## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must only defend that appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### Violation: They don’t.

#### "Resolved" requires a policy.

Merriam Webster '18 (Merriam Webster; 2018 Edition; Online dictionary and legal resource; Merriam Webster, "resolve," <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve;> RP)  
: a legal or official determination especially: a legislative declaration

#### Bans are legal prohibitions

MW n.d. “ban” Merriam Webster. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ban> TG

: legal or formal prohibition

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Fairness – post facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep. They can specialize in 1 area of literature for 4 years which gives them a huge edge over people switching topics every 2 months – this crushes clash because all neg prep is based on the rez as a stable stasis point and they create a structural disincentive to do research – we lose 90% of negative ground while the aff still gets the perm which makes being neg impossible.

#### 2] SSD is good – it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism – our argument is that the process of defending and answering proposals is an benefit of engaging the topic.

#### 3] Small schools disad: under-resourced are most adversely effected by a massive, unpredictable caselist which worsens structural disparities. Inclusion is an independent voter – you can’t debate if you can’t participate which is a prerequisite to accessing their benefits and ensures everyone gains from the activity.

#### The impact is fairness—a] it’s an intrinsic good – debate is fundamentally a game and some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity, b] probability – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but it can rectify skews which means the only impact to a ballot is fairness and deciding who wins, c] it internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### 5] Engagement –

#### A] Dialogue must be on an equal footing – else it gets distorted. Even if your aff is a radical idea, the way how it you present it in the academy makes it susceptible to manipulation.

Mott et al. 18, [Carrie Mott Rutgers University, USA Daniel Cockayne University of Waterloo, Canada] “Conscientious disengagement and whiteness as a condition of dialogue” Dialogues in Human Geography 2018, Vol. 8(2) 143–147 The Author(s) 2018 DOI: 10.1177/2043820618780575 journals.sagepub.com/home/dhg SLHS-RR

