### Witch PIC

#### CP text: We endorse the entirety of the 1AC aside from their endorsement of witches

#### NB: Appeals to witchcraft is cultural appropriation.

**Khan 17** [By Aysha Khan, 10/27/17"Is Tumblr witchcraft feminism – or cultural appropriation?," Religion News Service <https://religionnews.com/2017/10/27/is-tumblr-witchcraft-feminism-or-cultural-appropriation/> ghs-am]

 New York-based writer Jaya Saxena isn’t Wiccan. She’s no pagan, either. She grew up with a Hindu grandmother, attended a Quaker high school and has Jewish in-laws, but isn’t at all religious herself. Jaya Saxena is not a witch. So how did she end up publishing a guide to modern witchcraft? “We see ourselves as continuing a long line of unruly women,” Saxena explained. She and her “Basic Witches” co-author, Jess Zimmerman (an atheist who doesn’t believe in the occult or mysticism), aim to arm women – ordinary women who may scoff at spirituality or magic – with the subversive feminist powers of traditional witches. “We make no claim to the religious practice of Wicca, paganism or any other faith,” Saxena told RNS. “But we see the cultural image of a witch as a separate and valid identity.” That image is the kind of dark, witchy aesthetic you’ve probably seen while scrolling through Instagram or millennial women’s magazines. It’s the kind of empowered identity promoted in podcasts about toppling the patriarchy and Facebook posts about the radical importance of self-care. But even as these basic witches become increasingly popular, actual practitioners of magic still exist on the margins of society. And “real” witches, who’ve historically faced persecution and execution, aren’t all happy with the new trends. Critics say a perfect storm of Instagram-era online branding combined with leftist political posturing has made witchcraft the latest victim of cultural appropriation. In some ways, 2017’s witch obsession is nothing new. Those who grew up in the ’90s may remember TV shows like “Charmed” and “Sabrina the Teenage Witch.” There were, of course, the Harry Potter series’ Hermione Granger and Bellatrix Lestrange; and there were also Silver RavenWolf’s [guides](https://www.llewellyn.com/product.php?ean=9781567187250) to “Wicca for a new generation” and “practical witchcraft for the millennium.” But today’s digital witches are a little different. Many fuel their aesthetic with stylish Instagram accounts and overpriced sage sticks items sold at Urban Outfitters and magick Etsy shops. Take a minute to scroll through the [emoji spells](http://popculturewitches.tumblr.com/post/139227855349/emoji-spells-a-companion-to-my-post-emoji) and tarot card selfies on [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/explore/tags/witch/) and [Tumblr](https://tumblr.com/tagged/witch)‘s #witch tags. Glance at blogs like those of 21-year-old [Maddie](https://closet-earth-witch.tumblr.com/), a “solitary Christian witch” from Utah, or 26-year-old [A.J.](http://stonesandsigils.tumblr.com/), who sells handmade tarot deck bags from her home in Boston. Check out the [School of Witchery](http://www.schoolofwitchery.net/) and other online classes like it. Or look at the [many](https://www.whitewitchbox.co.uk/) ([many](https://www.cratejoy.com/box-insider/10-magickal-subscriptions-for-the-witchy-woman/), [many](https://www.racked.com/2016/8/4/12250160/witch-subscription-boxes), [many](https://boxes.hellosubscription.com/subscriptions/wiccan-pagan-subscription-boxes/)) subscription boxes aimed at witchy millennials. For many young women, participating in online witchcraft communities – re-blogging spells, recommending essential oils, posting selfies with crystal collections – is a [digital shelter](https://psmag.com/news/why-is-digital-witchcraft-so-appealing-to-young-women), an alternative identity from the real world. And online witchcraft’s DIY culture paired with its innate sisterhood is compelling to young women. The numbers are growing offline, too. In her 2015 book, “Witches of America,” Alex Mar estimates there are some 1 million practitioners of witchcraft throughout the country. And a quick search will reveal [Meetups,](https://www.meetup.com/topics/witches/us/) [covens](http://www.witchvox.com/vn/gr/usco_gra.html) and witchy [bookstores](https://store.isisbooks.com/) sprinkled across the country. Berlin-based writer Mikaella Clements [divides](https://theestablishment.co/a-brief-history-of-the-tumblr-witch-8f30657849f) witches on the microblogging site Tumblr into three categories: Witches who are devoted to magic, not religion. They often share spell books, like a [love spell](http://birdywitch.tumblr.com/post/161352979354/love-spell-to-find-a-partner), and “kitchen witchery,” like a honey-lemon-ginger [tea](http://lindentea.tumblr.com/post/30330134011/paganthings-cdnpgn-winter-sore-throat-tea) for sore throats or a magical laundry [detergent](http://birdywitch.tumblr.com/post/161278383235/diy-magical-laundry-detergent-i-love-using). Clements points to Tumblr’s base among digital-savvy teens who tend to be disenchanted with religion. The witches who are religious, and affiliate themselves with Wicca or other neo-pagan spiritual paths. They tend to focus more on the nonpractical uses of magic: “good energy and the natural world, rather than any concrete potions or charms,” Clements said. The Tumblr witch, who Clements said is “tied up in intersectional feminism, in a desire to reclaim power, and to laugh as she does so.” She posts pentacles for the aesthetic, and exults in hipster consumerism. She is politically aware, as are many on Tumblr’s social justice-friendly platform, and embraces the iconography of the angry satanic witch with irreverent irony. Do the first and second covens count as cultural appropriation? Is removing the spirituality behind spells and pentacles the same as, say, wearing a Native American headdress to a music festival? Can you compare it to a white person wearing his hair in dreadlocks or an Afro? There’s a reason the witch’s aesthetic has captured the imaginations of young, digital-minded women. “Beneath all that glossy packaging hums the same idea that has tantalized girls for millennia,” Anne Theriault [writes](https://theestablishment.co/the-real-reason-women-love-witches-647d48517f66) on The Establishment. “The fact that to be a witch is to be a woman with power in a world where women are often otherwise powerless.” Sometimes that radical feeling of subverting society’s standards comes from hexes, crystals and herbs. For others, a dark lipstick and long black dress do the trick. Just as ideas of women’s empowerment and self-care have become [marketable consumer trends](http://inthesetimes.com/article/19272/marketplace-feminism-and-the-commodification-of-empowerment), so has witchcraft, coinciding with rising interest in yoga, meditation and sex positivity (a movement that embraces safe, consensual sex). And the markers that caused witches in 1600s Europe to be persecuted – singlehood, financial independence, providing for oneself with a well-stocked herb garden – tend to be things today’s young liberal feminists prize. Saxena said her book’s view of witchcraft focuses on “the tradition that people who were accused of witchcraft were typically undermining dominant power structures, whether it was because they were performing abortions or refusing to marry or generally not acting ‘ladylike.'” For her and Zimmerman, her co-author, a general interest in the occult as youths “morphed into something secular but meaningful in our lives.” When they realized many other people out there felt that same pull to witchcraft’s elements of feminism and self-empowerment, they ended up writing “Basic Witches.” Powerful women always have been feared and silenced as “witches.” Protestant reformer Martin Luther’s wife, a nun named Katharina von Bora, was [branded a witch](http://www.credomag.com/the-radical-marriage-of-katharina-and-martin-luther/) by many a biographer for hundreds of years after her death. Tens of thousands of supposed witches were executed in Europe from the 1300s to the 1600s. In the U.S., the Salem witch trials, at the tail end of that period, ended in the deaths of 20 people, 14 of them women. Now, women want to reclaim that power. In a year when some 5 million women exerted their power in the [Women’s March on Washington](https://www.womensmarch.com/) and in cities around the world, that power takes a political angle. Witches around the world have joined forces to serve justice to convicted rapist Brock Turner, whose light sentence turned the internet’s viral ire on him. In June 2016, witches from around the world organized a [mass hexing ceremony](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/brock-turner-witch-hex_us_575af73be4b0e39a28ad754d) to turn Turner impotent and cause him the “constant pain of pine needles in (his) guts.” Witches also have grabbed headlines with [public hexes](https://www.vox.com/2017/6/20/15830312/magicresistance-restance-witches-magic-spell-to-bind-donald-trump-mememagic) on President Trump. The loosely organized “resistance witches,” including neo-pagans, activists and a diverse array of magic practitioners, number at least 13,000. They’re building on the legacy of socialist feminists involved in the 1960s Women’s International Terrorist Conspiracy from Hell (W.I.T.C.H.), who used their spellbinding powers to take on [patriarchy and capitalism](https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/43gd8p/wicked-witch-60s-feminist-protestors-hexed-patriarchy). Two years ago, liberal witchy women across the country launched revivals of W.I.T.C.H., hosting ritual performances to strengthen the rights to [housing](http://witchchicago.tumblr.com/2-6), [abortion](http://witchchicago.tumblr.com/6-3) and [education](http://witchchicago.tumblr.com/4-23). Along with their counterparts in [Portland, Ore.,](http://hautemacabre.com/2017/01/w-i-t-c-h-pdx-portland-brings-back-the-womens-international-terrorist-conspiracy-from-hell/) and other U.S. cities, the anonymous group has turned its powers toward “dismantling the white supremacist patriarchy” and fueling the #MagicalResistance against the current White House administration. But many actual practitioners of witchcraft weren’t thrilled with the headlines. They say they wouldn’t use their power to bring harm to another person — not even Trump. “There are people who want to bind or hurt or do work to make the injustices stop, and there are others who want to ‘shine the light’ so the person’s acts are exposed,” said Michelle Bowman, a co-organizer of the Women’s Spiritual Leadership Alliance’s [monthly forum](https://www.meetup.com/Conversations-in-Witchcraft/) on witchcraft. A Wiccan since the late ’90s, she also helps organize [Earth Temple](https://www.meetup.com/earthtemple/), an open Wiccan circle in the Denver area. “In Wicca, there’s the idea that actions have reactions. If you cast a binding spell on someone, then you yourself become bound in some way. I’m personally concerned about the cycle of consequences.”

