# 1NC – Grapevine R1

## 1NC – Off

### 1NC – 1

#### Empire has shifted from the administration of death to the production of life – the affs restructuring of global medical intervention is the new logic of biopolitical governance – no longer is imperialism a question of borders and military power, but rather the protection of bodies.

Ahuja ‘16

[Neel, English @ UNC Chapel Hill. 2016. “Bioinsecurities”] pat

One element common to this biopolitics of empire is an anxiety about the dependence of the human body on forces that appear inhuman, even inhumane: medical technologies to extend, optimize, or end life; markets and institutions that unequally distribute resources for sustaining life; environmental processes that support, deprive, or injure bodies. Such concerns were, of course, entirely common to twentieth-century modernist fears of alienation from nature, as well as to liberal, socialist, and fascist states that each proclaimed to defend the life of the people in the major imperial wars. Yet due to the ongoing expansion of government into life through technological, economic, and environmental interventions, a growing number of crises that advertise dreaded risks to life as we know it—climate change, nuclear toxicity, disease pandemics, biological weapons, and financial speculation, to name a few—have recently pressed critical studies of empire to think politics and agency at queer scales of relation, from the grand vantage of planetary geology and climate, through the lively migrations of commodities and animals, all the way down to the microbial, molecular, and quantum worlds of matter in which advanced sciences produce new technologies and knowledge. In an era in which excessive hope is invested in the idea that empire’s so-called free markets will inevitably deliver resources for improving life, discussions of risk and security increasingly provoke concern about how bodies are either threatened or safeguarded in links to other species, to ecology, and to technology. Public fears and hopes are thus invested in questions about how bodies interface beyond the skin of the organism. The living body is not only an ecology reproduced by constituent species (think of the life-sustaining work of gut bacteria or the ingested flesh of animals or plants). It is also an assemblage crosscut by technological, economic, and environmental forces (medical technologies, insurance markets, agricultural systems, toxic pollution) that render the body vulnerable as they reproduce its conditions of possibility.

Yet there remains a sense of tension concerning how social theorists frame the vulnerability of human life between biopolitics and these emerging posthumanist ideas. While biopolitical analysis foregrounds the contested figure of the human, emphasizing that the human body is an effect of power crafted through the social reproduction of nationality, race, sex, and/or class factors conjoined in inhuman fields of power, emerging posthumanist and newmaterialist fields including animal studies, environmental humanities, and object-oriented ontology more often emphasize the agency of the nonhuman and the surprising liveliness of physical matter. As such, despite the avowed critique of the human, they may take for granted the apparent universality of the human lifeworld from which they flee, foreclosing attention to the processes that anthropomorphize the human in order to characterize the human’s sovereign domination of the nonhuman. This move allows some posthumanist critics to project upon an outside, the nonhuman (in the form of environment, animal, machine, or other object), the possibility of resistance to anthropocentrism. Such thinking might be seen as a ruse of transcendence—an assumption that turning attention from the human to the nonhuman could bypass Marxist, feminist, critical race, and postcolonial critiques of imperial systems that proliferate inequality under the guise of universal human freedom.

Despite this liberal, idealist trend among posthumanists (which is more pronounced in the humanities than it is in the social sciences), studies of empire increasingly confront the fact that the apparent exteriority of the subject (the worlds of body, physical matter, and interspecies exchange) has more often formed the center of the politics of empire rather than its excluded outside. It is thus my hope that the collision of biopolitical and posthumanist thought may be salvaged in a practical if unexpected crossing: a more robust accounting of the ways in which politics, including the liberal and neoliberal politics of empire, is embedded in living bodies and planetary environments, which are themselves constituted as objects of knowledge and intervention for imperial science. Such an understanding goes beyond an assertion that life is controlled by human government, which would embrace the strong postEnlightenment division between government and life, human and nonhuman. I instead hope to explore the queer hypothesis that the adaptability, risk, and differentiation central to life increasingly constitute the very matter of politics. This book is about how disease outbreaks, medical technologies, and the relations between humans, animals, bacteria, and viruses galvanized racialized fears and hopes that determined the geopolitical form of US empire during the long twentieth century, following the continent-wide establishment of Euro-American settler networks. Before explaining that argument, however, this brief preface explores how—in addition to established methods of postcolonial study that define empire through histories of conquest, settlement, and the exploitation of labor and resources—the inequalities and violences of imperialism can productively be understood from the vantage of species, the field of life itself.

Research on colonial environmental history and disease control is long established in postcolonial studies, even as today there is growing attention to Global South environmental activism, advanced biotechnologies, and human-animal and human-plant interactions as significant concerns in the planetary routes of European and US empire. Yet my sense of an interspecies politics is still relatively unfamiliar from even the vantage of these studies. Extant studies have long highlighted questions of representation, agency, influence, and domination, explaining the unequal distribution of the privileges accorded for being anthropomorphized, for being made human through colonial ideological and social processes. While maintaining focus on such racialized inequalities fracturing the figure of the human in the worldwide routes of European and US imperialisms, it is the aim of this book to articulate an additional sense of the political as a lively zone of embodied connection and friction. “Interspecies relations form the often unmarked basis upon which scholarly inquiry organizes its objects, political interventions such as ‘human rights’ stake their claims, and capitalist endeavors maneuver resources and marshal profit.” A critique of the interspecies zone of the political—which at its broadest would expand beyond the human-animal and human-microbial relations discussed in this book to include the diversity of living species, matter, energies, and environmental systems that produce everyday life out of biosocial crossings—helps us understand the persistence of empire in a postcolonial age precisely because it conjoins power to forces that retreat into the seemingly natural and ahistorical domains of body and matter. From this vantage, empire appears not only as a process of territorial and economic accumulation across international divisions of labor and sovereignty, but also as a reproductive process managing bodies in unequal planetary conjunctions of life and death. Tracing this second phenomenon requires analysis of biosocial forms of exchange among microbes, plants, animals, and humans, as well as models of power and representation recognizing that bodies are not empty containers of human political subjects, but are lively, transitional assemblages of political matter.

