# 1AC – Truth

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### Advantage

#### The advantage is truth.

#### Objectivity is getting worse and that causes *polarization*, but it’s reversible

Sands 20 [Sands, John. "Americans Are Losing Faith In An Objective Media. A New Gallup/Knight Study Explores Why.". Knight Foundation, 2022, https://knightfoundation.org/articles/americans-are-losing-faith-in-an-objective-media-a-new-gallup-knight-study-explores-why/. Accessed 2 Mar 2022.] //chsKK/MM

1) Americans see increasing bias in the news media: One of the primary reasons Americans don’t think the media works for them is because of the bias they perceive in coverage. Many feel the media’s traditional roles, such as holding leaders accountable, is compromised by bias, with nearly 7 in 10 Americans (68%) who say they see too much bias in the reporting of news that is supposed to be objective as “a major problem,” up from 65% in the 2017 Knight/Gallup study. They see it in their own news sources (57%), and more than 6 in 10 are concerned about bias in the news other people are getting, the survey finds. Some 7 in 10 Americans worry that owners of media companies are influencing coverage. 2) Americans think the media is pushing an agenda. Eight in 10 Americans say that when they suspect an inaccuracy in a story, they worry it was intentional —because the reporter was misrepresenting the facts (52%) or making them up (28%). Only 18% say they think the inaccuracies were innocent mistakes. And when it comes to news sources they distrust, nearly three-quarters of Americans (or 74%) say those outlets are trying to persuade people to adopt a certain opinion. 3) Distrust in the media cuts along partisan lines: Views on the media vary widely by party, though overall, Americans view the media more negatively than positively. The breakdown: Nearly 7 in 10 Republicans (67%) have a very or somewhat unfavorable opinion of the news media, versus 1 in 5 Democrats (20%) and about half of independents (48%). 4) A majority of Americans say the media are under political attack – but are divided by party on whether it’s warranted: While people from all political persuasions agree that the media is being politically attacked, 66% of Democrats say those attacks are not justified, while 58% of Republicans say they are. 5) Opinions on the media also vary widely by age. Young Americans, for example, tend to have more negative views on the media. One in 5 American adults under 30 (20%) say they have a “very” or “somewhat” favorable opinion of the news media, versus almost half of those aged 65 and older (43%). 6) Americans blame the media for political divisions, but they also see the potential for the media to heal these divides. Forty-seven percent of Americans say the media bears “a great deal” of blame for political division in this country, and 36% say they bear “a moderate amount.” At the same time, 8 in 10 Americans believe the media can bring people together and heal the nation’s political divides.

**Disinformation cyclically and empirically constructs right wing populism through anti-media sentiments and political de-legitimizing**

**Hammers 20** [Hameleers, M. (2020), accessed on 3-8-2022,Populist Disinformation: Exploring Intersections between Online Populism and Disinformation in the US and the Netherlands. **Politics and Governance, 8**(1), 146-157. doi:<https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i1.2478>] chsAK/MM

The discursive construction of a populist divide between the ‘good’ people and ‘corrupt’ elites can conceptually be linked to disinformation. More specifically, (right-wing) populists are not only attributing blame to the political elites, but increas- ingly vent anti-media sentiments in which the mainstream press is scapegoated for not representing the people. In an era of post-truth relativism, ‘fake news’ is increasingly politicized and used as a label to delegitimize political opponents or the press. To better understand the affinity between disinformation and populism, this article conceptualizes two relation- ships between these concepts: (1) blame attributions to the dishonest media as part of the corrupt elites that mislead the people; and (2) the expression of populist boundaries in a people-centric, anti-expert, and evidence-free way. The results of a comparative qualitative content analysis in the US and Netherlands indicate that the political leaders Donald Trump and Geert Wilders blame legacy media in populist ways by regarding them as part of the corrupt and lying establishment. Compared to left-wing populist and mainstream politicians, these politicians are the most central players in the discursive construction of populist disinformation. Both politicians bypassed empirical evidence and expert knowledge whilst priori- tizing the people’s truth and common sense at the center stage of honesty and reality. These expressions resonated with public opinion on Facebook, although citizens were more likely to frame mis- and disinformation in terms of ideological cleavages. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the role of populist discourse in a post- factual era.

#### Right Wing populism in politics and press is large and growing - this uniquely takes out democracies and HR advocation -

**Bermann et al. 18** [Max Bermann, Carolyn Kenney, and Trevor Sutton, 11-2-2018, accessed on 3-8-2022, Center for American Progress, "The Rise of Far-Right Populism Threatens Global Democracy and Security", https://www.americanprogress.org/article/rise-far-right-populism-threatens-global-democracy-security/] chsAK/MM

Brazil’s recent [election](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/world/americas/jair-bolsonaro-brazil-election.html) of soon-to-be President Jair Bolsonaro demonstrated that far-right populism and authoritarian promises to restore law and order remain a potent and growing force in global politics. Bolsonaro’s campaign drew from a familiar playbook, placing at its heart an [authoritarian and xenophobic](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/28/brazil-urgent-call-protect-rights) vision of Brazilian society. He declared that he would not accept election results if he lost; defended Brazil’s decades-long brutal military dictatorship; threatened to shoot supporters of the opposing Workers’ Party; and vowed to pack the country’s supreme court with sympathetic jurists and persecute media critical of him. Like many right-wing populists around the world, Bolsonaro embraced racist, homophobic, and misogynist rhetoric, achieving a level of provocation so incendiary that the country’s attorney general [charged](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/world/americas/brazil-president-candidate-hate.html?module=inline) then-candidate Bolsonaro “with inciting hatred and discrimination against blacks, indigenous communities, women and gays.” We’ve seen this before. Bolsonaro’s rise to power is only the latest chapter in a global resurgence of right-wing, illiberal populism. Far-right populist parties across Europe have seen a [surge](https://www.axios.com/european-union-right-wing-populist-immigration-52850b78-41c4-427a-88ff-4991f64c0a70.html) in public approval, making parliamentary gains in 15 of the 27 EU member countries over the past two election cycles. Far-right parties made the most significant gains in Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Estonia, winning 5 percent more in vote shares. Additionally, the right-wing Fidesz party cemented its control over Hungarian politics with 49.3 percent of the vote shares in their April 2018 election, even though their vote share only increased by 4.4 percent from 2014 to 2018. Simultaneously, public support for democracy in many countries has [declined](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/05/yes-support-for-democracy-is-declining-worldwide-but-not-in-the-u-s-or-other-western-democracies/?utm_term=.d7680e68995a)—with the exception of Western democracies, where support has rebounded in recent years. Far-right parties and authoritarian demagogues that have succeeded in gaining power at the national level—such as in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, the Philippines, the United States, and, now, Brazil—have wasted no time in undermining democratic institutions and norms. Unsurprisingly, according to V-Dem Institute’s 2018 [liberal democracy index](https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/v-dem_democracy_report_2018.pdf), these countries are among those that have seen the greatest democratic backsliding in the past few years. It is entirely possible—and even expected—that right-wing populists will seek to roll back democratic norms and institutions once in power in order to entrench their authority and quash political opposition. Turkish President [Recep Tayyip Erdogan](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-internet-law-restrictions.html), Hungarian Prime Minister [Viktor Orbán](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/12/viktor-orban-is-just-getting-started-hungary/), Poland’s [Law and Justice party](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/democracys-slow-fade-in-central-europe/2018/07/07/d155d1e4-8099-11e8-b0ef-fffcabeff946_story.html?utm_term=.c8308b08c424), and even U.S. President [Donald Trump](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/04/assault-on-democracy/557912/) have already demonstrated this. Once this degradation of democracy has been set in motion, **it is a steep and slippery slope from illiberal democracy to outright authoritarianism.** President Erdogan’s wholesale purge of the civil service and judiciary and his extended rule by decree under state of emergency [illustrate](https://americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/02/11/446164/turkeys-new-nationalism-amid-shifting-politics/) how this is already occurring in Turkey. The rise of openly illiberal candidates and parties in democracies and the decline in support for democracy—particularly in younger democracies—represents a major global crisis that requires sustained U.S. commitment and international cooperation to reverse. This is particularly notable when combined with the fact that there has been a disturbing increase in democratic backsliding around the world, including in the United States. This should be a huge wake-up call for liberal democratic leaders. Global and U.S. security is at risk This democratic backsliding is a threat to [global security](https://americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/09/05/457451/securing-democratic-world/). Nondemocracies are more prone to violence and war; more likely to stoke crises and confrontation; and, in many cases, more fiercely opposed to collective global responses to shared concerns such as climate change and migration. This is especially the case for far-right, illiberal regimes, which typically thrive on xenophobic paranoia, bellicosity, and a disavowal of any form of global cooperation in favor of a blunt, country-first approach to international affairs. The rise of [far-right, illiberal populism](https://americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2018/05/10/450430/europes-populist-challenge/) across the world is an affront to core American values and a challenge to U.S. global leadership. In order for the United States to advocate effectively for democracy and human rights on the global stage and maintain an advantage in great power competition with authoritarian states such as China and Russia, its government will need to adopt bold new policies that help vulnerable democracies resist authoritarian influence and strengthen a growing global democratic community. The United States can accomplish this in three ways. First, instead of shunning efforts to promote democracy and human rights, the United States should put its [democratic values](https://americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/09/05/457451/securing-democratic-world/) at the heart of its foreign and security policy. This should entail building and strengthening relationships with democratic states and devoting more resources to aid democracies. Second, democratic political leaders, nongovernmental organizations, and the free press should call out and confront illiberal leaders’ efforts to undermine democratic institutions and processes. Third, and most dauntingly, pro-democracy advocates need a clear, alternative economic agenda to counter those [advocated](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-09-13/financial-crisis-still-empowering-far-right-populists) by populists and to push back on populist [scapegoating](https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/dangerous-rise-of-populism) of minority populations. Only by banding together to realign their domestic and foreign policies with their democratic values can the United States and its democratic allies successfully confront the growing illiberal tide across the world.

