### 1

#### Interpretation: Medicines is a generic bare plural. The aff may not specify a subset of medicines that ought to have reduce IPP.

**Nebel 19.** [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution.” Vbriefly. August 12, 2019. <https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/?fbclid=IwAR0hUkKdDzHWrNeqEVI7m59pwsnmqLl490n4uRLQTe7bWmWDO_avWCNzi14> TG

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions. Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. “Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “colleges and universities” fails the [upward-entailment test](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#IsolGeneInte) for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution.

#### It applies to “Medicines” – 1] upward entailment test – “reduce IPP for medicines” doesn’t entail that IPP should be reduced for everything, since we could still have the same IPP for music 2] adverb test – adding “generally” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because reduction is universal

#### Nebels def outweighs 1] He intended to define in context of debate resolutions 2] Even if his is wrong, VBI is very large in debate and people read Nebels definition when prepping so it’s the expected definition

#### Violation: They spec \_\_\_ but there are many other medicines – Thousands in the US

**FDA 20**[November 2020, accessed on 9-8-2021, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, "Fact Sheet: FDA at a Glance", https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-basics/fact-sheet-fda-glance] Akaash

* There are over 20,000 prescription drug products approved for marketing.

#### Vote Neg:

#### 1] Semantics outweighs: A] Topicality is a constitutive rule of the activity they agreed to debate the topic when they signed up B] It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement.

#### 2] Limits: Speccing a medicine subset of medicines creates functionally an infinite caselist of affs since they can combine any permutation of medicines in the world and there’s no universal disad to all of them since each has its own different use situations and benefits which explodes the neg prep burden and makes any stable links impossible. They get to cherrypic their offense and choose medicines where mines are uniquely bad. It also kills clash on the affirmative flow because if I don’t have ground and am not prepared, I can’t clash with the aff page. Clash o/w since it’s the only point of debate.

#### 3] TVA – read the aff as an advantage to a whole res aff. PICs don’t solve – it’s absurd to say neg potential abuse justifies – leads to infinite aff abuse.

#### Paradigms

#### 1] Drop the debater on T, since deters future abuse and DTA would be incoherent.

#### 2] Procedural fairness is a voter and outweighs their aff a] it’s an intrinsic good – debate is

#### fundamentally a game and some level of competitive equity is necessary to

#### sustain the activity, b] probability – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but it can

#### rectify skews which means the only impact to a ballot is fairness and deciding

#### who wins, c] it internal link turns every impact – a limited debate promotes in-

#### depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their

#### education. D] aff claims are left untested when the round is unfair because I have to wait time reading T to check abuse

#### 3] Competing interps on T – A] topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical B] norm setting – reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention C] reasonability causes a race to the bottom.

#### 4] No RVIs: 1] Encourages theory baiting and chills checking real abuse. 2] Illogical b/c don’t win for being fair and logic is meta-constraint on arguments b/c comes lexically prior.

#### 5] T before 1AR theory – A] any neg abuse is mitigated by the fact that they weren’t topical B] outweighs on scope b/c 1ac abuse affects every speech after.

#### Don’t vote on Impact Turns

#### 1] We should experiment with ideological opposition – reading T is a good thing

#### even if its false because it makes us test a multiplicity of strategies from many

#### directions and refines good methods.

#### 2] They can’t win on an impact turn absent justifying an RVI because they’re

#### still operating under the model of theory

#### 3] Dropping the debater is overcompensation that doesn’t solve their

#### impacts—impact turns prove the interp is bad, not why my speech act was bad

### 2

**Counterplan Text: The member nations of the World Trade Organization should grant patents to Indigenous people for medicines based on Indigenous knowledge.**

**De Cunha**

Manuela Carneiro da Cunha  (Dr. Penelope Harvey Department of Anthropology University of Manchester Brunswick Street Manchester M13 9PL England)“Exploitable knowledge belongs to the creators of it: a debate” Wiley Online Library, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1469-8676.1998.tb00385.x

