## 1 - Cap K

#### The link is the 1AC’s endorsement of the right to strike as something to be “recognized” by the state – that coopts truly revolutionary movements

Crepon & Bez 19

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In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class struggle. To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is, in fact, the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike. Thus, the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles. We might consider this to be the perfect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of questioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benjamin dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (the proletarian general strike) to exceed the limits of the right to strike— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against the possible violence of class struggles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law. The difference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing that the right to strike is granted and guaranteed unconditionally. Rather, it is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers, on the one hand, and of the state on the other. From the point of view of the state, the partial strike cannot under any circumstance be understood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting (and verifiable) violence: that of the employer. In this sense, the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action, what Benjamin named a “pure means.” The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the alleged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. The political game is thus the following: the state legislated the right to strike in order to contain class struggles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason” to strike. However, it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with (and accomplice to) employers will ever recognize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will therefore be seen as abusing a right granted by the state, and in so doing transforming it into a violent means. On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of governments confronted with a strike (in education, transportation, or healthcare, for example) who, after claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, deny that the arguments constitute sufficient reason for a strike that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. They deny, in other words, that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic violence that justifies the strike. Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) left once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insufficient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of sufficient rationale, allowing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situation, or of a new policy. And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support. The second conflict of interpretation concerns what is at stake in the strike. For the state, the strike implies a withdrawal or act of defiance vis-à-vis the employer, while for the workers it is a means of pressuring, if not of blackmail or even of “hostage taking.” The diference is thus between an act of suspension (which can be considered nonviolent) and one of extortion (which includes violence). Does this mean that “pure means” are not free of ambiguity, and that there can be no nonviolent action that does not include a residue of violence? It is not clear that Benjamin’s text allows us to go this far. Nevertheless, the problem of pure means, approached through the notion of the right to strike, raises the following question: Could it be that the text “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” which we are accustomed to reading as a text on violence, deals in fact with the possibility and ambiguity of nonviolence? The opposition between the aforementioned conflicts of interpretation manifests itself in Benjamin’s excursus on the revolutionary strike, and specifically in the opposition between the political strike and the proletarian general strike, and in the meaning we should attribute to the latter. As previously discussed, the state will never admit that the right to strike is a right to violence. Its interpretative strategy consists in denying, as much as possible, the effective exercise of the right that it theoretically grants. Under these conditions, the function of the revolutionary strike is to return the strike to its true meaning; in other words, to return it to its own violence. In this context, the imperative is to move beyond idle words: a call to strike is a call to violence. This is the reason why such a call is regularly met with a violent reaction from the state, because trade unions force the state to recognize what it is trying to ignore, what it pretends to have solved by recognizing the right to strike: the irreducible violence of class struggles. This means that the previously discussed alternative between “suspension” and “extortion” is valid only for the political strike—in other words, for a strike whose primary vocation is not, contrary to that of the proletarian general strike, to revolt against the law itself. Essentially, the idea of a proletarian general strike, its myth (to borrow Sorel’s words), is to escape from this dichotomous alternative that inevitably reproduces and perpetuates the violence of domination.

#### The alternative: embrace an anti-captialist praxis that decouples both the means of survival and inherent human dignity from labor; rigorous intellectual analysis can lead us to a world without work.

Livingston 16

James Livingston -- professor of history @ Rutgers University, “No More Work: Why Full Employment Is a Bad Idea”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5149/9781469630663\_livingston, 2016, pgs. 96-102, EmmieeM – recut CAT

So the question is not how to put us all back to work for a minimum wage — fuck that — it’s how to detach income from time spent on the job**.** But look, we’ve already done that, too. Wall Street bankers don’t do much of anything except peddle bad paper, but they get paid millions of dollars. Teachers, professors, novelists, journalists, carpenters, musicians, and janitors do everything we say we value — they educate, entertain, they build things, and they clean up after us — but they get paid almost nothing. Meanwhile the so-called welfare state has also decoupled income from work, but not so that you’d notice unless you, like Paul Ryan and Jeb Bush, think “entitlements” are a danger to the moral fiber of the nation. Remember, 20 percent of all household income now arrives in the form of a transfer payment from government, and every Walmart “associate” is a ward of the state, someone collecting food stamps or using the emergency room for routine health care, because he or she can’t make it on the wages alone. So it’s not as if we don’t know how to do what needs to be done, which is detach income from work; it’s that we refuse to face the fact that it’s now simply necessary to complete what we’ve already begun — which is the transition to a postcapitalist society, where wage labor neither determines nor disfigures daily life. How, then, do we face the fact? I don’t doubt the moral and political significance of a movement for a higher minimum wage, $15 an hour. But as I’ve said, forty hours a week at this pay grade just puts you at the poverty line (and you know Coda 97 you’re not getting forty hours, because that would require real benefits from your employer). What is the point of a higher minimum wage, then, except to prove that you have a work ethic? Excuse me, that’s another rhetorical question. There’s no good reason to increase wages by legislative fiat if the labor market is broken. But there’s a good reason to replace that market. So what is to be done, for now, is intellectual work. Our question is, how to imagine a moral universe that isn’t anchored to or limited by socially necessary labor — how we learn to accept income that can’t be accounted for by reference to time on the job. **To hell with full employment. How about full enjoyment? Fuck work**. II Love and work — the two things we all want, according to Freud and every other student of human nature — have pretty much the same function in our lives. Like good teachers, they take us out of ourselves, into the world. Love and work commit us to purposes that we didn’t invent, and so they teach us to devise and evaluate our own. When we’re in love, what we most want is that the person we love can become what he or she wants to be, partly because we know that this urgent desire includes us. When we’re at work, what we most want is to get the assigned task completed, because we know that this is what our coworkers need — we know that this 98 Coda completion will free us from the commands of the past, and so let us experience the present, enter the future. In love or at work, commitment is a condition, but also a boundary and a limit. It requires certain behaviors, and it precludes others. But commitment in either emotional venue doesn’t necessarily mean a cancellation of your own purposes, although of course it can. The thing about love and work is that you typically feel commitment as both the limitation and the liberation of your own volition — as the realization rather than the negation of your self, of your natural talents, past effort, and learned skills. Think about it as a musical proposition. You can’t play the blues without mastering the genre, which is pretty simple without memorizing the chords and the changes and the lyrics. But you can’t improvise, make it new, become yourself as a player or a singer, without that preparation, that commitment. “Piety is not only honorable,” as G. L. S. Shackle put it in explaining the Keynesian revolution, “it is indispensable. Innovation is helpless without tradition.” Love forces us to acknowledge antecedents — the physical actuality and the moral capacity of other people. You can have sex with anyone without this doubled acknowledgment, but you can’t love someone without it. Broaden that dictum and you find that poor old Immanuel Kant was right, after all, in rendering the Golden Rule as a philosophical principle. To love your neighbor as yourself, he must appear to you as an end in himself, not a means to your ends, whether they’re sexual, economic, or political. Coda 99 To love someone is to treat him or her as a person who must be different from you, and who must, by the same token, be your equal. Otherwise you could rightfully decide their purposes for them, which would mean treating their moral capacity as absent or insufficient. Everyone would then appear to you as a slave or a child in need of your tutelage. The obvious limits of this supervisory vantage, by the way, are arguments against the idea that parental love (or God’s love for all his children) is the paradigm of love as such. To love your neighbor, to be your brother’s keeper, is, then, to care for yourself, and vice versa. That is what we have yet to learn. “As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master.” That’s how Abraham Lincoln put it in an unpublished note to himself. Harry Frankfurt puts it differently, but no less usefully, in a book called The Reasons of Love: “There must be something else that a person loves — something that cannot reasonably, or even intelligibly, be identified as his ‘self’ — in order for there to be anything at all to which his self-love is actually devoted A person cannot love himself except insofar as he loves other things.”[1](#bookmark11) Work seems much different than love in such perspective. A TV series like The Office and movies like Office Space or Horrible Bosses exist and succeed precisely because the people in charge quite realistically violate this Kantian principle, the Golden Rule. But that is why the heroes of these fictions say, “No, I would prefer not to.” They’re Bartleby the Scrivener all over again because they don’t stand up to anybody, they don’t even leave the office, no, they subvert the system by hanging around or doing something stupid. 100 Coda But what these fools, our fools, keep demonstrating is their moral capacity, however bumbling it may seem to their bosses, and to us the audience — at first, anyway. They insist that they must be acknowledged as agents in their own right, as moral personalities who can steer this business, and their own lives, as well as anyone in charge. They reject what Hegel, also Nietzsche, called “slave morality,” the idea that self-mastery is an interior to which no exterior corresponds. (The fascination with manual labor on reality TV, as in Dirty Jobs or Ice Truckers, has the same political valence; it’s a way of saying that every man, every woman, can decide for himself or herself, without guidance from the well-groomed and the well-educated.) Finally, love and work similarly remind us that the material artifacts of this world, whether natural or man-made, can be indifferent, even resistant, to our efforts. Here the rules of love begin to look like the laws of science — you can’t make the be- loved do what he or she won’t, or can’t, not anymore than you can bend the earth to your will. And here again that knowledge is a form of self-consciousness, a way of learning the limits of what we can ask of others, of the world. It’s a way of asking ourselves, given this situation, what can I do about it? Still, what becomes of love when work disappears? III Love and work as we know them, as the choices we make that decide who we are as individuals — these are the essential Coda 101 ingredients of modern times. They date from the late eighteenth century, when the notion of individualism we take for granted, as an expression of unique qualities that sets each of us apart from all others, took hold because it could, because the idea that “all men are created equal” became first a revolutionary slogan and then a cultural commonplace. So the real question is, what happens to us when work must be love? This absurd question is what we must answer, because work is no longer our lot. Unlike every generation before us, we can do without it, and we’ll have to. We don’t need to work. But if we want to survive, we have to love each other, as ourselves — we have to be our brothers’ keepers. It’s not merely a moral imperative, as Kant would have it; this is a practical, economic necessity. There’s not enough work to go around. We can produce more every year, every month, with less and less labor time. We lost our race with the machine, and we know the robots are coming to take our jobs and steal our emotions. That means the principle of productivity — from each according to his or her input, to each according to his or her output — is outmoded, even ridiculous, and not just because the more we produce, the more we destroy. That principle of productivity has been more or less incongruent with reality for a hundred years; but then cultural revolutions typically take about a century. The relation between goods produced and income received has been totally unintelligible for that long, anyway, since the “human element” could be eliminated from the factories, and now from the banks and 102 Coda the stores and the warehouses, by electrification, automation, instrumentation, cybernation, computerization. So, what is to be done? The first thing we do is kill all the bankers. Just kidding; we need them to keep the books. No, the first thing is, we think through what it means to detach income from work. Then we invent practical means of doing so. We don’t have to start from scratch just because for the last fifty years, liberals, conservatives, and all those in between have been addressing the wrong issue, “full employment.” Instead, we start with Nixon’s Family Assistance Program, and see where it leads us. Eventually we’ll decide that, in the absence of jobs that pay a living wage, even at a minimum of $15 an hour, we have to provide everyone with a guaranteed annual income, regardless of the work they do. Then we get to ask the real questions.

#### Thus, the ROB - vote for the debater who has the better liberatory strategy to free us from neoliberalism – yes this K is so good it has a solvency advocate

Medea and Davies 21 (10/20/21)

[Medea Benjamin](https://www.commondreams.org/author/medea-benjamin), co-founder of [Global Exchange](http://www.globalexchange.org/) and [CODEPINK: Women for Peace](http://www.codepinkalert.org/), is the author of the 2018 book, "[Inside Iran: The Real History and Politics of the Islamic Republic of Iran](https://www.amazon.com/Inside-Iran-History-Politics-Republic/dp/1944869654)." Her previous books include: "[Kingdom of the Unjust: Behind the U.S.-Saudi Connection](https://www.amazon.com/Kingdom-Unjust-Behind-U-S-Saudi-Connection/dp/1944869026)" (2016); "[Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control](https://bookshop.org/a/16708/9781781680773)" (2013); "[Don’t Be Afraid Gringo: A Honduran Woman Speaks from the Heart](https://bookshop.org/a/16708/9780060972059)" (1989), and (with Jodie Evans) "[Stop the Next War Now (Inner Ocean Action Guide)](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B004D4Y3A2?ie=UTF8&tag=commondreams-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=B004D4Y3A2)" (2005). [Nicolas J. S. Davies](https://www.commondreams.org/author/nicolas-js-davies) is an independent journalist, a researcher with CODEPINK and the author of [Blood On Our Hands: the American Invasion and Destruction of Iraq.](https://bookshop.org/a/16708/9781934840986) “Our Future vs. Neoliberalism” Common Dreams. October 20, 2021. <https://www.commondreams.org/views/2021/10/20/our-future-vs-neoliberalism?fbclid=IwAR3Wb3UHFCPxvh-QbPSXrPYct2qVNq5Va1WLfTpik1Eh6msAwLas1a1Ky1U> Accessed October 28, 2021 -CAT

In country after country around the world, people are rising up to challenge entrenched, failing [neoliberal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoliberalism) political and economic systems, with mixed but sometimes promising results. [Progressive leaders](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/oct/09/progressive-democrats-congress-strength-infrastructure-reconciliation) in the U.S. Congress are refusing to back down on the Democrats' promises to American voters to reduce poverty, expand rights to healthcare, education, and clean energy, and repair a shredded social safety net. After decades of tax cuts for the rich, they are also committed to raising taxes on wealthy Americans and corporations to pay for this popular agenda. Americans should likewise demand that our government stop wasting trillions of dollars to militarize the world and destroy countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, and start solving our real problems, here and abroad. Germany has elected a [ruling coalition](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58924480) of Social Democrats, Greens and Free Democrats that excludes the conservative Christian Democrats for the first time since 2000. The new government promises a $14 minimum wage, solar panels on all suitable roof space, 2% of land for wind farms and the closure of Germany's last coal-fired power plants by 2030. Iraqis voted in an election that was called in response to a popular [protest movement](https://www.juancole.com/2019/12/iraqis-against-corruption.html) launched in October 2019 to challenge the [endemic corruption](https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/iraq-150bn-stolen-oil-cash-smuggled-out-2003) of the post-2003 political class and its subservience to U.S. and Iranian interests. The protest movement was split between taking part in the election and boycotting it, but its candidates still won about 35 seats and will [have a voice](https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/iraq-elections-how-change-political-landscape) in parliament. The party of long-time Iraqi nationalist leader Muqtada al-Sadr won 73 seats, the largest of any single party, while Iranian-backed parties whose armed militias killed hundreds of protesters in 2019 lost popular support and many of their seats. Chile's billionaire president, Sebastian Piñera, is being [impeached](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/13/chile-sebastian-pinera-impeachment-proceedings-pandora-papers) after the Pandora Papers revealed details of bribery and tax evasion in his sale of a mining company, and he could face up to 5 years in prison. Mass street protests in 2019 forced Piñera to agree to a new constitution to replace the one written under the Pinochet military dictatorship, and [a convention](https://publicseminar.org/essays/chile-tries-to-write-a-new-constitution/) that includes representatives of indigenous and other marginalized communities has been elected to draft the constitution. Progressive parties and candidates are expected to do well in the general election in November. Maybe the greatest success of people power has come in Bolivia. In 2020, only a year after a U.S.-backed right-wing [military coup](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/sep/18/silence-us-backed-coup-evo-morales-bolivia-american-states), a [mass mobilization](https://peoplesdispatch.org/2020/08/07/national-strike-continues-across-bolivia-demands-grow-for-anez-to-step-down/) of mostly indigenous working people forced a new election, and the socialist MAS Party of Evo Morales was returned to power. [Since then](https://portside.org/2021-10-16/bolivia-shows-us-what-possible) it has already introduced a new wealth tax and welfare payments to four million people to help eliminate hunger in Bolivia. The Ideological Context Since the 1970s, Western political and corporate leaders have peddled a quasi-religious belief in the power of "free" markets and unbridled capitalism to solve all the world's problems. This new ["neoliberal"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoliberalism) orthodoxy is a thinly disguised reversion to the systematic injustice of 19th century laissez-faire capitalism, which led to gross inequality and poverty even in wealthy countries, famines that killed [tens of millions](https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/01/02/18/reviews/010218.18senlt.html) of people in India and China, and horrific exploitation of the poor and vulnerable worldwide. For most of the 20th century, Western countries gradually responded to the excesses and injustices of capitalism by using the power of government to redistribute wealth through [progressive taxation](https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02inpetr.pdf) and a growing public sector, and ensure broad access to public goods like education and healthcare. This led to a gradual expansion of broadly shared prosperity in the United States and Western Europe through a strong public sector that balanced the power of private corporations and their owners. The steadily growing shared prosperity of the post-WWII years in the West was derailed by a combination of factors, including the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, Nixon's freeze on prices and wages, runaway inflation caused by dropping the gold standard, and then a second oil crisis after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Right-wing politicians led by Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the U.K. blamed the power of organized labor and the public sector for the economic crisis. They launched a "neoliberal" counter-revolution to bust unions, shrink and privatize the public sector, cut taxes, deregulate industries and supposedly unleash "the magic of the market." Then they took credit for a return to economic growth that really owed more to the end of the [oil crises](https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2011/10/ronald-reagans-legacy/). The United States and United Kingdom used their economic, military and media power to spread their neoliberal gospel across the world. [Chile's experiment](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/13/why-is-inequality-booming-in-chile-blame-the-chicago-boys) in neoliberalism under Pinochet's military dictatorship became a model for U.S. efforts to roll back the "pink tide" in Latin America. When the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe opened to the West at the end of the Cold War, it was the extreme, neoliberal brand of capitalism that Western economists imposed as "[shock therapy](https://newint.org/features/2004/04/01/facts/)" to privatize state-owned enterprises and open countries to Western corporations. In the United States, the mass media shy away from the word "neoliberalism" to describe the changes in society since the 1980s. They describe its effects in less systemic terms, as globalization, privatization, deregulation, consumerism and so on, without calling attention to their common ideological roots. This allows them to treat its impacts as separate, unconnected problems: poverty and inequality, [mass incarceration](https://books.google.com/books?id=fFJh8wZlDIAC&pg=PA411#v=onepage&q&f=false), environmental degradation, ballooning debt, money in politics, disinvestment in public services, declines in public health, permanent war, and record military spending. After a generation of systematic neoliberal control, it is now obvious to people all over the world that neoliberalism has utterly failed to solve the world's problems. As many predicted all along, it has just enabled the rich to get [much, much richer](https://inequality.org/research/growing-apart-political-history-american-inequality/), while structural and even existential problems remain unsolved. Even once people have grasped the self-serving, predatory nature of this system that has overtaken their political and economic life, many still fall victim to the demoralization and powerlessness that are among its most insidious products, as they are brainwashed to see themselves only as individuals and consumers, instead of as active and collectively powerful citizens. In effect, confronting neoliberalism—whether as individuals, groups, communities or countries—requires a two-step process. First, we must understand the nature of the beast that has us and the world in its grip, whatever we choose to call it. Second, we must overcome our own demoralization and powerlessness, and rekindle our collective power as political and economic actors to build the better world we know is possible. We will see that collective power in the streets and the suites at COP26 in Glasgow, when the world's leaders will gather to confront the reality that neoliberalism has allowed corporate profits to trump a rational response to the devastating impact of fossil fuels on the Earth's climate. Extinction Rebellion and other groups will be [in the streets](https://rebellion.global/blog/2020/08/31/act-now-extinction-rebellion-demands/) in Glasgow, demanding the long-delayed action that is required to solve the problem, including an end to net carbon emissions by 2025. While scientists warned us for decades what the result would be, political and business leaders have peddled their [neoliberal snake oil](https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/environment/stefanik-market-solutions.html) to keep filling their coffers at the expense of the future of life on Earth. If we fail to stop them now, living conditions will keep deteriorating for people everywhere, as the natural world our lives depend on is washed out from under our feet, goes up in smoke and, species by species, dies and disappears forever. The Covid pandemic is another real world case study on the impact of neoliberalism. As the official death toll reaches [5 million](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-cases.html) and many more deaths go unreported, rich countries are still [hoarding vaccines](https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/us-must-stop-hoarding-excess-covid-19-vaccine-doses), drug companies are reaping a [bonanza of profits](https://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2021/09/15/pharmaceutical-companies-reaping-immoral-profits-covid-vaccines-yet-paying-low) from vaccines and new drugs, and the lethal, devastating injustice of the entire neoliberal "market" system is laid bare for the whole world to see. Calls for a "[people's vaccine](https://www.citizen.org/article/a-plan-for-the-peoples-vaccine/)" and "vaccine justice" have been challenging what has now been termed "vaccine apartheid." Conclusion In the 1980s, U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher often [told the world](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There_is_no_alternative), "There is no alternative" to the neoliberal order she and President Reagan were unleashing. After only one or two generations, the self-serving insanity they prescribed and the crises it has caused have made it a question of survival for humanity to find alternatives. Around the world, ordinary people are rising up to demand real change. The people of Iraq, Chile and Bolivia have overcome the incredible traumas inflicted on them to take to the streets in the thousands and demand better government. Americans should likewise demand that our government stop wasting trillions of dollars to militarize the world and destroy countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, and start solving our real problems, here and abroad. People around the world understand the nature of the problems we face better than we did a generation or even a decade ago. Now we must overcome demoralization and powerlessness in order to act. It helps to understand that the demoralization and powerlessness we may feel are themselves products of this neoliberal system, and that simply overcoming them is a victory in itself. As we reject the inevitability of neoliberalism and Thatcher's lie that there is no alternative, we must also reject the lie that we are just passive, powerless consumers. As human beings, we have the same collective power that human beings have always had to build a better world for ourselves and our children—and now is the time to harness that power.

