### Metatheory: No Out-of-Round Violations

#### Interp: Debaters may not initiate theory based on behavior outside the round except disclosure theory.

#### **Violation: You threatened to run an IVI for me asking about the 1AC when you refused to answer at least three times! You also \*accused me of harassment\* for no reason; you were literally just dodging the question – that’s super sketch and not ok.**

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#### **Standards**

#### **1] Jurisdiction**

Kymn 15

**Slaying the Dragon: An Argument Against Out-of-Round Theory** October 29, 2015 by Chris Kymn <http://nsdupdate.com/2015/slaying-the-dragon-an-argument-against-out-of-round-theory-by-chris-kymn/>

I’ll try to show that out-of-round theory arguments (including, but not limited to disclosure theory[[i]](http://nsdupdate.com/2015/slaying-the-dragon-an-argument-against-out-of-round-theory-by-chris-kymn/" \l "_edn1)) are specious and explain where they go astray. In doing so, I hope to (1) aid debaters in answering such theory arguments and (2) politely ask proponents of disclosure theory to consider revising their views. Bob Overing points to ambiguity in what counts as out-of-round theory.[[ii]](http://nsdupdate.com/2015/slaying-the-dragon-an-argument-against-out-of-round-theory-by-chris-kymn/" \l "_edn2) This ambiguity requires extra care in definition. As such, I’ll use the term “out-of-round theory” to refer to theory arguments whose violation is contingent on the (lack of) occurrence of an out-of-round event. Of course, an “out-of-round event” is one that did not occur in a speech, CX, or prep time of the current round. Under this definition, disclosure theory is an example of out-of-round theory. A theory interpretation stating “X debater must disclose Y argument” implies that “X debater may read Y argument only if X had disclosed Y,” where the “only if” condition, referring to an out-of-round event, is necessary to win the violation. While this article mainly addresses out-of-round theory arguments, the concerns raised may certainly apply to other arguments contingent upon out-of-round events. My intention in writing the article, which might be evident by the previous example, is to address disclosure theory, as it is the most common out-of-round theory argument. That being said, my objection to disclosure theory relies on my objection to the category of arguments it falls under, so the implications of my argument might also apply elsewhere. **Executive Summary** The ballot is a question of who did the better debating within a given round. (Call this the “In-Round View.”) Theory arguments are really just qualifying what counts as evidence of being the better debater. (Call this the “Qualifier View.”) Out-of-round theory arguments only qualify occurrences outside of round, and thus don’t answer the ballot question. The sections following the next three clarify the argument and answer potential objections, but they are not necessary to prove the above claims. *“However much this dragon tries to be spatial, he remains completely flat… But this dragon is an obstinate beast, and in spite of his two dimensions he persists in assuming that he has three…” – M.C. Escher* Essentially, out-of-round theory is like Escher’s dragon. It asserts that an out-of-round event has an extra, in-round, dimension. Yet despite their clever forms and obstinate personalities, both the dragon and out-of-round theory are wrong. **The In-Round View** I don’t believe this view is controversial. In any competitive activity, no match is ever meant to determine that one team is always better than another (if such a concept is possible). The in-round constraint also explains the concepts of “upsets” that inevitably occur in sports or debate rounds, and why the winner of a preliminary round, when side-locked against a familiar adversary in elimination rounds, may lose the rematch. Tournaments would be boring if the “best debater” always won! The intuition seems to follow from the fact that debate rounds, not unlike other competitive activities, are evaluations of performance within some defined range of time. In soccer, a team’s score is in no way determined by its score in a previous game. This fact is virtually taken for granted, and it forms the tip of an intuition against out-of-round theory. Why should we care about events happening prior to the beginning of the round? Of course, as some recent articles have taken joy in pointing out, debate is not exactly like soccer[[iii]](http://nsdupdate.com/2015/slaying-the-dragon-an-argument-against-out-of-round-theory-by-chris-kymn/" \l "_edn3). We tend to believe there is a difference because debaters can make arguments about the bounds of acceptable argumentation, i.e. theory. That being said, the valid meaning of theory arguments is often lost amidst jargon-filled theory debates. The next section will attempt to recover it. **The Qualifier View** The Qualifier View of theory asserts that theory is merely a framing factor for how much other arguments count as evidence of better debating. This phrase is admittedly a mouthful, so I’ll give a few examples of how to interpret shells in this way. First, consider a theory shell claiming moral skepticism, along with turns to the affirmative case, is unfair because the affirmative has to demonstrate that moral facts affirm and that moral facts support the resolution. This fairness argument can be rephrased as saying, “the negative strategy of making a skeptical argument and turning the affirmative contention does not prove that s/he did the better debating, since the negative had an arbitrary advantage.” Second, suppose the negative reads a theory shell that says the affirmative must read a plan because plans promote real-world policymaking, a valuable type of education. This argument essentially says that real world policymaking is an essential element in doing the “better” debating, and thus the affirmative’s advocacy is insufficient to warrant the ballot. Lastly, “drop the argument” and “drop the debater” (as well as other creative remedies) fit neatly underneath this schema. A “drop the argument” claim is tantamount to saying the theory shell is only a qualifier on certain arguments made by a side. A drop the debater claim either casts doubt on the entire strategy, functionally warranting a loss, or argues that the qualification is so severe that no other evidence of doing the better debating is relevant could counteract it. An important feature of the Qualifier View is that the violation of theory establishes what the theory argument qualifies. For example, a Topicality argument qualifies the advocacy of the affirmative. The idea that the violation is equivalent to a “link” on the contention level debate should not be a new one, but the Qualifier View makes it clear. This feature will be relevant later on. The Qualifier View is not just a plausible interpretation of theory; it is also necessary to defend the relevance of theory debate altogether. Consider the following line: *The only true rules of [LD] debate are sides [of a resolution] and speech times.* I don’t know whether most debaters and judges on the national circuit (where theory almost exclusively resides) believe this is true, but I doubt many think this claim seriously excludes any arguments made in contemporary circuit debate.[[iv]](http://nsdupdate.com/2015/slaying-the-dragon-an-argument-against-out-of-round-theory-by-chris-kymn/" \l "_edn4) (If it were, I doubt theory would be run as frequently as it is now.) Some may object on the grounds that terms such as “affirm”, “negate”, and “better debating” are open to interpretation. Others may point to examples like offensive rhetoric to warrant why exceptions to rules are necessary. These objections point towards the important intuition that there is little fixed about debate, by its very nature. While this flexibility makes debate more valuable, it poses a difficulty for advancing the authority of a theory argument. To demonstrate, here’s a more nuanced cousin of the line presented above: *Theory arguments, by virtue of having of an “interpretation,” propose a rule about debate. However, the presentation of this argument is within a debate round itself. Yet to change debate from inside itself is incoherent, since if the rule proposed by the interpretation were necessary to debate, we could not be debating right now. Of course, we are debating right now, proving the rule is not necessary.****[[v]](http://nsdupdate.com/2015/slaying-the-dragon-an-argument-against-out-of-round-theory-by-chris-kymn/" \l "_edn5)*** This argument poses a difficulty with a strong view that holds theory as an axiomatic rule, since clearly theory is not absolutely necessary to determine the winner of a round. The Qualifier View of theory, which is much more modest, has no problem accommodating the preceding objection, however, since it rejects the thinking that theory is an absolute rule. Underneath the Qualifier View, theory is functionally fancy weighing for which arguments count as better debating. For example, a Kritik of offensive rhetoric supported by a role of the ballot claims the discourse of the other debater is stronger evidence against the other debater’s better debating than any other part of his/her performance. Since theory is weighing, not a rule, it can be evaluated in the same way as other arguments. One final comment: theory may have other auxiliary purposes, just as a cup of coffee can serve as a convenient paperweight. An example is the idea that theory shells serve as ways to set up communal norms (often called “norm-setting”). While norm-setting may be a nice side-effect of theory, it is not something theory should aim to promote, since its promotion would be apathetic to concerns over who did the better debating. Plus, it would be silly to buy a cup of coffee only to use it as a paperweight. **Why Out-Of-Round Theory is Incompatible** The first step established that signing the ballot is a determination of better debating within a given round. The second step established how theory arguments relate to a notion of better debating. This final step will show that the notion of an out-of-round theory shell is incoherent, since it might be a qualifier on who is the better debater, but cannot be a qualifier on who did the better debating within a given round. The intuition behind why we should not take the “better” debater (put in quotation marks because it is unclear if such a concept exists) as having done the better debating in any given round is fairly straightforward. As a rather silly example, consider a debater who makes the argument “err towards my side on all weighing because I’m ranked higher than my opponent on [insert online ranking here], meaning more judges vote for me and my arguments are thus more credible.” This argument is clearly nonsensical. The better debating in a given round is not implied by a prior track record. Now consider an example of an out-of-round theory argument. Suppose a debater reads an interpretation requiring opponents to enter all coaches physically present at a tournament into that tournament’s judging pool. This violation is easy established, and the sole standard goes like this: because the opponent’s coach did not have to judge while my own coach did, that coach had extra time to scout my position and write a prep-out to it, which is not a reciprocal advantage. Upon first glance, this theory shell seems reasonable. The violation is clearly established, and the standards level debate even seems to describe in-round abuse. However, the Qualifier View of theory proves the construction of the shell is specious. This theory shell casts doubt not on any particular component of the opponent’s in-round strategy, but rather the construction of the preparation that the opponent put together. In other words, it was the circumstance that the opponent was in that gave them an unfair advantage, thus the theory shell is a qualifier on the judgment that the opponent came into the round a good debater. But if we accept the innocuous premise that the ballot is about debating in a given round, such a qualifier is irrelevant to the determination of the ballot. This problem is generalizable to all out-of-round theory shells, per the definition given above. Because the violation of an out-of-round theory shell could have been met by (not) doing something before the round started, the theory shell indicts an event before and outside of the round. Other theory shells such as “NIBs bad” avoid this problem, since they isolate the problem down to arguments made in round. Finally, suppose we decided outside evidence of better debating is relevant to the ballot. This decision would permit many absurd theory arguments, ranging from “Debaters may not have more than X number of coaches” to “The other debater must offer to give me breakfast if they ate breakfast, because doing so would help my concentration in this round and my hotel was too far away to have time to grab my own.” Rejecting out-of-round theory conveniently prevents these bad (and false) arguments from getting off the ground.[[vi]](http://nsdupdate.com/2015/slaying-the-dragon-an-argument-against-out-of-round-theory-by-chris-kymn/" \l "_edn6)

#### 2] Epistemology; the shell relies on unverifiable stories, not the act itself, so there’s no way to know if either side is lying. Screenshots can be photoshopped, websites hacked, etc.

