# 1AC Strake

## FW

#### 1. Policymakers use a utilitarian calculus

**Woller 97** (“An Overview by Gary Woller,” 1997 A Forum on the Role of Environmental Ethics, pg. 10)

Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group's gains must come at another group's expense. Consequently, public policies in a democracy must be justified to the public, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such justification cannot simply be assumed a priori by invoking some higher-order moral principle. Appeals to a priorimoral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that public policies inevitably entail trade-offs among competing values. Thus, since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and since public policies inherently imply winners and losers, the policymakers' duty to the public interest requires them to demonstrate that the redistributive effects and value tradeoffs implied by their policies are somehow to the overall advantage of society.

#### 2. Respecting every individual entails trade-offs – that requires aggregation of value

**Cummiskey** 96 (“Kantian Consequentialism,” David Cummiskey [philosophy chair at Bates College], 1996 - http://cmscontent.bates.edu/prebuilt/kantian.pdf)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter 5). In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have “dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others (chapters 5 and 7). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

**Thus, the standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.**

#### **Rule**-util is preferrable to act-util — 6 warrants.

Chappell on Mackie “Indirect Utilitarianism” June 11 2005 Philosophy, et cetera <http://www.philosophyetc.net/2005/06/indirect-utilitarianism.html>

J.L. Mackie (p.91) offers six utilitarian reasons for opposing "the direct use of utilitarian calculation as a practical working morality": 1. Shortage of time and energy will in general preclude such calculations. 2. Even if time and energy are available, the relevant information commonly is not. 3. An agent's judgment on particular issues is likely to be distorted by his own interests and special affections. 4. Even if he were intellectually able to determine the right choice, weakness of will would be likely to impair his putting of it into effect. 5. Even decisions that are right in themselves and actions based on them are liable to be misused as precedents, so that they will encourage and seem to legitimate wrong actions that are superficially similar to them. 6. And, human nature being what it is, a practical working morality must not be too demanding: it is worse than useless to set standards so high that there is no real chance that actions will even approximate to them.

**And act-consequentialism relies on specific circumstances and can’t declare a general principle good or bad.**

**This distinction has multiple implications:**

**[a] Reject specific DAs with contingent uniqueness and links caused by variable circumstance—doesn’t link to the aff rule, and any rule it would create would constantly fluctuate.**

**[b] Focus on big impacts is** bad—tends towards negative util since we’d be frozen from action, i.e. the butterfly effect.

**[c] If I win the aff general rule is good, then you vote affirmative even if they win an exception since their advocacy would violate my rule.**

#### Only consequences are morally relevant: A. They determine the degrees of rightness and wrongness for an action. Deontology holds all lies are wrong but certain lies are worse than others because they harm more people. My lie that your shirt looks nice is less wrong than my lie that I’ll pick you up from the airport. B. Government actions will inevitably lead to trade-offs since they benefit some and harm others; the only justifiable way to resolve these conflicts is by benefitting the maximum possible number of people since anything else would unequally prioritize one group over another. Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out util calc indicts since they’re empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be *no* action.

## Transhumanism Aff

#### **Contemporary moves to privatize space flight relies upon neo-reactionary moves which offer up space colonization as the great-filter, where-in eugenic premises defined who will survive the apocalypse through a flight to space. This fascination with the great filter ensures that private space colonization inevitably collapses in fascism.**

Haider 2017 (Shuja Haider is a writer and editor who has worked at Viewpoint, Popula, The Outline, and The Nation, “The Darkness at the End of the Tunnel: Artificial Intelligence and Neoreaction”, 3/28/2017, https://www.viewpointmag.com/2017/03/28/the-darkness-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-artificial-intelligence-and-neoreaction/)//NotJacob

White Flight to Mars In spite of its total lack of validity, this kind of racist and elitist pseudoscience, explicitly nurtured by the neoliberal mainstream, continues to be accepted by respectable, palatable pundits. NRx gets no credit for introducing such ideologies; it has only taken them to their extreme yet necessary conclusions. The reactionary version of human biodiversity has been kept alive across a wide spectrum of the right, from the aristocratic white nationalists of American Renaissance to the Pepe frogs and animé trolls of 4chan. Without explicitly supporting them, Land has aligned himself with them. His acceptance has been mutual, with the Dark Enlightenment becoming a topic of conversation at American Renaissance’s 2014 national conference. Much of the Dark Enlightenment sequence is devoted to an apologia for John Derbyshire, a former National Review staffer who has became a fellow-traveler to white supremacists. His essay “The Talk: Nonblack Version,” written in the wake of Trayvon Martin’s murder, was a heated defense of the presumption of guilt for black men. Typically, though, Land has added his own layer of complication to the argument. In an editorial for the Alternative Right blog, started by the titular movement’s originator, Richard Spencer, and now run by his collaborator Colin Liddell, Land named his theory of human genetics hyperracism. Land does endorse the idea of typical levels of ability correlating to different “sub-species” of humans. But unlike white nationalists, he’s not interested in differentiating solely by ethnicity. Instead, he prioritizes socioeconomic status, calling it “a strong proxy for IQ.” Though race is correlated along socioeconomic lines, says Land, a “genetically self-filtering élite” would not be strictly racially homogenous. A meritocracy allows superior beings to rise to the top, and though most of them will be white and Asian, superiority ultimately falls along a different “axis of variation.” Perhaps taking a cue from Musk, he concludes that “space colonization will inevitably function as a highly-selective genetic filter.” White flight to Mars? Rather than taking a more extreme view than the likes of Murray, Williamson, and now liberal columnist Frank Rich, Land has simply carried the mainstream ideology to its inexorable result. The ugly underbelly of the conventional view of market society as a meritocracy is precisely Land’s hyperracism: the assumption that some people are more fit than others, and their socioeconomic status is deserved. The contingent effects of specific historical tendencies and social institutions are exalted with the supposedly providential necessity of DNA. Thus the complex economic history resulting in the hegemony of Europe, the United States, and East Asia is taken to mean that whites and Asians are the most biologically fit; the effects of constrained social mobility and the self-reinforcing effects of economic inequality become the claim that poverty is heritable. The fantasy of meritocracy cannot survive a confrontation with the reality of a world shaped by imperialism and white supremacy. But unlike liberals who believe in the fantasy, Land admits its implications. Though it is now put to the service of the hyperracist agenda, “human biodiversity” was initially a neutral term coined by anthropologist Jonathan Marks, whose work was an innovative synthesis of the anthropology and genetics. In the late nineties, it was adopted by Steve Sailer, a journalist then at National Review, who sat perched on the fence between mainstream conservatism and white nationalism. He has since fallen off the far right end, and now writes for racist publications like VDARE. Scientific racism became a mainstream controversy once again when New York Times writer Nicholas Wade’s 2014 book A Troublesome Inheritance argued for the distinct categorization of “three major races,” in a hierarchical taxonomy that explains the historical “rise of the west.” More than 100 population geneticists wrote an open letter to the Times disavowing Wade’s “misappropriation of research from our field.” They concluded that “there is no support from the field of population genetics for Wade’s conjectures.” Another dissenter was Jonathan Marks. He has tirelessly rejected the misuse of the term he coined, openly criticizing A Troublesome Inheritance, The Bell Curve, and other conflations of culture and biology. This did not require a revision of his theory. His 1995 book Human Biodiversity stated from the outset that “the heredity of race is not genetic, but social.” Supercapitalism Machine learning can be so dazzling, we tend to forget that it’s shaped by human intervention. As triumphant as Google was over its new translation system, another recent machine learning experiment — Microsoft’s Tay — showed just how volatile that relationship can be. Intended as the most innocuous AI possible, Tay, an acronym for “thinking about you,” was a simulation of a social media user modeled after a teenage girl. Tay was released to Twitter on March 23rd 2016, and started the day making small talk, repeating memes, and learning the lyrics to “Never Gonna Give You Up.” By afternoon, with the help of some prodding from 4channers, Tay had become a Holocaust denier and 9/11 truther. Microsoft shut it down after 16 hours. A report from Artificial Intelligence Now, a symposium on the potential effects of machine intelligence to society, offers an explanation of this phenomenon, and its broader implications. Machine learning is subject to data bias: “AI systems depend on the data they are given, and may reflect back the characteristics of such data, including any biases, in the models of the world they create.” Machine learning is a case of Land’s hyperstition, slipping between belief and technology. The values of the programmer shape the sometimes tangible outputs of the resulting machine. The risk is that AI systems could “exacerbate the discriminatory dynamics that create social inequality, and would likely do so in ways that would be less obvious than human prejudice and implicit bias.” As principal researcher Kate Crawford puts it, artificial intelligence has a “white guy problem.” There are disturbing examples, like a study by ProPublica that found that a machine algorithm designed to measure rates of recidivism was almost twice as likely to falsely categorize black defendants as future criminals. And the software used for data mining by U.S. intelligence agencies, produced by Peter Thiel’s Palantir, hardly seems optimized to protect civil liberties in the age of the Muslim Ban. Moreover, cybersecurity researcher Heather Roff has pointed to the frequent gendering of humanoid robots: military technology, like the Navy’s grenade launcher SAFFiR, is built to resemble a male body, and service technology, like the iPhone’s Siri, is presented as female. Traditional gender roles that equate masculinity with power and femininity with subservience are reproduced by design. This is no surprise, considering that the ratio of women in the computing industry is at 26 percent, a drop from 35 percent in 1990, according to the AAUW. A 2016 survey found that 88 percent of women in Silicon Valley reported experiencing unconscious gender bias at work. Michael Anissmiov told Gizmodo in 2015 about a counterpart to AI: intelligence augmentation, or the synthesis of technology with the human mind. He described one potential outcome: “a powerful leader making use of intelligence enhancement technology to put himself in an unassailable position.” It’s a prospect that may strike you differently depending on whether or not you consider monarchy a desirable system of government. Even the supposedly apolitical dream of transhumanism conceals an ideology. Like Anissimov, Elon Musk anticipates “a closer merger of biological intelligence and digital intelligence,” as he put it in a speech in Dubai. Meanwhile, back on Earth, his employees are held fast in a fleshly present. A Tesla worker recently wrote a Medium post describing the all-too-human conditions Musk’s employees are subject to. “I often feel like I am working for a company of the future under working conditions of the past,” he wrote. “Really don’t want to get in politics. I just want to help invent and develop technologies that improve lives,” Musk said in a tweet. Regardless, along with Peter Thiel, he has taken a role in Trump’s gov-corp. Good news for Yarvin, who told Vox that Musk is his choice for CEO-king of America. Indeed, figures like Musk and Thiel don’t need to enter the political arena to hold kingly positions. Oxfam recently published data showing that eight men, including Silicon Valley overlords Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerburg, own as much wealth as half the world’s population. There is little sign that the architects of emerging technologies have any intention of changing these circumstances. Elon Musk doesn’t have to wait for a superintelligence to reward him. And the rest of us don’t have to wait to be reduced to productive machines within a network run by computers. The Real Barrier In 2013, Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek claimed “accelerationism” for the Left, with their Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics (MAP). Rather than following Land’s transhumanist trajectory, they picked up the thread of political emancipation left by Deleuze and Guattari, arguing that it should be possible to “accelerate the process of technological evolution” in order to apply it to “socio-political action” oriented toward egalitarian ends. Left accelerationism is best known for an especially vulgar variant of its argument, the easily scorned notion that the left’s project should be to make capitalism as destructive as possible, in hopes of triggering a revolution. But the MAP text advances a more rational variant, proposing that the productive forces of capitalism should be applied to a social democratic program rather than the existing one. Land, however, has disavowed any orientation of the accelerationist current toward left politics. In a blog post criticizing left accelerationism, he instead characterizes the left as a “decelerator,” impeding the real capitalist acceleration advocated by the “Outer Right.” Neoreaction is Accelerationism with a flat tire. Described less figuratively, it is the recognition that the acceleration trend is historically compensated. Beside the speed machine, or industrial capitalism, there is an ever more perfectly weighted decelerator, which gradually drains techno-economic momentum into its own expansion, as it returns dynamic process to meta-stasis. Comically, the fabrication of this braking mechanism is proclaimed as progress. It is the Great Work of the Left. Neoreaction arises through naming it (without excessive affection) as the Cathedral. He gives a “teleological definition” to the Cathedral, which performs its “emergent function as the cancellation of capitalism.” While history is oriented toward “acceleration into techno-commercial Singularity,” the progressive Cathedral “is the anti-trend required to bring history to a halt.” Williams and Srnicek are at odds with this interpretation. They draw from Deleuze and Guattari’s account of capitalism, which itself draws from a suggestive idea articulated in Volume 3 of Capital. While Marx said that “the real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself,” Williams and Srnicek conclude that “capitalism cannot be identified as the agent of true acceleration.” Their formulation argues that “capitalism has begun to constrain the productive forces of technology, or at least, direct them towards needlessly narrow ends.” As the MAP puts it, “rather than a world of space travel, future shock, and revolutionary technological potential, we exist in a time where the only thing which develops is marginally better consumer gadgetry.” This is undeniably true. But although applying an egalitarian ethic to the construction of future machines is a worthy goal, certainly more so than what Williams has described as Land’s lapse into “sick perversity,” there is a more immediate concern: who owns the existing machines, here and now, and who builds them? The tendency of the community that builds and operates those machines, from titans like Peter Thiel to cult figures like Curtis Yarvin, is openly totalitarian. The New York Times has reported that political donations from Silicon Valley PACs took a shift from the Democratic Party toward the GOP in 2016. But their influence on society is not merely channeled through the profit made by machines. It is built into the machines themselves. If, as Jason Smith puts it, “patterns of technological development increasingly reflect capitalist value-relations,” then accelerating capital’s internal tendencies may imply mass unemployment and ecological catastrophe rather than a new horizon of luxury and emancipation. Beasts of Burden In his critical history of accelerationism, Malign Velocities, Benjamin Noys likens Land’s vision of capitalism to a Basiliskesque monster, H.P. Lovecraft’s “Shoggoth.” It is a horrifying “beast of burden” created by the mysterious “Old Ones,” whose body, like a Deep Dream, is covered in shifting, pulsating eyes. Capitalism, for the accelerationist, bears down on us as accelerative liquid monstrosity, capable of absorbing us and, for Land, we must welcome this. The history of slave labor and literally monstrous class struggle is occluded in the accelerationist invocation of the Shoggoth as liquid and accelerative dynamism. The horror involves a forgetting of class struggle (even in dubious fictional form) and the abolition of friction in the name of immersion. The elision of class antagonism is literally obscured by machinery. Existing technology immerses us in the extreme political program proffered by neoliberal doctrine. Through data bias, the politics of tech culture will invisibly shape the social organization that results from the technologies of the future. The further right Silicon Valley shifts, the more dangerous their machines will become. In February, a conference convened in Asilomar, California, dedicated to the development of socially conscious “AI Principles.” It was a literal assembly of what Land, in his Ccru days, named the “Human Security System,” the means by which society obstructs our subjective merging with technology. Wired reported that in the conference’s opening speech, MIT economist Andrew McAfee dismissed “Terminator scenarios,” instead pointing to statistics regarding the effect of automation on jobs. The new data McAfee cited showed an erosion of the middle class, with low-income and high-income jobs continuing to build in volume. “If current trends continue,” he said, “people are going to rise up well before the machines do.” According to Wired, AI researchers later accosted McAfee in the hallways to warn him that his statistics understated the speed at which AI would amplify class disparities. Forget time-traveling killer robots or ancient beasts. NRx has simply exposed the operations of the capitalist machine in the present. Mainstream apologists for neoliberalism have a decision to make: whether to embrace the pseudoscience of Silicon Valley hyperracism, or to reject the vast economic inequalities generated by market society. If the political class is dedicated to keeping the machine running, it falls to the rest of us to shut it down.

#### This form of space colonization directly results in transhumanism

**Ventura and Vita-Moore 2019**  (Tim Ventura is, Natasha Vita-Moore is Executive Director of Humanity+ Inc, Natasha Vita-More on Transhumanism & Space Colonization, Nov 24, 2019, Natasha Vita-More on Transhumanism & Space Colonization)//NotJacob

Space environments contain many hazards for our current biology, such as damaging cosmic radiation, low-gravity leading to bone-loss & muscle deterioration, and with current technology, the simple limitation of trip times to other stars that vastly exceed the human lifespan. Do you see transhumanism being applied to design people capable of thriving in space-bound environments? The impulse behind transhumanism is to improve the human condition. The condition being a short lifespan ridden with disease. Survival is one element of this impulse which affords a means to overcome the human condition. Survival is based on transforming the current situation into one that is more opportune for our well being. If humans or transhumans are to survive in the environment of space, we need to design that environment to be friendly. We also need to transform ourselves to meet the challenge. In other words, we can design an environment with artificial gravity and reduces the affects of radiation, but we also need to build our bodies to be more adaptable, flexible and sustainable. This would require both medical, scientific, technological and industrial design components. An example of a future body that could exist in a space environment is my design “Primo Posthuman.” If engineering humans will happen anyways, do you think that it will convey defacto enhancements to humanity for space-exploration, or would tailoring the human body for space-travel require something additional? Would there be moral & ethical limits customizing the body for environments like this? It seems that the survival and fashion trends for space gear have been developed as second skin accommodations for the body. These spacesuits have certainly become more convenient for astronauts over the years. For the long-term space travel and lifestyle needs, we ought to have biologically adaptable bodies to meet the environmental challenges of space. This could be the designing new bodies for humans. Rather than moral issues, the most fundamental issue for space explorers is survival. It would be ethical and moral to keep our religious and philosophical views separate from the needs, protection and safety of the adventurous people who risk their lives to explore space. We must do all we can to protect them. If this means customizing the body for space-bound travel, then it must be done.

#### Transhumanism is a slippery slope into the worst forms of genetic interventions.

**McNamee and Edwards 2006** (Mike McNamee, and S D Edwards, Transhumanism, medical technology and slippery slopes, Journal of Medical Ethics, 2006 Sep; 32(9): 513-518, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2563415/)//NotJacob

In what ways can slippery slope arguments be used against transhumanism? What is wrong with transhumanism? Or, better, is there a point at which we can say transhumanism is objectionable? One particular strategy adopted by proponents of transhumanism falls clearly under the aspect of the thin end of the wedge conception of the slippery slope. Although some aspects of their ideology seem aimed at unqualified goods, there seems to be no limit to the aspirations of transhumanism as they cite the powers of other animals and substances as potential modifications for the transhumanist. Although we can admire the sonic capacities of the bat, the elastic strength of lizards' tongues and the endurability of Kevlar in contrast with traditional construction materials used in the body, their transplantation into humans is, to coin Kass's celebrated label, “repugnant” (Kass, 1997).19a Although not all transhumanists would support such extreme enhancements (if that is indeed what they are), less radical advocates use justifications that are based on therapeutic lines up front with the more Promethean aims less explicitly advertised. We can find many examples of this manoeuvre. Take, for example, the Cognitive Enhancement Research Institute in California. Prominently displayed on its website front page (http://www.ceri.com/) we read, “Do you know somebody with Alzheimer's disease? Click to see the latest research breakthrough.” The mode is simple: treatment by front entrance, enhancement by the back door. Borgmann,20 in his discussion of the uses of technology in modern society, observed precisely this argumentative strategy more than 20 years ago: The main goal of these programs seems to be the domination of nature. But we must be more precise. The desire to dominate does not just spring from a lust of power, from sheer human imperialism. It is from the start connected with the aim of liberating humanity from disease, hunger, and toil and enriching life with learning, art and athletics. Who would want to deny the powers of viral diseases that can be genetically treated? Would we want to draw the line at the transplantation of non‐human capacities (sonar path finding)? Or at in vivo fibre optic communications backbone or anti‐degeneration powers? (These would have to be non‐human by hypothesis). Or should we consider the scope of technological enhancements that one chief transhumanist, Natasha Vita More21, propounds: A transhuman is an evolutionary stage from being exclusively biological to becoming post‐biological. Post‐biological means a continuous shedding of our biology and merging with machines. (…) The body, as we transform ourselves over time, will take on different types of appearances and designs and materials. (…) For hiking a mountain, I'd like extended leg strength, stamina, a skin‐sheath to protect me from damaging environmental aspects, self‐moisturizing, cool‐down capability, extended hearing and augmented vision (Network of sonar sensors depicts data through solid mass and map images onto visual field. Overlay window shifts spectrum frequencies. Visual scratch pad relays mental ideas to visual recognition bots. Global Satellite interface at micro‐zoom range). For a party, I'd like an eclectic look ‐ a glistening bronze skin with emerald green highlights, enhanced height to tower above other people, a sophisticated internal sound system so that I could alter the music to suit my own taste, memory enhance device, emotional‐select for feel‐good people so I wouldn't get dragged into anyone's inappropriate conversations. And parabolic hearing so that I could listen in on conversations across the room if the one I was currently in started winding down. Notwithstanding the difficulty of bringing together transhumanism under one movement, the sheer variety of proposals merely contained within Vita More's catalogue means that we cannot determinately point to a precise station at which we can say, “Here, this is the end we said things would naturally progress to.” But does this pose a problem? Well, it certainly makes it difficult to specify exactly a “horrible result” that is supposed to be at the bottom of the slope. Equally, it is extremely difficult to say that if we allow precedent X, it will allow practices Y or Z to follow as it is not clear how these practices Y or Z are (if at all) connected with the precedent X. So it is not clear that a form of precedent‐setting slippery slope can be strictly used in every case against transhumanism, although it may be applicable in some.

#### That results in extinction

McNamee and Edwards 2006 (Mike McNamee, and S D Edwards, Transhumanism, medical technology and slippery slopes, Journal of Medical Ethics, 2006 Sep; 32(9): 513-518, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2563415/)//NotJacob

Critics point to consequences of transhumanism, which they find unpalatable. One possible consequence feared by some commentators is that, in effect, transhumanism will lead to the existence of two distinct types of being, the human and the posthuman. The human may be incapable of breeding with the posthuman and will be seen as having a much lower moral standing. Given that, as Buchanan et al9 note, much moral progress, in the West at least, is founded on the category of the human in terms of rights claims, if we no longer have a common humanity, what rights, if any, ought to be enjoyed by transhumans? This can be viewed either as a criticism (we poor humans are no longer at the top of the evolutionary tree) or simply as a critical concern that invites further argumentation. We shall return to this idea in the final section, by way of identifying a deeper problem with the open‐endedness of transhumanism that builds on this recognition. In the same vein, critics may argue that transhumanism will increase inequalities between the rich and the poor. The rich can afford to make use of transhumanism, but the poor will not be able to. Indeed, we may come to think of such people as deficient, failing to achieve a new heightened level of normal functioning.9 In the opposing direction, critical observers may say that transhumanism is, in reality, an irrelevance, as very few will be able to use the technological developments even if they ever manifest themselves. A further possibility is that transhumanism could lead to the extinction of humans and posthumans, for things are just as likely to turn out for the worse as for the better (eg, those for precautionary principle).

#### It evens collapses morality itself by removing vulnerability and erasing the concept of human solidarity.

McNamee and Edwards 2006 (Mike McNamee, and S D Edwards, Transhumanism, medical technology and slippery slopes, Journal of Medical Ethics, 2006 Sep; 32(9): 513-518, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2563415/)//NotJacob

Some radical critics of transhumanism see it as a threat to morality itself.1,11 This is because they see morality as necessarily connected to the kind of vulnerability that accompanies human nature. Think of the idea of human rights and the power this has had in voicing concern about the plight of especially vulnerable human beings. As noted earlier a transhumanist may be thought to be beyond humanity and as neither enjoying its rights nor its obligations. Why would a transhuman be moved by appeals to human solidarity? Once the prospect of posthumanism emerges, the whole of morality is thus threatened because the existence of human nature itself is under threat. One further objection voiced by Habermas11 is that interfering with the process of human conception, and by implication human constitution, deprives humans of the “naturalness which so far has been a part of the taken‐for‐granted background of our self‐understanding as a species” and “Getting used to having human life biotechnologically at the disposal of our contingent preferences cannot help but change our normative self‐understanding” (p 72). On this account, our self‐understanding would include, for example, our essential vulnerability to disease, ageing and death. Suppose the strong transhumanism project is realised. We are no longer thus vulnerable: immortality is a real prospect. Nevertheless, conceptual caution must be exercised here—even transhumanists will be susceptible in the manner that Hobbes12 noted. Even the strongest are vulnerable in their sleep. But the kind of vulnerability transhumanism seeks to overcome is of the internal kind (not Hobbes's external threats). We are reminded of Woody Allen's famous remark that he wanted to become immortal, not by doing great deeds but simply by not dying. This will result in a radical change in our self‐understanding, which has inescapably normative elements to it that need to be challenged. Most radically, this change in self‐understanding may take the form of a change in what we view as a good life. Hitherto a human life, this would have been assumed to be finite. Transhumanists suggest that even now this may change with appropriate technology and the “right” motivation. Do the changes in self‐understanding presented by transhumanists (and genetic manipulation) necessarily have to represent a change for the worse? As discussed earlier, it may be that the technology that generates the possibility of transhumanism can be used for the good of humans—for example, to promote immunity to disease or to increase quality of life. Is there really an intrinsic connection between acquisition of the capacity to bring about transhumanism and moral decline? Perhaps Habermas's point is that moral decline is simply more likely to occur once radical enhancement technologies are adopted as a practice that is not intrinsically evil or morally objectionable. But how can this be known in advance? This raises the spectre of slippery slope arguments.

#### Its way more likely that transhumanism is used for bad ends, and will only recreate inequalities.

Rubin 2016 (Charles T. Rubin teaches political philosophy at Duquesne University, Transhumanists are searching for a dystopian future, May 17, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/05/17/transhumanists-are-searching-for-a-dystopian-future/)//NotJacob

For its proponents, transhumanism — the idea of using technology to redesign humans beyond our biology — is just common sense. Who doesn’t want to live a healthier, happier and wealthier life? And wouldn’t it be great to live such an “enhanced” life indefinitely? For nearly as long as we have written record, humans have rebelled at the limits of the human condition, but with the development of modern science and technology we have become increasingly able to overcome what once seemed like absolute limits. Advances in fields such as genetics, synthetic biology, neuropsychology, robotics, artificial intelligence and nanotechnology are putting us on the verge of even more radical breakthroughs, allowing us to imagine that we can ultimately rebuild completely the flawed human product that evolution has bequeathed us. But the transhumanists are not the only ones imagining the impact of these technological possibilities. In popular fictional depictions — such as in Marvel’s superhero television series “Agents of SHIELD” and the much more acclaimed science fiction series “Orphan Black” — “transhumanist” is used more or less as a synonym for “mad scientist.” The notion of humans taking charge of human evolution is strongly associated with those who seem to be the bad guys. How do you teach a machine to be moral? What accounts for this gap between how transhumanists see themselves — as rational proponents of a cause, who seek little more than to speed humanity along a path it already follows — and how they are seen in popular culture — as dangerous conspirators against human welfare? Movies and TV need drama and conflict, and it is possible that transhumanists just make trendy villains. And yet the transhumanists and the show writers are alike operating in the realm of imagination, of possible futures. In this case, I believe the TV writers have the richer and more nuanced imaginations that more closely resemble reality. With great power ought to come great responsibility. The libertarian strain that is so powerful among transhumanists makes them imagine that such responsibility need be exercised only by individuals making choices about how to modify themselves or their children. What popular culture imagines is that transhumanist promises are being made by flawed human beings to flawed human beings, and that as a result the consequences of their decisions will likely have a broader reach than they anticipate. As a result, the great powers that transhumanism promises are likely to be used not in ways that will solve human problems, but in ways that will perpetuate them yet more terribly. That is because in a world where we have increasing power to modify our humanity, “enhancements” will still be developed by people who are not yet enhanced. Popular culture asks us to imagine how those individuals, whether in government or private industry, will make their choices in a world where darker human motives like selfishness, greed, and lust for power will play a role in decisions about what needs changing, for whom and at what price. And those seeking enhancement will be subject to their own darker motives: to social pressures, competitive inclinations, market manipulations. Indeed, if human beings are even half as imperfect as transhumanists apparently believe, why should we trust our unenhanced opinions about what would constitute an improvement in our lives? Eight questions to ask before human genetic engineering goes mainstream Of course, any honest transhumanist would admit that the extraordinary powers that we may be on the verge of developing could certainly be used to bad ends. Most would seek to avoid such an outcome. Here, however, another problem arises that pop culture predicts. On “Agents of SHIELD,” for example, the bad end lurking in the background seems to be some extinction-level event for mere humanity, and our displacement by some kind of post-human intelligence. Who would want that? But in a profound sense, this bad end is the same future that the transhumanists desire. If mere humans are as defective as the transhumanists make out, then surely the rational future, the future to be hoped for, would see us replaced by something far better — something, as roboticist Hans Moravec has happily anticipated, alien to humanity as we know it. Ultimately, there is no gap. The hopes of transhumanism and the fears exposed by pop culture converge in a way that should give us all pause. It’s more likely to result in dystopia than Utopia.