### LEO PIC

#### CP Text:

#### -The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust in all instances except for Low Earth Orbit Satellite constellations.

#### -Private entities ought to appropriate outer space ONLY for the deployment and maintenance of LEO Satellites. -Governments ought to regulate the size and number of these commercial satellites to avoid light pollution

#### Solves broadband internet access which is key for Native communities.

**Venkatesan et al 20** (Aparna Venkatesan is a Professor in the Department of Physics and Astronomy at the University of San Francisco. James Lowenthal is a professor of Astronomy at Smith College. Parvathy Prem is a Planetary Scientist specializing in Planetary research at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Monica Vidaurri works as a research scientist at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, specializing in astrobiology, policy, and ethics. “The impact of satellite constellations on space as an ancestral global commons”. November 06, 2020.)

**Satellite constellations could greatly improve** communications and ongoing **monitoring of** Earth **phenomena ranging from** weather and **climate to disaster management. Such large constellations also** have the potential to **offer global connectivity through** low-cost high-speed **broadband** internet. In principle, **this could be the critical leap needed to bridge the very real digital divide**2, **especially for** the world’s most minoritized populations, including **Indigenous communities.** This divide has been exposed as a chasm during this pandemic year, affecting many millions of students and low-income workers. **Broadband internet has become essential for daily life**, especially **during a pandemic** year when remote forms of learning, teaching, work and even health (for example, telemedicine) have become the norm. In 2019, the FCC offered US$20 billion in subsidies over ten years to address the digital divide in rural communities in the United States, which was quickly followed by a number of filings for LEOsats. **LEOsat broadband may benefit rural communities** more than urban areas—these ‘last mile’ connections are still challenging to complete relative to concentrated (urban) populations where ground-based cable/fibre internet infrastructure is cheaper. **Large satellite constellations thus have the potential to bridge the digital chasm**, but time will tell whether the promise of low-cost high-speed internet worldwide is achieved, **and** what the financial costs to customers are. **This potential democratization of space is worth noting, even if it may not lead to fair participation in space.**

#### Competition:

#### **Satellite constellations are appropriation --**

Takaya et al 18 “The Principle of Non-Appropriation and the Exclusive Uses of LEO by Large Satellite Constellations” Yuri Takaya-Umehara [Visiting researcher at the University of Tokyo since April 2017. She was affiliated to the Kobe University to provide a course on space law to post-graduate students (2011-2017). She chairs a working group on the formulation of global norms in space law organized by the Keio University since 2018. She obtained her Ph.D. degree at the IDEST of Paris XI University in France, LL.M. at the Leiden University in the Netherlands.] Quentin Verspieren [Ph.D. in public policy @ The University of Tokyo, Assistant Professor of Space Policy @UTokyo, General Manager, Global Strategy @ArkEdge Space Inc., Associate Research Fellow @ESPI] Goutham Karthikeyan [The University of Tokyo & Institute of Space and Astronautical Science, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (ISAS-JAXA)] 2018 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328094878\_The\_Principle\_of\_Non-Appropriation\_and\_the\_Exclusive\_Use\_of\_LEO\_by\_Large\_Satellite\_Constellations SM

* LSC = large satellite constellations
* Outlines “L”SC thresholds

By investigating expected large satellite constellation projects and by reviewing existing interpretations of international space law, this paper argues that the exclusive use of specific LEO orbits by a large constellation of satellite could constitute a violation of the non-appropriation principle by means of occupation and by means of use, drawing a parallel between orbits as resources and the exploitation of tangible mineral resources in space. Based on this, the important question to be raised is what constitutes an exclusive use of a specific orbit. In other words, an important hurdle in the concrete evaluation of whether a planned or established constellation potentially violates the non-appropriation principle through an exclusive use of LEO resides in the lack of clear definition on what can be considered an exclusive use. While the authors claim that legal issue can be clearly solved in abstracto, it naturally shifts towards a regulatory challenge.

This regulatory challenge consists in first defining qualitatively what is the exclusive use of an orbit before translating this definition into measurable, technical rules. In this paper, the authors define an exclusive use of an orbit by a state40 as any use that would prevent/hinder the usage of the same orbit by any other state. Translating this definition into an applicable regulation could consist in defining a threshold of orbital collision risk or a threshold of density of satellites along an orbit based on its altitude, shape, relative velocity of neighbouring objects, etc. It is however not the purpose of this space law paper. What is more appropriate here is to think about which organization or forum would be in charge of elaborating this technical definition. Serious candidates could be the ITU, with excellent track-record in dealing with the use of the GEO region but which would have to review its “first come, first served” principle, or the UNCOPUOS, aiming for the widespread adoption of a new piece of international law. Moreover, even if its rules suffer from a low implementation rates, the IADC would be an appropriate discussion platform thanks to its very deep technical focus.

6. Conclusion

The various announced projects of LSC, also called mega-constellations, push existing regulations and practices to their limit, forcing researchers and practitioners around the world to rethink the applicability of existing space law principles to this new trend. In this paper, the authors, after providing background information on current LSC plans as well as recalling the legal status of the LEO region, investigate whether the deployment of an LSC having an exclusive use of an orbit constitutes a violation of the nonappropriation principle as stated in OST Article II. This paper concludes that:

♣ The exclusive use of an orbit by an LSC constitutes a violation of the non-appropriation principle by means of occupation due to the innate nature of orbit being a specific location in space that can be occupied, but most notably by means of use, considering orbits as “limited natural resources” and invoking parallels with the exploitation of natural resources in outer space;

♣ ITU’s “first come, first served” principle is reaching its limits with current LSC projects and should be re-evaluated;

♣ The main challenge ahead is not legal but technical and regulatory and consists in defining precisely what can constitute an exclusive use of an orbit and in translating such definition into a clear regulation or code of conduct.

#### NB: You’ve only criticized space colonization as a bad thing, means that we solve your entire aff while also helping native communities.

### Cap K

#### [Hester 17] The aff’s politics cede the universal in favor of local, fragmented knowledge – this surrenders the ability to define the future to neoliberal hegemony – the universal is not inherently-oppressive, but it will be under unfettered capitalism. Hester 17 [Helen Hester is Associate Professor of Media and Communication at the University of West London. Her research interests include technofeminism, sexuality studies, and theories of social reproduction. She is a member of the international feminist collective Laboria Cuboniks. “Promethean Labors and Domestic Realism” 25 September 2017 <http://www.e-flux.com/architecture/artificial-labor/140680/promethean-labors-and-domestic-realism/> cVs, SK.]

There has been an excess of modesty in the feminist agendas of recent decades. Carol A. **Stabile is amongst those who have been critical of an absence of systemic thinking within postmodern feminisms, remarking upon** a “growing emphasis on fragmentations and single-issue politics.” **Stabile dismisses this kind of thinking which,** in **“so resolutely** avoiding ‘totalizing’—the bête noire of contemporary critical theory—[…] **ignores or** jettisons a structural analysis of capitalism.” **The** difference in scope **and scale** between that which is being opposed and **the** strategies being used to oppose it is generative of **a sense of** disempowerment. On the one hand, Stabile argues, **postmodern social theorists “accept the systemic nature of capitalism, as made visible in its consolidation of power and its global expansion** […] Capitalism’s power **as a system** is therefore identified **and named** as a totality**”;** on the other hand, these theorists “celebrate local, fragmented, or partial forms of knowledge as the only forms **of knowledge** available” and criticize big-picture **speculative** thinking for its potentially oppressive **tendencies or** applications. Nancy Fraser, too, has addressed this apparent “shrinking of emancipatory vision at the fin de siècle,” linking this with “a major shift in the feminist imaginary” during the 1980s and 1990s—that is, with a move away from attempting to remake political economy (redistribution) and towards an effort at transforming culture (recognition).4 **The legacies of this kind of political theorizing**—legacies some might describe as “folk political”—**are still being felt today, and continue to shape the perceived horizons of possibility for progressive projects.**5 Yet **these projects**, which are frequently valuable, necessary, and effective on their own terms, **are not sufficient as ends in themselves.** To the extent that they are conceptualized in detachment from an ecology of other interventions, **operating via a diversity of means and across a variety of scales, they** cannot serve as **a suitable** basis for any politics seeking to contest **the imaginaries of the right or to contend with the** expansive hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism**.** It is for this reason that Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams’s work positions itself as somewhat skeptical about fragmentations and single-issue politics, pointing out that problems such as “global exploitation, planetary climate change, rising surplus populations, [and] the repeated crises of capitalism are abstract in appearance, complex in structure, and non-localized.”6 As such, a **politics based around the ideas that “the local is ethical, simpler is better, the organic is healthy, permanence is oppressive, and progress is over” is not always the best weapon in an attempt to contend with the complex technomaterial conditions of the world as it stands.**7 **There is a** persistent kind of abstraction anxiety hang**ing** over progressive politics**; an anxiety that haunts a contemporary leftist feminism still unwilling or unable to critically reappraise the tendencies** that Stabile identified in the 90s. Recently, however, a renewed appetite for ambitious and future-oriented emancipatory politics has begun to make itself felt **at the fringes of the left—and indeed, to gather momentum and popular support more broadly**.8 Perhaps **the most remarkable example of this tendency within philosophically-inflected political theory circles has been accelerationism, with its calls to build an “intellectual infrastructure” capable of “creating a new ideology, economic and social models, and a vision of the good to replace and surpass the emaciated ideals that rule our world today.”**9 These so-called “Promethean” ideas have generated widespread interest, arguably both reflecting and contributing to the changing tenor of activist discourse. Interestingly, this term has to some extent emerged in opposition to the pejorative “folk political,” acting as a shorthand for a very different set of values and perspectives. In a recent critical piece, Alexander Galloway suggests that “Prometheanism” could be defined as “technology for humans to overcome natural limit.”10 Peter **Wolfendale, meanwhile, sees it as a “politics of intervention”—one that starts from the insistence that nothing be exempted in advance from the enactment of re/visionary processes.**