There are risks in attempting to theorize a political process like empire via the material shape it takes in life and matter, anticipated in long-standing liberal and Marxist distinctions between human and natural history. Must such a move necessarily turn away from issues of interest, hegemony, violence, representation, and inequality that often define organized decolonial struggles? I would argue that this need not be so, and that vitalizing colonial discourse studies through an accounting of empire’s living textures may actually give a more grounded account of imperial power as well as the strategies of representation that have persistently masked its material articulations. To this end, I explore empire as a project in the government of species. Broadly, this idea refers to how interspecies relations and the public hopes and fears they generate shape the living form and affective lineaments of settler societies, in the process determining the possibilities and foreclosures of political life. In practice, the government of species has historically optimized and expanded some life forms (human or otherwise) due to biocapital investments in national, racial, class, and sex factors. Operating through interspecies assemblages known as bodies, such investments selectively modify and reproduce life forms and forms of life, extracting “the human” out of the planetary field of interspecies relation. Once securitized, this form is constantly under pressure from the unpredictable and inhuman risks of life in a world of ecological, economic, and political complexity. These forces in turn contribute to the ways publics experience and interpret their futures as more or less livable.

An account of the government of species thus explains that empire can be understood as a project in the management of affective relations—embodied forms of communication and sensation that may occur independently of or in tandem with sentient forms of thought and discourse. These affective relations cross the divisions of life and death, human and animal, media and bodies, and immune and environmental systems. In the process of forming the human out of cacophonous biosocial relations, empire often persists—even after the formal conclusion of colonial occupation or settlement—in part because it invests public hope in the management of bodily vulnerability and orients reproductive futures against horizons of impending risk, a phenomenon I call dread life. In such processes by which bodily vulnerability is transmuted into political urgency, techniques proliferate for managing the relations of populations and the living structures of species (human, animal, viral). As such, empire involves the control of life through accumulation of territory and capital, which may be securitized by activating life’s relational potential. Lauren Berlant describes a “lateral agency” that moves across bodies and populations rather than in the top-down fashion of sovereign power; it may, then, be possible to understand empire’s force of securitization not only through conventional dramas of domination and resistance, but rather through embodied processes of coasting, differentiating, adapting, withering, transition, and movement. These are processes that subtly determine how bodies take form, and to what extent they are able to reproduce themselves in space-time relation. They also more radically stretch the body beyond the organic lifetime and into evolutionary, environmental, and informational domains where life/death distinctions blur.

However, the intimate connection between the governmental imperatives to make live and to make die, which Jasbir Puar names “the bio-necro collaboration,” has long been obscured in social and political theories. It thus remains commonplace for biopolitical analyses to view power as either repressive or productive in essence. In his classic work on the topic, French philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault argued that by the eighteenth century, a political form had emerged in Europe targeting the human as biological species as the central object of power. Power was no longer simply about the repressive force of the state and its controlling interests wielding the right to kill. Power was increasingly vested in the productive reshaping of the biological life of human organisms by institutions such as clinics, prisons, and asylums and their related forms of scientific knowledge; power meant letting live, albeit in constrained form. Foucault recognized the embedding of biopower across species, calling for a social history that incorporated “the evolution of relations between humanity, the bacillary or viral field, and the interventions of hygiene, medicine, and the different therapeutic techniques.” In the notes to his late lectures, he even speculated that neoliberalism involved a governmentality that can “act on the environment and systematically modify its variables.”

Foucault’s description of the rise of biopower is the inspiration for a number of studies in sociology and anthropology that assess new biopolitical shifts involving advanced biomedical technologies. Given that these biopolitical studies focus largely on the United States, western Europe, China, and India— states that have built biotechnology sectors as engines of unequal neoliberal growth—it is perhaps not surprising that a concomitant line of critique has emerged acknowledging vast and growing world sectors of biological and economic precarity. Building on a number of key postcolonial/feminist studies of the 1990s exploring Foucault’s theory beyond European borders, these necropolitical critiques announce that politics today often emerges as the specter of death. The world’s poor, as well as a growing “precariat” carved from shrinking national bourgeoisies, appear less often as the objects of technological uplift than as the human surplus of the political order of things, populations at risk for displacement, dispossession, captivity, and premature death. The precaritization of sweated labor, the subjection of agrarian populations to the twin scourges of neoliberal structural adjustment and environmental devastation, the proliferation of deterritorialized war and ethnic cleansing, and the growth of predatory industries and rents to recycle capital from surplus populations all reveal that those humans targeted for biopolitical optimization constitute a shrinking population who reproduce through the cannibalistic appropriation of life elsewhere. But necropower is not simply about the distribution of death; it is also about the accumulation of social or economic capital through death and precarity. For example, when suicide passes on social force through the deathly body, or when life insurance capitalizes death, death itself thus gives form to life.

#### History proves that the risk of bioterror is minuscule, but the fear of them is used to generate uncertainty which extends the violence of liberal governance to imperial interventions against perceived enemies of sovereignty.

