# 1NC Rd 5

## 1

**Interp: The affirmative must define democracy in a delimited text in the 1AC.**

**Democracy is flexible and has too many interps – normal means shows no consensus and makes the round irresolvable since the judge doesn’t know how to compare between types of offense and o/w since it’s a side constraint on decision making.**

**Wikipedia**, xx-xx-xxxx, "Democracy Index," No Publication, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index> SJCP//JG

[**Full democracies**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_democracy) **are nations where civil liberties and fundamental political freedoms are not only respected but also reinforced by a political culture conducive to the thriving of democratic principles**. These nations have a valid system of governmental checks and balances, an independent judiciary whose decisions are enforced, governments that function adequately, and diverse and independent media. These nations have only limited problems in democratic functioning.[[6]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index#cite_note-index2015-6) [**Flawed democracies**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illiberal_democracy) **are nations where elections are fair and free and basic civil liberties are honoured but may have issues (e.g. media freedom infringement and minor suppression of political opposition and critics)**. These nations have significant faults in other democratic aspects, including underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and issues in the functioning of governance.[[6]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index#cite_note-index2015-6) [**Hybrid regimes**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hybrid_regime) **are nations with regular** [**electoral frauds**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electoral_fraud)**, preventing them from being fair and free democracies.** These nations commonly have governments that apply pressure on political opposition, non-independent judiciaries, widespread corruption, harassment and pressure placed on the media, anaemic rule of law, and more pronounced faults than flawed democracies in the realms of underdeveloped political culture, low levels of participation in politics, and issues in the functioning of governance.[[6]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index#cite_note-index2015-6)

**Violation – you don’t.**

**Prefer –**

**1] Stable Advocacy – they can redefine in the 1AR to wriggle out of DA’s which kills high-quality engagement and becomes two ships passing in the night – triggers presumption since the aff wasn’t subject to well researched scrutiny. We lose access to American politics DA’s, Xi lashout DA’s, basic case turns, and core process counter plans that have different definitions and 1NC pre-round prep.**

**2] Ground – not defining hurts my strategy since they can shift out as I ask DA questions, so I err on the side of caution and read generics which get destroyed by AC frontlines.**

**3] Real World – Policy makers will always how they are implementing a law. It also means zero solvency, absent spec, private entities can circumvent since there is no delineated way to enforce the aff and means their solvency can’t actualize.**

**DSpec isn’t regressive or arbitrary – its core topic lit for what happens when the aff is implemented and cannot be discounted from policies that require enforcement to function.**

## 2

#### CP Text – In a Democracy, a Free Press ought to prioritize Objectivity over Advocacy, except for instances of Investigative Journalism.

#### The CP competes – the tension between Objectivity and Advocacy lies in Objective Journalisms separation of opinion and personal bias from discussions.

Reavy 13, Matthew. "Objectivity and advocacy in journalism." Media Ethics 25.1 (2013). (Communication Department Chairperson at University of Scranton)//Elmer

Advocacy Journalism Public journalism and, for the most part, citizen journalism can be viewed as examples of advocacy journalism, a form of journalism that endeavors to be fact-based, but does not separate editorial opinion from news coverage and often approaches the news from a specific viewpoint. Advocacy journalists distinguish the “good guys” from the “bad guys” and “actively participate in the debate, becoming more activists than observers of the events” (Ruigrok, 2010). Thus, they can be said to exhibit the same kind of “interventionist impulse” that scholars such as Hanitzsch (2007, p. 373) see at work in public journalism. Advocacy journalism has been at times credited with everything from combating “the moral failings of Western governments” (Hammond, 2002, p. 178) to offering "a more progressive notion of experts and expertise by citing community members while critiquing or pointedly ignoring dominant discourses from government and academic ‘experts’” (Heitner, 2009, p. 405). It has been tied to peace journalism (Kempf, 2007), “alternative” publications (Waisbord, 2009) and environmental journalism (Waisbord & Peruzzotti, 2009) among others. Some scholars contend that advocacy journalists can be assumed to write from a “leftist” point of view (Craig, 2004, p. 240), often as a counterweight to the “inherently conservative” notion of objectivity (Glasser, 1984, para. 3), which some argue serves as a tool to “help the powerful maintain order” (Ryan, 2009. p. 8). Many other scholars contend that any liberal bias on the part of journalists is more than offset by a conservative bias among owners. For example, Parry (2003) notes that “media owners historically have enforced their political views and other preferences by installing senior editors whose careers depend on delivering a news product that fits with the owner’s prejudices.”