#### Right Wing Populism means endless nativist and racist otherization

Rattansi 20 [Ali Rattansi, 03-23-2020, "Racism and the rise of populist movements," Ali Rattansi is Visiting Professor of Sociology, City, University of London These issues and many others are explored in greater depth in the second edition of his book: Racism: A Very Short Introduction, to be published by Oxford University Press on 24 March 2020. No Publication, https://www.runnymedetrust.org/blog/racism-and-the-rise-of-populist-movements, accessed 8-27-2020] chsMM

But how and in what ways is racism involved in the phenomenal growth of this nationalist right-wing populism? First, it helps to define populism.At a minimum, populist ideology posits an opposition between a ‘pure’ people and a ‘corrupt’ political elite which is out of touch and is responsible for the damage caused to the nation or people. Populist electoral strategy is then based on a promise to rein in the power of this elite, rid it of corruption, and restore the fortunes of the people. There is usually a crucial element in which populists argue that there are internal or external ‘others’ who are involved in the downward fortunes of the genuine ‘people’ of the nation. It is in this way that racism can be inserted as an important part of the message. These others may be the EU, minorities, recent or even third generation immigrants, refugees or economic migrants, such as the Mexicans so strongly evoked by Trump as posing a strong economic and cultural threat to white Americans. Even the EU has created an external, xenophobic and racialised threat by a short-lived attempt to rebrand the head of the EU’s migration policy as ‘the commissioner for protecting the European way of life’. Sociologists and political scientists have argued that there are four main causes that explain the rise of nationalist right-wing populism, some aligned with the definition above. The four components are: a distrust of corrupt or out of touch power elites; a fear of the destruction of national cultures and identities; relative deprivation; and a dealignment between mainstream parties and electorates. This last issue is a phenomenon particularly reflected in the poor showing of social democratic, labour parties which have seen their working- class voter base eroded by the nationalist populists. Each of these four main causes are intertwined with racism or racialisation in one form or another. The distrust of political elites is partly related to the unwillingness or inability of national elites to curb immigration, especially Muslim immigration. Muslims are racialised as practising a distinctly non-white way of life that is supposedly completely at variance with the ‘Western’ or ‘European’ culture. Relative deprivation in the form of a fall in living standards is easily blamed on the arrival of immigrants and refugees, and this is indeed what right-wing populists tend to do. The restructuring of the usual pact between working-class electorates and social democratic parties has occurred in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis in which social democratic parties, rather than the financial sector and its elites, are blamed for profligacy and being supposedly ‘soft’ on welfare ‘scroungers’, especially non-white immigrants (although white Eastern Europeans have also been caught up in a form of racialised, xenophobic framing). What brings all these elements together is what has been called the ideology of ‘nativism’. “Britain first”, as the murderer of the British MP Jo Cox shouted as he killed her, echoes Trump’s ‘America first’, and ‘Germany for Germans’ or ‘Sweden for the Swedes’, always with the strong sense that the ‘true’ or ‘genuine’ natives who are being defended are white. Trump’s rallying cry ‘Make America Great Again’ has been perceived as a thinly veiled call for making America ‘white again’, notwithstanding the fact that the earliest Americans we know were non-white indigenous peoples (formerly labelled ‘Red Indians’). In the case of Britain (and this might be extended to the whole of Western Europe), the fantasy of an original, pure white population is belied by the fact that the earliest Briton discovered so far (the so-called ‘Cheddar Man’ whose remains were found in the Cheddar gorge) would today be identified as black. Right-wing national populism, then, is a thoroughly racialised phenomenon. Not all those who support nativism would see themselves as racist, but the consequences of adopting a nativist stance draws one into territory that is certainly stained with racism. Recently, Hilary Mantel, twice winner of the Booker Prize, said that she thought racism was definitely a factor in the criticisms levelled against Meghan Markle, the mixed-race Duchess of Sussex. Mantel, who of course wasn’t the only high profile commenter to make this connection, also added that she thinks racism ‘is more deeply embedded in people’s consciousness than any of us is willing to admit.’ All the evidence points to the essential truth in Mantel’s admonition of attitudes towards the Duchess. Moreover, her description of ordinary people’s consciousness points to underlying, widely held racist beliefs. These can take the form of ‘cultural’ racism, Islamophobia, or even ‘colour-blindness,’ in which people accuse antiracists of racism, for raising the issue of racism. That is what is meant by “reverse racism”, which attempts to shut down rational discussion of racism and racialisation. It is little surprise then that both racism - and the rise of nationalist right-wing populism that is fuelled by it - has flourished on such fertile ground.

#### Independently of fake news, sensational media empirically leads to more cascading support for violence

**Javed and Miller 19** [Jeffrey Javed and Blake Miller, 8-9-2019, accessed on 3-9-2022, Eprints.lse.ac, "The Dangers of False News: How Sensational Content and Outgroup Cues Strengthen Support for Violenceand Anti-Muslim Policies", http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/101438/1/miller\_dangers\_of\_false\_news.pdf] chsAK