#### And, dismantling capitalism o/ws under under any framework -- it’s the greatest existential threat and the biggest affront to human rights and structural inequalities. The consensus of recent studies prove that transition is possible but that requires radical rejection of current neoliberal politics

Ahmed 20

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* The last paragraph shows that rapid peaceful transition is possible so put away that garbage Harris 02 transition wars card

The COVID19 pandemic has exposed a strange anomaly in the global economy. If it doesn’t keep growing endlessly, it just breaks. Grow, or die. But there’s a deeper problem. New scientific research confirms that capitalism’s structural obsession with endless growth is destroying the very conditions for human survival on planet Earth. A landmark study in the journal Nature Communications, “Scientists’ warning on affluence” — by scientists in Australia, Switzerland and the UK — concludes that the most fundamental driver of environmental destruction is the overconsumption of the super-rich. This factor lies over and above other factors like fossil fuel consumption, industrial agriculture and deforestation: because it is overconsumption by the super-rich which is the chief driver of these other factors breaching key planetary boundaries. The paper notes that the richest 10 percent of people are responsible for up to 43 percent of destructive global environmental impacts. In contrast, the poorest 10 percent in the world are responsible just around 5 percent of these environmental impacts: The new paper is authored by Thomas Wiedmann of UNSW Sydney’s School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Manfred Lenzen of the University of Sydney’s School of Physics, Lorenz T. Keysser of ETH Zürich’s Department of Environmental Systems Science, and Julia K. Steinberger of Leeds University’s School of Earth and Environment. It confirms that global structural inequalities in the distribution of wealth are intimately related to an escalating environmental crisis threatening the very existence of human societies. Synthesising knowledge from across the scientific community, the paper identifies capitalism as the main cause behind “alarming trends of environmental degradation” which now pose “existential threats to natural systems, economies and societies.” The paper concludes: “It is clear that prevailing capitalist, growth-driven economic systems have not only increased affluence since World War II, but have led to enormous increases in inequality, financial instability, resource consumption and environmental pressures on vital earth support systems.” Capitalism and the pandemic Thanks to the way capitalism works, the paper shows, the super-rich are incentivised to keep getting richer — at the expense of the health of our societies and the planet overall. The research provides an important scientific context for how we can understand many earlier scientific studies revealing that industrial expansion has hugely increased the risks of new disease outbreaks. Just last April, a paper in Landscape Ecology found that deforestation driven by increased demand for consumption of agricultural commodities or beef have increased the probability of ‘zoonotic’ diseases (exotic diseases circulating amongst animals) jumping to humans. This is because industrial expansion, driven by capitalist pressures, has intensified the encroachment of human activities on wildlife and natural ecosystems. Two years ago, another study in Frontiers of Microbiology concluded presciently that accelerating deforestation due to “demographic growth” and the associated expansion of “farming, logging, and hunting”, is dangerously transforming rural environments. More bat species carrying exotic viruses have ended up next to human dwellings, the study said. This is increasing “the risk of transmission of viruses through direct contact, domestic animal infection, or contamination by urine or faeces.” It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the COVID19 pandemic thus emerged directly from these rapidly growing impacts of human activities. As the new paper in Nature Communications confirms, these impacts have accelerated in the context of the fundamental operations of industrial capitalism. Eroding the ‘safe operating space’ The result is that capitalism is causing human societies to increasingly breach key planetary boundaries, such as land-use change, biosphere integrity and climate change. Remaining within these boundaries is essential to maintain what scientists describe as a “safe operating space” for human civilization. If those key ecosystems are disrupted, that “safe operating space” will begin to erode. The global impacts of the COVID19 pandemic are yet another clear indication that this process of erosion has already begun. “The evidence is clear,” write Weidmann and his co-authors. “Long-term and concurrent human and planetary wellbeing will not be achieved in the Anthropocene if affluent overconsumption continues, spurred by economic systems that exploit nature and humans. We find that, to a large extent, the affluent lifestyles of the world’s rich determine and drive global environmental and social impact. Moreover, international trade mechanisms allow the rich world to displace its impact to the global poor.” The new scientific research thus confirms that the normal functioning of capitalism is eroding the ‘safe space’ by which human civilisation is able to survive. The structures The paper also sets out how this is happening in some detail. The super-rich basically end up driving this destructive system forward in three key ways. Firstly, they are directly responsible for “biophysical resource use… through high consumption.” Secondly, they are “members of powerful factions of the capitalist class.” Thirdly, due to that positioning, they end up “driving consumption norms across the population.” But perhaps the most important insight of the paper is not that this is purely because the super-rich are especially evil or terrible compared to the rest of the population — but because of the systemic pressures produced by capitalist structures. The authors point out that: “Growth imperatives are active at multiple levels, making the pursuit of economic growth (net investment, i.e. investment above depreciation) a necessity for different actors and leading to social and economic instability in the absence of it.” At the core of capitalism, the paper observes, is a fundamental social relationship defining the way working people are systemically marginalised from access to the productive resources of the earth, along with the mechanisms used to extract these resources and produce goods and services. This means that to survive economically in this system, certain behavioural patterns become not just normalised, but seemingly entirely rational — at least from a limited perspective that ignores wider societal and environmental consequences. In the words of the authors: “In capitalism, workers are separated from the means of production, implying that they must compete in labour markets to sell their labour power to capitalists in order to earn a living.” Meanwhile, firms which own and control these means of production “need to compete in the market, leading to a necessity to reinvest profits into more efficient production processes to minimise costs (e.g. through replacing human labour power with machines and positive returns to scale), innovation of new products and/or advertising to convince consumers to buy more.” If a firm fails to remain competitive through such behaviours, “it either goes bankrupt or is taken over by a more successful business. Under normal economic conditions, this capitalist competition is expected to lead to aggregate growth dynamics.” The irony is that, as the paper also shows, the “affluence” accumulated by the super-rich isn’t correlated with happiness or well-being. Restructure The “hegemonic” dominance of global capitalism, then, is the principal obstacle to the systemic transformation needed to reduce overconsumption. So it’s not enough to simply try to “green” current consumption through technologies like renewable energy — we need to actually reduce our environmental impacts by changing our behaviours with a focus on cutting back our use of planetary resources: “Not only can a sufficient decoupling of environmental and detrimental social impacts from economic growth not be achieved by technological innovation alone, but also the profit-driven mechanism of prevailing economic systems prevents the necessary reduction of impacts and resource utilisation per se.” The good news is that it doesn’t have to be this way. The paper reviews a range of “bottom-up studies” showing that dramatic reductions in our material footprint are perfectly possible while still maintaining good material living standards. In India, Brazil and South Africa, “decent living standards” can be supported “with around 90 percent less per-capita energy use than currently consumed in affluent countries.” Similar possible reductions are feasible for modern industrial economies such as Australia and the US. By becoming aware of how the wider economic system incentivises behaviour that is destructive of human societies and planetary ecosystems critical for human survival, both ordinary workers and more wealthy sectors — including the super-rich — can work toward rewriting the global economic operating system. This can be done by restructuring ownership in firms, equalising relations with workers, and intentionally reorganising the way decisions are made about investment priorities. The paper points out that citizens and communities have a crucial role to play in getting organised, upgrading efforts for public education about these key issues, and experimenting with new ways to work together in bringing about “social tipping points” — points at which social action can catalyse mass change. While a sense of doom and apathy about the prospects for such change is understandable, mounting evidence based on systems science suggests that global capitalism as we know it is in a state of protracted crisis and collapse that began some decades ago. This research strongly supports the view that as industrial civilization reaches the last stages of its systemic life-cycle, there is unprecedented and increasing opportunity for small-scale actions and efforts to have large system-wide impacts. The new paper shows that the need for joined-up action is paramount: structural racism, environmental crisis, global inequalities are not really separate crises — but different facets of human civilization’s broken relationship with nature. Yet, of course, the biggest takeaway is that those who bear most responsibility for environmental destruction — those who hold the most wealth in our societies — urgently need to wake up to how their narrow models of life are, quite literally, destroying the foundations for human survival over the coming decades.

## 2 – Violence DA

#### The right to strike legitimizes and perpetuates violence as a response to economic inequalities

Caruso 19

Amerigo Caruso, [Joining Forces against '**Strike Terrorism**': The Public-Private Interplay in Policing Strikes in Imperial Germany, 1890–1914](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0265691419864007) – European History Quarterly (2019). <https://bonndoc.ulb.uni-bonn.de/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.11811/9035/Caruso_Armed_Bands_of_Strikebreakers.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y> -CAT

The aim of this chapter is to shed new light on the structure of internal violence and its media representation in late Imperial Germany. In doing so, I will argue Strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany 187 that repressive functions carried out by militarised citizens were more widespread and more readily tolerated when social conflicts and political antagonism were perceived as a major threat to the established order and when state-led repression triggered divisive discussions concerning the legitimate use of violence. Although the erosion of trust in the state and political violence reached unprecedented levels after 1918, violent confrontations between strikers and strikebreakers had already been an integral part of the social reality and public discourses before the outbreak of the war. However, while debates about legitimate repression and “class justice” were led by the Social Democratic milieu in the pre-war period, it was the radical left that redirected them against the moderate SPD after the brutal repression of the Spartacist uprising. This chapter focuses on the violence perpetrated by armed bands of professional strikebreakers before 1914, i.e. in a period in German history of massive but largely non-violent protest and relatively few episodes of brutal repression. 5 The first section examines the structure of violence in late Imperial Germany, with particular focus on the fact that it was not only ideological antagonism but also the glamorisation and sensationalisation of violence in the modern media that played a crucial role in intensifying political polarisation, hence setting the preconditions for political violence. Section two presents the context in which violent strikebreaking tactics emerged and became part of the social reality and the media reconstruction of it. Sections three to five analyse several episodes of violence, namely eight murders carried out by armed strikebreakers in the decade before the outbreak of the First World War. The sixth section explores the repertoire of action by professional bands of armed strikebreakers, including those led by Katzmarek and Hintze. This is followed by some concluding remarks. Violence in late Wilhelmine Germany According to Alf Lüdtke in his studies of the history of everyday life, low-level violence against outsiders and potential revolutionaries is a widespread and routine practice in modern societies. 6 Throughout the nineteenth century European states were increasingly successful in establishing a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force, although violence perpetrated by private citizens was far from marginalised. Private violence survived as a form of counter-violence against the state, or, in contrast, as a form of private law enforcement and support for the established order. After the emergence of a modern private security industry around 1900 ,7 privately organised coercion was more frequently driven by economic than political reasons. The rise of armed strikebreaking was politically motivated in that it was a counter-strike strategy supported by the so-called loyal classes, but it was also, and probably more importantly, economically motivated by the steady growth in demand for replacement workers and for the “protection” of non-strikers in the decades before 1914. As mentioned in the introduction, collective violence and brutal repression were relatively infrequent in Wilhelmine Germany, and it is common knowledge that the SPD and the Free Trade Unions discouraged violence as counterproductive. 188 Amerigo Caruso The picture changes, at least in part, if we take a micro-historical approach and examine the low-level aggression and violent confrontations that became a widespread phenomenon during mass demonstrations and strikes, especially where strikebreakers and pickets were involved. 8 The armed strikebreakers’ repertoire of strategies included repressive practices and mafia-like activities, such as provocation, harassment, intimidation and even murder. What makes the episodes of “strike terrorism” and the activities of armed strikebreakers remarkable is that violent confrontations during labour disputes were some of the most frequently discussed and polarising topics in German newspapers. Widespread “threat communication” made conflicts and violence more visible. 9 As noted by Ian Kershaw, the processes of enlargement of the public sphere and massification of society often led to the “glamorisation of violence”. 10 Sensational media reports of “strike terrorism” had an impact not only on the political debate, but also on the popular culture and everyday life. In 1910, for example, the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung reported that instead of playing “cops & robbers” or “cowboys & indians”, children in Berlin were playing “strikebreakers & unionised workers”.11 The heightened media attention on violent strikebreaking reflected a social reality that emerged during the decade before the First World War, when transnationally active bands of strikebreakers spread throughout the highly industrialised regions of Central Europe. The innovative aspect of their activity was that they not only replaced striking workers, they also organised multiple services, such as transportation and supplying and housing “blacklegs”. Strikebreaker agents also organised “self-defence” against “strike terrorism”, and intimidation of unionised workers was an integral part of their business. They were almost always armed, mostly with revolvers, sticks and daggers. Cheap handguns could be obtained with no legal restrictions, and the wide circulation of firearms became a destabilising factor in an age of class conflict, fear of social disintegration and radical nationalism.12 Bands of strikebreakers were therefore involved not only in the broader class struggles and political antagonism of late Imperial Germany, but also in the dynamics of violent masculinity and firearm obsession that characterised the “Browning generation”, i.e. those born in the late nineteenth century with no greater desire than to buy (and use) a revolver. 13 Strikebreaking in context In North America, the business of providing strikebreakers and armed guards during labour conflicts had already become widespread in the late nineteenth century. Several detective agencies and private police forces were widely employed to protect “blacklegs” and intimidate striking workers. 14 At the same time, famous strikebreaking agents, such as Jack Whitehead and James Farley, the latter portrayed in Jack London’s novel Iron Heel (1907), assembled permanent groups of replacement workers to be deployed throughout the country. 15 In Great Britain, “free labour” organisations such as the National Free Labour Association (1893) led by William Collison, self-proclaimed “king of the blacklegs”, also emerged Strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany 189 around 1900. 16 Only a few years later, however, strikebreaking became increasingly professionalised, more widespread and violent in Imperial Germany as well. The intensification of strikes and social conflicts created a new sense of urgency among employers, who were interested not only in the rapid recruitment of replacement workers, but also in private security services. In the years leading up to World War I, the Social Democratic press in Germany complained on an almost daily basis about legal discrimination against unionised workers and the intensification of violence and intimidation perpetrated by armed bands of strikebreakers, which went largely unpunished. The SPD party newspaper, Vorwärts, was openly critical of the fact that violent repression against the labour movement was de facto considered a legitimate course of action, while the impunity of strikebreakers represented a major threat to the rule of law in Wilhelmine society. 17 The Social Democratic propaganda pointed out that classbased justice was the result of the general incompatibility of interests and values of the working class and the capitalist elites. 18 This emotionally charged narrative of left-wing newspapers tended to exaggerate – or even invent – episodes of anti-labour repression, while, by contrast, conservative newspapers placed greater emphasis on the violence against and intimidation of strikebreakers. With the discourse radicalised on both sides, unionised workers and strikebreakers alike were accused of “terrorism”. 19 However, aside from these politically motivated overstatements, violent clashes between strikebreakers and unionised workers undoubtedly intensified around 1910. What is also remarkable is that the SPD party press and its agitationary journalism were able to use sensationalised and tendentious reports as an effective political and moral weapon in the context of emerging mass communication. 20 In doing so, Social Democratic opinion making managed to create a political culture of opposition in an era in which the SPD and the “free” trade unions were unassimilated forces in Wilhelmine society. 21 At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the threat to national interests by “strike terrorism” and growing fears of revolution were enough in the eyes of the “parties of order” to justify violent intimidation and repression of the labour movement. The right wing saw counter-strike actions by “yellow” unions and professional strikebreakers as necessary and urgent. Rudolf Lebius, a former Social Democratic journalist who founded the Federation of Yellow Unions ( Gelber Arbeiterbund) in 1907, described the emerging yellow movement as a “fighting force” ( Kampforganisation) against “strike terrorism”. 22 This narrative was rooted in anti-socialist discourses that spread more rapidly after the Social Democratic victories in 1903 and were supported by nationalist pressure groups such as the Imperial League against Social Democracy. 23 As a result of partly spontaneous but partly orchestrated fears of revolution and “strike terrorism”, the formation of professional groups of armed strikebreakers was seen as both economically and politically necessary. The idea of rallying anti-socialist forces together, which was typical of the so-called Bülow Bloc, resulted in strikebreakers being considered part of the loyal classes and deserving of special protection, or a sort of extended right of self-defence against supposed terrorism. Hence, when two strikebreakers killed a worker during a pub brawl 190 Amerigo Caruso in north-eastern Bavaria in 1907, Vorwärts polemically argued that since state authorities protected strikebreakers as “useful members of the community”, the murder was therefore a state crime ( Staatsverbrechen).24 Karl Otto Uhlig, a Social Democratic member of the Saxon Landtag, accused bands of strikebreakers of persistent immorality and criminal acts that threatened not only the unionised workers but also the entire community, and he considered it unacceptable that the police protected them. 25 What is remarkable is that non-state armed groups, such as pirates, mercenaries and bandits, were primarily characterised by their recourse to violence without state authority or in opposition to it. 26 However, these armed groups – and professional strikebreakers clearly were – could also serve as a source of extra-legal repression and law enforcement. “We can kill striking workers without being prosecuted” According to Vorwärts and other left-wing newspapers, strikebreakers had good reason to claim that they could “kill striking workers without being prosecuted”. 27 This catchphrase was attributed to a strikebreaker flaunting his impunity, and it became a widespread slogan against counter-strike action and “class justice”. After being mentioned for the first time in 1906, the phrase was used and reused by many left-wing newspapers in Germany, Austria and the Swiss Confederation before 1914. 28 In the summer of 1906 when there had already been widespread debates about the impunity of violent strikebreakers, a brutal fight between unionised workers and strikebreakers took place outside the “Union” motor vehicle factory near Nuremberg in Bavaria. On the morning of 17 August, during the ongoing labour dispute, the management of the company incited the strikebreakers to intimidate the leaders of the local trade unions standing outside the factory. On the evening of the same day, a group of strikebreakers assaulted striking workers with revolvers, sticks and knives. Maurer, the director of the factory, led the attack; he drove his car into the fighting crowd and used an air pump as a weapon. Vorwärts and the Austrian Arbeiter-Zeitung reported that the police were present but did not intervene to stop the attacks.29 During the fight, 22-year-old strikebreaker Ernst Thiel fired three times at Melchior Fleischmann, one of the local trade union leaders, who died two days later. Claiming self-defence, Thiel went unpunished. In court, the company and the strikebreakers successfully accused the striking workers of being responsible for the escalation of violence outside the factory. 30 Thiel was not the only strikebreaker armed with a revolver; another, by the name of Fackelmeier, carried weapons and threatened unionised workers with his revolver. 31 The fact that the police ignored calls to take the weapons away from the strikebreakers provoked quite frequent violent outbursts by the crowd against strikebreakers and police forces.32 The court case on the 1906 riot in Nuremberg resulted in five striking workers being sentenced to prison for upwards of three months. By contrast, the armed strikebreakers Fackelmeier and Thiel (who had murdered Fleischmann) went unpunished because their actions were deemed legitimate self-defence against Strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany 191 the provocations and attacks of unionised workers. 33 Liberal newspapers such as the Allgemeine Zeitung defended the plea of self-defence and blamed the unionised workers who had attacked the strikebreakers. 34 The paper confirmed that Fleischmann had been killed by Thiel, although it presented the murder in a completely different way to Vorwärts. The Allgemeine Zeitung denounced the striking workers outside the “Union” factory as violent alcoholics and published detailed reports on the trial endorsing the claim of legitimised self-defence against “strike terrorism”.35 Murders carried out by armed strikebreakers before 1914 Although the Nuremberg riot of 1906 and the murder of Fleischmann had a huge echo in the Social Democratic press, it was only after popular protests erupted in 1910 in Moabit, an industrial suburb of Berlin, that the debate about “strike terrorism”, “excessive strikes” and claims for better protection of “willing workers” spread more rapidly. 36 It reached its peak in the last years before the First World War when, after the first murder case in Nuremberg, several more workers were killed by strikebreakers, strikebreaking agents and armed employers (see Table 11.1 ). It is not surprising that liberal and conservative newspapers tended to overlook episodes of anti-labour violence while left-wing newspapers overstated them. Even though the narrative of “class justice” emphasised by Social Democrats needs critical reassessment, it seems clear that the Kaiserreich’s judicial system took a very permissive attitude towards strikebreakers’ armed self-defence. 37 The quasi-impunity of armed strikebreakers was clearly demonstrated by the Nuremberg case and many similar episodes in the following years. The most sensational of these episodes involved Paul Keiling, a well-known strikebreaking agent who had 17 prior convictions for theft, violence, robbery and other crimes. 38 In February 1914, despite being well known to the police, he was able to leave German territory and offer his strikebreaking services in Austria-Hungary, where he killed the bookbinder Johann Solinger during a strike in Silesia. Keiling was sentenced to only eight months in prison in what was one of most extensively discussed murder cases in German, Swiss and Austrian newspapers until the outbreak of war. 39 Prior to the Keiling case, the most prominent and most important transnationally, another murder had been carried out by an armed strikebreaker in Duisburg in September 1911 during the Rhineland transport company strike. Strikebreaker and former police officer Brackhage fired his revolver and killed the dockworker Meierling. 40 Brackhage’s crime was also deemed to be self-defence and this unpunished murder had a huge impact on the working class. Postcards were printed to commemorate the victim and to denounce the Kaiserreich’s class-based justice system. 41 A few months before Meierling’s murder, another episode of violence in Lübeck outraged the left-wing newspapers. In the old city port, a group of 40 strikebreakers armed with revolvers and sticks were responsible for a night of terror as pubs and stores were plundered and many citizens injured. 42 In September 1912, a striking worker was killed by Joseph Ruppert, a prominent strikebreaking agent, near Magdeburg. Here, too, the murderer was acquitted 192 Amerigo Caruso Table 11.1 Workers killed by German strikebreakers, strikebreaking agents and armed employers between 1906 and 1914 Date Place Incident Court decision 17 August Nuremberg 1906 1907 Wunsiedel (Bavaria) 27 September Duisburg 1911 14 September Burg 1912 (Magdeburg) 21 April 1912 Zurich 6 May 1912 Aachen 4 June 1913 Frauendorf/ Golęcino (Stettin) 4 October Magdeburg 1913 8 February Tetschen/Děčín 1914 (Bohemia) Strikebreaker Ernst Thiel fired at one of the local trade union leaders, Melchior Fleischmann, who died two days later Two strikebreakers employed by the local porcelain factory, fatally stabbed the worker Schödel Strikebreaker and former police officer Brackhage killed dockworker Meierling Joseph Ruppert, a professional strikebreaker, killed striking worker Karl Fritsche German strikebreaker Otto Kaiser killed Swiss worker Karl Wydler Employer Von der Hecken, armed with a revolver, killed Dutch worker Hieronymus Stroet Strikebreaker Brandenburg stabbed striking worker Kühl with a bread knife Strikebreaking agent Karl Katzmarek caused a traffic collision killing a pedestrian, retired tailor Kühne Strikebreaking agent Paul Keiling killed foreman Johann Solinger during a bookbinders’ strike Acquitted (acting in self-defence) Unknown Acquitted (acting in self-defence) Acquitted (acting in self-defence) Acquitted (acting in self-defence) Sentenced to three months in prison, later reprieved Acquitted (acting in self-defence) Sentenced to one month in prison Sentenced to eight months in prison (in AustriaHungary) by a German court because he was deemed to have been exercising his right of legitimate self-defence. 43 A few months before Magdeburg, there was another case of a strikebreaker shooting and killing a striking worker in Zurich. The perpetrator was the German strikebreaker Otto Kaiser and the victim the unionised worker Karl Wydler, who was shot with a revolver and died a few days later. 44 Kaiser was acquitted, this time by a Swiss tribunal, because he was deemed to be acting in self-defence. This new case of “class justice” and “terrorism” once again sparked off emotionally charged discussions in the German, Swiss and Austrian press. 45 One year after Wydler’s murder, on the evening of 4 June 1913 in the port city of Stettin, a strikebreaker named Brandenburg stabbed a striking worker with a bread knife. The victim, named Kühl, died almost instantly. 46 Strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany 193 Alongside these cases of striking workers killed by strikebreakers, there is a very long list of workers seriously injured by armed strikebreakers. In 1913, for example, three blacklegs who were working in Kassel fired their revolvers at the striking worker Ostertag, who miraculously escaped death. 47 Although the multiple episodes of violence mentioned here involved German-speaking strikebreakers and striking workers, the conflicts between unionised workers and strikebreakers, and hence the ideological antagonism between left-wing and bourgeois newspapers, became radicalised when foreign “blacklegs” were employed. In June 1906, Vorwärts reported from Cologne that armed strikebreakers from “semi-civilised regions”, such as the Balkans and Italy, not only threatened striking workers but terrorised the entire city with their violence and criminal activities. 48 If bands of strikebreakers used a broad repertoire of violence against labour, it is also true that exploited and vulnerable migrant workers were frequently discriminated against, insulted and attacked by striking workers. Socialist and trade union newspapers used an extremely harsh tone in speaking of strikebreakers, who were not only morally stigmatised but also physically threatened. The home addresses of notorious strikebreakers were often published in left-wing newspapers, and posters with explicit death threats were frequently printed during strikes. 49 In Basel, for example, posters with explicit death threats against strikebreakers were frequently translated into Italian. 50 Xenophobic discourses against strikebreakers also clearly emerged during transport workers’ strikes in Berlin, when for instance Russian replacement workers were stigmatised as “Pollacken” (a disrespectful term for “Polish”) or “Müllkosaken” (rubbish Cossacks).51 More than isolated cases of violence? As early as 1904, two years before the first murder case in Nuremberg, Vorwärts had extensively reported on the violent clashes between armed strikebreakers and unionised workers in Berlin. The SPD party newspaper argued that at least two companies in the industrial area of Berlin (Krey and Zürn & Glienicke) systematically distributed weapons to strikebreakers. Armed with sticks, they formed an “assault column” ( Sturmkolonne) against strike pickets. 52 The newspaper of the Federation of Yellow Unions echoed these rumours and boastfully reported on the increasing number of armed strikebreakers in, for example, Wittenau near Berlin, where they were all armed with revolvers. 53 Sometimes employers did not limit themselves to arming strikebreakers but were themselves armed and actively participated in “selfdefence”. This was the case with the iron industry employer, Von der Hecken, from Aachen, who not only distributed revolvers to his strikebreakers, but also armed himself and killed the Dutch worker Hieronymus Stroet during a strike in 1912. 54 What is remarkable is that it was not only the professional and hierarchically organised groups of strikebreakers, such as those led by Hintze and Katzmarek, that were armed: the more ad hoc groups also obtained weapons. However, while armed intimidation was a fundamental aspect of the business of professional strikebreakers, who were already equipped with revolvers, unorganised strikebreakers were mostly provided with weapons by the employers. Eventually, the 194 Amerigo Caruso problem of armed strikebreakers was discussed in the Reichstag. During a debate in 1907, the Social Democratic member of parliament Paul Singer showed the assembly a photograph of armed strikebreakers in Cologne symbolically carrying their weapons to “defend” the company of the industrial magnate Kohl. 55 Another SPD parliamentarian, Theodor Bömelburg, created a huge sensation when he showed the Reichstag assembly one of the steel-reinforced sticks that had been distributed to strikebreakers in the Ruhr area.56 The first reports of “blackleg gunfighters” ( arbeitswillige Revolverhelden) and employers’ attempts to militarise strikebreakers had appeared already around 1900 but intensified in the decade before the war. 57 Liberal newspapers also frequently reported on armed strikebreakers. Between September 1906 and March 1907, for example, the Allgemeine Zeitung published three articles about strikebreakers armed with revolvers in Munich, Nuremberg and Cologne.58 These armed strikebreakers were labelled “gunfighters” by the left-wing newspapers, a term that was broadly used to demonise gun violence and criminal gangs and hence created a semantic connection between the criminal underworld and professional strikebreakers. 59 Highly evocative notions, such as “gunfighters”, or “worker’s murder” ( Arbeitermord), suggested that bands of strikebreakers serving to secure capitalist interests were similar to street gangs and that violence was an integral part of their service. Although left-wing newspapers dramatically emphasised the strikebreakers’(illegal) use of violence, the polemic against “blackleg gunfighters” did partly reflect the social reality after the turn of the century when strikebreakers began systematically to use weapons, partly in selfdefence and partly with the aim of intimidating workers and offering private security services to employers. It is therefore not surprising that Vorwärts also explicitly compared strikebreaking agents like Friedrich Hintze with Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency. 60 Bands of strikebreakers: “Yellow Katzmarek” and “Hintze’s soldiers” In the decade up to 1914, the groups led by Friedrich Hintze in Hamburg and Karl Katzmarek in Berlin emerged as the most important strikebreaking agencies in Imperial Germany. Both bands of strikebreakers were highly professionalised and active in almost the whole of German-speaking Central Europe. They were well known for their brutality and for their use of weapons as a major part of their everyday business. Katzmarek’s and Hintze’s activities resulted in these leaders becoming synonymous with violent, professional strikebreaking activities. In describing the broader phenomenon of strikebreaking, left-wing newspapers used their names as negative terms for violent strikebreaking ( Katzmareks, Hintzegardisten and Hintzebrüder).61 Katzmarek, in particular, had a great interest in his selfrepresentation. Nicknamed “Yellow Katzmarek”, he was a member of the board of the Federation of Yellow Unions and had a personal link with Rudolf Lebius, leader of the Federation. 62 “Yellow Katzmarek” was always armed with revolvers and daggers and he owned a car, which was not at all common at the time. On the Strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany 195 night of 4 October 1913, on his way back to Magdeburg in his car, he caused a traffic collision killing a pedestrian. Socialist newspapers reported that during the trial Katzmarek tried to defend himself with the argument that he was a prominent strikebreaking agent and therefore a useful member of the community deserving of special protection. Although he had previous convictions for violence, insults and robbery, he was sentenced to only one month in prison. 