## 1

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#### A topical affirmative must defend a theory of fair distributions

#### They violate—the plan uses the normative term “should”

#### First—precision. Justice is distinct from and narrower than morality. Defending that the plan is moral does not make it just.

Swain 20

Dan Swain (Assistant professor of philosophy and social sciences at the Czech University of Life Sciences in Prague; research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences). “None so Fit to Break the Chains: Marx's Ethics of Self-Emancipation.” Haymarket Books (October 6, 2020). JDN.

It is worth noting that this entire controversy only makes sense if what is meant by justice is something more specific than simply questions of right or wrong. Indeed, one of the ways in which this debate gets distorted is the sense that justice, in this sense, exhausts normative political theory. There is a marked tendency in some writings to assume that any substantive social wrong must ultimately boil down to a question of (in)justice. Increasingly, it becomes taken for granted that to say something **is unjust** and to condemn it are synonymous. For example, Nielsen, in attacking Wood’s arguments that Marx rejects the language of justice, suggests that this debate might merely be a ‘trivial verbal one’.20 Since Wood accepts that Marx condemns capitalism as severely unequal and exploitative he ‘must agree … that capitalism is indeed, in the plain untechnical sense of the term, an unjust social system’.21 Perhaps it is a symptom of too much political philosophy, but it is entirely unclear to me what the ‘plain, untechnical sense’ of justice is. Of course, if justice is defined differently, either less narrowly concerned with distribution, or more specifically concerned with domination, democracy and power, capitalist exploitation may be more easily integrated into a justice account. Young herself, for example, wants to hold on to the word justice but stresses that domination and oppression should be the primary terms in which it is thought of.22 However, in the main **discussions of justice remain dominated by distributive language**, and in particular by Rawls and the various variations and developments of his core approach.23 In any case, there is a **real difference** between saying something is wrong because it is unjust and saying it is wrong because it denies freedom (or indeed because it is heretical, illiberal, evil, lacks solidarity or many other terms of condemnation).

Thus, in denying that exploitation is a matter of justice, I am arguing three things: Firstly, it is not a question of an unfair, unjust or unequal transaction or exchange. Secondly, it is not a matter of distribution, either of starting point or outcome. Thirdly, it is not based on fundamental and universal principles that are derivable independently of given social conditions and integrated into a complete and over-arching theory.24

#### Second, education—most LD topics already use “ought” so any education gained from having one more util-deont debate is redundant and non-unique. This topic offers a chance to delve into unique and novel theories of fairness and distributive justice that their interp forecloses.

#### Third, the TVA—you can still read your China plan. You just need to use “unjust” as the evaluative term in the plan and support it with a theory of just distributions.

#### Drop the debater—T is a prima facie burden and it’s too late to redo the 1NC after the 1AR shifts.

## 2

### China Becomes the US’s Lackey CP

#### Counterplan: The People’s Republic of China should:

#### --forfeit all territorial claims to Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, the Spratly Islands, and disputed border areas with India

#### --bindingly abide by all international legal commitments it has entered into

#### --enter a formal non-aggression pact with the United States including opening its military to random inspections by the US armed forces

#### --cease all cooperation with the Russian Federation on space exploration, ground- and space-based weapons development and deployment, and weapons testing

#### --declare Russian space militarization a top national security concern

#### --pursue continued economic development of space in conjunction with the United States and partnerships with its private sector businesses

#### --make no demands of US concessions in exchange for its cooperation

#### The counterplan is effectively China’s unconditional surrender in the race to primacy. This is what the hegemon demands.

Rogin 22

Josh Rogin (WaPo columnist). “Biden doesn’t want to change China. He wants to beat it.” WaPo. 10 Feb 2022. JDN. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/02/10/biden-china-strategy-competition/>

One big change in the U.S. approach was to do away with “linkage.” No longer would China’s participation or progress on issues of common interest such as climate change or North Korea be grounds for Washington to grant concessions on other fronts. “We are not in the business of trading cooperation with China on climate change as a favor that Beijing is doing for the United States,” Sullivan said at the Aspen Security Forum in April.

#### The US and China are both market-oriented powers whose geopolitical aims are compatible, BUT Russia remains a unique threat to the global order. Best recent studies prove.

