## 1AC – Oppression FW

**Adopting the perspective of the oppressed is the only way to account for dominant ideologies that skew our thought processes.**

### Mills 5: Charles W. Mills (John Evans Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy) ““Ideal Theory” as Ideology” Hypatia vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 2005) RW

Now what distinguishes ideal theory is not merely the use of ideals, since obviously nonideal theory can and will use ideals also (certainly it will appeal to the moral ideals, if it may be more dubious about the value of invoking idealized human capacities). What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual. As O’Neill emphasizes, this is not a necessary corollary of the operation of abstraction itself, since one can have abstractions of the ideal-as- descriptive-model type that abstract without idealizing. But ideal theory either tacitly represents the actual as a simple deviation from the ideal, not worth theorizing in its own right, or claims that starting from the ideal is at least the best way of realizing it. Ideal theory as an approach will then utilize as its basic apparatus some or all of the following concepts and assumptions (there is necessarily a certain overlap in the list, since they all intersect with one another): • An idealized social ontology. Moral theory deals with the normative, but it cannot avoid some characterization of the human beings who make up the society, and whose interactions with one another are its subject. So some overt or tacit social ontology has to be presupposed. An idealized social ontology of the modern type (as against, say, a Platonic or Aristotelian type) will typically assume the abstract and undifferentiated equal atomic individuals of classical liberalism. Thus it will abstract away from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and oppression, which in reality, of course, will profoundly shape the ontology of those same individuals, locating them in superior and inferior positions in social hierarchies of various kinds. • Idealized capacities. The human agents as visualized in the theory will also often have completely unrealistic capacities attributed to them—unrealistic even for the privileged minority, let alone those subordinated in different ways, who would not have had an equal opportunity for their natural capacities to develop, and who would in fact typically be disabled in crucial respects. • Silence on oppression. Almost by de nition, it follows from the focus of ideal theory that little or nothing will be said on actual historic oppression and its legacy in the present, or current ongoing oppression, though these may be gestured at in a vague or promissory way (as something to be dealt with later).

Correspondingly, the ways in which systematic oppression is likely to shape the Charles W. Mills 169 basic social institutions (as well as the humans in those institutions) will not be part of the theory’s concern, and this will manifest itself in the absence of ideal-as- descriptive-model concepts that would provide the necessary macro- and micro-mapping of that oppression, and that are requisite for understanding its reproductive dynamic. • Ideal social institutions. Fundamental social institutions such as the family, the economic structure, the legal system, will therefore be conceptualized in ideal-as-idealized-model terms, with little or no sense of how their actual workings may systematically disadvantage women, the poor, and racial minorities. • An idealized cognitive sphere. Separate from, and in addition to, the idealization of human capacities, what could be termed an idealized cognitive sphere will also be presupposed. In other words, as a corollary of the general ignoring of oppression, the consequences of oppression for the social cognition of these agents, both the advantaged and the disadvantaged, will typically not be recognized, let alone theorized. A general social transparency will be presumed, with cognitive obstacles minimized as limited to biases of self-interest or the intrinsic difficulties of understanding the world, and little or no attention paid to the distinctive role of hegemonic ideologies and group-specific experience in distorting our perceptions and conceptions of the social order.

**Oppression is created by social systems so only a focus on material conditions can solve.**

**Johnson no date:** Allan Johnson (PhD in sociology, he joined the sociology department at Wesleyan University) <http://www.cabrillo.edu/~lroberts/AlanJohnsonWhatCanWeDO001.pdf>. RW Privilege is a feature of social systems, not individuals. People have or don't have privilege depending on the system they're in and the social categories other people put them in. To say,

then, that I have race privilege says less about me personally than it does about [how] the society we all live in and how it is organized to assign privilege on the basis of a socially defined set of racial categories that change historically and often overlap. The challenge facing me as an individual has more to do with how I participate in society as a recipient of race privilege and how those choices oppose or support the system itself. In dealing with the problem of privilege, we have to get used to being surrounded by paradox. Very often those who have privilege don't know it, for example, which is a key aspect of privilege. Also paradoxical is the fact that privilege doesn't necessarily lead to a "good life," which can prompt people in privileged groups to deny resentfully that they even have it. But privilege doesn't equate with being happy. It involves having what others don't have and the struggle to hang on to it at their expense, neither of which is a recipe for joy,personal fulfillment, or spiritual contentment To be an effective part of the solution, we have to realize

that privilege and oppression are not a thing of the past. It's happening right now. It isn't just a collection of wounds inflicted long ago that now need to be healed. The wounding goes on as I write these words and as you read them, and unless people work to change the system that promotes it, personal healing by itself cannot be the answer. Healing wounds is no more a solution to the oppression that causes the wounding than military hospitals are a solution to war. Healing is a necessary process, but it isn't enough....

### Since privilege is rooted primarily in systems—such as families, schools, and workplaces— change isn't simply *a* matter of changing people. People, of course, will have to change in order for systems to change, but the most important point is that changing people isn't enough. The solution also has to include entire systems, such as capitalism, whose paths of least resistance [that] shape how we feel, think, and behave as individuals, how we see ourselves and one another.

**The standard is minimizing oppression, defined as promoting the material conditions necessary for inclusion.**

### Debate is a space for real world change, but we have to consider tangible policy action above all else—ideal theory abstracts away from material consequences and legitimizes oppression

**Curry 14:** Dr. Tommy J. Curry 14, “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century”, Victory Briefs, 2014

**Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity** and intellectual exercise **pointing to the real world consequences** of dialogue, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value- weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set]

against factual/descriptive issues.”At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as- descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one

#### “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. ¶ This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real

discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to

the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning

(which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe)

are totalizable by any

various

that the

we cannot suggest

complexities of social problems

#### one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-

pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate(policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

### This outweighs – dlearning philosophy makes us immoral

Posner 98: The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, Richard A. Posner ~Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; University of Chicago Law School.~, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 111, No. 7 (May, 1998), pp. 1637-1717

The better read you are in philosophy or literature, and the more imaginative and analytically supple you are, the easier you will find it to reweave your tapestry of moral beliefs so that your principles allow you to do what your id tells you to do. My point is not that it's costless to change one's moral stripes, but only that the cost is less for a highly educated person. Ignorance is the ally of morality, as the medieval Roman Catholic Church recognized when it instructed priests not to ask parishioners in the confessional about specific sexually deviant practices, lest they give them ideas. Moral education equips the student to argue against moral preceptors. So even if instruction in moral reasoning improves people's moral beliefs (which I greatly doubt), the effect may be completely offset by the reduction in the likelihood that people would conform their behavior to moral precepts. To be confident that moral instruction would not have this effect, you would have to agree with Socrates that people are naturally good and do bad things only out of ignorance.

### Trust your basic intuitions about oppression—otherwise debate is made unsafe

Teehan 14 ~Ryan Teehan, NSD staffer and competitor from the Delbarton School~ – NSD Update comment on the student protests at the TOC in 2014.

Honestly, I don't think that 99% of what has been said in this thread so far actually matters. It doesn't matter whether you think that these types of assumptions should be questioned. It doesn't matter what accepting this intuition could potentially do or not do. It doesn't matter if you see fit to make, incredibly trivializing and misplaced I might add, links between this and the Holocaust. All of the arguments that talk about how debate is a unique space for questioning assumptions make an assumption of safety . They say that this is a space where one is safe to question assumptions and try new perspectives. That is not true for everyone. When we allow arguments that question the wrong ness of racism, sexism, homophobia, rape, lynching, etc., we make debate unsafe for certain people. The idea that debate is a safe space to question all assumptions is the definition of privilege, it begins with an idea of a debater that can question every assumption. People who face the actual effects of the aforementioned things cannot

question those assumptions, and making debate a space built around the idea that they can is hostile. So, you really have a choice. Either 1) say that you do not want these people to debate so that you can let people question the w rongness of everything I listed before, 2) say that you care more about letting debaters question those things than making debate safe for everyo ne, or 3) make it so that saying things that make debate u nsafe has actual repercussions. On "debate is not the real world". Only for people who ca n separate their existence in "the real world" from their existence in debate. That means privileged, white, heterosexual males like myself. I don't understand how you can make this sweeping claim whe n some people are clearly harmed by these arguments. At the end of the day, you have to figure out whether you care about debate being safe for everyone involved. I don't think anyone has contested that these arguments make debate unsafe for certain people . If you care at all about the people involved in debate then don't vote on these arguments . If you care about the safety and wellbeing of competi tors, then don't vote on these arguments. If you don't, then I honestly don't understand why you give up your time to coach and/or j udge . The pay can't be that good. I don't believe that you' re just in it for the money, which is why I ask you to ask yourselves whether you can justify making debate unsa fe for certain people.

## Diversionary War

**Strikes work to solve inequalities as well as balancing power.**

**Bahn 19**. Kate Bahn is the director of labor market policy and interim chief economist at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth. Her areas of research include gender, race, and ethnicity in the labor market, care work, and monopsonistic labor markets. Previously, she was an economist at the Center for American Progress. Bahn also formerly served as the executive vice president and secretary for the International Association for Feminist Economics. Bahn received her Ph.D. in economics from the New School for Social Research and her B.A. from Hampshire College. “The once and future role of strikes in ensuring U.S. worker powers,” Washington Center for Equitable Growth; https://equitablegrowth.org/the-once-and-future-role-of-strikes-in-ensuring-u-s-worker-power/Trusha

At the same time, there is an increasing consensus today that **unions are a positive force for increasing worker power and**[**balancing against economic inequality**](https://equitablegrowth.org/examining-the-links-between-rising-wage-inequality-and-the-decline-of-unions/). In polling of support for unions and specific aspects of collective bargaining, Equitable Growth grantee Alex Hertel-Fernandez of Columbia University, along with William Kimball and Thomas Kochan of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, find that [support for unions](https://equitablegrowth.org/what-kind-of-labor-organizations-do-u-s-workers-want/) has grown overall, with nearly half of U.S. workers in 2018 saying they would vote for a union if given the opportunity. This is a significant increase from one-third of workers supporting unionization in 1995. According to their research, workers primarily value unions’ role in collective bargaining and ensuring access to benefits such as healthcare, retirement, and unemployment insurance. **Strikes have historically been one of the strongest tools used by unions to ensure they have power to engage in collective bargaining.** But striking was viewed as a negative attribute in the survey done by Hertel-Fernandez, Kimball, and Kochan. Yet, when they presented workers with the hypothetical choice of a union exercising strike power with other attributes of unions, such as collective bargaining, support increased. But strikes, of course, do not take place in a bubble. The wider **climate of worker bargaining power and institutions that support labor organizing plays a role in making this historically crucial tool effective again.**

**Unequal balances of power put minorities at a sever disadvantage through the rise of ethnic nationalism.**

**Shiller 16** ROBERT J. SHILLER is Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale. “What’s behind a rise in ethnic nationalism? Maybe in economy,” The New York Times; https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/16/upshot/whats-behind-a-rise-in-ethnic-nationalism-maybe-the-economy.html//Trusha

**Global economic weakness and a rise in inequality appear to be causing a disturbing growth in ethnic nationalism.** Leaders today often do not openly declare themselves to be ethnic nationalists — in which identity is defined by perceived genetic, religious or linguistic heritage rather than democratic ideals or principles. But political appeals to such forms of identity are nevertheless widespread. In the United States, despite his attempts to woo minority voters, Donald J. Trump appears to derive support from such sentiment. In Moscow, Vladimir V. Putin has used Russian nationalist sentiment to inspire many of his countrymen. And we see growing ethnic political parties inspired by national identity in other countries. It is natural to ask whether something so broad might have a common cause, other than the obvious circumstantial causes like the gradual fading of memories about the horrors of ethnic conflict in World War II or the rise in this century of forms of violent ethnic terrorism. Economics is my specialty, and I think economic factors may explain at least part of the trend. In the United States, while the unemployment rate is relatively low, the Federal Reserve has so far had to keep interest rates near zero to keep unemployment down. It’s the same or worse in many other countries. Yet economic growth continues, though at a reduced pace, and not just in the United States. According to the [International Monetary Fund](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/pdf/text.pdf), real world gross domestic product was 29 percent higher in 2015 than it was just before the recession, in 2007. It has just grown at a lower rate than before, 3.2 percent a year in the eight years after 2007 compared with 4.5 percent a year in the eight years ending in 2007. Perhaps that doesn’t sound like a big enough difference to affect political outcomes. But the modest slowdown could be a big part of the explanation for the apparent rise of ethnic nationalism, if combined with another factor**: rising inequality, along with considerable fear about future inequality.** The numbers are stark. According to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, earnings have been basically static. In the bureau’s language, “median usual weekly earnings — in constant (1982-84) dollars (employed full time)” has hardly grown in a generation. The total increase since this data series began in 1979 has been only 1.2 percent, or 0.03 percent a year. The increase has been less than 1 percent since 2007. Even such paltry economic growth is going to the very top, not to the median wage earner. That means that **roughly half of full-time wage earners are doing less well in real terms than their parents were.** [Benjamin M. Friedman](http://scholar.harvard.edu/bfriedman/home) of Harvard University, in his book “The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth” [(Knopf, 2005)](http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bfriedman/files/knopf.pdf), said that at a deep level people make judgments about the economic progress that they see in their own lifetimes, and in comparison with the progress made by the previous generation, especially their own parents. Few people study economic growth statistics. But nearly everyone knows what they are being paid. If they realize that they are doing less well than their forebears, they become anxious. And if they can’t see themselves and others in their cohort as progressing over a lifetime, their social interactions often become angry, resentful and even conspiratorial. Ethnic nationalism creates an ego-preserving excuse for self-perceived personal failure: Other groups are blamed for bad behavior and conspiracies. Often, ethnic, racial or religious conflict follows. Among the horrific examples are the atrocities committed in the name of nationalism during World War II — not coincidentally following the Great Depression. Mr. Friedman provides other such instances from **the last two centuries in which ethnic conflict followed slow economic growth.**

**Ethnic nationalism contributes to time bombs both domestically and internationally.**

**Solt 11**. Southern Illinois University. “Diversionary Nationalism Economic Inequality and the Formation of National Pride,” JSTOR; <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s002238161100048x//Trusha>

**Nationalism serves states’ interests in diverting attention from high levels of economic inequality** particularly well for two reasons. First, nationalism works to obscure the extent of inequality in a society. Inherent to the idea of nationalism is the denial that differences of any sort even exist among members of the nation. As Anderson explained, ‘‘regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’’ (1991, 7). Indeed, idealizing the commonalities shared by members of the asserted national community while forgetting their differences has been recognized as ‘‘the essence of a nation’’ since the nineteenth century (Renan 1996, 43). Rosa Luxemburg (1976, 135) famously decried how ‘‘the concept of ‘the nation’ as a homogenous social and political entity’’ was used as a ‘‘misty veil’’ to conceal the differing conditions and antagonistic interests of its purported members. To the extent that nationalism is spread among citizens of a country, then, those citizens are unlikely to recognize their unequal circum- stances, much less call for policies to ameliorate them. Second, even when inequality is recognized, nationalism can easily be used to delegitimize de- mands for redistribution. Redistribution can be cast as a matter inappropriate for political debate, a form of special-interest pleading that must necessarily be secondary to issues of ‘national’ concern. Because redistribution by definition benefits some citizens at others’ expense, it clashes with the state’s claims to represent the nation as a whole; according to nation- alists, the state therefore cannot properly assent to demands to redress inequalities in this way. Indeed, even making such ‘‘narrow’’ and ‘‘self-interested’’ claims violates citizens’ supposed paramount duty to the state (Hobsbawm 1990, 9; Tilly 1998, 171). The **diversionary theory of nationalism therefore contends that states generate nationalism in their citizens to defuse the ticking bomb of economic inequality**. Nationalism conceals unequal conditions, preempts calls for redistribution, and thereby pre- vents the development of unrest, so states should be expected to inculcate more nationalism in their populations when economic inequality is greater (Posen 1993, 88–89; Van Evera 1990, 28–29).

**Politicians use diversionary tactics as a scapegoat to prove leadership elsewhere in effort to save their political lives**

**Jung 19.** “Diversionary Theory of War,” Oxford Bibliographies; https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0265.xml//Trusha

The main idea underpinning **the diversionary theory of war is that domestic unrest is one of the major causes of war.** When faced with domestic challenges to their leadership, political leaders tend to initiate interstate conflict, diverting domestic attention to foreign affairs and staying in power. How does this work? As [Haynes 2017](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0265.xml#obo-9780199743292-0265-bibItem-0001) suggests, at least two rationales can be identified for the embattled leaders’ choice of diversionary conflict to ensure political survival. The first derives from the rally-round-the-flag effect. Many social psychologists have insisted that an individual favors in-group members to out-group members irrespective of prior interaction and that an external threat strengthens the in-group/out-group bias. Indeed, [Theiler 2018](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0265.xml#obo-9780199743292-0265-bibItem-0004) shows that political leaders’ domestic popularity increases as the imminence of foreign threat and international conflict rises. The second rationale highlights the political opportunity to prove leadership competence. [Richards, et al. 1993](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0265.xml#obo-9780199743292-0265-bibItem-0003) points out that that **leaders who lose domestic support due to their policy failures or unjust behaviors need an opportunity to prove their leadership capability. Winning an international conflict offers such an opportunity to restore domestic support and save their political lives.**

## Class Domination

**The right to strike is the right to resist oppression – it allows workers to check the unilateral nature of the bargaining process**

**Lim ’19:** Woojin Lim. “The Right to Strike”. December 11th, 2019. The Harvard Crimson. <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/12/11/lim-right-to-strike/>. FD

On April 9, 1969, roughly 500 student activists [took over](https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2019/04/event-commemorating-1969-harvard-strike-to-include-current-student-activists/) University Hall to protest Harvard’s role in the Vietnam War. City and state police armed with riot gear, clubs, and mace were [called](https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1994/4/22/police-raided-university-hall-pithe-following/) to remove all protesters who had vowed nonviolent resistance. In the early morning hours of April 10, over 400 police officers [stormed](https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/5/27/university-hall-1969/) University Hall, between 250 and 300 arrests were made, and 75 students were injured. In response, by April 11, thousands of Harvard students, teaching fellows, and faculty had gathered in Harvard Stadium to strike. Fifty years later, the Harvard Graduate Students Union-United Automobile Workers [declared](https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/12/3/grad-union-strikes/) a strike, fighting [for](https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/11/21/grad-student-strike-proposals/) increased compensation, health benefits, and neutral third-party arbitration for sexual harassment and discrimination. On December 3, over 500 demonstrators, wearing on their shoulders large blue-and-white “UAW on Strike” placards, [marched](https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2019/12/unionized-harvard-students-go-on-strike/) routes throughout the Yard. In the strike of 1969, strikers fought for social justice; in the HGSU-UAW strike of 2019, strikers press on the fight for fair wages and working conditions. The right to strike is a [right](https://jacobinmag.com/2018/07/right-to-strike-freedom-civil-liberties-oppression) to resist oppression. The strike (and the credible threat of a strike) is an indispensable part of the collective bargaining procedure. Collective bargaining (or “agreement-making”) provides workers and employees with the opportunity to influence the establishment of workplace rules that govern a large portion of their lives. The concerted withdrawal of labor allows workers to promote and defend their unprotected economic and social interests from employers’ unilateral decisions, and provide employers with pressure and incentives to make reasonable concessions. Functionally, strikes provide workers with the bargaining power to drive fair and meaningful negotiations, offsetting the inherent inequalities of bargaining power in the employer-employee relationship.

**Status quo legal frameworks prop up oppressive working conditions and privilege employers to defend them** – turns liberty based NCs

**Gourevitch ’12:** Alex Gourevitch. “A Radical Defense of the Right to Strike”. Jacobin. July 12th, 2018. <https://jacobinmag.com/2018/07/right-to-strike-freedom-civil-liberties-oppression>. FD.

Workers have an interest in resisting the oppression of class society by using their collective power to reduce, or even overcome, that oppression. Their interest is a liberty interest in a double sense. First, resistance to that class-based oppression carries with it, at least implicitly, a demand for freedoms not yet enjoyed. A higher wage expands workers’ freedom of choice. Expanded labor rights increase workers’ collective freedom to influence the terms of employment. Whatever the concrete set of issues, workers’ strike demands are always also a demand for control over portions of one’s life that they do not yet enjoy. Second, strikes don’t just aim at winning more freedom — they are themselves expressions of freedom. When workers walk out, they’re using their own individual and collective agency to win the liberties they deserve. The same capacity for self-determination that workers invoke to demand more freedom is the capacity they exercise when winning their demands. Freedom, not industrial stability or simply higher living standards, is the name of their desire. Put differently, the right to strike has both an intrinsic and instrumental relation to freedom. It has intrinsic value as an (at least implicit) demand for self-emancipation. And it has instrumental value insofar as the strike is an effective means for resisting the oppressiveness of a class society and achieving new freedoms. But if all this is correct, and the right to strike is something that we should defend, then it also has to be meaningful. The right loses its connection to workers’ freedom if they have little chance of exercising it effectively. Otherwise they’re simply engaging in a symbolic act of defiance — laudable, perhaps, but not a tangible means of fighting oppression. The right to strike must therefore cover at least some of the coercive tactics that make strikes potent, like sit-downs and mass pickets. It is therefore often perfectly justified for strikers to exercise their right to strike by using these tactics, even when these tactics are illegal. Still, the question remains: why should the right to strike be given moral priority over other basic liberties? The reason is not just that liberal capitalism produces economic oppression but that the economic oppression that workers face is in part created and sustained by the very economic and civil liberties that liberal capitalism cherishes. Workers find themselves oppressed because of the way property rights, freedom of contract, corporate authority, and tax and labor law operate. Deeming these liberties inviolable doesn’t foster less oppressive, exploitative outcomes, as its defenders insist — quite the opposite. The right to strike has a stronger claim to be protecting a zone of activity that serves the aims of justice itself — coercing people into relations of less oppressive social cooperation. Simply put, to argue for the right to strike is to prioritize democratic freedoms over property rights.