63 In 1912, during a strike in Berlin, Katzmarek joined forces with Hintze to mobilise an armed band of strikebreakers that terrorised unionised workers. 64 According to sensationalised reports in the SPD party press, violent intimidation of both striking workers and the Social Democratic milieu was the trademark activity of Katzmarek’s and Hintze’s bands. In 1911, during a strike in the small city of Güstrow in Mecklenburg, Katzmarek’s band arrived from Berlin and took de facto control of the town and established a “rule of violence” ( Gewaltherrschaft).65 The same strategy had been adopted by Hintze a year earlier during a mineworkers’ strike in Finkenheerd, another small town in northern Germany. When the 15 members of “Hintze’s guard” arrived in Finkenheerd, they immediately set about organising a shooting range for weapons training, sending a clear message to the striking workers.66 After the Moabit riot in 1910, Hintze became the most notorious German strikebreaker, ironically nicknamed “the hero of Moabit” by Vorwärts because of his having led the so-called patriotic forces that helped to restore order after two weeks of rioting. 67 The Moabit riot was actually a labour dispute that escalated into widespread popular protests, especially after violent clashes between striking workers and strikebreakers. 68 According to the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, fighting escalated on the evening of 28 September with more than 90 injured. 69 “Hintze’s soldiers” undertook two tasks during the riot: they supplied substitutes for striking workers, helping to deliver coal during the day, and at night they cooperated with the police to combat “strike terrorism”. Hintze and his strikebreakers had access to a temporary prison camp for arrested striking workers, where, in collusion with the police authorities, they savagely beat the prisoners. It was not only Vorwärts but also the liberal Vossische Zeitung that reported on the quasi-paramilitary organisation of Hintze’s band during the Moabit uprising.70 In October 1910, Hintze gave a long interview to the popular newspaper Berliner Morgenpost, in which he described his career as a professional strikebreaker and provided insights on how he organised his business. 71 Initially, Hintze worked for the well-known strikebreaker agent August Müller in Hamburg, but shortly after Müller’s death, the 21-year-old Hintze established his own organisation. He claimed to have more than 6,000 strikebreakers whom he could mobilise in only eight days. Despite this obviously exaggerated statement, Hintze was able to organise quite large groups of armed strikebreakers with long-range mobility. In 1911 Vorwärts reported that hundreds of “Hintze’s soldiers” had travelled from Hamburg to the East Prussian city of Königsberg, which was almost 1,000 kilometres away. 72 Berlin and Hamburg were the most important logistic centres for the distribution of strikebreakers to distant cities such as Königsberg or Basel, but 196 Amerigo Caruso they more frequently operated in the regional areas of cities such as Bremen and Kassel as well as many small towns in Mecklenburg and Brandenburg. 73 Hintze’s name became a synonym for professional strikebreaking with brutal methods. According to the SPD parliamentarian Cohn, Hintze recruited violent teenagers from the poorest districts of Berlin. 74 In his interview to the Morgenpost, Hintze mentioned that his agency was doing very well and that he was paid ten marks for each strikebreaker he delivered. He explicitly stated that he offered not only labour replacement but also supply services, logistics (he had three cars) and, of course, organisation of the strikebreakers’ “self-defence”. He was aware that the interview with the Morgenpost was a great opportunity for free publicity and mentioned that his strikebreakers would do any kind of job that the company would pay for, but, more importantly, they could effectively intimidate unionised workers. The agent proudly proclaimed that “with thirty men I can terrify five hundred strikers”. 75 Hintze’s agency was not only active during strikes, it also offered its services to private companies in the aftermath of unrest to prevent the expansion of labour unions. 76 Hintze also mentioned that he was already involved in 15 different strikes and that the most important aspect of his business was to create a military-like organisation and establish military discipline among the strikebreakers. Bands of strikebreakers combined violence, a quasi-paramilitary organisation and street gang behaviour with a highly professionalised business. It was not only Hintze who made an effort to publicise his semi-legal strikebreaking agency: Katzmarek distributed marketing brochures informing potential employers that they were to pay his strikebreakers five marks per day and that they should also pay for transportation, food supplies and housing. Katzmarek’s brochure also stated that he was able to recruit service staff and cooks and to provide cooking utensils for the strikebreakers as well as “resolute foremen” and armed guards. 77 His band of strikebreakers was hierarchically organised and well known not only in Germany but also in Austria and the Swiss Confederation. Katzmarek had a right-hand man, Gründke, and a group of foremen who oversaw the other strikebreakers.78 After his election to the central committee of Lebius’s Federation of Yellow Workers in January 1908, Katzmarek was described by Lebius as someone with a charismatic but dangerously self-overestimated personality and “gipsy blood” (Zigeunerblut).79 Although Katzmarek cooperated with other notorious strikebreakers, such as Hintze, he also tried to protect his lucrative business using illegal methods against his competitors. In 1913, for example, he sent falsified letters purporting to be from private companies to other strikebreaking agents resulting in these delivering “blacklegs” to the wrong place and therefore receiving no pay. 80 Joseph Ruppert was another professional strikebreaker who killed a worker near Magdeburg in 1912 and who, during his trial, tried to justify always carrying his revolver with the argument that “weapons are the tools of our trade”. 81 He was accused by Vorwärts of being one of the most dangerous members of Katzmarek’s band.82 More often, Ruppert worked independently with his partner Anton Meinel, another notorious strikebreaker who was also accused of being a procurer. 83 Strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany 197 They were involved in several episodes of violence and intimidation not only in Magdeburg but also in Berlin, Thuringia (Zeulenroda) and Nesseldorf in the Moravian-Silesian region. The Social Democratic Arbeiter-Zeitung reported that Meinel threatened unionised workers during a strike in Berlin claiming: “I can do what I want, I am allowed in certain circumstances to shoot, I can even kill a man”.84 Like the other “blackleg gunfighters” mentioned in this chapter, the focus of Ruppert’s and Meinel’s activities was less on replacing striking workers and more on intimidating them.85 Conclusion Greater protection for strikebreakers had already begun to be sought by conservative politicians and employers at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1897, the Kaiser announced a programme of “protection for the national labour of the productive classes, . . . ruthless repression of all revolutionary subversion and the heaviest penalty for anyone who dares to hinder his neighbour, who wants to work, in his freedom to work”. 86 This political manifesto against organised labour formed part of the so-called Zuchthausvorlage, the penitentiary bill designed to penalise picketing that was presented to the Reichstag in 1899 but defeated by the parliamentary opposition. 87 However, the spirit of the Zuchthausvorlage remained embedded in the Prussian courts, at least from a Social Democratic standpoint, even after its defeat in the Reichstag. The de facto impunity of armed groups of strikebreakers can be explained as an extra-legal response aimed at protecting the “productive classes” after leading conservatives recognised that the intensification of repressive authoritarian practices against the labour movement was rather unpopular and could not be legally imposed. The advent of mass politics, especially the introduction of universal male suffrage and the rise of mass-produced newspapers, set new limits on state repression and authoritarian control. At the same time, “threat communication” and the radicalisation of the debates on “strike terrorism” gave greater visibility and urgency to social conflicts. As a result, strikebreaking became more professionalised and militarised after the turn of the century. This shows that the transition to democracy and mass politics opened up new horizons for privately organised coercion and motivated the redistribution of coercive tasks to nonstate actors. The debate about “strike terrorism” reached a new peak in 1907 when some of the most influential members of the conservative party stressed the urgency for greater protection for those “patriotic and loyal workers” who opposed the “red terror”. 88 During a debate in the Reichstag in 1907, Arthur von PosadowskyWehner, the Prussian secretary of state of the interior and vice chancellor, openly encouraged presumed victims of the “red terror” to organise themselves against the intimidation and violence inflicted on them by the labour movement. Posadowsky openly supported the formation of yellow unions and armed groups of strikebreakers and assured them that Prussian courts and police authorities would tolerate counter-strike actions. 89 This proposition was well received and was taken up by 198 Amerigo Caruso the leader of the Federation of Yellow Workers, Rudolf Lebius, as stated in his pamphlet Gelbe Gedanken (Yellow Thoughts), published in 1908. 90 In his articles for the federation’s newspaper and for several other publications, Lebius stressed the fact that the yellow unions were born out of the right to self-defence of patriotic workers who organised themselves against terrorism: “Red terrorism is the initiator of the yellow movement”. 91 The Federation of Patriotic Workers ( Bund Vaterländischer Arbeitervereine), another anti-labour organisation, created in 1907, used the same argumentative strategy as Lebius. Deutsche Treue, the newspaper of the “patriotic workers”, claimed that “true German men” should not wait for state protection, but had to mobilise against labour militancy and socialist propaganda. 92 In 1910, German industrialists launched a fresh campaign for better protection of “willing workers”, calling for the army’s intervention and the demonstrative use of machine guns against striking mineworkers in the Ruhr area. 93 State-led repression and repressive practices on the part of extra-legal groups, such as the armed bands of strikebreakers, had something in common: they all involved “collective violence”. In Charles Tilly’s definition, collective violence includes a vast range of social interactions and excludes “purely individual action”. 94 It is therefore grounded in complex interactions and is also closely related to the perceived urgency to defend the established order against emerging social movements and their claims. Therefore, violence carried out by armed strikebreakers was, again following Tilly’s definition, not simply “individual aggression writ large” but was significantly affected by “social ties, structures and process” as well as by the political discourses and media representations in Wilhelmine Germany. 95 Defining repressive practices carried out by armed strikebreakers as collective violence raises further, more general questions: why did strikes and mass demonstrations in the first decades of the twentieth century increasingly shift into collective violence (both in late Imperial Germany and much more dramatically in the early Weimar years)? What impact did different political regimes (semiauthoritarian before 1918, democratic after 1918) have on the levels and forms of collective violence? What impact did the glamorisation and sensationalisation of collective violence in the modern media have in different political contexts? Although further studies are needed to provide exhaustive answers, the rise of armed groups of professional strikebreakers examined in this chapter is an important yet less well-studied issue within the broader framework of authoritarian responses to social conflicts. The impunity of Katzmarek, Hintze and other notorious strikebreakers gives new insights into the privatisation of repressive strategies and the mobilisation of non-state actors in defence of the bourgeois order. In the decade up to 1914, strikebreaking agents were almost always armed and frequently used mafia-like methods to intimidate unionised workers. Along with providing labour replacement, the main aim of these “gunfighters” was to effect non-bureaucratic repression of the labour movement. The violence carried out by bands of strikebreakers demonstrates that the Kaiserreich’s authorities were inclined to tolerate, to a certain extent, privately organised coercion, especially where social movements, democratic institutions and the modern media were effective in thwarting legal, state-led authoritarian responses.