In Chamisso’sstory, aman (Peter Schlemihl) sells his shadow to the Devil, who rolls it up and takes it away, A shadow is an awkward thing to sell, although it is undoubtedly one’s own. **Strange things are being transacted nowadays, both material and immate rial**: blood, tissues, organs, sperm, ovules, embryos, but also ideas, shapes, images, voices ... In other times or other places, people were sometimes selling their very souls. Our debate today could actually be phrased: ‘**Are we selling our souls by allowing knowledge to become its creators’ private property?**’ I w ill try to show that it is precisely the ultimate obstacle to putting our souls on the market. One could argue that rights in knowledge are actually not really new. Information and knowledge, or at least some of it, have been property for a long time in many societies. Intellectual Property Rights’ western genealogy is usually traced to the Middle Ages and to guild trade secrets. What knowledge and information mean and cover, however, was greatly expanded and this is what we are talking about today. That there should be new objects of ownership need not surprise us. Property rights have a history and topography. The appearance of such objects of ownership is related to two kinds of production: the production of things and the production of identities and status, that is of relationships. Res And.personae as they appear in Roman Law, if you wish. Technology, or more generally how people conceive of the process of production, entails that rights should be ascribed over each and every input. We all know of societies in which proper names, ornaments, songs or spells are crucial for the process of production and thus subject to ownership or other kinds of rights. Technological change or, more broadly, changes in representations on production create new objects of rights. On the other hand, as Veblen, Levi-Strauss, Barth, Bourdieu, Baudrillard and Sahlins (among others, including myself) have pointed out, systems of objects, which emerge and disappear, stand for systems of people and produce identities. Taste and knowledge, which are then relations to these objects, are also ways of distinction among people, something quite exploitable in itself. This is not a different kind of knowledge, something we could call ‘expressive knowledge’: it is rather a different role for it. We thus have two capacities for exploitable knowledge: knowledge in the production of objects and knowledge in the production of identities. They should be discussed separately since they bring up different problems. **What has changed, besides the extension of what is defined as exploitable knowledge, is the degree to which rights in knowledge have entered the market and become alienable property. For property is a highly variable bunch of rights.** In particular, property is not necessarily alienable: land, for example, in Babylonian Law, had been property for long, but was only painstakingly made transactable through a number of ritual fictions (Cassin 1952). Knowledge follows asimilar pattern: although having been property in many places and for a long time, it often was or is not transactable. It has been pointed out in connection, for instance, with conservation issues, that regulation of resources is highly dependent on property regimes. At this point it is important to stress the distinctions between such regimes. A simplistic division is sometimes made between regimes of free access and private property. What is simplistic here is that such a division, although fundamental, fails to consider more elaborate distinctions within private property and takes all private property to be individual private property. Yet there are other viable forms, such as for example collective or even state ownership. As Daniel Bromley (1991) has insisted, there has been an unfortunate confusion between ‘common property regimes’ and ‘open access resources’ . Open access is the kind of regime that is most liable to indiscriminate predation. Let me give you an example from outside the usual anthropological stock. Robert Crumb, the underground cartoonist of the sixties, decided, in a counter-culture move, not to ask for copyright for his characters. As a result, the cartoon ‘Keep Trucking’ was appropriated by the advertising industry, and Crumb now writes an ironic C at the bottom of any of his drawings. **Property is not - and we have that already in Roman Law - just an exclusive right to use and dispose of things. More than a relation between people and objects, it is also and maybe chiefly a relation between people about objects. It is a way of preventing other people putting certain objects to a use one might object to. Property does not necessarily entail the consequence, as I have reminded you, that objects should be put into the market: rather the contrary, it is the only way, given the planetary system of trade, in which they can actually be kept out o f the market. What is the present situation? After** a long period of attempts at revising the 1967 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in the framework of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the main industrial countries moved to a different forum and were able to have trade sanctions linked to the infringement of Intellectual Property Rights in the GATT/TRIPS Agreement