### 1 – T (2:00)

Independent voters at the top for clarity:

* Shiftiness DA (standard – accesses the voters in T independently, since it checks against further in-round abuse)
* Switch-Side Debate (standard – the Aff’s norm must explain why we switch sides)
* Fairness (voter – contestation means the judge should vote NEG unfairly)

#### Interpretation: The AFF must defend a clear agent of action and method of implementation in the 1AC.

#### Violation – you don’t.

#### Standards

#### Textuality.

#### The resolution is an actionable statement, indicated by “resolved.” You’re not affirming if you don’t spec a plan or implementation.

Words and Phrases 64

Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### **Impacts are implied consequences of actions – but there’s no such actor as “the WTO.” If you don’t care about consequences, you can’t claim impacts. No plan, no offense.**

Larson 17

[Kenny Larson](https://www.quora.com/profile/Kenny-Larson-5), High school policy debater with national circuit experience. [Answered Apr 30, 2017](https://www.quora.com/In-high-school-debate-what-do-the-following-terms-mean-impact-link-perm-turn-appeal-role-of-the-ballot-DA-K-and-impact-calculus/answer/Kenny-Larson-5) · Author has 133 answers and 811k answer views <https://www.quora.com/In-high-school-debate-what-do-the-following-terms-mean-impact-link-perm-turn-appeal-role-of-the-ballot-DA-K-and-impact-calculus> -CAT

Impact: The consequence of something, usually framed in terms of an advantage or off-case position. Impacts are the last in a chain of events in a certain argument, and tell the judge why something is bad. For example, a team may argue that the affirmative team’s plan causes the President to lose key political capital, which means he cannot pass a certain policy in Congress (otherwise known as a politics disadvantage). The result of him not passing this policy is nuclear war, which is the impact of the disadvantage. Without the impact, there is no clear reason why the policy not passing is bad, and so no reason to vote the affirmative team down.

#### **Semantics outweigh pragmatics**

Nebel 19

Nebel, Jake. [PhD candidate in philosophy at New York University, executive director at the Victory Briefs Institute for Debate, professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California]. “Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resoulution,” Vbriefly, August 12, 2019 <https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/>

