# 1st off

**Interp: The aff must disclose the plan text and the advantage 30 minutes before round**

**Violation:**

**They didn’t, they didn’t even put their contact info on the wiki**

**1] Evidence Ethics – Disclosure is the only way to verify that cards aren’t miscut or highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat**

**2] Depth of clash – allows debaters to have specific researched objections to the 1AC evidence – that leads to better ev comparison – o/ws because thinking on your feet is non-unique; we still have to do that for responses and CX**

**3] Reciprocity – they get infinite pre-round prep to write the 1AC and we get none to research it**

**4] Education – a) their model incentivizes terrible “one-and-done” affs that are intellectually bankrupt and decrease education – proves they just want the ballot; b) o/ws claims of innovation because innovation is only valuable if the ideas are valuable.**

**Voters are education – it’s why schools fund debate – and fairness – that’s a threshold issue because otherwise you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments**

**Paradigm issues**

**DTD**

**1] Actual abuse - I had to alter my strat to run theory**

**2] Deters future abuse – norm-setting**

**3] DTA is DTD – it’s the 1AC**

**4] At minimum if we’re winning any part of the shell they can’t weigh case; A] lack of preround prep means their truth claims are untested which you should presume them false; B] 1AR extensions look stronger than they really are b/c they kept me from cutting specific evidence to challenge their link chain – that’s a reason why new affs are bad, not why the 1AC is true –no “try or die” 2AR**

#### Competing interps: Reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices.

# 2nd off

## Abolish CP

**Text: The World Trade Organization ought to be abolished. The United States ought to independently and without influence from international government reduce IP protection for COVID-19**

**Hawley, senator, JD Yale, 20**

(Josh, 5-5, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html)

The coronavirus emergency is not only a public health crisis. With [30 million Americans unemployed](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/us-weekly-jobless-claims.html), it is also an economic crisis. And it has exposed a hard truth about the modern global economy: it weakens American workers and has empowered China’s rise. That must change. The global economic system as we know it is a relic; it requires reform, top to bottom. We should begin with one of its leading institutions, **the World Trade Organization. We should abolish it.**

**Eliminating the WTO ends U.S. global hegemony**

**Bello, PhD, 2000**

(Walden, Sociology @ Stanford, https://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1352/ecologist/Should%20WTO%20be%20abolished.pdf)

The idea that the world needs the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one of the biggest lies of our time. The WTO came about, in 1995, mainly because it was in the interest of the US and its corporations. The European Union, Japan and especially the developing countries were mostly ambivalent about the idea; it was the US which drove it on. Why? Because though the US, back in 1948, blocked the formation of an International Trade Organisation (ITO), believing that, at that time, the interests of its corporations would not be served by such a global body, it had changed its mind by the 1990s. Now it wanted an international trade body. Why? Because its global economic dominance was threatened. The flexible GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) system, which preceded the WTO, had allowed the emergence of Europe and East Asia as competing industrial centres that threatened US dominance even in many high-tech industries. Under GATT’s system of global agricultural trade, Europe had emerged as a formidable agricultural power even as Third World governments concerned with preserving their agriculture and rural societies limited the penetration of their markets by US agricultural products. In other words, before the WTO, **global trade was growing by leaps and bounds**, but countries were using trade policy to industrialise and adapt to the growth of trade so that their economies would be enhanced by global trade and not be marginalised by it. That was a problem, from the US point of view. And that was why the US needed the WTO. The essence of the WTO is seen in three of its central agreements: the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The purpose of TRIPs is **not to promote free trade but to enhance monopoly power**. One cannot quarrel with the fact that innovators should have preferential access to the benefits that flow from their innovation for a period of time. TRIPs, however, goes beyond this to institutionalise a monopoly for high-tech corporate innovators, most of them from the North. Among other things, TRIPs provides a generalised minimum patent protection of 20 years; institutes draconian border regulations against products judged to be violating intellectual property rights; and – contrary to the judicial principle of presuming innocence until proven guilty – places the burden of proof on the presumed violator of process patents. What TRIPs does is reinforce the monopolistic or oligopolistic position of US high tech firms such as Microsoft and Intel. It makes industrialisation by imitation or industrialisation via loose conditions of technology transfer – a strategy employed by the US, Germany, Japan, and South Korea during the early phases of their industrialisation – all but impossible. It enables **the technological leader**, in this case **the US, to greatly influence** **the pace of technological and industrial development in the rest of the world**.