-sensational media is dramatized media/yellow journalism

Sensational content significantly increased support for violence when measured indirectly through questions about the mob attack on the alleged perpetrator and open-ended responses on the events in the article.3 Respondents presented with sensational content were more likely to donate to a legal defense fund for people who engaged in a mob attack on the alleged perpetrator (P < 0.05), and were more likely to believe that not punishing them was justified, though this finding is not statistically di↵erent from zero at conventional levels of significance (Figure 1). This e↵ect for sensational content further holds when looking at the text data from the open-ended responses. We find that sensational content significantly increased the probability that respondents will express support for violence in their written responses, including extrajudicial, mob-style violence (P < 0.05); for both measures this e↵ect represents a roughly fifteen percent increase in probability (Figure 2).4 We used a structural topic model (STM) to systematically summarize the responses of our subjects to the open ended questions (see Figure S11 and Table S8, p. 14-15). A cursory comparison of representative responses per topic illustrate di↵erences in punitiveness across treatment conditions. One respondent given the sensationalized content treatment wrote the following, which was coded as supportive of violence: “I am absolutely disgusted, appalled, and at a loss for words about this attack. They should kill him in the street. Let everyone who wants a piece of him have a piece of him.” Contrast this with a non-violent response in the control condition: “I want to know what happened. I want to know if the person that was beat up is the one accused of the murder. I want to know the details.” See the Supporting Information (pp. 17-18) for example open-ended responses and comments by coding category and treatment condition. Unexpectedly, we find that outgroup cues decreased support for violence against the perpetrator in the story when measured indirectly and in the open-ended responses (P < 0.05) (Figures 1 and 2). We suspect this negative e↵ect was driven by perceptions that the event or even the article itself was racist. Respondents were significantly more likely to believe that the mob attack or the article itself was racially-motivated when given the outgroup treatment (see Figures S12-13, p. 22). We find that sensational content and violent peer influence a↵ected how people inter- act with online content. The sensational content treatment increased the probability that espondents would leave a comment on the website by roughly sixteen percent (P < 0.05) (Figure 3). Since the act of leaving a comment is vulnerable to significant selection e↵ects, we run Heckman two-step selection models to detect and correct for selection bias (Heck- man 1979). Older respondents and respondents scoring high on symbolic racism were far more likely to leave a comment. After taking this into account, we find that the sensational treatment increased the probability of writing a violent comment by roughly twenty-four percent, though this e↵ect is not statistically significant at conventional levels (P = 0.14 level) (Figure 4). While peer signals mattered little for attitudinal outcomes, they consistently affected how respondents interacted with the news article, creating a “cascade effect” (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992) for endorsement of violence. That is, respondents bandwagoned onto violent comments if they were already highly-liked. If the top, most-liked comment was violent, respondents were more likely to like a violent comment (P < 0.05) and to leave a violent comment of their own (P < 0.05); and far less likely to like a non-violent comment (P < 0.001) (Figures 3 and 4). In addition, respondents were less likely to report the violent comment when it was highly liked, though this e↵ect was not statistically significant (P = 0.12). Because the most liked comment was also positioned at the top of the three comments—as is normally the case in a comments section on a news website—this e↵ect may possibly be driven by the position of the comment rather than the fact that it was highly liked; that is, respondents may have been merely satisficing by interacting with the upvoted violent comment because it was at the top of comment list. We believe the violent comment’s upvoting was more important than its positioning for two reasons. First, we found that the upvoted violent comment treatment had a negative e↵ect on reporting the violent comment and a positive treatment e↵ect on expressing violence in a written comment, which suggests the e↵ect is not due to simply interacting with whatever comment was positioned at the top of the comments list. Second, each comment was only one or two lines long, so users would have seen all three comments at once when they scrolled down; it is unlikely that the bottom two comments would have been less visible to respondents.

#### That terminalizes to extensively violent and oppressive impacts – genocide and exacerbated ethnic conflict are the result.

**Coblan 19** [Jessica Coblan 2-7-2019, accessed on 3-8-2022, Center for American Progress, "How Misinformation Fueled Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in the Tijuana Border Region", https://www.americanprogress.org/article/misinformation-fueled-anti-immigrant-sentiment-tijuana-border-region/] chsAK

In October 2018, thousands of migrants [fled violence in Central America](https://americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2018/06/01/451474/still-refugees-people-continue-flee-violence-latin-american-countries/) and traveled to the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. Residents from the village of Pijijiapan [demonstrated their solidarity](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/mexicans-shower-the-caravan-with-kindness--and-tarps-tortillas-and-medicine/2018/10/26/b2f828b4-d7b0-11e8-8384-bcc5492fef49_story.html?utm_term=.72d186634f86) with crates of food, water, clothing, and medical supplies. After receiving clothing and a toy for his 3-year-old son, Alexander, Pedro Osmin Ulloa told reporters, “These people have been beautiful. … Everyone’s helping us out.” By the time the caravan traveled into Mexico City, the group had grown to include [5,000](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/10/world/americas/migrant-caravan-mexico-city.html) migrants. The city turned a sports stadium into a camp that offered medical and dental services. Children spent their mornings drawing, and mariachi bands and masked wrestlers filled the stadium to perform. The caravan’s planned destination in Mexico was Tijuana, where the group intended to present themselves at the San Ysidro Port of Entry several miles south of San Diego. However, as the migrant caravan grew, so did Mexico’s anti-immigrant sentiment. [Misinformation](https://www.univision.com/noticias/inmigracion/estas-fotos-son-falsas-y-se-utilizaron-en-las-redes-para-alimentar-el-rechazo-a-los-migrantes) exploded on social media, including rumors that caravan members were hostile toward Mexican citizens, refused to accept Mexican aid, and behaved violently toward police authorities. Misinformation spreads on social media One of the most potent images circulated on social media just days after the caravan arrived in Mexico. It was first shared by a [news outlet and on social media](https://es-us.noticias.yahoo.com/polic-heridos-en-fotos-no-enfrentaron-migrantes-214129262.html) on [October 20](https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/mexican-police-caravan-photos/), under the [headline](https://www.univision.com/noticias/inmigracion/estas-fotos-son-falsas-y-se-utilizaron-en-las-redes-para-alimentar-el-rechazo-a-los-migrantes) “Brutally beaten by the members of the caravan in their attempt to force their entry into Mexico.” The image shows an injured Mexican police officer with blood covering his face and running from his head to his neck. (warning: [graphic image](https://www.univision.com/noticias/inmigracion/estas-fotos-son-falsas-y-se-utilizaron-en-las-redes-para-alimentar-el-rechazo-a-los-migrantes)) The narrative on social media and in the news contended that members of the caravan had injured a Mexican police officer while they crossed the Mexico-Guatemala border. This is patently false. The photo was actually taken years earlier, in 2012, by journalist Gustavo Aguado Butanda. On October 23, 2018, Aguado Butanda took to [Twitter](https://twitter.com/Gustavo3_0/status/1054957028429516801) to explain that the photo depicts a confrontation between the Mexican Federal Police and students in a school in Tiripetío, Michoacán. Aguado Butanda only found out that the [photo was being misused](https://www.univision.com/noticias/inmigracion/estas-fotos-son-falsas-y-se-utilizaron-en-las-redes-para-alimentar-el-rechazo-a-los-migrantes) when news outlets contacted him for more details about the confrontation. But by then, the image had spread across the public consciousness. This was not the first time the image had been used to spread misinformation. Aguado Butanda told [Univision](https://www.univision.com/noticias/inmigracion/estas-fotos-son-falsas-y-se-utilizaron-en-las-redes-para-alimentar-el-rechazo-a-los-migrantes), “[M]y photograph was used to depict another confrontation between the police and local residents. … This is happening because of the internet’s ability to spread fake news on social networks, eventually making it into the mainstream media.” Other content used to mislead the public about the caravan includes a photo taken in 2014 of a [Mexican flag](https://www.animalpolitico.com/2019/01/falso-quema-bandera-migrantes-hondurenos/) burned during a protest in Oaxaca, Mexico, that was falsely portrayed as having been destroyed by members of the caravan. The motivations behind misinformation Misinformation, commonly referred as “[fake news](https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline.pdf),” generally refers to a wide range of inaccurate or false information circulating online and in the media. Websites that intentionally spread misinformation [have different motivations](https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline.pdf). Some sites generate fraudulent, intentionally sensational content on topics from celebrities to politics and immigrants, with the goal of driving clicks and building ad revenue. These sites often try to look reputable, or even mimic another legitimate news site, in order to increase readership and make a profit. Other outlets manipulate information and mischaracterize events to disseminate an ideological agenda and achieve a specific political goal. Mainstream media sources sometimes pick up and publish these pieces, without much corroboration, unintentionally giving misinformation more exposure. By the time the caravan reached Tijuana, the misleading images and fraudulent posts had gone viral on social media. Even as some [civic groups](https://www.informador.mx/mexico/Conforman-comite-de-apoyo-a-caravana-migrante-en-Tijuana-20181123-0113.html) welcomed the caravan with open arms, social media helped amplify the voices of people expressing hostility toward the migrant caravan. Groups on Facebook such as “[Tijuana against the migrant caravan](https://www.facebook.com/unionTJ664/)” called on members to rise up in opposition. Days after the caravan’s arrival in Tijuana, groups, including some associated with the Facebook group, organized anti-immigrant rallies—a stark contrast to the reception of the caravan in southern Mexico or even Mexico City. On November 14, a violent confrontation erupted in Playas de Tijuana, during which people in the crowd were [heard](https://www.facebook.com/uniradioinforma/videos/365755887499742/) calling the caravan members “invaders.” Then, [a fight](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/15/migrant-caravan-tijuana-lgbt-group-locals-reaction) broke out between residents and caravan members. This hostility is unbecoming of the region, since Tijuana prides itself on being a “[city of migrants](https://www.bbc.com/mundo/amp/noticias-america-latina-46260057).” [According](https://www.bbc.com/mundo/amp/noticias-america-latina-46260057) to the Mexican government agency Council on National Population, 1 in every 2 residents of Tijuana was not born in the city. Claudia Benassini, a researcher in digital media at La Salle University in Mexico City, told [BBC News](https://www.bbc.com/mundo/amp/noticias-america-latina-46260057) that fake news significantly affected the perception of migrants in Mexico: “Information has been shared out of context and accepted as facts by consumers of social media.” In the case of Tijuana, misinformation drove some residents to act hostilely toward members of the caravan. Misinformation has deadly consequences worldwide What happened in Tijuana is consistent with recent incidents around the world and reflects a growing challenge facing social media platforms. While most social media companies have adopted terms of service and user agreements intended to ensure that users do not misuse their platforms to [spread hateful content](https://americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2018/10/25/459668/curbing-hate-online-companies-now/) and incite violence, these companies have struggled to effectively manage the content shared on their platforms. Facebook, for example, currently has [2.3 billion](https://www.recode.net/2019/2/4/18203992/facebook-15-year-anniversary-user-growth) monthly users—nearly one-third of the world’s population. The platform’s most daunting task is to moderate the content of so many users, all of whom regularly share content in different languages and within different political, religious, and ideological contexts. In 2017, for example, hateful posts on Facebook aimed at Myanmar’s Muslim minority [Rohingya](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html) incited murder and rape, ultimately leading to the exodus of 700,000 members of this community and what the United Nations called “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” In [Sri Lanka](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/21/world/asia/facebook-sri-lanka-riots.html), misinformation on Facebook exacerbated violence between Muslims and the country’s Buddhist majority. In this case, the Facebook-owned message application WhatsApp was used to organize violent mobs in several towns, burning mosques, businesses, and homes. In the case of Tijuana, misinformation led to anti-immigrant sentiment and hostile demonstrations. While these examples differ in the severity of hateful activities, they present a significant parallel: In each case, misinformation spread on social media negatively affected the perception of a specific group, leading to tensions and civil unrest.