Rose-Redwood et al. (2018) draw on Mouffe’s (2000) concept of agonistics—the idea that disagreement and dissensus, rather than centrist notions of compromise—are key to democratic politics and dialogue. In one sense, the authors agree— as we do—with Mouffe’s anti-universalist position. In another, they are critical of agonism for tending to assume a common ground upon which dialogue is able to proceed. They ask, ‘aren’t the most profound disagreements in academia precisely over what should serve as the foundational values of scholarly discourse and practice in the first place’ (RoseRedwood et al., 2018: 114)? To this critique, we would like to add emphasis to the problems that arise in circumstances when, as is common today, an agreed-upon foundation for dialogue is absent. We consider this especially urgent given, for example, UC Berkeley’s announcement of a (since-cancelled) ‘Free Speech Week’, in which white nationalist speakers were invited to campus to allow students to ‘hear both sides’ of the highly racialized debates in the wake of protests in Charlottesville, Virginia. When there is no shared foundation for agonistic dialogue, it is all-too-easy to annul real differences between speech acts (see for example Sultana, 2018), to conflate white supremacist speech or online harassment with academic or other attempts to engage with ideas. We claim that speech can be viewed from the point of view of nonequivalence, to situate difference itself as a condition for dialogue, rather than the assumed sameness that has emerged in the absence of a common foundation. The point here is not to silence people (nor to conflate white supremacist speech with online harassment) but to note that given the absence of a shared foundation for dialogue, it is sometimes necessary to conscientiously disengage when one is faced with white supremacist interlocutors or targeted harassment. Nonequivalence may appear to be anti-egalitarian and contrary to democratic practice, and we recognize the danger in this position. Yet, as Butler (2016) notes, if one group speaks or assembles with the specific aim of silencing or preventing the speech or assembly of others (e.g. by committing or inciting acts of violence against them or by outing others as queer, trans, or paperless), their speech and assembly work against claims to democracy, and therefore, through the frame of nonequivalence, should be assessed in this context and perhaps not be considered protected forms of speech or assembly. We claim nonequivalence in order to minimize extreme and explicitly antidemocratic acts of speech and assembly, and, in the context of this response, to highlight that harassment should not be counted as a foundation for thoughtful agonistic dialogue. Our article, ‘Citation Matters’, highlights ongoing conversations about the racialized and gendered dynamics of knowledge production within human geography. We point to preexisting scholarship that addresses these conversations—much of which has been written by women of color (e.g. Gilmore, 2002; Joshi et al., 2015; Kobayashi, 2006; Louis, 2007; Mahtani, 2014; Nagar, 2008; Pulido, 2002; Sanders, 2006; see also the very recent article by Tolia-Kelly, 2017). We saw our contribution as a way to emphasize that conversations about the imbalanced representations of spatial knowledge have been ongoing for decades, despite the fact that the most highly cited scholars in the field are white men whose bibliographies feature other white men most prominently. As we wrote the article, we discussed our shared concern that geographers were tired of the topic of citation politics and representation. It has been addressed in geography conferences, discussed on social media, and written about as a common problem in various subdisciplines in human geography. Yet, after the publication of our article, it became clear that the idea is still novel for many geographers, for scholars in other fields, and for the general public. Within a few weeks of the article becoming available online, we were contacted by a writer from the website Campus Reform who planned to publish about our article, asking us if we would respond to some questions. After reaching out to colleagues for advice, we decided to address some of the questions that we were sent. A quick search of articles previously published by this writer made it clear that they would most likely publish only the most superficial details of our article, with the specific aim of triggering Campus Reform’s right-wing readership. Nonetheless, we wanted to engage on some level with the hope of addressing obvious misunderstandings of our work. Despite our shared attempts to address the questions and explain the nuance specific to the context of human geography, our interlocutor, as anticipated, published a piece that severely distorted the contents of our article. Once it became public, other conservative and alt-right websites published similar pieces, resulting in targeted harassment for both of us through social media, e-mail, and communications sent to various parties at our respective institutions. The character of these messages was often slanderous, racist, sexist, misogynist, and homophobic and included e-mails accusing us of being—somehow—both race traitors and Nazi sympathizers. Carrie bore the brunt of the harassment, which we collectively attribute primarily to her being a woman, but also to her being first and corresponding author, and being located at a US institution. Shortly thereafter, the article was discussed in a piece published in The Washington Post. The attention a mainstream media outlet gave to our article led to broader popular interest across the political spectrum but also intensified the aforementioned harassment. It also brought the piece to the greater attention of geographers and other academics, who responded in various ways. Many, including some geographers, argued simply that it was bad science to pay attention to an author’s identity. Others pointed to links in their own fields between citation practices and white heteromasculinism. For example, Russell (2017: 8), writing in environmental education, drew on our article and other research to emphasize ‘how certain voices, methodologies, and intellectual traditions continue to be marginalized’ in her field. Responses and commentary on ‘Citation Matters’ from academics and the general public typically did not engage with our argument from the common ground that Mouffe describes— a point from which agonistic politics might be able to proceed—but from an apparently reactionary conviction that our claims (usually, we suspected, without having read them) were biased or misinformed. Dialogue, in our reading, suggests two or more voices participating in a conversation, on equal footing with one another and with tacitly agreed upon parameters. The public responses—in particular those in the form of harassment—occurred in a manner that we generally did not consider to be dialogic and that ultimately resulted in our disengagement. As Cottom (2015) points out, academics are particularly vulnerable for calls to create public scholarship and engage outside of the proverbial ivory tower. She writes, ‘[w]e’re all sensitive to claims that we’re out of touch and behind on neoliberal careerism. And some of us actually care about engaging publics’ (Cottom, 2015: n.p.). Yet the danger is that often we do not choose the parameters for engagement. As we learned, targeted harassment and doxing of academics is an increasingly common practice. Cottom points out that one condition for dialogue is that academic institutions must be able to protect their faculty and support them through the harassment that can accompany public engagement. However, in the context of an ever-more competitive job market for early career academics, many find themselves in temporary contracts, or positions that do not offer the possibility of tenure, a situation that increases one’s vulnerability and further limits the conditions for dialogue. Based on advice we received from colleagues and our institutions, for fears over personal safety and job security, and because of the emotional exhaustion that accompanies harassment (and the necessity to read and document harassment in case legitimate threats emerge and must thus be reported to the police), we chose to disengage from further dialogue. As early career scholars without the security of tenure, we were both grateful for the support of colleagues, our departments, and our respective institutions. The public attention on our work provided a forum for engagement, but the opportunity for dialogue seemed limited. The majority of the people contacting us had obviously not read our article, and, in instances where they had, the specificity and disciplinary context of our writing was overlooked. Instead, we seemed to symbolize some aspect of the perceived liberal and elite academy that many people wanted an opportunity to attack. Some of the advice that we were given for how to deal with online harassment was to disengage from public dialogue. One should lay low on social media, not respond to online trolling or offensive e-mails, and ‘wait for the storm to pass’. However, there are consequences to this approach. Friends and colleagues did not know what we were going through and were thus unable to offer support or guidance during a difficult and emotionally trying time. Out of fear of further attention and harassment, we turned down interview offers that may have actually been legitimate opportunities for dialogue. Conscientiously disengaging, in acknowledgement of the modern limits of dialogue, was for us an unfortunate but necessary strategy for both personal safety and emotional survival. In more general terms, disengagement is partially to blame for the fact that many academics do not realize how commonplace events like our experience actually are. We acknowledge, in consonance with Cottom’s comments above, that the ability both to engage and to be able to disengage is predicated on the privilege of institutional and other resources. Th