**Primacy causes endless war, terror, authoritarianism, prolif, and Russia-China aggression.**

**Ashford, PhD, 19**

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 4, CNAS)

**Humility is a virtue**. Yet in the last quarter century, American policymakers have been far more likely to embrace the notion of America as the “indispensable nation,” responsible for protecting allies, promoting democracy and human rights, tamping down conflicts, and generally managing global affairs. Compare this ideal to the U.S. track record – **endless Middle Eastern wars, the rise of ISIS, global democratic backsliding, a revanchist Russia, resurgent China**, and a world reeling from the election of President Donald Trump – and this label seems instead **the height of hubris.** Many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy speak for themselves. As the daily drumbeat of bad news attests, interventions in Iraq and Libya were **not victories for human rights or democracy, but rather massively destabilizing** for the Middle East as a whole. Afghanistan – despite initial military successes – has become a quagmire, highlighting the futility of nation- building. Other failures of America’s grand strategy are less visible, but no less damaging. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe helped to reignite hostility between Russia and the West. Worse, it has diluted the alliance’s defensive capacity and its democratic character. And even as the war on terror fades from public view, it remains as open-ended as ever: Today, the United States is **at war in seven countries and engaged in “combating terrorism’ in more than 80**.1 To put it bluntly: America’s strategy since the end of the Cold War – **whether it is called primacy or liberal internationalism** – may not be a total failure, but it **has not been successful** either. Many have tried to place blame for these poor outcomes.2 But recrimination is less important than understanding why America’s strategy has failed so badly and avoiding these mistakes in future. Much of the explanation is the natural outcome of changing constraints. **Iraq and Libya should not be viewed as regrettable anomalies, but rather the logical outcome of unipolarity and America’s liberal internationalist inclination to solve every global problem.** It’s also a reliance on **flawed assumptions** – that what is good for America is always good for the world, for example. Support for dangerous sovereignty-undermining norms adds to the problem; just look at the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has proved not to protect populations or stabilize fragile states, but to **provoke chaos, encourage nuclear proliferation, and undermine the international institutions.** Perhaps, if nothing else had changed, a form of watered-down liberal internationalism that foreswore interventionism and drew back from the war on terror might have been possible.3 But international politics are undergoing a period of profound transformation, from unipolarity to regional or even global multipolarity. **Primacy** – and the consistent drumbeat of calls in Washington to do more, always and everywhere – **is neither sustainable nor prudent.** Nor can we fall back on warmed-over Cold War–era strategies better suited to an era of bipolar superpower competition.

# 3rd off

#### The counterfeit medicine market is attracting new suppliers, but new technologies are evolving to crack down on counterfeits – it’s prevalence is tentative

Hallie B Forcinio 21 [Hallie Forcinio is BioPharm International's packaging editor, editorhal@sbcglobal.net . PharmTech, 2-2-2021, "Countering Counterfeiters and Diverters," https://www.pharmtech.com/view/countering-counterfeiters-and-diverters]//anop