Ahuja ‘16

[Neel, English @ UNC Chapel Hill. 2016. “Bioinsecurities”] pat

While the project publicly presented this theory of deterrence in terms of rational force projection, the US Strategic Command’s theory for deterring terrorists and rogues in the post-Soviet era suggested that uncertainty was central to its governing logic. Being trigger-happy, combined with maintenance of a large US nuclear arsenal, had continuing deterrent effects: “It hurts to portray ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed”; it is “beneficial” if “some elements may appear to be potentially ‘out of control.’” The logic could be deployed against a rogue leader like Saddam Hussein as such: the sovereign must engage in “frightening, scaring the enemy . . . by giving the rogue the image of an adversary who always might just do anything, like a beast, who can go off the rails and lose his cool . . . when his vital interests are at play.” Uncertainty thus marks both the incitement to and the practice of security. This logic of preempting the uncertain racialized enemy with the uncertainty of imperial force projection did not require establishment of Iraq’s actual pursuit of bioweapons, or of smallpox in particular; it only required that dispersed potentials for catastrophic smallpox weaponization existed in the world, and that they could network around sites of intensification: rogue states and terrorists. Intervention was understood as a kind of deterrent, but one that required constant activity, analysis, and adjustment; containment would now be an indefinite proliferation of small and large acts of war. Norman Podhoretz laments that the administration placed so much emphasis on WMD, when this general logic of preemption and deterrence in his eyes justified the Iraq action. Karl Rove sums up the logic with blunt hubris: “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.”

It is not the threat itself of a known biological or chemical weapon that underlines the urgency of military intervention in Iraq, but the problem of uncertainty. This was a fully theorized war using uncertainty against uncertainty, attempting to redirect the queer worlds in which states, species, technologies, and identities fail to remain dependably disentangled by borders. Iraq’s very submission to the UNSCOM inspections regime only increases the uncertainty associated with its weapons program:

Even if full inspections were eventually to resume, which now seems highly unlikely, experience has shown that it is difficult if not impossible to monitor Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons production. The lengthy period during which the inspectors will have been unable to enter many Iraqi facilities has made it even less likely that they will be able to uncover all of Saddam’s secrets. As a result, in the not-too-distant future we will be unable to determine with any reasonable level of confidence whether Iraq does or does not possess such weapons. Such uncertainty will, by itself, have a seriously destabilizing effect on the entire Middle East.

Failing to act preemptively means “we will face the prospect of having to confront him at some later point when the costs to us, our armed forces, and our allies will be even higher.” Under pressure from the neocons and with wide congressional support, the Clinton administration passed the Iraq Liberation Act, making it official US policy to remove Saddam from power.

From February to December 1998, when Clinton and the United Kingdom launched the bombing campaign that laid the groundwork for the aerial occupation and economic sanctions of Iraq, US politicians openly discussed unilateral intervention in terms similar to the 2002 debate leading up to Bush’s all-out conventional war, as Iraq decided to refuse unlimited access to UN inspectors, several of whom we now know spied for the CIA. James Rubin, Madeleine Albright, John Kerry, and John McCain all publicly proclaimed the right of the United States to act militarily to oust Saddam Hussein based on his government’s apparent stonewalling of the UNSCOM mission. Iraq received unique defense focus after the fall of the Berlin Wall, connecting prior Cold War imaginaries of threatening enemies with the emergent new threat of the Islamic rogue terrorist. Melani McAlester describes the unique composite figure of Saddam Hussein: he was portrayed in the US media as simultaneously an irrational and excessive threat of Islamic militancy and a conventional rogue, a reincarnation of European fascism. The United States had been at war with Iraq, in different forms, since the fall of the Soviet Union. If the uncontainability of Saddam’s weapons and borders posed the initial public threat in 1991, this was transmuted into aerial control and economic sanctions during the Clinton era, and finally the formal military occupation in 2003.

#### Local food production and small farms in the global north fail and lock in unsustainable food production globally – turns case.

Tilzey ‘18

(Mark, Senior Research Fellow in Governance of Food and Farming Systems, Centre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience at Coventry University, *Political Ecology, Food regimes, and Food Sovereignty*: *Crisis, Resistance, and Resilience*, “The Neoliberal Food regime in crisis” (Chapter 7), 197-225, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64556-8_3>) thanks avery!

It was within the context of the neoliberal ‘turn’, however, that a putatively oppositional paradigm of ‘post-productivism’ (more specifically, that of endogenous, or agrarian-based, rural development) was promoted, premised on the assertion that the market power of corporate food interests could be countered by exploiting the turn by consumers away from industrial food provisioning in favour of quality, organic, and local food production (Marsden 2003; Marsden and Sonnino 2005; Morgan et al. 2006). While these authors placed emphasis on elements, such as localism and ecology, that are key to ‘strong’ sustainability, their paradigm remained centrally wedded to market dependence (see Wood 2002, 2005), and subject, therefore, to the contradictions that attend this condition. Thus, the turn to ‘economies of scope’ and niche markets, and therefore to dependency on middle-class consumption as the principal revenue stream for smaller producers, was likely to afford only temporary respite from the pressures of competition as more producers entered the field of quality production. Downward pressure on prices and capital concentration were predictable outcomes, while the volatility and, arguably, unsustainable nature of higher end income consumption, given its dependence on globalized, neoliberal circuits of finance capital, suggested considerable caution in relation to the longer-term viability, and possibly ethics, of this ‘alternative’ paradigm. Indeed, these authors (Morgan et al. 2006, 195) themselves expressed reservations concerning the assumed ‘alterity’ of their paradigm, intimating that the turn to the ‘local’, when allied to continuing market dependence, might represent merely the ‘inside’ of a wider process of rescaling the state, the ‘outside’ being the growth of supra-national scales of governance associated with neoliberal globalization—in effect, imperialism. This means both that producers of ‘quality food’ remain capitalist, and subject to the pressures of capitalist competition, and that, where there is a significant shift to ‘postproductivism’ while demand for cheaper wage foods remains undiminished, **productivism** (the source of those wage foods) **must be going somewhere else**, **rather than being discontinued**. **That ‘somewhere else’ is** typically **the periphery**, either of Europe in this instance, or the global South. **So long as it remains subject to capitalist relations of production**, therefore, ‘post-productivism’ implies the existence of a **spatio-temporal fix** that externalizes the costs of productivism onto the periphery. There is a strong suspicion in this regard that many of van der Ploeg’s (2008) socalled new peasantries, at least in Europe, actually fall within this category of ‘ecological’, ‘local’, and ‘post-productivist’ capitalist producers. While these petty commodity producers may not employ wage labour (a Chayanovian definition of the ‘peasantry’ and one which I have critiqued elsewhere (Tilzey 2016b)), they nonetheless remain capitalist, or dependent on the capitalist market, however ‘local’ and ‘green’ this may be. In this way, it is perhaps more accurate to describe such producers as ‘alterhegemonic’, rather than counter-hegemonic, and as conforming to what Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck (2011) have termed the ‘progressives’. While these ‘progressives’ may have secured a degree of their desired ‘autonomy’ from neoliberalism, they have not achieved this in relation to capitalism. As we shall see, this would require a far deeper transformation in social relations away from market dependence, and towards ‘strong’ autonomy (see Tilzey 2016b for discussion).

#### This culminates in a form of dread life which organizes and deploys disaster biopolitics to justify constant interventionism, health apartheid, and antagonistic subject formation that turns and outweighs the aff.

Debrix ‘18  
(François Debrix, Professor and director of ASPECT, College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences, Virginia Tech. “End piece: Dealing with disastrous life” in Biopolitical Disaster. Ed. Jennifer L. Lawrence and Sarah Marie Wiebe. 2018 Routledge forthcoming. cVs) rc/pat

Disastrous biopolitics makes possible dread life. I borrow the term “dread life” from Neel Ahuja’s recent study of the racialized dimensions of the governance and management of anxiety, particularly with regards to the fear of infectious diseases (Ahuja 2016). Dread life is a life that has grown accustomed to and has placed its trust in governance discourses that promise that life can be cared for or preserved through a series of social, political, economic, cultural, or technological interventions at the level of collective and individual bodies. Dread life is a life that has become reliant on discourses and representations of crises, looming dangers, impending catastrophes, and ongoing disasters (whether they are visible or not). As Ahuja puts it, dread life emerges as a result of discourses and representations “that (1) posit the environment as an unruly site of perpetual risk, and (2) shore up an imperial optimism in the force of the state that tends to far outstrip its actual ability to control [the crisis]” (Ahuja 2016: 9). Discourses that produce dread life abound because they keep the crisis or the disaster alive, productive, and always active. Through these discourses, the presence of dread life is a constant reminder of the fact that humanity remains under the spell cast by a bad or evil star, that, as fate has it, disasters will always be around. But, just as crucially, dread life also enables the production of an array of configurations, objects, and objectives, and subjectivities that help to make disastrous biopolitics into a set of tangible, material, and generable operations on a day-to-day basis. Thus, dread life breaks down into a series of subsets of disastrous life and living conditions. Depending on how, where, or when the crisis or disaster is mobilized (as many of this volume’s chapters have detailed), dread life can morph into resilient life, or into triaged life, or perhaps into deracinated life, or possibly into toxic life, or sometimes into emergency life, or maybe into a life suspended between disease and death. Any instance whereby dread life is placed in front of “an unruly site of perpetual risk” (as Ahuja puts it) is potentially productive of one of these (and other) subsets of disastrous life/living. Moreover, for any subset of dread life one finds a corresponding modality of governance/governmentality best suited (or so we are told) to manage the crisis or the disaster and, as such, most apt at keeping alive as dread. Thus, for example, resilient life calls for, justifies, and makes effective operations, technologies, and strategies of resilience. Secure life instantiates and authorizes security practices, policies, and politics. Toxic life requires responses in the form of environmentally conscious purifying or cleansing remedies that typically mobilize various layers of scientific expertise. Triaged life often calls for and normalizes clinical and administrative gazes that can sort bodies in order to repurpose them for upcoming disaster challenges (wars, future diseases, weather emergencies, etc.) Dread life is also productive of a range of subjects and subjectivities in charge of determining which types of interventions at the level of populations and bodies are more likely to cope with the disaster of deciding how the governing strategy that has been adopted (resilience, sustainable development, security, etc.) is to be deployed. This is precisely the point where what Ahuja calls “the optimism in the force of the state” (2016:9) is maximized. The state or, better yet, all sorts of agents/agencies in charge of the governance of dread life both depend on and become a function of the production of multiple instances of dread life so that they can serve as the ultimate guarantors of the safety, security, resilience, or sustainability of life itself (even if, more often than not, such a maintenance of dread life implies the culling of other bodies whose lives are not even worthy of being subjected to dread). Thus, as most of this volume’s chapters have revealed, one cannot think life under conditions of disaster without accounting for a series of governing or managing agents/agencies (the state, in some cases, but also various neoliberal assemblages such as corporations, environmental organizations, militaries and other security and enforcement agents, laws, policies and policy statements, extractive technologies, regimes of health, communities of experts, scientific pronouncements, etc.) that come together to make sure that dread life will be maintained as dread life and that disasters will be kept as productive discursive modalities for more dread life (and disasters) to come. This is not necessarily to say that these agents or agencies of governance of dread life are the instigators of dread life or of disastrous biopolitics. Rather, it is to say that these agents/agencies of biopolitical governance are active assemblages that are produced by discourses of disaster maintenance and by the need created in these discourses for life to remain tethered to disaster. Yet, these active assemblages of productive governance of dread life through disaster management display an actancy (through their active/creative performances) that enables discourses of disastrous biopolitics to be reproduced, re-imagined, or redeployed.

#### Voting negative adopts failed IR for a healthy dose of pessimism – at the end of the world, all we can do is hope to be buried alive together.

Grove ‘19

[Jarius, PoliSci at the University of Hawai’i. 2019. “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics in the Anthropocene.”] pat – ask me for the PDF!

Failed ir affirms the power of this kind of negative thinking as an alternative to the endless rehearsing of moralizing insights and strategic foresight. The negative is not “against” or reacting to something. Rather, it is the affirmation of a freedom beyond the limits of life and death. That is, it is making a life by continuing to think about the world, even if that thinking is not recuperative, and even if nothing we think can save us. In the face of it all, one celebrates useless thinking, useless scholarship, and useless forms of life at the very moment we are told to throw them all under the bus in the name of survival at all costs. This is a logic referred to lately as hope and it is as cruel as it is anxiety inducing. Hope is a form of extortion. We are told that it is our obligation to bear the weight of making things better while being chided that the failure of our efforts is the result of not believing in the possibility of real change. In such an environment, pessimism is often treated as a form of treason, as if only neoliberals and moral degenerates give up—or so goes the op-ed’s insisting upon the renewed possibility of redemption.

In response to these exhortations, pessimism offers a historical atheism, both methodologically and morally. The universe does not bend toward justice. Sometimes the universe bends toward the indifference of gravity wells and black holes. Affirming negativity, inspired by Achille Mbembe, is grounds for freedom, even if that freedom or relief is only fleeting and always insecure. I am not arrogant enough to think a book can attain freedom of this sort, but this book is inspired by refusals of critique as redemption in favor of useless critique and critique for its own sake.

That the pursuit of knowledge without immediate application is so thoroughly useless, even profane, is a diagnosis of our current moment. The neoliberal assault on the university is evidence of this condition, as is the current pitch of American politics. Our indifference as intellectuals to maximizing value has not gone unnoticed. We are still dangerous, worthy of vilification, of attack, sabotage, and derision because we fail so decadently. We are parasites according to Scott Walker, Donald Trump, and the rest. So be it. We are and shall remain irascible irritants to a worldwide assault on thinking that is well underway and facing few obstacles in other jurisdictions.

What would failed scholarship do? Learn to die, learn to live, learn to listen, learn to be together, and learn to be generous. These virtues are useless in that they do not prevent or manage things. They do not translate into learning objectives or metrics. Virtues of this order are selfsame, nontransferable experiences. They are meaningful but not useful. These are luxurious virtues. Like grieving or joy, they are ends unto themselves. But how will these ideas seek extramural grants, contribute to an outcomes-based education system, or become a policy recommendation? They will not, and that is part of their virtue.

Even if there is no straight line to where we are and where we ought to be, I think we should get over the idea that somehow the U.S. project of liberal empire is conflicted, or “more right than it is wrong,” or pragmatically preferable to the alternatives. I hope this book can contribute to the urgent necessity to get out of the way by reveling in the catastrophic failure that should inspire humility but instead seems to embolden too many to seek global control yet again. Demolition may be an affirmative act if it means insurgents and others can be better heard. And yet this may fail too. If we can accomplish nothing at all, we can at least, as Ta-Nehisi Coates and other pessimists have said, refuse to suborn the lie of America any longer. Telling the truth, even if it cannot change the outcome of history, is a certain kind of solace. In Coates’s words, there is a kind of rapture “when you can no longer be lied to, when you have rejected the dream.” Saying the truth out loud brings with it the relief that we are not crazy. Things really are as bad as we think.

If there are those of us who want to break from this one-hundred-year-old race to be the next Henry Kissinger, then why do we continue to seek respect in the form of recognizable standards of excellence? I am not sure where the answer finally lies, but I do know that professionalization will not save us. To appear as normal and recognizably rigorous will not be enough to stave off the neoliberal drive to monetize scholarship, or to demand of us strategically useful insights. The least we can do in the face of such a battle is to find comfort in meaningful ideas and the friendships they build rather than try to perform for those we know are the problem. Some will ask, who is this “we” or is that “they”—where is your evidence? More will know exactly what I am talking about.

The virtues I seek are oriented toward an academy of refuge, a place we can still live, no matter how dire the conditions of the university and the classroom. It is not the think tank, boardroom, or command center. We are, those of us who wish to be included, the last of the philosophers, the last of the lovers of knowledge, the deviants who should revel in what Harney and Moten have called the undercommons.

In one of his final lectures, Bataille speaks of the remnants of a different human species, something not quite so doomed, something that wasted its newly discovered consciousness and tool-being on the art that still marks the walls of prehistoric caves. This lingering minor or vestigial heritage is philosophy’s beginning. Philosophy survives war, atrocity, famine, and crusades. Thinking matters in a very unusual way. Thinking is not power or emancipation. Thinking matters for a sense of belonging to the world, and for believing in the fecundity of the world despite evidence to the contrary.

How do you get all this from pessimism, from failure? Because willing failure is a temptation, a lure to think otherwise, to think dangerous thoughts. Pessimism is a threat to indifferentism and nihilism in the sense of the phenomenon of Donald Trump. Pessimism is a provocation and an enemy of skepticism, particularly of the metaphysical variety. It is not redemption from these afflictions, but in pessimism there is solace in the real. To put it another way, to study the world as it is means to care for it.

The exhortation that our care or interest should be contingent on how useful the world is and how much of it conforms to our designs is as much opposed to care as it is to empiricism. We can study airports, poetry, endurance races, borders, bombs, plastic, and warfare, and find them all in the world. To consider the depth of their existence can be an invitation to the world rather than a prelude to another policy report. One cannot make a successful political career out of such pursuits, but you might be able to make a life out of it, a life worth repeating even if nothing else happens.

At the end of Jack Halberstam’s The Queer Art of Failure, we are presented with the Fantastic Mr. Fox’s toast as an exemple of something meaningful in these dark times of ours.

They say all foxes are slightly allergic to linoleum, but it’s cool to the paw—try it. They say my tail needs to be dry cleaned twice a month, but now it’s fully detachable—see? They say our tree may never grow back, but one day, something will. Yes, these crackles are made of synthetic goose and these giblets come from artificial squab and even these apples look fake—but at least they’ve got stars on them. I guess my point is, we’ll eat tonight, and we’ll eat together. And even in this not particularly flattering light, you are without a doubt the five and a half most wonderful wild animals I’ve ever met in my life. So let’s raise our boxes—to our survival.

Halberstam says of this queer moment:

Not quite a credo, something short of a toast, a little less than a speech, but Mr. Fox gives here one of the best and most moving—both emotionally and in stop-motion terms—addresses in the history of cinema. Unlike Coraline, where survival is predicated upon a rejection of the theatrical, the queer, and the improvised, and like Where the Wild Things Are, where the disappointment of deliverance must be leavened with the pragmatism of possibility, Fantastic Mr. Fox is a queerly animated classic in that it teaches us, as Finding Nemo, Chicken Run, and so many other revolting animations before it, to believe in detachable tails, fake apples, eating together, adapting to the lighting, risk, sissy sons, and the sheer importance of survival for all those wild souls that the farmers, the teachers, the preachers, and the politicians would like to bury alive.

Although not as much fun as Halberstam’s monument to low theory, Savage Ecology is for all the other wild animals out there studying global politics. May we be buried alive together.

#### The Role of the Judge is to give up hope.

#### Hopeful affirmation warps within the biomedical sphere to structure policy toward the governance of difference – voting neg refuses to play into the affirmation of life for the sake of it

Ehlers and Krupar ‘14

[Nadine Ehlers, Women's and Gender Studies at Georgetown University, and Shiloh Krupar, Geographer and Provost's Distinguished Associate Professor at Georgetown University. Fall 2014. “Hope Logics: Biomedicine, Affective Conventions of Cancer, and the Governing of Biocitizenry,” <https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1849/>] pat

Hope carries utopian promise; it offers possibilities of a “not yet,” a “to come,” and an imagining of life otherwise. In contemporary critique, hope has often been deployed as the means to effect radical social transformation and the reinvention of contemporary reality. It is seen as a way of reaching beyond the stymied conditions of today by orienting toward the horizon of an alternative tomorrow. Hope is invoked as an incantation, under conditions of uncertainty; it is an insistent affirmation of the ability to effect change. This change can be imagined politically and economically, psychologically and corporeally. Indeed, hope is ubiquitous in contemporary culture, from US President Barack Obama’s political memoir—The Audacity of Hope—to international food drives—the “Convoy of Hope”4—to biomedical understandings of illness and health. As in the above quotation from “Banners of Hope” (an online outreach for children with life-threatening diseases), hope is the panacea for chronic or terminal illness. Hope might be seen to operate as a logic within the biomedical arena, one that structures subjectivities, social realities, and corporeal states. It incites particular behaviors; it induces certain forms of community and belonging; it seduces us to believe in the possible transcendence of bodily limits and/or temporal constraints. As we explore in this essay, hope is the guiding principle of biomedicine’s telos toward the affirmation of life.

This essay argues that hope is conventionalized in particular ways that work in the service of biopolitical imperatives to govern life, and to secure, optimize, and speculate on that life. We orient the investigation toward the regulation of affect within the US biomedical arena to consider how affective conventions—that is, the perceptual, emotional, and corporeal modes of managing and responding to events—of hope perform a governing function. In relation to illness, for example, they condition responses to bodily vulnerability and uncertainty, manage the present for the future, and relentlessly affirm life. We ground these broad claims in an examination of the dominant affective conventions of hope at work in cancer activism and treatment. Documenting the ways in which hope is increasingly militarized, commodified, routinized, and delimited in the neoliberal era, the essay explores how such conventions of hope are actively made and maintained through aspects of cancer-related biomedical encounters—what we call infrastructures of care and bioethics of faith within oncology. The essay concludes by considering alternative hope tactics—“hoping for other things”—in relation to cancer.

## 1NC – Case

### 1NC – BioD !D

#### No biodiversity tipping point

* Permian-Triassic extinction proves resiliency
* No data on tipping points
* Ecosystems never outright collapse
* 600 models prove no ecosystem collapse

Hance 18 [Jeremy Hance, wildlife blogger for the Guardian and a journalist with Mongabay focusing on forests, indigenous people, climate change and more. He is also the author of Life is Good: Conservation in an Age of Mass Extinction. Could biodiversity destruction lead to a global tipping point? Jan 16, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/radical-conservation/2018/jan/16/biodiversity-extinction-tipping-point-planetary-boundary]

Just over 250 million years ago, the planet suffered what may be described as its greatest holocaust: ninety-six percent of marine genera (plural of genus) and seventy percent of land vertebrate vanished for good. Even insects suffered a mass extinction – the only time before or since. Entire classes of animals – like trilobites – went out like a match in the wind.

But what’s arguably most fascinating about this event – known as the Permian-Triassic extinction or more poetically, the Great Dying – is the fact that anything survived at all. Life, it seems, is so ridiculously adaptable that not only did thousands of species make it through whatever killed off nearly everything (no one knows for certain though theories abound) but, somehow, after millions of years life even recovered and went on to write new tales.

Even as the Permian-Triassic extinction event shows the fragility of life, it also proves its resilience in the long-term. The lessons of such mass extinctions – five to date and arguably a sixth happening as I write – inform science today. Given that extinction levels are currently 1,000 (some even say 10,000) times the background rate, researchers have long worried about our current destruction of biodiversity – and what that may mean for our future Earth and ourselves.

In 2009, a group of researchers identified nine global boundaries for the planet that if passed could theoretically push the Earth into an uninhabitable state for our species. These global boundaries include climate change, freshwater use, ocean acidification and, yes, biodiversity loss (among others). The group has since updated the terminology surrounding biodiversity, now calling it “biosphere integrity,” but that hasn’t spared it from critique.

A paper last year in Trends in Ecology & Evolution scathingly attacked the idea of any global biodiversity boundary.

“It makes no sense that there exists a tipping point of biodiversity loss beyond which the Earth will collapse,” said co-author and ecologist, José Montoya, with Paul Sabatier Univeristy in France. “There is no rationale for this.”

Montoya wrote the paper along with Ian Donohue, an ecologist at Trinity College in Ireland and Stuart Pimm, one of the world’s leading experts on extinctions, with Duke University in the US.

Montoya, Donohue and Pimm argue that there isn’t evidence of a point at which loss of species leads to ecosystem collapse, globally or even locally. If the planet didn’t collapse after the Permian-Triassic extinction event, it won’t collapse now – though our descendants may well curse us for the damage we’ve done.

Instead, according to the researchers, every loss of species counts. But the damage is gradual and incremental, not a sudden plunge. Ecosystems, according to them, slowly degrade but never fail outright.

“Of more than 600 experiments of biodiversity effects on various functions, none showed a collapse,” Montoya said. “In general, the loss of species has a detrimental effect on ecosystem functions...We progressively lose pollination services, water quality, plant biomass, and many other important functions as we lose species. But we never observe a critical level of biodiversity over which functions collapse.”

### 1NC – Rant – Farms

#### They have card zero substantiating the internal link – even if some small scale urban farming is possible, that a. doesn’t apply to places in the US where weed is illegal and b. certainly can’t scale up to stabilize food prices globally.

### 1NC – No Food Wars

#### Food insecurity doesn’t cause war

Vestby et al 18 [Jonas Vestby, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO, and Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography, “Does hunger cause conflict?”, 5/18/18, https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/]

It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.

Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

### 1NC – Alt Causes

#### Reducing waste and improving distribution are the issue---not production

Easterbrook 18—Author of eleven books, he has been a staff writer, national correspondent or contributing editor of The Atlantic for nearly 40 years, was a fellow in economics, then in government studies, at the Brookings Institution, and a fellow in international affairs at the Fulbright Foundation [Gregg, February 2018, *It's Better Than It Looks: Reasons for Optimism in an Age of Fear*, Chapter 6: Why Does Technology Become Safer Instead of More Dangerous?, pgs 166, Google Play] AMarb

"Agriculture has become so effective that we're producing too much calories and protein for our own good. The rich nations would be better off with 25 percent less food. Top yield in farming may be close to maxing out, but average yield can improve a great deal; reducing waste and improving distribution is more important than increasing production. We've adapted so rapidly to population growth that if the global count stops at nine or ten billion people, the world should be okay. Twenty billion people would be different.

### 1NC – Taliban

#### Taliban thumps narcoterror – US doesn’t have a plan to address it.

Landay 08/16

[Johnathan, covers the Middle East for Reuters. 08/16/2021. “Profits and poppy: Afghanistan's illegal drug trade a boon for Taliban,” <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/profits-poppy-afghanistans-illegal-drug-trade-boon-taliban-2021-08-16/>]

As the United States wraps up its longest war, Afghanistan remains the world's biggest illicit opiate supplier and looks certain to remain so as the Taliban is on the brink of taking power in Kabul, said current and former U.S. and U.N. officials and experts.

Widespread destruction during the war, millions uprooted from their homes, foreign aid cuts, and losses of local spending by departed U.S.-led foreign troops are fueling an economic and humanitarian crisis that is likely to leave many destitute Afghans dependent on the narcotics trade for survival.

That dependence threatens to bring more instability as the Taliban, other armed groups, ethnic warlords, and corrupt public officials vie for drug profits and power.

Some U.N. and U.S. officials worry Afghanistan's slide into chaos is creating conditions for even higher illicit opiate production, a potential boon to the Taliban.

"The Taliban have counted on the Afghan opium trade as one of their main sources of income," Cesar Gudes, the head of the Kabul office of the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), told Reuters. "More production brings drugs with a cheaper and more attractive price, and therefore a wider accessibility."

With the insurgents entering Kabul on Sunday, "these are the best moments in which these illicit groups tend to position themselves" to expand their business, Gudes said.

The Taliban banned poppy growing in 2000 as they sought international legitimacy, but faced a popular backlash and later mostly changed their stance, according to experts.

Despite the threats posed by Afghanistan's illicit drug business, experts noted, the United States and other nations rarely mention in public the need to address the trade - estimated by the UNODC at more than 80% of global opium and heroin supplies.

"We've stood by on the sidelines and, unfortunately, allowed the Taliban to become probably the largest funded non-designated terrorist organization on the globe," said a U.S. official with knowledge of Afghanistan's drug trade.

"The U.S. and international partners have continued to pull out and not addressed poppy cultivation," the official said on condition of anonymity. "What you're going to find is that it has exploded."

### 1NC – Rant – Terror

#### The advantage is laughably bad – can’t solve opium addiction where there’s no access – that means most of the US is out since its either illegal or heavily regulated – zero evidence that says its currently recognized by state laws as a treatment for opioid addiction and they can’t fiat it gets prescribed – same goes for most of Europe.

#### There’s also zero internal link between opioids and acquiring CBWs or nukes – they read a card about Carfentanil, a synthetic opioid, then a card saying “nerve gas causes extinction.”

### 1NC – No BioTerror

#### No impact to bioweapon---multiple barriers.

John MULLER 10. Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and a Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University. *Atomic Obsession – Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda*. Oxford University Press. Accessed Online from Emory Libraries.

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could potentially, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used. For the most destructive results, they need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Since aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, while their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. Such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. In the summary judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties-as an aerosol that could be inhaled-requires a delivery system of enormous sophistication, and even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions.

### 1NC – Narcoterror

#### Terrorist groups just change their methods and other organizations solve

Jorisch 12 Avi, a former U.S. Treasury Department official, is a senior fellow for counterterrorism at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C. “Drug War at Sea: Rise of the Narco Subs,” 5/13/12, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/05/13/the-drug-war-at-sea-rise-of-the-narco-subs.html

Historically, each innovation in drug trafficking has come about when existing methods have reached a state of crisis. Early in the drug war, Colombian drug cartels preferred to move their product by small planes, which landed on secret air strips in Central America. American authorities eventually started tracking these planes and closing down the secret airports. During the Miami Vice era, drug traffickers used high-speed boats for transport, but again American authorities caught on. And so in the early ’90s, the narco sub was born.

Over the past few years, law-enforcement officials have received reports that terrorist organizations, such as the FARC in Colombia and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, have been constructing semi-submersible narco subs to fund their activities. So too have drug-trafficking organizations such as Mexico’s powerful Sinaloa Cartel. And though it hasn’t been reported that al Qaeda and Hizbullah have ever tried to rent space on a narco sub or build one themselves in an effort to move drugs, weapons, or terrorists, it’s not much of a stretch to imagine this development, especially considering the latter’s alleged links to drug traffickers in parts of Latin America.

The reason these vessels are so successful, according to U.S. and Latin American law-enforcement officials, is that they’re difficult to capture. Their hulls are painted dark blue, making them nearly impossible to spot. Powered by ordinary diesel engines, they leave little wake and produce an extremely small radar signature. The DEA claims that roughly 10 percent of all narco subs leaving Latin America are caught, but the true number is probably much lower since crews often sink their craft if they fear they might be discovered.

During the 1990s, American drug-enforcement officials heard of narco subs operating in Central America. In fact, the subs earned the named Bigfoots because some considered them a myth. In 2006, that myth was shattered when U.S. authorities spotted and seized their first vessel. By 2008, they began spotting about 10 a month.

Analysts have estimated that drug-trafficking organizations manufacture more than 120 narco subs every year. The building process, they say, takes anywhere from three months to a year, and costs up to $2 million per sub. The price may be well worth it, though, as these Bigfoots reportedly move as much as 12 tons of cocaine per trip; cut and sold, that translates to up to $4 million.

In an interview with VICE’s VBS TV, former drug trafficker Miguel Angel Montoya said that most narco submarines are made in the Buenaventura Jungle, one of Colombia’s poorest regions and an area that is accessible only by boat. Under the cover of the jungle’s heavy foliage, traffickers are able to hide in plain sight from law enforcement as they carry out their nefarious activities. For access and protection, narco traffickers pay the FARC and other paramilitary groups undisclosed sums, according to Montoya. The traffickers then assign each sub a four-man crew and pay them roughly $40,000 total per voyage.

Semi-submersible subs generally leave Colombia and make their way to drop off their cargo in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. But narco subs have been captured in Honduras, Colombia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Spain. And some are even rumored to have tried to reach Italy. For drugs intended for the U.S. market, traffickers tend to ship their wares over land or transfer them to smaller crafts for smuggling across the border. Narco subs can be used multiple times, but Colombian Coast Guard members have reported that crews tend to sink them after their first voyage to decrease the chances of future detection.

As difficult as these subs are to detect, the situation is not hopeless. Allies in the war on drugs can create obstacles for drug runners. The U.S. (PDF) and Colombia have passed laws criminalizing the financing, construction, storage, transport, or use of semi-submersible submarines. Other Latin American countries should follow suit, especially now as successes in the drug war have increasingly pushed cocaine producers into countries such as Peru and Bolivia.

Vigilance is especially important. The next generation of narco subs, Montoya says, will be piloted remotely like unmanned aerial vehicles. And drug traffickers have reportedly already built full-blown submarines, equipped with a periscopes and electric motors, which are able to dive to a depth of 20 meters.

Such rapid innovation is cause for concern, and law-enforcement officials throughout the Americas should bolster their operations and increase their intelligence-sharing activities. In particular, the Organization of American States’ Anti-Money-Laundering Section, which provides training and technical assistance to countries throughout the Western hemisphere, has an important role to play in assisting countries to curb this threat. And the U.S. and its allies in Central and South America should devote resources allocated in regional security pacts such as the Merida Initiative and Plan Colombia, specifically to thwarting narco subs. Doing so is vital to our national security.