Affirmatives tend to defend their (pseudo-)counterinterpretations on this issue by arguing that topicality should primarily be a matter of “pragmatic” rather than “semantic” considerations. (See my “Priority of Resolutional Semantics” for this distinction. Please note that these terms are being used in a debate-specific sense; the “semantic/pragmatic” distinction in linguistics and philosophy of language is completely different.) Semantic arguments are arguments about what the resolution means; pragmatic arguments are about what it would be better or worse to interpret the resolution as meaning. My view is that semantics function as a side constraint on resolutional interpretation, and that pragmatics can help us choose between different interpretations that are semantically eligible. If the resolution is genuinely ambiguous between two or more propositions—a claim that requires evidence of some form (e.g., explicit definitions or linguistic tests)—we can ask which of those propositions would be better to debate. But there are many propositions that the resolution just doesn’t mean; one, in the context of this resolution, is that some colleges and some universities ought not consider some tests in some admissions decisions. The alternative “pragmatics-first” view seems to hold that the pragmatic benefits of debating something can be sufficient to interpret the resolution as meaning that thing, even if the resolution doesn’t mean that thing. Now, even on the “pragmatics-first” view, it’s not at all clear that it would be better to interpret the resolution to mean that some colleges and some universities ought not consider some standardized tests in some undergraduate admissions decisions. After all, there are over five thousand colleges and universities in the United States. On the affirmative’s interpretation, there are vastly more topical affirmatives than there are atoms in the observable universe. (There at most 10^82 atoms in the observable universe. The number of non-singleton subsets of two or more items out of a set of five thousand is 2^5000 − 5001, or approximately 1.4 × 10^1505. For simplicity I’ve ignored the distinction between colleges and universities, since I don’t know the breakdown between them. It’s still an underestimate, though, because it doesn’t count affirmatives that specify different tests or decisions.) Against a generic interpretation of the topic, some complain that there is “only one aff.” That may be true, if you strangely insist on individuating affs only by their advocacy rather than their arguments or advantages (e.g., they think your Kant aff and my util aff are one and the same aff, which I find bizarre).4 But, however we count affs, it is much better for there to be only one—the generic generalization expressed by the resolution—than for there to be more than a googol. It’s impossible to adequately prepare specific answers to such a vast number of affs. That preparation burden leads to worse debates, since it leads negatives to have lower-quality answers to any particular aff; everyone knows this, so debaters are incentivized to quickly mine for surface-level arguments for obscure affs, so they can use the rest of their time finding the minimal viable quantity of barely responsive evidence against other people’s affs, or beefing up maximally generic arguments that are recycled from topic to topic. That is a worse outcome than everyone researching the very same proposition, knowing that everyone else will research that proposition, thereby creating an incentive for in-depth research, expertise, and innovation. Limits are not obstacles to creativity; they are essential to it. But even if our hypothetical affirmative’s interpretation would be better for debate, we should reject the “pragmatics-first” view that the pragmatic benefits of debating something can be sufficient to interpret the resolution as meaning something it doesn’t mean. This is because the pragmatically best proposition to debate could be something that has nothing to do with the topic or is straightforwardly inconsistent with the topic. So all the reasons to debate the resolution are reasons to reject the pragmatics-first view. Moreover, no one knows or could ever know which of all possible propositions would be best to debate, since there are infinitely many propositions that could be debated and no way of figuring out which of them would be best. So, on the “pragmatics-first” view, no one knows how the topic should be interpreted. That is an embarrassing result, because the purpose of having a resolution is to establish a commonly known basis for preparation. What’s more, it is incredibly unlikely that the proposition affirmed by the affirmative is the best possible proposition to debate, so the affirmative is incredibly unlikely to be topical even in its own terms. One reply to this argument is to say that we don’t have to consider all of the possible propositions that could be debated, but all and only those that are advanced via interpretations in any given debate. This doesn’t solve the problem. Suppose the negative interprets the current LD resolution to mean that the United States federal government should substantially reduce Direct Commercial Sales and/or Foreign Military Sales of arms from the United States. Since the affirmative defends no such reduction, they aren’t topical. This interpretation would be much better for clash, affirmative flexibility, limits, advocacy skills, and so on. Obviously it’s not what the resolution means, but that’s not what topicality is about—right? On the view we’re considering, pragmatic benefits can justify interpreting the resolution to mean something it doesn’t mean. As long as the negative can identify at least one proposition much better for debate than what the resolution actually means, the affirmative is not topical. Perhaps the view is the pragmatic benefits of an interpretation can justify it so long as it’s semantically good enough. I have no idea what it is for an interpretation to be semantically good enough, if it’s not just to be something the resolution might mean. And, as we have shown, the requisite interpretation for the affirmative is just not something the resolution could mean. There is no dialect of any language in which even one meaning of the resolution is that some colleges and some universities ought not consider some standardized tests in some undergraduate admissions decisions. If the resolution were genuinely ambiguous between the affirmative’s interpretation and others, or if we just couldn’t tell whether the resolution might mean what the affirmative wants it to mean, then perhaps its pragmatic benefits could justify it. But the resolution is not ambiguous along that dimension, for all the reasons we have already seen. It seems to me that, despite appearances encouraged by the format of topicality arguments, the “pragmatics-first” person isn’t really rejecting the second premise of my argument: that, even if some particular colleges and universities ought not consider particular tests in particular decisions, that doesn’t mean that that colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. They are instead rejecting the first premise of the argument: that, on this topic, the affirmative should have to argue that, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. They are, in other worse, rejecting the topicality rule, as I define it. So let’s now turn to that premise.

#### Resolvability – otherwise there’s no consensus on interpretation and justification of IPRs.

Drahos 16

Peter Drahos, *A Philosophy of Intellectual Property* (2016), DOI: <http://doi.org/10.22459/PIP.06.2016>, pp. 45-46 <https://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/pdf/book.pdf> -CAT

We are now in a better position to appreciate why the justification for patents was so highly instrumental within English law and why copyright, after some argument, went the same way. It was uncontroversial within the society of the time that individuals had to exist by their labour. This was part of God’s design. Inventors and authors, like others, laboured and were entitled to a reward, but the reward which they could be given consistently with God’s design was no more than a temporary privilege. Anything more would be too great an interference with the labour of others and therefore against the law of God and the fundamental laws of the realm. At best an inventor or an author could expect some kind of temporary advantage over others. The character of this advantage was a privilege. It could never amount to anything more because that would constitute too great a threat to the negative liberties of others, particularly in the area of commerce and trade. The right of free trade was a fundamental common law right. It meant, in theory at least, that people had a right of entry into the labour force. Temporary privileges in abstract objects had, it was thought, the long-term effect of increasing the industry of others. Such privileges were consistent with fundamental law and God’s design. Natural property rights in abstract objects never could be. Natural property rights in the physical objects which one’s labour had produced were consistent with the divine plan. The interesting feature of the instrumentalist justification for copyright and patents is that it is worked out in the context of a natural law tradition, a tradition which at first sight might be thought not to be sympathetic to such a treatment of the mental products of one’s labour. That such a justification emerged shows that, when it comes to justifying intellectual property, the crucial choices are between not first order ethical theories (natural law versus utilitarianism) but rather the concept of community and the metaphysical scheme upon which that concept of community is dependent. As it happens, the modern emphasis on the question of justification is at the level of first order ethical theory. This does not mean that concepts of community are irrelevant to the question of justification. Rather, it suggests that they are the silent drivers of the debate.