#### Right Wing Conservatives withhold facts about child poverty to justify inaction.

**Ryan 21** [Frances Ryan, 6-8-2021, accessed on 3-9-2022, New Statesman, "By rebranding child poverty, the Conservatives think they are saving the poor from themselves", https://www.newstatesman.com/business/economics/2015/06/rebranding-child-poverty-conservatives-think-they-are-saving-poor-themselves] chsAK

Is it wrong to celebrate child poverty? When it appears to not increase, at least. Yesterday, it was being predicted that – in response to coalition cuts such as the bedroom tax and benefit freezes – the number of children living in relative poverty had rocketed for the first time since the 1990s. This morning, official figures for 2013/14 put it at 2.3 million – not much changed from the previous year. I imagine that is called “a win”. The [three pound coins](http://www.newstatesman.com/law/2013/10/what-will-happen-when-high-court-sees-human-face-benefit-cap) a single mother has each day to feed, clothe, and warm her kids after the benefit cap. The [sanitary towels to be picked at a clothes’ bank](http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/02/mind-gap-how-charities-are-mopping-after-government-s-failure-care). The bedsores on [a severely disabled woman told to pay the bedroom tax](http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/02/five-stories-harsh-realities-governments-bedroom-tax). None of that matters now, if it ever did. Two hundred thousand more children have actually been pushed deeper into poverty over the past year, as The Children’s Society put it to me this morning. The number of vulnerable children being taken into care or placed on child protection plans has – as [a separate studied showed this week](http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jun/23/vulnerable-children-uk-rises-welfare) – increased for the fifth year in a row, thanks in part to growing poverty. The Conservatives can ignore that. As they can the fact that 300,000 more disabled people are in poverty (after housing costs). It is that bracketed measure that is particularly telling. It was not just two days ago that David Cameron worked to change the definition of poverty. As Chris Goulden at Joseph Rowntree Foundation stresses, if we use the definition of poverty that included housing costs – the one that was used before 2010 – 4.1 million children are now below the poverty line. Muddy the waters. If you do not like the answer, ask another question. As Alison Garnham, chief executive of the Child Poverty Action Group, [wrote for the New Statesmanyesterday](http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/06/david-camerons-attempts-move-goalposts-poverty-are-disaster-dont-take-my-word-it) – no matter how the Conservatives try to shift the goal posts – “it’s clear the government is nowhere near meeting its child poverty targets”. It would be easy to wonder if they are even trying. Back in 2012, the Institute for Social and Economic Research [reported](http://www.cpag.org.uk/sites/default/files/NOTE%20ON%20EU27%20CHILD%20POVERTY%20RATES_final_1403.pdf) that it is only benefits and redistributive tax that stop the UK having one of the highest child poverty rates in Europe. The Conservative response was to make unprecedented hacks to social security. We are here again. End Child Poverty, a coalition of 150 children’s charities and experts, recommend giving measures like child tax credits a “triple lock” – the same protection given to the basic state pension – so they either rise in line with prices, earnings, or by 2.5 per cent, effectively saving 310,000 children from living in absolute poverty who will otherwise be by 2020. Instead, Cameron spent this week emphasising the need to cut them. Having children living in poverty does not sit well with the idea of a growing economy. Luckily, the cuts promoted are no longer about the deficit. Austerity was always economic strategy as a smokescreen for social engineering. The difference between when cuts like the bedroom tax were brought in and today is that, nowadays, they barely bother to hide it. Listen to the language George Osborne and Iain Duncan Smith chose for their joint stall setting [in theSunday Times last weekend](http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/Politics/article1571740.ece). It was not only a statement that they will press on with undiluted £12bn of benefit cuts, but that it will be done in order to reform the “the damaging culture of welfare dependency”. Cameron’s Conservatives did not invent the belief that state support to lift citizens out of poverty is what traps the poor in it. “In general it is only hunger which can spur and goad them onto labour,” read the Dissertation on the Poor Laws in 1786. As George Monbiot [wrote in an excellent column this week](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/23/skivers-strivers-200-year-old-myth-wont-die), the myth that cruelty – read, removing benefits – is actually kindness has been with conservatism for 200 years and more. It is not going anywhere. The [Conservative manifesto for 2015](https://www.conservatives.com/Manifesto) included the push to recognise “the root causes of poverty: entrenched worklessness, family breakdown, problem debt, and drug and alcohol dependency”. We are in the first half of a decade of “poverty: the re-brand”. The Conservatives are less looking to alleviate hunger, more create a new understanding of it. How the government chooses to interpret today’s figures will act as fuel to what is an ideological mission. The poor are poor because of their own dependency, and – rather than socio-economic travesties – the bedroom tax to cuts to child tax credits are innovations. Show some gratitude. The Conservatives are saving the poor from themselves.