signed in April 1994 (Oman 1994). GATT stands for General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (from 1947), and TRIPS for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including Trading in Counterfeit Goods. **While the emergence of new knowledge-items is related, as we have seen, to changes in technology and in society, the value they have acquired and the insistence, particularly by the United States, on their global enforcement has been linked by some to the particular position of developed countries in the global system of production**. As manufacturers are increasingly located in countries where labour is cheap, inputs from developed countries become chiefly technological or industrial innovation. **Hence the pressure by developed countries to have patents recognised and enforced worldwide.** It would correspond to an effort by powerful countries to reap more benefits from production in a transnational division of labour. An expanded and revised political economy in which information stands as a productive force (Lash and Urry 1994: 4), would then be accountable for the unprecedented valuation of Intellectual Property Rights (hereafter IPR). It is only a further proof of the place of power in the value attributed to knowledge that it should be denied to so-called collective knowledge. Such denial is based on two grounds: that what has to be stimulated by rewarding it with ownership is invention (as against tradition) and that invention is ascribable to individuals and not to collectivities. Invention is taken in its contemporary sense of creation of the mind (ab nihiloV), while the former sense of ‘discovery’ (as, for example, in the expression ‘The invention of the Holy Cross’ for the discovery by the empress Helen of the True Cross of Christ) is suppressed. Take traditional peoples and their discoveries. These can involve the recognition of the utility of substances, such as rubber or curare. They can be discoveries of processes such as those complex ones involved in the preparation of manioc or of ayahuasca. In ayahuasca it is not one plant but rather the combination of different plants that produces the desired effect. **There is a growing amount of prospecting on the part of pharmaceutical companies, and even the US National Cancer Institute, of the resources particularly of tropical forests. It has been pointed out that indigenous knowledge provides pharmaceutical companies with a priority list for screenings, and that it therefore increases the efficiency of research by 400 per cent** (Balick 1990). As for seed varieties, a 1994 study commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that indigenous people’s seed varieties account for most of the five billion dollars a year value of germplasm in rich nations’ crops and calls U N D P ’s attention to the fact that ‘the commercial value of developing-country seed varieties and germplasm is not acknowledged and compensated for’ (‘Conserving indigenous knowledge’ by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, quoted in Dayal 1994). **Much indigenous knowledge is thus appropriated yet not compensated for. It is on the market, whether one likes it or not. The point then becomes, as Cunningham (1991) has ably argued, whether it is equitable to have an open access regime for resources at the indigenous end and an ownership property regime at the multinational corporation end. Given that indigenous knowledge is on the market (presently for free), and that is a state of affairs that we are unable to alter, should we not support the proposition that its creators receive a share of the profits?** **This is why a growing number of anthropologists** (such as Boom, Brush, Davis, Elizabetski, Greaves, Kloppenburg and Posey) **have been urging the recognition of IPR for indigenous peoples. Recognising IPR, some say, is a legal framework alien to the way traditional societies handle knowledge. So? The same could be said of the whole political and legal situation in which such societies move nowadays. Were it not so, why should we uphold their rights to have land recognised and demarcated? Is property in land not equally a concept possibly foreign to most indigenous societies? And have anthro pologists not realised that foreign concepts are put to new use and strategically appropriated by weak societies? That they might be, while used as weapons, kept so to say on the boundaries, within spheres that do not mix with internal institutions? Or else, couched in new institutions that follow rules different from the world at large?