[Torrant 14] Theorizing survival within oppressive social relations as resistance displaces critique and transformation of those systems by naturalizing exploitation as inevitable. Torrant 14

[Torrant, Julie, “It Is Time To Give Up Liberal, Bourgeois Theories, Including New Materialist Feminism, And Take Up Historical Materialist Feminism For The 21st Century,” *Red Critique,* Winter/Spring 2014]

Recently, there has been a turn away from textualist and culturalist theory in feminism and the emergence of "new" materialist feminisms. Represented by the work of Elizabeth Grosz, Rosi Braidotti, and others, this turn in theory has come in response to the deepening inequalities and crises of capitalism that are having profound effects on women worldwide — material problems outside the text and not resolvable by a change in cultural values. While it is important to see that the new materialist feminisms are responses to real problems, it is equally important to understand how these materialisms are limited by their conceptualization of the material. The new materialist feminisms are actually disenabling for feminism in that they are forms of spiritualism which displace critique with strategies of enchanted affective adaptation and survival and thus dismantle materialist feminism's primary conceptual tool for social transformation. To avoid merely reproducing sophisticated forms of the survivalism and "prepperism" that have emerged as individualistic coping responses to economic crisis and austerity, I argue that feminism needs to return to historical materialism in the tradition of Marx, Engels and Kollontai to understand social life in terms of its root relations and aid in the struggles to bring about social transformation. Exemplary of the new materialist feminism is Rosi Braidotti's writing on "the politics of 'life itself'," a theory which she organizes around the trope of "sustainability." Sustainability, a concept in ecology for living within natural limits, becomes in these writings a means of reconceiving the historical social relations of capitalism as if they were the unchangeable, underlying existential limit-situation of "life itself." The politics of "life itself" and the new materialist focus on seeking a sustainable feminism within this new, more "realist" approach to material reality, is a form of feminist theory and politics which is ultimately the already familiar theory and politics of reparative reading. Why is this significant? As Ellis Hanson suggests in a review of Sedgwick, "Faced with the depressing realization that people are fragile and the world hostile, a reparative reading focuses not on the exposure of political outrages that we already know but rather on the process of reconstructing a sustainable life in their wake" (105). In other words, reparative analysis begins not with critique of the so-called already known and presumably known to be unchangeable, but by focusing on how to live within the already-known-to-be hostile world. Such a theory of the social begins and ends by reducing knowledge to a matter of how to cope, how to feel, how to exist, etc. within what is taken to be unchangeable. The effect of this focus on "sustainability" within hostility is that social transformation — which requires the production of knowledge of what needs to be transformed — is treated as impossible. Abandoning the project of transformation, I argue, is a sign of the way dominant "materialist" feminism — under the guise of "new materialism"— has increasingly abandoned the project of women's emancipation from exploitation, and in the interests of capital instead translates austerity measures into a theoretical discourse of getting by on less.

[ANON 17] Academics have failed to make revolution – critique must point toward solutions that bridge local context toward global solutions. ANON 17  
[#Alt-Woke Manifesto is the work of ANON. We are a collective of “Other.” Some of us are sex workers, some immigrants, many of us queer. There are even a few privileged white cucks amongst us. Nevertheless, ANON is largely the work and brainchild of People of Color (PoC). Our social disciplines are as varied as our identities, from journalists to dominatrixes. ANON are the intellectual cousins of #BlackLivesMatter divorced from liberalism http://tripleampersand.org/alt-woke-manifesto/ cVs]

If the liberal is the evangelical, pearl clutching apostle of the woke Left, the radical, then, is St. Augustine — the hierophant, the pedagogue. The radical is the vanguard inhabiting academia & activism, creating the language and atmosphere of critique. Its ideologies trickle down from intellectuals at universities to moderate liberals on social media, and more recently, the Alt-Right (e.g. culture jamming by way of “meme magic” or the synthesis of identity politics and white nationalism by way of identitarianism). Radicals scapegoated liberals to absolve themselves of any responsibility by being all critique with no tangible answers. The radical left in its current incarnation is somewhat fossilized in terms of strategies and needs an immediate remodelling. The radical is too comfortable inhabiting only the periphery of academia & activism. Radical academics and activists are insulated not only by algorithms but also their obsolescence. The radical academic has failed to bridge the gap between intellectuals & larger society. That is, intellectuals failed to subvert hegemony and normativity. Academics did not do enough to reach beyond universities and make positive reforms to public education. Intellectuals failed to politicize the natural sciences early enough. Intellectuals lost programming and hacker culture to neoliberalism & libertarians. Computer science transitioned from cyberpunk to Silicon Valley venture capitalism. Had radical academics succeeded, there might’ve been more legitimacy in the fight to combat climate change. Or traditional journalism wouldn’t have been so easily defeated by the post-fact information economy. What we have now is a new Scholasticism of students & professors as clergy dominated by an agitated, anti-intellectual populist bloc. “Learning surrenders control to the future, threatening established power. It is vigorously suppressed by all political structures, which replace it with a docilizing and conformist education, reproducing privilege as wisdom. Schools are social devices whose specific function is to incapacitate learning, and universities are employed to legitimate schooling through perpetual reconstitution of global social memory. The meltdown of metropolitan education systems in the near future is accompanied by a quasi-punctual bottom-up takeover of academic institutions, precipitating their mutation into amnesiac cataspace-exploration zones and bases manufacturing cyberian soft-weaponry.” Nick Land, “Meltdown” (1994) The radical activist lost its sense resistance. There are no radicals in Congress. There are no radical lawmakers. No radical judges. Community organizing is helpful, but it’s not sufficient. To remain relevant radicals have to widen their scope to adapt to the changing global climate. “The idea that one organisation, tactic or strategy applies equally well to any sort of struggle is one of the most pervasive and damaging beliefs among today’s left. Strategic reflection – on means and ends, enemies and allies – is necessary before approaching any political project. Given the nature of global capitalism, any postcapitalist project will require an ambitious, abstract, mediated, complex and global approach – one that folk-political approaches are incapable of providing.” — Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, “Inventing the Future” (2015)

#### [Shaviro 15] Neoliberal capitalism will produce extinction – the system reproduces crises that depoliticize the left, undermine futural thought, and postpone its demise – the impacts are environmental collapse, endless war, and the rise of fascism. Shaviro 15 [Steven Shaviro is an American academic, philosopher and cultural critic whose areas of interest include film theory, time, science fiction, panpsychism, capitalism, affect and subjectivity. He earned a PhD from Yale in 1981. “No Speed Limit: Three Essays on Accelerationism” <https://track5.mixtape.moe/qdkkdt.pdf> cVs, SK.]