### Cap K

Claiming “debate space” as a site for organic, horizontalist politics sells out radical change to the private sphere of individual performance. It particularizes the struggle and makes transformation impossible. Marcus 12

[Associate book editor at Dissent Magazine (Fall, David, “The Horizontalists”, <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/the-horizontalists>) cVs, SK.]

There is a much-recycled and certainly apocryphal tale told of an ethnographer traveling in India. Journeying up and down the Ganges Delta, he encounters a fisherman who claims to know the source of all truth. “The world,” the fisherman explains, “rests upon the back of an elephant.” “But what does the elephant stand on?” the ethnographer asks. “A turtle.” “And the turtle?” “Another turtle.” “And it?” “Ah, friend,” smiles the fisherman, “it is turtles all the way down.” As with most well-circulated apocrypha, it is a parable that lacks a clear provenance, but has a clear moral: that despite our ever-dialectical minds, we will never get to the bottom of things; that, in fact, *there is nothing* at the bottom of things. What we define as society is nothing more than a set of locally constructed practices and norms, and what we define as history is nothing more than the passage of one set to the next. Although we might “find the picture of our universe as an infinite tower of tortoises rather ridiculous,” as one reteller admitted, it only raises the question, “Why do we think we know better?” Since the early 1970s we have wondered—with increasing anxiety—why and if we know better. Social scientists, literary critics, philosophers, and jurists have all begun to turn from their particular disciplines to the more general question of interpretation. There has been an increasing uneasiness with universal categories of thought; a whispered suspicion and then a commonly held belief that the sum—societies, histories, identities—never amounts to more than its parts. New analytical frameworks have begun to emerge, sensitive to both the pluralities and localities of life. “What we need,” as Clifford Geertz argued, “are not enormous ideas” but “ways of thinking that are responsive to particularities, to individualities, oddities, discontinuities, contrasts, and singularities.” This growing anxiety over the precision of our interpretive powers has translated into a variety of political as well as epistemological concerns. Many have become uneasy with universal concepts of justice and equality. Simultaneous to—and in part because of—the ascendance of human rights, freedom has increasingly become understood as an individual entitlement instead of a collective possibility. The once prevalent conviction that a handful of centripetal values could bind society together has transformed into a deeply skeptical attitude toward general statements of value. If it is, indeed, turtles all the way down, then decisions can take place only on a local scale and on a horizontal plane. There is no overarching platform from which to legislate; only a “local knowledge.” As Michael Walzer argued in a 1985 lecture on social criticism, “We have to start from where we are,” we can only ask, “what is the right thing *for us* to do?” This shift in scale has had a significant impact on the Left over the past twenty to thirty years. Socialism, once the “name of our desire,” has all but disappeared ;new desires have emerged in its place: situationism, autonomism, localism, communitarianism, environmentalism, anti-globalism. Often spatial in metaphor, they have been more concerned with where and how politics happen rather than at what pace and to what end. Often local in theory and in practice, they have come to represent a shift in scale: from the large to the small, from the vertical to the horizontal, and from—what Geertz has called—the “thin” to the “thick.” Class, race, and gender—those classic left themes—are, to be sure, still potent categories. But they have often been imagined as spectrums rather than binaries, varying shades rather than static lines of solidarity. Instead of society, there is now talk of communities and actor networks; instead of radical schemes to rework economic and political institutions, there is an emphasis on localized campaigns and everyday practices. The critique of capitalism—once heavily informed by intricate historical and social theories—has narrowed. The “ruthless criticism of all,” as Karl Marx once put it, has turned away from exploitative world systems to the pathologies of an over-regulated life. As post-Marxists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe declared in 1985, Left-wing thought today stands at a crossroads. The “evident truths” of the past—the classical forms of analysis and political calculation, the nature of the forces in conflict, the very meaning of the Left’s struggles and objectives—have been seriously challenged….From Budapest to Prague and the Polish coup d’état, from Kabul to the sequels of Communist victory in Vietnam and Cambodia, a question-mark has fallen more and more heavily over the whole way of conceiving both socialism and the roads that should lead to it. In many ways, the Left has just been keeping up with the times. Over the last quarter-century, there has been a general fracturing of our social and economic relations, a “multiplication of,” what one sociologist has called, “partial societies—grouped by age, sex, ethnicity, and proximity.” This has not necessarily been a bad thing. Even as the old Left—the *vertical* Left—frequently bemoaned the growing differentiation and individuation, these new categories did, in fact, open the door for marginalized voices and communities. They created a space for more diversity, tolerance, and inclusion. They signaled a turn toward the language of recognition: a politics more sensitive to difference. But this turn was also not without its disadvantages. Gone was the Left’s hope for an emerging class consciousness, a movement of the “people” seeking greater realms of freedom. Instead of challenging the top-down structures of late capitalism, radicals now aspired to create—what post-Marxists were frequently calling—“spaces of freedom.” If one of the explicit targets of the global justice movement of the late 1990s was the exploitative trade policies of the World Trade Organization, then its underlying critique was the alienating patterns of its bureaucracy: the erosion of spaces for self-determination and expression. The crisis of globalization was that it stripped individuals of their rights to participate, to act as free agents in a society that was increasingly becoming shaped by a set of global institutions. What most troubled leftists over the past three or four decades was not the increasingly unequal distribution of goods and services in capitalist societies but the increasingly unequal distribution of power. As one frequently sighted placard from the 1999 Seattle protests read, “No globalization without participation!” Occupy Wall Street has come to represent the latest turn in this movement toward local and more horizontal spaces of freedom. Occupation was, itself, a matter of recovering local space: a way to repoliticize the square. And in a moment characterized by foreclosure, it was also symbolically, and sometimes literally, an attempt to reclaim lost homes and abandoned properties. But there was also a deeper notion of space at work. Occupy Wall Street sought out not only new political spaces but also new ways to relate to them. By resisting the top-down management of representative democracy as well as the bottom-up ideals of labor movements, Occupiers hoped to create a new politics in which decisions moved neither up nor down but horizontally. While embracing the new reach of globalization—linking arms and webcams with their encamped comrades in Madrid, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Santiago—they were also rejecting its patterns of consolidation, its limits on personal freedom, its vertical and bureaucratic structures of decision-making. Time was also to be transformed. The general assemblies and general strikes were efforts to reconstruct, and make more autonomous, our experience of time as well as space. Seeking to escape from the Taylorist demands of productivity, the assemblies insisted that decision-making was an endless process. Who we are, what we do, what we want to be are categories of flexibility, and consensus is as much about repairing this sense of open-endedness as it is about agreeing on a particular set of demands. Life is a mystery, as one pop star fashionista has insisted, and Occupiers wanted to keep it that way. Likewise, general strikes were imagined as ways in which workers could take back time—regain those parts of life that had become routinized by work. Rather than attempts to achieve large-scale reforms, general strikes were improvisations, escapes from the daily calculations of production that demonstrated that we can still be happy, creative, even productive individuals without jobs. As one unfurled banner along New York’s Broadway read during this spring’s May Day protests, “Why work? Be happy.” In many ways, the Occupy movement was a rebellion against the institutionalized nature of twenty-first century capitalism and democracy. Equally skeptical of corporate monopolies as it was of the technocratic tendencies of the state, it was ultimately an insurgency against control, against the ways in which organized power and capital deprived the individual of the time and space needed to control his or her life. Just as the vertically inclined leftists of the twentieth century leveraged the public corporation—the welfare state—against the increasingly powerful number of private ones, so too were Occupy and, more generally, the horizontalist Left to embrace the age of the market: at the center of their politics was the anthropological “man” in both his forms—*homo faber* and *homo ludens*—who was capable of negotiating his interests outside the state. For this reason, the movement did not fit neatly into right or left, conservative or liberal, revolutionary or reformist categories. On the one hand, it was sympathetic to the most classic of left aspirations: to dismantle governing hierarchies. On the other, its language was imbued with a strident individualism: a politics of anti-institutionalism and personal freedom that has most often been affiliated with the Right. Seeking an alternative to the bureaucratic tendencies of capitalism and socialism, Occupiers were to frequently invoke the image of autonomy: of a world in which social and economic relations exist outside the institutions of the state. Their aspiration was a society based on organic, decentralized circuits of exchange and deliberation—on voluntary associations, on local debate, on loose networks of affinity groups. If political and economic life had become abstracted in the age of globalization and financialization, then Occupy activists wanted to re-politicize our everyday choices. As David Graeber, one of Occupy’s chief theoretical architects, explained two days after Zuccotti Park was occupied, “The idea is essentially that “the system is not going to save us,” so “we’re going to have to save ourselves.” Borrowing from the anarchist tradition, Graeber has called this work “direct action”: the practice of circumventing, even on occasion subverting, hierarchies through practical projects. Instead of attempting “to pressure the government to institute reforms” or “seize state power,” direct actions seek to “build a new society in the shell of the old.” By creating spaces in which individuals take control over their lives, it is a strategy of