** Knowledge can be put on the world market by indigenous societies and yet be put in common or distributed along different paths within the group (as it is in traditional academia). The issue that intrigues me, rather, is why we should be discussing this matter here, while no one would contend the right of indigenous peoples to their land? There might be a subtle reason for this. Would it not be that, although we support indigenous land struggles with no restrictions, the issue of knowledge strikes more close to home, as intellectuals and as anthropologists? Traditional academia is a bastion of internal freedom of knowledge, but such freedom is under global and insidious attack (H ill and Turpin 1995). It might seem contradictory to defend ownership of knowledge abroad and open access at home. Furthermore, as anthropologists, we deal precisely with other people’s knowledge. Some might feel post-modern scruples to write about it. Others might fear that by restricting what we can freely write about other peoples is to be cutting the very branch we are sitting on. I do not share those scruples nor those fears. In fact, securing ownership of exploitable knowledge would leave us in a much more easy position. I am presently editing a book, called the Encyclopaedia o f the Forest, which is all about knowledge. This is a result of large team research involving rubber-tappers and three indigenous societies who live on the headwaters of the Jurua river, in Brazilian Western Amazonia. Our guidelines are not to publish anything that could possibly have commercial value, since it would presently amount to putting commercially valuable knowledge into public domain. **If IPR were recognised for traditional societies, such problems would not arise, since they could be secured and published at the same time. But knowledge also appears in connection, as I pointed out at the beginning of my talk, with the production of identities and status.** Many current dilemmas about ownership of knowledge and cultural items in general, for traditional peoples as well as for anthropologists, concern what has been called ‘cultural appropriation’. This involves things such as myths, themes, patterns, artefacts, religious practices and ultimately image, voice and representation. I don’t think the issue is to worry about conflicts over representation between anthropologists and the people they talk about. After all, journalists handle that quite well with more exacting people. The real issue lies elsewhere. That culture is a flow, not a thing, a production not a product, is by now common anthropological wisdom (e.g. Carneiro da Cunha 1992; 1995). **Can we, as anthropologists, uphold the idea of ‘cultural ownership’ at the same time as we realise that culture is in constant flow? Better than answering this in the abstract, we should look into ‘cultural ownership’ debates in their political and historical context, as Coombe (1993) has done for the First Nations in Canada. First Nations claims in Canada were perfectly comprehensible when thought in situ: a history of definitions of identity by a bureaucracy which was committed to the disappearance of language and ceremonies of political weakness, of dispossession of land and pride (Coombe 1993). Let me sum up. I have argued that exploitable knowledge can be related to the production of objects and to the production of identities. In its first capacity, its presence on the market has increased. So too has its value, possibly due to the novel place of developed countries in the multi-national process of production. (Manu factures being increasingly located in third-world countries, the input of powerful countries in production is chiefly knowledge and information. Hence the immense and Successful pressure by developed countries to have IPR infringements linked to trade sanctions in GATT/TRIPS agreement.) Indigenous peoples have developed knowl edge that is valuable for production. Yet that knowledge is not compensated for, due to a western individualistic definition of patents and IPR in general. It is only fair that it should be recognised and rewarded. The present situation is still to have an ideology of common heritage or open access at the indigenous peoples’ level and of private property at the corporations’ level.** On the other hand, how can we reconcile our disbelief in a set of things called culture with the support of culture ownership? **My point is that cultural appropriation debates are ways for dispossessed peoples to phrase claims for power. What is at stake is the authority to define, to represent, to keep or to dispose of, in a word, for lack of a better word, agency. There is nothing contradictory in acknowledging culture to be invented and yet upholding ownership of culture, since cultural ownership is but the local translation for agency and it is agency we are deemed to support. My basic point is that recognising ownership of knowledge in the production of objects is not equivalent to putting it on the market. It is actually the only way in which it might not be sold.** The same principle applies to knowledge in the production of identities. If identitary signs are common heritage, they are like fish in the open ocean, subject to everyone’s predation. Collective ownership is the only way to prevent a hunting season for signs, to avoid their becoming a commodity**. In other words, if we allow exploitable knowledge to belong to its creators, rather than selling our soul to the Devil, we are actually building a barrier, as Polanyi has put it, to the satanic mill.** Addendum. Two days ago, just before catching my plane, I received the news of a press report by COICA, the Co-ordination of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin. C O IC A is objecting that the US have registered under number 5751 the formula for ayahuasca, submitted by Loren Miller, owner of the International Plant Medicine Corporation. C O IC A urges everyone to protest to the President of the United States for such an appropriation of knowledge, and I submit this pledge to EASA, irrespective of what the results of our debate here might be.

### Case – Plan

#### The WTO can’t enforce the aff- causes circumvention.

Lamp 19 [Nicholas; Assistant Professor of Law at Queen’s University; “What Just Happened at the WTO? Everything You Need to Know, Brink News,” 12/16/19; <https://www.brinknews.com/what-just-happened-at-the-wto-everything-you-need-to-know/>] Justin

Nicolas Lamp: For the first time since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the Appellate Body cannot accept any new appeals, and that has knock-on effects on the whole global trade dispute settlement system. When a member appeals a WTO panel report, it goes to the Appellate Body, but if there is no Appellate Body, it means that that panel report will not become binding and will not attain legal force.

The absence of the Appellate Body means that members can now effectively block the dispute settlement proceedings by what has been called appealing panel reports “into the void.”

The WTO panels will continue to function as normal. When a panel issues a report, it will normally be automatically adopted — unless it is appealed. And so, even though the panel is working, the respondent in a dispute now has the option of blocking the adoption of the panel’s report. It can, thereby, shield itself from the legal consequences of a report that finds that the member has acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations.

#### Waivers don’t solve restrictive bilateral agreements or patent linkages- those restrict generic manufacturing and distribution

Bonadio 21 Enrico Bonadio, (Reader in Intellectual Property Law, City, University of London) and Dhanay M. Cadillo Chandler (Postdoctoral research fellow, University of Turku), 2/24/21, Intellectual property and COVID-19 medicines: why a WTO waiver may not be enough, The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/intellectual-property-and-covid-19-medicines-why-a-wto-waiver-may-not-be-enough-155920>/SJKS

There are other barriers that the waiver wouldn’t address. One is that some developing countries have entered into bilateral agreements, especially with the US, the EU and other industrialised nations. These have limited the ability of generics producers to manufacture and distribute cheap medicines. One example is that this has limited the freedom to rely on parallel imports. These usually guarantee the importation of cheaper medicines purchased in countries where the drugs are sold at a lower price. Also, certain free trade agreements have introduced provisions which prevent national drug regulatory authorities from registering and allowing the sale of generics if the medicine is still patented. This is the so-called “[patent linkage](https://www.drugpatentwatch.com/blog/patent-linkage-resolving-infringement/)”. Among the countries that have signed these agreements are those who are part of the Comprehensive and [Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-018-0758-3). They include Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru and Vietnam. Other trade and partnership agreements have also obliged certain developing countries to provide an absolute protection of clinical [test data](http://www.hjil.org/wp-content/uploads/Nsour-FINAL.pdf) submitted to regulatory agencies to demonstrate the quality, safety and efficacy of new medicines. This strong exclusivity stops the manufacturers of generics from using such data while applying for their own marketing authorisation. This inevitably slows down the availability of cheaper drugs. Countries like Morocco, Jordan, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua do protect such data as a consequence of trade agreements concluded with the US.

#### Waivers Present in the Squo

#### WTO 15

[Enrico Bonadio. “World’s Poorest Countries Allowed to Keep Copying Patent-Protected Drugs.” The Conversation, 24 Nov. 2015, theconversation.com/worlds-poorest-countries-allowed-to-keep-copying-patent-protected-drugs-50799. Accessed 5 Sept. 2021] Akaash

The World Trade Organisation has agreed to [extend a waiver](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/trip_06nov15_e.htm) that allows poor countries to copy patented medicines. The waiver, which was due to expire in January 2016, has now been extended to 2033.

The countries that will benefit from the waiver are the **48 poorest nations**, classified by the United Nations as “Least Developed Countries” or LDCs, and include many African and some Asian countries. About half of the 900m population across these countries live on less than [US$1.25 a day](http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/facts-and-figures-2/).

All other countries, including developing countries such as India and China, are still bound by the WTO’s agreement on trade-related intellectual property rights (or TRIPS) with respect to drug patents.

### ROTJ

#### Framing: You can’t use your ROJ to exclude my shell. My shell allows you to

#### read your aff, it just functionally constrains how you can do that. Additionally,

#### as long as I win comparative offense to my interp it precludes on a

#### methodological level -my method is your aff with specification, your is just the

#### aff, so if the former is better it’s a reason to vote for me even if method

#### debates in general preclude theory.

### 3

#### Interpretation – Debaters must read everything that they want to be relevant in the round. To clarify, all analytics and definitions must be read in order for it to be relevant on the flow in round.

#### Violation – In the 1AC speech doc – they list definitions under their advocacy that they never read but they “defend”

#### Standards:

#### 1] Infinite Abuse – their model of debate justifies putting any number of things in the doc that they no longer have to read ranging anywhere from preempts to plan texts to aprioris. Kills fairness since I don’t know how these arguments affect the round until I’ve already conceded them.

#### 2] Prep Skew – I have to waste all my prep time looking at the doc, reflowing things, and making clarification questions because I flowed off of what you spread and not the doc, which kills my ability to make good substantive and strategic decisions which kills education.

#### 3] Norming – debate is intrinsically a speech act – they set a bad norm that opens the floodgate to making debate simply an email chain instead of an actual debate. Outweighs because it destroys debate as an activity which is a prior question to all argumentation

#### DTD – The skew already occurred since I predicated offense on what was in the doc