The never-ending battle against counterfeit pharmaceutical products has become fiercer with the pandemic. With product protection a constant concern, the market for anticounterfeiting technologies is strong, regulatory efforts are ongoing, and authentication and anticounterfeiting technologies are evolving. As a result, the anticounterfeiting packaging market is projected to grow at a 7.8% compound annual growth rate to $189.9 billion in 2026 (1). A major driver for this growth is the expanding use of e-commerce platforms, which make it easy to set up shop to sell fraudulent products and are largely unregulated. A study by Local Circles noted that approximately 20% of all products sold on e-commerce sites are counterfeit (1). Anticounterfeiting laws and regulations, such as the European Union’s Falsified Medicine Directive and the US’s Drug Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA), safeguard prescription drugs available from pharmacies. “However, pharmaceutical manufacturers should be aware that these measures alone will not guarantee a product’s integrity and authenticity,” says Gene Dul, president of Schreiner MediPharm US. He says, “Only additional counterfeit-proof authenticity features can provide a comprehensive approach against fraud, misuse, and tampering.” Unfortunately, the coronavirus pandemic has increased the opportunities for counterfeiting. “In a survey issued by IDC in June 2020, 70% of companies agreed that their supply chain is ‘very vulnerable’ to suffering more problems if the COVID-19 crisis lasted more than a couple of months longer, and 75% of companies agreed that the COVID-19 pandemic has ‘greatly increased/will greatly increase’ problems with diversion, theft, and counterfeiting of critical products such as test kits, vaccines, and antivirals,” reports Aimee Genzler, vice-president, Corporate & Brand Communications at TraceLink, the study sponsor (2). In fact, in anticipation of a spike in counterfeiting, the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) has launched Operation Stolen Promise 2, to halt the production, distribution, and sale of illicit COVID-19 treatments and vaccines. HSI reported that its agents have seized illicit proceeds and goods, made arrests, and shut down fraudulent websites (3), including the seizure of two domain names in December 2020 (4). The proliferation of counterfeit goods stems in part from the shift to e-commerce, which has been accelerated by stay-at-home orders and advisories and reduced access to physical retail pharmacies. “The emergence of on-line pharmacies poses a significant threat of escalation in counterfeit pharmaceuticals and underscores the urgent need for on-dose countermeasures,” reports Peter Wong, chief operating officer at TruTag Technologies, which recently entered a partnership with Colorcon to provide advanced security coatings for on-dose use. “Counterfeiters are opportunistic,” explains John Pitts, key account manager for Antares Vision, noting, “COVID-19 provided the ‘perfect storm’ for the counterfeiters: panic in consumers; product shortages from the brand name ethical providers; desire and, in many cases, requirement to purchase via e-commerce; and lack of and often conflicting information from the media and authorities.” Joe Farrell, life sciences expert at Loftware, concurs, “It seems clear that whenever there are high-value pharmaceutical products, there will be people trying to profit illegally. The fact that the COVID-19 vaccines need to be shipped in stringent cold storage containers with radio frequency identification (RFID) temperature sensors along with specialized transportation methods will make it more difficult for counterfeiters to enter the supply chain, but not impossible.” With COVID-19 vaccines now rolling out in limited quantities, demand will outstrip supply in the coming months. “This will create a ripe environment for unscrupulous parties to offer fake product,” says Wong, noting, “Distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine is designed to go to many more points of dispensing than for a normal pharmaceutical drug, as governments seek to deliver vaccinations broadly and as quickly as possible while maintaining demanding cold-chain requirements. These logistical requirements will create higher than normal transition points in the overall supply chain, which in turn create increase opportunities for diversion, adulteration, and fake product to reach the patient.” Counterfeiting countermeasures The pharmaceutical industry has been on the leading edge of anticounterfeiting and brand protection efforts for many years. “Anticounterfeit solutions are usually tailor-made according to the needs of the brand owner,” says Paavo Sillanpää, senior business manager, Pharma at UPM Raflatac. A diverse strategy considering threat scenario and product is needed. “Most pharma companies have a multi-layered approach,” notes Farrell. The most common physical solutions are tamper-evident labels and packaging materials, designs that prevent the placement of a counterfeit product into the original packaging, serialization, and overt and covert authentication methods such as holograms, invisible markers, and taggants. “Ideally, multi-level security concepts should be used that are individually tailored to a specific use case, combining analog and digital features, which can be verified by different stakeholders within the supply chain,” says Dul. There is heightened interest in tools and technologies that go beyond the package to protect patients, such as on-dose solutions. In addition, says Wong, “the industry is increasing its public awareness campaigns of the problem of fake and unsafe medicine in an effort to educate consumers about the dangers of unauthentic drug products.” As a result, Pitts predicts an increased focus on consumer engagement. He notes, “Enabling the end consumer and the dispenser to authenticate their products is powerful on so many levels. It makes counterfeiting more difficult, provides vital and real-time data to the consumer, and can offer the manufacturer feedback.” Labeling technologies Labeling plays an important role in the fight against counterfeit products. As the passport for moving products through the global supply chain, it contains any track-and-trace or authentication information. “In the label business, we have seen an increased interest in various tamper-evident (TE) solutions and holograms,” reports Sillanpää. One new product from UPM Raflatac combines heat resistance, advanced adhesion, and conformability. Designed primarily for the European market where cartoned blister packaging is common, the heat-resistant TE label won’t shrink in heat tunnels used to produce multipacks. UPM Raflatac has also introduced sustainable TE labeling. It’s produced from Forest Film, which Sillanpää says is “the world’s first wood-based plastic labeling material.” Benefits include performance equivalent to traditional plastic film label materials and the ability to help pharmaceutical brands achieve sustainability goals. Demand for more sustainable products extends to RFID and near-field communication (NFC) tags. Eco-friendly RFID and NFC tags from Identiv feature paper-based transponder inlays that reduce polyethylene terephthalate content, resulting in a repulpable substrate (5). RFID technology is integral to the Cap-Lock plus RFID cap adapter and label combination from Schreiner MediPharm. The label-integrated RFID inlay provides digital proof of integrity and first-opening evidence for syringes as well as product authentication. Dul explains, “The adapter is placed on top of the syringe’s primary closure and interlinked with it to equalize the diameter differences of the syringe body and closure. The label wraps around the syringe body and cap adapter and—once opened—provides irreversible tamper evidence due to an integrated perforation.” Printing and tagging technologies Magnetic ink is another potential anticounterfeiting tool. Technology from Inspectron relies on a proprietary reader, track-and-trace software, and magnetic ink, long used on checks to facilitate automated sorting. The magnetic ink is used to print a barcode, which is detectable even if it’s not visible to the eye. That means the code, which may be serialized, can be hidden on the inside of a carton or under a label and still be read. The current reader works from a distance of up to 2 mm, but units with longer read ranges are under development. “However, longer read ranges require bigger codes,” notes Nathalie Muller, head of Innovation at Inspectron. Although the first commercial application of the technology inkjets the codes on paper to enable identification of diverted product, Muller says, the permanent magnetic codes could be printed on plastic or glass containers and potentially support tasks like vial tracking. Also under development is a hybrid one- and two-dimensional barcode that would hold more data. On-dose technology enables authentication at the product level. Edible microparticles coupled with the Smart Medicine solution from TruTag Technologies confirms product authenticity and can help boost patient adherence and outcomes. A new Pharma Mobile App allows patients to scan each dose with their smartphone, authenticate it, and record that it was taken. If desired, the record of the dose can be shared with healthcare providers. The system also can link to other product information. In April 2020, FDA accepted molecular tagging technology from Applied DNA Sciences into its Emerging Technology Program (6). The company says that its technology is a multilayered platform that gives both the dose and the packaging an immutable identity for authentication. On Nov. 30, 2020, AlpVision launched its Alpvision COVID-19 Initiative to protect COVID-19-related therapeutics and vaccines against counterfeiting. Under the program, AlpVision provides pharmaceutical companies and their suppliers with the tools to deploy its Cryptoglyph digital security feature on their packaging. Invisible to the human eye, the Cryptoglyph feature can be authenticated via smartphone. Adopting the technology does not change the production process or involve additional consumables. In addition, the smartphone applications connect to AlpVision’s Brand Monitoring System, a centralized server platform that enables real-time monitoring of product authentication activities. AlpVision plans to provide this service for free until the World Health Organization declares the pandemic has ended (7). Software tools Physical technologies are common anticounterfeiting tools, but counterfeit and diversion prevention also relies on software. Farrell reports, “At Loftware, we are being asked for help in getting the correct information onto the label. It’s important to have an enterprise labeling solution that integrates with a company’s sources of data to make sure the correct approved information is automatically applied to the labels. This includes languages, barcodes, regulatory symbology, and regional product information. You also need a labeling solution that can aid with approving, managing, and promoting electronic information for use [data] to help speed the process for a faster time to market for these critical products.” Although not specifically an anticounterfeiting product, Loftware Spectrum software integrates with serialization solutions and ensures labeling is consistent, accurate, and contains the right serialized data and barcodes. “The use of global templates in an enterprise solution also helps our life sciences customers to globally standardize on the look of their supply chain labels to help identify counterfeited products,” he explains. The scalable Track My Way platform from Antares Vision offers single-unit, batch, and custom traceability; provides direct consumer engagement; and can extend from raw materials tracking to end-of-life package disposal/recycling. Geolocation functionality can track the harvesting of the raw materials, packaging locations, the movement of products through the supply chain, and the point-of-sale location. In April 2020, TraceLink released an anticounterfeiting tool called Smart Distribution Tracking. By integrating the Internet of Things with product serialization, Smart Distribution Tracking provides full track-and-trace visibility for the secure delivery of vaccines, test kits, and high-value products. Another software tool, the Summit Authentication Platform from Microtrace Solutions, is a customized system consisting of a self-authenticating, encrypted barcode; a Spectral Taggant; and a handheld detector plus a smartphone mobile app. “Our Spectral Taggant is a chemistry formulated into an ink that, when printed, is a highly secure ‘signature’ or ‘fingerprint,’” explains Brian Brogger, president at Microtrace Solutions. This signature can be authenticated instantly via the handheld spectrometer or smartphone without an Internet connection. For vaccines and therapeutics, the barcode and Spectral Taggant can be applied to security labels. The mobile app is then able to verify that the barcode was genuinely issued and the Spectral Taggant verifies that the barcode has not been copied. The system also can provide real-time reporting and analysis. The latest release of the Systech Brand Protection Suite from Systech International, the software solutions division of Markem-Imaje, delivers a fully integrated solution to combat counterfeiters, identifies product diversion, meets regulatory compliance, and provides analytics. The centerpiece of the suite, the company’s non-additive e-Fingerprint technology, turns any existing barcode into a unique, digital identifier to provide end-to-end visibility and actionable information as a product moves through the supply chain. New functions include the ability to push unique responses and content to users and smartphone authentication of e-Fingerprinted products. Responses can be tailored to the user, location, time, and safety of the product, and include photos or other information. A new analytics platform, Systech Insight, offers a series of Information on Demand dashboards and an analytics data pool (8).