#### That escalates police militarization and domestic securitization – turns case.

Asaro 19 (Peter Asaro, Professor Peter Asaro is a philosopher of science, technology and media. His work examines artificial intelligence and robotics as a form of digital media, the ethical dimensions of algorithms and data, and the ways in which technology mediates social relations and shapes our experience of the world, Summer 2019, “Algorithms of Violence: Critical Social Perspectives on Autonomous Weapons,” *Social Research* vol. 86 (2), <https://peterasaro.org/writing/Asaro_AlgorithmsViolence.pdf>) -CAT

We have seen how autonomous weapons could be used to protect the political authority of a regime; i.e., its authority to make and adjudicate the rules of society. But while in many cases there is a large overlap between the economic and political elites in a society, they are often different even if closely aligned, and sometimes in conflict with each other. Here we consider the use of autonomous weapons in maintaining economic inequality, and preserving or establishing an economic order. The role of a police force in society is twofold: to protect the rights of individuals from being infringed on by other individuals, and to protect the socio-political-economic order itself. The two are tied together insofar as the economic system—the rules of exchange governing the distribution of goods and resources, as well as state imposed duties and taxes—establishes property rights that are then enforced through state-sanctioned violence. To the extent that the distribution of economic goods is unequal and perceived as unjust or illegitimate, there is a risk of protests, rebellion, and revolution either by powerful individuals and organized groups, or by popular masses. Autonomous weapons could, through the use of violent force, support greater levels of economic inequality and injustice than would otherwise be possible—greater even than what could be supported with human slaves and soldiers—and for many of the same reasons that they could entrench despotic and tyrannical regimes. And since even soldiers and police need to eat, such an order could also require spending fewer economic resources on the police and military needed to maintain it. More generally, increasing automation across all sectors of the economy could result in larger percentages of the population becoming outsiders to the economy, such as the landless, the jobless, the disenfranchised, and the economically irrelevant. This is a central fear among those warning of mass technological unemployment due to automation and artificial intelligence, but rarely do they explicitly consider how technological unemployment might transform security forces. Clearly automation has served to disempower workers, though perhaps not as much as have the politics and laws undermining the power of workers and unions. But we have not really thought through the implications of disempowering police and military forces.6 It is also important to consider that the use of automated violence in imposing economic arrangements need not be conducted only by states and governments. Private organizations and individuals could also acquire such systems. One of the early applications for autonomous weapons is likely to be sentry guards—autonomous robots that patrol and protect private property such as factories, warehouses, and homes from intruders. A central question will be whether these will be simply fancy alarm systems, or systems authorized to use violent force against intruders or to arrest and detain them until human authorities arrive. Similarly, wealthy individuals might obtain autonomous weapons to protect their gated communities and homes, or even as personal bodyguards. Such systems would allow the elite to enjoy their wealth even when there are vast numbers of disenfranchised people willing to act violently towards these beneficiaries of an egregiously unjust economic order. Indeed, we have already seen the deployment of weaponized remote-operated systems for private security. The Skunk drone was developed by Desert Wolf, a South African company, for the specific purpose of crowd control. Its first sales were to the private security forces of mining companies, for use in managing violent encounters with the protesting union workers (Kelion 2014). The system is a small drone that is armed with paintball guns and also capable of deploying tear gas pellets. The fact that one of the first acquisitions of private armed drones was specifically to deal with organized labor protests is a good indication that such systems would also be at the forefront of the development of autonomous weapons for private applications. Some police forces have also obtained the Skunk drone, and Israeli Border Police have used their own tear gas–deploying drones against protestors on the Palestinian border (Times of Israel 2018). This 552 social research raises further questions about how autonomous weapons might be deployed along borders in the future to stop refugees seeking safety and migrants seeking economic opportunity. As climate change and environmental degradation drive more and more people from their homes and countries, autonomous weapons could be deployed at scale to prevent them from crossing certain borders, thereby reinforcing economic and environmental inequalities, even though it is a human rights violation to refuse entry to refugees.

#### And, backlash to liberal policies empowers young right-wing conservatives to support increasing violence and fascism.

Krigel 20

Noah Krigel, “We’re not the party to bitch and whine”: Exploring US democracy through the lens of a college Republican club Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article Volume 12 (1): 492 – 514 (July 2020) Noah Krigel holds a B.A. in Sociology with minors in Science, Technology, & Society and Women & Gender Studies. He lives in San Francisco and can be contacted at noahkrigel AT gmail.com. <https://www.interfacejournal.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Interface-12-1-Krigel.pdf> -CAT

* [The article title has an offensive gendered term that I don’t read but it’s present in the large text; I don’t endorse that]
* [CR = College Republicans]

A respite from the perceived hostility and sense of victimhood faced on campus, club meetings and events became an important site for community development and group thought. CRs encouraged each other to become unabashedly conservative, by being provocative publicly. When asked what constituted successful events, Lynn, a white Christian female upper-level and board member who reflected many other CR perspectives, said: ‘Every year, we have a free speech wall. Literally, all we do is put up a wall and people go crazy. I think it’s important to do things that are outrageous and provocative to see that the basic concept of these liberal policies can be outrageous. … Like oh, whoa, that is kind of a crazy idea.’ A free speech wall, intended to commemorate the fall of the Berlin Wall, is a common political event that has been noted at other college Republican clubs for at least the past 15 years (Binder & Wood, 2012). At WestU, however, this large plywood board in the middle of campus was more commonly recognized as a vehicle to spark reactions due to the Islamophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, misogynistic and transphobic slurs written by students. This, in turn, provoked frequent op-eds in the WestU newspaper, protests across campus, and occasional news coverage by national media outlets. In previous years, CRs also hosted “Empty Gun Holster Day” to encourage CRs to parade around campus with an empty gun holster, as well as invited self-identified far-right speakers who preached racial superiority. Events such as these felt empowering to CRs who believed it helped foster an important sense of community. As Randy, a white Catholic male under-level and board member, explained, “The free speech wall, I helped put the nails in that. I love being part of something bigger.” Events and social gatherings produced a sense of electrifying excitement and a social cohesion. At meetings and events, particularly those that sparked protests outside, CRs welcomed each other with large smiles and hugs, rarely permitting anyone to sit alone. After one such contentious event, when CRs were met with a Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article Volume 12 (1): 492 – 514 (July 2020) Krigel, “We’re not the party to bitch and whine” 504 group of about seven protesters wearing black hoodies and with handkerchiefs over their faces, yelling and taking photos, CRs began wrapping their arms around each other, chuckling as they walked by. “Good to know that they’re brave people” one white male CR said sarcastically, while another joked, “I’m a little underwhelmed.” Comradery among CRs appeared to be reinforced by verbal attacks from other students, helping legitimize their actions. During one club meeting, while discussing a recent on-campus racist event, a white male general member proudly regaled CRs with stories from attending an open-forum put on by the WestU student government. Dismissing the emotional toll that the racist event had on multiple student communities (particularly the Black, Latinx, and queer communities), the member proudly explained how he represented the club’s voice: “I was the only one who wasn’t crying and stuff. It makes us look really good. We’re not the party to bitch and whine.” CRs relished the belief that their inflammatory actions, which represented their collectivized standpoint, would be propagated to by other students.6 During another interview, when asked about inclusion on campus, Kevin, a white Catholic male upper-level and general member who also identified as a member of the on campus Turning Point USA club, said, “I’m always open-minded, but excluding Turning Point USA, the Republican club is the most open-minded club on campus. The rest of the clubs are basically fucking Communists. It’s really sad.” Many CRs, some of whom were also members of the on campus Turning Point USA club, drew boundaries around tolerance, suggesting that acceptance was found only in libertarian and conservative spaces, while insinuating that liberals reflected or were manipulated by radical-left thought. **There also appeared to be an ostensibly growing consensus to refuse ruling out violence against liberals**. Kevin, when asked what he thought about CR’s record of inviting provocative speakers, explained, “We need someone to [verbally] punch back and hit people. I’m willing to accept [a speaker] who is a little rough around the edges but is able to fight for us. It’s either that or capitulating.” Similarly, when asked what he would do if he faced provocative protests from liberal groups, John, a white male upper-level and general member, said, “It’s good to get a little bruised up sometimes.” Violent rhetoric was also common during meetings and social events. During one meeting, a white female board member suggested CRs even host an “alt-Right fight night” and pit a liberal against a CR. Legitimized viewpoint While there was some internal debate regarding the club’s official view on issues such as local candidates during elections, CRs vehemently defended almost every statement/action expressed by Trump, coalescing around him rather than 6 While I did not explicitly study relationships between CRs and other WestU clubs, relations seemed mutually antagonistic. Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article Volume 12 (1): 492 – 514 (July 2020) Krigel, “We’re not the party to bitch and whine” 505 an ideology. Life-size cutouts of Donald and Melania Trump and flags stating “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) – the official slogan during Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign – commonly draped the walls of club meetings and events. CRs also adapted the MAGA slogan, signing most emails, “Make WestU Great Again” and selling $25 red hats with the slogan as well. Meeting PowerPoints almost always included pictures of Trump and frequently included Trump-themed dating advice. At one meeting, for example, a risqué picture of Melania Trump was followed by the words, “Work hard so you can land someone banging and way out of your league like Trump did.” During the weekly club meeting speed-dating activity in which CRs were paired together, the Board asked questions such as, “Why is Hilary Clinton the worst?”; “Why do you like Trump?”; and “Which of Trump’s policies is your favorite?”. The Wi-Fi password at the unofficial house for club parties was, “Trump2020,” and the group text for all CRs was entitled, “God King Trump.” Anyone who disagreed with or did not support Trump was excluded from the club. Said Annie, a white Christian under-level in the process of leaving the club: 'Ever since winter last year, it went downhill. The Libertarians that wanted to drink and have fun were pushed out because they weren’t conservative enough. They were considered RINOS – Republican in name only. The club thought my friends weren’t conservative enough because they didn’t like Trump. To be conservative in the club now is to be as right-wing as you can. … Our club has become the most extreme conservatives on campus, some of the most extreme right-wingers. That’s why I’m not that involved this year. I don’t even challenge them. I feel outnumbered. I don’t want to be on the girls’ bad side. I’m worried they’re going to spread rumors about me. … They witch-hunted a lot of people out of the club.’ After Trump was elected, the board created socially unpleasant experiences for those who did not support the new president, using gossip to attack dissenters’ social reputations and encouraging them to leave the club. Members who stood up to voice disagreement with this practice were met with a similar reaction. One such member, Tim, a Catholic Asian male upper-level and former CR who was forced out of the club after criticizing this exclusionary tactic, said, “The purpose of the club is to be Trump’s puppets. …They go out of their way to defend [Trump] on every basis imaginable.” More than merely defend Trump, however, it seemed that CRs did not tolerate almost any form of disagreement. In fact, for the most part, CRs did not challenge the board’s decisions. Many CRs did not feel comfortable explaining what they disliked about the club, fearful of becoming social pariahs. One CR during our interview frequently asked to obscure their demographic information, as well as speak “off the record.” Another interviewee, Cheryl, a white Catholic upper-level and general member, felt comfortable saying only, “If you’ve done something to upset one or multiple women on the board then it can kind of, word spreads quickly.” Suggesting that backlash came from the female-dominated board, Cheryl hinted at the policing, Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article Volume 12 (1): 492 – 514 (July 2020) Krigel, “We’re not the party to bitch and whine” 506 but quickly asked to move on to the next question. Fear was a powerful vehicle in the club’s regulation of their internal discourse. This policing extended outside the club as well. At one meeting, after receiving backlash from the Republican party for inviting a controversial speaker to campus, a white Christian female under-level and board member said to her fellow cheering CRs, “Local Republicans are pushing against us. I say they’re not real Republicans.” In another incident, in response to a WestU policy that increased student fees for out-of-state students to support working-class students – who were more likely to be students of color – a different white female board member spoke on a national conservative media outlet where she argued that WestU was cutting enrollment for white students. After WestU immediately released a counterstatement pointing out that it was illegal for the University to consider race in its enrollment process, the national media outlet apologized for falsely reporting on the issue. In response, CRs then released their own statement, denouncing both the conservative media outlet and WestU for their “promotion of identity politics.” Despite receiving financial support from the off-campus Republican party, CRs still challenged those Republicans for disagreeing with them. Preaching dogma which, in its dominant form, rested on an unwavering idolization of Trump, CRs regulated discourse and ostracized those with whom they disagreed.

## 3 – FW

#### 1] Use epistemic modesty – the 1AC framework isn’t deontology so there’s no reason not to weigh impacts under both;

#### 2] Pettit’s a consequentialist – collapses

Chappell 05

Richard Chappell, PhD, Princeton University. Libertarian vs. Utilitarian Justice, Philosophy. June 2005. JC

Libertarians hold that each person owns themselves, and others may not make use of their property (i.e. them) without their consent.[28] Just as others have no right to shelter a homeless man in my house, so they have no right to tax the products of my labour and redistribute to the needy. But the free market requires ownership rights over both self and external resources,[29] and we have seen that the latter is problematic. Moreover, self-ownership is a merely ‘formal’ notion that does not guarantee substantive freedom or power over one’s own life. For suppose that natural resources are initially owned by everyone rather than no-one. On this view, a self-owning individual may not make use of the material world without others’ consent. But, as Kymlicka asks, “how can I be said to own myself if I may do nothing without the permission of others?”[30] Such merely formal freedom has no worth. Yet this is the position of the poor and disadvantaged within a libertarian capitalist society. Once we recognize the importance of substantive rather than merely formal freedom, our aim becomes to enable people to live the lives they want to live. This commits us to ensuring access to education, healthcare, and basic human needs like food and shelter, since all of these are essential prerequisites to any form of freedom worth having. If provision of these goods requires us to compromise self-ownership, so be it. The latter has no value in the absence of the former in any case. We are thus led back in the direction of utilitarianism.