The problem may be summarized as follows. **Capitalism has indeed created the conditions for general prosperity and therefore for its own supersession. But it has also blocked, and continues to block, any hope of realizing this transformation.** We cannot **wait for capitalism to transform on its own, but we also cannot** hope to progress by appealing to some radical Outside **or by fashioning ourselves as militants faithful to some “event” that** (as Badiou has it) **would mark a radical and complete break with the given “situation” of capitalism.** Accelerationism rather demands a movement against and outside capitalism—but on the basis of tendencies and technologies that are intrinsic to capitalism. **Audre Lord famously argued that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.” But** what if the master’s tools are the only ones available? Accelerationism grapples with this dilemma. What is the appeal of **accelerationism** today? It **can be understood as a response to the particular social and political situation in which we currently seem to be trapped: that of a long-term, slow-motion catastrophe**. Global warming, and environmental pollution and degradation, threaten to undermine our whole mode of life. And this mode of life is **itself increasingly stressful and** precarious**, due to the depredations of neoliberal capitalism.** As Fredric Jameson puts it, the world today is characterized by **“heightened** polarization**, increasing** unemployment, [and] the **ever more desperate** search for new **investments and new** markets**.”** These are all general features of capitalism identified by Marx, but in neoliberal society we encounter them in a particularly pure and virulent form. I want to be as specific as possible in my use of the term “neoliberalism” in order to describe this situation. I define neoliberalism as a specific mode of capitalist production (Marx), and form of governmentality (Foucault), that is characterized by the following specific factors: 1. The dominating influence of financial institutions, which facilitate transfers of wealth from everybody else to the already extremely wealthy (the “One Percent” or even the top one hundredth of one percent). 2. The privatization and commodification of what used to be common or public goods (resources like water and green space, as well as public services like education, communication, sewage and garbage disposal, and transportation). 3. The extraction, by banks and other large corporations, of a surplus from all social activities: not only from production (as in the classical Marxist model of capitalism) but from circulation and consumption as well. Capital accumulation proceed**s not only** by **direct** exploitation **but also by rent-seeking, by debt collection,** and **by outright** expropriation (“primitive accumulation”). 4. The subjection of all aspects of life to the **so-called** discipline of the market**. This is equivalent**, in more traditional Marxist terms**, to the “real subsumption” by capital of all aspects of life: leisure as well as labor.** Even our sleep is now organized in accordance with the imperatives of production and capital accumulation. 5. The redefinition of human beings as private owners of their own “human capital.” **Each person is thereby**, as Michel Foucault puts it, **forced to become “an entrepreneur of himself.”** In such circumstances, we are continually obliged to market ourselves, to “brand” ourselves, to maximize the return on our “investment” in ourselves. There is never enough: like the Red Queen, we always need to keep running, just to stay in the same place. **Precarity is the fundamental condition of our lives. All of** these processes work on a global scale**; they extend far beyond the level of immediate individual experience. My life is precarious, at every moment, but I cannot apprehend the forces that make it so. I know how little money is left from my last paycheck, but I cannot grasp, in concrete terms, how “the economy” works. I directly experience the daily weather, but I do not directly experience the climate. Global warming and worldwide financial networks are examples of** what the ecological theorist Timothy Morton calls **hyperobjects.** They are phenomena that actually exist but that “stretch our ideas of time and space, since they far outlast most human time scales, or they’re massively distributed in terrestrial space and so are unavailable to immediate experience.” Hyperobjects affect everything that we do, but we cannot point to them in specific instances. **The chains of causality are far too complicated and intermeshed for us to follow.** In order to make sense of our condition, we are forced to deal with difficult abstractions. We have to rely upon data that are gathered in massive quantities by scientific instruments and then collated through mathematical and statistical formulas but that are not directly accessible to our senses. We find ourselves, as Mark Hansen puts it, entangled “within networks of media technologies that operate predominantly, if not almost entirely, outside the scope of human modes of awareness (consciousness, attention, sense perception, etc.).” We cannot imagine such circumstances in any direct or naturalistic way, but only through the extrapolating lens of science fiction. **Subject to these conditions,** we live under relentless environmental and financial assault**.** We continually find ourselves in what might well be called a state of crisis. However, this involves a paradox. **A crisis—whether economic, ecological, or political—is a turning point, a sudden rupture, a sharp and immediate moment of reckoning.** But for us today, crisis has become **a** chronic **and seemingly permanent condition.** We live**, oxymoronically,** in a state of perpetual**, but never resolved, convulsion and** contradiction. Crises **never come to a culmination; instead, they** are **endlessly and indefinitely** deferred. For instance, after **the economic collapse of** 2008, the big banks were bailed out **by the United States government.** This allowed them to resume the **very** practices—the creation of arcane financial instruments, in order to enable relentless rent-seeking—that led to the breakdown of the economic system in the first place. **The functioning of the system is restored, but only in such a way** as to guarantee the renewal of the **same** crisis, on a greater scale, further down the road. Marx rightly noted that crises are endemic to capitalism. But far from threatening the system as Marx hoped, today these crises **actually** help it to renew **itself.** As David Harvey puts it, **it is precisely “**through **the destruction of the achievements of preceding eras by way of** war**, the devaluation of assets, the degradation of productive capacity,** abandonment and **other forms of ‘**creative destruction**’” that** capitalism creates **“a new basis for profit-making and** surplus absorption**.”** What lurks behind this analysis is the frustrating sense of an impasse. Among its other accomplishments, **neoliberal capitalism has also robbed us of the future. For it turns everything into an eternal present.** The highest values of our society—as preached in the business schools—are novelty, innovation, and creativity. And yet these always only result in more of the same. How often have we been told that a minor software update “changes everything”? **Our society seems to function**, as Ernst Bloch once put it, **in a state of “sheer aimless infinity and incessant changeability; where everything ought to be constantly new, everything remains just as it was.” This is because, in our current state of affairs,** the future exists only **in order** to be colonized **and made into an investment opportunity.** John Maynard Keynes sought to distinguish between risk and genuine uncertainty. Risk is calculable in terms of probability, but genuine uncertainty is not. Uncertain events are irreducible to probabilistic analysis, because “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever.” Keynes’s discussion of uncertainty has strong affinities with Quentin Meillassoux’s account of hyperchaos. For Meillassoux, there is no “totality of cases,” no closed set of all possible states of the universe. Therefore, there is no way to assign fixed probabilities to these states. This is not just an empirical matter of insufficient information; uncertainty exists in principle. For Meillassoux and Keynes alike, there comes a point where “we simply do not know.” But today, Keynes’s distinction is entirely ignored. **The Black-Scholes Formula and the Efficient Market Hypothesis both conceive the future entirely in probabilistic terms.** In these theories, as in the actual financial trading that is guided by them (or at least rationalized by them), **the genuine unknowability of the future is transformed into a matter of calculable, manageable risk.** True novelty is excluded, because all possible outcomes have already been calculated and paid for in terms of the present. While this belief in the calculability of the future is delusional, it nonetheless determines the way that financial markets actually work. We might therefore say that speculative finance is the inverse—and the complement—of the “affirmative speculation” that takes place in science fiction. Financial speculation seeks to capture, and shut down, the very same extreme potentialities that science fiction explores. Science fiction is the narration of open, unaccountable futures; derivatives trading claims to have accounted for, and discounted, all these futures already. The “market”**—**nearly deified in neoliberal doctrine—thus works preemptively, as a global practice of what Richard Grusin calls premediation. It seeks to deplete the future in advance. Its **relentless** functioning makes it nearly impossible **for us** to conceive of any alternative **to the global capitalist world order. Such is the condition that Mark Fisher calls capitalist realism.** As Fisher puts it, channeling both Jameson and Žižek, **“it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism.”**

#### [Dean 16] The alternative is to affirm the form of the party—against the subjective atomization of contemporary politics, only a vertical form of organization aimed at transformation of constituted structures of power can actualize change. Dean 16

[Jodi and Chuck, Donald R. Harter ’39 Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences @ Hobart and William Smith Colleges and Host at This is Hell!, “The JFRP: For a New Communist Party,” aNtiDoTe Zine 1/23/16, https://antidotezine.com/2016/01/23/for-a-new-communist-party/]