ankfully, the support that was available to both of us enabled us to get through this particular encounter. Of course, such resources may not be available to all scholars, such as those employed in precarious positions, at universities with limited resources, or to scholars of color and other academics from socially marginalized backgrounds. Throughout the 2-year period that we spent writing and editing ‘Citation Matters’, we frequently discussed our shared feeling that we wanted to call attention to a long-standing conversation. It was not a new idea that we were proposing, and we constantly fretted over whether it was still relevant. Hadn’t others stated this before, over and over again? Why should we be the ones, as two white scholars with relative degrees of privilege, to write about this? How could we possibly say anything new about it? One of our aims was to draw attention to the wealth of already existing scholarship—most of it written by women of color—on the topic of gendered and racialized representation in our field. As a consequence of the publicity that our article received, however, the focus once again remained on two white scholars. The ideas from others that we sought to highlight were attributed to us, erasing the rich history of critique on this topic by other scholars from social marginalized backgrounds, thereby successfully whitewashing these debates. We wish to point out the primary irony, however unsurprising, of this particular encounter—that whiteness appears once again to be the condition of dialogue. In this light, it is important to draw attention, as Rose-Redwood et al. (2018) do in their article, to how the limits of dialogue remain raced and gendered in pernicious and violent ways and to how the conditions for engagement appear to remain, still, determined by white heteromasculinity.

#### B] Clash turns critical education since it means we can never test your method/framing to get the best version of it. Lack of in-depth refutation turns the debate into a monologue without educational benefits.

[Ralf Poscher 16, director of the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law, Professor of Public Law and Legal Philosophy, “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement,” in Metaphilosophy of Law, ed. Gizbert-Studnicki, Dyrda, Banas, 2/19/16, SSRN] CY