Kymn 2

**Slaying the Dragon: An Argument Against Out-of-Round Theory** October 29, 2015 by Chris Kymn <http://nsdupdate.com/2015/slaying-the-dragon-an-argument-against-out-of-round-theory-by-chris-kymn/>


**The Act-Mention Distinction** In ordinary language, there is a distinction between the use of a word and the mention of the word. When I say that ‘Austin’ has two syllables, I am not making a statement about the capital of Texas. Rather, I am making an observation about the word ‘Austin,’ deliberately put in single quotes to denote its distinct usage.[[vii]](http://nsdupdate.com/2015/slaying-the-dragon-an-argument-against-out-of-round-theory-by-chris-kymn/" \l "_edn7) Similarly, the act of doing something is different than the mentioning of that same action. Walking five hundred miles requires much more time and physical exertion than bragging about walking five hundred miles, regardless of how true the boast is. [[viii]](http://nsdupdate.com/2015/slaying-the-dragon-an-argument-against-out-of-round-theory-by-chris-kymn/" \l "_edn8) This act-mention distinction shows the flaw in attempting to bring out-of-round events into in-round criteria. While the mention of an out-of-round event can be brought into a round, by definition the act cannot be. At this point, it’s worth giving another example. Suppose the affirmative first claims the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who provides the best methodology for solving poverty, then endorses the resolution as an effective metric of reducing poverty. The negative then concedes the role of the ballot and argues that because he volunteers at a soup kitchen, endorsing him with the ballot does more in the real world to solve poverty. After all, the ballot does not enact the plan after the round. While the negative should be applauded for his service, his argument fallaciously ignores the act-mention distinction. Volunteer work would certainly impact towards the goals of the role of the ballot, yet only the mention of volunteer work can be brought into round. And since the statement of a personal fact is not a methodology that reduces poverty, the argument fails to carry weight. Of course, most people would expect that the volunteering debater to have an advantage. That expectation is not misplaced. Perhaps this debater has extra anecdotal evidence on why the affirmative’s policy is ineffective. He might also have insights on why the affirmative framing of poverty is ultimately counterproductive. The negative should use this knowledge to his advantage by making in-round arguments of the sort. It is effectively easier for the negative in this instance to prove he is the better debater, but the advantage is not granted by mere participation in external service. This example, I believe, reflects the relation between the concept of the “better debater” (however we establish such a metric) and the concept of better debating in round. Naturally, we would expect the better debater to win more often than not, but such a fact cannot be guaranteed by evidence external to the round. **Answering potential objections** *Some theory shells criticize the conjunction of an in-round practice and an out-of-round practice. For example, a shell that requires debaters to disclose pre-emptive theory interpretations (i.e. spikes) criticizes a failure to disclose and the act of reading spikes. Since there is criticism of an in-round component, how could your view exclude the shell?* Good question! This shell is still out-of-round, because the violation is contingent upon the out-of-round event, which is disclosure. This shell points out no intrinsic problem with the strategy of reading spikes; it only criticizes having done so without putting them up on the wiki. Because it does so, it centers criticism on an event that did not occur in round and thus irrelevant to who did the better debating in round. Of course, you might again point out that the violation still requires an in-round component. However, this in-round component becomes insufficient when coupled with an out-of-round requirement. Since the shell could have been met by (not) performing some out-of-round action, it says the alleged “in-round” abuse could have been solved for by an action outside of the round. Yet the latter cannot count as evidence towards the ballot, and so the comparison is illogical. *Some out-of-round events clearly are related to the evaluation of a particular round. Here’s an example: Before an elimination round, Debater A wins the flip but refuses to tell Debater B which side they chose until right before the round. Even though this event technically happened out-of-round, the other debater should have some recourse.* This situation relies on the false premise that a person can win the flip and not declare their side immediately. Flipping prior to round should accompany an expectation to immediately declare sides, and I think most reasonable teams would abide. Suppose, however, that a team did not do so. In such an instance, that would be an instance where the tournament should have made a clearer expectation, and the debater wronged should appeal to the tournament for a remedy on the situation. This response actually touches upon a common trend with out-of-round shells. Many of these shells point to a larger problem with community norms, while asserting that the appropriate redress to the issue is to drop only the debaters who had the good fortune of debating the person reading the shell. *Disclosure still has an in-round violation, because the other debater chose to read an undisclosed argument. Furthermore, there are still in-round effects from a failure to disclose.****[[ix]](http://nsdupdate.com/2015/slaying-the-dragon-an-argument-against-out-of-round-theory-by-chris-kymn/" \l "_edn9)*** Yes, the term “out-of-round” is ambiguous, which is why I took care to define it earlier. The important feature of out-of-round theory is not that it has no concern with the events that occurred in round. Rather, out-of-round theory is problematic because the shell would have been met by some event outside of the round. Topicality is principally different, since no decision outside of round would have averted the violation of the T shell. Because of this, the shell is criticizing a decision that can be isolated to the round. Yes, there may be in-round effects from a failure to disclose. But “in-round effects” is not a good enough bright-line for abuse on theory. An opponent having more teammates to cut prep might boost his/her in-round performance, but clearly theory is not the appropriate response to the situation. Many things may affect the round, some adversely, but that does not entail that theory is always the correct remedy. The salient question is whether those in-round effects are attributable to in-round events, which theory can address. *Even standards on shells such as Topicality rely on out-of-round claims to support arguments. Arguments claiming that an argument is not in the literature or that “I lack prep against this case” are not easily verifiable claims.****[[x]](http://nsdupdate.com/2015/slaying-the-dragon-an-argument-against-out-of-round-theory-by-chris-kymn/" \l "_edn10)*** Sure, Topicality standards are not always made verifiably. However, this issue merely shows that debaters sometimes construct their standards poorly. Whether or not “I” could find a disadvantage to a plan is irrelevant to the abuse story, since if my opponent readily presents a disadvantage I could have read and easily found, the warrant for my standard goes away. The allusion to the out-of-round event is nothing more than anecdotal evidence for a ground claim. What is relevant is the reasoning behind why any person could not find good preparation. For example, if the solvency advocate’s paper was not cited in any scholarly literature, that would be a solid warrant against the merits of debating the plan. Thus, the lack of verifiability in this instance is the result of an underdeveloped argument. My definition of out-of-round theory does not allow theory to be on a continuum, and so the premise that out-of-round theory comes in degrees is insufficient to take out this formulation. Again, the violation establishes what the shell is questioning, and in the case of out-of-round theory, the shell is asking the wrong questions. *Special thanks to those who took the time to read prior versions of the article and offer feedback.*

#### **Jurisdiction is a voter in and of itself since otherwise the debate would never end.**

### Disclosure

#### Interp: Debaters must disclose all previously broken positions on [the wiki](https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/), full text or OS, at least 30 minutes before the round, or email them to the opposing debater at least 30 minutes before the round.

#### Violation – I asked. You didn’t disclose. Screenshots – and your practice is downright atrocious.



Text

Description automatically generated with low confidence

#### (See the screenshots from the first shell).

#### Standards:

#### Reciprocity

#### If you use the wiki or benefit from it, you should put your stuff on the wiki too. It’s the only way to set a reciprocal norm.

#### Engagement

#### Disclosure incentivizes good arguments.

**Nails 13** [Jacob Nails (Debate Coach, Sacred Heart HS). “A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third-Party Disclosure).” NSDUpdate. October 10th, 2013. http://nsdupdate.com/2013/a-defense-of-disclosure-including-third-party-disclosure-by-jacob-nails/]

I find that the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides. First, disclosure streamlines research. Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of. Students can look through the different studies on the topic and choose the best ones on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature. The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. Quality of evidence increases across the board.