#### Clash – Spec-ing increases clash, K2 good debate

#### Shiftiness. They can ignore or override the 1AC in CX and rebuttals; that moots all pre-round prep and disclosure. 1) That’s a bad norm; and 2) if they morph their advocacy or go for substance implementation in this round this triggers as independent offense.

#### K2 education because it’s the only means of accessing in-round discussion of the topic lit. K2 fairness because it’s how we determine whether a response on the flow is actually responsive.

#### Independently, clash is K2 switch-side debate, because avoiding clash moots arguments that test the aff’s advocacy

Poscher 16

Poscher, 16—director at the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law at the University of Freiburg (Ralf, “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement”, Metaphilosophy of Law, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki/Adam Dyrda/Pawel Banas (eds.), Hart Publishing, forthcoming, dml)

Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits the idea of negation. It is a central feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls the “labour of the negative”103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema points to yet another feature of disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes.104 This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices. In these scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases.107 A second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”. These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea. In hard cases we must – in some way – lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. In these cases it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the view towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case. It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of legal disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading him: to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena. f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But what was wrong with District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly flipping a coin?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered? One reason lies in the mixed nature of our reasons in actual legal disagreements. The different second order reasons can be held apart analytically, but not in real life cases. The hope of coming to terms will often play a role at least for some time relative to some participants in the debate. A second reason is that the objectives listed above could not be achieved by a non‐argumentative procedure. Flipping a coin, throwing dice or taking a gut vote would not help us to explore our communalities or our inferential commitments nor help to scrutinize the positions in play. A third reason is the overall rational aspiration of the law that Dworkin relates to in his integrity account111. In a justificatory sense112 the law aspires to give a coherent account of itself – even if it is not the only right one – required by equal respect under conditions of normative disagreement.113 Combining legal argumentation with the non‐argumentative decision‐ making procedure of counting reasoned opinions serves the coherence aspiration of the law in at least two ways: First, the labor of the negative reduces the chances that constructions of the law that have major flaws or inconsistencies built into the arguments supporting them will prevail. Second, since every position must be a reasoned one within the given framework of the law, it must be one that somehow fits into the overall structure of the law along coherent lines. It thus protects against incoherent “checkerboard” treatments114 of hard cases. It is the combination of reasoned disagreement and the non‐rational decision‐making mechanism of counting reasoned opinions that provides for both in hard cases: a decision and one – of multiple possible – coherent constructions of the law. Pure non‐rational procedures – like flipping a coin – would only provide for the decision part. Pure argumentative procedures – which are not geared towards a decision procedure – would undercut the incentive structure of our agonistic disagreements.115 In the face of unresolvable disagreements endless debates would seem an idle enterprise. That the debates are about winning or losing helps to keep the participants engaged. That the decision depends on counting reasoned opinions guarantees that the engagement focuses on rational argumentation. No plain non‐argumentative procedure would achieve this result. If the judges were to flip a coin at the end of the trial in hard cases, there would be little incentive to engage in an exchange of arguments. It is specifically the count of reasoned opinions which provides for rational scrutiny in our legal disagreements and thus contributes to the rationales discussed above. 2. THE SEMANTICS OF AGONISTIC DISAGREEMENTS The agonistic account does not presuppose a fact of the matter, it is not accompanied by an ontological commitment, and the question of how the fact of the matter could be known to us is not even raised. Thus the agonistic account of legal disagreement is not confronted with the metaphysical or epistemological questions that plague one‐right‐answer theories in particular. However, it must still come up with a semantics that explains in what sense we disagree about the same issue and are not just talking at cross purposes. In a series of articles David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have reconstructed legal disagreements in semantic terms as metalinguistic negotiations on the usage of a term that at the center of a hard case like “cruel and unusual punishment” in a death‐penalty case.116 Even though the different sides in the debate define the term differently, they are not talking past each other, since they are engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the same term. The metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the term serves as a semantic anchor for a disagreement on the substantive issues connected with the term because of its functional role in the law. The “cruel and unusual punishment”‐clause thus serves to argue about the permissibility of the death penalty. This account, however only provides a very superficial semantic commonality. But the commonality between the participants of a legal disagreement go deeper than a discussion whether the term “bank” should in future only to be used for financial institutions, which fulfills every criteria for semantic negotiations that Plunkett and Sundell propose. Unlike in mere semantic negotiations, like the on the disambiguation of the term “bank”, there is also some kind of identity of the substantive issues at stake in legal disagreements. A promising route to capture this aspect of legal disagreements might be offered by recent semantic approaches that try to accommodate the externalist challenges of realist semantics,117 which inspire one‐right‐answer theorists like Moore or David Brink. Neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics provide for the theoretical or interpretive element of realist semantics without having to commit to the ontological positions of traditional externalism. In a sense they offer externalist semantics with no ontological strings attached. The less controversial aspect of the externalist picture of meaning developed in neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics can be found in the deferential structure that our meaning‐providing intentions often encompass.118 In the case of natural kinds, speakers defer to the expertise of chemists when they employ natural kind terms like gold or water. If a speaker orders someone to buy $ 10,000 worth of gold as a safe investment, he might not know the exact atomic structure of the chemical element 79. In cases of doubt, though, he would insist that he meant to buy only stuff that chemical experts – or the markets for that matter – qualify as gold. The deferential element in the speaker’s intentions provides for the specific externalist element of the semantics. In the case of the law, the meaning‐providing intentions connected to the provisions of the law can be understood to defer in a similar manner to the best overall theory or interpretation of the legal materials. Against the background of such a semantic framework the conceptual unity of a linguistic practice is not ratified by the existence of a single best answer, but by the unity of the interpretive effort that extends to legal materials and legal practices that have sufficient overlap119 – be it only in a historical perspective120. The fulcrum of disagreement that Dworkin sees in the existence of a single right answer121 does not lie in its existence, but in the communality of the effort – if only on the basis of an overlapping common ground of legal materials, accepted practices, experiences and dispositions. As two athletes are engaged in the same contest when they follow the same rules, share the same concept of winning and losing and act in the same context, but follow very different styles of e.g. wrestling, boxing, swimming etc. They are in the same contest, even if there is no single best style in which to wrestle, box or swim. Each, however, is engaged in developing the best style to win against their opponent, just as two lawyers try to develop the best argument to convince a bench of judges.122 Within such a semantic framework even people with radically opposing views about the application of an expression can still share a concept, in that they are engaged in the same process of theorizing over roughly the same legal materials and practices. Semantic frameworks along these lines allow for adamant disagreements without abandoning the idea that people are talking about the same concept. An agonistic account of legal disagreement can build on such a semantic framework, which can explain in what sense lawyers, judges and scholars engaged in agonistic disagreements are not talking past each other. They are engaged in developing the best interpretation of roughly the same legal materials, albeit against the background of diverging beliefs, attitudes and dispositions that lead them to divergent conclusions in hard cases. Despite the divergent conclusions, semantic unity is provided by the largely overlapping legal materials that form the basis for their disagreement. Such a semantic collapses only when we lack a sufficient overlap in the materials. To use an example of Michael Moore’s: If we wanted to debate whether a certain work of art was “just”, we share neither paradigms nor a tradition of applying the concept of justice to art such as to engage in an intelligible controversy.