#### Investigative Journalism is a form of Advocacy Journalism – it doesn’t violate the Truth BUT attaches it to a partial cause.

Givens 20 Dana Givens 10-14-2020 "Opinion: When It Comes to Advocacy Journalism, the Truth Should Come Before Emotion" <https://theclick.news/essay-when-it-comes-to-advocacy-journalism-the-truth-should-come-before-emotion/> (Sacred Heart University with a Bachelor's of Science in Marketing and Global Studies)//Elmer

(NEW YORK) — Advocacy journalists take a different kind of stance than other journalists when it comes to crafting a story. This type of writing has a different belief system attached — it is dedicated to a certain cause, where the journalist takes a direct and intentional stance. It’s a step above simply an opinion essay because the goal is to create a call to action, to call out injustice. An example of this type of journalism was a recent report from the nonprofit Human Rights Watch, regarding new evidence showing the members of the New York City police department staged a mass arrest and assault on a group of peaceful protesters in the Bronx. The organization released a report and video showing new evidence that the police department did create a plan to stage a mass arrest in Mott Haven, a part of the Bronx, after tracking down peaceful protesters in early June. This is a great example of advocacy journalism because it was tied to human rights and police brutality and demonstrates detailed investigative reporting. They were able to back up their arguments with evidence on the event in addition to getting testimonies from the people involved. We have discussed how objectivity is one of the foundations of journalism and while the organization has taken a stance in their advocacy, they presented an argument backed up by verified facts and sources. The video was able to give even more context to the details leading up to the event and what happened outside of what had previously been reported.

#### Investigative Journalism solves Corruption.

Hrvolova and Katz 21 Martina Hrvolova and Jonathan D. Katz 11-29-2021 "The Anti-Corruption Role of Free Media and Investigative Journalism" <https://www.gmfus.org/news/anti-corruption-role-free-media-and-investigative-journalism> (Resident Fellow WASHINGTON, DC OFFICE)//Elmer