No Backlash DA – **any damage incurred must be weighed against the transgression of a fundamental human right – eroding rights helps no one**

**Lim ’19:** Woojin Lim. “The Right to Strike”. December 11th, 2019. The Harvard Crimson. <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/12/11/lim-right-to-strike/>. FD

The right to strike is essential in preserving and winning rights. Any curtailment of this right involves the risk of weakening the very basis of collective bargaining. Strikes are not only a means of demanding and achieving an adequate provision of basic liberties but also are themselves intrinsic, self-determined expressions of freedom and human rights. The exercise of the power to strike affirms a quintessential corpus of values akin to liberal democracies, notably those of dignity, liberty, and autonomy. In acts of collective defiance, strikers assert their freedoms of speech, association, and assembly. Acts of striking, marching, and picketing command the attention of the media and prompt public forums of discussion and dialogue. The question of civic obligations, however, remains at stake. Perhaps those disgruntled with the strike might claim on a whiff that the strike impedes upon their own freedom of movement, educational rights, privacy, and so forth. Do strikers, in virtue of expressing their own freedoms, shirk valid civic norms of reciprocity they owe to members of the community, for instance, to students? No. The right to strike stems from the premise of an unjust flaw in the social order, that is, the recognition that the benefits from shouldering the burdens of social cooperation are not fairly distributed. Strikes and protests publicize this recognition and demand reform. No doubt, work stoppages from teaching fellows, course assistants, and graduate research assistants — no sections, no office hours, no labs, no grades — may pose [inconvenience](https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/11/26/barham-quesada-protest/) and perhaps hardship in our present lives. Strikes may also impose a serious financial [cost](https://harvardmagazine.com/2019/11/a-harvard-graduate-student-union-strike) on both the employer and the employees. These costs and inconveniences, however, should not be ridiculed as outrageous, for they rightfully [invite](https://jacobinmag.com/2018/07/right-to-strike-freedom-civil-liberties-oppression) disruption. The possible hazards that arise from a strike must be weighed against the workers’ welfare and just rewards and to the community. For instance, current graduate students who struggle in [financials](https://www.apa.org/monitor/2015/04/money-stress) and [mental health](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/258702) may be troubled with juggling teaching obligations. If graduate students are provided with pay security and adequate dental, mental health, and specialist coverage, their quality of teaching and research may [improve](https://cpr.bu.edu/resources/reasonable-accommodations/how-does-mental-illness-interfere-with-school-performance/) in the [long run](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6350815/). There are dangers to bystanders and neutrals when a strike occurs, but such considerations also arise when one lays down the right to strike. That said, if we should defend the right to strike, it must be meaningful. Both parties involved should strive to strike a deal — no pun intended — in [good faith](https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/3/25/editorial-pursuing-good-faith-negotiations/), and not merely act upon purposeless forms of virtue-signaling or anger-venting on chaotic impulse. Nonetheless, provided the facts of injustice and repression, affected members should not only be permitted but highly encouraged (and obliged) to uptake the call of justice to restore broken institutions — be that through joining the pickets or standing in solidarity.

**Class domination results in myriad forms of oppression an causes poverty –** this impact has uniqueness

**Gourevitch ’12:** Alex Gourevitch. “A Radical Defense of the Right to Strike”. Jacobin. July 12th, 2018. <https://jacobinmag.com/2018/07/right-to-strike-freedom-civil-liberties-oppression>. FD.

[Class-based oppression](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/03/working-class-capitalism-socialists-strike-power/) is inextricable from liberal capitalism. While meaningful variation exists across capitalist societies, one of the fundamental unifying facts is this: the majority of able-bodied people are forced to work for members of a relatively small group, who dominate control over productive assets and who, thereby, enjoy control over the activities and products of those workers. There are [workers](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/07/turning-to-the-working-class), and then there are owners and their managers. Workers are pushed into the labor market because they have no reasonable alternative to looking for a job. They cannot produce the goods they need for themselves, nor can they rely on the charity of others, nor can they count on adequate state benefits. Depending on how we measure income and wealth, about 60 to 80 percent of Americans [fall into this category](https://thenewpress.com/books/after-new-economy) for most of their adult lives. This structural compulsion is not symmetric. A significant minority of the population has enough wealth — whether inherited or accumulated or both — that they can avoid entering the labor market. They might happen to work, but they are not forced to do so. The oppression, then, stems not from the fact that some are forced to work. After all, if socially necessary work were shared equally, then it might be fair to force each to do their share. The oppression stems from the fact that the forcing is unequal —that only some are made to work for others, producing whatever employers pay them to produce. This structural inequality feeds into a second, interpersonal dimension of oppression. Workers are forced to join workplaces typically characterized by large swathes of uncontrolled managerial power and authority. This oppression is interpersonal because it is power that specific individuals (employers and their managers) have to get other specific individuals (employees) to do what they want. We can distinguish between **three overlapping forms that this interpersonal, workplace oppression takes: subordination, delegation, and dependence**. Subordination: Employers have what are sometimes called “[managerial prerogatives](https://books.google.com/books/about/Managerial_Prerogative_and_the_Question.html?id=NQLEBAAAQBAJ)” — legislative and judicial grants of authority to owners and their managers to make decisions about investment, hiring and firing, plant location, work process, and the like. Managers may change working speeds and assigned tasks, the hours of work, or, as Amazon currently does, force employees to spend up to an hour going through security lines after work [without paying them](https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-433). They can fire workers for [Facebook comments](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/17/facebook-firings_n_1003789.html), [their sexual orientation](https://www.sgvtribune.com/2011/10/08/fired-gay-water-polo-coach-and-supporters-protest-at-charter-oak-board-meeting/), [for being too sexually appealing](http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/07/29/borgata_babes_lawsuit_new_legal_cases_assess_discrimination_based_on_sex.html), or for not being appealing enough. They can [give](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/71431/the-big-squeeze-by-steven-greenhouse/9781400096527/) workers more tasks than can be performed in the allotted time, lock employees in the workplace overnight, [require employees to labor](http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/09/amazon-warehouse-employees-overheated-ahead-of-holiday-season.html) in extreme heat and [other physically hazardous conditions](https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/us/osha-emphasizes-safety-health-risks-fester.html), or [punitively isolate](https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/caring-on-stolen-time-a-nursing-home-diary) workers from other coworkers. They can [pressure](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/03/labor-law-corporations-workers-political-influence)employees to take unwanted political action, or, in the case of nurses, force employees to [work for twenty-two different doctors](https://socialistworker.org/2018/07/03/nurses-are-set-to-strike-uvm). What unifies these seemingly disparate examples is that, in all cases, managers [are exercising](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/06/private-government-interview-elizabeth-anderson) legally permitted prerogatives. The law does not require that workers have any formal say in how those powers are exercised. In fact, in nearly every liberal capitalist country (including social democracies like Sweden), employees are defined, in law, as “subordinates.” This is subordination in the strict sense: workers are subject to the will of the employer. Delegation: There are additional discretionary legal powers that managers enjoy not by legal statute or precedent but because workers have delegated these powers in the contract. For instance, workers might sign a contract [that allows managers to require employees](https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-reform/drug-testing?redirect=workplace-drug-testing) to submit to random drug testing or unannounced searches. In the United States, 18 percent of current employees and 37 percent of workers in their lifetime [work under noncompete agreements](http://equitablegrowth.org/why-its-time-to-rethink-non-compete-agreements/). These clauses give managers the legal power to forbid employees from working for competitors, in some cases reducing these workers to near indentured service. The [contract](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/04/verizon-wireless-strike-bernie-sanders-cwa/) that the Communications Workers of America had with Verizon until 2015 included a right for managers to force employers to perform from ten to fifteen hours of overtime per week and to take some other day instead of Saturday as an off-day. While workers have granted these prerogatives to employers voluntarily, in many cases it’s only technically voluntary because of the compulsion to work. This is especially true if workers can only find jobs in sectors where these kinds of contracts proliferate. Which leads to the third face of oppression: the distributive effects of class inequality. The normal workings of liberal capitalism elevate a relatively small group of owners and highly paid managers to the pinnacle of society, where they accumulate most of the wealth and income. Meanwhile, most workers do not earn enough to both meet their needs and to save such that they can employ themselves or start their own businesses. The few that do rise displace others or take the structurally limited number of opportunities available. The rest remain workers. Dependence: Finally, managers might have the material power to force employees to submit to commands or even to accept violations of their rights because of the worker’s dependence on the employer. A [headline example](https://jacobinmag.com/2018/06/heres-how-much-money-americas-biggest-corporations-have-stolen-from-their-own-workers) is [wage theft](https://www.epi.org/blog/wage-theft-by-employers-is-costing-u-s-workers-billions-of-dollars-a-year/), which affects [American workers](https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/WinningWageJusticeSummaryofResearchonWageTheft.pdf) to the tune of $8 to $14 billion per year. Employers [regularly break](http://www.jwj.org/free-and-fair-how-labor-law-fails-u-s-democratic-election-standards) labor law, by disciplining, threatening, or firing workers who wish to organize, strike, or otherwise exercise supposedly protected labor rights. In other cases, workers have been [refused bathroom breaks](https://www.oxfamamerica.org/livesontheline/) and resorted to wearing diapers, [denied legally required lunch breaks](https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Employers-must-pay-if-they-deny-lunch-breaks-2474407.php)or [pressured to work through them](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/14/indiana-att-technicians-class-action-lawsuit-lunch-breaks_n_1777166.html), [forced to keep working](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/business/media/ads-for-mcdonalds-and-las-vegas-aimed-at-harried-workers.html) after their shift, or denied the right to read or turn on air conditioning during break. In [particularly egregious examples](https://www.buzzfeed.com/jessicagarrison/the-new-american-slavery-invited-to-the-us-foreign-workers-f#.nmJN7Yg27), employers have forced their workers to stay home rather than go out on weekends or to switch churches and alter religious practices on pain of being fired and deported. There are also the many cases of systematic [sexual harassment](https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/03/metoo-workplace-discrimination-sexual-harassment-feminism), in those wide regions of the economy where something more than a public shaming is needed to control bosses. In all these instances, employers are not exercising legal powers to command. Instead they are taking advantage of the material power that comes with threatening to fire or otherwise discipline workers. This material power to get workers to do things that employers want is in part a function of the class structure of society, both in the broad sense of workers being unequally dependent on owners, and in the narrower sense of workers being legally subordinate to employers. The oppression lies not just in the existence of these powers, nor in some capitalist bad apples, but in how these powers are typically used. Managers tend to use these powers “rationally,” to exploit workers and extract profits. Each of these different faces of oppression — structural, interpersonal, and distributive — is a distinct injustice. Together they form the interrelated and mutually reinforcing elements of class domination that are typical of capitalist societies. Defenders of liberal capitalism insist that it provides the fairest way of distributing work and the rewards of social production. They often speak in the idiom of freedom. Yet liberal capitalism fundamentally constrains workers’ liberty, generating the exploitation of one class by another. It is this oppression that explains why workers have a right to strike and why that right is best understood as a right to resist oppression.

#### Poverty is the worst form of structural violence and kills as many people as a nuclear war

Abu Jamal ’98: Abu-Jamal, prominent social activist and author, ’98, [A Quiet and Deadly Violence, Sept 19, <http://www.flashpoints.net/mQuietDeadlyViolence.html>]. FD.

The deadliest form of violence is poverty. --Ghandi It has often been observed that America is a truly violent nation, as shown by the thousands of cases of social and communal violence that occurs daily in the nation. Every year, some 20,000 people are killed by others, and additional 20,000 folks kill themselves. Add to this the nonlethal violence that Americans daily inflict on each other, and we begin to see the tracings of a nation immersed in a fever of violence. But, as remarkable, and harrowing as this level and degree of violence is, it is, by far, not the most violent features of living in the midst of the American empire. We live, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, in a nation that condones and ignores wide-ranging "structural' violence, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; By "structural violence" I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting "structural" with "behavioral violence" by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. --(Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.) This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes: [E]very fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. [Gilligan, p. 196] Worse still, in a thoroughly capitalist society, much of that violence bec[omes]ame internalized, turned back on the Self, because, in a society based on the priority of wealth, those who own nothing are taught to loathe themselves, as if something is inherently wrong with themselves, instead of the social order that promotes this self-loathing. This intense self-hatred was often manifested in familial violence as when the husband beats the wife, the wife smacks the son, and the kids fight each other.