acting and thinking “as if one is already free.” Marina Sitrin, another prominent Occupier, has offered another name for this politics—“horizontalism”: “the use of direct democracy, the striving for consensus” and “processes in which everyone is heard and new relationships are created.” It is a politics that not only refuses institutionalization but also imagines a new subjectivity from which one can project the future into the present. Direct action and horizontal democracy are new names, of course, for old ideas. They descend—most directly—from the ideas and tactics of the global justice movement of the 1990s and 2000s. Direct Action Network was founded in 1999 to help coordinate the anti-WTO protests in Seattle; *horizontalidad*, as it was called in Argentina, emerged as a way for often unemployed workers to organize during the financial crisis of 2001. Both emerged out of the theories and practices of a movement that was learning as it went along. The ad hoc working groups, the all-night bull sessions, the daylong actions, the decentralized planning were all as much by necessity as they were by design. They were not necessarily intended at first. But what emerged out of anti-globalization was a new vision of globalization. Local and horizontal in practice, direct action and democracy were to become catchphrases for a movement that was attempting to resist the often autocratic tendencies of a fast-globalizing capitalism. But direct action and horizontal democracy also tap into a longer, if often neglected, tradition on the left: the anarchism, syndicalism, and autonomist Marxism that stretch from Peter Kropotkin, Emma Goldman, and Rosa Luxemburg to C.L.R. James, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Antonio Negri. If revolutionary socialism was a theory about ideal possibilities, then anarchism and autonomism often focused on the revolutionary practices themselves. The way in which the revolution was organized was the primary act of revolution. Autonomy, as the Greco-French Castoriadis told *Le Monde* in 1977, demands not only “the elimination of dominant groups and of the institutions embodying and orchestrating that domination” but also new modes of what he calls “self-management and organization.” With direct action and horizontal democracy, the Occupy movement not only developed a set of new tactics but also a governing ideology, a theory of time and space that runs counter to many of the practices of earlier leftist movements. Unlike revolutionary socialism or evolutionary social democracy—Marx’s Esau and Jacob—Occupiers conceived of time as more cyclical than developmental, its understanding of space more local and horizontal than structural and vertical. The revolution was to come but only through everyday acts. It was to occur only through—what Castoriadis obliquely referred to as—“the self-institution of society.” The seemingly spontaneous movement that emerged after the first general assemblies in Zuccotti Park was not, then, sui generis but an elaboration of a much larger turn by the Left. As occupations spread across the country and as activists begin to exchange organizational tactics, it was easy to forget that what was happening was, in fact, a part of a much larger shift in the scale and plane of Western politics: a turn toward more local and horizontal patterns of life, a growing skepticism toward the institutions of the state, and an increasing desire to seek out greater realms of personal freedom. And although its hibernation over the summer has, perhaps, marked the end of the Occupy movement, OWS has also come to represent an important—and perhaps more lasting—break. In both its ideas and tactics, it has given us a new set of desires—autonomy, radical democracy, direct action—that look well beyond the ideological and tactical tropes of socialism. Its occupations and general assemblies, its flash mobs and street performances, its loose network of activists all suggest a bold new set of possibilities for the Left: a horizontalist ethos that believes that revolution will begin by transforming our everyday lives. It can be argued that horizontalism is, in many ways, a product of the growing disaggregation and individuation of Western society; that it is a kind of free-market leftism: a politics jury-rigged out of the very culture it hopes to resist. For not only does it emphasize the agency of the individual, but it draws one of its central inspirations from a neoclassical image: that of the self-managing society—the polity that functions best when the state is absent from everyday decisions. But one can also find in its anti-institutionalism an attempt to speak in today’s language for yesterday’s goals. If we must live in a society that neither trusts nor feels compelled by collectivist visions, then horizontalism offers us a leftism that attempts to be, at once, both individualist and egalitarian, anti-institutional and democratic, open to the possibilities of self-management and yet also concerned with the casualties born out of an age that has let capital manage itself for far too long. Horizontalism has absorbed the crisis of knowledge—what we often call “postmodernism”—and the crisis of collectivism—what we often call “neoliberalism.” But instead of seeking to return to some golden age before our current moment of fracture, it seeks—for better and worse—to find a way to make leftist politics conform to our current age of anti-foundationalism and institutionalism. As Graeber argued in the prescriptive last pages of his anthropological epic, *Debt: The First 5,000 Years*, “Capitalism has transformed the world in many ways that are clearly irreversible” and we therefore need to give up “the false choice between state and market that [has] so monopolized political ideology for the last centuries that it made it difficult to argue about anything else.” We need, in other words, to stop thinking like leftists. But herein lies the problem. Not all possible forms of human existence and social interaction, no matter how removed they are from the institutions of power and capital, are good forms of social organization. Although it is easy to look enthusiastically to those societies—ancient or modern, Western or non-Western—that exist beyond the structures of the state, they, too, have their own patterns of hierarchy, their own embittered lines of inequality and injustice. More important, to select one form of social organization over the other is always an act of exclusion. Instituting and then protecting a particular way of life will always require a normative commitment in which not every value system is respected—in which, in other words, there is a moral hierarchy. More problematically, by working outside structures of power one may circumvent coercive systems but one does not necessarily subvert them. Localizing politics—stripping it of its larger institutional ambitions—has, to be sure, its advantages. But without a larger structural vision, it does not go far enough. “Bubbles of freedom,” as Graeber calls them, may create a larger variety of non-institutional life. But they will always neglect other crucial avenues of freedom: in particular, those social and economic rights that can only be protected from the top down. In this way, the anti-institutionalism of horizontalism comes dangerously close to that of the libertarian Right. The turn to previous eras of social organization, the desire to locate and confine politics to a particular regional space, the deep skepticism toward all forms of institutional life not only mirror the aspirations of libertarianism but help cloak those hierarchies spawned from non-institutional forms of power and capital. This is a particularly pointed irony for a political ideology that claims to be opposed to the many injustices of a non-institutional market—in particular, its unregulated financial schemes. Perhaps this is an irony deeply woven into the theoretical quilt of autonomy: a vision that, as a result of its anti-institutionalism, is drawn to all sites of individual liberation—even those that are to be found in the marketplace. As Graeber concludes in *Debt*, “Markets, when allowed to drift entirely free from their violent origins, invariably begin to grow into something different, into networks of honor, trust, and mutual connectedness,” whereas “the maintenance of systems of coercion constantly do the opposite: turn the products of human cooperation, creativity, devotion, love and trust back into numbers once again.” In many ways, this is the result of a set of political ideas that have lost touch with their origins. The desire for autonomy was born out of the socialist—if not also often the Marxist—tradition and there was always a guarded sympathy for the structures needed to oppose organized systems of capital and power. Large-scale institutions were, for thinkers such as Castoriadis, Negri, and C.L.R. James, still essential if every cook was truly to govern. To only “try to create ‘spaces of freedom’ ‘alongside’ of the State” meant, as Castoriadis was to argue later in his life, to back “down from the problem of politics.” In fact, this was, he believed, the failure of 1968: “the inability to set up new, different institutions” and recognize that “there is no such thing as a society without institutions.” This is—and will be—a problem for the horizontalist Left as it moves forward. As a leftism ready-made for an age in which all sides of the political spectrum are arrayed against the regulatory state, it is always in danger of becoming absorbed into the very ideological apparatus it seeks to dismantle. For it aspires to a decentralized and organic politics that, in both principle and practice, shares a lot in common with its central target. Both it and the “free market” are anti-institutional. And the latter will remain so without larger vertical measures. Structures, not only everyday practices, need to be reformed. The revolution cannot happen only on the ground; it must also happen from above. A direct democracy still needs its indirect structures, individual freedoms still need to be measured by their collective consequences, and notions of social and economic equality still need to stand next to the desire for greater political participation. Deregulation is another regulatory regime, and to replace it requires new regulations: institutions that will limit the excesses of the market. As Castoriadis insisted in the years after 1968, the Left’s task is not only to abolish old institutions but to discover “new kinds of relationship between society and its institutions.” Horizontalism has come to serve as an important break from the static strategies and categories of analysis that have slowed an aging and vertically inclined Left. OWS was to represent its fullest expression yet, though it has a much longer back story and still—one hopes—a promising future. But horizontalists such as Graeber and Sitrin will struggle to establish spaces of freedom if they cannot formulate a larger vision for a society. Their vision is not—as several on the vertical left have suggested—too utopian but not utopian enough: in seeking out local spaces of freedom, they have confined their ambitions; they have, in fact, come, at times, to mirror the very ideology they hope to resist. In his famous retelling of the turtle parable, Clifford Geertz warned that in “the search of all-too-deep-lying turtles,” we have to be careful to not “lose touch with the hard surfaces of life—with the political, economic, stratificatory realities within which men are everywhere contained.” This is an ever-present temptation, and one that, in our age of ever more stratification, we must resist.