**Misinformation is the method - it’s empirical - Trump did it to reduce welfare.**

**Deaton, Nobel winner, 19** [Angus Deaton, (Angus Deaton, the 2015 Nobel laureate in economics, is Professor Emeritus of Economics and International Affairs at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs and Presidential Professor of Economics at the University of Southern California. , ) 1-8-2019, accessed on 3-9-2022, Project Syndicate, "How American Poverty Became “Fake News” | by Angus Deaton - Project Syndicate", https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/how-american-poverty-became-fake-news-by-angus-deaton-2019-01] chsAK

There are more “globally poor” people in the US than in Sierra Leone or Nepal, and the poverty rates in the US and China are similar, despite the more than threefold difference in per capita income. Unfortunately, as in so many areas, here, too, President Donald Trump’s administration is embracing alternative facts. PRINCETON – Under the administration of the incontinently mendacious President Donald J. Trump, everyone should worry about the integrity of America’s official statistics. They should worry about much more under Trump, particularly the fate of democracy in the United States. But without credible official data, there can be no genuine accountability – and thus no democracy. Consider the Trump administration’s reporting on poverty in the US. It seems that the baseline numbers produced by the US Census Bureau are (so far) intact, but there has been a flurry of misinterpretations that go beyond the usual partisan spin. Commentators on the right like to quote Ronald Reagan’s 1988 [claim](https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4642456/reagan-war-poverty-poverty-won) that in the War on Poverty, [declared](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/01/08/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-war-on-poverty/?utm_term=.82f220eb2dbe) by Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964, poverty won. That claim, perennially used as a cudgel to beat the social safety net that was expanded under Johnson’s “Great Society” reforms, is consistent with official poverty estimates, the methodology of which has not been updated since the 1960s. Because that methodology ignores taxes (including the earned income tax credit) and programs like food stamps (now called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP), their effects are not counted, no matter how successful they are in reducing want. Such a widely acknowledged statistical flaw invites commentators to fill the hole with their prejudices, as Reagan did. More recently, Trump’s Council of Economic Advisers, in a July [report](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Work-Requirements-in-Non-Cash-Welfare-Programs.pdf) arguing for work requirements to be attached to social benefits, claimed that, thanks to the American safety net, the War on Poverty “is largely over and is a success.” This argument hinges on abandoning traditional metrics, which measure income, and switching to consumption. Consumption is arguably (but only arguably) superior to income as a welfare measure, but it is unclear how many of the very poor participate in a burdensome and intrusive survey that has a 40% non-response rate. More worrying still is the essentially arbitrary “correction” to the consumer price index (CPI) that reduces the poverty line so that there are fewer people beneath it. Perhaps the official CPI does not adequately capture quality improvements in goods and services. The consequences of this have been addressed in the scholarly literature, notably by a National Academy of Sciences panel that argued against a mechanical correction. But debating that issue is very different from abandoning the official CPI in favor of a more politically advantageous one that comes close to eliminating poverty. A more egregious case of data manipulation concerns a report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights. At the invitation of the US government, the Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston, examined extreme poverty in the US. He [reported his findings](https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/125/30/PDF/G1812530.pdf?OpenElement) to the UN Human Rights Council in June 2018. The result makes for dreadful reading. Documenting the extraordinary depths of poverty in parts of the US, the report includes tent camps on the streets of Los Angeles, yards awash in untreated sewage because local authorities refuse to supply services, and the widespread use of fines and confiscations levied on poor people that many towns and cities are using to finance themselves. Whereas Johnson declared a war on poverty, parts of America are now waging a war on the poor. Many of us believe that, because the US social safety net is so imperfect, extreme poverty is more prevalent there than elsewhere – and certainly among developed countries. Welfare reform that encouraged work has been good for some of the poor, but bad for the poorest, expanding inequality within the poor population and hurting the worst off. Books by [Kathryn J. Edin and H. Luke Shaefer](http://www.twodollarsaday.com/) and by [Matthew Desmond](http://www.evictedbook.com/) have documented in detail the miseries of life at the bottom in America, and Shaefer and Edin argue that several million children in the US are living on less than two dollars a day. In a New York Times [commentary](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/opinion/poverty-united-states.html) published in January 2018, I noted that the World Bank now publishes estimates of global poverty that include the rich countries, and that those estimates show 5.3 million people in the US living on less than the equivalent of the world’s global poverty line. In my argument, I used $4 per person per day for rich countries as roughly equivalent to the global poverty line of $2 used for poor countries. There are more “globally poor” people in the US than in Sierra Leone or Nepal, and the poverty rates in the US and China are similar, despite the more than threefold difference in per capita income. The World Bank’s calculations that I reported were widely denounced – by both the right and the left. The Heritage Foundation [argues](https://www.heritage.org/poverty-and-inequality/report/examining-extreme-and-deep-poverty-the-united-states) that if one uses consumption, not income, there are only 250,000 globally poor people in the US. Never mind whether the parents selling their children’s social security numbers to survive, or risking their children’s safety to find a place to live, have time to participate in the consumption survey. Many on the left, meanwhile, refuse to believe that any American is as poor as the poorest in Africa or Asia. Whereas the right wants to decrease domestic transfers, the left wants to increase foreign transfers. The story then turns surreal. Alston’s report drew an angry rebuke from the US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, who [claimed](https://www.sanders.senate.gov/download/haley-response-to-sanders?id=EFF61D64-853F-4445-BCC8-2F6374F04537&download=1&inline=file) that “it is patently ridiculous for the United Nations to examine poverty in America,” and an official [US response](https://geneva.usmission.gov/2018/06/22/country-concerned-statement-in-response-to-sr-alstons-country-report-on-the-united-states/) saying that Alston’s numbers were wrong. Yet the only numbers Alston used came from the US Census Bureau, an estimate described in the response as “the exaggerated figure cited by the Special Rapporteur.” The response then approvingly cited the Heritage calculations, which are based on my $4-per-day poverty line. And then, perhaps only coincidentally, the Trump administration pulled the US out of the Human Rights Council, with the result that Haley did not attend the report’s presentation. She, like the Council of Economic Advisers, noted that the Trump administration knows how to tackle deep poverty, which is to force people to work. That may or may not be true, but denouncing the Census Bureau’s estimates in favor of those from the Heritage Foundation (there is [evidence](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/02/internal-documents-show-how-trump-administration-state-department-misled-public-on-poverty/) that agency officials objected) or conveniently tampering with the CPI, and then treating the alternative numbers as superior to the official statistics, is surely well beyond the pale. Trump’s administration showed in 2018 that it will admit no blemishes, whether extreme poverty or the unconscionable death toll following Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico. And there is no reason to believe that further distortions of the truth, and the threat to democracy that such behavior implies, will not appear in the coming year.

#### **Poverty in the US is a death sentence –**

**Eskow 18** [Richard Eskow, 1-22-2018, accessed on 2-24-2021, OurFuture.org by People's Action, "Death by Inequality: Poverty and Racism Are Killing America's Children | OurFuture.org by People's Action", https://ourfuture.org/20180122/death-by-inequality-poverty-and-racism-are-killing-americas-children] chsMM/AK