#### IP protection prevents and quickly stops spread counterfeit medicines – multiple warrants

FIFARMA 21, [FIFARMA is the Latin American Federation of the Pharmaceutical Industry created in 1962. We represent 16 research-based biopharmaceutical companies and 11 local associations dedicated to discovering and developing innovative, quality and safe health products and services that improve the lives of patients in Latin America and the Caribbean and advocate for patient-centric, sustainable health systems characterized by high regulatory standards and ethical principles. (Apr 22, 2021), "This is how we fight counterfeit medicines with Intellectual Property," https://fifarma.org/en/this-is-how-we-fight-counterfeit-medicines-with-intellectual-property/]//anop

In addition to functioning as a tool to maintain constant innovation in the industry, IP helps reducing counterfeit medicines because medicines have better technologies and ingredients are more difficult to copy. This means that, through market incentives, the industry manages to have high quality infrastructure, new technology and trained personnel, to create specialized and specific medicines and therapies, which is why they are difficult to replicate. On the other hand, political will functions as another important axis, as it must prosecute those who are making counterfeit medicines. This is achieved through a constant conversation between industry and governments. Therefore, it will be absolutely clear how to identify the authenticity of medicines. In short, IP allows quality standards to be clearer and stricter, and regulators to have greater knowledge and traceability of each product that enters the market. Through IP, you can establish a record of all products globally, which makes it easier to find possible counterfeit medicines. Consequently, the best way to fight counterfeit medicines is through accessing the best quality medicines and for this to happen, an ecosystem between countries, regulators and industry is needed. This ecosystem shall take into account the structural deficiencies of each country and addresses them in a holistic manner, to provide the best quality medicines. In the end, with the Intellectual Property associated with the creation of the product, there are also associated standards of transparency and detailed information that every regulatory agency can access. Moreover, the value chains will receive all this information in order to be aware of the appearance of products that are not registered with the standards of a product protected by IP. Also, IP helps to combat counterfeit medicines internationally, since there are laws that cover all member countries of the United Nations and punish more severely those who commit this crime. Likewise, these laws provide countries with the necessary mechanisms to take concrete action once a counterfeit medicine is discovered. This, of course, must go hand in hand with the political will of each country, because only with collaboration between different actors will it be possible to prosecute the entire chain of counterfeit medicines. Plus, IP owners can receive electronic notifications worldwide more quickly and can take direct communication actions. In a nutshell, IP allows the industry to show the public almost immediately that there is a counterfeit medicine in a country or that a website is selling counterfeit medicines. This is because legally infringing a product protected by IP allows action to be taken to prosecute the counterfeit products. This is especially important for those consumers or small organizations that do not have access to information like a hospital or public health center has. However, it is necessary to involve other actors of the health system so that information about counterfeit medicines reaches remote regions or places, which do not have an internet connection. On the other hand, thanks to IP, the industry is creating specialized safety technology in order for each country to easily identify a drug that comes with a brand but does not belong to that brand. The industry has also used mobile laboratories to test samples of suspected medicines and report them quickly to the value chain. Thus, technology is becoming an important element in fighting this problem. Counterfeit medicines have a wide range of negative effects for different actors and especially for the people who fall victim of them. However, more and more governments and industries are creating concrete actions to pursue the entire chain of counterfeiters, as this is the only way to eradicate the problem all together. The tools to combat counterfeiting exist, the important thing is that actors know how to use them for the benefit of the greatest number of people in the world.