#### TVA – Spec a policy

#### “Resolved” implies a policy focus.

Parcher 1

(Jeff, former debate coach at Georgetown, February, 2001, <http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html>) -CAT

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### They’ll say CX checks but that supercharges why the AFF’s model is bad for debate

#### the NEG will always be forced to waste time asking in CX while the AFF can be deliberately squirrely and then claim that CX isn’t binding.

#### CX is better spent discussing evidence, authors, and topic lit; logistics questions have no value outside this round.

#### Paradigm issues

#### 1] DTD, it’s the AFF & abuse has already occurred

#### 2] Competing interps—you were either topical or you weren’t.

#### 3] NO RVIs a] you don’t win by meeting a prima facie burden b] going for RVIs prove the 1AC is non-T; if you were T you could just beat back the shell with a legit competing interp and then win on case offense

#### 4] Fairness is a voter and comes first— a] debate is fundamentally a game – if it’s not fair, people won’t play; that controls the internal link to education. b] that O/Ws because every argument implicitly concedes to the validity of fairness, meaning if they win fairness bad vote neg because you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments.

## 2 - Boring Politics

**The link is 1AC’s Beller 21 – they claim to seize the materiality of social production, but their rejection of slow, boring, institutional change is weaponized by the very capitalists they claim to oppose, making those institutions more insidious by choosing the moral purity of refusal over challenging the Right.**

Gray, 18

Paul Christopher Gray, Faculty Member in Labour Studies, Brock University, “From the Streets to the State: Changing the World by Taking Power,” SUNY Press (2018)

Fourth, we neglect the **persisting importance of the state**. Widespread rejections of the political party as a form of organization are often associated with the **optimistic assertions** that, in the age of globalization, nation-states and national struggles are of diminishing importance. Those who espouse “Think globally, act locally” correctly expose the constraints on democratic spaces imposed by international institutions, trade agreements, currency zones, and new forms of imperialism. Nevertheless, they often ignore that **nation-states** are **not superseded** by, but rather are the **facilitators of, globalization** (Panitch 1994, 63). The prevalent depictions of contemporary capitalism as postindustrial or postmaterialist attempt to transcend **in thought** the social relations we have been **unable to transcend in practice**. The recent waves of technological and social innovations are staggering, but they remain developments within capitalism (Albo 2007, 12). An eroding collective memory and the obsession with academic novelty tend to neglect the extent of historical continuity in our era. Indeed, **the only things new under the sun are the carbon emissions that disastrously trap its rays**. Finally, disengaging from the state **cedes** much **political space** and operational terrain **to ruling classes**. It is true, Holloway’s anti-power politics has helped to cultivate a healthy wariness of co-optation by government institutions. Nevertheless, by rejecting all electoral politics as a legitimation of the state, much of the radical left relies, often unconsciously, on an anarcho-reformism which can only make radical demands from **outside of the state**. Consequently, we allow the **atrophy** of the **collective capacities** necessary to transform the state and stifle the development of new such capacities. Furthermore, there are **uncomfortable parallels** between anti-power politics and the **dominant neoliberal** assertions that public institutions are **inherently** corrupt and inefficient. **Ruling classes** have **harnessed** widespread discontent with government bureaucracy to promote the marketization, privatization, and deregulation of state institutions and practices. To the extent that the **radical left engages in the big refusal, we hasten** these **attacks on the welfare state**, redistributive measures, and social programs. Indeed, **the neoliberal hollowing of the state is complemented by a neo-anarchist Hollowaying of the state**. By **abstaining** from this terrain of politics, we play the game of the neoliberals “as conscientious objectors play the game of the conquerors.”4 Surely, we cannot glorify dirty hands, “right up to the elbows” (Sartre 1989, 218). But if the anti-power milieu has **clean hands**, it is **only because** **they hold them above their heads in surrender** as the tide of blood creeps up their legs. Anti-power politics has proven to be as **unable** to challenge capitalism from outside of the state as is any purely party politics from the inside. Transcending capitalist society and the state might very well depend on reconciling the best aspects of both of these equally one-sided tendencies. Indeed, this split has divided the radical left throughout the history of its resistance to capitalism. We can describe these two long-standing tendencies as parliamentarism and extra-parliamentarism. On the one hand, for the parliamentarist tendency, to the extent that the state is democratic, it embodies universal liberties, not the power of the capitalist class and elite groups. This tendency argues that the radical left can use this state to fully realize these liberties in ways that preserve the continuity between the partial democracy permitted under capitalism and the full democracy allowed by socialism. For the parliamentarist tendency, the most important factor is a sufficiently strong and long-lasting governing majority that can fundamentally transform the hindrances to full democracy in civil society. Nevertheless, this tendency, historically exemplified by the social democrats, has been completely absorbed by the state. It can reform capitalism, but not transform it. On the other hand, the extra-parliamentarist tendency believes that even the most democratic of states is essentially controlled by the capitalist class and ruling groups. Therefore, instead of attempting to win the already existing state power, this tendency builds alternative institutions in its shadows. Rather than being co-opted into the inferior forms of merely representative democracy, it creates qualitatively different forms of participatory, deliberative, and direct democracy. Ultimately, this tendency envisions **long preparations** for what will be a sudden and total break with capitalist institutions, either by violently smashing them or through a more nonviolent exodus from them. Those in the former subtendency, exemplified by the communists, have typically remained **dependent on** and **lacked real control** over the state that they have “conquered.” Thus, they resort to recruiting the former state officials and administrators of the ruling classes. This, among other causes, has meant that they tend to replace the capitalist state with a command economy that is just as undemocratic**, if not more so**. Those in the latter subtendency, exemplified by the anarchists, altogether refuse to operate on the terrain of the state, which, when it can no longer ignore them, **easily crushes them**. Despite all of their differences, these two subtendencies meet a similar fate. **They can oppose capitalism, but not transcend it**.5 In recent decades, the balance has shifted toward the extra-parliamentarism of those who espouse anti-power politics. As is often the case, they point to the shortcomings of parliamentarism without being sufficiently critical of their own attempts to change the world without taking power. But the pendulum might be swinging to the other tendency given the emergence of the new radical left parties, the “parties of a new type,” in Latin America, Europe, Turkey, the Philippines, Tanzania, and elsewhere (for more on this, see chapters 3 to 6 in this volume). **Even** Holloway’s major inspiration, **the Zapatistas**, have recently **announced their intention to engage in electoral politics** (Niembro 2017). Nevertheless, the new radical left parties are beginning to fall into the problems typical of traditional social democratic parties, as is illustrated by the ways in which the Syriza government has become co-opted into the Greek state and the institutions of the European Union (see chapters 2 and 3). These parties do not sufficiently heed the criticisms leveled by anti-power politics. Indeed, it has been the case historically that both the parliamentarist and the extra-parliamentarist tendencies bend the stick so far in their own directions that they turn it into a dull boomerang capable only of glancing the arguments of the other side before returning to their own. Surely, this is the most narcissistic of weapons.

**The 1AC doesn’t give a role of the ballot – but based on their rhetoric we agree the ROB is to endorse the debater that best develops internal resistance strategies to exploitation – that hijacks all of the 1AC impacts**

#### The alt is roleplaying the state – what you would expect high-school debaters to do – propose policy solutions to reform pressing social issues. Roleplaying the state doesn’t endorse it but teaches the language of power to best enable internal resistance strategies

Coverstone 05

Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005 <https://www.natcom.org/> -CAT

An important concern emerges when Mitchell describes reflexive fiat as a contest strategy capable of “eschewing the power to directly control external actors” (1998b, p. 20). Describing debates about what our government should do as attempts to control outside actors is debilitating and disempowering. Control of the US government is exactly what an active, participatory citizenry is supposed to be all about. After all, if democracy means anything, it means that citizens not only have the right, they also bear the obligation to discuss and debate what the government should be doing. Absent that discussion and debate, much of the motivation for personal political activism is also lost. Those who have co-opted Mitchell’s argument for individual advocacy often quickly respond that nothing we do in a debate round can actually change government policy, and unfortunately, an entire generation of debaters has now swallowed this assertion as an article of faith. The best most will muster is, “Of course not, but you don’t either!” The assertion that nothing we do in debate has any impact on government policy is one that carries the potential to undermine Mitchell’s entire project. If there is nothing we can do in a debate round to change government policy, then we are left with precious little in the way of pro-social options for addressing problems we face. At best, we can pursue some Pilot-like hand washing that can purify us as individuals through quixotic activism but offer little to society as a whole. It is very important to note that Mitchell (1998b) tries carefully to limit and bound his notion of reflexive fiat by maintaining that because it “views fiat as a concrete course of action, it is bounded by the limits of pragmatism” (p. 20). Pursued properly, the debates that Mitchell would like to see are those in which the relative efficacy of concrete political strategies for pro-social change is debated. In a few noteworthy examples, this approach has been employed successfully, and I must say that I have thoroughly enjoyed judging and coaching those debates. The students in my program have learned to stretch their understanding of their role in the political process because of the experience. Therefore, those who say I am opposed to Mitchell’s goals here should take care at such a blanket assertion. However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point. There is a fallacy in arguing that movements represent a better political strategy than voting and person-to-person advocacy. Sure, a full-scale movement would be better than the limited voice I have as a participating citizen going from door to door in a campaign, but so would full-scale government action. Unfortunately, the gap between my individual decision to pursue movement politics and the emergence of a full-scale movement is at least as great as the gap between my vote and democratic change.

**Real change requires the kind of pragmatic analysis only the 1NC does through identifying the harms of reducing IP**

**Smulewicz-Zucker & Thompson 15** Gregory, Editor of Logos and adjunct professor of Philosophy at Baruch College, CUNY; and Michael J., Associate Professor of Political Science at William Paterson University, “Introduction,” in Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics, pg. 1-32

Radical politics in contemporary Western democracies finds itself in a state of **crisis**. When viewed from the vantage point of social change, a progressive transformation of the social order, political radicalism is **found wanting**. This would seem to go against the grain of perceived wisdom. As an academic enterprise, radical theory has blossomed. Figures such as Slavoj Žižek openly discuss Marxism in popular documentaries, **new journals have emerged** touting a radical “anti-capitalism,” and whole conferences and subfields are dominated by questions posed by obscure theoretical texts. Despite this, there is a profound lack in **substantive**, meaningful **political, social, and cultural criticism** of the kind that once made progressive **and rational left political discourse relevant** **to the machinations of real politics and the broader culture** . Today, leftist political theory in the academy has fallen under the spell of ideas **so far removed** from actual political issues that the question can be posed whether the traditions of left critique that gave intellectual support to the great movements of modernity—from the workers’ movement to the civil rights movement—**possess a critical mass to sustain future struggles.** Quite to the contrary, **social movements have lost political momentum**; they are generally focused on questions of culture and **shallow discussions** of class and **obsessed with issues of identity**— racial, sexual, and so on—rather than on the great “social question” **of unequal economic power**, which once served as the driving impulse for political, social, and cultural transformation. As these new **radical mandarins** spill ink on futile debates over **“desire,”** “identity,” and **illusory visions** of anarchic democracy, **economic inequality has ballooned into oligarchic proportions,** working people have been **increasingly marginalized**, and ethnic minority groups turned into a coolie labor force. This has been the result, we contend, of a lack of concern with real politics in contemporary radical theory. Further, we believe that this is the result of a transformation of ideas, that contemporary political theory on the Left has witnessed a decisive **shift in focus** in recent decades—a shift that has produced nothing less than the **incoherence** **of the tradition of progressive politics in our age.** At a time when the Left is struggling to redefine itself and respond to current political and economic crises, a series of trends in contemporary theory has reshaped the ways that politics is understood and practiced. Older thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida, and newer voices like Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, David Graeber, and Judith Butler, among others, have risen to the status of academic and cultural icons while their ideas have become embedded in the “logics” of new social movements. As some aspects of the recent Occupy Wall Street demonstrations have shown, political discourse has become increasingly **dominated** by the impulses of neo-anarchism, identity politics, **postcolonialism**, and other intellectual fads. This new radicalism has made itself **so irrelevant** with respect to real politics that it ends up serving as a kind of **cathartic space** for the **justifiable anxieties** **wrought by late capitalism,** further **stabilizing** its systemic and **integrative power** rather than disrupting it. These trends are the products as well as **unwitting allies** of that which they oppose. The transformation of radical and progressive politics throughout the latter half of the twentieth and the early decades of the twenty-first centuries is characterized by both a sociological shift as well as an intellectual one. A core thesis has been that the shift from industrial to postindustrial society has led to the weakening of class politics. But this is unsatisfying. There is no reason why class cannot be seen in the divisions of mental and service labor as it was with an industrial proletariat. There is no reason why political power rooted in unequal property and control over resources, in the capacity for some to command and to control the labor of others as well as the consumption of others **ought not to be a basic political imperative.** To this end, what we would call **a rational radical politics** should **seek not the utopian end of a “post-statist” politics**, but rather to enrich common goods, **erode the great divisions of wealth and class,** **democratize all aspects of society and economy**, and seek to orient the powers of individuals and the community **toward common ends.** Indeed, only by **widening the struggles of labor** **and rethinking the ends of the labor movement**—connecting the struggles of labor to issues beyond the workplace, to **education**, the **environment**, p**ublic life, issues of racial and gender equality**, culture, and the nature of the social order more broadly—can we envision a revitalization of a workers’ movement, one **that would have no need of the alienated theory of the new radicals**.1

#### Prefer boring politics to the 1AC’s pseudoactivism; two reasons. The first is longevity. The effects of their method are short-lived and not retained as valuable information when opportunities to create real change present themselves.

**Goodin and Niemeyer 03**

Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf> -CAT

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is **likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think** about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### Second is competition. The AFF method creates unforeseen friction and resistance, leading to hyperpartisanship and a regression of allyship due to lack of consideration for the negative’s role in this space and the way they can contribute to the AFF’s roadmap for broader change.

Atchison and Panetta 09

Atchison and Panetta, 09 (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia, Assistant Professor and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd Rhetoric Associate Professor University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication, Historical Developments and Issues for the Future, â€œIntercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,â€ The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317-334)

Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the "debate as activism" perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents' academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes mat each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.

## 3 – Health Diplomacy

#### Now let’s do the hard work. Reducing IP in the real world is a bad idea if it destabilizes international relations, which depend on WTO agreements. The link is the 1AC’s Mundt 19 which “affirms a reduction in intellectual property.”

#### WTO agreements protecting intellectual property are the cornerstone to international health diplomacy because they save lives – HIV/AIDS proves

Aginam 10

Obijiofor Aginam, Obijiofor Aginam is currently Deputy Director and Head of Governance for Global Health in the United Nations University-International Institute for Global Health, 2010 “HEALTH OR TRADE? A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO GLOBAL HEALTH DIPLOMACY,” <https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=149097083081123105113085099123123091104014059082060018071001088023116023118119002064117119051059021051011085110010121013091016020070011051015018011008065019104127084042076098081007102099120087031085093119071127122005124010118009001092104124120121094&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE> -recut CAT

The third limb of global health diplomacy critique reflects the complex linkages between “health and trade”18 where the modest achievements in global health diplomacy in the past decade are substantially driven not by events in the health sector but by the normative developments in the trade and economic relations of states enforced by the WTO. Although this sounds like “economic globalization triumphalism”, it is nonetheless hard to dispute the fact that it was the patent requirements for pharmaceuticals and other inventions in the WTO TRIPS Agreement that substantially catalyzed the health diplomacy on access to anti-retroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS for millions of poor HIV-positive who live mostly in developing countries. Food safety and security concerns and the hard diplomacy animated by biotechnology advances in food production, although global health issues in their own right, are catalyzed by the developments in the WTO on the SSPS Agreement, and not the subtle “diplomacy” around the WHO/FAO jointly administered Codex Alimentarius Commission standards. The migration of qualified health professionals from most of Africa to the West is now being driven in complex ways by one of the modes of service supply in the GATS Agreement.

#### Health diplomacy K2 solving the most urgent crises we face

Roffey et al 02

[(Roger, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Division of NBC-Defense, Umeå. Kurt Lantorp, Department of Infectious Disease Control, Jönköping. Anders Tegnell, Center for Microbiological Preparedness, Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control (SMI), Solna. Frederik Elgh, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Division of NBC-Defense, Umeå.) “Biological weapons and bioterrorism preparedness: importance of public-health awareness and international cooperation”, ScienceDirect, 8/2002 [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1198743X14626410#](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1198743X14626410)!] KZ -recut CAT

Coordination and communication also need to be strengthened, to minimize response times. If a bioterrorist event is suspected, established communication must be among hospital personnel, local and central healthcare departments, specialized laboratories, central and regional authorities for disease surveillance, and police and rescue services. A biological attack will also require of preservation evidence (at the scene of a crime), a unified command system, and the need to protect emergency responders against possible secondary devices intentionally placed to maim or injure them [19,20]. The management of the disease might not follow normal procedures, since diagnostic laboratory confirmation might take too long. Instead, it will be necessary to initiate a response based on the recognition of high-risk syndromes. Epidemiologic principles must be used to assess whether a patient’s presentation is typical of an endemic disease or is an unusual event that should raise concern [21]. There should also be specialist teams on standby that can rapidly analyze any potential threat and give recommendations to responsible authorities. After an incideSic. xnt, there might be a need for decontamination of the affected area, depending on the type of agent and the quantity released; this is also an area for international cooperation, as expertise is not always available in the country under attack. From a European perspective, it can be questioned whether each country can afford or be motivated to set up qualified rapid response teams that could, at short notice, be deployed to the scene of a bioterrorist attack. Perhaps this could be one area for cooperation between countries. What could be a realistic goal for such teams in a European context? In the area of research and development, to enhance our knowledge of agents of concern and to develop rapid methods for identification and detection of agents, international cooperation is vital, given today’s scarce economic resources. Another area for cooperation across borders is the training of personnel in handling situations involving the threat or use of biological warfare agents.

#### And, health diplomacy controls the internal link to every existential threat – that o/ws anything coming out of the 1AC on magnitude

James 17

Wilmot James, Honorary Professor in the Division of Human Genetics at the University of Cape Town's Medical School and Non-residential Senior Fellow at Bard College’s Hannah Arendt Centre, Ph.D. from University of Wisconsin at Madison, 2017 “In an Age of Zika and a Threat of Biochemical Terror, Health Security Must Be Everybody’s Concern”, Daily Maverick, 4-2, <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-04-02-op-ed-in-an-age-of-zika-and-a-threat-of-biochemical-terror-health-security-must-be-everybodys-concern/#.WOY8xTvDHHw> -recut CAT

With Zika there too was political failure to act quickly, give honest advice and confront the abortion conundrum head-on, the result being that 3,000 and likely more children with microcephaly will test the emotional resilience and financial resources of their families to breaking point. We should never cease to invest in the public health and medical science of disease, but it seems to me that our fundamental problem is not the quality of the health sciences but the grim mediocrity of our politics. Party-political bickering for short-term gain paralyses and drains the national effort in South Africa as much as it does in the United States, undermining our ability to see with compelling clarity the solutions the issues of the day deserve. Health security is humanity’s shared concern. Promoting health and preventing death define us at our most altruistic and advanced. The Hippocratic Ideal, the concept of the physician as the guardian of human health, encapsulates a fundamental human quality common to all the world’s great religions. Medicine is one of the earliest and greatest human achievements because it is a co-operative enterprise involving highly skilled individuals; and it is as a result of cooperation– and our unusual ability for complex language – that cumulative civilisation is possible. In the age of globalisation, it is health security, a recent Lancet editorial stated, that “is now the most important foreign policy issue of our time”. The rapid emergence and re-emergence of pathogenic infectious disease, of which Zika is the most recent, the slow but steady cumulative acts of nature associated with climate change, high-risk forced migration caused by desperation and war, the creeping reality of biochemical terror and the threat of nuclear war, propel human survival and well-being to the frontline of what today must be everybody’s concern. The field of health diplomacy provides an unprecedented opportunity to build human solidarity. It is an area of human endeavour that cuts through inherited antagonisms. Governments that offer health improvements as part of aid to nations with whom they wish to develop stronger diplomatic links succeed in cultivating deeper cultural relationships precisely because of their direct benefit to citizens. To advance health diplomacy requires health leaders with an inclusive global vision...

## Case

### FW

#### Capitalism Is Inevitable; Socialization Precludes The Alternative

Lipschutz, 2004:

[Ronnie D, Professor and head of the PHD department at UC Santa Cruz, *Global Environmental Politics*, 144]

**The collective action problem is not without an inherent politics of its own, which is obscured by its compelling economistic logic. Not only is our experience in a capitalist society one of constant and never-satiated needs, but our socialization has conferred on us the foundational assumptions of material envy and self-interested behavior. “Wanting more” is naturalized through belief and practice**. If everyone does it, we would be foolish not to do it, too. And how can it be otherwise? In effect, **by making the claim that collective action is rational only when each individual realizes a clearly defined benefit, the reasoning behind the collective action problem makes other forms of collective action appear foolish and even inexplicable.** Consequently, social activists who engage in politics outside established institutions, and who appear to realize small or nonexistent benefits from their activities, are made to seem both irrational and even dangerous to business as usual. Indeed, if too many people were to act in such a fashion, business as usual might well be threatened.