A new report concludes 600,000 children have died in the United States for no reason over a 50-year period. Thousands more will die this year, and next year, and the year after that. 600,000 is a lot of people. it’s more than the population of Tulsa, Oklahoma. Or Oakland, California. Or Minneapolis, Minnesota. Or Omaha, Miami, Atlanta, and Milwaukee. An entire city of children has been lost. This is the real “death tax.” It’s a tax on poverty, a tax on race, a tax on political powerlessness. And it’s paid with the lives of the innocent. These deaths should have led every news broadcast and been a banner headline in every newspaper in the country. They would have been, if terrorists had killed these kids. After all, we changed our way of life after 3,000 people died on 9/11. But after the deaths of 600,000 children, nothing’s changed at all. Lost Children The [report](https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2017.0767), published in the journal Health Affairs, compared child mortality in the United States with that of 19 other comparably developed nations. Here’s what the authors found: A child born in the U.S. is 76 percent more likely to die before reaching adulthood than a child born elsewhere in the developed world. “From 2001 to 2010 the risk of death in the U.S. was 76 percent greater for infants and 57 percent greater for children ages 1–19.” “During this decade, children ages 15–19 were eighty-two times more likely to die from gun homicide in the U.S.. Over the fifty-year study period, the lagging U.S. performance amounted to over 600,000 excess deaths.” The leading cause of infant death was extreme immaturity, which was three times higher for American infants, followed by sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). For children aged 15 to 19, motor vehicle accidents were the leading cause of death. Significantly, these accidents were twice as likely to result in death in the U.S. The second-leading cause of death was gunfire. American teens were 82 times more likely to die by gun than their peers in the comparison countries. “There is not a single category for which the (comparison countries) had higher mortality rates than the U.S. over the last three decades of our analysis.” The United States spends more on health care than the other countries, but has worse outcomes. Although it spent more on health care, the U.S. “spent significantly less of its gross domestic product(GDP) per capital on child health and welfare programs, compared to other wealthy nations.” These programs also affect child health. A Moral Failure The U.S., say the report’s authors, is “the most dangerous of wealthy nations for a child to be born into.” As the [Los Angeles Times](http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-childhood-mortality-usa-20180108-story.html) notes, “The study authors said their findings support the conclusions of the Institute of Medicine, which blamed a fragmented health system, poverty, a weak social safety net and other factors for ‘poor health outcomes’ in the U.S.” The authors reached the following conclusions: “The care of children is a basic moral responsibility of our society. The U.S. outspends every other nation on health care per capital for children, yet outcomes remain poor.” “All U.S. policy makers, pediatric health professionals, child health advocates, and families should be troubled by these findings.” They also warn that Donald Trump’s proposed budget cuts will make the situation even worse. And, as of this writing, Republicans in Congress have not renewed funding for the children’s health insurance program known as CHIP. Parents are already [being warned](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/01/18/lets-remember-9-million-kids-health-insurance-is-at-stake-in-this-budget-fight/?utm_term=.44a62985a462) that their children’s coverage could lapse as soon as next month if Congress doesn’t act. Medical Apartheid The Health Affairs report is new, but we’ve known about the systemic injustices in our healthcare system for a long time. African-American infant mortality rates are 2.2 times higher than those of non-Hispanic whites. They were 3.2 times more likely to die from complications due to low birthweight, and experienced more than twice the rate of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS). Racial disparities are even more pronounced when they are combined with geographic differences. The infant mortality rate in [Mississippi](http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/13/health/infant-mortality-mississippi/index.html) is the highest in the country. At 9.4 deaths per thousand, that state is closer to Costa Rica, Botswana, and Sri Lanka than it is to the overall United States. A [2015 study](http://www.newsweek.com/washington-global-infant-maternal-mortality-328148) found that infants born Washington D.C.’s poorest neighborhood were ten times more likely to die than its richest infants. That neighborhood, Ward 8, was 93.5 percent black at the time. It also found that the nation’s capital has a higher infant mortality rate than any other capital in the developed world. Another recent [infant mortality report](http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/04/health/infant-mortality-by-state-study/index.html) found something else significant: The white, non-Hispanic infant mortality rate ranged from a low of 2.52 deaths per 1,000 in the Washington, DC to a high of 7.04 in Arkansas. That difference is, of itself, an injustice. The mortality rate for black infants ranged from a low of 8.27 per 1,000 in Massachusetts to a high of 14.28 in Wisconsin. That means a black infant born in Wisconsin faces the same [likelihood of death](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2091rank.html) as an infant born in the West Bank of Palestine. She or he is more likely to die than an infant born in Colombia, or Jamaica, or Venezuela, or Tunisia. Something else is striking about these race-based statistics: The country’s worst white infant mortality rate is better than its best black rate. That is apartheid, and it is a moral crime. Racial and Economic Barriers A [2011 study](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22191192) compared World Health Organization data from the U.S. and 19 countries and found that the U.S. had the worst child mortality rates. Using a UNICEF standard of measurement, it concluded that “the USA health care system appears the least efficient and effective in ‘meeting the needs of its children’.” Meeting the needs of our children: why can’t we do it? Many parents can’t afford adequate healthcare for either expectant mothers or children. Many of the same parents also face barriers of entrenched racism.

#### Globally, poverty outweighs war and is the root cause of violence

James **Gilligan**, **1996**. Professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School and Director of the Center for the Study of Violence. Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and Its Causes, p. 195-96.

The finding that structural violence causes far more deaths than behavioral violence does is not limited to this country. Kohler and Alcock attempted to arrive at the number of excess deaths caused by socioeconomic inequities on a worldwide basis. Sweden was their model of the nation that had come closest to eliminating structural violence. It had the least inequity in income and living standards and the lowest discrepancies in death rates and life expectancy; and the highest overall life expectancy in the world. When they compared the life expectancies of those living in the other socioeconomic systems against Sweden, they found that 18 million deaths a year could be attributed to structural violence to which the citizens of all the other nations were being subjected. During the past decade the discrepancies between the rich and poor nations have increased dramatically and alarmingly. The 14-18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths a year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths including those caused by genocide- or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000 deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-73) and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the US and USSR (232 million) it was clear that even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six year period. **This is**, in effect, **the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide, perpetuated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world**. Structural violence is also the main cause of behavioral violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to war and genocide). The question as to which of the two forms of violence-structural or behavioral- is more important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.

### Plan

#### Thus, I affirm: In a democracy a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

#### We defend Watt 21s as the advocate, clarifies our implementation.

#### An objective press is achieved by a four-tier process- it best solves and kills misinformation.

Watts 21 (Watts, Duncan J., et al. “Measuring the News and Its Impact on Democracy.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 118, no. 15, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1912443118>. //chskk/MM)