#### And disclosure motivates research.

**Nails 2** [Jacob Nails (Debate Coach, Sacred Heart HS). “A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third-Party Disclosure).” NSDUpdate. October 10th, 2013. http://nsdupdate.com/2013/a-defense-of-disclosure-including-third-party-disclosure-by-jacob-nails/]

In theory, the increased quality of information could trade off with quantity. If debaters could just look to the wiki for evidence, it might remove the competitive incentive to do one’s own research. Empirically, however, the opposite has been true. In fact, a second advantage of disclosure is that it motivates research. Debaters cannot expect to make it a whole topic with the same stock AC – that is, unless they are continually updating and frontlining it. Likewise, debaters with access to their opponents’ cases can do more targeted and specific research. Students can go to a new level of depth, researching not just the pros and cons of the topic but the specific authors, arguments, and advocacies employed by other debaters. The incentive to cut author-specific indicts is low if there’s little guarantee that the author will ever be cited in a round but high if one knows that specific schools are using that author in rounds. In this way, disclosure increases incentive to research by altering a student’s cost-benefit analysis so that the time spent researching is more valuable, i.e. more likely to produce useful evidence because it is more directed. In any case, if publicly accessible evidence jeopardized research, backfiles and briefs would have done LD in a long time ago.

#### Voter is education – it’s why schools fund debate

DTD

1. It’s irreversible – I had to alter my strat to run theory
2. Deters future abuse – the only way to actually enforce norm-setting
3. **DTA is DTD – it’s the 1AC**

**No RVIs**

1. **Time skew RVIs are incoherent in this round because I’m not arguing fairness as a voter in the first place – and if you run it as a new argument in the 1AR, it bites itself because you’re just wasting your own time.**
2. **Any other RVI requires you to show why the standards are actively bad. So if they can’t do that, don’t grant them an RVI.**

### Sokal K

#### The Aff’s pomobabble shields bad ideas from informed criticism

Boghossian 96

Paul Boghossian Professor of Philosophy, NYU What the Sokal Hoax Ought to Teach Us The pernicious consequences and internal contradictions of "postmodernist" relativism Paul A. Boghossian From the Times Literary Supplement, Commentary. December 13, 1996, pp.14-15 <http://www.academia.edu/download/3239482/What_the_Sokal_Hoax_Ought_to_Teach_Us.doc> -CAT

In the autumn of 1994, New York University theoretical physicist, Alan Sokal, submitted an essay to Social Text, the leading journal in the field of cultural studies. Entitled "Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity," it purported to be a scholarly article about the "postmodern" philosophical and political implications of twentieth century physical theories. However, as the author himself later revealed in the journal Lingua Franca, his essay was merely a farrago of deliberately concocted solecisms, howlers and non-sequiturs, stitched together so as to look good and to flatter the ideological preconceptions of the editors. After review by five members of Social Text's editorial board, Sokal's parody was accepted for publication as a serious piece of scholarship. It appeared in April 1996, in a special double issue of the journal devoted to rebutting the charge that cultural studies critiques of science tend to be riddled with incompetence. Sokal's hoax is fast acquiring the status of a classic succes de scandale, with extensive press coverage in the United States and to a growing extent in Europe and Latin America. In the United States, over twenty public forums devoted to the topic have either taken place or are scheduled, including packed sessions at Princeton, Duke, The University of Michigan, and New York University. But what exactly should it be taken to show? I believe it shows three important things. First, that dubiously coherent relativistic views about the concepts of truth and evidence really have gained wide acceptance within the contemporary academy, just as it has often seemed. Second, that this has had precisely the sorts of pernicious consequence for standards of scholarship and intellectual responsibility that one would expect it to have. Finally, that neither of the preceding two claims need reflect a particular political point of view, least of all a conservative one. It's impossible to do justice to the egregiousness of Sokal's essay without quoting it more or less in its entirety; what follows is a tiny sampling. Sokal starts off by establishing his postmodernist credentials: he derides scientists for continuing to cling to the "dogma imposed by the long post-Enlightenment hegemony over the Western intellectual outlook," that there exists an external world, whose properties are independent of human beings, and that human beings can obtain reliable, if imperfect and tentative knowledge of these properties "by hewing to the 'objective' procedures and epistemological strictures prescribed by the (so-called) scientific method." He asserts that this 'dogma' has already been thoroughly undermined by the theories of general relativity and quantum mechanics, and that physical reality has been shown to be "at bottom a social and linguistic construct." In support of this he adduces nothing more than a couple of pronouncements from physicists Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, pronouncements that have been shown to be naive by sophisticated discussions in the philosophy of science over the past fifty years. Sokal then picks up steam, moving to his central thesis that recent developments within quantum gravity -- an emerging and still-speculative physical theory -- go much further, substantiating not only postmodern denials of the objectivity of truth, but also the beginnings of a kind of physics that would be truly "liberatory," of genuine service to progressive political causes. Here his `reasoning' becomes truly venturesome, as he contrives to generate political and cultural conclusions from the physics of the very, very small. His inferences are mediated by nothing more than a hazy patchwork of puns (especially on the words 'linear' and 'discontinuous'), strained analogies, bald assertions and what can only be described as non-sequiturs of numbing grossness (to use a phrase that Peter Strawson applied to the far less deserving Immanuel Kant). For example, he moves immediately from Bohr's observation that in quantum mechanics "a complete elucidation of one and the same object may require diverse points of view" to: In such a situation, how can a self-perpetuating secular priesthood of credentialed "scientists" purport to maintain a monopoly on the production of scientific knowledge? 'The content and methodology of postmodern science thus provide powerful intellectual support for the progressive political project, understood in its broadest sense: the transgressing of boundaries, the breaking down of barriers, the radical democratization of all aspects of social, economic, political and cultural life. He concludes by calling for the development of a correspondingly emancipated mathematics, one that, by not being based on standard (Zermelo-Fraenkel) set theory, would no longer constrain the progressive and postmodern ambitions of emerging physical science. As if all this weren't enough, en passant, Sokal peppers his piece with as many smaller bits of transparent nonsense as could be made to fit on any given page. Some of these are of a purely mathematical or scientific nature -- that the well-known geometrical constant pi is a variable, that complex number theory, which dates from the nineteenth century and is taught to schoolchildren, is a new and speculative branch of mathematical physics, that the crackpot New Age fantasy of a 'morphogenetic field' constitutes a leading theory of quantum gravity. Others have to do with the alleged philosophical or political implications of basic science -- that quantum field theory confirms Lacan's psychoanalytic speculations about the nature of the neurotic subject, that fuzzy logic is better suited to leftist political causes than classical logic, that Bell's theorem, a technical result in the foundations of quantum mechanics, supports a claimed linkage between quantum theory and "industrial discipline in the early bourgeois epoch." Throughout, Sokal quotes liberally and approvingly from the writings of leading postmodern theorists, including several editors of Social Text, passages that are often breathtaking in their combination of self-confidence and absurdity. Commentators have made much of the scientific, mathematical and philosophical illiteracy that an acceptance of Sokal's ingeniously contrived gibberish would appear to betray. But talk about illiteracy elides an important distinction between two different explanations of what might have led the editors to decide to publish Sokal's piece. One is that, although they understood perfectly well what the various sentences of his article actually mean, they found them plausible, whereas he, along with practically everybody else, doesn't. This might brand them as kooky, but wouldn't impugn their motives. The other hypothesis is that they actually had very little idea what many of the sentences mean, and so were not in a position to evaluate them for plausibility in the first place. The plausibility, or even the intelligibility, of Sokal's arguments just didn't enter into their deliberations. I think it's very clear, and very important, that it's the second hypothesis that's true. To see why consider, by way of example, the following passage from Sokal's essay: Just as liberal feminists are frequently content with a minimal agenda of legal and social equality for women and are "pro-choice," so liberal (and even some socialist) mathematicians are often content to work within the hegemonic Zermelo-Fraenkel framework (which, reflecting its nineteenth-century origins, already incorporates the axiom of equality) supplemented only by the axiom of choice. But this framework is grossly insufficient for a liberatory mathematics, as was proven long ago by Cohen 1966. It's very hard to believe that an editor who knew what the various ingredient terms actually mean would not have raised an eyebrow at this passage. For the axiom of equality in set theory simply provides a definition of when it is that two sets are the same set, namely, when they have the same members; obviously, this has nothing to do with liberalism, or, indeed, with a political philosophy of any stripe. Similarly, the axiom of choice simply says that, given any collection of mutually exclusive sets, there is always a set consisting of exactly one member from each of those sets. Again, this clearly has nothing to do with the issue of choice in the abortion debate. But even if one were somehow able to see one's way clear -- I can't -- to explaining this first quoted sentence in terms of the postmodern love for puns and wordplay, what would explain the subsequent sentence? Paul Cohen's 1966 proves that the question whether or not there is a number between two other particular (transfinite cardinal) numbers isn't settled by the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. How could this conceivably count as a proof that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is inadequate for the purposes of a "liberatory mathematics," whatever precisely that is supposed to be. Wouldn't any editor who knew what Paul Cohen had actually proved in 1966 have required just a little more by way of explanation here, in order to make the connection just a bit more perspicuous? Since one could cite dozens of similar passages -- Sokal goes out of his way to leave telltale clues as to his true intent -- the conclusion is inescapable that the editors of Social Text didn't know what many of the sentences in Sokal's essay actually meant; and that they just didn't care. How could a group of scholars, editing what is supposed to be the leading journal in a given field, allow themselves such a sublime indifference to the content, truth and plausibility of a scholarly submission accepted for publication? By way of explanation, coeditors Andrew Ross and Bruce Robbins have said that as "a non-refereed journal of political opinion and cultural analysis produced by an editorial collective" Social Text has always seen itself in the `little magazine' tradition of the independent left as much as in the academic domain." But it's hard to see this as an adequate explanation; presumably, even a journal of political opinion should care whether what it publishes is intelligible. What Ross and Co. should have said, it seems to me, is that Social Text is a political magazine in a deeper and more radical sense: under appropriate circumstances, it is prepared to let agreement with its ideological orientation trump every other criterion for publication, including something as basic as sheer intelligibility. The prospect of being able to display in their pages a natural scientist -- a physicist, no less -- throwing the full weight of his authority behind their cause was compelling enough for them to overlook the fact that they didn't have much of a clue exactly what sort of support they were being offered. And this, it seems to me, is what's at the heart of the issue raised by Sokal's hoax: not the mere existence of incompetence within the academy, but rather that specific form of it that arises from allowing ideological criteria to displace standards of scholarship so completely that not even considerations of intelligibility are seen as relevant to an argument's acceptability. How, given the recent and sorry history of ideologically motivated conceptions of knowledge -- Lysenkoism in Stalin's Soviet Union, for example, or Nazi critiques of `Jewish science' -- could it again have become acceptable to behave in this way? The complete historical answer is a long story, but there can be little doubt that one of its crucial components is the brush-fire spread, within vast sectors of the humanities and social sciences, of the cluster of simple-minded relativistic views about truth and evidence that are commonly identified as `postmodernist'. These views license, and on the most popular versions insist upon, the substitution of political and ideological criteria for the historically more familiar assessment in terms of truth, evidence and argument. Most philosophers accept the claim that there is no such thing as a totally disinterested inquirer, one who approaches his or her topic utterly devoid of any prior assumptions, values or biases. Postmodernism goes well beyond this historicist observation, as feminist scholar Linda Nicholson explains (without necessarily endorsing): The traditional historicist claim that all inquiry is inevitably influenced by the values of the inquirer provides a very weak counter to the norm of objectivity" [T]he more radical move in the postmodern turn was to claim that the very criteria demarcating the true and the false, as well as such related distinctions as science and myth or fact and superstition, were internal to the traditions of modernity and could not be legitimized outside of those traditions. Moreover, it was argued that the very development and use of such criteria, as well as their extension to ever wider domains, had to be described as representing the growth and development of `specific regimes of power.' (From the "Introduction" to her anthology, Feminism and Postmodernism) As Nicholson sees, historicism, however broadly understood, doesn't entail that there is no such thing as objective truth. To concede that no one ever believes something solely because it's true is not to deny that anything is objectively true. Furthermore, the concession that no inquirer or inquiry is fully bias-free doesn't entail that they can't be more or less bias-free, or that their biases can't be more or less damaging. To concede that the truth is never the only thing that someone is tracking isn't to deny that some people or methods are better than others at staying on its track. Historicism leaves intact, then, both the claim that one's aim should be to arrive at conclusions that are objectively true and justified, independently of any particular perspective, and that science is the best idea that anyone has had about how to satisfy that aim. Postmodernism, in seeking to demote science from the privileged epistemic position it has come to occupy, and thereby to blur the distinction between it and `other ways of knowing, -- myth and superstition, for example -- needs to go much further than historicism, all the way to the denial that objective truth is a coherent aim that inquiry may have. Indeed, according to postmodernism, the very development and use of the rhetoric of objectivity, far from embodying a serious metaphysics and epistemology of truth and evidence, represents a mere play for power, a way of silencing these `other ways of knowing'. It follows, given this standpoint, that the struggle against the rhetoric of objectivity isn't primarily an intellectual matter, but a political one: the rhetoric needs to be defeated, rather than just refuted. Against this backdrop, it becomes very easy to explain the behavior of the editors of Social Text. Although it may be hard to understand how anyone could actually hold views as extreme as these, their ubiquity these days is a distressingly familiar fact. A front-page article in the New York Times of October 22, 1996 provided a recent illustration. The article concerned the conflict between two views of where Native American populations originated -- the scientific archeological account, and the account offered by some Native American creation myths. According to the former extensively confirmed view, humans first entered the Americas from Asia, crossing the Bering Strait over 10,000 years ago. By contrast, some Native American creation accounts hold that native peoples have lived in the Americas ever since their ancestors first emerged onto the surface of the earth from a subterranean world of spirits. The Times noted that many archeologists, torn between their commitment to scientific method and their appreciation for native culture, "have been driven close to a postmodern relativism in which science is just one more belief system." Roger Anyon, a British archeologist who has worked for the Zuni people, was quoted as saying: "Science is just one of many ways of knowing the world".[The Zunis' world view is] just as valid as the archeological viewpoint of what prehistory is about." How are we to make sense of this? (Sokal himself mentioned this example at a recent public forum in New York and was taken to task by Andrew Ross for putting Native Americans "on trial." But this issue isn't about Native American views; it's about postmodernism.) The claim that the Zuni myth can be "just as valid" as the archeological theory can be read in one of three different ways, between which postmodern theorists tend not to distinguish sufficiently: as a claim about truth, as a claim about justification, or as a claim about purpose. As we shall see, however, none of these claims is even remotely plausible. Interpreted as a claim about truth, the suggestion would be that the Zuni and archeological views are equally true. On the face of it, though, this is impossible, since they contradict each other. One says, or implies, that the first humans in the Americas came from Asia; the other says, or implies, that they did not, that they came from somewhere else, a subterranean world of spirits. How could a claim and its denial both be true? If I say that the earth is flat, and you say that it's round, how could we both be right? Postmodernists like to respond to this sort of point by saying that both claims can be true because both are true relative to some perspective or other, and there can be no question of truth outside of perspectives. Thus, according to the Zuni perspective, the first humans in the Americas came from a subterranean world; and according to the Western scientific perspective, the first humans came from Asia. Since both are true according to some perspective or other, both are true. But to say that some claim is true according to some perspective sounds simply like a fancy way of saying that someone, or some group, believes it. The crucial question concerns what we are to say when what I believe -- what's true according to my perspective -- conflicts with what you believe -- with what's true according to your perspective? The one thing not to say, it seems to me, on pain of utter unintelligibility, is that both claims are true. This should be obvious, but can also be seen by applying the view to itself. For consider: If a claim and its opposite can be equally true provided that there is some perspective relative to which each is true, then, since there is a perspective -- realism -- relative to which it's true that a claim and its opposite cannot both be true, postmodernism would have to admit that it itself is just as true as its opposite, realism. But postmodernism cannot afford to admit that: presumably, its whole point is that realism is false. Thus, we see that the very statement of postmodernism, construed as a view about truth, undermines itself: facts about truth independent of particular perspectives are presupposed by the view itself. How does it fare when considered as a claim about evidence or justification? So construed, the suggestion comes to the claim that the Zuni story and the archeological theory are equally justified, given the available evidence. Now, in contrast with the case of truth, it is not incoherent for a claim and its negation to be equally justified, for instance, in cases where there is very little evidence for either side. But, prima facie, anyway, this isn't the sort of case that's at issue, for according to the available evidence, the archeological theory is far better confirmed than the Zuni myth. To get the desired relativistic result, a postmodernist would have to claim that the two views are equally justified given their respective rules of evidence, and add that there is no objective fact of the matter which set of rules is to be preferred. Given this relativization of justification to the rules of evidence characteristic of a given perspective, the archeological theory would be justified relative to the rules of evidence of Western science, and the Zuni story would be justified relative to the rules of evidence employed by the relevant tradition of myth-making. Furthermore, since there are no perspective-independent rules of evidence that could adjudicate between these two sets of rules, both claims would be equally justified and there could be no choosing between them. Once again, however, there is a problem not merely with plausibility, but with self-refutation. For suppose we grant that every rule of evidence is as good as any other. Then any claim could be made to count as justified simply by formulating an appropriate rule of evidence relative to which it is justified. Indeed, it would follow that we could justify the claim that not every rule of evidence is as good as any other, thereby forcing the postmodernist to concede that his views about truth and justification are just as justified as his opponent's. Presumably, however, the postmodernist needs to hold that his views are better than his opponent's; otherwise what's to recommend them? On the other hand, if some rules of evidence can be said to be better than others, then there must be perspective-independent facts about what makes them better and a thoroughgoing relativism about justification is false. It is sometimes suggested that the intended sense in which the Zuni myth is "just as valid" has nothing to do with truth or justification, but rather with the different purposes that the myth subserves, in contrast with those of science. According to this line of thought, science aims to give to give a descriptively accurate account of reality, whereas the Zuni myth belongs to the realm of religious practice and the constitution of cultural identity. It is to be regarded as having symbolic, emotional, and ritual purposes other than the mere description of reality. And as such, it may serve those purposes very well -- better, perhaps, than the archeologist's account. The trouble with this as a reading of "just as valid" is not so much that it's false, but that it's irrelevant to the issue at hand: even if it were granted, it couldn't help advance the cause of postmodernism. For if the Zuni myth isn't taken to compete with the archeological theory, as a descriptively accurate account of prehistory, its existence has no prospect of casting any doubt on the objectivity of the account delivered by science. If I say that the earth is flat, and you make no assertion at all, but instead tell me an interesting story, that has no potential for raising deep issues about the objectivity of what either of us said or did. Is there, perhaps, a weaker thesis that, while being more defensible than these simple-minded relativisms, would nevertheless yield an anti-objectivist result? It's hard to see what such a thesis would be. Stanley Fish, for example, in seeking to discredit Sokal's characterization of postmodernism, offers the following (Opinion piece, The New York Times): What sociologists of science say is that of course the world is real and independent of our observations but that accounts of the world are produced by observers and are therefore relative to their capacities, education and training, etc. It is not the world or its properties but the vocabularies in whose terms we know them that are socially constructed" The rest of Fish's discussion leaves it thoroughly unclear exactly what he thinks this observation shows; but claims similar to his are often presented by others as constituting yet another basis for arguing against the objectivity of science. The resultant arguments are unconvincing. It goes without saying that the vocabularies with which we seek to know the world are socially constructed and that they therefore reflect various contingent aspects of our capacities, limitations and interests. But it doesn't follow that those vocabularies are therefore incapable of meeting the standards of adequacy relevant to the expression and discovery of objective truths. We may illustrate why by using Fish's own example. There is no doubt that the game of baseball as we have it, with its particular conceptions of what counts as a `strike' and what counts as a `ball,' reflects various contingent facts about us as physical and social creatures. `Strike' and `ball' are socially constructed concepts, if anything is. However, once these concepts have been defined -- once the strike zone has been specified -- there are then perfectly objective facts about what counts as a strike and what counts as a ball. (The fact that the umpire is the court of last appeal doesn't mean that he can't make mistakes.) Similarly, our choice of one conceptual scheme rather than another, for the purposes of doing science, probably reflects various contingent facts about our capacities and limitations, so that a thinker with different capacities and limitations, a Martian for example, might find it natural to employ a different scheme. This does nothing to show that our conceptual scheme is incapable of expressing objective truths. Realism is not committed to there being only one vocabulary in which objective truths might be expressed; all it's committed to is the weaker claim that, once a vocabulary is specified, it will then be an objective matter whether or not assertions couched in that vocabulary are true or false. We are left with two puzzles. Given what the basic tenets of postmodernism are, how did they ever come to be identified with a progressive political outlook? And given how transparently refutable they are, how did they ever come to gain such widespread acceptance? In the Unites States, postmodernism is closely linked to the movement known as multiculturalism, broadly conceived as the project of giving proper credit to the contributions of cultures and communities whose achievements have been historically neglected or undervalued. In this connection, it has come to appeal to certain progressive sensibilities because it supplies the philosophical resources with which to prevent anyone from accusing oppressed cultures of holding false or unjustified views. Even on purely political grounds, however, it is difficult to understand how this could have come to seem a good way to conceive of multiculturalism. For if the powerful can't criticize the oppressed, because the central epistemological categories are inexorably tied to particular perspectives, it also follows that the oppressed can't criticize the powerful. The only remedy, so far as I can see, for what threatens to be a strongly conservative upshot, is to accept an overt double standard: allow a questionable idea to be criticized if it is held by those in a position of power -- Christian creationism -- for example, but not if it is held by those whom the powerful oppress -- Zuni creationism, for example. Familiar as this stratagem has recently become, how can it possibly appeal to anyone with the slightest degree of intellectual integrity; and how can it fail to seem anything other than deeply offensive to the progressive sensibilities whose cause it is supposed to further? As for the second question, regarding widespread acceptance, the short answer is that questions about truth, meaning and objectivity are among the most difficult and thorny questions that philosophy confronts and so are very easily mishandled. A longer answer would involve explaining why analytic philosophy, the dominant tradition of philosophy in the English-speaking world, wasn't able to exert a more effective corrective influence. After all, analytic philosophy is primarily known for its detailed and subtle discussion of concepts in the philosophy of language and the theory of knowledge, the very concepts that postmodernism so badly misunderstands. Isn't it reasonable to expect it to have had a greater impact on the philosophical explorations of its intellectual neighbors? And if it hasn't, can that be because its reputation for insularity is at least partly deserved? Because philosophy concerns the most general categories of knowledge, categories that apply to any compartment of inquiry, it is inevitable that other disciplines will reflect on philosophical problems and develop philosophical positions. Analytic philosophy has a special responsibility to ensure that its insights on matters of broad intellectual interest are available widely, to more than a narrow class of insiders. Whatever the correct explanation for the current malaise, Alan Sokal's hoax has served as a flashpoint for what has been a gathering storm of protest against the collapse in standards of scholarship and intellectual responsibility that vast sectors of the humanities and social sciences are currently afflicted with. Significantly, some of the most biting commentary has come from distinguished voices on the left, showing that when it comes to transgressions as basic as these, political alliances afford no protection. Anyone still inclined to doubt the seriousness of the problem has only to read Sokal's parody.

#### By isolating me from their discourse, the Aff creates unfair political power in this debate space

Pollman 02

ARTICLE:BUILDING A TOWER OF BABEL OR BUILDING A DISCIPLINE? TALKING ABOUT LEGAL WRITING, 85 Marq. L. Rev. 887, 916-921 Summer, 2002 Reporter 85 Marq. L. Rev. 887 \* Length: 17959 words Author: Terrill Pollman\* \* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

The legal academy, however, must contend not only with the traditional use of jargon in the law but also the traditional use of academic jargon. For example, language scholar Walter Nash offers a [\*917] schematic explanation of how various segments of society use jargon. Nash divides jargon into "shop talk" - the language of professions, "sales talk" - the language of production and consumerism, and "show talk" - the jargon of pretension. It is "show talk" that Nash finds objectionable. He has said that "it is a claim to status. To speak in this way is to assume the guise of the articulate, the secure, the self-assured; the speaker lets the world know that he knows his stuff." Nash puts the language of the academic in the category of "show talk." Nash is not the only language scholar who has deplored the use of jargon in the academy. An early study in a different academic area may show that academics are unduly impressed with professional language of any sort. In 1973, the scholars Donald Naftulin, John Ware, and Frank Donnelly asked an actor to play "Dr. Fox." Dr. Fox gave a lecture to an audience of psychiatrists, psychologists, professors, and administrators. Although the lecture relied on authentic scholarship [\*918] in mathematics, the scholars had rewritten it with "'excessive use of double talk neologisms, non sequiturs and contradictory statements … and meaningless references to unrelated topics.'" The audience was almost unanimously favorable in responding to a questionnaire on the quality of the lecture. One problem with the audience response might be that the audience was comprised of experts in psychology, and not the lecture's topic, mathematics. The audience was, however, generally familiar with mathematics, and the researchers concluded that presentation mattered more than content, and it was important enough to the audience to be "in the know" that they would not question content dressed up in gobbledegook. The Dr. Fox study drew considerable attention, and in 1980 another researcher, J. Scott Armstrong, expanded on the idea. Armstrong took sample passages from ten well-known academic journals and applied the Flesch Reading Ease test. The results showed that the more prestigious the journal, the more difficult the reading. Although this result left open the possibility that the "better" journals selected more complex ideas, a further study by Armstrong suggested that was not true. In that experiment, Armstrong edited four previously published articles to make them either easier or more difficult to read. Then he asked thirty-two academics, this time specialists in the article's field, to rate them. All of the original articles were rated higher than the easier to read version. Similarly, the more complex articles often rated better than the original, and always rated at least as well. The inescapable conclusion for scholars who hope to publish an article in a prestigious [\*919] journal is that they are more likely to attain that goal using a complex and difficult-to-read style. Although these studies are dated, a more recent example of the academy allowing jargon to cloud professional judgment was Alan D. Sokal's notorious hoax. Sokal, a physics professor at New York University, submitted a jargon-ladened article entitled Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity to the prestigious journal, Social Text. Shortly after the professionally edited journal accepted and published the piece, Sokal announced that his article was an experiment to see whether his garbled nonsensical article would fool the editors of a major journal of social criticism. Although these examples did not involve the field of law, similar principles should prove equally applicable in the legal academy. Student editors choose articles for publication in most law reviews. Student editors may be more clear-sighted and less pompous about elitist jargon than the professionals in the Armstrong study or the editors of Social Text in the Sokal hoax. However, as novices to the profession, some student editors have more difficulty recognizing "an excessive amount of double-talk, non-sequiters, contradictory statements and jargon … and meaningless references to unrelated topics" of a "Doctor Fox" article. For example, recognizing that articles full of post-modern jargon were in "vogue," the Michigan Law Review published a clever spoof titled, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" for the Uninitiated. Although there is no record revealing why the student editors decided to publish the article, a frustration with the popularity of post-modernist jargon may be one reason. Nevertheless, the decision that it was funny enough [\*920] to print, and the initial momentary confusion readers may have felt as they decided whether it was parody, indicate that post-modern jargon has been plentifully published by law reviews. At least it is probable that the student editors of the Michigan Law Review knew that they were publishing a parody, unlike the editors at Social Text. The rise of cross-disciplinary studies has led to another common illustration of how jargon may create misunderstanding within the legal academy. More than one faculty member, more versed in traditional doctrinal analysis than modern rhetorical theory, has left a faculty colloquium presented by a post-modernist "law and scholar" asking plaintively, "What were they talking about?" Jargon in this instance hinders communication. However, if the "Doctor Fox" principles still apply, as the publication of the Pomobabble article suggests that they may, some of these jargon-laden presentations have led not only to confusion but also to job offers from faculties impressed by the elite language. Thus, while jargon-laden speech or writing may limit accessibility, it may enhance the status of the jargon user. Similarly, jargon may create a sense of community but at the same time distance the user from others. Employing specialized, "expert" language creates a world of insiders, members of the tribe who know the language, which in turn creates a sense of solidarity. In an emerging area of study, disciples recognize each other by the language they speak. Thus, identifying others who also participate, who "speak the same language," can create a needed sense of commonality, and may actually create political power. The "Dr. Fox" principle suggests that other legal academics will be impressed by this "show talk" and respect the emerging area more as its language develops. A professional vocabulary may legitimize an area of study and create a sense of solidarity among those traditionally disadvantaged in the legal academy. Professional jargon can at least lead other legal academics to recognize that legal writing is an emerging area of substance. To those impressed by "show talk," the jargon confirms the contention that study is necessary before one can claim to be an expert in the area. On the other hand, however, in addition to creating solidarity by identifying insiders and impressing colleagues susceptible to "show talk," using jargon can reinforce the political isolation of those who [\*921] speak the new language. In a field as conservative and resistant to change as law, being part of an emerging area and separating oneself from the accepted doctrine is often politically risky. Those who participate in the new area may already be marginalized because of mainstream disdain for the new area, and the jargon of the new area may serve to further marginalize the speakers. Legal writing teachers already are separated from their colleagues by status issues, and the language that they use might distance them further from others in the legal community. At the same time, this distance may reflect the emerging boundaries of the new discipline. In effect, recognition of the boundaries could lead to recognition of legal writing as an area of study with its own substance. In sum, legal writing professionals face complex decisions when balancing the positive and negative political effects of using jargon. Legal writing needs legitimacy in the legal academy, but jargon may lend a false, "Dr. Fox" legitimacy. Whether legal writing can afford this type of legitimacy is questionable. The pretensions of "show talk" are especially dangerous for teachers of communication who are working to develop a true "shop talk." The legal writing professionals' ultimate goal of furthering efficient and inclusive communication within the legal community must trump the political benefits of impressing other academics by using impenetrable jargon.

#### That’s an independent link to the ableism DA; they’re forcing ADHD and dysgraphic students like me to wade through mountains of incomprehensible gibberish and they wouldn’t even explain this nonsense in CX.

#### The alt is to promote scientific inquiry through inclusive, jargon-free discourse; that’s how we check against right-wing extremists.

Berube 11

[Michael, Paterno Family Professor in Literature and Director of the Institute for the Arts and Humanities at Pennsylvania State University, where he teaches cultural studies and American literature, “ The Science Wars Redux,” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Issue #19, Winter 2011 <http://democracyjournal.org/article2.php?ID=6789&limit=3000&limit2=4500&page=3>]

But what of Sokal’s chief post-hoax claim that the academic left’s critiques of science were potentially damaging to the left? That one, alas, has held up very well, for it turns out that the critique of scientific “objectivity” and the insistence on the inevitable “partiality” of knowledge can serve the purposes of climate-change deniers and young-Earth creationists quite nicely. That’s not because there was something fundamentally rotten at the core of philosophical anti-foundationalism (whose leading American exponent, Richard Rorty, remained a progressive Democrat all his life), but it might very well have had something to do with the cloistered nature of the academic left. It was as if we had tacitly assumed, all along, that we were speaking only to one another, so that whenever we championed Jean-François Lyotard’s defense of the “hetereogeneity of language games” and spat on Jürgen Habermas’s ideal of a conversation oriented toward “consensus,” we assumed a strong consensus among us that anyone on the side of heterogeneity was on the side of the angels. But now the climate-change deniers and the young-Earth creationists are coming after the natural scientists, just as I predicted–and they’re using some of the very arguments developed by an academic left that thought it was speaking only to people of like mind. Some standard left arguments, combined with the left-populist distrust of “experts” and “professionals” and assorted high-and-mighty muckety-mucks who think they’re the boss of us, were fashioned by the right into a powerful device for delegitimating scientific research. For example, when Andrew Ross asked in Strange Weather, “How can metaphysical life theories and explanations taken seriously by millions be ignored or excluded by a small group of powerful people called ‘scientists’?,” everyone was supposed to understand that he was referring to alternative medicine, and that his critique of “scientists” was meant to bring power to the people. The countercultural account of “metaphysical life theories” that gives people a sense of dignity in the face of scientific authority sounds good–until one substitutes “astrology” or “homeopathy” or “creationism” (all of which are certainly taken seriously by millions) in its place. The right’s attacks on climate science, mobilizing a public distrust of scientific expertise, eventually led science-studies theorist Bruno Latour to write in Critical Inquiry: Entire Ph.D. programs are still running to make sure that good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made up, that there is no such thing as natural, unmediated, unbiased access to truth...while dangerous extremists are using the very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives. Was I wrong to participate in the invention of this field known as science studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean what we meant? Why does it burn my tongue to say that global warming is a fact whether you like it or not? Why can’t I simply say that the argument is closed for good? Why, indeed? Why not say, definitively, that anthropogenic climate change is real, that vaccines do not cause autism, that the Earth revolves around the Sun, and that Adam and Eve did not ride dinosaurs to church? At the close of his “Afterword” to "Transgressing the Boundaries," Sokal wrote: No wonder most Americans can’t distinguish between science and pseudoscience: their science teachers have never given them any rational grounds for doing so. (Ask an average undergraduate: Is matter composed of atoms? Yes. Why do you think so? The reader can fill in the response.) Is it then any surprise that 36 percent of Americans believe in telepathy, and that 47 percent believe in the creation account of Genesis? It can’t be denied that some science-studies scholars have deliberately tried to blur the distinction between science and pseudoscience. As I noted in Rhetorical Occasions and on my personal blog, British philosopher of science Steve Fuller traveled to Dover, Pennsylvania, in 2005 to testify on behalf of the local school board’s fundamentalist conviction that Intelligent Design is a legitimate science. “The main problem intelligent design theory suffers from at the moment,” Fuller argued, “is a paucity of developers.” Somehow, Fuller managed to miss the point–that there is no way to develop a research program in ID. What is one to do, examine fossils for evidence of God’s fingerprints?

#### Thus, the double-bind: Either the Aff can get up and explain this crap in the 1AR, which proves the link, or they can’t, at which point it’s not an argument and you can negate on presumption.

### Cap K v 3

#### The link is starting points – neoliberalism causes massive global dehumanization and requires unrelenting class-based politics before challenging other politics of difference.

McLaren 4

Distinguished Fellow – Critical Studies @ Chapman U and UCLA urban schooling prof, and Scatamburlo-D’Annibale, associate professor of Communication – U Windsor, ‘4 (Peter and Valerie, “Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’,” Educational Philosophy and Theory Vol. 36, Issue 2, p. 183-199)

The grosteque conditions that inspired Marx to pen his original critique of capitalism are present and flourishing. The inequalities of wealth and the gross imbalances of power that exist today are leading to abuses that exceed those encountered in Marx’s day (Greider, 1998, p. 39). Global capitalism has paved the way for the obscene concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands and created a world increasingly divided between those who enjoy opulent affluence and those who languish in dehumanizing conditions and economic misery. In every corner of the globe, we are witnessing social disintegration as revealed by a rise in abject poverty and inequality. At the current historical juncture, the combined assets of the 225 richest people is roughly equal to the annual income of the poorest 47 percent of the world’s population, while the combined assets of the three richest people exceed the combined GDP of the 48 poorest nations (CCPA, 2002, p. 3). Approximately 2.8 billion people—almost half of the world’s population—struggle in desperation to live on less than two dollars a day (McQuaig, 2001, p. 27). As many as 250 million children are wage slaves and there are over a billion workers who are either un- or under-employed. These are the concrete realities of our time—realities that require a vigorous class analysis, an unrelenting critique of capitalism and an oppositional politics capable of confronting what Ahmad (1998, p. 2) refers to as ‘capitalist universality.’ They are realities that require something more than that which is offered by the prophets of ‘difference’ and post-Marxists who would have us relegate socialism to the scrapheap of history and mummify Marxism along with Lenin’s corpse. Never before has a Marxian analysis of capitalism and class rule been so desperately needed. That is not to say that everything Marx said or anticipated has come true, for that is clearly not the case. Many critiques of Marx focus on his strategy for moving toward socialism, and with ample justification; nonetheless Marx did provide us with fundamental insights into class society that have held true to this day. Marx’s enduring relevance lies in his indictment of capitalism which continues to wreak havoc in the lives of most. While capitalism’s cheerleaders have attempted to hide its sordid underbelly, Marx’s description of capitalism as the sorcerer’s dark power is even more apt in light of contemporary historical and economic conditions. Rather than jettisoning Marx, decentering the role of capitalism, and discrediting class analysis, radical educators must continue to engage Marx’s oeuvre and extrapolate from it that which is useful pedagogically, theoretically, and, most importantly, politically in light of the challenges that confront us. The urgency which animates Amin’s call for a collective socialist vision necessitates, as we have argued, moving beyond the particularism and liberal pluralism that informs the ‘politics of difference.’ It also requires challenging the questionable assumptions that have come to constitute the core of contemporary ‘radical’ theory, pedagogy and politics. In terms of effecting change, what is needed is a cogent understanding of the systemic nature of exploitation and oppression based on the precepts of a radical political economy approach (outlined above) and one that incorporates Marx’s notion of ‘unity in difference’ in which people share widely common material interests. Such an understanding extends far beyond the realm of theory, for the manner in which we choose to interpret and explore the social world, the concepts and frameworks we use to express our sociopolitical understandings, are more than just abstract categories. They imply intentions, organizational practices, and political agendas. Identifying class analysis as the basis for our understandings and class struggle as the basis for political transformation implies something quite different than constructing a sense of political agency around issues of race, ethnicity, gender, etc. Contrary to ‘Shakespeare’s assertion that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet,’ it should be clear that this is not the case in political matters. Rather, in politics ‘the essence of the flower lies in the name by which it is called’ (Bannerji, 2000, p. 41).

#### Thus, the ROB - vote for the debater who has the better liberatory strategy to free us from neoliberalism. The alt is to reject consumerism and embrace socialism.; millennials prove feasibility

Lynch 19

Conor Lynch, *The Week*, “Think Young People Are Hostile to Capitalism Now? Just wait for the next recession.” 10/17/2019. Conor Lynch is a freelance journalist living in New York City. He has written for The New Republic, Salon, and Alternet. <https://theweek.com/articles/871131/think-young-people-are-hostile-capitalism-now-just-wait-next-recession> CAT

Though the panic that erupted during the summer months about a potential recession has cooled somewhat since, especially with the impeachment drama taking up most of our collective attention, signs of a looming economic downturn nevertheless remain. Job growth has slowed, levels of corporate and consumer debt have both reached all-time highs (surpassing levels last seen before the Great Recession), and the yield curve measuring the difference between 10-year and 3-month Treasury bond yields has been "inverted" for months. The economist Campbell Harvey, whose research showed that the inverted yield curve accurately predicted the last seven recessions, recently said that the indicator is "flashing code red." "It's not normal. It's something that foreshadows bad times," observed Campbell. A downturn is probably on the horizon, then, and while it may not be as devastating as the 2008 recession, which threatened to undo the entire financial system, there's a good chance that the public will respond with even more anger and intensity than 10 years ago. The last economic crisis contributed directly to the rise of populism over the following decade, but the next crisis will come squarely within the age of populism. It will also come in an age of extreme inequality and polarization, where capitalism is being questioned and critiqued more than in any other period since the end of the Cold War, especially by the generation that came of age during the Great Recession. The rise of populism wasn't just a response to the financial crisis and its painful consequences, though. It was a response to the fact that nothing fundamentally changed in its aftermath. The big banks remained too big to fail, executives who had overseen rampant fraud remained free (with their generous bonuses intact), income and wealth inequality continued to grow out of control, and wages continued to stagnate as billionaires saw their wealth multiply. In other words, the economy "recovered" for those on top, while the recession lingered for everyone else. In his modern classic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, the French economist Thomas Piketty suggested that growing inequality in America contributed directly to the country's financial instability. One consequence of increasing inequality, he wrote, "was virtual stagnation of the purchasing power of the lower and middle classes in the United States, which inevitably made it more likely that modest households would take on debt, especially since unscrupulous banks and financial institutions, freed from regulation and eager to earn good yields on the enormous savings injected into the system by the well-to-do, offered credit on increasingly generous terms." A decade after the crisis, income inequality is the highest it's been in America since the Census Bureau began tracking it over five decades ago. And disparities in wealth are even more extreme. Meanwhile, household debt has exceeded levels seen in 2008, reaching $14 trillion earlier this year. This number is driven largely by student loans and credit card debt, which steadily grow as wages stagnate and jobs become more precarious. These trends disproportionately affect young people, although that hasn't stopped the financial class from blaming them for the "sluggish economy." Millennials are reportedly consuming less and saving more, which is causing an "economic imbalance." "The higher savings rate, we believe, has had disinflationary impact, driving the relatively slow growth and low inflation in this recovery," wrote an analyst for Raymond James, observing that younger people are "saving instead of purchasing like last generation, limiting demand growth." The fact that millennials are consuming less than their Gen-X and baby boomer elders may indicate a slight cultural shift from the consumerist mindset of previous generations, but the more likely cause is that they simply have less disposable income to throw around. A recent study that surveyed 4,000 American consumers found that, since 1996, the average net worth of consumers under 35 has dropped by 35 percent. This, along with declining real wages, increasing cost of living (home ownership has substantially declined for millennials), and swelling levels of debt, makes the growing millennial hostility towards capitalism perfectly sensible. People "behave more like their income than their age," said one of the study's authors, and just as the American working class became the middle class in the mid-20th century and thus embraced capitalism, young people in the 21st century are being proletarianized (or precariatized) and thus embracing socialism. Coming of age in the midst of the financial crisis and entering the workforce during the rise of the gig economy has given millennials an intuitive understanding of the deep instability and unfairness of our economic (and political) system. A recent survey from Quinnipiac revealed just how divided older and younger Democrats are on capitalism. Forty-four percent of those aged 18-34 supported the "democratic socialist" Bernie Sanders, compared to 22 percent for Elizabeth Warren (who is progressive but "capitalist to her bones") and 9 percent for Joe Biden. On the other hand, 41 percent of those over 65 supported Biden, compared to 26 percent for Warren and an incredible 2 percent for Sanders. The socialist platform of Sanders repels older voters who grew up in the so-called "golden age" of capitalism, while it naturally appeals to younger voters who grew up in the age of neoliberalism and economic crisis. Of course, it's not just about one's personal income or wealth, but the impact that capitalism is having on the future of the planet as well. The 16-year old Greta Thunberg captured well in her UN speech last month: "We are in the beginning of a mass extinction, and all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth." When the next recession comes, young people and the working class will no doubt be impacted the hardest, and this will only further radicalize their politics. The more they feel that the system is rigged against them, the more they will demand the system itself be overthrown. After the 2008 recession, President Obama and the Democrats effectively saved capitalism from itself; a more radical leadership would fight to replace it with a better system. This time around there may be far more pressure from below to do just that, especially with a more organized left and more class conscious young people. Politics is situational, and economic and political circumstances have changed drastically over the past few decades — especially since the financial crisis. The baby boomers grew up and spent their adult lives under very different conditions than most millennials today, and their contrasting worldviews reflect this reality. Millennials are set to overtake baby boomers this year as the largest generation in America, and after 10 years of tepid recovery, they will have a real say in how to respond to the next crisis. Don't expect them to take it quietly.

#### And, dismantling capitalism o/ws under under any framework -- it’s the greatest existential threat and the biggest affront to human rights and structural inequalities. The consensus of recent studies prove that transition is possible but that requires radical rejection of current neoliberal politics

Ahmed 20

Nafeez Ahmed -- Visiting Research Fellow at the Global Sustainability Institute at Anglia Ruskin University's Faculty of Science & Technology + M.A. in contemporary war & peace studies + DPhil (April 2009) in international relations from the School of Global Studies @ Sussex University, “Capitalism is Destroying ‘Safe Operating Space’ for Humanity, Warn Scientists”, https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-06-24/capitalism-is-destroying-safe-operating-space-for-humanity-warn-scientists/, 24 June 2020, EmmieeM) -recut CAT

* The last paragraph shows that rapid peaceful transition is possible so put away that garbage Harris 02 transition wars card

The COVID19 pandemic has exposed a strange anomaly in the global economy. If it doesn’t keep growing endlessly, it just breaks. Grow, or die. But there’s a deeper problem. New scientific research confirms that capitalism’s structural obsession with endless growth is destroying the very conditions for human survival on planet Earth. A landmark study in the journal Nature Communications, “Scientists’ warning on affluence” — by scientists in Australia, Switzerland and the UK — concludes that the most fundamental driver of environmental destruction is the overconsumption of the super-rich. This factor lies over and above other factors like fossil fuel consumption, industrial agriculture and deforestation: because it is overconsumption by the super-rich which is the chief driver of these other factors breaching key planetary boundaries. The paper notes that the richest 10 percent of people are responsible for up to 43 percent of destructive global environmental impacts. In contrast, the poorest 10 percent in the world are responsible just around 5 percent of these environmental impacts: The new paper is authored by Thomas Wiedmann of UNSW Sydney’s School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Manfred Lenzen of the University of Sydney’s School of Physics, Lorenz T. Keysser of ETH Zürich’s Department of Environmental Systems Science, and Julia K. Steinberger of Leeds University’s School of Earth and Environment. It confirms that global structural inequalities in the distribution of wealth are intimately related to an escalating environmental crisis threatening the very existence of human societies. Synthesising knowledge from across the scientific community, the paper identifies capitalism as the main cause behind “alarming trends of environmental degradation” which now pose “existential threats to natural systems, economies and societies.” The paper concludes: “It is clear that prevailing capitalist, growth-driven economic systems have not only increased affluence since World War II, but have led to enormous increases in inequality, financial instability, resource consumption and environmental pressures on vital earth support systems.” Capitalism and the pandemic Thanks to the way capitalism works, the paper shows, the super-rich are incentivised to keep getting richer — at the expense of the health of our societies and the planet overall. The research provides an important scientific context for how we can understand many earlier scientific studies revealing that industrial expansion has hugely increased the risks of new disease outbreaks. Just last April, a paper in Landscape Ecology found that deforestation driven by increased demand for consumption of agricultural commodities or beef have increased the probability of ‘zoonotic’ diseases (exotic diseases circulating amongst animals) jumping to humans. This is because industrial expansion, driven by capitalist pressures, has intensified the encroachment of human activities on wildlife and natural ecosystems. Two years ago, another study in Frontiers of Microbiology concluded presciently that accelerating deforestation due to “demographic growth” and the associated expansion of “farming, logging, and hunting”, is dangerously transforming rural environments. More bat species carrying exotic viruses have ended up next to human dwellings, the study said. This is increasing “the risk of transmission of viruses through direct contact, domestic animal infection, or contamination by urine or faeces.” It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the COVID19 pandemic thus emerged directly from these rapidly growing impacts of human activities. As the new paper in Nature Communications confirms, these impacts have accelerated in the context of the fundamental operations of industrial capitalism. Eroding the ‘safe operating space’ The result is that capitalism is causing human societies to increasingly breach key planetary boundaries, such as land-use change, biosphere integrity and climate change. Remaining within these boundaries is essential to maintain what scientists describe as a “safe operating space” for human civilization. If those key ecosystems are disrupted, that “safe operating space” will begin to erode. The global impacts of the COVID19 pandemic are yet another clear indication that this process of erosion has already begun. “The evidence is clear,” write Weidmann and his co-authors. “Long-term and concurrent human and planetary wellbeing will not be achieved in the Anthropocene if affluent overconsumption continues, spurred by economic systems that exploit nature and humans. We find that, to a large extent, the affluent lifestyles of the world’s rich determine and drive global environmental and social impact. Moreover, international trade mechanisms allow the rich world to displace its impact to the global poor.” The new scientific research thus confirms that the normal functioning of capitalism is eroding the ‘safe space’ by which human civilisation is able to survive. The structures The paper also sets out how this is happening in some detail. The super-rich basically end up driving this destructive system forward in three key ways. Firstly, they are directly responsible for “biophysical resource use… through high consumption.” Secondly, they are “members of powerful factions of the capitalist class.” Thirdly, due to that positioning, they end up “driving consumption norms across the population.” But perhaps the most important insight of the paper is not that this is purely because the super-rich are especially evil or terrible compared to the rest of the population — but because of the systemic pressures produced by capitalist structures. The authors point out that: “Growth imperatives are active at multiple levels, making the pursuit of economic growth (net investment, i.e. investment above depreciation) a necessity for different actors and leading to social and economic instability in the absence of it.” At the core of capitalism, the paper observes, is a fundamental social relationship defining the way working people are systemically marginalised from access to the productive resources of the earth, along with the mechanisms used to extract these resources and produce goods and services. This means that to survive economically in this system, certain behavioural patterns become not just normalised, but seemingly entirely rational — at least from a limited perspective that ignores wider societal and environmental consequences. In the words of the authors: “In capitalism, workers are separated from the means of production, implying that they must compete in labour markets to sell their labour power to capitalists in order to earn a living.” Meanwhile, firms which own and control these means of production “need to compete in the market, leading to a necessity to reinvest profits into more efficient production processes to minimise costs (e.g. through replacing human labour power with machines and positive returns to scale), innovation of new products and/or advertising to convince consumers to buy more.” If a firm fails to remain competitive through such behaviours, “it either goes bankrupt or is taken over by a more successful business. Under normal economic conditions, this capitalist competition is expected to lead to aggregate growth dynamics.” The irony is that, as the paper also shows, the “affluence” accumulated by the super-rich isn’t correlated with happiness or well-being. Restructure The “hegemonic” dominance of global capitalism, then, is the principal obstacle to the systemic transformation needed to reduce overconsumption. So it’s not enough to simply try to “green” current consumption through technologies like renewable energy — we need to actually reduce our environmental impacts by changing our behaviours with a focus on cutting back our use of planetary resources: “Not only can a sufficient decoupling of environmental and detrimental social impacts from economic growth not be achieved by technological innovation alone, but also the profit-driven mechanism of prevailing economic systems prevents the necessary reduction of impacts and resource utilisation per se.” The good news is that it doesn’t have to be this way. The paper reviews a range of “bottom-up studies” showing that dramatic reductions in our material footprint are perfectly possible while still maintaining good material living standards. In India, Brazil and South Africa, “decent living standards” can be supported “with around 90 percent less per-capita energy use than currently consumed in affluent countries.” Similar possible reductions are feasible for modern industrial economies such as Australia and the US. By becoming aware of how the wider economic system incentivises behaviour that is destructive of human societies and planetary ecosystems critical for human survival, both ordinary workers and more wealthy sectors — including the super-rich — can work toward rewriting the global economic operating system. This can be done by restructuring ownership in firms, equalising relations with workers, and intentionally reorganising the way decisions are made about investment priorities. The paper points out that citizens and communities have a crucial role to play in getting organised, upgrading efforts for public education about these key issues, and experimenting with new ways to work together in bringing about “social tipping points” — points at which social action can catalyse mass change. While a sense of doom and apathy about the prospects for such change is understandable, mounting evidence based on systems science suggests that global capitalism as we know it is in a state of protracted crisis and collapse that began some decades ago. This research strongly supports the view that as industrial civilization reaches the last stages of its systemic life-cycle, there is unprecedented and increasing opportunity for small-scale actions and efforts to have large system-wide impacts. The new paper shows that the need for joined-up action is paramount: structural racism, environmental crisis, global inequalities are not really separate crises — but different facets of human civilization’s broken relationship with nature. Yet, of course, the biggest takeaway is that those who bear most responsibility for environmental destruction — those who hold the most wealth in our societies — urgently need to wake up to how their narrow models of life are, quite literally, destroying the foundations for human survival over the coming decades.

#### Perms shift the Overton window to the right, preventing us from actualizing a post-capitalist economy.

Naschek 18

Melissa - member of the Democratic Socialists of America, “The Identity Mistake,” 8/28/18, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/08/mistaken-identity-asaid-haider-review-identity-politics>

We Can’t “Do Both” Today, with the popularity of Bernie Sanders and a resurgence in trade union activity, circumstances are finally re-emerging for a political program capable of fostering mass working-class solidarity. Instead, Haider would have us turn to the model that has failed the working class for years: rhetorically accepting identity-based particularism at the implicit expense of class-based universalism. Of course, Haider does not overtly suggest that this is an either/or. Instead, he insists that we must do both — working-class politics and identity politics. But “doing both” is easier said than done. Identity politics and class politics understand capitalist power structures in distinct ways and therefore lead to distinct political strategies. More importantly, however, “doing both” misreads the balance of power in America today: institutionally on the Left, we have nothing but a fraction of the already miniscule labor movement to back our platform and our analysis. But liberalism has a major political party, the media, academia, and the entire world of nonprofits, which today controls about as much wealth as the Church did before the French Revolution. And it’s in the “do both” strategy that these powerful enemies of the Left (and allies of capital) worm their way into our coalition and play up identity to reshape working-class demands until they’re neutralized. Haider fails to recognize the profound asymmetry between the power of institutions of the working-class and the advocates of universal class-based reforms, and those of the liberal establishment and their own embrace of identity-based particularism. Concretely, this asymmetry does not lead to the best of identity politics and the best of universal demands in some sort of synthesis. Instead, the lopsided advocacy for particularist demands serves only to further marginalize the universalist demands. An anticapitalist politics capable of fighting against such forces must appeal to the whole working class to build a mass movement. Masses of people become interested in politics when organizations offer a real possibility to change their lives for the better. The only way to forge a movement capable of achieving that is by fighting for shared working-class political and economic interests. This remains the only plausible path to harnessing the only power offered to workers in society: their position as an exploited majority. The good news is that the needs for affordable medical care, a livable planet, quality education, and respect and security in the workplace satisfy such a mandate. It is two of Mistaken Identity’s supposed interlocutors, Barbara J. Fields and Karen Fields, who note that downplaying class demands “is a devastating, intolerable mistake. It leads people to say that race is fundamental — not economics, not class — and if you bring class in then you’re trying to deny the reality of human existence and identity. That is the big mystification achieved by racecraft.” While Haider rightly identifies the ineptitude of identity politics, he does not craft a political strategy that could serve as the basis for a socialist politics. Ultimately, Mistaken Identity is a manifesto of the Zombie New Left, claiming to overcome identity politics but leading us down the same dead end.

### Performance DA

#### Judging performance backfires. It presumes a counterproductive juridical model of power

Butler 95

Judith Butler, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, UC Berkeley, Performativity and Performance, Ed. Parker and Sedgwick, 1995, p. 204

That words wound seems incontestably true, and that hateful, racist, misogynist, homophobic speech should be vehemently countered seems incontrovertibly right. But does understanding from where speech derives its power to wound alter our conception of what it might mean to counter that wounding power? Do we accept the notion that injurious speech is attributable to a singular subject and act? If we accept such a juridical constraint on thought - the grammatical requirements of accountability - as a point of departure, what is lost from the political analysis of injury when the discourse of politics becomes fully reduced to juridical requirements?? Indeed, when political discourse is collapsed into juridical discourse, the meaning of political opposition runs the risk of being reduced to the act of prosecution. How is the analysis of the discursive historicity of power unwittingly restricted when the subject is presumed as the point of departure for such an analysis? A clearly theological construction, the postulation of the subject as the causal origin of the performative act is understood to generate that which it names; indeed, this divinely empowered subject is one for whom the name itself is generative.