation between technical change, ideas of knowledge and legal institutions. For them, the birth and growth of IPRs has been a battle between two antagonistic beliefs: that on the one hand individuals should benefit from their ideas and that on the other these ideas should benefit the public through their free dissemination (Sell & May 2001). Both beliefs are illustrated in the early debates about the justification of IPRs. For instance, several authors at the beginning of the nineteenth century, such as Renouard and Roguin in 1835,10 argued that IP has nothing in common with ordinary property. IP is an unacceptable legal privilege or a legally protected monopoly. By contrast, thinkers such as Picard in 1899 and Kohler in 190711 recognised IPRs as real rights, the object of which was the good produced by intellectual creation. Certainly, despite the theoretical disputes, patent systems and copyright laws began to spread in many countries, due to the expansion of international commerce (Sell & May 2001, p. 482). By the mid-nineteenth century, patent laws were enacted in almost all major countries of the European continent (Machlup & Penrose 1950, p. 3). The criticism of patent protection and copyright laws also spread. The reason for this was the contradiction between IPRs and classical property rights. Specifically, the historical birth of the latter was connected with the death of the feudal system of privileges and the growth of economic liberalism based on laissez-faire (Polanyi 1944). By contrast, the historical development of patent protection and copyright laws was linked with the re-emergence of privileges and monopolies, which were against the liberal spirit of free competition. This internal contradiction of capitalism was well reflected in the nineteenth century patent controversy (Machlup & Penrose 1950). In England and in Germany, the anti-patent movement advanced free-trade arguments in order to convince governments about the illiberal nature of IPR protection (ibid.). However, those arguments were rejected by patent advocators such as Mill (1909, p. 932), who stressed that inventions contribute to social welfare and therefore it is just for inventors to use their ideas exclusively for a limited period of time. Eventually, patent advocators won the battle through remarkable propaganda (Machlup & Penrose 1950, p. 5). It was the historical moment in which patent advocators began to introduce IPRs as natural rights. Their aim was none other than overcoming the internal contradiction between protectionism and economic liberalism. According to Machlup & Penrose (ibid., p. 9), ‘It was strategically essential for [the patent system] to separate as far as possible the idea of patent protection from the monopoly issue and from the free trade issue. This was attempted by presenting the case of patent protection as one of natural law and private property’. Whether IPRs can be plausibly justified as natural rights will be investigated in the next section. For the time being, let us move from historical account to philosophical inquiry, examining the relationship between IPRs and classical private property in analytical terms. IPRs constitute relations between persons concerning specific intangible resources.What these relations have in common with classical private property is the possibility of exclusivity of use (Richards 2002, p. 523). Thus, strictly following Hohfeld’s theory, someone might argue that the IPRs and related duties a person P has partly determine whether P is permitted to access and control ideas and inventions. Is this argument philosophically sustainable? Can ideas and inventions be exclusively accessed and controlled by a person like tangible resources? The answer to both questions is negative. Ontologically speaking, ideas and inventions constitute special intangible resources. In the philosophy literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ideas are conceived as qualitative entities founded upon reason (Descartes 1994) or upon experience (Hume 1975; Locke 1993). Although the separation between rationalism and empiricism was never clear cut as regards the development of ideas, the latter were always viewed through the prism of the relationship between human mind and external world. This relationship is complex. Human mind (representing reason) and external world (representing experience) are neither identical (monism) nor distinct (dualism) orders. They mutually constitute each other in the process of historical development. Ideas can be ontologically seen as the outcome of that mutual constitution (of reason and experience). Certainly, there are different categories of ideas. As Bouckaert (1990, pp. 801–803) points out, first of all, there are ideas that are not expressed in symbols or signs but remain mental entities in the creator’s mind. Second, there are those ideas that are expressed in symbols or signs but are not immediately communicated in society. Third, there are ideas that are immediately expressed and communicated in society. Only in the first category does the creator retain the natural ownership of her ideas. In the second and third categories, the creator loses her natural intellectual ownership in the course of time. Once ideas are expressed and communicated socially, different persons are allowed to share the natural ownership of the creator. The special ontological character of ideas implies that they differ not only from physical property but also from other intangible resources such as stocks, shares and choices in action. These resources are artificially created through abstract legal relations between persons. The main differences between ideas, physical property and artificial intangibles can be summarized in four words: scarcity, separability, time and exclusion. First, while tangibles and artificial intangibles are scarce, due to natural and political limitations, ideas are abundant. Ideas can be produced by everyone who wishes to keep them to herself or to share them with others. Second, while tangibles and artificial intangibles are separable from us, ideas are not. This implies that we cannot trade ideas in the same way we do with land, stocks and shares. Third, while tangibles and artificial intangibles can be used at any one time by only one person or group of people, ideas can be used simultaneously by everyone (Hughes 1988, p. 315). Fourth, while people can be effectively excluded from physical property and stocks or shares, the same cannot happen with ideas. For instance, it is easy to prevent someone from using ideas of others in public but difficult to do so with the private use of ideas. The above-mentioned differences between ideas, tangibles and artificial intangibles indicate that IPRs and related duties constitute relations between persons that are essentially different from those of classical private property rights. For instance, the issue of scarcity implies that IPRs are personal rights that create conditions of artificial scarcity in order to protect creators’ ownership. Theorists such as Penner (1997, p. 119) dispute this argument, stressing that IPRs fail to qualify as private property rights. In their view, IPRs are just monopolies created by law. Penner derives his own view from the separability thesis. He argues that a person cannot contingently own ideas because even if she sells them to another person she still has them in mind. The important point, of course, is that a person can use ideas as a means of producing exchange values in the market. Members of the Institutional School of Economics (including, among others, Veblen [1904] and Commons [1959]), argue that, in capitalism, innovative ideas constitute ‘intangible assets’. These are extensions of the classical concept of private property to the expected exchange value of intangibles such as one’s knowledge and capacities. Intangible assets develop opportunities for new products in the market and therefore new capital accumulation and use values. What IPRs prevent someone from doing is not having in mind the ideas of others but temporally using them to produce exchange values. In this sense, the possibility of temporal exclusivity of IP use in capitalism refers to the expected opportunities of new capital development.

#### Everyday suffering is dictated by continued structures of power that puts minorities into a continuous cycle of violence. The result is sadistic violence occurring right now— structural violence, climate change, biodiversity loss, genocide, and even economic collapse. This capitalistic crisis is not like others in history- ITS HAPPENING RIGHT NOW.

Robinson 16 — William I. Robinson, Professor of Sociology, Global Studies and Latin American Studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, PhD in Sociology, 2016 (“Sadistic Capitalism: Six Urgent Matters for Humanity in Global Crisis,” Truth-Out, April 12th, Available Online at <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis>)//RM

In these mean streets of **globalized capitalism in crisis**, it has become **profitable** to turn **poverty and inequality into a tourist attraction**. The South African Emoya Luxury Hotel and Spa company has made a glamorized spectacle of it. The resort recently advertised an opportunity for tourists to stay "in our unique Shanty Town ... and experience traditional township living within a safe private game reserve environment." A cluster of simulated shanties outside of Bloemfontein that the company has constructed "is ideal for team building, braais, bachelors [parties], theme parties and an experience of a lifetime," read the ad. The luxury accommodations, made to appear from the outside as shacks, featured paraffin lamps, candles, a battery-operated radio, an outside toilet, a drum and fireplace for cooking, as well as under-floor heating, air conditioning and wireless internet access. A well-dressed, young white couple is pictured embracing in a field with the corrugated tin shanties in the background. The only thing missing in this fantasy world of sanitized space and glamorized poverty was the people themselves living in poverty. The "luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole. Faced with a **stagnant global economy**, elites have managed to turn **war**, **structural violence** and **inequality** into opportunities for **capital**, **pleasure** and **entertainment**. It is hard not to conclude that **unchecked capitalism** has become what I term "**sadistic capitalism**," in which the **suffering** and **deprivation** generated by capitalism become a source of **aesthetic pleasure**, leisure and entertainment for others. I recently had the opportunity to travel through several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around the world. Everywhere I went, **social polarization** and **political tensions** have reached **explosive dimensions**. Where is the crisis headed, what are the possible outcomes and what does it tell us about global capitalism and resistance? **This crisis is not like earlier structural crises of world capitalism**, such as in the 1930s or 1970s. **This one is fast becoming systemic**. The crisis of humanity shares aspects of earlier structural crises of world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I highlight here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a descent into chaos and uncertainty. 1) The **level** of global social polarization and inequality is **unprecedented** in the face of out-of-control, **over-accumulated capital**. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam published a follow-up to its report on global inequality that had been released the previous year. According to the new report, now just 62 billionaires -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as **one half of the world's population**, and the top **1%** owns more wealth than the **other 99% combined**. Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the global power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some 95 percent of the world's wealth, while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with just 5 percent. This 20-80 divide of global society into haves and the have-nots is the new **global social apartheid**. It is evident not just between rich and poor countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent high-consumption sectors alongside the downward mobility, "precariatization," destabilization and expulsion of majorities. Escalating inequalities **fuel capitalism's chronic problem** of over-accumulation: The transnational capitalist class **find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus** it has accumulated, **leading to stagnation in the world economy**. The signs of an **impending depression are everywhere**. The front page of the February 20 issue of The Economist read, "**The World Economy: Out of Ammo?**" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing the 80 percent, co-opting some into a hegemonic bloc and repressing the rest. Alongside the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression is heightened dissemination through the culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that depoliticize through consumerist fantasies and the manipulation of desire. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates, another strategy of **co-optation** is the **manipulation of fear and insecurity** among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled toward **scapegoated communities**. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Scapegoated communities are under siege, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in India, the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with its 20th century predecessor, 21st century fascism hinges on such manipulation of social anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis. **Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression** that lend to projects of 21st century fascism. 2) The system is **fast reaching the ecological limits to its reproduction**. We have reached several tipping points in what environmental scientists refer to as nine crucial "**planetary boundaries**." We have already exceeded these boundaries in three areas -- **climate change**, **the nitrogen cycle** and **diversity loss**. There have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system. If the capitalist system **stops expanding outward**, **it enters crisis and faces collapse**. We have entered what Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have transformed up to half of the world's surface. We are altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the oceans at a rate that undermines the conditions for life. The ecological dimensions of global crisis cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, The Sixth Extinction. "No other creature has ever managed this ... The Sixth Extinction will continue to determine the course of life long after everything people have written and painted and built has been ground into dust." Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible. The human-nature contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network collapsed about AD 900 due to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, given capital's implacable impulse to accumulate profit and its accelerated commodification of nature, **it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system**. "**Green capitalism**" appears as an oxymoron, as sadistic capitalism's attempt[s] to turn the **ecological crisis into a profit-making opportunity**, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction. **The sheer magnitude of the means of violence is unprecedented**, as is the concentrated control over the means of global communications and the production and circulation of knowledge, symbols and images. We have seen the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more perturbing than that described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities. Now, however, the corporate and political powers that be force obedience even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global apartheid involves the creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where elites are insulated through new systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country. Urban areas around the world are now green zoned through gentrification, gated communities, surveillance systems, and state and private violence. Inside the world's green zones, privileged strata avail themselves of privatized social services, consumption and entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite sealed off under the protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. What is required is a redistribution of power downward and transformation toward a system in which social need trumps private profit. Green zoning takes on distinct forms in each locality. In Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City, the most exclusive residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are accessible only by helicopter and private gated roads. In Johannesburg, a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals rows of mansions that appear as military compounds, with private armed towers and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner suburbs where the country's elite could live out their aspirations and fantasies. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and shopping centers and English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles, where I live, the freeway system now has an express lane reserved for those that can pay an exorbitant toll. On this lane, the privileged speed by, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in the city's notorious bumper-to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get to and from work. There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into the exclusive lane, it is instantly recorded by this surveillance system and a heavy fine is imposed on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous. Outside of the global green zones, **warfare and police containment have become normalized** and sanitized for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even glamorizing war and violence as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news" channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It desensitizes, bringing about complacency and indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are prison industrial complexes, immigrant and refugee repression and control systems, the criminalization of outcast communities and capitalist schooling. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate economy, in particular, aim to colonize the mind -- to undermine the ability to think critically and outside the dominant worldview. A neofascist culture emerges through militarism, extreme masculinization, racism and racist mobilizations against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over. If the capitalist system stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and faces collapse. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? With the limits to expansion comes a turn toward militarized accumulation -- making wars of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the militarization of social and political institutions so as to continue to generate new opportunities for accumulation in the face of stagnation. 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a "planet of slums," alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to these sophisticated systems of social control and destruction. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced recruitment of miners at gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo, sweatshops and exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore, the global working class is experiencing accelerated "precariatization." The "new precariat" refers to the proletariat that faces capital under today's unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization, casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are uprooted everywhere, there is a rising reserve army of immigrant labor. The global working class is becoming divided into citizen and immigrant workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and therefore, exploitable. The challenge for dominant groups is how to contain the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity, the immigrant workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st century megacities become the battlegrounds between mass resistance movements and the new systems of mass repression. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside) **are at risk of genocide**, such as those in Gaza, zones in Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria. 6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy and a nation-state-based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and do not wield enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the G-8 and G-20 were unable to impose transnational regulation on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss such regulation. Elites historically have attempted to resolve the problems of over-accumulation by state policies that can regulate the anarchy of the market. However, in recent decades, transnational capital has broken free from the constraints imposed by the nation-state. The more "enlightened" elite representatives of the transnational capitalist class are now clamoring for transnational mechanisms of regulation that would allow the global ruling class to reign in the anarchy of the system in the interests of saving global capitalism from itself and from radical challenges from below. At the same time, the division of the world into some 200 competing nation-states is not the most propitious of circumstances for the global working class. Victories in popular struggles from below in any one country or region can (and often do) become diverted and even undone by the structural power of transnational capital and the direct political and military domination that this structural power affords the dominant groups. In Greece, for instance, the leftist Syriza party came to power in 2015 on the heels of militant worker struggles and a mass uprising. But the party abandoned its radical program as a result of the enormous pressure exerted on it from the European Central Bank and private international creditors. The Systemic Critique of Global Capitalism A growing number of transnational elites themselves now recognize that **any resolution** to the global crisis must involve **redistribution downward of income**. However, in the viewpoint of those from below, a neo-Keynesian redistribution within the prevailing corporate power structure is not enough. What is required is a **redistribution of power downward and transformation toward a system in which social need trumps private profit**. A **global rebellion against the transnational capitalist class** has **spread** since the financial collapse of 2008. Wherever one looks, there is popular, **grassroots and leftist struggle**, and the rise of new cultures of resistance: **the Arab Spring**; **the resurgence of leftist politics in Greece**, **Spain and elsewhere in Europe**; **the tenacious resistance of Mexican social movements following the Ayotzinapa massacre** of 2014; **the favela uprising in Brazil** against the government's World Cup and Olympic expulsion policies; **the student strikes in Chile**; **the remarkable surge in the Chinese workers' movement**; **the shack dwellers and other poor people's campaigns in South Africa**; **Occupy Wall Street**, the **immigrant rights movement**, **Black Lives Matter**, **fast food workers' struggle** and the mobilization around the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in the United States. This global revolt is spread unevenly and faces many challenges. A number of these struggles, moreover, **have suffered setbacks**, such as the Greek working-class movement and, tragically, the Arab Spring. What type of a transformation is viable, and how do we achieve it? How we interpret the global crisis is itself a matter of vital importance as politics polarize worldwide between a neofascist and a popular response. **The systemic critique of global capitalism must strive to influence**, from this vantage point, **the discourse and practice of movements for a more just distribution of wealth and power**. **Our survival may depend on it**.

#### Any reform on IPR fails, capitalist nations maintain their dominance over the market and developing nation- TRIPS proves. Thus the advocacy is the member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to abolish all intellectual property protections.

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These events – the corporate capture of the global pharmaceutical IP regime, state complicity and vaccine imperialism – are not new. Recall [Article 7 of TRIPS](https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm), which states that the objective of the Agreement is the ‘protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights [to] contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology’. In similar vein, Article 66(2) of TRIPS further calls on developed countries to ‘provide incentives to enterprises and institutions within their territories to promote and encourage technology transfer to least-developed country’. While the language of ‘transfer of technology’ might seem beneficial or benign, in actuality it is not. As I discussed in [my book](https://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/patent-games-in-the-global-south-9781509927401/), and as [Carmen Gonzalez](https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1631&context=faculty) has also shown, when development objectives are incorporated into international legal instruments and institutions, they become embedded in structures that may constrain their transformative potential and reproduce North-South power imbalances. This is because these development objectives are circumscribed by capitalist imperialist structures, adapted to justify colonial practices and mobilized through racial differences. These structures are the essence of international law and its institutions even in the twenty-first century. They continue to animate broader socio-economic engagement with the global economy even in the present as well as in the legal and regulatory codes that support them. Thus, it is not surprising that even in current global health crisis, calls for this same transfer of technology in the form of a TRIPS waiver to scale up global vaccine production is being thwarted by the hegemony of developed states inevitably influenced by their respective pharmaceutical companies. The ‘emancipatory potential’ of TRIPS cannot be achieved if it was not created to be emancipatory in the first place. It also makes obvious the ways international IP law is not only unsuited to promote structural reform to enable the self-sufficiency and self-determination of the countries in the global south, but also produces asymmetries that perpetuate inequalities.

#### The plan solves- only with IPR are the elite able to sadistically control the global market. Without their IPR, corporations will fail to thrive, allowing for a peaceful transition.

Pagano 14 (Ugo Pagano, Ugo Pagano is an Italian economist and Professor of Economic Policy at the University of Siena where he is also Director of the PhD programme in Economics and President of S. Chiara Graduate School, “A Crisis of Intellectual Monopoly Capitalism”, November 2014)//RM

In the midst of the financial crisis, the Financial Times of 6 March 2009 reported that government was considering saving Opel from the possible bankruptcy of GM, only that, although the company had the same workers, machines and management0, its vanished because some legal papers had changed hands (Benoit and Schaefer, 2009): 'Our impression is that Opel has not freed itself from GM's influence and that it serious about becoming more autonomous as a business,' the insider said, confirming Mr Guttenberg and Ms Merkel were losing patience with the companies. Berlin has refused to assist Opel without cast-iron guarantees that the money will GM or be lost in the wake of a GM insolvency. Officials say Opel's restructuring suggestions far have failed to provide this guarantee. The government suspects GM has provided some of Opel's patents as collateral to the US Treasury in exchange for financial assistance. Berlin therefore doubts Opel would be shielded against a GM insolvency. Without its patents, Opel was worth nothing and could not be saved even by substantial funding from the German state. This story exemplifies the nature of intellectual monop oly capitalism and in particular the importance of intellectual property rights (IPR) for a company's future prospects and value. Even if machines, workers and state support are still in place, a company may have no future when it is deprived of its intellectual property. The situation is likely to be even worse if the company has had no ownership of intellectual assets since the outset. Even if we disregard the overwhelming importance of trademarks, the absence of other forms of intellectual property is sufficient to jeopardise a company's prospects. With IPR protection lacking, all other resources, such as related skills and physical resources, are unlikely to be developed and investment opportunities may be completely blocked by the absence of a multiple set of factors. The overall blocking effect of patents appears to be even stronger if one considers that they include not only technological blueprints but also basic design **patents.** In the 3 An account of cases in which traditional knowledge has been stolen by multinationals is given by Shiva (2001). 4 For example, see Shiva (2001, pp. 44-8). 