Summary Global democracy is under growing threat from illiberal actors. In response to challenges including backsliding, the United States and its partners are ramping up efforts to reinvigorate and renew democracy at the U.S.-organized Summit for Democracy in December and its follow-up in 2022. Participants will focus on defending against authoritarianism, fighting corruption, and promoting respect for human rights. Media freedom and investigative journalism—vital for democracy, transparency, and accountability—have been targeted by illiberal forces worldwide, including autocrats in China and Russia. The United States, Europe, and democracy actors internationally need to prioritize media support or face consequences at home and abroad as disinformation deepens polarization, enables corruption, and advantages malign actors. Journalists and independent media are outspent and face violence and even death. They need greater support, legal assistance, training, and protection on the part of donors, governments, and multilateral bodies. The summit can be a launchpad for collaboration and coordination on this front, ensuring that freedom of media and expression serve as bulwarks against rising authoritarianism and corruption. Introduction Democratic governance, civil society, and media are increasingly undermined and threatened across the globe, including in the Western democracies. The rise of authoritarian-led countries, including China and Russia, has severely eroded democratic gains. The impact of illiberal forces and democratic backsliding has been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic, climate change, and growing economic inequality. Corruption, impacting billions globally, helps fuel the democratic spiral, and the trends in this regard point in the wrong direction.1 Corruption in plain sight—but often hidden from scrutiny—has too often been a common and a successful tactic used by authoritarians and their enablers on every continent to gain and maintain power, to repress populations, and to undermine democracy. Authoritarians have increasingly deployed corruption to rot democratic institutions, liberal economies, and citizens’ trust from the inside as well as to create a favorable environment for lawlessness and graft. Free media, including investigative journalists acting as watchdogs, have been at the forefront in addressing the corruption epidemic and in seeking to provide accountability—in closing- space countries as in Western democracies. In Russia, publicity around President Vladimir Putin’s seaside estate highlighted how media can work together across international boundaries to expose serious, long-term corruption in a country.2 The recent release of the Pandora Papers has reaffirmed the indispensable role of media in protecting democracy and addressing the challenges posed by corruption.3 The continuing release of investigative reports based on the Pandora Papers also shows how international collaboration protects journalists and improves their ability to report more completely on the vast international networks of corruption and their enablers across the globe.4 The world is at a historic tipping point for democracy, media, and journalism. Free media will remain an essential institution to preserve and protect democracy. Investigative journalism is playing a leading role in detecting and exposing corruption. It is critical in the current global environment that media remain free and independent. When media is undermined, threatened or weaponized, this creates an environment for autocrats and their enablers to prosper. The U.S.-organized Summit for Democracy in December 2021, the subsequent “year of action,” and the second summit in late 2022 provide a critical opportunity for democracies to commit to protect, promote, and support free, independent media and investigative journalism. The Role of Free Media and Investigative Journalism While many corrupt individuals, corporations, and governments undermine the rule of law and fund media to create propaganda, hate, and divisions among people, independent journalism is in a threatened state operationally and economically. Solutions can be found at many different levels, but the first step is to understand the context and importance of free and independent media, including investigative reporting, as a crucial actor promoting oversight and accountability. According to the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, the following four pillars are essential for addressing the nexus between authoritarianism and corruption: Introducing, adopting, and implementing impactful regulations to address corruption at home and abroad as well as to defend and enhance media freedom. Exposing corruption and its patterns by media. Acting on media findings by civil society and activists Prosecuting corruption based on leads from media, civil society, and activists and enforcing anti-corruption laws.5 Exposing corruption and its patterns by media, civil society, and activists serves as a catalyst that arms others with the information needed to drive positive change and advance democracy, transparency, and accountability. Using media revelations, civil society and activists can push law-enforcement bodies to act and advocates can press for necessary policy reform. At the same time, policymakers can point to media investigations and data releases to gather support for passing legislation and advancing reforms.6 The four pillars have not traditionally been interconnected, which must change if there is to be more impactful efforts at strengthening democracy by fighting corruption and the authoritarianism it supports. Investigative journalists, civil society, and activists have critical roles to play in documenting corruption and enforcing actions against it, but they often work in silos. By contrast, tycoons, corrupt officials, and organized criminal networks are highly coordinated across borders. Corruption is a transnational issue and must be addressed through transnational cooperation. Even a handful of people can make a significant difference if they work together and amplify each other’s voices, as shown by the recent reporting on corruption that have taken center stage at the global level following the release of the Pandora Papers and previous similar leaks. International groups of investigative journalists such as the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, and the Global Anti-Corruption Consortium are some of the prime examples of an international cooperation that leads to tangible results in bringing corruption to the attention of the public and law-enforcement bodies. While sensational stories, investigations, and leaked information exposing high-level corruption have been front-page news worldwide, follow-up action to ensure accountability and to push for lasting change, including by implementing and enforcing laws and regulations have often lagged. In democratic systems, prosecuting corruption based on leads from media, activist watchdogs, and oversight mechanisms begins with training investigators, prosecutors, judges, and other governmental actors to pursue and correctly handle complex corruption cases as well as to work with journalists, civil society, and activists on efforts in promoting transparency and public accountability. For example, the Central and Eastern European Law Institute in the Czech Republic educates legal professionals across multiple geographies through innovative training programs with a focus on providing participants with tools to promote human rights, strengthen democratic institutions, fight corruption, and support free-market economies. This includes making available lectures about how investigative journalists interact with law-enforcement bodies. The changes needed at the regulatory level are equally significant, starting with legislators and governments providing consistent resources and taking actions that advance and enforce policies preventing and addressing corruption as well as promoting media freedom. Activists and journalists often cite transparency and accountability as essential principles for building trust in democracy and shaping the information space to the advantage of democratic actors. They encourage officials, leaders, and employees in the public and private sectors to act not only in their institutions’ interest but also for the common good. Without public access to some of their essential records and information, holding them accountable is nearly impossible. And, while a lot has been done in democracies to bolster transparency and accountability, continued efforts are needed to address gaps where corruption flourishes. The extent to which journalists can assist in addressing corruption also depends on whether the media is free and independent. In addition to strengthening domestic transparency and accountability systems in line with the United Nations Convention against Corruption, there is also a need for governments to participate in various international anticorruption initiatives, to harmonize their anticorruption laws and mechanisms, and to increase enforcement activities. In particular, harmonization can remove the knowledge and resources barriers that journalists and activists encounter when engaging in preventing corruption and taking corrective actions. For example, while the establishment of registers of ultimate beneficial ownership in some jurisdictions has increased transparency about the ownership of companies, critics note the lack of their uniform adoption by more countries. The extent to which journalists can assist in addressing corruption also depends on whether the media is free and independent. Therefore, legislative frameworks must be in place more widely to protect journalists and their sources from physical attacks, unfounded lawsuits, recrimination, and victimization.7 However, there is a critical difference between the “law on the books” and the “law in action.” For example, while Europe and the Americas continue to be the most favorable continents for press freedom, they have also seen increased violence against journalists in 2021. And, throughout the world, journalists (and activists) have been killed for their role in exposing corruption.8 In President Joe Biden’s words, “freedom of expression and access to factual and accurate information provided by independent media are foundational to prosperous and secure democratic societies. But the outlook for the rights of journalists today is harrowing.”9 In addition to seeking accountability for all crimes against journalists and media workers, expanding existing efforts and introducing new measures that provide for their legal and physical security must be urgently accelerated. This includes leveraging sanction regimes and launching “wraparound” measures like relocation and placement programs. For example, strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) are increasingly used to silence media critics in all jurisdictions. Greater access to insurance or other resources to help defend journalists against baseless defamation suits and legal intimidation is essential for outlets that in the past have been considered uninsurable or have been unable to afford insurance and defend themselves legally due to high costs. Legislative and other policy actions can also be leveraged to help stem the tide of lawsuits following an effective journalistic investigation. The recent commitment by the U.S. Agency for International Development to launch a global Defamation Defense Fund for Journalists represents a much-needed innovative approach to these challenges. The fund is intended to design an insurance system to help media address the increased number of lawsuits burdening reporters with the cost of a legal defense until they abandon their stories. Defending media in its global role in the fight against corruption starts with investing in it. Another key area for modernizing media assistance is digital security. While the promotion of a free and open Internet and the infusion of democratic values into the adoption of major new technologies, such as 5G, are already underway, the efforts to promote responsible, equitable, and safe use of artificial intelligence must be enhanced to boost the ability of democratic institutions and media to better respond and adapt to changing needs and circumstances in the digital age. What is also missing is a comprehensive mapping and strategy to address the power of new technologies as a source of autocratic wealth and investment in undemocratic media. While many journalists invest in their digital security through best practices in encryption and other types of basic information management, there is always an “arms race” between users, governments, and the developers of technologies that can be used to break even the most secure implementations of data-security protocols. Although such protocols have been developed with law enforcement in mind, policies and other controls necessary to prevent their more nefarious use have not been put in place. The introduction, harmonization, and consistent application of such rules as well as of export controls on digital weapons are necessary to protect journalists and the public more generally. Finally, defending media in its global role in the fight against corruption starts with investing in it. Russia and China alone spend billions on their internal and external propaganda media outlets. For example, Russian media outlets had declared spending over $16 million on propaganda targeting the United States alone this year up to October.10 Meanwhile, with the rise of digital media, artificial intelligence, and distorted media markets, free journalism is in a weak state economically and overall. However, official donors spent only an average $80–90 million each year on support for laws and policies that promote media freedom in 2010–2015. And international support to the media remains a tiny fraction of official development assistance, averaging just 0.3 percent in recent years.11 Besides, this funding often does not meet the requirements of the Paris agreement on aid effectiveness on core flexible long-term financing. Democracies, including the United States, the EU countries, and their partners need to adopt a stronger and more coordinated international response to the threat to the survival of free media.