CM: Great to have you on the show.¶ Let’s start with Occupy. What, to you, explains the impact that the Tea Party had on Republicans, relative to the impact that Occupy seems to have had on the Democratic Party? All of the sudden there were “Tea Party Republicans.” There weren’t “Occupy Democrats.”¶ JD: That’s a good point. **The Tea Party** took the Republican Party as its target. They **decided that their goal was going to be to influence the political system** by getting people elected and basically **by trying to take over** part of **government. That’s why they were able to have** good **effects. They didn’t regard the mainstream political process as something irrelevant to their concerns. They thought of it as something to seize**.¶ The problem with **many**—but not all—**l**eftists in the US is that they think the political process is so corrupted that we have to completely refuse it**, and** leave it altogether. The Tea Party decided to act as an organized militant force, and **too much of** the US left (we saw this in the wake of Occupy) has thought that to be “militant” means to **refuse and** disperse and become fragmented. CM: So what explains the left turning its back on the collective action of a political party? It would seem like a political party would fit into what the left would historically want: an apparatus that can organize collective action.¶ JD: **There are multiple things. First, the fear of success**: the left has learned from the excesses of the twentieth century. **Where Communist** and socialist **parties “succeeded,” there was violence** and purges and repression. One reason **the left has turned its back** is **because of this historical experience** of state socialism. **And we have taken that to mean that we should not ever have a state. I think that’s the wrong answer.** That we—as the left—made a mistake with some regimes does not have to mean that we can never learn. **Another reason** that th**e left has turned its back on the party form has been the important criticism of twentieth century parties that have been too white, too masculine, potentially homophobic; parties that have operated in intensely hierarchical fashion.** Those criticisms are real.But rather than saying we can’t have a party form because that’s just what a party does, why not make a party that is not repressive **and does not exclude or diminish people on the basis of sex, race, or sexuality?**¶ So we’ve got at least two historical problems that have made people very reluctant to use the party. I also think that, whether or not you mark it as 1968 or 1989, **the left’s embrace of** cultural individualism and **the free flow of** personal experimentation **has made it critical of discipline and** critical of **collectivity. But** I think that’s just a capitalist sellout**. Saying everybody should just “do their own thing”** is **just** going in the direction of the dominant culture**. That is actually not a left position at all**.¶ CM: So does **identity politics undermine collectivism**? **And** did that end up **lead**ing **to fragmentation and a weakening of the left**? Because there are a lot of people we’ve had on the show—and one person in particular, Thomas Frank—who say that there is no left in the United States.¶ JD: First I want to say that I disagree with the claim that there is no left. In fact, I think that “the left” is that group that keeps denying its own existence. We’re always saying that we’re the ones who don’t exist. But the right thinks that we exist. That’s what is so fantastic, actually. Did you see the New York Post screaming that Bernie Sanders is really a communist? Great! They’re really still afraid of communists! And it’s people on the left who say, “Oh, no, we’re not here at all!”¶ The left denies its own existence and it denies its own collectivity. Now, is identity politics to blame? Maybe it’s better to say that **identity politics has been a symptom of the pressure of capitalism. Capitalism has operated in the US by exacerbating racial differences**. That has to be addressed on the left, and **the left has been addressing that. But** we haven’t been addressing it in a way that recognizes how racism operates to support capitalism. Instead, **we’ve made it too much about identity rather than as an element in building collective solidarity**.¶ I’m trying to find a way around this to express that **identity politics has been important but it’s reached its limits.** Identity politics can’t go any further insofar as it denies the impact of capitalism. An identity politics that just rests on itself is nothing but liberalism. **Like all of the sudden everything will be better if black people and white people are equally exploited? What if black people and white people say, “**No, we don’t want to live in a society based on exploitation?**”**¶ CM: You were saying that the left denies its own collectivity. Is that only in the US? Is that unique to the US culture of the left?¶ JD: That’s a really important question, and I’m not sure. Traveling in Europe, I see two different things. On the one hand I see a broad left discussion that is, in part, mediated through social media and is pretty generational—people in their twenties and thirties or younger—and that **there’s a general feeling about the problem of collectivity, the problem of building something with cohesion**, and a temptation to just emphasize multiplicity. You see this everywhere. Everybody worries about this, as far as what I’ve seen.¶ On the other hand, there are countries whose political culture has embraced parties much more, and fights politically through parties. Like Greece, for example—and we’ve seen the ups and downs with Syriza over the last two years. And Spain also. Because they have a parliamentary system where small parties can actually get in the mix and have a political effect—in ways that our two-party system excludes—the European context allows for more enthusiasm for the party as a form for politics.¶ But there’s still a lot of disagreement on the far left about whether or not the party form is useful, and shouldn’t we in fact retreat and have multiple actions and artistic events—you know, the whole alter-globalization framework. That’s still alive in a lot of places. CM: You mentioned the structure of the US electoral system doesn’t allow for a political party to necessarily be the solution for a group like Occupy. Is that one of the reasons that activists dismiss the party structure as something that could help move their agenda forward?¶ JD: **We can think about** the B**lack** P**anther** P**arty as a neat example** in the US context: **A party which** was operating not **primarily** to win elections but to galvanize social power. That’s an interesting way of thinking about what else parties can do in the US.¶ **Or we can think about parties in terms of local elections**. Socialist Alternative has been doing really neat work all over the country, organizing around local elections with people running as socialist candidates not within a mainstream party. I think that even as we come up against the limits of a two-party system, we can also begin to think better about local and regional elections.¶ The left really likes that old saw: “Think Globally, Act Locally.” And then it rejects parties—even though **political parties are, historically, forms** that do that, **that actually scale, that operate on multiple levels as organizations**.¶ That we have a two-party system makes sense as an excuse why **people haven’t used left parties very well in the US, but that doesn’t have to be the case**.¶ **And** one more thing: **there is a ton of sectarianism in the far left parties that exist**. Many still fight battles that go back to the twenties, thirties, forties, fifties, and haven’t let that go. **That has to change**. We don’t need that kind of sectarian purity right now.¶ CM: You ask the question, “How do we move from the inert mass to organized activists?” You mention how you were at Occupy Wall Street; you write about being there on 15 October 2011 as the massive crowd filled New York’s Times Square. And you mention this one young speaker, and he addresses the crowd; they’re deciding if they should move on to Washington Square Park or not, because they need to go somewhere where there are better facilities. You then quote the speaker saying, “We can take this park. We can take this park tonight. We can also take this park another night. Not everyone may be ready tonight. Each person has to make their own autonomous decision. No one can decide for you. You have to decide for yourself. Everyone is an autonomous individual.”¶ Did that kind of **individualism kill Occupy Wall Street from the start**?¶ JD: Yeah, I think so. A lot of times I blame the **rhetorics of** consensus and horizontalism, but both of those are rooted in an individualism that says politics must begin with each individual**, their interests, their** experience**, their positions, and so on.** As collectivity forms**—which is not easy when everyone’s beginning from their individual position—what starts to happen is that** peoplestart lookingfor how their exact experiences **and interests** are not being recognized. I think that **the left has given in too much to this assumption that politics begins with an individual**. That’s a liberal assumption. **Leftists, historically, begin with the assumption that** politics begins in groups. And for the left in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the operative group is class**. Class** is what **determines where our political interests come from**.¶ I try to do everything I can in the book **to dismantle the assumption** that politics, particularly **left politics, should begin with the individual**. Instead I want people thinking about how the individual is a fiction**, and a really oppressive fiction at that**. And one that’s actually, conveniently, falling apart.¶ CM: You write about Occupy Wall Street having been an opening but having had no continuing momentum. You mention that the party could add that needed momentum. That’s one of the things that parties can do. **The structure of the party can continue momentum and keep the opening alive**.¶ When you say that a party could be a solution for a movement like Occupy, you don’t mean the Democratic Party, do you?¶ JD: I’ve got a lot of layers on this question. My first answer is that no, I really mean the Communist Party. My friends call this “Jodi’s Fantasy Revolutionary Party” as a joke, because **the kind of Communist Party I take as my model may not be real, or may have only existed for a year and a half in Brooklyn in the thirties**. And I don’t mean the real-existing Communist Party in the US now, which still exists and basically endorses Democrats.¶ My idea is to think in terms of how we can imagine the Communist Party **again** as a force**—what it could be like if all of our left activist groups and small sectarian parties decided to come together in a new radical left party**.¶ So no, I don’t envision the Democratic Party as being that. That’s not at all what I have in mind. I’m thinking of a radical left party to which elections are incidental. Elections might be means for organizing, but **the goal isn’t just being elected.** The goal is overthrowing capitalism**.** The goal is being able to build a communist society as capitalism crumbles. Second, **it could be the case—as a matter of tactics on the ground in particular contexts—that working for a Democratic candidate might be useful**. It could be the case that trying to take over a local Democratic committee in order to get communist/socialist/radical left candidates elected could also be useful. **But** I don’t see the goal as taking over the Democratic Party. **That’s way too limited a goal, and it’s a goal that presupposes the continuation of the system we have, rather than its overthrow**.¶ CM: But how difficult would it be for a Communist Party to emerge free of its past associations with the Soviet Union? Can we even use the word “communist” or is it impossibly taboo?¶ JD: We have to recognize that the right is still scared of communism. That means the term is still powerful. That means it still has the ability to instill fear in its enemies. I think that’s an argument for keeping the word “communism.”¶ It’s also amazing that close to half of Iowa participants in the caucuses say that they are socialist. Four or five years ago, people were saying socialism is dead in the US. No one could even say the word. So I actually think holding on to the word “communism” is useful not only because our enemies are worried about communism, but also because it helps make the socialists seem really, really mainstream, and that’s good. We don’t want socialism to seem like something that only happens in Sweden. We want it to seem like that’s what America should have at a bare minimum.¶ One last thing about the history of communism: **every political ideology that has infused a state form has done awful things**. For the most part, if people like the ideology, they either let the awful things slide, or they use the ideology to criticize the awful things that the state does. We can do the same thing with communism. It’s helpful to recognize that **the countries we understand to have been** ruled by **Communist** Parties **were never really communist—they didn’t even claim to have achieved communism themselves**. We can say that **state socialism made these mistakes, and in so doing was betraying communist ideals**.¶ I don’t think we need to abandon these terms or come up with new ones. I think we need to use the power that they have. And people recognize this, which is what makes it exciting.¶ CM: You write, “Some contemporary crowd observers claim the crowd for democracy. They see in the amassing of thousands a democratic insistence, a demand to be heard and included. In the context of communicative capitalism, however, the crowd exceeds democracy.¶ “In the 21st century, dominant nation-states exercise power as democracies. They bomb and invade as democracies, ‘for democracy’s sake.’ International political bodies legitimize themselves as democratic, as do the contradictory and tangled media practices of communicative capitalism. When crowds amass in opposition, they pose themselves against democratic practices, systems, and bodies. To claim the crowd for democracy fails to register this change in the political setting of the crowd.”¶ So are crowds today, the protesters today, opposed to democracy? Or are they opposed to the current state of, let’s say, representative democracy?¶ JD: Let’s think about our basic environment. By “our,” now, I mean basically English-speaking people who use the internet and are listening to the radio and live in societies like the United States. In our environment, what we hear is that we live in democracy. We hear this all the time. We hear that the network media makes democratic exchange possible, that a free press is democracy, that we’ve got elections and that’s democracy.¶ When crowds amass in this setting, if they are just at a football game, **it’s not a political statement. Even at a march** (fully permitted) that’s **registering opposition to the invasion of Iraq**, for example, **or concern about the climate**—all of those things are within the general environment of “democracy,” and they don’t oppose the system**. They don’t register as opposition to the system. They’re just saying that we want our view on this or that issue to count**.¶ **But** the way that crowds have been amassing over the last four or five years—Occupy Wall Street is one example, but the Red Square debt movement in Canada is another; some of the more militant strikes of nurses and teachers are too—has been to say, “Look, the process that we have that’s been called democratic? It is not. We want to change that.”¶ It’s not that we are anti-democratic. It’s that democracy is too limiting a term to register our opposition. We want something more**. We want actual equality**. Democracy is too limiting. The reason it’s too limiting is we live in a context that understands itself as “democratic.” So democracy as a political claim, in my language, can’t “register the gap that the crowd is inscribing.” It can’t register real division or opposition. Democracy is just more of what we have.¶ CM: We are so dependent. We use social media so much, we use Facebook so much, we use so many of these avenues of what you call communicative capitalism so much. How can we oppose or reject this system without hurting ourselves and our ability to communicate our message to each other? Can we just go on strike? Can we become the owners of the means of communicative production?¶ JD: One of the ways that Marxism historically has understood the political problems faced by workers is our total entrapment and embeddedness in the capitalist system. What makes a strike so courageous is that workers are shooting themselves in the foot. They’re not earning their wage for a time, as a way to put pressure on the capitalist owner of the workplace.¶ What does that mean under communicative capitalism? Does it mean that we have to shoot ourselves in the foot by completely extracting ourselves from all of the instruments of communication? Or does it mean that we change our attitude towards communication? Or does it mean that we develop our own means of communication?¶ There’s a whole range here. I’m not a Luddite. I don’t think the way we’re going to bring down capitalism is by quitting Facebook. I think that’s a little bit absurd. I think what makes more sense is to think of how we could use the tools we have to bring down the master’s house. We can consolidate our message together. We can get a better sense of how many we are. We can develop common modes of thinking. We can distribute organizing materials for the revolutionary party. I don’t think that an extractive approach to our situation in communicative media is the right one. I think it’s got to be more tactical. How do we use the tools we have, and how do we find ways to seize the means of communication? This would mean the collectivization of Google, Facebook, Amazon, and using those apparatuses. But that would probably have to be day two of the revolution.¶ CM: Jodi, I’ve got one last question for you, and it’s the Question from Hell, the question we might hate to ask, you might hate to answer, or our audience is going to hate the response.¶ How much did the narrative that Occupy created, of the 99% and the 1%, undermine a of collectivity? Because it doesn’t include everyone…¶ JD: **Division is crucial. Collectivity is never everyone**. What this narrative did was produce **the divided collectivity that we need**. It’s great to **undermine the** ~~stupid~~ **myth of American unity**, “The country has to pull together” and all that crap. It’s fantastic that **Occupy Wall Street asserted collectivity through division. This is class conflict. This says there is not a unified society.** Collectivity is the collectivity of us against them. It produced the proper collectivity: an antagonistic one.

[Dean 15] The only possible escape hatch from capitalism is through unwavering solidarity – the role of the party must be unifying in the face of the oppressions produced by capitalism – all of their reasons why the party has been oppressive in the past are reasons why only solidarity can build a new one to take political power. Dean 15  
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The party is necessary because the people are split. We are split by the way we are given—positioned—within capitalism. We are situated within a field that tells us who we are and what we can be, that establishes the matrix of our desire (Žižek's definition of ideology), but that represses the truth of this field in class struggle.77 See my discussion in Zizek's Politics (Dean 2006 Dean, J. 2006. Žižek’s politics. New York: Routledge. [Google Scholar] ). View all notes The party asserts this truth: it speaks from the position of this truth and offers another field of possibilities, a discourse for another subject (Žižek 2002 Žižek, S. 2002. Revolution at the gates. London: Verso. [Google Scholar] , 187–9). In contrast and in opposition to capitalist desire, the party opens up a terrain for the desire of another subject—a collective, political subject. The party doesn’t know everything; it provides a form for the knowledge we gain through experience and that we analyze from the perspective of the communist horizon. This is rather abstract and probably pretty unsatisfying to people who want to know what the kind of party I have in mind will look like, how it will be organized, and how such organization could in any way be adequate to our circumstances, given the way global capitalism is organized as a global financial system. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin (2013 Panitch, L., and S. Gindin. 2013. The making of global capitalism. London: Verso. [Google Scholar] ) are helpful here, as they make explicit the inextricably political dimension of our current tasks: we can’t change the world without taking political power. All we can do is pursue small experiments, the left version of the 1 percent's gating themselves off. We can’t take political power if we lack political form. For the most part, our problem is less one of organizational details than it is solidary political will. As the will emerges, people will figure out the structure in light of the challenges we face: expanding militant pressure in ways that inspire and educate cadres while at the same time straining the resources of the state and breaking the confidence of the financial sector; abolishing private property and the capitalist banking system while advancing international coordination in an uneven environment; increasing popular support and developing a program for addressing common concerns over the environment, health, transportation, communication, food, housing, and education. A five- or ten-year plan for getting from here to there could be helpful. An alliance of the radical Left or, better, a new Communist party could grow out of the concentrated forces of already existing groups, from militants skilled at direct action to artists adept with symbols and slogans to parties experienced at organizing to issue groups knowledgeable about specific areas of concern. Such a concentration would provide people who want to be engaged in radical politics but who aren’t sure what to do with a place to go, a place to start. At a minimal level, if we are to have a chance of taking power, of reformatting the basic conditions under which we live and work, we have to share a name in common as a fundamental marker of division. If not, our names will be given to us by capital, which will seek to fragment and distract us. In the movements of the last few years, we’ve seen recognitions of the power and the need for a name in common as a marker of division—Occupy is a clear example, yet across the spectrum of the Left, people disavow it. In addition to needing a name in common, we need to know whom we can trust, and we need to extend the bonds of trust beyond local ties and small networks. An absence of solidarity may be the biggest challenge right now insofar as without solidarity a common will cannot emerge. Defeat, betrayal, and fear as well as ongoing patterns of sexism, racism, and homophobia have made us deeply suspicious. One way a party helps deal with this is by explicit criteria for membership and by expectations for its members. Another way is through a cellular structure that ensures that each person is connected to a known group of others to whom she or he is accountable. And still another way is to acknowledge different skills and expertise by delegating tasks—we don’t each need to know what every other person is doing. Trusting others’ skills and knowledge is essential if we are to form ourselves into a political force capable of addressing global capital. This suggests the utility of working groups in multiple locales and issue areas—groups with enough autonomy to be responsive and enough direction to carry out a common purpose, which itself would have to be hashed out and to which all would have to be committed. I have suggested a name in common and some basic structural components involving a membership organized in cells, the delegation of tasks, and the following of a common purpose. The idea behind this rudimentary sketch is that the party is a political form of commitment, a solidarity that requires of members a willingness to put aside endless self-assertion and to admit that pulling together is more important than insisting on one's own uniqueness. To conclude, here are questions that the party form forces us to answer: How do we imagine the world? Are we doomed to continue down a path determined for us? Do we take refuge in a left realist view that tells us the time is not right? Do we conform to communicative capitalism's promise that another world is possible through a cool new app? Or do we embrace uncertainty and do the impossible, with recourse not to pure voluntarism but to the recognition of the ultimately open character of the world in which we participate? How do we imagine politics? Do we take for granted the political systems we have and position ourselves within them, repeating time and again the small moments of rebellion that let us sleep at night? What do we want? Do we want an end to exploitation, the abolition of private property, a system of shared responsibility for production and distribution? Or have the last thirty years sunk in too deep, filling us with doubt and making us suspect that, yes, it's true, there is no alternative to capitalism, let's just make it not so bad for people like us? What is the relation between means and ends? What is the relation between the actions we design, the events in which we participate, the texts we write and circulate, and the world we want to bring into being? What is the plan, the end game, the relation between actions over space and time? Do we dare to avow power, to enact a political association that does not imagine itself as the whole of community or as idealized friendship but that instead rests on fighting side by side for an emancipated and egalitarian political, economic, and social formation?

#### Role of the ballot: we should endorse anti-neoliberal pedagogy in the debate space – it is the only way to produce new ideas and escape the military-industrial-academic-cultural complex

Giroux 14 [Henry A. Giroux (Chair for Scholarship in the Public Interest​, The Paulo Freire Distinguished Scholar in Critical Pedagogy), April 15, 2014, "Neoliberalism and the machinery of disposability," Philosophers for Change, https://philosophersforchange.org/2014/04/15/neoliberalism-and-the-machinery-of-disposability/, 6-28-2019]

Such movements are not simply about reclaiming space but also about producing new ideas, generating new conversations, and introducing a new political language. While there has been considerable coverage in the progressive media since 2001 given to the violence being waged against the movement protesters in Brazil, the United States, Greece and elsewhere, it is important to situate such violence within a broader set of categories that enables a critical understanding of not only the underlying social, economic and political forces at work in such assaults, but also makes it possible to reflect critically on the distinctiveness of the current historical period in which they are taking place. For example, it is difficult to address such state-sponsored violence against young people without analyzing the devolution of the social state, emergence of a politics of disposability, and the corresponding rise of the warfare and punishing state. The merging of the military-industrial-academic-cultural complex and unbridled corporate power points to the need for strategies that address what is specific about the current warfare state and the neoliberal project and how different interests, modes of power, social relations, public pedagogies, and economic configurations come together to shape its politics of domestic terrorism, cruelty, and zones of disposability. Such a conjuncture is invaluable politically in that it provides a theoretical opening for making the practices of the neoliberal revolution visible to organize resistance to its ideologies, policies and modes of governance. It also points to the conceptual power of making clear that history remains an open horizon that cannot be dismissed through appeals to the end of history or end of ideology.[20] It is precisely through the indeterminate nature of history that resistance becomes possible and politics refuses any guarantees and remains open. A number of neoliberal societies, including the United States, have become addicted to violence. War provides jobs, profits, political payoffs, research funds, and forms of political and economic power that reach into every aspect of society. As war becomes a mode of sovereignty and rule, it erodes the distinction between war and peace. Increasingly fed by a moral and political frenzy, warlike values produce and endorse shared fears as the primary register of social relations. Shared fears and the media-induced panics that feed them produce more than a culture of fear. Such hysteria also feeds the growing militarization of the police, who increasingly use their high-tech scanners, surveillance cameras and toxic chemicals on anyone who engages in peaceful protests against the warfare and corporate state. Images abound in the mainstream media of such abuses. As a mode of public pedagogy, a state of permanent war needs willing subjects to abide by its values, ideology and narratives of fear and violence. Such legitimation is largely provided through a market-driven culture addicted to production of consumerism, militarism, and organized violence, largely circulated through various registers of popular culture that extend from high fashion and Hollywood movies to the creation of violent video games and music concerts sponsored by the Pentagon. The market-driven spectacle of war demands a culture of conformity, quiet intellectuals and a largely passive republic of consumers. But it also needs subjects who find intense pleasure in the spectacle of violence.

#### Class divisions are the root of all other oppressions

Kovel 2 (Alger Hiss Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, awarded Fellowship at the John Guggenheim Foundation, Joel, The Enemy of Nature, pages 123-124)

If, however, we ask the question of efficacy, that is, which split sets the others into motion, then priority would have to be given to class, for the plain reason that class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforce­ment and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of 'classism' to go along with 'sexism' and 'racism,' and `species-ism'). This is, first of all, because class is an essentially man-made category, without root in even a mystified biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender dis­tinctions – although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable – indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species' time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because 'class' signifies one side of a larger figure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state.'° Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of woman's labour. Class society continually generates gender, racial, ethnic oppressions and the like, which take on a life of their own, as well as profoundly affecting the concrete relations of class itself. It follows that class politics must be fought out in terms of all the active forms of social splitting. It is the management of these divisions that keeps state society functional. Thus though each person in a class society is reduced from what s/he can become, the varied reductions can be combined into the great stratified regimes of history — this one becoming a fierce warrior, that one a routine-loving clerk, another a submissive seamstress, and so on, until we reach today's personi­fications of capital and captains of industry. Yet no matter how functional a class society, the profundity of its ecological violence ensures a basic antagonism which drives history onward. History is the history of class society — because no matter how modified, so powerful a schism is bound to work itself through to the surface, provoke resistance (`class struggle'), and lead to the succession of powers. The relation of class can be mystified without end — only consider the extent to which religion exists for just this purpose, or watch a show glorifying the police on television — yet so long as we have any respect for human nature, we must recognize that so funda­mental an antagonism as would steal the vital force of one person for the enrichment of another cannot be conjured away.

### Case

**[Spillers 18] A choice to disengage with the specifics of institutional politics at this particular moment in history is violent – their move away from politics is pushes black folx further to the margins through fatalistic reading of social agency. Spillers 18**

[Spillers, Hortense. Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of English @ Vanderbilt U., “Or Else…” *The A-Line: A Journal of Progressive Thought*, https://alinejournal.com/convergence/or-else/]

Ironically, however twisted a standard of measure, we might gauge how far we’ve come by the degree of doubt expressible toward the efficacy of voter registration and electoral politics, as have a couple of my fellow writers in this issue. Even though I regard this argumentative posture as a strategic error of near-fatal proportions, I think I understand how we got here: basically, there are two related, but contrastive, founding propositions on black life and thought in modernity that critics have consistently elaborated since “time immemorial,” and by that, I mean the time that the student of history marks down as the beginning of her sense of crisis that initiates “blackness” in the Western context; as I understand it, Afrocentric views, for instance, elide “blackness” and Africanity which concept is driven back into the ancient world so that transatlantic slavery—relatively recent in light of an ancient human past—is not the origin—or more precisely, the prime time— of black personality’s historical identity, but, rather, an interruption of it. The diasporic, or (for lack of a better word) creolized reading of blackness lends weight to the term itself, insofar as blackness on this view defines a new historical apprenticeship, kin to Africanness, but distinct from it in its particular and stressful formation, instaurated by the trade. One “becomes” black –neither a phylogeny nor an ontogeny—by virtue of his/her interpellation in total Western Economy. These portions of discursive content imply discrete spatiotemporal registers, as the putative subjects of each overlap, but are not entirely conformable (even if they look exactly alike), and there’s the rub. In the former instance, one discovers as many occasions as possible to establish and sustain symbolic contact with an imagined past, long receded, so that emphasis comes to rest on the power and porosity of myth and its ceremonial/ritualistic determinations wherever possible. Whether the Afrocentric sense eventuates in a vision of strategic movement toward a putative origin (as in “return” narratives/actualities of black politics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries), or of ideological movement toward it (“ancestral” ceremonies, ritual celebrations), this reading seems to engender a politics that is cultural, that looks “otherworldly”—the place of the ego-ideal—in its valorized reference to an imagined ancestral field. We would anticipate that electoral politics in its uninspirational mundaneness might actually be beneath it. In the latter instance, focus comes to rest on the conditions that make blackness possible in the first place and what several diasporic thinkers, Frantz Fanon, prominent among them, describe as “disalienation,” or the process of undoing the deleterious effects of slavery and colonization; because the diasporic view installs the latter as efficient cause of historic black movement, its political projects are charged with a sense of urgency as they resonate the era of their appearance with unmistakable identitarian markings. David Walker’s, Anna Julia Cooper’s, and W.E.B.Du Bois’s respective discourse, for example, could never be mistaken for a different time/cultural period, which means that such discourses are organically linked to their own “now.” Consequently, the political protocols of a diasporic commitment tend to reflect the sense of crisis that characterizes blackness as an emergent category of human possibility. Because blackness in the diasporic reading runs parallel to modernity, blackness is cut away from the idea of Africa—perhaps we could say more precisely that the idea of Africa is bracketed in this ideological outline, rather than jettisoned as it might have been a century ago—as the idea of blackness itself assumes the name of a virtually absolute origin. If we think of these concurrent strands of ideas as postures, then we realize the extent to which they determine not only how one stands, but where, as well as why. This enormous conceptual legacy, one way or another, accounts, I believe, for the lion’s share of African-American theoretical production and might be said to proffer a rich example of the problem of being/becoming and time. In its impressive variations and combinations, recombinations and iterations, black theory-making has engendered its fullest efflorescence in my view in the post-sixties period with regard to both thematic variedness and complexity and the democratic and demographic distribution of its practitioners; it is also true that any one of these postures and/or variations on it might evince at any given moment a kind of intellectual sclerosis which would induce in turn a conservative politics. If, for example, a theory governed by a diasporic view of black history from which to commence its narrative reifies slavery and colonization as inherent properties in a subject, then the theoretical posture no longer serves as an intellectual technology, or a heuristic device, but, rather, comes to advance an ontological valence. In my own work, for instance, I attempt to advance a theory of flesh/body as a strategy to differentiate historical positionalities in confrontation with the modern world. But if this idea has any usefulness, it proposes the theory as an opening into a closure; a torque that kicks off movement or rotation in static properties. But I **should** hope **not** to **lose sight of the human potential that the subject** of the flesh **embodies**; perhaps another way to say this is that the **enfleshed subject inscribes an opening in a chain of necessity** rather than a last word. The theory does not exhaust the subject that it would address, but attempts to highlight it. **To hold** to the view **that the enfleshed subject is actually chattel or property**—which we cannot say, insofar as we have merely established a subject possibility in this case—**defeats the purpose** of discriminating in the first place between a conceptual device on the one hand and a speaking (even if barred) subject on the other. I have taken, then, the long way around in order to say that **the ballot does not lose efficacy when** it is **wielded by black personality because the latter was** once defined as anomie, as **chattel**. In other words, to premise the future of blackness on its past is to be mired in timelessness, which is precisely to be bereft of historicity, of differentiation, of progression. But moreover, it confuses a conceptual narrative, or a position in discourse, with an actual narrative that will always exceed it. **To disparage the black vote is not** a sophisticated, or **radical**, response to anything, **but reverberates** instead, without meaning to, we might suppose, **a long-standing hatred of black people** and their aspirations. To express doubt about the vote, especially this election season, in light of what we face now is beyond criticism: it is quite simply **to embrace the inevitability of violence**, and one should avoid flirtation with violence unless she is willing to put herself in its path. Anything less is an act of bad faith; I would go so far as to say that the failure to cast a vote at the coming midterms is an immoral act for at least two reasons that might go without saying, but bear repeating nonetheless: **the meaning of suffrage** for generations of African-Americans **and** the **suffering** that **it** has **exacted** over the decades **and the certain danger** that **the current presidency and a treasonous, complicit Republican congress**ional majority **pose to the U**nited **S**tates **and the world**. Do we need to count the ways that we are doubtless threatened? When I was a child, I not only spoke as one, but imagined like a child, too—a sauce pan, for instance, turned upside down made a really great hat—shining and irrepressible, cocked upside the head to the left, or the right; fabulous for a stately procession; the family’s beautiful mahogany console housed a radio with a green light in it, and if you squeezed yourself behind the device and examined the exposed radio tubes in it, you watched as they were suddenly dissolved in your mind’s eye into the skyline of a good-size city that you were taking in from a bird’s eye-view; if you stood a mop head up and drew a face on its handle, you had a pretty good doll for a day, especially if your father, or a sibling, whittled down the handle. In this world of discovery and surprise and everyday objects charged with magic, a word like “treason” signaled a remoteness light years away; in fact, it was a “school” word about as close to a little four- to seven -year old black girl’s reality as eighteenth-century images of white guys in tri-cornered hats, crossing the Delaware (wherever that was!), except that one of them was oddly named “Benedict Arnold,” who was not a very nice guy, we were told, and nowhere near “George Washington,” “who never told a lie.” Somebody cut down a cherry tree and, asked about it, ‘fessed up. (Or was that Abe Lincoln?) But this “treason” business started growing up, too, not unlike its young host body, as its next iteration was closer in both time and space to that of the school children—it was the Civil War and “seceding” states from the “Union.” Why would “they,” including the state where our young lady lived then and now, do that? Ah! And she learns that “history hurts.” And at that precise moment, one put away childish things, even though Emmett Till, my contemporary, was child enough. One day, long after, the end of a line in the presidential oath of office caught my attention, in fact, it quite astonished me—to defend the United States against “all enemies, foreign and domestic.” But is it possible for the “enemy” to be domestic? And what if it is? I thought I’d never live to see the day when I would have to ask myself that question and to wonder what the citizen’s duty might be in the realization that it is not only possible, but under certain circumstances, as appears to be the case at present, quite likely. And here **we are, faced with the actual possibility** now **that** the **long-deferred democracy we** have **labored toward is poised to** take a blow that could **permanently end** it. If voting could stave it off, who would refuse? Hold that thought.

**[Thomas 18] Their universalized reading of blackness and humanism solely within an occidental context (i.e. description of Asian and Black existence solely in the context of the West) lays the foundation for the re-inscription of anti-black colonialist discourses. Thomas 18**

[Thomas, Greg. “Afro-Blue Notes: The Death of Afro-pessimism (2.0).” 2018.]

It’s imperative to analyze this **specific discourse** (or notion) **of “slavery**” embedded here along with the conception of history or the geopol-itics of history inscribed by a “Black” discourse that could so casually dub itself “Afro-pessimism.” The entire discourse operates in the flow of an exceptionally provincial time and place. The “First Worldism” noted in Afro-pessimism (1.0) by Emeagwali is matched here by what Malcolm X marvelously defied **as “Americanism**.” A “new,” “pessimist” critique of “anti-Black racism” is made in the age and academic context of liberal identity conflicts and competitions—“after the revolution has failed,” to recall George L. Jackson, after counter-revolution has receded an array of revolutionary movements of praxis from hegemonic and certainly academic view. Wilderson adds in his writing against redemption: “We need to apprehend the profound and irreconcilable difference between White supremacy (the colonial utility of the Sand Creek massacre) and anti-Blackness (the human race’s necessity for violence against Black people). The antagonism between the post-colonial subject and the settler (the Sand Creek massacre, or the Palestinian Nakba) cannot—and should not be—analogized with the violence of social death: that is the violence of slavery, which did not end in 1865, for the simple reason that slavery did not end in 1865.”23 The chronological marker of “1865” is not insignificant or inconsequential. It **indexes a specific white settler** nationalist **project**; the USA construct of “Americanism” (or “amerikanism”) and slaveocracy; an official, white settler-slave state nationalist history and historiography. Yet Blackness and slavery are supposedly being thought at the most global or worldly level of humanity and humanism. Yet species automatically becomes nation, or the settler nation-state ideal, “American” meaning US settler imperialism in North America—both the species of humanity and the species of Blackness, which is cut up, constricted, and undercut from the start by Wilderson’s paradigm. **How should 1865 function for** the London site of The Occupied Times?24 The powder-keg **Haitian Revolution** does not pivot around 1865, of course, but 1791–1804. Britain declared a “gradual” abolition of slavery in 1833–34 with a typical “compensation” mandated for the slavers. So, what of the official if spurious “emancipation” dates for the rest of the Black world of Africa’s enslaved diaspora? **Spain** is said to officially **abolish slavery in 1811**, for instance, while making exceptions for colonies in Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico. Denmark proclaims abolition in its “West Indies” in 1846–1848, like Sweden for Barthélemy in 1847. France is forced to follow suit, once more, in 1848; and Gabon is “founded” accordingly in Africa as the US would Liberia, etc. “Upper Canada” was said to end slavery with the British and “Lower Canada” (now Québec) with the French, an interesting fact for narrations of the Underground Railroad that often kept moving beyond Canada in the north back to the African continent (often Sierra Leone). The Netherlands is said to do so in 1861 or 1863. The modern slavery founded in the “Hispano-Portuguese slave trade” would thrive in the Western Hemisphere both before and after formal independence from Spain and Portugal. This is key to debunk the “Afro-pessimism” that thinks it can delink slavery and colonialism as two separate, even competing entities or issues. The criollo settler-colonial slave-states of Cuba and Brazil do not officially abolish slavery for Africans until two decades after 1865 in 1886 and 1888, respectively. Slavery was purportedly abolished in Ecuador in 1851, but it is quite possible to move that pretentious date to 1894, which is well beyond the official “closing” dates widely touted for Brazil after Puerto Rico and Cuba in the Americas. **To think of slavery’s pseudo-abolition in terms of 1865** alone or any one date **is not to think on** the **level of “Blackness”** and “Human Life” at all; it is to **reinscribe** the **most imperial white “American” perspective** on slavery and Blackness instead. The conceptual-geopolitical trappings of “1865” fundamentally define the discourse of “Afro-Pessimism and the Ends of Redemption,” like assorted neo-pessimist texts: “The expanding field of Afropessimism theorises [sic] the structural relation between Blackness and Humanity as an irreconcilable encounter, an antagonism. One **cannot know Blackness as distinct from slavery**, for there is no Black temporality which is antecedent to the temporality of the Black slave.”25 Critically, Wole Soyinka details “pre-colonial” African languages of “black” self-identification from the Yoruba to the Ga to the Hausa peoples on continent, for starters, in “The African World and the Ethnocultural Debate” (1989). But these details do not enter modern Eurocentric discussions in the main, be they Marxist or anti-Marxist, etc.26 There is in Wilderson **only** the **slaver’s history of slavery**—one slaver’s official “national” or state history and discourse. The “expanding field” of “Afro-pessimism” (2.0) further expands anti-Black, anti-African conceptions of historical agency. There is nothing outside of, or before, or countering Wilderson’s “slavery” for the African enslaved. There is only Wilderson’s “Blackness,” which is curious. For what he casts as “Black” rather than “black” is more accurately cast as “negro” (in this specifically English usage, moreover, with no memory of the Spanish or Portuguese etymology) and not even “Negro,” quiet as it’s kept—since all of Africa is flatly foreclosed by this acutely paradoxical “Afro-pessimism.” Both **Africa and diasporas eclipsed**, his “**Blackness” and “Human Life” turn out to be** the **blackness and humanism of white Americanism**, specifically and restrictively, an isolationist or exceptionalist Americanism despite the past and present hegemony of white Western humanism and its “anti-Black racism” worldwide. What is the “Afro” in “Afro-pessimism,” therefore, when this Afro-pessimism (2.0) revivifies in disguise the “negro” concept of white settler-slave state history and historiography? It ironically does so in the name of some “Blackness” itself or, rather, the “blackness” of whiteness, of white postulation—not the Blackness of Blackness or the transvaluations of manifold Black liberation movements themselves, even as it blithely misappropriates the ongoing if now naturalized cultural-political labor of that historic Blackness in the upper case. A **dominant Anglo-American discourse of slavery is** all that there is and ever was now when it comes to the **Black and African**, all **anti-slavery discourses and counter-discourses of slavery** as well as **Blackness somehow vanished.**