This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices. In these scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases.107 A second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”. These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea. In hard cases we must – in some way – lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. In these cases it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the view towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case. It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of legal disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading him: to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena. f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But what was wrong with District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly flipping a coin?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered? One reason lies in the mixed nature of our reasons in actual legal disagreements. The different second order reasons can be held apart analytically, but not in real life cases. The hope of coming to terms will often play a role at least for some time relative to some participants in the debate. A second reason is that the objectives listed above could not be achieved by a non‐argumentative procedure. Flipping a coin, throwing dice or taking a gut vote would not help us to explore our communalities or our inferential commitments nor help to scrutinize the positions in play. A third reason is the overall rational aspiration of the law that Dworkin relates to in his integrity account111. In a justificatory sense112 the law aspires to give a coherent account of itself – even if it is not the only right one – required by equal respect under conditions of normative disagreement.113 Combining legal argumentation with the non‐argumentative decision‐ making procedure of counting reasoned opinions serves the coherence aspiration of the law in at least two ways: First, the labor of the negative reduces the chances that constructions of the law that have major flaws or inconsistencies built into the arguments supporting them will prevail. Second, since every position must be a reasoned one within the given framework of the law, it must be one that somehow fits into the overall structure of the law along coherent lines. It thus protects against incoherent “checkerboard” treatments114 of hard cases. It is the combination of reasoned disagreement and the non‐rational decision‐making mechanism of counting reasoned opinions that provides for both in hard cases: a decision and one – of multiple possible – coherent constructions of the law. Pure non‐rational procedures – like flipping a coin – would only provide for the decision part. Pure argumentative procedures – which are not geared towards a decision procedure – would undercut the incentive structure of our agonistic disagreements.115 In the face of unresolvable disagreements endless debates would seem an idle enterprise. That the debates are about winning or losing helps to keep the participants engaged. That the decision depends on counting reasoned opinions guarantees that the engagement focuses on rational argumentation. No plain non‐argumentative procedure would achieve this result. If the judges were to flip a coin at the end of the trial in hard cases, there would be little incentive to engage in an exchange of arguments. It is specifically the count of reasoned opinions which provides for rational scrutiny in our legal disagreements and thus contributes to the rationales discussed above. 2. THE SEMANTICS OF AGONISTIC DISAGREEMENTS The agonistic account does not presuppose a fact of the matter, it is not accompanied by an ontological commitment, and the question of how the fact of the matter could be known to us is not even raised. Thus the agonistic account of legal disagreement is not confronted with the metaphysical or epistemological questions that plague one‐right‐answer theories in particular.

#### 1] Use competing interps – topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify and we’ll win reasonability links to our offense.

#### 2] Drop the debater because dropping the arg is severance which moots 7 minutes of 1nc offense.

#### 3] No rvis—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

#### 4] They can’t weigh the case—lack of preround prep means their truth claims are untested which you should presume false—they’re also only winning case because we couldn’t engage with it

#### 5] No impact turns—exclusions are inevitable because we only have 45 minutes so it’s best to draw those exclusions along reciprocal lines to ensure a role for the negative.

#### No Cross-apps:

#### A] It’s better to have a flawed model than no model at all I indict my ability to engage with the case.

#### B] Logic – if you’re being unfair – you’re using a layer that you get the auto-win as the highest layer, so you’ll win every time – also makes evaluation of whether that layer is even true impossible.

#### C] When theory doesn’t come first there’s intervention since there is no way for a proper evaluation of arguments in the first place – assume all 1AC truth claims false since evaluation is suspect.

#### No impact turns or RVIs:

#### A] Perfcon – if T’s bad and you vote for them on that arg, you’re voting on T.

#### B] Substance – if T’s bad then we should try debating on substance – impact turns force me to go for T since I need to defend my position.

#### C] Illogical – don’t win for being fair and logic is a meta-constraint for argumentation.

## 3

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### 1] The aff has no impact expect for themselves which means its non-unique – if their model of debate allows anyone to decide what the aff should be then anyone could decide what the aff is.

#### 2] The aff isn’t a shift from the status squo – its only about what’s good for them but we don’t know if that’s a shift which means there’s no unique reason the aff does anything.

#### It flows neg:

#### A] We start with premise that things are false. This is why we don’t believe conspiracy theories are true. This means the aff has to prove it is true before assuming that is it.

#### B] It’s more likely that statement will be false than true – there’s a bunch of ways to prove something false, but only 1 way to prove that it’s true (only way to prove sky is blue if its actually blue; but bunch of ways to prove its false – i.e. could be yellow, purple, red, green).

#### C] It’s harder to negate since aff gets first, last speech, judge psychology side-bias, framing and advantage choice, and infinite prep time to frontline all their 1ar responses. Even if the neg gets slightly more time, doesn’t matter b/c they get to frame the round and collapse to whatever they want.

## Case

#### It’s not all simulacra --- reality still exists outside the text --- should take into account the people whose lives are actually affected by these images

Simon Blackburn 7, professor of philosophy at Cambridge University, 4-29-07, “Au revoir Baudrillard,” Prospect , http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2007/04/aurevoirbaudrillard/---- {hors texte = outside the text}

Baudrillard was not concerned with the artist’s touch but with what happens when television and other media purport to take us to the field of action. The 1990 Gulf war was modelled by planners using simulations; it was won, if we call a massacre a victory, largely by pilots looking at computer screens; and it was relayed to the public by television. Most consumers of these images get no reality check; the image is all we have to go on. And the image does not come to us innocently. What happened in 1990 may, indeed, have been something more than a war: an episode in America’s cultural narcissism, a hallucinatory projection of its fears and fantasies, a Faustian pact between developed capitalism and virtual reality, a promotional video, or a simulacrum indistinguishable from Disneyland. So **Baudrillard’s hyperbole had a serious point. He often provoked outrage by it,** but when, for instance, he tactlessly suggested that the iconic place of Nazi atrocities as a symbol of evil makes it “logical” to ask whether they even existed, his point was not to ally himself with the David Irvings of this world, but to suggest that for many political and cultural purposes, the answer is irrelevant. As with God, it is our investment that matters, not whether it is invested in a fiction.¶ **Baudrillard’s ideas about simulated reality seem to have touched on an old philosophical panic**. Perhaps our senses are no better than our televisions. **Perhaps nature has varnished and spun the pictures we receive**. They too are commodities, bought in to provide sustenance. **Perhaps**, at the limit, **we live in a virtual reality, unable to comprehend our real position, sentenced to** a woeful life of dreams, myth, fiction and **illusion**. Baudrillard, the inspiration for the Matrix films, tried to distance himself from the trite opposition of one moment seeing through the glass darkly and then coming face to face with reality, yet he enjoyed playing with its ingredients. I do not think this was wise, since **generalised scepticism implies that there is nothing especially wrong about America or late capitalism or consumer society—and would any self-respecting culture critic want to draw that conclusion?**¶ In any event, it is not all simulacra**. We are participants in a public world, not hermits trapped in our own private cinemas.** The cure for the sceptical nightmare is action. **Nobody stays sceptical while crossing the street, or choosing dinner. Nor while dodging bombs and shells, even if they are sent by people watching computer screens. In the hurly-burly of survival**, there isa lot that is hors texte—**although this is more true for the artisan driving nails or baking bread than** for **the** politician (or academic) whose work is confined to the production of signs and messages.

#### Debate SOLVES collapse and oversaturation of tehcnical meaning

Turner 4 – Bryan S. Turner, Dean of Social Sciences at Deakin University, Australia, “Baudrillard for Sociologists,” in Forget Baudrillard?, 2004 edition, p. 80-83

While, as far as one can tell, Baudrillard was not influenced by Bell’s vision of the role of technology and the media in shaping postindustrialism, he was influenced by Marshall McLuhan’s analysis (Gane 1991b:48) of the impact of new media on the transformation of modern culture, especially in The Gutenberg Galaxy (McLuhan 1967). McLuhan was particularly sensitive to the idea that we live in a processed social world where human beings live in a complete technostructure. This technological environment is carried with us as extensions of our own bodies, but McLuhan did not adopt a pessimistic view of the age of anxiety, because his ‘technological humanism’ (Kroker et al. 1984) and Catholic values committed him to the idea of the immanence of reason and the hope of an escape from the labyrinth. Indeed, a global technological system could become the basis of a universalistic culture. Although he was fully aware of the sensory deprivation which he associated with the impact of the mass media, he none the less remained committed to the hope that these negative effects were not fatal. Baudrillard, who as we have noted was deeply influenced by McLuhan’s idea that the content of messages was relatively unimportant in relation to their form, has embraced a very nihilistic position with respect to our processed environment.¶ Baudrillard’s pessimistic view of the fissure in the historical development of the modern is based on his view of the masses. Baudrillard’s analysis of the masses is a product of the Situationist responses to the May events of 1968, when it became increasingly obvious that the critical social movements of modern society would not be dominated by Marxist theory or directed by a vanguard of the working class. The crisis of May 1968 had not been predicted by Marxism or by mainstream sociology, but they did validate the claims of Situationists like Guy Debord in the journal Internationale Situationiste. However, if the crisis had been unanticipated by conventional political analysis, then the sudden collapse of the students’ and workers’ movements of 1968 found no easy explanation in the framework of mainstream social sciences.¶ Baudrillard’s concept of the inexplicable nature of the mass depend a great deal on the unusual circumstances surrounding the May events. By 1973 with the publication of The Mirror of Production (Baudrillard 1975), Baudrillard was already moving away from an orthodox Marxist view of production, arguing that Marxism, far from being an external critique of capitalism, was merely a reflection or mirror of the principal economistic values of capitalism. Instead of engaging in the production of meaning, a subversive, oppositional movement would have to challenge the system from the point of view of meaninglessness. Subversion would have to rob the social system of significance. In taking this stand, Baudrillard followed the Situationist claim that whatever can be represented can be controlled (Plant 1992:137). The mass events of 1968 offered a promise of the nonrepresentational moment, the pure event of authenticity, which could not be explained, and therefore could not be manipulated. Baudrillard, in dismissing Marxist theory as a means of representing events, sought to replace the idea of a mode of production with a mode of disappearance.¶ In taking this attitude towards modern social movements, Baudrillard’s argument also rests on the various meanings of the word ‘mass’. Baudrillard is thus able to make allusions to the idea of physical substance, matter, the majority and the electrical meaning of earth. The translator’s note to In the Shadow of the Silent Majority points out that faire masse can mean to form a majority and to form an earth. Baudrillard argues by allusion that the mass absorbs the electrical charges of social and political movements; the mass thus neutralizes the electrical charge of society. This use of allusion, parody and irony is typical of Baudrillard’s mode of analysis, which is a type of sociological poetics, a style which is likely to make sociologists feel uncomfortable (Gane 199la:193). There is here also a continuity with the style of Dada and the Situationists. The poetic and striking character of Baudrillard’s style has no counterpart in professional social science, least of all in the British context.¶ Baudrillard’s ‘sociological fictions’ (1990a:15) are striking and challenging, but they are not ultimately convincing. Arguments which depend on allusion, allegory and similar rhetorical devices are decorative but they are not necessarily powerful. The notion of ‘mass society’ already has a clearly worked out sociological critique. The idea of ‘mass society’ might have been relevant in describing the new markets which were created in the post-war period with the advent of innovative technologies, which had the immediate effect of lowering prices and making commodities available to a mass audience. However, the trend of sociological analysis in the last two decades has been to assert that mass audiences have been broken down into more selectively constructed niches for more individualized products. It is controversial to argue that industrialization necessarily produces a mass society, characterized by a common culture, uniform sentiments or an integrated outlook. The idea of a mass society was often associated with the notion that the decline of individualism would produce a directionless mass as the modern equivalent of the eighteenthcentury mob. Critical theorists like Adorno and Marcuse associated the massification of society with authoritarianism and a potential for fascism. Of course, Baudrillard’s version of mass society is based on a particular view of the mass media creating a hyperreality in which the real has been absorbed by the hyperreal; meaning has imploded on itself. Although Baudrillard’s analysis of hyperreality is postcritical (Chen 1987), he does adopt in practice a critical position towards American civilization, which is the extreme example of massification. Rather like critical theorists, Baudrillard believes that the (bourgeois) individual has been sucked into the negative electrical mass of the media age. However, sociological research on mass audiences shows that there is no ground for believing that media messages are received, consumed or used in any standardized manner, and the majority of social scientists working on culture have attempted to argue that cultural objects in the age of the mass media are appropriated, transformed and consumed in diverse forms and according to various practices (de Certeau 1984). In fact, sociologists, largely inspired by the Situationists, have argued that everyday life is resistant to massification and that the concrete reality of everyday life-situations is the principal arena within which opposition to massification can be expected. Everyday life was regarded by both Guy Debord and Henri Lefebvre (1991) as the foundation of authenticity. Baudrillard, by arguing that criticism belongs to the period of modernism and not to the age of hyperreality, has ruled out opposition to the system, at least at the level of public debate and formal politics.