The objective of a comprehensive research agenda to study the origins, nature, and consequences of misinformation on democracy in turn entails assembling four subsidiary components: 1) A large-scale data infrastructure for studying the production, distribution, consumption, and absorption of news over time and across the entire information ecosystem (including the web, television, radio, and other modes of production). 2) A “mass collaboration” model that leverages the shared infrastructure to advance replicable, cumulative, and ultimately useful science. 3) A program for communicating the insights generated by the research to stakeholders outside of the research community (e.g., journalists, policymakers, industry leaders, the public). 4) A network of academic–industry partnerships around data and solutions. Objective 1: Building a Large-Scale Data Infrastructure for Studying News Production, Distribution, Consumption, and Absorption. A primary requirement for comprehensive research agenda around misinformation is a shared, open infrastructure for collecting data and running experiments at scale for diverse populations over long timescales. Such an infrastructure would facilitate results that generalize better than prior work and can be more easily implemented in practice. Moreover, the infrastructure would be open, meaning that it would be made available to the research community while also addressing issues of data security, individual privacy, and intellectual property. To illustrate the scale and scope of the proposed infrastructure, Fig. 1 shows a schematic of the information ecosystem, which is represented in four “layers”: 1) production, 2) consumption and distribution, 3) absorption and understanding, and 4) action and engagement. Each layer corresponds to a different stage of the process by which information about events and issues affecting a democracy ultimately impacts public opinion, understanding, and civic engagement. Each layer also corresponds to different types of data that derive from distinct sources, typically in different formats and sampled in different ways. Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the information ecosystem. Production (web, TV, radio). What information is produced, either by online publishers or by TV or radio broadcasters, that could potentially inform and/or influence public opinion? The web alone comprises many thousands of news sources, ranging from large and comprehensive (e.g., The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal) to small and niche, from neutral to partisan, and including original news publishers as well as aggregators and distributors. As noted earlier, publishers can bias the news they produce in several ways, including selection (what they choose to cover vs. ignore), emphasis (how prominently a given story is featured and for how long), slant (how headlines are written, the tone of the article, the relative emphasis of different facts), and finally outright deception (fake news, propaganda, etc.). To obtain a comprehensive, longitudinal view of information production, the research community requires a continuously updated catalog of information sources relevant to contemporary issues and political discourse. Several media databases already exist (e.g., Media Cloud, Event Registry, GDELT, Internet Archive’s TV news archive, Newsbank). However, they are not designed to directly support the range of queries that are the focus of many research questions; thus, results typically require substantial investment in postprocessing. In addition, they do not exhibit the kind of methodological transparency that is required for academic research (41) and/or they do not have the comprehensiveness across the necessary range of site and modes. To illustrate the problem, simple keyword searches (e.g., “Hillary Clinton emails”) on unpreprocessed corpora of articles will return many irrelevant articles (i.e., those that contain the keywords but are not about the topic) and will also miss many relevant articles (i.e., those that are on the topic but do not use the exact keywords). Moreover, the results contain no information about features such as partisanship or sentiment that must then be appended by the researcher. Keyword-based search results, in other words, are largely uninformative without a large amount of supplemental data cleaning and analysis. Because this work is typically done in a one-off, nonreplicable manner, simply collecting and storing vast amounts of news data does not on its own do much to accelerate the research process. A central objective for any collective research effort, therefore, is to build data processing pipelines and systems on top of the raw data that make them easily queryable by researchers and journalists alike. Included in this objective is also the capability for independent researchers to develop and contribute new modes of querying (e.g., abstracting away from specific stories to broader themes or narratives) as well as new methods for generating relevant metadata (e.g., stance, sentiment, partisan bias, etc.). Consumption and distribution (desktop and mobile panels). Much of the information that is produced receives little attention, while some stories resonate with millions. Even comprehensive and well-annotated data on news production, therefore, do not on their own tell us how that information is or is not reaching consumers, let alone how different types of information reaches different types of consumers. Are there groups of people who watch MSNBC in the morning, surf mainstream news during the day, and watch Fox News at night? Do Breitbart and Daily Kos readers also get mainstream news on TV or the web? One potential direction for research on media consumption is to leverage commercial panel providers such as Nielsen, ComScore, Pew Research, and YouGov. Although valuable (see, e.g., next section), these “off-the-shelf” solutions also exhibit some important limitations. In particular, desktop-only panels increasingly suffer from coverage gaps in part because they do not capture mobile activity, and in part because an increasing amount of web traffic is contained in “walled gardens” such as Facebook within which user activity is visible only to the platform. Ultimately, therefore, it will be necessary to develop new data sources. For example, a dedicated mobile panel would greatly facilitate the measurement of information consumption across social and conventional media, as well as enable linkage to other behaviors of potential interest. In addition, certain modes of consumption—in particular social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Reddit), but also email, messaging services (e.g., WhatsApp)—are also mechanisms for distribution. A proper understanding of consumption, therefore, will also require data on information distribution. Absorption and understanding (polls, virtual labs). Just as the publication of a particular piece of information does not guarantee that anyone will see it, so is exposure to information no guarantee of awareness, understanding, or agreement about its meaning (4, 42). Exposure to disconfirming information may reduce polarization, increase it, or have no effect depending on other factors (43, 44). Understanding how consumption translates into knowledge and/or beliefs is therefore critical to designing and evaluating possible interventions. Building off of recent advances in nonprobability polling techniques (45, 46), one could conduct regular panel surveys to probe public knowledge and explore the baselines and shifts in knowledge and attitudes. Polling of this sort could yield indices of facts and sentiment from the general population that could be correlated with media consumption on various issues and, ultimately, civic participation. Understanding of opinion change, influence, and deliberation would also be accelerated via experiments conducted in online “virtual labs” (47). Action and engagement (admin data, ethnography). In addition to being an end in itself, knowledge is also important to democracy inasmuch as it translates into political action: voting, community organizing, engagement with legislators, political speech, and protest. An important goal for any comprehensive research agenda is therefore to understand the link between the production, consumption, and absorption of information on the one hand, and action on the other hand. Because “political action” is a multidimensional concept, however, quantifying action is challenging, at a minimum requiring diverse administrative datasets (e.g., voter records, campaign contributions, volunteering, protesting, search, activity on social media, etc.), but also survey and ethnographic data to elucidate levels of engagement in the political process, broadly construed (48). Alternatively, or in order to get repeated actions or more coverage, researchers could leverage proxies for engagement such as search queries as a proxy for intent (49) or lightweight user actions (following, retweeting, liking, commenting, etc.) as a proxy for interest (50). Objective 2: Build a “Mass Collaboration” Model to Advance Replicable, Cumulative, and Useful Knowledge. Maximizing the value of the data infrastructure just described will also require a “mass collaboration” model in which many researchers leverage the same data assets (51). Mass collaboration models based on shared infrastructure have an established track record in the physical sciences (e.g., the Sloan Digital Sky Survey, the Large Hadron Collider, the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory) and also in biology (e.g., the Human Genome Project), but are unfamiliar to many social scientists (the closest model would be surveys such as the General Social Survey, the American National Election Studies, and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics). The ultimate success of any such model is therefore subject to its acceptance by the relevant research community, which cannot be guaranteed ex ante. Nonetheless, the model has some advantages over the traditional single investigator model that we believe increase its chances of successful adoption. 1) It will enable the research community to better leverage the data assets to produce many times the research output that would be possible with a traditional laboratory model in which both data collection/curation and research are conducted in-house. 2) It lends itself to more comparable research, as researchers can more easily replicate the questions, data, and analytics of previous work, when conducting new inquiries. Often replication efforts are complicated by potentially subtle differences in framing, data, and methods between exploratory and confirmatory studies. 3) It allows researchers to contribute in a variety of ways including a) additional data sources (e.g., text of radio transcripts, social media data); b) improved methods for processing and/or analyzing existing data (e.g., better named entity extraction or topic identification); c) appending useful metadata derived from their own research (e.g., content categories, partisanship labels); d) direct financial support from research grants to support overhead. By accommodating different types of contributions, a shared infrastructure approach should appeal to a wider range of potential collaborators, thereby also increasing its value to subsequent researchers. Objective 3: Communicate Insights to Nonacademic Stakeholders. An important facilitator of success in the proposed research enterprise is that it be perceived as both legitimate (i.e., rigorous, transparent, and nonpartisan) and also useful. In addition to gathering and organizing data and coordinating research across many research groups, an important goal is therefore to translate the output of the work for nonacademic audiences. More broadly, it is important to advocate for the importance of the social sciences in addressing critical needs, like information ecosystem design in democracies. Although there are many ways to engage stakeholders outside of academia (e.g., blog posts, white papers), one interesting approach that naturally leverages the existence of a centralized data infrastructure is to expose the data itself via web-based interactive visualizations (aka “dashboards”) that allow journalists, activists, policymakers, researchers, and members of the public to explore the evidence directly. Another benefit of data dashboards is that, in contrast with published research findings, they are dynamic entities that maintain their relevance even in a fast-moving environment. Rather than reading a statistic about the prevalence of fake news or the diversity of news consumption as it was when the researchers did their work months or even years ago, for example, a dashboard populated with (nearly) live data could show its prevalence as of yesterday, as well as how it has changed in the past week, month, or year. Visualizing data in a way that is psychologically effective and also scientifically valid is a nontrivial undertaking that requires expertise in statistics, user experience design, and software development as well as the substantive domain in question (52, 53). Without downplaying the challenges inherent in designing and implementing useful interactive dashboards, we hope that they will help to ground the public debate around misinformation and democracy on rigorous, nonpartisan evidence. Objective 4: Develop Academic-Industry Partnerships around Data and Solutions. Modifying the information ecosystem to better support democracy is an example of what has been called solution-oriented social science (40, 54, 55), meaning that it advances fundamental understanding of the social sciences in the course of solving concrete problems of practical interest (56). Rather than pursuing a research agenda based purely on theoretical interest, that is, research should address the concrete challenges confronting the participants (e.g., technology and media companies, fact-checking organizations, scientific societies, etc.) in the information ecosystem. To this end, it is critical to foster academic–industry partnerships with the goal of not only understanding but also improving the information ecosystem. Partnerships could advance solution-oriented research in a variety of ways, including helping to define the research agenda and specific questions, contributing data, providing analytical tools, translating research findings into design principles, and implementing and testing potential solutions. Journalists and media organizations are perfectly situated to ask questions and provide a platform for disseminating results, while technology firms have data that researchers could use, as well as access to analytical tools. For example, voter files offer ground truth voting behavior (57), search queries correlate with certain offline behaviors (58, 59), and lightweight user actions (e.g., replying, liking, sharing, and commenting) are a useful proxy for engagement. Finally, beyond harvesting existing telemetry data, the capability to design, implement, and test interventions (e.g., reducing uncivil discourse, increasing relative consumption of high-quality information, etc.) requires direct access to proprietary platforms. The topic of academic–industry partnerships around data has been of increasing interest to academic researchers (see, e.g., ref. 60), but only limited progress has been made in securing the cooperation of industry partners. Perhaps the most prominent recent example is Social Science One (https://socialscience.one/), a commission of senior academics who work with companies (thus far restricted to Facebook) to make preapproved datasets available to researchers while also waiving their right to suppress publication of unfavorable results (39). Although Social Science One is promising, our proposed approach differs from it by starting first with an independent, researcher-designed, and managed data infrastructure. As both these models, along with other models that are being developed in the domain of government administrative data (see, e.g., https://www.aisp.upenn.edu/) and health informatics (see, e.g., https://saildatabank.com/), have their respective strengths and weaknesses, we see them as complements rather than substitutes. Research Questions In this section, we briefly summarize a selection of completed, in-progress, or planned research projects that utilize data of the sort described above. These examples are intended only to illustrate some possibilities and not to limit the scope of the overall research agenda, which we hope will be determined by the collective creativity of a whole research community. Putting Fake News in Context. As described above, in recent work (18), we have quantified fake news consumption across multiple platforms including television, desktop, and mobile web, finding that it constitutes less than 1/10th of 1% of total daily media consumption, and less than 1% of overall news consumption. Surprisingly, we also find that news consumption in general constitutes a small fraction of overall media consumption (roughly 14%) and is heavily biased toward television across all age categories. Selection vs. Framing. Which is more important to the underlying and perceived partisanship of publications: selection (which topics they choose to cover) or framing (what slant they give those topics they select to cover)? In future work, we plan to track and map both activities historically and in real time for daily news events spanning television and online content. Content Overlap in Online News. In response to declining revenue, news publishers have reduced costs by replacing original content with copied or slightly edited versions of generic stories provided via wire services (i.e., AP, Reuters). In ongoing work, we are attempting to quantify the proportion of news reporting that is either copied or unique, as well as the patterns of content overlap that exist within and between news articles. In future work, we will construct networks of publishers characterized by their cocopying patterns, identifying clusters of redundant coverage. Snippet-Based Content Classification. Prior work on news consumption has relied on classifications of content at the domain (e.g., http://nytimes.com or http://infowars.com) or program (e.g., Today Show, CBS Evening News) level. This approach, while easy to implement, misclassifies content that is not representative of the domain/program of which it is a part (e.g., news content on late-night comedy shows) or is simply not a part of any domain/program (e.g., user-generated content). In ongoing work, we are developing methods using human labelers to classify content at the “snippet” level, where a snippet is defined as a short piece of text or video, thereby allowing us to compare the proportion of news and misinformation across platforms. Ideologically Segregated Consumption. Partisan echo chambers, and selective exposure to partisan news more generally, are of key concern to communication scholars and the public (61, 62). In ongoing work, we seek to replicate previous findings (63–65) regarding the ideological segregation of online news exposure over the 2016–2018 interval as well as to compare it with television news consumption. Comparing Survey with Behavioral Data. Surveys are a vital tool in understanding public opinion and knowledge, but have been shown to overestimate news consumption (66, 67). In forthcoming work (68), we show that the bias extends to online and social media-based news consumption and also fails to accurately capture trends. We highlight how behavioral data are more easily adaptable to the wide range of possible results that a researcher may need to answer with different, but related, sets of questions about news consumption. Measuring Awareness and Understanding of News Events. In ongoing work, we are pulling the top facts from online articles each day and running regular polls that ask 1) whether respondents are aware of a given event, and 2) if so, whether or not they know the facts in question. In addition to measuring the relationship between news coverage and public awareness, this dataset will initiate a larger program of tracking which types of information are absorbed by the news consuming public, and via which channels. Conclusion The debate around misinformation and its potentially damaging effects on public opinion, understanding, and democratic decision making is complex and multifaceted. There is not, to our knowledge, any general consensus on what “the problem” is, and even less agreement on what the solution or solutions ought to be (2, 4, 5, 13, 16, 17, 24, 29). We do not pretend that our approach will resolve these disagreements over what matters and what to do about it. To the extent that such disagreements arise and persist because of the absence of systematic empirical evidence, however, we hope that it will help, in two ways. First, the creation of a shared, open data infrastructure to support research on misinformation and its effect on democracy will reduce existing barriers to producing rigorous, replicable, and ultimately useful science. Second, exposing the data and research insights to external stakeholders via continuously updating interactive visualizations will force interlocutors to confront the world as it is (or at least as it has been measured) rather than how they imagine it to be. Of course, we acknowledge that measurement itself is also imperfect in important ways; however, we do not see these shortcomings as a reason not to rely on data, but rather as a motivation to design better instruments and to collect better data. That data will also be imperfect, and the process of discovering that will in turn motivate better instruments, and so on. Just as no one experiment can settle any complex social scientific question, no one dataset can ever satisfactorily capture everything that we might care about. The process of informing our understanding of the world with evidence will therefore be an ongoing one. Our proposal is simply that we cannot afford not to begin this process.