5 The blocking effect of patents was first considered in Heller and Heisemberg's (1998) classic study on anti-commons. Chang (2002) considered the constraints set by patents on development opportunities. For a more recent assessment of the problem see also Jaffe and Lerner (2006). Apple even claimed ownership of geometric shapes such as rectangles with rounded corners: The following elements of Apple product designs comprise the Apple i-phone Trade Dress at issue in this case: - a rectangular product with four evenly rounded corners; - a flat clear surface covering the front of the product; - a display screen under the clear surface; - under the clear surface, substantial neutral (black or white) borders above and below the display screen; - when the device is on, a matrix of colorful icons with evenly rounded corners within the display screen; - when the device is switched on, a bottom dock of colorful square icons with evenly rounded corners set off from the other icons on the display, which does not change as other pages of the user interface are viewed. (United States District Court, 2011, pp. 18-19) However, in spite of Apple's claims, rectangles are the only reasonable shapes for these devices and corners must be rounded for safety reasons. The intellectual ownership of such elementary geometric shapes would block the entire development of the mobile communication devices industry. While Apple tries to remove rounded rectangles from the public sphere, much of the technology generating the astronomic profit-making iPhone (from Internet, semicon ductors and microchips to GPS, Siri and touch-screen technologies) comes from huge investments made by public agencies that get little or no return for their very risky investments (Mazzucato, 2013, pp. 87-110). The picture is even worse when we consider that some agents—the so-called patent trolls6—do not use their patents to protect their own technological advances but only to extract profits from companies that they can 'hold up' with their patents. While pure patent trolls may still be a minority phenomenon, the growth industry of the new millen nium (Lemley, 2008, p. 613) may be patent hold-up: Hundreds of companies are engaging in efforts to capture not just the value of what they contributed to an invention, but also a disproportionate share of somebody else's product. (Lemley, 2008, pp. 613-14) It will be argued in the next section that these multiple blockages, due to intellectual monopoly capital, must be included among the causes of the current 'Great Recession'. We can conclude this section by observing that the same blockages evidence the extent to which, under modern intellectual monopoly capitalism, the labourer is brought face to face with the intellectual potencies of the material process of production, as the property of another, and as a riding power. 6 Strictly speaking, we can define patent trolls as entities that 'license' only the right not be sued and are not engaged in any technological transfer. However most firms carry out both activities and are character ised by different mixes of them. Since the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, universities are not only permitted but also encouraged to patent federally funded inventions and in the past three decades they have contributed to the massive surge of patenting. Universities have also made an unfortunate contribution to the growth of the hold-up industry. Indeed, since they are not directly interested in production and are engaged in more basic research, cross-licensing cannot help solve the hold-up problem, which in their case is particularly damaging because it concerns usually essential upstream knowledge (Lemley, 2008, pp. 615-19). This monopoly power the worker must face the intellectual potencies of the production process as another and as a ruling poiver setting legal limits on the development of workers' bilities and skills. In this respect, what was in Marx's time the 'future of capitalism' gone well beyond Marx's most dramatic expectations. 3. The Great Recession and global intellectual monopolies In much economic theory, knowledge had been treated as a public good. However knowledge is an impure public good; it shares its non-rival nature with pure public goods, but not the impossibility of exclusion. Depriving others of access to knowledge can be accomplished with various devices, such as secrecy and IPR. Moreover, the inclusion of others in the use of knowledge (i.e. its transmission and diffusion) may be very costly. Under a regime of strong property rights, each firm is forced to specialise its investments in the narrow field left free by the intellectual monopoly of other firms. In some cases these specialisation opportunities coincide with the shrinking fields, unaffected by IPR, which are the modern equivalent of the common lands unaffected by the enclosures of the Industrial Revolution. In other cases, besides these shrinking commons, the field includes the firm's exclusive private intellectual property (which contributes to the narrowing of all the other possible fields of specialisation). While the start of industrial capitalism was preceded by the enclosure of lands, intellectual monopoly capitalism has been made possible by a parallel enclosure of ideas in privately owned fields. Also in the case of this second enclosure movement, the insti tution of new private rights has affected the legal positions on the public demesne.7 There are however some fundamental differences. In the case of land, according to the views of some commentators,8 enclosures and private property may even have prevented the overexploitation of a resource being depleted by overcrowding and they may have provided a solution to the well-known 'tragedy' of the local commons. No similar claim can be made for the case of intellectual assets. Rather than preventing a tragedy of commons, their private ownership is instead likely to produce an anti-com mons tragedy (Heller and Eisemberg, 1998). The fields of knowledge are not subject to overcrowding. By contrast, they may be greatly damaged if they are enclosed within narrow and rigid boundaries. When the access to knowledge is severely restricted by the fields privatised by others, agents are forced to specialize in narrow fields and they are likely to suffer a dramatic squeeze of investment opportunities. In other words, an anti-commons tragedy due to overprivatisation is likely to occur. Moreover, the legal ownership of knowledge that restricts the freedom of some countries to enter certain specialization fields has consequences more drastic than those of tariffs. Tariffs can at most completely close the market of the country imposing them. IPR are much more restrictive: those imposed by a firm, or by clusters of allied firms of a certain country, can close global markets for all the other firms and for all the other countries. However, although IPR act like global tariffs, they cannot be reciprocated 7 Boyle (2003) clarifies the similarities and differences between the first and second enclosure move ments. His methodology is based on the Hohefeldian legal relations between the private and public domains. On the importance of Hohefeld and Commons for the analysis of property relations see Pagano (2007A). 