#### the aff's dismissal of our academic model forecloses productive political dialogue and ensures that we dont learn the skills to contest hegemonic ideology

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Like their compatriots in Zuccotti square, the 70 Harvard college students who walked out of Greg Mankiw’s economics class were larger on theatrics than on message, and failed to articulate a reasonable, much less coherent, justification for their protest.

Gabriel Bayard and Rachel J. Sandalow-Ash, the two organizers of the protest, discuss the reasoning behind the walk-out in­­ today’s Harvard Crimson:

The walkout should be seen in the context of Occupy Boston and the Occupy Movement nationwide, which seeks to curb the trends of rising income inequality and concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few over the past thirty years. We believe that Professor N. Gregory Mankiw, a former economic advisor to President Bush, played a key role in creating the policies which have exacerbated economic inequality and led to financial instability and collapse.

If their argument had ended there, one could maintain that the protest was absolutely reasonable, if a few years late. Mankiw was an advisor to President Bush, and President Bush’s economic policies angered many members of the Harvard Community. Now that Mankiw is back lecturing, it is understandable why some students might want to share with him—and the rest of the Harvard community—their displeasure with his job as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors. A peaceful walk-out on Mankiw’s class—while perhaps inelegant—could be just such a way to spread that message. But Bayard and Sandalow-Ash’s next sentence severely undercuts their credibility:

We argue that it is unfair that he teaches this foundational course, which greatly impacts the attitudes of Harvard students, every year.

That’s just silly. One skill students are supposed to learn in college is critical thinking; the ability to recognize that all speech—whether coming from in front of the classroom, from a novel, or from a textbook—reflects a certain ideology, point-of-view or, yes, bias. It is up to the student to recognize, and then pull apart, the assumptions inherent in any given academic exercise. Then, utilizing tools like analysis and evidence, the student should discuss, and perhaps rebut, the material at hand. Any professor who claims pure objectivity is, simply put, lying; what professors do is present the material as they view it in as coherent, structured, and pedagogically oriented manner as they can.

Mankiw may be a conservative, but there is absolutely nothing “unfair” about his teaching an introductory course. The professor teaching introduction to women’s studies may be a liberal feminist; the instructor teaching intro to Judaic Studies might be an anti-Zionist; the professor teaching intro to sociology might be a Marxist: what we are supposed to learn in college is to parse through an academic playground (or battleground) and develop our own ideas and thoughts, not to complain about fairness when we disagree with the person in the front of the room! We learn in the university not what to think, but how to think. Disagreement is part of that, and diversity of opinion—and the occasional bias with which it is disseminated—is the beauty of the university, not the academy’s undoing.

Bayard and Sandalow-Ash’s editorial goes on to disagree with Mankiw’s views on the minimum wage, his “uncritically supportive position on free trade,” and, most strangely, his assertion that “equity and efficiency in the economy are ‘two goals [which] often conflict.’” In each case, Bayard and Sandalow-Ash present a different economist who disagrees with Mankiw’s ideas. Rather than proving Mankiw unfit for introductory courses, all Bayard and Sandalow-Ash show is that they care deeply about the material and have been inspired by their professor; what better endorsement for Mankiw’s teaching capabilities than that?

The students are angry; they see the United States’ income inequality, and they desire to foster a dialogue about how to stop it. Such an urge is laudable. But for a protest to be effective, it should have a clear, well-defended point, and the Econ 10 walkout clearly does not.

So what was the Econ 10 walkout actually about? Was it a protest of the state of the macro-economy? Or, more likely, was it merely a theatrical complaint about a professor some students do not like? From Bayard and Sandalow-Ash’s column, I would argue the latter.

There may be plenty of reasons to walk out of Greg Mankiw’s 700 person class, first and foremost the notion that a student is paying fifty thousand dollars a year to be 1 out of 700 individuals in a class. But to protest Mankiw’s teaching of Introductory Economics because he’s a conservative? That’s ridiculous, and in an academic community, counter-productive.