[Gourevitch 17] Their shallow advocacy of direct action leaves no room for ideas or strategy – no matter how populist they become, they never challenge the status quo of fascism. Gourevitch 17  
[Alex Gourevitch is an assistant professor of political science at Brown University and the author of From Slavery To the Cooperative Commonwealth: Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century. “Beyond Resistance,” Jacobin, 2/13/17, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/trump-gop-democrats-protests-marches-social-movement/> cVs, SK.]

The first few weeks of the Trump administration have made reflection almost impossible. The rapidfire barbarities have been mesmerizing. We watch, we read, we protest, and we watch some more. But, hard as it is to do, we have to tear our gaze away from Trump’s horror show. If we ever want to be anything more than observers, we have to acknowledge the painful and brutal truth that we on the Left, whoever we are, are in no position to seriously contest for political power and we suffer from a serious deficit of ideas. Consider a few central events from the recent past: The massive antiwar marches in the early 2000s had no discernible effect on George W. Bush’s invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Unlike Vietnam protests thirty years earlier, they became less politically significant as time went on. Under Obama, Occupy squandered the initial hopefulness and general appeal when it let procedural squabbles sap its energy and undermine its potential for a real political intervention. No wonder there was little public support when the police showed up. The resurgence of activism associated with the Black Lives Matter movement marked another significant moment for the American left but, despite three years of protest and consciousness-raising, public attitudes towards the police have improved and there are few balancing accomplishments to point to. Similar weakness is seen on the international stage. The Arab Spring has been crushed, with Egypt a dictatorship, the Gulf States where they were, and Syria a killing field. In Europe, Syriza lacked the courage of its democratic convictions; it led the Greeks up the European mountain only to be frog marched back down. In Spain, Podemos has stalled, backing away from its most radical promises to challenge the sadomonetarist consensus of euro austerity, and majorly under-performing in recent elections. While there was some legitimate schadenfreuede in watching the Blairites self-immolate in their battle with Corbyn, Labour remains an empty vessel, with no live alternative to offer British voters and even less of an electoral future. Hamon has brought a little jolt of life to the French left with a few utopian proposals, but it is the French Trump, Marine Le Pen, who leads the polls, and the centrist Macron trailing her. In Europe’s most powerful country, Chancellor Merkel is much more worried about challenges from the centrist SPD and the new, right-wing AfD party than she is about political challenges from the left. Back in the United States some might be inclined to point to Sanders as the sign of something more promising. It was certainly enjoyable to watch the Clinton camp squirm during the primary, but the contradictions of the Sanders campaign were also enormous. Day one of a Sanders presidency would have made our disorganization and lack of direction painfully obvious. Not only would he have faced massive resistance from Republicans in Congress, but many of Sanders’s own party did not want him and were not signed up to much of his program. Sanders would have needed a massive, well-organized, politically powerful movement outside the party to sustain anything. That kind of movement simply does not exist. In retrospect we have to acknowledge that we face less the explosive resurgence of the Right than the persistent weakness of the Left. It is true that the recent protests are heartening, especially when compared to what it was like to do politics even just a decade ago. The airport protests put Trump on the back foot, the mass protests forced some complacent Democrats to take notice, and Republicans have backtracked on a number of initiatives. But those minor successes can be seriously misleading about our actual strength and capacity. The point here isn’t to bash the Left; it’s to take a sober look at the opportunities and limits we face. The truth is, this should be our moment. The Trump administration and Republican Congress are a fragile entity, whose control of the state rests less on mass support and more on the undemocratic features of our institutions. Trump received a minority of the popular vote, the fifty-two Republican senators in Congress represent 44 percent of the population, and the eight-soon-to-be-nine ghouls in Supreme Court robes are even more insulated from actual majorities. Moreover, there are all kinds of internal divisions among Republicans on how to handle everything from health care to immigration. To the degree that Trump and the Republicans look like an unflinching, reactionary juggernaut it is because there is so little organized power to stand in their way. This should be our moment for another reason as well. This election dealt a serious blow not only to the New Democrats’ control over the party but also to its lesser-evil ideology. Hillary should have done more than just beat Trump — she should have destroyed him. He was one of the worst Republican candidates in decades. He was and remains unpopular. Yet Hillary stood for and campaigned on nothing but fear; her primary selling point was “I’m not the other one.” That was just enough for a bare majority of the popular vote, not a decisive victory. Toeing the lesser-evil line, the Democrats not only failed to offer an ideal — they also disciplined anyone who thought there should be one. Over and over we heard some version of, “Don’t criticize the Democratic candidate, don’t open a second front, because doing so will just help the enemy.” This has always been the true meaning of lesser evilism: an ideological cudgel with which to bludgeon the Left and lower expectations. Yet lesser evilism failed even on its own terms. It couldn’t beat Donald Trump. It couldn’t even take back the Senate, let alone the House, nevermind the enormous down-ticket failures in state houses. The ideological emptiness of the presidential campaign reflected a deeper rot in the Democratic Party. All this should be emancipating. When it’s clear that we aren’t the spoilers because the brew is already spoiled, we should be freer to argue for our own position and fill the political vacuum within mainstream politics. But we’re not. Despite the fact that everyone is ready to gird for battle, organize marches, and protest the latest atrocity, in the present moment we remain ill-equipped to mount an effective opposition. Even when it comes to the big marches, we show up, but we don’t lead. Even when those protests succeed, we don’t define the terms of those victories. The sad reality is that whether the Republicans ram through a wave of reactionary legislation and lay waste to the global order, or collapse under the weight of infighting and mutual recrimination, will depend primarily on their ability to manage their own affairs. The Left won’t factor much into the equation. Instead of taking stock of this political moment, the overriding impulse seems to be to just get out in the streets, to march and protest. There is no time to think, to reflect on first principles and basic strategy, because now, we’re told, is the time for action. In what can only be seen as a left version of lesser evilism, taking a step back, pointing out the limits of mass protest, and examining our own weakness is derided as giving succor to our enemies. Raising doubts and questions, even from within, is taken as momentum-killing criticism that we just can’t afford. How did we get to this point of being merely resisters, who fall back on our own politics of fear? The Left’s difficulty carving out a distinct place for itself in US politics has a long history. It is rooted partly in the identification of left politics with non-electoral, social movements. These social movements have been fertile ground for direct action. Though anarcho-syndicalist groups like the Industrial Workers of the World provided its starkest ideological expression, something like direct action has always had a deep appeal given the sectional, corrupt, and opportunistic character of major American political parties. Georges Sorel, the early twentieth-century, quasi-reactionary French theorist of anarcho-syndicalism, gave the clearest expression of how anti-state, direct action was a response to the decay and corruption of mainstream left parties. “It is impossible that there should be the slightest understanding between the syndicalists and the official socialists; the latter . . . hope to possess the force of the State.” For Sorel the attempt to seize political power was the corrupting act: “Against this noisy, garrulous and lying socialism which is exploited by ambitious people of every description, which amuses a few buffoons and is admired by decadents, stands revolutionary syndicalism.” Sorel’s target was Jean Jaures’s Socialist Party in turn-of-the-last-century France. But his view was even more suited to the United States, where mainstream parties since the Civil War have always been non-ideological catch-all parties, with the capitalist class split across the two organizations, and which have used every legal and non-legal tool at their means to suppress third-party challenges. There was a long period during which certain kinds of direct action really were socially and politically powerful forms of collective action, including Sorel’s favored general strike. To name a few: the general strikes of 1919 and 1934, the strike wave of 1947, the wildcat strikes of the late 1960s and 70s, not to mention the anti-Vietnam protests and the civil rights sit-ins and boycotts. Standing behind these movements was the idea that those who demand freedom win it through their own efforts. Power and principle were related. Mass actions of the time had the capacity to paralyze industries, cities, even whole states, forcing major political issues on to the national table. These acts were powerful because they were disruptive. There was no Civil Rights Act of 1964 without Birmingham 1963. But the downside of direct action is that it has often served as a tacit admission of the Left’s inability to translate social power into political control. The Left has generally been on the outside looking in and its celebration of direct action put it in static rather than dynamic opposition to the corruption and opportunism of existing parties. There have certainly been moments when the Left challenged the political hegemony of the Republicans and Democrats. The most notable were the electoral successes of the Socialist Party in the early 1900s. But after the Socialist Party’s fortunes declined during the 1920s, the American left backed away from major attempts at acquiring control of the state. Two other moments of real possibility were the 1930s and 1960s. In the thirties, with the growth of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the rise of independent left leadership, such as the Trotskyists organizing the general strike of Minneapolis, there was a real social basis for challenging the political hegemony of the Democrats. But under the constraints of Stalinism and Popular Front politics, the step to national politics was never taken. Too many radical leaders agreed or acquiesced to exercising their power in labor movements, strikes, boycotts, rather than through a political party that had a chance of controlling the state. As the moment passed and WWII dominated the horizon, the Left continued to fragment and fracture. The major unions, facing Red Scare purges of their most militant members, themselves became junior partners in the governing apparatus. The upshot of all this was that that the return of labor militancy, anti-imperial protest, and racial egalitarianism in the 1960s included a turn against all institutionalized authority. Established parties faced real challenges, but so did unions and even the semi-organized left alternatives. Direct action found its justification in resistance to organized authority. Jeremy Brecher, a New Left historian of mass strikes, expressed this sentiment in the 1974 edition of his book Strike!: Increasingly, people today experience the institutions that have been set up to “help” them — the unions, the schools, the welfare agencies, and the like to be — as alien and even hostile forces . . . instead of trying again to create such a structure, younger workers today use direct action to force immediate solutions to their own problems. This was the last period during which mass direct action seriously threatened to transform political life or have a significant influence on the character of the state. And even then, the effects were indirect. As Brecher rightly observed, direct actions started to look less like means for achieving political ends and more like self-contained exercises. No wonder that even some of the era’s most famous proponents of direct action raised concerns about whether marches and protests had lost their strategic character. Martin Luther King, evaluating the need to change tactics in 1967, observed that what was needed was “more than a statement to the larger society; there must be a force that interrupts its functioning at some key point.” The problem according to King was that, “the effectiveness of street marches in cities is limited because the normal turbulence of city life absorbs them as mere transitory drama quite common in the ordinary movement of masses. In the South, a march was a social earthquake; in the North, it is a faint, brief exclamation of protest.” Worse yet, it seemed like many protesters failed to see any distinction between effective marches and “transitory dramas.” The movements of King’s day were still able to shake the political establishment. They were oriented toward a vision of a society of equal freedom and had formal organizations that bore that vision. This ideal gave some strategic orientation to the movements and generated the commitments that made them powerful. But over time, being out in the streets started to become a kind of end in itself. A calibrated form of disruptive collective action was slowly transformed into a kind of political theater. By the end of the Cold War, with the global defeat of Marxism, the Left reached its nadir. Its main public presence was the practice of oppositional, street theater. But this kind of temporary mass demonstration had become something closer to a carnival: a ritualized activity that helped reproduce the social order by temporarily suspending its norms. We can field thousands, sometimes tens of thousands, even occasionally hundreds of thousands, and then be safely ignored. We call it resistance, but any exercise of our agency that isn’t total cooperation with the status quo looks like resistance. It contains no internal measure of success or failure, which is why it is compatible with retreat or even resignation. And while it is “mass” politics in the sense of many people, protests do not require anything like the ongoing commitment to principle and organization that something like party politics does. Our unwillingness to admit our own weakness is the flip side of not having a clear set of principles that can serve as the basis for a mass movement. Instead, we give ourselves the appearance of unity and purpose by resisting evil and by taking our collective “No” out into the streets. We find comfort in knowing that we are not them, that at least we are doing something. Trump is immediate and present, the evils are right in front of us, numerous, and ready-to-hand. There is no doubt that some protests have a marginal and valuable effect, most visibly in the case of the partial reversal of the immigration ban. And all protest provides the frisson of doing something against policies that are inarguably wrong. But that sense of purpose is not the same as a positive principle or an organization that you are winning people towards. It is, instead, an appeal based on fear, on resisting evil.