#### Put away your circumvention cards- empirically verifiable facts guarantee a basis for objective truth and the method by which we defend objective practices ensure the best outcome

Sonnemaker 15 (Sonnemaker, Tyler, "Objectivity and the Role of Journalism in Democratic Societies" (2015). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 1057. <http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1057> //chskk)

In thinking of this objectivity-subjectivity spectrum, we must remember that it does not span endlessly in either direction. On one end, we can reject entirely any claims of truth that directly contradict objective, empirically verifiable facts about the external world. For example, “a water molecule is composed of two hydrogen atoms and one helium atom,” is untenable. Water is actually composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, and we have myriad scientific methods by which to confirm that this is how hydrogen is composed in reality. Thus, the former statement has no claim on truthfulness at all. On the other end, human fallibility and our limited knowledge prevents us from saying something like “the law of gravity is, has, and will always be a constant force in the universe.” But within this range is a multitude of facts, theories, opinions, and even values that we place on the spectrum according to the degree with which we can objectively verify their truth. As I will show to some extent in the remainder of this chapter, and more extensively in Chapters 3 and 4, there are certain criteria that journalists ought to rely on in order to accomplish this. The crucial point here is that, while no one denies the importance of ontological accuracy (how well does a fact actually correspond with reality), the emphasis is on identifying objective methods by which to verify their reliability. Determining a statement’s objective truth is a process of inquiry — by ensuring the integrity of this process, we ensure that the outcome of our inquiry (our various ontological claims about the world), are as reliable as possible.34 But before we can determine the methods and criteria that should guide this process, we need an understanding of how our cognition exposes us to the world

### Framing

#### Ideal theory is too abstract to motivate descriptive agents - it fails as a fundamental ethic. Only non-ideal theory that begins from lived, material experiences can guide action.

Mills 05 [Mills, Charles. W, Professor of Moral and Intellectual philosophy at Northwestern University, “Ideal Theory” as Ideology. Hypatia, Volume 20, Number 3, Summer 2005, pp. 165-184. <http://www.nsdupdate.com/assets/2017/02/Ideal-theory-as-ideology.pdf>] chsAK

I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically naïve or jejune, is in fact the correct one. If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point of ethics is to guide our actions and make ourselves better people and the world a better place, then the framework above [ideal theory] will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise. In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved. It is no accident that historically subordinated groups have always been deeply skeptical of ideal theory, generally see its glittering ideals as remote and unhelpful, and are attracted to nonideal theory, or what significantly overlaps it, “naturalized” theory. In the same essay cited above, Jaggar identifies a “unity of feminist ethics in at least one dimension,” a naturalism “characteristic, though not definitive, of it” (Jaggar 2000, 453). Marxism no longer has the appeal it once did as a theory of oppression, but it was famous for emphasizing, as in The German Ideology, the importance of descending from the idealizing abstractions of the Young Hegelians to a focus on “real, active [people] men,” not “men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived,” but “as they actually are,” in (class) relations of domination (Marx and Engels 1976, 35–36). And certainly black Americans, and others of the racially oppressed, have always operated on the assumption that the natural and most illuminating starting point is the actual conditions of nonwhites, and the discrepancy between them and the vaunted American ideals. Thus Frederick Douglass’s classic 1852 speech, “What to the Slave Is the Fourth [of] July?” points out the obvious, that the inspiring principles of freedom and independence associated with the celebration are not equally extended to black slaves: “I am not included within the pale of this glorious anniversary! Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between us. . . . The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence, bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me. . . . This Fourth July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I must mourn” (1996, 116, emphasis in original). So given this convergence gender, class, and race theory on the need to make theoretically central the existence and functioning of the actual non-ideal structures that obstruct the realization of the ideal, what defensible arguments for abstracting away from these realities could there be?

Thus, the standard is mitigating structural violence— it’s consequentialist. Prefer:

[1] Parameters—theoretical justifications come first since they frame an obligation constitutive to the judge whose role is an educator—prefer our framing:

(a) Inclusion – discussions of structural violence and material oppression allow for ALL underprivileged people to be in our calculus to make debate more inclusive . Outweighs since all voter assume people can access debate spaces.

### UV

#### [1] 1AR theory –

#### a) AFF gets it - otherwise neg can engage in infinite abuse

#### b) drop the debater – 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse