# 1st off

#### India walked out on RCEP now but can rejoin easily.

**Raghavan 20** “RCEP: Door still open for India, may take part in meets as ‘observer’” Prabha Raghavan [Journalist @IndianExpress] November 16, 2020 <https://indianexpress.com/article/business/rcep-door-still-open-for-india-may-take-part-in-meets-as-observer-7052832/> SM

India, as an original negotiating participant of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), has the option of joining the agreement without having to wait 18 months as stipulated for new members in the terms of the mega trade pact. RCEP signatory states said they plan to commence negotiations with India once it submits a request of its intention to join the pact “in writing”, and it may participate in meetings as an observer prior to its accession. While India had been involved in RCEP negotiations since 2013, it walked out of the pact last year citing “significant outstanding issues” that were unresolved by the deadline to enter the agreement.

#### Strict IP protections are keeping India out of RCEP – plan reverses that.

**Mitra-Jha 17** “Big pharma, IP wars and profit over people” Shreerupa Mitra-Jha [Senior correspondent for diplomacy and international affairs] August 21, 2017 <https://www.governancenow.com/news/regular-story/-big-pharma-ip-wars-and-profit-over-people> SM

Sticking points As is typical of many mega FTA negotiations, RCEP talks are shrouded in secrecy. The scope of the possible deal is staggering which aims to cover agreements on goods, services, investments, tariff and non-tariff barriers, technical cooperation, competition and intellectual property (IP) rights. The little that is known of the RCEP text, however, has rattled some Indian businessmen and activists alike. Reportedly, there were important talks finalising the maximum number of duty-free goods. Several governments want India to eliminate duties on about 90 percent of traded goods as part of the FTA. This may not be easy for India to agree to. Apart from other considerations, this could also affect the prime minister’s flagship programme of ‘Make in India’. “India’s trade deficit [annual] with RCEP nations is about $100 billion, and half of this is with China alone even without an FTA with China,” Siddhartha Roy, economic advisor, Tata Group, told The Hindu after the Hyderabad talks began. “Post India’s FTA with ASEAN, Japan and Korea [who are all RCEP members], our trade deficit with them have increased, and the government needs to take this into account during RCEP negotiations,” he added. India, on the other hand, wants greater market access for its services sector including IT/ITeS but finds its interests at odds with many of the developed nations who oppose this demand. This is a battle that India is also fighting at the Geneva-based World Trade Organisation (WTO) where it has submitted a proposal for a Trade Facilitation in Services on similar lines as the recently-adopted Trade Facilitation Agreement in goods. The proposal is being opposed by many of the richer member states. The **most contentious** part of the text, and possibly one that will have the most wide-reaching impact globally, however, is around IP issues. The award-winning American NGO Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) leaked parts of the RCEP’s IP-related text in 2015. The demands are nothing new or surprising. Like most FTAs that involve India, the pharmaceutical-hosting countries, like Japan and South Korea, want India to rein in its thriving generic industry, which has given India its moniker as the pharmacy of the developing world. Other FTAs that have similar IP asks are the EU-India FTA and the India-EFTA (European Free Trade Association comprising Switzerland, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein) FTA – they have also run into a logjam. Additionally, like for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the RCEP draft text asks for the setting up of an Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism (more below), which allows private parties to drag governments to private courts, including for IP matters. RCEP, like many other FTAs, has IP protection requirements that not only go beyond international laws drawn up at the WTO through the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) but are also Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)-Plus. TRIPS protection grants the applicant a right to exclude others for a 20-year period from the date of filing. This is considered the length of a patent following which it can be accessed and used by anyone. The RCEP draft text proposes to increase patent terms beyond the stipulated 20 years, which ensures that patent holders can ward off generic competition and maintain artificially high prices. The proposed text also asks for data exclusivity for five years, which would protect results of clinical trial data that tests if a drug is safe and effective for human use. This means that generic drug manufacturers cannot rely on this data and have to conduct their own tests for submission to regulatory agencies, a process that can take several years, thus, again, preventing their entry into the competitive market. Additionally, sources indicate that Japan wanted to tamper with section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, which stipulates that the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance that does not enhance the known efficacy of that substance is not patentable. This was scrapped off