[Torrant 14] Theorizing survival within oppressive social relations as resistance displaces critique and transformation of those systems by naturalizing exploitation as inevitable. Torrant 14

[Torrant, Julie, “It Is Time To Give Up Liberal, Bourgeois Theories, Including New Materialist Feminism, And Take Up Historical Materialist Feminism For The 21st Century,” *Red Critique,* Winter/Spring 2014]

Recently, there has been a turn away from textualist and culturalist theory in feminism and the emergence of "new" materialist feminisms. Represented by the work of Elizabeth Grosz, Rosi Braidotti, and others, this turn in theory has come in response to the deepening inequalities and crises of capitalism that are having profound effects on women worldwide — material problems outside the text and not resolvable by a change in cultural values. While it is important to see that the new materialist feminisms are responses to real problems, it is equally important to understand how these materialisms are limited by their conceptualization of the material. The new materialist feminisms are actually disenabling for feminism in that they are forms of spiritualism which displace critique with strategies of enchanted affective adaptation and survival and thus dismantle materialist feminism's primary conceptual tool for social transformation. To avoid merely reproducing sophisticated forms of the survivalism and "prepperism" that have emerged as individualistic coping responses to economic crisis and austerity, I argue that feminism needs to return to historical materialism in the tradition of Marx, Engels and Kollontai to understand social life in terms of its root relations and aid in the struggles to bring about social transformation. Exemplary of the new materialist feminism is Rosi Braidotti's writing on "the politics of 'life itself'," a theory which she organizes around the trope of "sustainability." Sustainability, a concept in ecology for living within natural limits, becomes in these writings a means of reconceiving the historical social relations of capitalism as if they were the unchangeable, underlying existential limit-situation of "life itself." The politics of "life itself" and the new materialist focus on seeking a sustainable feminism within this new, more "realist" approach to material reality, is a form of feminist theory and politics which is ultimately the already familiar theory and politics of reparative reading. Why is this significant? As Ellis Hanson suggests in a review of Sedgwick, "Faced with the depressing realization that people are fragile and the world hostile, a reparative reading focuses not on the exposure of political outrages that we already know but rather on the process of reconstructing a sustainable life in their wake" (105). In other words, reparative analysis begins not with critique of the so-called already known and presumably known to be unchangeable, but by focusing on how to live within the already-known-to-be hostile world. Such a theory of the social begins and ends by reducing knowledge to a matter of how to cope, how to feel, how to exist, etc. within what is taken to be unchangeable. The effect of this focus on "sustainability" within hostility is that social transformation — which requires the production of knowledge of what needs to be transformed — is treated as impossible. Abandoning the project of transformation, I argue, is a sign of the way dominant "materialist" feminism — under the guise of "new materialism"— has increasingly abandoned the project of women's emancipation from exploitation, and in the interests of capital instead translates austerity measures into a theoretical discourse of getting by on less.

#### [Shaviro 15] Neoliberal capitalism will produce extinction – the system reproduces crises that depoliticize the left, undermine futural thought, and postpone its demise – the impacts are environmental collapse, endless war, and the rise of fascism. Shaviro 15 [Steven Shaviro is an American academic, philosopher and cultural critic whose areas of interest include film theory, time, science fiction, panpsychism, capitalism, affect and subjectivity. He earned a PhD from Yale in 1981. “No Speed Limit: Three Essays on Accelerationism” <https://track5.mixtape.moe/qdkkdt.pdf> cVs, SK.]

The problem may be summarized as follows. Capitalism has indeed created the conditions for general prosperity and therefore for its own supersession. But it has also blocked, and continues to block, any hope of realizing this transformation. We cannot wait for capitalism to transform on its own, but we also cannot hope to progress by appealing to some radical Outside or by fashioning ourselves as militants faithful to some “event” that (as Badiou has it) would mark a radical and complete break with the given “situation” of capitalism. Accelerationism rather demands a movement against and outside capitalism—but on the basis of tendencies and technologies that are intrinsic to capitalism. Audre Lord famously argued that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.” But what if the master’s tools are the only ones available? Accelerationism grapples with this dilemma. What is the appeal of accelerationism today? It can be understood as a response to the particular social and political situation in which we currently seem to be trapped: that of a long-term, slow-motion catastrophe. Global warming, and environmental pollution and degradation, threaten to undermine our whole mode of life. And this mode of life is itself increasingly stressful and precarious, due to the depredations of neoliberal capitalism. As Fredric Jameson puts it, the world today is characterized by “heightened polarization, increasing unemployment, [and] the ever more desperate search for new investments and new markets.” These are all general features of capitalism identified by Marx, but in neoliberal society we encounter them in a particularly pure and virulent form. I want to be as specific as possible in my use of the term “neoliberalism” in order to describe this situation. I define neoliberalism as a specific mode of capitalist production (Marx), and form of governmentality (Foucault), that is characterized by the following specific factors: 1. The dominating influence of financial institutions, which facilitate transfers of wealth from everybody else to the already extremely wealthy (the “One Percent” or even the top one hundredth of one percent). 2. The privatization and commodification of what used to be common or public goods (resources like water and green space, as well as public services like education, communication, sewage and garbage disposal, and transportation). 3. The extraction, by banks and other large corporations, of a surplus from all social activities: not only from production (as in the classical Marxist model of capitalism) but from circulation and consumption as well. Capital accumulation proceeds not only by direct exploitation but also by rent-seeking, by debt collection, and by outright expropriation (“primitive accumulation”). 4. The subjection of all aspects of life to the so-called discipline of the market. This is equivalent, in more traditional Marxist terms, to the “real subsumption” by capital of all aspects of life: leisure as well as labor. Even our sleep is now organized in accordance with the imperatives of production and capital accumulation. 5. The redefinition of human beings as private owners of their own “human capital.” Each person is thereby, as Michel Foucault puts it, forced to become “an entrepreneur of himself.” In such circumstances, we are continually obliged to market ourselves, to “brand” ourselves, to maximize the return on our “investment” in ourselves. There is never enough: like the Red Queen, we always need to keep running, just to stay in the same place. Precarity is the fundamental condition of our lives. All of these processes work on a global scale; they extend far beyond the level of immediate individual experience. My life is precarious, at every moment, but I cannot apprehend the forces that make it so. I know how little money is left from my last paycheck, but I cannot grasp, in concrete terms, how “the economy” works. I directly experience the daily weather, but I do not directly experience the climate. Global warming and worldwide financial networks are examples of what the ecological theorist Timothy Morton calls hyperobjects. They are phenomena that actually exist but that “stretch our ideas of time and space, since they far outlast most human time scales, or they’re massively distributed in terrestrial space and so are unavailable to immediate experience.” Hyperobjects affect everything that we do, but we cannot point to them in specific instances. The chains of causality are far too complicated and intermeshed for us to follow. In order to make sense of our condition, we are forced to deal with difficult abstractions. We have to rely upon data that are gathered in massive quantities by scientific instruments and then collated through mathematical and statistical formulas but that are not directly accessible to our senses. We find ourselves, as Mark Hansen puts it, entangled “within networks of media technologies that operate predominantly, if not almost entirely, outside the scope of human modes of awareness (consciousness, attention, sense perception, etc.).” We cannot imagine such circumstances in any direct or naturalistic way, but only through the extrapolating lens of science fiction. Subject to these conditions, we live under relentless environmental and financial assault. We continually find ourselves in what might well be called a state of crisis. However, this involves a paradox. A crisis—whether economic, ecological, or political—is a turning point, a sudden rupture, a sharp and immediate moment of reckoning. But for us today, crisis has become a chronic and seemingly permanent condition. We live, oxymoronically, in a state of perpetual, but never resolved, convulsion and contradiction. Crises never come to a culmination; instead, they are endlessly and indefinitely deferred. For instance, after the economic collapse of 2008, the big banks were bailed out by the United States government. This allowed them to resume the very practices—the creation of arcane financial instruments, in order to enable relentless rent-seeking—that led to the breakdown of the economic system in the first place. The functioning of the system is restored, but only in such a way as to guarantee the renewal of the same crisis, on a greater scale, further down the road. Marx rightly noted that crises are endemic to capitalism. But far from threatening the system as Marx hoped, today these crises actually help it to renew itself. As David Harvey puts it, it is precisely “through the destruction of the achievements of preceding eras by way of war, the devaluation of assets, the degradation of productive capacity, abandonment and other forms of ‘creative destruction’” that capitalism creates “a new basis for profit-making and surplus absorption.” What lurks behind this analysis is the frustrating sense of an impasse. Among its other accomplishments, neoliberal capitalism has also robbed us of the future. For it turns everything into an eternal present. The highest values of our society—as preached in the business schools—are novelty, innovation, and creativity. And yet these always only result in more of the same. How often have we been told that a minor software update “changes everything”? Our society seems to function, as Ernst Bloch once put it, in a state of “sheer aimless infinity and incessant changeability; where everything ought to be constantly new, everything remains just as it was.” This is because, in our current state of affairs, the future exists only in order to be colonized and made into an investment opportunity. John Maynard Keynes sought to distinguish between risk and genuine uncertainty. Risk is calculable in terms of probability, but genuine uncertainty is not. Uncertain events are irreducible to probabilistic analysis, because “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever.” Keynes’s discussion of uncertainty has strong affinities with Quentin Meillassoux’s account of hyperchaos. For Meillassoux, there is no “totality of cases,” no closed set of all possible states of the universe. Therefore, there is no way to assign fixed probabilities to these states. This is not just an empirical matter of insufficient information; uncertainty exists in principle. For Meillassoux and Keynes alike, there comes a point where “we simply do not know.” But today, Keynes’s distinction is entirely ignored. The Black-Scholes Formula and the Efficient Market Hypothesis both conceive the future entirely in probabilistic terms. In these theories, as in the actual financial trading that is guided by them (or at least rationalized by them), the genuine unknowability of the future is transformed into a matter of calculable, manageable risk. True novelty is excluded, because all possible outcomes have already been calculated and paid for in terms of the present. While this belief in the calculability of the future is delusional, it nonetheless determines the way that financial markets actually work. We might therefore say that speculative finance is the inverse—and the complement—of the “affirmative speculation” that takes place in science fiction. Financial speculation seeks to capture, and shut down, the very same extreme potentialities that science fiction explores. Science fiction is the narration of open, unaccountable futures; derivatives trading claims to have accounted for, and discounted, all these futures already. The “market”—nearly deified in neoliberal doctrine—thus works preemptively, as a global practice of what Richard Grusin calls premediation. It seeks to deplete the future in advance. Its relentless functioning makes it nearly impossible for us to conceive of any alternative to the global capitalist world order. Such is the condition that Mark Fisher calls capitalist realism. As Fisher puts it, channeling both Jameson and Žižek, “it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism.”

#### [Dean 16] The alternative is to affirm the form of the party—against the subjective atomization of contemporary politics, only a vertical form of organization aimed at transformation of constituted structures of power can actualize change. Dean 16

[Jodi and Chuck, Donald R. Harter ’39 Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences @ Hobart and William Smith Colleges and Host at This is Hell!, “The JFRP: For a New Communist Party,” aNtiDoTe Zine 1/23/16, https://antidotezine.com/2016/01/23/for-a-new-communist-party/]

CM: Great to have you on the show.¶ Let’s start with Occupy. What, to you, explains the impact that the Tea Party had on Republicans, relative to the impact that Occupy seems to have had on the Democratic Party? All of the sudden there were “Tea Party Republicans.” There weren’t “Occupy Democrats.”¶ JD: That’s a good point. The Tea Party took the Republican Party as its target. They decided that their goal was going to be to influence the political system by getting people elected and basically by trying to take over part of government. That’s why they were able to have good effects. They didn’t regard the mainstream political process as something irrelevant to their concerns. They thought of it as something to seize.¶ The problem with many—but not all—leftists in the US is that they think the political process is so corrupted that we have to completely refuse it, and leave it altogether. The Tea Party decided to act as an organized militant force, and too much of the US left (we saw this in the wake of Occupy) has thought that to be “militant” means to refuse and disperse and become fragmented. CM: So what explains the left turning its back on the collective action of a political party? It would seem like a political party would fit into what the left would historically want: an apparatus that can organize collective action.¶ JD: There are multiple things. First, the fear of success: the left has learned from the excesses of the twentieth century. Where Communist and socialist parties “succeeded,” there was violence and purges and repression. One reason the left has turned its back is because of this historical experience of state socialism. And we have taken that to mean that we should not ever have a state. I think that’s the wrong answer. That we—as the left—made a mistake with some regimes does not have to mean that we can never learn. Another reason that the left has turned its back on the party form has been the important criticism of twentieth century parties that have been too white, too masculine, potentially homophobic; parties that have operated in intensely hierarchical fashion. Those criticisms are real. But rather than saying we can’t have a party form because that’s just what a party does, why not make a party that is not repressive and does not exclude or diminish people on the basis of sex, race, or sexuality?¶ So we’ve got at least two historical problems that have made people very reluctant to use the party. I also think that, whether or not you mark it as 1968 or 1989, the left’s embrace of cultural individualism and the free flow of personal experimentation has made it critical of discipline and critical of collectivity. But I think that’s just a capitalist sellout. Saying everybody should just “do their own thing” is just going in the direction of the dominant culture. That is actually not a left position at all.¶ CM: So does identity politics undermine collectivism? And did that end up leading to fragmentation and a weakening of the left? Because there are a lot of people we’ve had on the show—and one person in particular, Thomas Frank—who say that there is no left in the United States.¶ JD: First I want to say that I disagree with the claim that there is no left. In fact, I think that “the left” is that group that keeps denying its own existence. We’re always saying that we’re the ones who don’t exist. But the right thinks that we exist. That’s what is so fantastic, actually. Did you see the New York Post screaming that Bernie Sanders is really a communist? Great! They’re really still afraid of communists! And it’s people on the left who say, “Oh, no, we’re not here at all!”¶ The left denies its own existence and it denies its own collectivity. Now, is identity politics to blame? Maybe it’s better to say that identity politics has been a symptom of the pressure of capitalism. Capitalism has operated in the US by exacerbating racial differences. That has to be addressed on the left, and the left has been addressing that. But we haven’t been addressing it in a way that recognizes how racism operates to support capitalism. Instead, we’ve made it too much about identity rather than as an element in building collective solidarity.¶ I’m trying to find a way around this to express that identity politics has been important but it’s reached its limits. Identity politics can’t go any further insofar as it denies the impact of capitalism. An identity politics that just rests on itself is nothing but liberalism. Like all of the sudden everything will be better if black people and white people are equally exploited? What if black people and white people say, “No, we don’t want to live in a society based on exploitation?”¶ CM: You were saying that the left denies its own collectivity. Is that only in the US? Is that unique to the US culture of the left?¶ JD: That’s a really important question, and I’m not sure. Traveling in Europe, I see two different things. On the one hand I see a broad left discussion that is, in part, mediated through social media and is pretty generational—people in their twenties and thirties or younger—and that there’s a general feeling about the problem of collectivity, the problem of building something with cohesion, and a temptation to just emphasize multiplicity. You see this everywhere. Everybody worries about this, as far as what I’ve seen.¶ On the other hand, there are countries whose political culture has embraced parties much more, and fights politically through parties. Like Greece, for example—and we’ve seen the ups and downs with Syriza over the last two years. And Spain also. Because they have a parliamentary system where small parties can actually get in the mix and have a political effect—in ways that our two-party system excludes—the European context allows for more enthusiasm for the party as a form for politics.¶ But there’s still a lot of disagreement on the far left about whether or not the party form is useful, and shouldn’t we in fact retreat and have multiple actions and artistic events—you know, the whole alter-globalization framework. That’s still alive in a lot of places. CM: You mentioned the structure of the US electoral system doesn’t allow for a political party to necessarily be the solution for a group like Occupy. Is that one of the reasons that activists dismiss the party structure as something that could help move their agenda forward?¶ JD: We can think about the Black Panther Party as a neat example in the US context: A party which was operating not primarily to win elections but to galvanize social power. That’s an interesting way of thinking about what else parties can do in the US.¶ Or we can think about parties in terms of local elections. Socialist Alternative has been doing really neat work all over the country, organizing around local elections with people running as socialist candidates not within a mainstream party. I think that even as we come up against the limits of a two-party system, we can also begin to think better about local and regional elections.¶ The left really likes that old saw: “Think Globally, Act Locally.” And then it rejects parties—even though political parties are, historically, forms that do that, that actually scale, that operate on multiple levels as organizations.¶ That we have a two-party system makes sense as an excuse why people haven’t used left parties very well in the US, but that doesn’t have to be the case.¶ And one more thing: there is a ton of sectarianism in the far left parties that exist. Many still fight battles that go back to the twenties, thirties, forties, fifties, and haven’t let that go. That has to change. We don’t need that kind of sectarian purity right now.¶ CM: You ask the question, “How do we move from the inert mass to organized activists?” You mention how you were at Occupy Wall Street; you write about being there on 15 October 2011 as the massive crowd filled New York’s Times Square. And you mention this one young speaker, and he addresses the crowd; they’re deciding if they should move on to Washington Square Park or not, because they need to go somewhere where there are better facilities. You then quote the speaker saying, “We can take this park. We can take this park tonight. We can also take this park another night. Not everyone may be ready tonight. Each person has to make their own autonomous decision. No one can decide for you. You have to decide for yourself. Everyone is an autonomous individual.”¶ Did that kind of individualism kill Occupy Wall Street from the start?¶ JD: Yeah, I think so. A lot of times I blame the rhetorics of consensus and horizontalism, but both of those are rooted in an individualism that says politics must begin with each individual, their interests, their experience, their positions, and so on. As collectivity forms—which is not easy when everyone’s beginning from their individual position—what starts to happen is that people start looking for how their exact experiences and interests are not being recognized. I think that the left has given in too much to this assumption that politics begins with an individual. That’s a liberal assumption. Leftists, historically, begin with the assumption that politics begins in groups. And for the left in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the operative group is class. Class is what determines where our political interests come from.¶ I try to do everything I can in the book to dismantle the assumption that politics, particularly left politics, should begin with the individual. Instead I want people thinking about how the individual is a fiction, and a really oppressive fiction at that. And one that’s actually, conveniently, falling apart.¶ CM: You write about Occupy Wall Street having been an opening but having had no continuing momentum. You mention that the party could add that needed momentum. That’s one of the things that parties can do. The structure of the party can continue momentum and keep the opening alive.¶ When you say that a party could be a solution for a movement like Occupy, you don’t mean the Democratic Party, do you?¶ JD: I’ve got a lot of layers on this question. My first answer is that no, I really mean the Communist Party. My friends call this “Jodi’s Fantasy Revolutionary Party” as a joke, because the kind of Communist Party I take as my model may not be real, or may have only existed for a year and a half in Brooklyn in the thirties. And I don’t mean the real-existing Communist Party in the US now, which still exists and basically endorses Democrats.¶ My idea is to think in terms of how we can imagine the Communist Party again as a force—what it could be like if all of our left activist groups and small sectarian parties decided to come together in a new radical left party.¶ So no, I don’t envision the Democratic Party as being that. That’s not at all what I have in mind. I’m thinking of a radical left party to which elections are incidental. Elections might be means for organizing, but the goal isn’t just being elected. The goal is overthrowing capitalism. The goal is being able to build a communist society as capitalism crumbles. Second, it could be the case—as a matter of tactics on the ground in particular contexts—that working for a Democratic candidate might be useful. It could be the case that trying to take over a local Democratic committee in order to get communist/socialist/radical left candidates elected could also be useful. But I don’t see the goal as taking over the Democratic Party. That’s way too limited a goal, and it’s a goal that presupposes the continuation of the system we have, rather than its overthrow.¶ CM: But how difficult would it be for a Communist Party to emerge free of its past associations with the Soviet Union? Can we even use the word “communist” or is it impossibly taboo?¶ JD: We have to recognize that the right is still scared of communism. That means the term is still powerful. That means it still has the ability to instill fear in its enemies. I think that’s an argument for keeping the word “communism.”¶ It’s also amazing that close to half of Iowa participants in the caucuses say that they are socialist. Four or five years ago, people were saying socialism is dead in the US. No one could even say the word. So I actually think holding on to the word “communism” is useful not only because our enemies are worried about communism, but also because it helps make the socialists seem really, really mainstream, and that’s good. We don’t want socialism to seem like something that only happens in Sweden. We want it to seem like that’s what America should have at a bare minimum.¶ One last thing about the history of communism: every political ideology that has infused a state form has done awful things. For the most part, if people like the ideology, they either let the awful things slide, or they use the ideology to criticize the awful things that the state does. We can do the same thing with communism. It’s helpful to recognize that the countries we understand to have been ruled by Communist Parties were never really communist—they didn’t even claim to have achieved communism themselves. We can say that state socialism made these mistakes, and in so doing was betraying communist ideals.¶ I don’t think we need to abandon these terms or come up with new ones. I think we need to use the power that they have. And people recognize this, which is what makes it exciting.¶ CM: You write, “Some contemporary crowd observers claim the crowd for democracy. They see in the amassing of thousands a democratic insistence, a demand to be heard and included. In the context of communicative capitalism, however, the crowd exceeds democracy.¶ “In the 21st century, dominant nation-states exercise power as democracies. They bomb and invade as democracies, ‘for democracy’s sake.’ International political bodies legitimize themselves as democratic, as do the contradictory and tangled media practices of communicative capitalism. When crowds amass in opposition, they pose themselves against democratic practices, systems, and bodies. To claim the crowd for democracy fails to register this change in the political setting of the crowd.”¶ So are crowds today, the protesters today, opposed to democracy? Or are they opposed to the current state of, let’s say, representative democracy?¶ JD: Let’s think about our basic environment. By “our,” now, I mean basically English-speaking people who use the internet and are listening to the radio and live in societies like the United States. In our environment, what we hear is that we live in democracy. We hear this all the time. We hear that the network media makes democratic exchange possible, that a free press is democracy, that we’ve got elections and that’s democracy.¶ When crowds amass in this setting, if they are just at a football game, it’s not a political statement. Even at a march (fully permitted) that’s registering opposition to the invasion of Iraq, for example, or concern about the climate—all of those things are within the general environment of “democracy,” and they don’t oppose the system. They don’t register as opposition to the system. They’re just saying that we want our view on this or that issue to count.¶ But the way that crowds have been amassing over the last four or five years—Occupy Wall Street is one example, but the Red Square debt movement in Canada is another; some of the more militant strikes of nurses and teachers are too—has been to say, “Look, the process that we have that’s been called democratic? It is not. We want to change that.”¶ It’s not that we are anti-democratic. It’s that democracy is too limiting a term to register our opposition. We want something more. We want actual equality. Democracy is too limiting. The reason it’s too limiting is we live in a context that understands itself as “democratic.” So democracy as a political claim, in my language, can’t “register the gap that the crowd is inscribing.” It can’t register real division or opposition. Democracy is just more of what we have.¶ CM: We are so dependent. We use social media so much, we use Facebook so much, we use so many of these avenues of what you call communicative capitalism so much. How can we oppose or reject this system without hurting ourselves and our ability to communicate our message to each other? Can we just go on strike? Can we become the owners of the means of communicative production?¶ JD: One of the ways that Marxism historically has understood the political problems faced by workers is our total entrapment and embeddedness in the capitalist system. What makes a strike so courageous is that workers are shooting themselves in the foot. They’re not earning their wage for a time, as a way to put pressure on the capitalist owner of the workplace.¶ What does that mean under communicative capitalism? Does it mean that we have to shoot ourselves in the foot by completely extracting ourselves from all of the instruments of communication? Or does it mean that we change our attitude towards communication? Or does it mean that we develop our own means of communication?¶ There’s a whole range here. I’m not a Luddite. I don’t think the way we’re going to bring down capitalism is by quitting Facebook. I think that’s a little bit absurd. I think what makes more sense is to think of how we could use the tools we have to bring down the master’s house. We can consolidate our message together. We can get a better sense of how many we are. We can develop common modes of thinking. We can distribute organizing materials for the revolutionary party. I don’t think that an extractive approach to our situation in communicative media is the right one. I think it’s got to be more tactical. How do we use the tools we have, and how do we find ways to seize the means of communication? This would mean the collectivization of Google, Facebook, Amazon, and using those apparatuses. But that would probably have to be day two of the revolution.¶ CM: Jodi, I’ve got one last question for you, and it’s the Question from Hell, the question we might hate to ask, you might hate to answer, or our audience is going to hate the response.¶ How much did the narrative that Occupy created, of the 99% and the 1%, undermine a of collectivity? Because it doesn’t include everyone…¶ JD: Division is crucial. Collectivity is never everyone. What this narrative did was produce the divided collectivity that we need. It’s great to undermine the ~~stupid~~ myth of American unity, “The country has to pull together” and all that crap. It’s fantastic that Occupy Wall Street asserted collectivity through division. This is class conflict. This says there is not a unified society. Collectivity is the collectivity of us against them. It produced the proper collectivity: an antagonistic one.