8 Ostrom (1990) shows that, in many cases, Hardin's (1968) tragedy of the commons did not in fact occur. Thus, unlike tariffs, they are associated with forced specialisation and with increases in global trade.9 Countries that are prevented from specialising in certain fields must import goods or licences from the holders of the legal rights on the relative knowledge. As a consequence, IPR tend to create new sorts of national com parative advantage.10 Paradoxically, a form of protection stronger than the strongest tariff forces new flows of trade. Thus IPR forced trade (Belloc and Pagano, 2012) joins the spontaneous causes favouring international trade considered by the classical theo ries of comparative advantage as well as by the theory of intraindustry trade developed by Krugman (1980) by drawing on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).11 Besides effects on forced specialisation and forced trade, the overall result of the IPR protectionism of intellectual monopoly capitalism is a global squeeze of investment opportunities. This restriction of productive opportunities, however, is highly asymmetric and path dependent on past endowments of intellectual assets. Organisations rich in intellectual assets own larger fields of investment and of new patenting opportunities. In the innovative ness of different firms (and even more of different countries), a polarisation arises. A picture of this asymmetric dynamics emerges rather sharply from Figure 1 (panels A and B). As Figure 1 shows, the degree of inequality in the distribution of patents increases over time both among firms and among countries, but the degree of polarisation is constantly higher for the latter. Firms in the same country undertaking joint research activities are more likely to engage in cross-licensing or other types of alliance to fight rival patenting activities, and these strategies are likely to augment firms' inequalities. While some countries and firms may gain from intellectual protectionism, the overall restriction of investment opportunities is likely to generate the dynamic process shown in Figure 2, where we can observe a total world increase in investments for about five years after the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) but, after that initial phase, a continuous decline starting in 1999 and culminating with the recent global financial crisis. The interactions between productive forces and pro duction relations is likely to have produced two different phases in the dynamics of intellectual monopoly capitalism, the first characterising the 'roaring nineties' and the second the much less glamorous first decade of the new millennium. The first phase (1990-99) marked the expansion of the so-called knowledge econ omy—the new economy that was supposed to open a new age of everlasting develop ment. By 1990, the Cold War belonged to the past and the USA had become the only superpower, which, together with its multinationals, could heavily influence the new architecture of the world economy. The fruits of the Cold War effort and of its victory were not only evident in the political sphere, for in the new world under American 9 One effect of a strong IPR regime is that companies are not afraid to decentralize production to low-cost countries. This decentralization involves some form of subordinate development for these countries and wage pressure in the industrialised ones. However developing countries can employ appropriate industrial policies to decrease their private knowledge dependency. For example, since the 1980s, China has been able to couple the advantages of being a low-cost country with appropriate industrial policies (Nolan, 2001). 10 This is a particular case of what Hall and Soskice (2001) call 'institutional comparative advantage' and which may imply a specialization in the global economy that may even increase the institutional diversity among different countries (Pagano, 2007C). 11 Under increasing returns to scale, there is a trade-off between product variety and the abatement of costs. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) show that, under some conditions, the market can approximate the optimal variety of products. Building on their findings, Krugman (1980) argues that, for the selfsame reasons, countries specialize in different products and that gains from trade arise from the fact that the opening of markets allows for a greater variety of products. By contrast, Belloc and Pagano (2012) find that the monopolist closing of some markets stimulates international specialization and trade. Global patents and global investments Source: Belloc and Pagano (2012). dominance, the Internet, computers and other innovations—to whose development military and public research had substantially contributed (Mazzucato, 2013)— became cheaply available, opening up many new technological possibilities for the entire world economy. However, this technological generosity did not last for long. The 1994 Marrakesh agreements marked the beginning of a new era of the world economy in which a few giant firms could own a disproportionate share of the global knowledge. The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with the associated 1994 TRIPS agreements, marked a structural break in the world economy that saw the birth of the institutions of intellectual monopoly capitalism. Initially, in the sec ond half of the 1990s, the establishment of these institutions reinforced the boom. It was possible to enjoy the fruits of past public investment in knowledge as well as the incentives of knowledge privatisation. The cheap availability of revolutionary forms information and communication technology opened new investment opportunities, which were greatly enhanced by the fact that they included the possibility to acquire new secure IPR. The reinforcement of private IPR happened on virgin terrain that had just been fertilised by the ICT innovations made publicly available to all.

#### The affirmative is a class-based critique of the system through a radical interrogation of the fundamental structures of capitalism—pedagogical spaces are the crucial staging ground for keeping socialism on the horizon. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the best methodology to resist capitalism.