after fierce opposition from India and other RCEP negotiating countries. What is at stake? To be precise: a lot. Barriers to entry of generic medicines to the market make drugs prohibitively expensive since their entry is the most effective way of reducing prices of essential medicines as well as ensure access to treatment. For instance, in 2001, the price of HIV medicines came down from $10,439 per patient per year to $350 per patient per year owing to competition from Indian generic manufacturers, mostly Cipla. Patented medicines have ensured that treatments to diseases like multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB), cancer, hepatitis-C are beyond the reach of most, even in rich European countries and the US. Health ministries, humanitarian medical treatment providers such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) have relied on affordable, quality generic medicines to address public health challenges. India manufactures two-thirds of all generic medicines, including 80 percent of all HIV medicines, while China is a big producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) for the drug industry. “If the most aggressive provisions in the RCEP are in the final agreement, it will create a host of new barriers to making, selling and obtaining generic drugs and vaccines. Prices will be even higher and monopolies will last longer for new drugs,” Jamie Love, director of KEI, says. “The promise of access to medicines for all will become even more empty, and more a slogan than a reality. Negotiators who advocate TRIPS plus provisions on medicines should be ashamed, and acknowledge the consequences and their role in the outcome,” he adds. Japan’s negotiating text on IP is TRIPS-plus and if accepted it will roll back public health safeguards enshrined in international and Indian patent law, MSF says in a letter written to the Indian commerce minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, in August 2014. “They have not realised that ACTA is coming through the backdoor. Majority of the text is about IP enforcement ensuring that there is such a chilling effect that no generic manufacturer or third-party challenges their patents in court. They are skewing the judicial system in their favour,” Leena Menghaney, regional head of South Asia, MSF Access Campaign, told Governance Now. The draft text, if adopted with its current proposals, would impair legitimate trade between developing countries. It would allow the raiding of manufacturing premises of generic companies and the seizing of materials used for the manufacture of generics that includes API and machinery, say health activists. “The IP enforcement part is not something that countries are paying much attention on. Japan, Australia, South Korea are pushing very hard against Indonesia, Thailand, India and China,” Menghaney says. As pharmaceutical lobbies grow more powerful with active funding for political parties in many countries across the world, governments are succumbing to negotiating to further the lobbies’ interests. Japan is one such country, which is insisting on stricter IP rules, for instance, with a drug patented by Otsuka for the treatment of extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis. “The company has been strategically withholding the registration of the patent in India, thereby preventing a generic version of the drug from being manufactured,” writes Feroz Ali, IPR chair professor at IIT Madras, in the Hindu. “In the event that a provision of data exclusivity is passed, the millions of TB patients in India would have to buy the high-priced drugs, which would have no cheaper generic alternative,” he adds. He further argues that if India has an agreement with Japan through the RCEP, India will be obliged to offer the same concessions to other members of the WTO through the most-favoured-nation clause. “It is evident that developed countries are using FTAs to expand the existing standards of IP,” he writes. WTO is clear that such stringent IP protection is to be reserved for commercial piracy only – validity of drug patents have to be tested by courts first. According to WTO rules, governments can tailor their national IP policies taking into consideration a country’s economic, developmental and other objectives, including public health. Furthermore, least developed countries (LDCs) are allowed to maintain maximum flexibility in their approach to patenting pharmaceutical products until at least 2033, following a decision taken by the WTO’s Council for TRIPS in November last year. “The value of the WTO was supposed to be a rules-based trading regime with protections for weaker parties. The FTA negotiations have embraced indefensible secrecy to push an agenda that benefits the powerful and the rich at the expense of everyone else,” argues Love. Till now, India has had a “good position” on the RCEP negotiations and some other FTAs, says Menghanay, but the devil lies in the details. ASEAN is being represented by Singapore and Singapore has traditionally stood by TRIPS-plus provisions. This is what is worrying for activists and negotiators from middle-income and LDCs.

#### Joining RCEP floods India with imports which guts domestic industry and wrecks the economy.

**Dhar 19** “India Was Right to Walk Away from RCEP, But What Comes Next?” November 7, 2019, [Biswajit Dhar is a professor at the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawharlal Nehru University] <https://thewire.in/economy/rcep-india-future> SM

Few realised that for the first time in post-independence India, a cross-section of domestic constituencies, including farmers, trade unions, representatives of major sectors of Indian industry and civil society organisations, spoke in one voice against the threats to their future posed by the RCEP. They gave a clear message that ceding the country’s economic space to foreign businesses by accepting the trade liberalisation commitments under RCEP would deal a body blow to the interests of domestic players. In other words, RCEP would have hurt an already stressed economy, which is saddled with a perceptible slowdown in the manufacturing sector coupled with an increasingly distressed farming sector. There were adequate reasons for India to avoid hopping on to the RCEP bandwagon when it was first proposed in 2012. India had concluded three free trade negotiations (FTAs) with ASEAN, Korea and Japan, and the benefits of concluding these deals were being questioned by farmers’ organisations and some state governments. However, those backing the deals saw benefits for India in terms of enhanced market access in one of the most dynamic regions and participation in regional value chains. Watch: ‘RCEP Is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Us to Achieve Our Export Targets’ The reality of these FTAs became apparent before long, with India failing to take advantage of any of the purported benefits. Expansion of exports were much below expectations, but imports from the FTA partners kept increasing since India had reduced/eliminated its relatively high tariffs. India’s participation in the value chains, too, became a distant dream. The NDA government fully understood this reality and took measured steps to engage in the RCEP negotiations in at least two important areas: market access to RCEP participating countries (RPCs), and protection and promotion of foreign investment. In the area of market access, India’s initial offer showed that the government had factored in the adverse implications of the three existing FTAs. A modest increase in market access was offered to ASEAN, Korea and Japan, its existing FTA partners. Further, the most significant RPC, namely China, was promised relatively less market access, the logic being that if China was able to establish such a large presence in the Indian market even when its products did not receive preferential tariffs, grant of tariff preferences to China under RCEP could result in rapid expansion of the Chinese footprint. But India’s initial offer was rejected by the RPCs, and the mandate of the RCEP, “progressively eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers on substantially all trade” and achieving “high level of tariff liberalisation”, seemed to have been accepted by India. Also read: Why India Shouldn’t View its Refusal to Join RCEP as a Victory As regards the protection and promotion of foreign investment, RCEP negotiations saw the major economies among the RPCs, except India, argue in favour of an investment agreement that gave a strong endorsement to investor rights, often at the expense of the host country. India’s view was to the contrary mainly because foreign investors had taken advantage of the dispute settlement clauses (the so-called investor state dispute settlement mechanism, or ISDS) in the bilateral investment treaties that India had signed up to, and had taken the government of India into international arbitration. After India lost the first dispute in 2012, a review of the bilateral treaties was undertaken, an exercise that was completed in 2015. The NDA government revised the model text for the Indian bilateral investment treaty, which provided several safeguards against excesses by foreign investors. The government announced that future investment agreements negotiated by India would be based on the model text. However, RCEP investment negotiations did not have any space for India’s suggestions. Given the aforementioned, several issues arise regarding India’s continued engagement in RCEP negotiations. The first is the justification of remaining engaged when the government’s initial assessment of RCEP was clearly downbeat. In fact, this assessment was identical to those voiced by the stakeholders about the imminent risks of joining RCEP. A second issue arises with respect to the process that was followed while engaging in the negotiations. Here again, the government showed its willingness to put in the public domain its initial negotiating stance on the important issue of market access in the starting stages of the negotiations. This was in keeping with the democratic traditions of decision-making. But this changed dramatically afterwards, for in the critical later stages, the government negotiated the country’s economic future in complete secrecy. Also read: Invoking Mahatma Gandhi to Stay out of RCEP Is a Lazy Act A third issue relates to assessments of possible outcomes of the RCEP negotiations, which the government or its agencies never attempted, or even if they did, the assessments were not put in the public domain. Although the government was reluctant to walk this path, it had become clear from the implementation of the ASEAN, Korea and Japan FTAs, 12 of the 15 RPCs, that the growing trade deficits would become unsustainable after joining RCEP. What also became clear was that while in the three existing FTAs, India was able to protect the vulnerabilities in agriculture and the sensitive industries in the manufacturing sector, RCEP opens these sectors to import competition. Already suffering from the consequences of low productivities and efficiencies, such an external shock could certainly have resulted in disruption causing loss of jobs that the country can ill-afford in the face of growing unemployment. Also read: In India’s RCEP Exit, Domestic Compulsions Sideline Fear of Being Isolated Several narratives have appeared in the aftermath of India’s withdrawal from RCEP that are critical of the government’s decision. These use the arguments that India has lost export opportunities in East Asia by stepping aside and also that policy makers have foregone the opportunities to push domestic reforms by accepting the policy package that RCEP has to offer. The first argument, being made much like the way it was when India was negotiating the three FTAs with ASEAN, Korea and Japan, can effectively be addressed by considering ability or more pertinently, the lack of it, of domestic enterprises to utilise the market access opportunities provided by these FTAs. This effectively proves that domestic enterprises must be pulled up by their bootstraps before they are able to compete in global markets. The government must focus on this critical dimension going forward. As regards the second argument, it needs to be pointed out that the experience of successful economies, especially in the East Asian region, is all about the ability of their governments to utilise the policy space to make their domestic enterprises more efficient. These successful economies have crafted their policies with an eye on the domestic imperatives and have avoided importing policy packages promoted by other countries. https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/why-india-was-right-in-staying-out-of-rcep/story-IbGTgBnZBwS4vvJbzxITxH.html RCEP is a China club, best India stays out of it India joined the negotiations in 2012 and continued to be part of them until the Bangkok meet. It was flexible in negotiations and made adjustments in pursuit of a comprehensive, fair and a balanced agreement. In the end, the final document did not meet any of the three parameters. By Shishir Gupta UPDATED ON NOV 23, 2020 10:07 AM IST The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was signed on November 15 at a virtual meeting of member-states, on the margins of the annual East Asia Summit, eight years after the bloc was launched in Phnom Penh. The timing is neither surprising nor linked to any geopolitical development — it was announced during the East Asia Summit in Bangkok in 2019. India joined the negotiations in 2012 and continued to be part of them until the Bangkok meet. It was flexible in negotiations and made adjustments in pursuit of a comprehensive, fair and a balanced agreement. In the end, the final document did not meet any of the three parameters. For one, it remained weak on services, especially in areas where India had a competitive advantage. But the breaking point was the absence of specific safeguards on imports from China. One circuit breaker was the steep rise in imports; another, because RCEP permits differential coverage of market access between countries, India wanted, but did not get, full assurance that China would not be able to take advantage of the higher coverage permitted to Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean) countries. And a third was adequate protection on tariff increases it had instituted on some products since the negotiations commenced, partly to remove anomalies such as levies on inputs being higher than those on finished goods. MORE FROM THIS SECTION Punjab Congress Committee president Navjot Singh Sidhu meeting with Punjab chief minister Capt. Amarinder Singh. (PTI File) Punjab: As Congress factionalism persists, Opposition smells an opportunity Representational Image. (Getty Images/iStockphoto) HT Explains | The pandemic’s missing AI response and why India should care Representational image. (HT Archive) Delhi Master Plan 2041: People, processes, accountability key to implementation Representational image. (HT PHOTO) There is a turn in India’s Covid infection trends — for the worse Facing a growing trade deficit with China, the risks were too high. There are also no guarantees that China will play by the rules. It did not do so as a World Trade Organization (WTO) member. India has found it hard to access Chinese markets in areas of its competitive advantage, despite this being routinely taken up at the highest levels. China has not stopped using coercive trade measures to express political displeasure against The Philippines, Vietnam, and even Singapore — all partners in Asean-China Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) – or, for that matter, with Japan, Korea and, more recently, Australia. India started entering into FTAs and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) from the mid-2000s. Among RCEP members, it has FTAs or Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements (CECA) with Asean, Singapore, Japan and Korea. RCEP would have added China, Australia and New Zealand to the list. But it would have been an FTA with China. India’s domestic industry, however, wasn’t competitive enough to benefit from the existing FTAs. In any case, India’s largest exports were going to countries it did not have FTAs with. It is unlikely that India would have been able to withstand the import surge (from China) and damage to its industry in the short-run had it signed RCEP. India’s focus should first be on becoming industrially strong through a “Make in India” programme. Many RCEP members have reached this stage. An industrially weak and economically vulnerable India would have hardly been able to shape the region’s rules, no matter what those arguing on the strategic merits of joining RCEP believe. And China, after all, did not become the world’s biggest manufacturing power by entering into FTAs. RCEP is being touted as a triumph of multilateralism in an age of protectionism. But it is, at best, regionalism and it militates against multilateralism, pursued through WTO. FTAs did not prevent supply shocks and disruptions during the pandemic. Supply chain resilience, trust and efficiency have become more important these days and will influence trade.