1ac Haskins:

1. This card is only a critique of jfk’s langauge, not of space exploration writ large, read the ev
2. Other countries also explore space — this ev ignores that countries such as india have also adventured into space — no american heg
3. Reps don’t equal reality - no explicit warrant in the 1ac in regards to space colonization

#### Focusing on representation ignores the material conditions that shape policy action

**Tuathail 96**

[Gearóid, Professor of Government and International Affairs, Virginia Tech, The patterned mess of history and the writing of critical geopolitics: a reply to Dalby, Political Geography 15:6/7, p 661-5]

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, **the discourse and concerns of** foreign-policy **decisionmakers are** quite different, **so different that they constitute a distinctive** problemsolving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. **Political, military and economic** structures, **institutions**, discursive networks and leadership **are** all **crucial** in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and poststructuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly selfinterested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of **discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing** this **concern with discourse** so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. **Critical geopolitics**, in other words, **should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant** that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism **nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative**; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

1ac smiles

1. This card is just a reexplanation of Wolfe and fasley equivocates land and outer space — they’re totally different
2. Read the ev - “space” means land not outer space basically every time it’s highlighted
3. Settler’s use of space is to feed capital - ur ev says it and means we get root cause

1ac Ngo

1. Nowhere does this card talk about space exploration — generic setcol bad, which awe agree
2. Root cause of model minority is the concept of working hard and wealth allocation - capitalism is literally root cause

1ac nguyen

1. This debate is a question of alternatives to capitalism: aff v alt- Hastings means no aff

PART 3

#### 1ac Kim cards: group them

#### Post-colonial futurism is pocketed utopianism and make it impossible to create coalitions or enact political change – its built on a flawed foundation & spreads bad knowledge

Niezen, 07 (Ronald Niezen holds the Katharine A. Pearson Chair in Civil Society and Public Policy in the faculties of Law and of Arts, a Tier 1 Canada Research Chair in the Anthropology of Law, and is a Professor and former Chair of the Department of Anthropology., “Postcolonialism and the Utopian Imagination”, 21 September 2007 //nrt)

Postcolonial futurism has no answer to the problems and paradoxes of cultural claims and collective strivings toward distinctiveness and selfdetermination other than to imagine a world in which they do not exist. Recalling that postcolonialism also encourages nationalist essentialism, this means that there are two antipathetic, mutually negating versions of postcolonial liberation: one looking toward a future of borderless global cultural liberation, another toward a more immediate, intellectuallyinspired era of cultural affirmation and autonomy. Postcolonial futurism commits the fundamental error, once widely attributed to Marxism, of anticipating a global state of collective being that underestimates the propensity toward national or minority identities based on affirmation of the rights of peoples, today often expressed in terms of cultural distinctiveness coupled with claims of political self-determination. But the national and universalist versions of postcolonial liberation are, at least in one sense, complementary. The utopian imagination is able to make particular cultural allegiances seem more palatable for global consumption, to mask the unpleasant flavours of indigenophilism and small-scale identity politics with saccharine promises of unconditional liberation from the levelling powers of nation-states. It is able to reconfigure particular cultural aspirations in a way that removes from view their tensions, contradictions and proclivities to intolerance, while leaving intact their most compelling promises of inclusion, spiritual awareness, intimacy and affirmation. This brings us to the most important question that follows from the recent resurgence of utopian visions: what is wrong with hope? Why should we deny dreamers the consolation of their fantasies? Is not the capacity to imagine a different and better world the most important component of our ability to change the world for the better? And does it POSTCOLONIALISM AND THE UTOPIAN IMAGINATION 727 Downloaded by [] at 07:10 18 July 2015 not follow that denying the possibility of imagining a radically different future might result in a crippling of the capacities to criticize present institutional injustices and dysfunctions and to create better institutions and forms of governance? There is a relatively simple answer to this: hope for the future goes astray whenever it is built upon a mistaken understanding of present conditions; and there is no definitive way to correct its errors. The utopian imagination is by its very nature free to elaborate radically different-from-the-present visions of a yet-to-be-realized society, founded on misleading, irrational understandings of the present circumstances or propensities of human social life. There is a sense in which utopianism, when tolerated as a form of intellectual discourse, can wreak havoc on recognized forms of critical etiquette. How might one, as a critic, point conclusively to a misrepresentation of the collective future? One of the appeals of utopianism is its immunity from falsification. Certain dreams are inherently adverse to the stimulants of facts, practicalities and openness to revision. The postcolonial utopian imagination is especially fraught with dilemmas and improbabilities. Although being largely premised on postmodernism’s rejection of ‘grand narratives’, and although expressing its vision of the future as one of permissiveness and cultural freedom, it indirectly possesses its own civilizing agenda to which all others are expected to conform. Insofar as it does articulate a specific vision of future change, it anticipates the dismantling of existing structures of nation-states and institutions of global governance, while maintaining a naı¨ve faith in the emergence, out of conditions of revolutionary change and insecurity, of a free-flowing global cultural ecumene. Does this mean that there is no form of utopian imagination applicable to conditions of planetary integration, one that can offer realizable inspiration without engaging in obscurantism, cultural fundamentalism or civilizing agendas? My perspective suggests that postcolonial idealism makes it almost impossible to learn from the actual disorderly processes of negotiating and overcoming differences. But perhaps it is yet possible to construct a vision of the future that acknowledges the untidiness and disarray of human identities. Whatever other qualities it might have, such futurism would begin with the following premise: we have more to learn from those who have struggled through conflict, compromise and reconciliation to achieve a condition of peace than from those who are content to imagine away the obstacles to an otherwise unachievable ideal.

1ac osajima

1. this ev is only student protests – not writ large
2. no spill over – capitalism and racism still exist
3. individual politics fail – 1nc hastings – prefer the alt

### Cross-Ex

How is the role of the ballot distinct from role of the judge?

Does the ballot have inherent value?

Does the judge have a role outside of determining who gets the ballot?

How do I know that this panel knows what racist education is?