#### Corruption hurts the Economy.

Chêne 14, Marie. "The impact of corruption on growth and inequality." Transparency International (2014). (Reporter at Transparency International)//Elmer

Corruption as an obstacle to economic growth At the macro level, the literature generally shows that corruption has a negative, direct impact on economic growth and development. Corruption also has an indirect effect on a country’s economic performance by affecting many factors fuelling economic growth such as investment, taxation, level, composition and effectiveness of public expenditure. Economists have long identified a number of channels through which corruption may affect economic growth (Mauro 1995; Tanzi 1997; Gupta 2000; Gyimah-Brempong 2001, among others): Corruption distorts incentives and market forces, leading to misallocation of resources. Corruption diverts talent and resources, including human resources, towards “lucrative” rent-seeking activities, such as defence, rather than productive activities. Corruption acts as an inefficient tax on business, ultimately raising production costs and reducing the profitability of investments. Corruption may also decrease the productivity of investments by reducing the quality of resources. For example, by undermining the quality and quantity of health and education services, corruption decreases a country’s human capital. Rent-seeking behaviour is also likely to create inefficiencies, fuelling waste of resources and undermining the efficiency of public expenditure. Corruption is negatively correlated with economic growth Macro level studies, using country-level data to explore cross-country variations in both governance and economic indicators, have consistently found that corruption significantly decreases economic growth and development. For example, cross-country data indicate that corruption is consistently correlated with lower growth rates, GDP per capita, economic equality, as well as lower levels of human development (Rothstein and Holmberg 2011). Similarly, a 2011 systematic review of available evidence of the effect of corruption on economic growth confirms that corruption has a direct and negative effect on growth in low income countries (Ugur and Dasgupta 2011). According to the analysis, corruption also has indirect effects through transmission channels such as investment, human capital and public finance/expenditure. While the direct and indirect effects of corruption on growth hold true for all countries under scrutiny, the review suggests that they can be mitigated by contextual factors such as the level of development and the overall quality of governance, with the effect of corruption expected to be more detrimental for countries with higher levels of per capita income and institutional quality.

#### Decline cascades – nuclear war

Maavak 21 – Mathew Maavak, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, External Researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal – The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Volume 9, Number 1, p. 2-8

Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals. Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset INTRODUCTION The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998). The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020). An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity. COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach. METHODOLOGY An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020): • Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006); • Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012); • Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and • Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources. ECONOMY According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid- 2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity. The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak. The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007). Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit. According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019): “You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author). President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period. A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016). In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade. ENVIRONMENTAL What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation: The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs. Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated. Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity. Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021). Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications. On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabriabased ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008). The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section. Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade. GEOPOLITICAL The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic. Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced

## 3

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. To clarify, I’ll defend act util.

#### 1] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store**,** I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

#### 2] Actor specificity: util is the best for governments, which is the actor in the rez. Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action. This comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out util calc indicts since they’re empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be no action.

#### 3] Lexical pre-requisite: threats to bodily security preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibits the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose.

#### 4] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions lose their bindingness and are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### 5] All frameworks are functionally topicality interpretations of the word ought so they must theoretically justified. Prefer:

#### [A] Ground – util guarantees turn ground on both sides and anything can function as an impact as long as an external benefit is articulated.

#### [B] Topic lit – most articles are written through the lens of util since they’re crafted for policymakers and the general public who take consequences to be important, not philosophy majors.

#### [C] Actor spec – other topics don’t have government specific actors so we can talk about phil or K ground then but this res is key to util debates.

#### 6] Risk of extinction outweighs

Bostrom, 2012(Mar 6, Nick, director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Gannon Award, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction,” interview with Ross Andersen, freelance writer in D.C., <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>)

Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria,

## Case

#### The 1AC’s reliance on Media as a conduit of images and facts is an abolishment of reality that replaces human interaction with spectacle, image, and simulation reinforcing the hegemony of the Sign Economy.

Pawlett 7, William. Jean Baudrillard: against banality. Routledge, 2007. (Senior Lecturer in Cultural Studies at the University of Wolverhampton)//Elmer