#### Economic downturn compounds risk of Indopak conflict.

**Kugelman 19** “India and Pakistan Are Edging Closer to War in 2020” Michael Kugelman is the writer of Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia Brief. He is the Asia Program deputy director and senior associate for South Asia at the Wilson Center in Washington. 12/31/2019 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/31/afghanistan-taliban-nuclear-india-pakistan-edging-closer-war-2020/> SM

Meanwhile, 2019 was a dangerously tense year for India and Pakistan—two rivals that are both neighbors and nuclear states. In February, a young Kashmiri man in the town of Pulwama staged a suicide bombing that killed more than three dozen Indian security forces—the deadliest such attack in Kashmir in three decades. Jaish-e-Mohammad—a Pakistan-based terror group with close ties to Pakistan’s security establishment—claimed responsibility. India retaliated by sending jets across Pakistan-administered Kashmir and launching limited strikes, for the first time since a war in 1971. Soon thereafter, Pakistan claimed it had carried out six air strikes in Kashmir to showcase its might, and it also shot down an Indian fighter jet and captured the pilot. The confrontation, which de-escalated when Islamabad announced the pilot’s release several days later, represented the most serious exchange of hostilities in years. Then, in August, India revoked the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir, the India-administered part of Kashmir, and declared it a new territory of India. New Delhi also imposed a security lockdown in Kashmir that included the detention of hundreds of people and a communication blackout. For Islamabad, which claims Jammu and Kashmir as its own, the move amounted to a serious provocation, if not a hostile act. Pakistan retaliated by expelling India’s envoy from Islamabad and suspending trade with New Delhi. Undaunted, in the weeks that followed, senior Indian officials—including the defense and foreign ministers—turned their attention to Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which New Delhi has long claimed, and suggested they eventually planned to reclaim it. Bilateral relations remained fraught over the last few months of the year. Islamabad issued constant broadsides against New Delhi for its continued security lockdown in Kashmir. By year’s end, an internet blackout was still in effect. Then, in December, India’s parliament passed a controversial new citizenship law that affords fast-track paths to Indian citizenship for religious minorities—but not Muslims—fleeing persecution in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. The new law angered Islamabad not just for excluding Muslims, but because of the implication—accurate but not something Islamabad likes to admit—that Pakistan persecutes its Hindu and Christian communities. These prolonged tensions often overshadowed what was arguably the biggest story in both countries in 2019: economic struggle. India suffered its biggest economic slowdown in six years, and Pakistan confronted a serious debt crisis. The two weren’t unconnected: Given the inability of New Delhi and Islamabad to fix their economies, both governments arguably sought political advantages from the distractions of saber rattling. READ MORE Indian police try to detain supporters of the hardline faction of the All Parties Hurriyat Confrence (APHC) as they clash during a protest following the house arrest of APHC leader, Syed Ali Shah Geelani in Srinagar on August 23, 2015. Geelani was placed under house arrest shortly before attempting to leave his residence to address a seminar organised by the APHC. Police used tear smoke shells and water cannons to disperse hundreds of supporters protesting Geelani's arrest. AFP PHOTO/ Tauseef MUSTAFA (Photo credit should read TAUSEEF MUSTAFA/AFP/Getty Images) Crisis Mode in South Asia The best hope India and Pakistan have for moving forward is dealing with all of their issues simultaneously instead of piecemeal. THE SOUTH ASIA CHANNEL | MOEED YUSUF Against this tense backdrop, the opening in November of a new border corridor that enables Indian Sikhs to enter Pakistan visa-free to worship at a holy shrine, which in better times could have been a bridge to an improved relationship, amounted to little more than a one-off humanitarian gesture. Bad as these crises are, they are poised to get worse next year. The good news for Americans is that a U.S.-Taliban deal likely isn’t far off; both sides are fully invested in a troop withdrawal. For Trump, the importance of troop departures will grow as the U.S. presidential election draws closer, and especially because the Washington Post’s release in December of the “Afghanistan Papers”—documents that feature senior U.S. officials admitting failure in the war—will likely solidify U.S. public opinion in favor of winding down America’s role in the 18-year war. However, any U.S.-Taliban deal will do little to reduce violence, other than halting attacks on U.S. troops. In other words, the war will continue. A U.S.-Taliban accord would clear the path for an intra-Afghan dialogue between the Afghan government, other political stakeholders, and the Taliban that aims to produce a cease-fire and an eventual political settlement that ends the war. The path to intra-Afghan dialogue, however, is fraught with obstacles. Afghanistan held a presidential election in September. The preliminary results—released in December—showed President Ashraf Ghani in the lead, but with barely the 50 percent of votes needed to avoid a second round of voting with the second-place finisher, his bitter rival Abdullah Abdullah (who rejected the results). The close margin suggests that when final results are announced, the loser won’t accept them. This means Afghanistan is unlikely to have a new government in place for at least another few months, and even longer if the final results are different from the initial ones and require a second vote. Due to winter weather in Afghanistan, a runoff likely wouldn’t occur until the spring. Without a new government in place, it beggars belief that Afghanistan could launch a process to establish an intra-Afghan dialogue, much less negotiate an end to the war. And even if and when an intra-Afghan dialogue is launched, the hardest of sells will be required to convince the Taliban to lay down arms and agree to share power within a political system that it has long rejected and vowed to overthrow by force. Consequently, Afghanistan in 2020 is likely to see a withdrawal of U.S. forces before a peace agreement is in place—a demoralizing outcome for already struggling Afghan forces that would deliver another boost to the Taliban and further increase violence. Meanwhile, the underlying tensions between India and Pakistan remain sharp. Pakistan arrested dozens of Islamist militants this past year, but New Delhi wasn’t convinced Islamabad was taking strong and “irreversible” steps against India-focused terrorists and their networks. And New Delhi’s actions in Kashmir in 2019 represented worst-case scenarios for Islamabad. The two nuclear-armed nations will enter 2020 just one big trigger event away from war. The trigger could be another mass-casualty attack on Indian security forces in Kashmir traced back to a Pakistan-based group, or—acting on the threats issued repeatedly by New Delhi in 2019—an Indian preemptive operation to seize territory in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. In either scenario, escalation would be swift. Bilateral relations are much worse than they were during last February’s confrontation. Ever since its resounding reelection victory last spring, India’s ruling party has pursued its Hindu nationalist agenda in increasingly aggressive fashion—which gives it no incentive to go easy on Islamabad. Pakistan, not wanting to show weakness, will not give in easily.