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(Peter and Valerie, “Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’,” Educational Philosophy and Theory Vol. 36, Issue 2, p. 183-199)//RM

For well over two decades we have witnessed the jubilant liberal and conservative pronouncements of the demise of socialism. Concomitantly, history's presumed failure to defang existing capitalist relations has been read by many self-identified ‘radicals’ as an advertisement for capitalism's inevitability. As a result, the chorus refrain ‘There Is No Alternative’, sung by liberals and conservatives, has been buttressed by the symphony of post-Marxist voices recommending that we give socialism a decent burial and move on. Within this context, to speak of the promise of Marx and socialism may appear anachronistic, even naïve, especially since the post-al intellectual vanguard has presumably demonstrated the folly of doing so. Yet we stubbornly believe that the chants of T.I.N.A. must be combated for they offer as a fait accompli, something which progressive Leftists should refuse to accept—namely the triumph of capitalism and its political bedfellow neo-liberalism, which have worked together to naturalize suffering, undermine collective struggle, and obliterate hope. We concur with Amin (1998), who claims that such chants must be defied and revealed as absurd and criminal, and who puts the challenge we face in no uncertain terms: humanity may let itself be led by capitalism's logic to a fate of collective suicide or it may pave the way for an alternative humanist project of global socialism. The grosteque conditions that inspired Marx to pen his original critique of capitalism are present and flourishing. The inequalities of wealth and the gross imbalances of power that exist today are leading to abuses that exceed those encountered in Marx's day (Greider, 1998, p. 39). Global capitalism has paved the way for the obscene concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands and created a world increasingly divided between those who enjoy opulent affluence and those who languish in dehumanizing conditions and economic misery. In every corner of the globe, we are witnessing social disintegration as revealed by a rise in abject poverty and inequality. At the current historical juncture, the combined assets of the 225 richest people is roughly equal to the annual income of the poorest 47 percent of the world's population, while the combined assets of the three richest people exceed the combined GDP of the 48 poorest nations (CCPA, 2002, p. 3). Approximately 2.8 billion people—almost half of the world's population—struggle in desperation to live on less than two dollars a day (McQuaig, 2001, p. 27). As many as 250 million children are wage slaves and there are over a billion workers who are either un- or under-employed. These are the concrete realities of our time—realities that require a vigorous class analysis, an unrelenting critique of capitalism and an oppositional politics capable of confronting what Ahmad (1998, p. 2) refers to as ‘capitalist universality.’ They are realities that require something more than that which is offered by the prophets of ‘difference’ and post-Marxists who would have us relegate socialism to the scrapheap of history and mummify Marxism along with Lenin's corpse. Never before has a Marxian analysis of capitalism and class rule been so desperately needed. That is not to say that everything Marx said or anticipated has come true, for that is clearly not the case. Many critiques of Marx focus on his strategy for moving toward socialism, and with ample justification; nonetheless Marx did provide us with fundamental insights into class society that have held true to this day. Marx's enduring relevance lies in his indictment of capitalism which continues to wreak havoc in the lives of most. While capitalism's cheerleaders have attempted to hide its sordid underbelly, Marx's description of capitalism as the sorcerer's dark power is even more apt in light of contemporary historical and economic conditions. Rather than jettisoning Marx, decentering the role of capitalism, and discrediting class analysis, radical educators must continue to engage Marx's oeuvre and extrapolate from it that which is useful pedagogically, theoretically, and, most importantly, politically in light of the challenges that confront us. The urgency which animates Amin's call for a collective socialist vision necessitates, as we have argued, moving beyond the particularism and liberal pluralism that informs the ‘politics of difference.’ It also requires challenging the questionable assumptions that have come to constitute the core of contemporary ‘radical’ theory, pedagogy and politics. In terms of effecting change, what is needed is a cogent understanding of the systemic nature of exploitation and oppression based on the precepts of a radical political economy approach (outlined above) and one that incorporates Marx's notion of ‘unity in difference’ in which people share widely common material interests. Such an understanding extends far beyond the realm of theory, for the manner in which we choose to interpret and explore the social world, the concepts and frameworks we use to express our sociopolitical understandings, are more than just abstract categories. They imply intentions, organizational practices, and political agendas. Identifying class analysis as the basis for our understandings and class struggle as the basis for polistical transformation implies something quite different than constructing a sense of political agency around issues of race, ethnicity, gender, etc. Contrary to ‘Shakespeare's assertion that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet,’ it should be clear that this is not the case in political matters. Rather, in politics ‘the essence of the flower lies in the name by which it is called’ (Bannerji, 2000, p. 41). The task for progressives today is to seize the moment and plant the seeds for a political agenda that is grounded in historical possibilities and informed by a vision committed to overcoming exploitative conditions. These seeds, we would argue, must be derived from the tree of radical political economy. For the vast majority of people today—people of all ‘racial classifications or identities, all genders and sexual orientations’—the common frame of reference arcing across ‘difference’, the ‘concerns and aspirations that are most widely shared are those that are rooted in the common experience of everyday life shaped and constrained by political economy’ (Reed, 2000, p. xxvii). While post-Marxist advocates of the politics of ‘difference’ suggest that such a stance is outdated, we would argue that the categories which they have employed to analyze ‘the social’ are now losing their usefulness, particularly in light of actual contemporary ‘social movements.’ All over the globe, there are large anti-capitalist movements afoot. In February 2002, chants of ‘Another World Is Possible’ became the theme of protests in Porto Allegre. It seems that those people struggling in the streets haven’t read about T.I.N.A., the end of grand narratives of emancipation, or the decentering of capitalism. It seems as though the struggle for basic survival and some semblance of human dignity in the mean streets of the dystopian metropoles doesn’t permit much time or opportunity to read the heady proclamations emanating from seminar rooms. As E. P. Thompson (1978, p. 11) once remarked, sometimes ‘experience walks in without knocking at the door, and announces deaths, crises of subsistence, trench warfare, unemployment, inflation, genocide.’ This, of course, does not mean that socialism will inevitably come about, yet a sense of its nascent promise animates current social movements. Indeed, noted historian Howard Zinn (2000, p. 20) recently pointed out that after years of single-issue organizing (i.e. the politics of difference), the WTO and other anti-corporate capitalist protests signaled a turning point in the ‘history of movements of recent decades,’ for it was the issue of ‘class’ that more than anything ‘bound everyone together.’ History, to paraphrase Thompson (1978, p. 25) doesn’t seem to be following Theory's script. Our vision is informed by Marx's historical materialism and his revolutionary socialist humanism, which must not be conflated with liberal humanism. For left politics and pedagogy, a socialist humanist vision remains crucial, whose fundamental features include the creative potential of people to challenge collectively the circumstances that they inherit. This variant of humanism seeks to give expression to the pain, sorrow and degradation of the oppressed, those who labor under the ominous and ghastly cloak of ‘globalized’ capital. It calls for the transformation of those conditions that have prevented the bulk of humankind from fulfilling its potential. It vests its hope for change in the development of critical consciousness and social agents who make history, although not always in conditions of their choosing. The political goal of socialist humanism is, however, ‘not a resting in difference’ but rather ‘the emancipation of difference at the level of human mutuality and reciprocity.’ This would be a step forward for the ‘discovery or creation of our real differences which can only in the end be explored in reciprocal ways’ (Eagleton, 1996, p. 120). Above all else, the enduring relevance of a radical socialist pedagogy and politics is the centrality it accords to the interrogation of capitalism. We can no longer afford to remain indifferent to the horror and savagery committed by capitalist's barbaric machinations. We need to recognize that capitalist democracy is unrescuably contradictory in its own self-constitution. Capitalism and democracy cannot be translated into one another without profound efforts at manufacturing empty idealism. Committed Leftists must unrelentingly cultivate a democratic socialist vision that refuses to forget the ‘wretched of the earth,’ the children of the damned and the victims of the culture of silence—a task which requires more than abstruse convolutions and striking ironic poses in the agnostic arena of signifying practices. Leftists must illuminate the little shops of horror that lurk beneath ‘globalization’s’ shiny façade; they must challenge the true ‘evils’ that are manifest in the tentacles of global capitalism's reach. And, more than this, Leftists must search for the cracks in the edifice of globalized capitalism and shine light on those fissures that give birth to alternatives. Socialism today, undoubtedly, runs against the grain of received wisdom, but its vision of a vastly improved and freer arrangement of social relations beckons on the horizon. Its unwritten text is nascent in the present even as it exists among the fragments of history and the shards of distant memories. Its potential remains untapped and its promise needs to be redeemed.

**Large-scale threats of future suffering perpetuate capitalist violence and the hegemonic power of the elite, endlessly prolonging suffering. The only response is to interrupt the system, insisting that the urgent bodies across the globe cannot wait**

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Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the body is increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially **large-scale future events of forecasted suffering**. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can **distort moral reasoning**. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be **bypassed** because there are **bigger scales to worry about**:¶ What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they nec essitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006)¶ In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). **Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent**, because they are **excluded from the potential collectivity** that could be **suffering everywhere in some future time**. Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014).¶ As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city.¶ In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the **assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency**, the urgent body becomes **literally nonsense, a non sequitur** within societies, states and worlds that will **always be more urgent**.¶ If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency.¶ In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, **depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards infinity’** (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any value. Waiting, like urgency, can **undermine the possibility of self-care** two-fold, first by making people wait for essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123).¶ Waiting can therefore function as a potentially important spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of **governing individuals**, but also to **retain claims over moral urgency**. But there is **growing resistance** to the capture of claims of urgency by the elite, and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of **reclaiming urgency for the body**. In detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps, geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view, and also reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of struggle.¶ In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked – by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when the urgent body is rendered as only waiting, both materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006). Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as **private, apolitical and mundane’** (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply **political, public, and exceptional** as other forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that **a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait**, has the **ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional scope of large-scale futures**. It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate scale of normative priority and social care.¶ In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body. This bias also justifies the production of new waiting places in our material landscape, places like the detention center and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others, the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g. Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that **moral reasoning is important** both because it **exposes normative biases against subjugated people**, and because it potentially **provides routes toward struggle where claims to urgency seem to foreclose** the **possibilities** of alleviation of suffering. **Saving the world still should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires a debate about what really cannot wait**. My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning.¶ I conclude, however, by pulling together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an acknowledgement that the **temporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism** can be interrupted in creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future concerns. **Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions** and the disruption of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though **calls for urgency will** certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also **serve as fertile ground for radical critique**, a truly fierce **urgency for now.**