Mousseau 19

Michael Mousseau (Former Research Fellow at the Belfer Center International Security Program of Harvard University and the United Nations Studies Program at Yale University; Professor, University of Central Florida). “The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace” International Security, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Summer 2019), pp. 160-196. JDN. doi.org/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00352

I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states’ embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 **Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order.** Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order based on the principle of self-determination. If another commercial power, such as a rising China, were to overtake the United States, the world would take little notice, because the new leading power would largely agree with the global rules promoted and enforced by its predecessor. Vladimir Putin’s **Russia, on the other hand, seeks** to create **chaos around the world.** Most other powers, having market-oriented economies, continue to abide by the hegemony of the United States despite its relative economic decline since the end of World War II.6

To support my theory that domestic factors determine states’ alignment decisions, I analyze the voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010. I find that states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they are major powers or have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. The power of states with robust internal markets, in contrast, appears to have no effect on their foreign policy preferences, as **market-oriented states align with the** market **leader regardless of** their **power status** or capabilities. I corroborate that this pattern may be a consequence of states’ interest in the global market order by finding that states with higher levels of exports per capita are more likely than other states to have preferences aligned with those of the United States; those with lower levels of exports are more likely to have interests that do not align with the United States, but again more so if they are stronger rather than weaker.

Liberal scholars of international politics have long offered explanations for why the incidence of war may decline, generally beginning with the assumption that although the security dilemma exists, it can be overcome with the help of factors external to states.7 Neoliberal institutionalists treat states as like units and international organization as an external condition.8 Trade interdependence is dyadic and thus an external condition.9 Democracy is an internal factor, but theories of democratic peace have an external dimension: peace is the result of the expectations of states’ behavior informed by the images that leaders create of each other’s regime types.10 In contrast, I show that the security dilemma may not exist at all and how peace can emerge in anarchy with states pursuing their interests determined entirely by internal factors.11

#### Russia remains an existential threat to the United States

Kaufman 21

Ellie Kaufman (Producer in CNN's Washington DC bureau). “Top US military intelligence official says Russian military poses an 'existential threat' to the US.” CNN. 29 April 2021. JDN. https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/29/politics/military-intel-leader-russia/index.html

**The top US military intelligence official** said during a congressional hearing on Thursday that the Russian military is an **"existential threat"** to the United States.

"The Russian military is an existential threat to the United States," Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing about worldwide threats.

Berrier said the country's military is being used to maintain influence over states "along its periphery, compete with US global primacy and compel adversaries who challenge Russia's vital national interests."

"Moscow continues to invest in its strategic **nuclear forces**, in new capabilities to enhance its strategic deterrent, and that places the US homeland at risk," Berrier said.

Berrier's comments come as **tensions** between Russia and the US **remain high.** The US unveiled sanctions against Moscow earlier this month over its interference in the 2020 US presidential election, the SolarWinds cyberattack and its ongoing occupation and "severe human rights abuses" in Crimea.

#### The US can’t win a two-front war. Only the counterplan secures China’s active assistance in defeating Russia.

Ullman 22

Harlan Ullman (Harlan Ullman, Ph.D, is senior adviser at Washington, D.C.’s Atlantic Council). “Is Russia or China a bigger threat?” The Hill. 17 January 2022. JDN. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/589964-is-russia-or-china-a-bigger-threat

What is the best course of action for the U.S.? In my analysis, **Russia is the more immediate** political-military **threat** and China the long-term geo-economic challenge. While China’s technological military advancements have been impressive, Russia’s have been at least as noteworthy, particularly in space and modernizing its nuclear and conventional forces. Despite the specter of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, that threat has been exaggerated. China lacks the capacity to mount a successful amphibious assault on Taiwan and will for the foreseeable future.

About regarding China and Russia as co-equal threats, for over a decade and a half during the Cold War, the U.S. relied on the so-called "**two-and-a-half war doctrine**. It posited fighting two major wars (China and Russia) simultaneously and a half war elsewhere. Unable to win the half war in Vietnam, the concept of a two-war strategy remains **unaffordable, unobtainable and unwinnable.**

#### Here’s how to envision the plan versus the counterplan. The US is in a stand-off, with both China and Russia on the other side. The plan has China drop its gun, which is good but not enough because Russia remains a threat. The counterplan has China keep its gun and point it at Russia which actively aids the US in maintaining hegemony against a hostile non-market power. The perm to have China just do the non-mutually exclusive planks would mean China dropping its gun and trying to punch Russia which doesn’t solve because all the 1AC’s evidence proves that China’s space industrial base is the lynchpin of its geopolitical influence.