#### Goes nuclear and causes extinction

**Roblin 21.** [(Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China, "If the Next India-Pakistan War Goes Nuclear, It Will Destroy the World," The National Interest, March 26, 2021. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/if-next-india-pakistan-war-goes-nuclear-it-will-destroy-world-181134>] TDI

Here's What You Need to Remember: India and Pakistan account for over one-fifth **world’s population**, and therefore a significant **share of economic** activity. Should their **major cities** become **irradiated** ruins with their populations decimated, a **tremendous disruption** would surely result.

Between February 26 and 27 in 2019, Indian and Pakistani warplanes **launched strikes** on each other’s territory and engaged in **aerial combat** for the first time since 1971. Pakistan ominously hinted it was convening its National Command Authority, the institution which can authorize **a nuclear strike**.

The two states, which have retained an **adversarial relationship** since their founding in 1947, between them deploy **nuclear warheads** that can be delivered by land, air and sea.

However, those weapons are inferior in number and yield to the thousands of nuclear weapons possessed by Russia and the United States, which include megaton-class weapons that can wipe out a metropolis in a single blast.

Some commenters have callously suggested that means a “limited regional nuclear war” would remain an Indian and Pakistani problem. People find it difficult to assess the risk of rare but catastrophic events; after all, a full-scale nuclear war has never occurred before, though it has come close to happening.

Such assessments are not only shockingly callous but shortsighted. In fact, **several studies** have modeled the global impact of a “limited” **ten-day nuclear war** in which India and Pakistan each exchange fifty 15-kiloton nuclear bombs equivalent in yield to the Little Boy uranium bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

Their findings concluded that **spillover** would in no way be “limited,” directly impacting people **across the globe** that would struggle to locate Kashmir on a map.

And those results are merely a conservative baseline, as India and Pakistan are estimated to possess over **260 warheads**. Some likely have yields exceeding 15-kilotons, which is relatively small compared to modern strategic warheads.

**Casualties**

Recurring **terrorist attacks** by Pakistan-sponsored militant groups over the status of India’s Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir state have repeatedly led to threats of a **conventional** military **retaliation** by New Delhi.

Pakistan, in turn, maintains it may use **nuclear weapons** as a **first-strike weapon** to **counter-balance**

# 2nd off

#### Text: The World Trade Organization ought to be abolished.

#### The following 164 countries listed in the speech doc ought to independently and without influence from international government

Afghanistan

Albania

Angola

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Australia

Austria

Bahrain, Kingdom of

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belgium

Belize

Benin

Bolivia, Plurinational State of

Botswana

Brazil

Brunei Darussalam

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cabo Verde

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

Colombia

Congo

Costa Rica

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Denmark

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Estonia

Eswatini

European Union (formerly EC)