### T-Framework

#### Interpretation: The affirmative should only defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution

#### Standards:

#### 1] Topicality’s key to preserving competitive debate –

#### A) Letting the aff pick the topic ex post facto is bad and incentivizes vague argumentation that’s not grounded in a consistent, stable mechanism. The ability to select anything to say is bad for debate and makes the terms affirmative and negative meaningless. Being forced to switch-sides is debate’s greatest value and it solves all of their exclusion offense

#### B) their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs – that’s bad because research isn’t infinite, it monopolizes prep, and creates a structural skew in their favor – not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus every 2 months.

#### 4) Institutional engagement is key for queer survival

Faithful, black queer street shaman, folk healer and lawyer, ‘12

(Richael, “'Toward the Heart of Justice' - Keynote Address, Women's Diversity Conference, March 24, 2012, Adrian College,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2028737)

So, what is it like to be a young, queer, Black, southern female lawyer working in Virginia on felon disenfranchisement (which I’ll explain more about shortly)? Well, it’s slow-moving, stressful, and humbling. It requires me to constantly adapt to my environment, navigate internal and external politics, and take well-calculated risks. Most of all, it forces me to deal with broader questions like whether and how engaging with power helps the people with whom I work, and systems which we need to collectively dismantle and re-build?

I want to address this fundamental question about strategically approaching powerful institutions in two parts to provide context to my current work. The first part is dissecting a myth prevalent in social justice circles. Often, it is posed this way—is it better to work on the “inside” or “outside” the system. I don’t think that this framing is complete. The reality is that each of us exists within powerful institutions—we buy food within a capitalist economy, we make consumer decisions manipulated by the advertisement industry, we receive news generated by corporate media sources, and most important, we know and love people who not only wholeheartedly embrace these institutions, but we are closely connected to other humans who are integral to the perpetuation of these institutions—whom I call decision-makers and power-brokers.

Many of us are influenced, and exist within, powerful institutions even if we are actively resisting their forces. Some of us are re-shaping our relationships to these institutions by making intentionally choices that tip the balance of power. Therefore, the real issues that we encounter are not whether to work “within” or “outside” the “system.” Instead, the real issues are how we should we exist “inside” powerful institutions. To which degree should these institutions affect us? In my view, the existential problem for those who want to strive toward the heart of justice is how to engage with powerful institutions without being crushed.

The second part is how we can positively build alternative institutions, commonly described as “working outside the system.” Often this part is posed this way, lodged as a grenade against those seeking justice—“if you don’t like the current system and don’t have ideas about how to change it, shut up.” First, this rationale is nothing more than a silencing tactic that is designed to stifle critique and is no more productive in addressing problems that we face. Second, I want to defend speaking out, because expressing rage, sadness, grief, and excitement is important in itself, as serving as a mirror into the institutions that we create, and being healing to those who are airing their reactions.

It is, nonetheless, critical that we work to build alternative institutions that more responsibly deal with power. And we have to remember that these alternatives are inspired by, and informed by existing institutions of power. Here, is where the most creative, fun, imaginative, and powerful work lives. We see people in the US doing this work all of the time—the Highlander Folk School that taught literacy and provided civil disobedience training during the popular Civil Rights Movement; the South Central Farm of the late 1990s, which was at a time the largest community garden and urban farm in the country, promoting greater and better food access; the explosion of Ithaca Hours and other local currencies in the last twenty years created to encourage neighborhood economies; and even the Occupy Wall Street Movement, which put democratic consensus governance, an alternative to majority-rule governance, on the national map. This form of resistance is the site of many interesting cultural, social, economic and political experiments, equal in importance to resisting powerful institutions.

One of my favorite radical thinkers, Robin D.G. Kelley, Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity at the University of Southern California, writes extensively about transformative possibility. In a 2010 interview, his interviewer asked why he has so much optimism about the future.

Robin says, “It doesn’t come from any abstract sense of hope. Nor does it come from any sense of denial about the political realities that confront us and the extent of power and how it works. It comes out of being a historian. There are so many historical examples of seemingly impossible circumstances in which we had these revolutionary transformations.”1

Without vivid imagination, no positive future would ever exist. I outline these frameworks because, like many other people, I try to work on both levels—intentionally engaging with powerful institutions, and affirmatively building alternative institutions that maintain healthier relationships with power. Likewise, my fellowship project tries to engage and build on these levels, creating possibilities beyond the law and electoral politics.

Virginia is one of four states that forever strips citizens’ civil rights, including their right to vote, upon a felony conviction. This type of law is commonly referred to as “felon disenfranchisement.”In 2004, at least 377,000 people were estimated to be disenfranchised, or in other words, alienated from their natural civic and political rights borne from their status as US citizens. Most notably, disenfranchisement permanently carves out a fraction of the electorate, which is disproportionately people of color, working-class and poor, disabled, and likely queer/transgender-identified. For example, about 55% of disenfranchised citizens in Virginia are African-American, which make up less than 20% of the state population.

In Virginia, the only way for disenfranchised citizens to restore their civil rights is through individual Governor petition. Only 1,000 people each year restore their rights, on average. There are ten eligibility criteria that eliminate or discourage many people from accessing the system. In the end, after jumping every hoop and climbing every ladder, the Governor may deny an application for any reason and no reason at all, with no appeal process.

Some criticize the system as being fundamentally broken, unfair, and inhumane. Others, like brilliant legal scholar, Michelle Alexander, author of The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, argue that systems such as these are relics of bygone eras that expressly intended to deny full Black citizenship. I go even further to say that Virginia’s disenfranchisement system remains because powerful interests (cut across race and class lines) cannot maintain their democratic stranglehold if it is changed. I think that it is designed to silently kill the democratic dream.

My Equal Justice Works fellowship, the Virginia Rights Restoration Project, which I’ll call VRRP, is an initiative aimed at building long-term infrastructure to dismantle the existing system. VRRP’s specific goal is to engineer new, creative strategies toward the alternative of automatic restoration upon sentence completion, which was necessary after two hard-fought but lost campaigns to pressure previous Governors into changing the law.

#### Vote neg – they’ve destroyed the round from the beginning and topicality’s key to set the correct model of debate which means it comes first.

### Case

#### Witchcraft as deviance is a Eurocentric impulse –

**VAN WYK Professor of Theology @ The Reformed Theological College @ U of Pretoria 2k4 “**African witchcraft in theological perspective” <https://hts.org.za/index.php/HTS/article/view/575>

Witchcraft has always been a major problem in Africa (Mönnich 1967:78-97; Sundkler 2000:94-95, 347, 358, 378). This statement is underlined by the fact that African Traditional Religion (ATR) and African healing practices have as one of their most important functions the struggle against witchcraft. This problem is one of the most fundamental problems of African existence. Older **scientific studies** on witchcraft (e g Mbiti 1985:195197 and Bosch 1987:42-43) include extensive reports on interviews with Africans enquiring about the reality and actual existence of witches and witchcraft. According to those **reports questions on** whether or not **witchcraft** is a reality, **are typical white man’s questions. Africans never ask such questions, because to them witches and witchcraft are part of their everyday reality.** Older and recent popular-scientific studies report extensively on the living reality of witchcraft or “black magic” (e g Campbell 1998:115-117; Holland 2001). Many lecturers at the various theological faculties and seminaries in South Africa (e g Van Niekerk 1992:44-64), including myself, can recount many stories of what they have personally witnessed in this regard or can recount what they have been told about witchcraft. **We also know that not only witchcraft, but also witch-hunts and witchkillings (killing of witches) have been a serious problem** in South Africa during the last decades. The following statistics highlight the enormity of the problem: In the Limpopo Province of South Africa 445 witchcraft-related cases were reported to the police between 1990 and 1995. During 1996 a total of 1,182 cases were reported; during 1998 a total number of 554 cases and between January and September 1999 a total number of 739 cases were reported. Between 1990 and 1994 over 300 people were killed, and between April 1994 and April 1995, 228 people were allegedly killed as a result of witchcraft accusations/suspicions (Minnaar 1991:54, Mashangoane 2001:489). In the year 2000, 1 300 witchcraft-related crimes were reported to the police in this province (SANPAD 2003:3). In the Bushbuckridge district in the Mpumalanga Province, 21 witches were violently attacked between 1971 and 1985. The comrades (politically motivated youth) attacked 10 witches between 1986 and 1989. Over Christmas time in 1990, 34 witches were attacked in a witch-hunt. In 1993, 8 people and in 1994, 9 people were accused of witchcraft (Niehaus 2001:202207). **The fact that many of these killings took place amidst an extremely unstable political situation, cannot be disputed and the political motives behind many of these murders cannot be disputed** (Niehaus 2001). Together with people such as Minnaar (1991) and Mihálik & Cassim (1993), **I am,** however, **convinced** **that the witch-killings** in South Africa **are not only to be explained in terms of political conflict. This problem is not only a problem characteristic of the struggle years against apartheid** in the former homelands of Lebowa, Gazankulu and Venda. **It problem is an everyday reality in many communities**

#### Hauntological projects enable colonialism because it mythologizes colonialism and erases historical context. Their inherency argument is about erasure—means we turn the case

**O’Riley 07**

, Michael O’Riley, Ohio State University, “Postcolonial Haunting: Anxiety, Affect, and the Situated Encounter,” Postcolonial Text, 2007, Vol. 3, No. 4, pg. 11-12//

In many ways, the affective domain related to a haunting aura is always implicated in such endeavors, particularly because of the complex colonial legacy still circulating in and between former imperialist centers and their peripheries. There is, on one hand, the imperative of an awareness of histories that have never been recorded, a desire to relate to that which is, and was made, other. Yet, there is also a widespread tendency in such endeavors to create monuments of the colonial, to transform it into a mythical and unproblematic domain, unproblematic precisely because it is always assumed to be so problematic, so utterly disruptive to the way we think of it.13 The hauntings of the colonial examined above include both of these tendencies. They do so because the obsessive desire to relate to the Other, to establish a “relational” form of memory through the image and memory of the colonial Other, often collapses into a type of thought that is ultimately not at all relational or plural and, moreover, hardly seems disruptive

### AT:RVI

### Toplevel

#### 1] Skews neg strat since the 2AR can collapse for a persuasive 3min and I can never predict what they’ll say to preempt it

#### 2] Illogical – you shouldn’t win just cause you’re fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance

#### 3] Topic ed – no RVI means we can go back to substance, but an RVI means the debate has to be resolved on the theory layer

#### 4] Chilling effect – new debaters will be scared to read theory because they’re scared of better debaters, which allows experienced debaters to get away with abuse

#### 5] Norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms

### AT: 2N Theory Collapse

#### 1] 2AR collapse solves – you have persuasive advantage and the last word and I don’t have a 3N

#### 2] If you’re on the right side of the issue it’s easy to win – there’s no reason time means I auto-win

#### 3] Give more strategic 1ARs that split the 2N and preempt common collapses – solves since you’ll have a 7-6 time advantage

### AT: Reciprocity

#### 1] 1AR theory solves – you can read your own shells and do weighing – negs can’t read counterplan theory

#### 2] No abuse – you can link turn with you violate and impact turn fairness and education

#### *3] It’s your burden to be T – it’s a stock issue the same as inherency and you don’t win just for having it*

### AT: Time Skew

#### 1] Non UQ – all args skew time somewhat, there’s no reason this is worse

#### 2] There’s no reason RVIs are key when 1AR theory or impact turns split the 2N too

#### 3] No abuse – we both have 13 minutes – be more efficient

#### *4] No abuse – just read T preempts in the AC*

### AT: Deters Friv Shells

#### 1] Turn – RVIs incentivize people to be abusive, bait theory, then prep the counterinterp and RVI

#### 2] Chilling o/w – solving excessively marginal fairness skews only improves debate but allowing people to get away with large amounts of abuse is terrible

#### 3] Alt solvency – a) friv shells lack abuse stories and are easy to beat, b) judges are less likely to vote on silly args

### OV

#### The K o/w and turns case. O/W:

#### Magnitude: capitalism causes war, violence, environmental destruction, and extinction, and it is going to collapse by the middle of the century. This is ongoing structural violence and extinction level claims due to the contradictory nature of capitalism; expansion forever in a limited world. This is already causing the 6th mass extinction. 2008 signaled the slide into a systemic crisis due to those inherent contradictions, that’s Streek. Structural, racial, class- based violence always outweighs.

#### That means we win on probability as well since our impacts are already happening right now, 100% chance.

#### Timeframe: Our impacts are ongoing meaning you vote neg to deal with the impacts happening right now.

#### Class divisions are the root of all other oppressions

Kovel 2 (Alger Hiss Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, awarded Fellowship at the John Guggenheim Foundation, Joel, The Enemy of Nature, pages 123-124)

If, however, we ask the question of efficacy, that is, which split sets the others into motion, then priority would have to be given to class, for the plain reason that class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforce­ment and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of 'classism' to go along with 'sexism' and 'racism,' and `species-ism'). This is, first of all, because class is an essentially man-made category, without root in even a mystified biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender dis­tinctions – although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable – indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species' time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because 'class' signifies one side of a larger figure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state.'° Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of woman's labour. Class society continually generates gender, racial, ethnic oppressions and the like, which take on a life of their own, as well as profoundly affecting the concrete relations of class itself. It follows that class politics must be fought out in terms of all the active forms of social splitting. It is the management of these divisions that keeps state society functional. Thus though each person in a class society is reduced from what s/he can become, the varied reductions can be combined into the great stratified regimes of history — this one becoming a fierce warrior, that one a routine-loving clerk, another a submissive seamstress, and so on, until we reach today's personi­fications of capital and captains of industry. Yet no matter how functional a class society, the profundity of its ecological violence ensures a basic antagonism which drives history onward. History is the history of class society — because no matter how modified, so powerful a schism is bound to work itself through to the surface, provoke resistance (`class struggle'), and lead to the succession of powers. The relation of class can be mystified without end — only consider the extent to which religion exists for just this purpose, or watch a show glorifying the police on television — yet so long as we have any respect for human nature, we must recognize that so funda­mental an antagonism as would steal the vital force of one person for the enrichment of another cannot be conjured away.

Extend our Dean evidence – we ought to use this space to organize genuine political movements. Parliaments and legislatures across the world have the power to actualize the communist horizon, but the left remains too fragmented to actually do anything in the face of modern neoliberalism. A commitment to the establishment of the communist party acts as a transition to the next generation – in the status quo, we can push for reforms like universal healthcare and wealth redistribution that set up society for a final push into a post-scarcity economy. The Dean evidence is extremely specific in saying that our alternative is the critical first step in organizing the left *EVEN IF* the state is not the perfect model or venue to enact change. If we can’t establish a party in an electoral system, what can we do? Our alternative is the staging ground to enacting broader societal change