To exemplify his position regarding information, Baudrillard focuses on news reports where there is ‘a discontinuum of signs and messages in which all orders are equivalent (1998a: 121). News reports on ‘war, famine and death are interspersed with adverts for washing powder and razors’ and, we might add, with the self-advertising of journalists, news organisations and TV companies. But this is not merely a chaotic, confused abundance of signs: ‘it is the imposition upon us, by the systematic succession of messages, of the equivalence of history and the minor news item, of the event and the spectacle, of information and advertising at the level of the sign’ (1998a: 122). Not only events, but also the world itself, are ‘segmented’, cut up into ‘discontinuous, successive, non-contradictory messages’. We do not consume a spectacle or an image as such, but the principle of the succession of all possible spectacles or images: ‘there is no danger of anything emerging that is not one sign among others’ (1998a: 122). Baudrillard engages with the theories of McLuhan and his infamous slogan ‘The medium is the message’, arguing that the really signiﬁcant level at which media inﬂuence people is not that of the content of its messages. It is in ‘the constraining pattern – linked to the very technical essence of those media – of the disarticulation of the real into successive and equivalent signs’ (1998a: 122). Marxist attempts to theorise the effects of the media on audiences and consumers fail because such critiques focus on the ideological nature of content and the ownership of networks but pay little attention to the medium itself and to its possible affects on perception and social relations (1981: 166–72). In exploring the medium Baudrillard postulates a ‘law of technological inertia’, suggesting that the closer the medium gets to ‘the real’, through techniques such as documentary style ﬁlm-making and live coverage, the greater the ‘real absence from the world’. In other words, ‘the world’ as space of perspective – of seeing and knowing – is increasingly replaced by a sequence of images in which ‘the primary function of each message is to refer to another message’ (1998a: 122). In this way the medium, not the message, imposes a certain way of seeing the world on the audience. Rather than a space for reﬂection and critical distance we have information sliced and diced as a commodity-sign. This is no Luddite hatred of technology. Both McLuhan and Baudrillard note that the medium of the printed book, dating back to the ﬁfteenth century, imposes a particular mechanics of perception, a form of constraint favouring solitary reﬂection and linearity. But the distinctive nature of the electronic mass media is, for Baudrillard, that they ‘function to neutralise the lived, unique, eventual character of the world and substitute for it a multiple universe of media which are homogeneous’ (1998a: 123). The electronic media are ideological in the sense that they declare through their form, and often also in content, ‘the omnipotence of a system of reading over a world become a system of signs’. The ‘confused’ and ‘conﬂicted’ world is transformed into an abstract, ordered one, a world of consumable signs where ‘the signiﬁer becomes its own signiﬁed . . . we see the abolition of the signiﬁed and the tautology of the signiﬁer . . . the substitution of the code for the referential dimension deﬁnes mass media consumption’ (1998a: 124–5). For Baudrillard the media are, in fact, ‘anti-mediatory’ (1981: 169). They prevent response, the reciprocal exchange of meaning, allowing only simulatory responses, responses drawn from a predeﬁned range or code. Indeed, for Baudrillard ‘the code is the only agency that speaks’ (1981: 179). Today, ‘interactive’ TV is far more developed but the ‘interactivity’ on offer remains that of the medium or the code. We are confronted with a myriad of choices, channels, spectator angles and phone-in options, but all are generated from the medium: we merely complete the circuit. Human interaction is replaced by simulatory interactivity.

#### The Impact is implosive violence as we seek to exterminate otherness by imposing meaning onto the globe.

Artrip and Debrix 14, Ryan E., and François Debrix. "The digital fog of war: Baudrillard and the violence of representation." (2014). (Philosophy and Political Science at Guilford College and Elon University)//Elmer

The story that needs to be told is thus not about the undoubtedly deplorable “truth” or fact of explosive and warlike violence, but about a violence of another sort. In the radical digital transparency of the global scene, we (members of the demos) often have full or direct exposure to explosivity, as we saw above with the image of terror. But what still needs to be thought and problematized is implosivity or what may be called implosive violence. Implosive violence is a violence for which we do not, and perhaps will never, have much of a language (Rancière, 2007: 123). Although, not having a language for it or, rather, as we saw above, seeking to find a language to talk about it and, perhaps, to make sense of it is still sought after. This is, perhaps, what digital pictures of war/terror violence seek to capture or want to force through. Implosive violence, often digitally rendered these days, is in close contact with media technologies and representational devices and techniques because it seeks representation and meaning. This is why implosive violence insists on **calling in wars** (against terror, for example) and on mobilizing war machines (against terrorist others, against **vague enemy figures**), but wars and war machines that no longer have—to the extent that they ever had—a clearly identifiable object and subject, or a **clear mission/**purpose. As such, this implosive violence and its wars (the new Western/global way of war, perhaps) must remain uncertain, unclear, foggy, inwardly driven, representational, and indeed virulent. They must remain uncertain and confused even as they are digitally operative and desperately capture events/images to give the impression that meaning**s/significations** can **and will** be found. Yet, as we saw above, it is not meanings exactly that must be found, but information and the endless guarantee of its immediate circulation. As information occupies the empty place of meaning, certainty, or truth, images must be instantaneously turned into appearances that search for meanings that will never be discovered because, instead, a proliferation of information-worthy facts and beliefs will take over (perhaps this is what US fake pundit and comedian Stephen Colbert famously referred to as “truthiness”). Or, as Baudrillard puts it, “free from its former enemies, humanity now has to create enemies from within, which in fact produces a wide variety of inhuman metastases”