Fiji

Finland

France

Gabon

Gambia

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Greece

Grenada

Guatemala

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Hong Kong, China

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait, the State of

Kyrgyz Republic

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Latvia

Lesotho

Liberia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macao, China

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Moldova, Republic of

Mongolia

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Myanmar

Namibia

Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

North Macedonia

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Romania

Russian Federation

Rwanda

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Samoa

Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Suriname

Sweden

Switzerland

Chinese Taipei

Tajikistan

Tanzania

Thailand

Togo

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom

United States

Uruguay

Vanuatu

Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of

Viet Nam

Yemen

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Hawley, senator, JD Yale, 20

(Josh, 5-5, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html)

The coronavirus emergency is not only a public health crisis. With [30 million Americans unemployed](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/us-weekly-jobless-claims.html), it is also an economic crisis. And it has exposed a hard truth about the modern global economy: it weakens American workers and has empowered China’s rise. That must change. The global economic system as we know it is a relic; it requires reform, top to bottom. We should begin with one of its leading institutions, the World Trade Organization. We should abolish it.

#### Eliminating the WTO ends U.S. global hegemony

Bello, PhD, 2000

(Walden, Sociology @ Stanford, https://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1352/ecologist/Should%20WTO%20be%20abolished.pdf)

The idea that the world needs the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one of the biggest lies of our time. The WTO came about, in 1995, mainly because it was in the interest of the US and its corporations. The European Union, Japan and especially the developing countries were mostly ambivalent about the idea; it was the US which drove it on. Why? Because though the US, back in 1948, blocked the formation of an International Trade Organisation (ITO), believing that, at that time, the interests of its corporations would not be served by such a global body, it had changed its mind by the 1990s. Now it wanted an international trade body. Why? Because its global economic dominance was threatened. The flexible GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) system, which preceded the WTO, had allowed the emergence of Europe and East Asia as competing industrial centres that threatened US dominance even in many high-tech industries. Under GATT’s system of global agricultural trade, Europe had emerged as a formidable agricultural power even as Third World governments concerned with preserving their agriculture and rural societies limited the penetration of their markets by US agricultural products. In other words, before the WTO, global trade was growing by leaps and bounds, but countries were using trade policy to industrialise and adapt to the growth of trade so that their economies would be enhanced by global trade and not be marginalised by it. That was a problem, from the US point of view. And that was why the US needed the WTO. The essence of the WTO is seen in three of its central agreements: the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The purpose of TRIPs is not to promote free trade but to enhance monopoly power. One cannot quarrel with the fact that innovators should have preferential access to the benefits that flow from their innovation for a period of time. TRIPs, however, goes beyond this to institutionalise a monopoly for high-tech corporate innovators, most of them from the North. Among other things, TRIPs provides a generalised minimum patent protection of 20 years; institutes draconian border regulations against products judged to be violating intellectual property rights; and – contrary to the judicial principle of presuming innocence until proven guilty – places the burden of proof on the presumed violator of process patents. What TRIPs does is reinforce the monopolistic or oligopolistic position of US high tech firms such as Microsoft and Intel. It makes industrialisation by imitation or industrialisation via loose conditions of technology transfer – a strategy employed by the US, Germany, Japan, and South Korea during the early phases of their industrialisation – all but impossible. It enables the technological leader, in this case the US, to greatly influence the pace of technological and industrial development in the rest of the world.

#### Primacy causes endless war, terror, authoritarianism, prolif, and Russia-China aggression.

Ashford, PhD, 19

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 4, CNAS)

Humility is a virtue. Yet in the last quarter century, American policymakers have been far more likely to embrace the notion of America as the “indispensable nation,” responsible for protecting allies, promoting democracy and human rights, tamping down conflicts, and generally managing global affairs. Compare this ideal to the U.S. track record – endless Middle Eastern wars, the rise of ISIS, global democratic backsliding, a revanchist Russia, resurgent China, and a world reeling from the election of President Donald Trump – and this label seems instead the height of hubris. Many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy speak for themselves. As the daily drumbeat of bad news attests, interventions in Iraq and Libya were not victories for human rights or democracy, but rather massively destabilizing for the Middle East as a whole. Afghanistan – despite initial military successes – has become a quagmire, highlighting the futility of nation- building. Other failures of America’s grand strategy are less visible, but no less damaging. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe helped to reignite hostility between Russia and the West. Worse, it has diluted the alliance’s defensive capacity and its democratic character. And even as the war on terror fades from public view, it remains as open-ended as ever: Today, the United States is at war in seven countries and engaged in “combating terrorism’ in more than 80.1 To put it bluntly: America’s strategy since the end of the Cold War – whether it is called primacy or liberal internationalism – may not be a total failure, but it has not been successful either. Many have tried to place blame for these poor outcomes.2 But recrimination is less important than understanding why America’s strategy has failed so badly and avoiding these mistakes in future. Much of the explanation is the natural outcome of changing constraints. Iraq and Libya should not be viewed as regrettable anomalies, but rather the logical outcome of unipolarity and America’s liberal internationalist inclination to solve every global problem. It’s also a reliance on flawed assumptions – that what is good for America is always good for the world, for example. Support for dangerous sovereignty-undermining norms adds to the problem; just look at the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has proved not to protect populations or stabilize fragile states, but to provoke chaos, encourage nuclear proliferation, and undermine the international institutions. Perhaps, if nothing else had changed, a form of watered-down liberal internationalism that foreswore interventionism and drew back from the war on terror might have been possible.3 But international politics are undergoing a period of profound transformation, from unipolarity to regional or even global multipolarity. Primacy – and the consistent drumbeat of calls in Washington to do more, always and everywhere – is neither sustainable nor prudent. Nor can we fall back on warmed-over Cold War–era strategies better suited to an era of bipolar superpower competition.

# 3rd off

#### Interp – “medicines” treat or cure, whereas vaccines prevent

**Vecchio 7/22** (Christopher Vecchio, [CFA, Senior Strategist,], 7-22-2021, “Delta Variant Concerns Won't Cripple Markets, US Economy“, DailyFX, accessed: 8-9-2021, https://www.dailyfx.com/forex/video/daily\_news\_report/2021/07/22/market-minutes-delta-variant-concerns-wont-cripple-markets-us-economy.html)  ajs

Let’s stick to the facts. The COVID-19 vaccines are not medicines, which by definition “treat or cure diseases.” Vaccines “help prevent diseases,” an important distinction. Why does this matter? Because data coming out of some of the world’s developed economies with high adult vaccination rates suggest that the vaccines are working as intended: tail-risks have been reduced, with hospitalizations and deaths falling relative to the recent spike in infections (which have been occurring primarily among the unvaccinated at this point). Put another way, vaccines are like a Kevlar vest for the immune system; while they don’t make you bulletproof, they dramatically increase the odds of surviving an adverse event.

#### Vaccines are medical interventions – not medicines

**Elbe 10** (Stefan Elbe, [director of the Centre for Global Health Policy and a professor of international relations at the University of Sussex. He is the author of Strategic Implications of HIV/AIDS,  Security and Global Health, and Virus Alert: Security, Governmentality, and the AIDS Pandemic.], 5-3-2010, “Security and Global Health” Polity Press, accessed: 8-9-2021, https://books.google.com/books?id=PKMoMJrSsksC)  ajs

Yet here too we must be careful not to overlook other types of medical intervention simultaneously pursued by the 'social' arm of modern medicine at the population level. Vaccines in particular continue to be particularly important medical interventions that repeatedly surface in a variety of different health security delib- erations. Strictly speaking, vaccines are not medicines because they consist of small concentrations of disease-causing microbes (or their derivatives) used to enhance a person's immuno-response to a future infection. As a public health measure, vaccines have therefore also been largely sidelined in the existing medicalization literature. Yet, generally speaking, vaccines too can be considered as medical inter- ventions. That is certainly how the World Health Organization views them, pointing out that 'vaccines are among the most important medical interventions for reducing illness and deaths' available today (WHO 2009a). Whereas pills and other therapies mark the tools of clinical medicine, vaccines play a crucial part in the arsenal of 'social' medicine and public health. Developing and rolling out of new vaccines against a range of current (and future) diseases therefore represents further evidence of how the rise of health security is also encouraging security to be practised through the introduction of new medical interventions in society.

#### Violation –

#### Negate –

#### 1] Limits – expanding the topic to preventative treatment or medical interventions allows anything from surgery to medical devices to education strategies or mosquito repellent to prevent malaria. Destroys core generics like innovation which are exclusive to disease curing – core of the topic is about proprietary information. A big case list with no unifying generics destroy neg prep – disincentivizes in depth topic research and leaves the neg behind.

#### 2] Precision – WHO definitively outweighs on common usage and quals and views vaccines as medical interventions which proves we’re right and consistent with topic lit – debates should mirror international medical consensus.

# Case