#### Pharmaceutical counterfeiting is increasingly used to support terrorism – used for funding and mediums of attacks

née Lybecker 18, Kristina M.L. Acri [Kristina M. L. Acri née Lybecker is an Associate Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics and Business at Colorado College in Colorado Springs, CO. (February 2018), "Pharmaceutical Counterfeiting: Endangering Public Health, Society and the Economy" Fraser Institute, https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/pharmaceutical-counterfeiting-endangering-public-health-society-and-the-economy.pdf]//anop

Pharmaceutical counterfeiting is linked to numerous forms of organized crime: drug trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism (Lybecker, 2016; Pfizer, 2007; Redpath, 2012; Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2006; UNODC, 2017). As reported by Redpath (2012: 7), “not only have groups such as the Russian mafia, Colombian drug cartels, Chinese triads and Mexican drug gangs all become heavily involved in producing and trafficking counterfeit drugs over the past decade, but mounting evidence also points to the direct involvement of Hezbollah and al Qaeda.” *Given the profitability of the endeavor, it is not surprising that pharmaceutical counterfeiting is increasingly a source of funding for terrorist groups* (Lybecker, 2016; Pfizer, 2007; Redpath, 2012). Moreover, by their very nature, organized criminal operations are well suited to the intricacies of pharmaceutical counterfeiting. “Criminal organisations have the advantage of huge resources, international networks and skilled labour. They can move with a speed that often confounds the authorities. Counterfeit versions of the antiviral drug Tamiflu were available on fake internet pharmacy sites, like the one posing as the ‘Canadian Pharmacy,’ within weeks of the [World Health Organization] declaration of H1N1 as a pandemic” (Redpath 2012: 8). While anecdotal evidence of the link is quite plentiful, the clandestine nature of the business as well as the secrecy maintained by law enforcement make it virtually impossible to either completely understand or measure the extent of the trade. A 2014 INTERPOL study provides perspective on pharmaceutical crime and organized criminal groups. INTERPOL’s Medical Product Counterfeiting and Pharmaceutical Crime Sub-Directorate has prepared an analysis of available data, dating from 2008 to 2014, to establish the extent of organized criminal groups (OCGs) activity in the realm of pharmaceutical crime (INTERPOL, 2014).5 According to the report, a recent Europol threat assessment concludes that there are “a wide variety of actors, operating within the pharmaceutical crime arena, encompassing both OCGs and individual criminals, both of which are involved at any point in the supply chain.” The report points to the involvement of both traditionally structured hierarchical crime groups in addition to highly organized, yet generally informal, networks of illicit online pharmacies and finally, small groups of three to ten members. The INTERPOL study, as well as those from other agencies, provides some perspective on the involvement of organized criminal groups in Canada. Numerous investigations in the US, Canada, and Sweden have linked the Hell’s Angels to the production and distribution of counterfeit medicines, in particular ED medications and steroids (INTERPOL, 2014). • Fake oxycontin pills containing fentanyl were responsible for more than 50 deaths in Alberta in 2015. The counterfeit pills are also responsible for three deaths in Saskatchewan (Partnership for Safe Medicines, 2015b). • In November 2013, Canadian authorities began an organized crime investigation named “Project Forseti,” targeting the Hells Angels and the Fallen Saints (Customs Today Report, 2015). In January of 2015, police in Saskatchewan and Alberta, Canada seized guns and drugs, including significant amounts of counterfeit oxycontin. A United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) study suggests that criminal networks use routes and methods to transport counterfeit medicines that are similar to those used to traffic in drugs, firearms, and people (UNICRI, 2012). Evidence suggests that organized criminal gangs involved in the production of synthetic drugs are able to easily access the materials and expertise needed to also produce counterfeit medicines. In both Europe and Southeast Asia, authorities cite evidence of “criminal manufacturers of amphetamine-type substances [that] have been involved in the production and distribution of counterfeit medicines” (INTERPOL, 2014).

#### Terrorism escalates to nuclear war

Ayson 10 (Robert Ayson. Robert Ayson is Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, where he works closely with the Centre for Strategic Studies. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects”. 6-21-2010. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2010.483756?journalCode=uter20>) **//TruLe**

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability.