## T

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a just government.

#### “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just government” in the res – means that you have to prove the resolution true in a vacuum, not a particular instance

CCC (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation) LHSLA JC/SJ

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### The article “a” implies a nonspecific or generic reading of the word “just government”.

Walden 20 Walden University [The Writing Center provides a broad range of writing instruction and editing services for students at Walden University, including writing assistance for undergraduates, graduate students, and doctoral capstone writers], “"A" or "An"” last modified July 14 2020, <https://academicguides.waldenu.edu/writingcenter/grammar/articles> SM

When to Use "A" or "An" "A" and "an" are used with singular countable nouns when the noun is nonspecific or generic. I do not own a car. In this sentence, "car" is a singular countable noun that is not specific. It could be any car. She would like to go to a university that specializes in teaching. "University" is a singular countable noun. Although it begins with a vowel, the first sound of the word is /j/ or “y.” Thus, "a" instead of "an" is used. In this sentence, it is also generic (it could be any university with this specialization, not a specific one). I would like to eat an apple. In this sentence, "apple" is a singular countable noun that is not specific. It could be any apple.

#### Violation: they spec US

#### Standards:

#### 1] Precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### 2] Limits – there are infinite governments that could be just – explodes limits since there are tons of independent affs plus functionally infinite combinations, all with different advantages in different political situations. Kills neg prep and debatability since there are no DAs that apply to every aff – i.e. laws about the right to strike in the US are different than in New Zealand – means the aff is always more prepared and wins just for speccing.

#### 3] TVA – just read your aff as an advantage under a whole adv, solves your offense

#### Paradigm issues

#### 1] DTD, it’s the 1AC & abuse has already occurred

#### 2] Competing interps—you were either topical or you weren’t.

#### 3] NO RVIs a] you don’t win by meeting a prima facie burden

#### 4] Fairness is a voter and comes first— a] debate is fundamentally a game – if it’s not fair, people won’t play; that controls the internal link to education. b] that O/Ws because every argument implicitly concedes to the validity of fairness, meaning if they win fairness bad vote neg because you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments.

## Violence NC / CP

### Framing

#### Use progressive consequentialism as a side-constraint on util; the best way to reduce violent outcomes is to reject means that legitimate violence

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Mark Vorobej (former associate professor in the Department of Philosophy, and a former director of the Centre for Peace Studies at McMaster University). “The Concept of Violence.” Routledge. 2016. JDN. Google books.

Or at least it need not be. But even if Galtung himself does not work self-consciously within the Utilitarian tradition, is it possible to develop his insights and incorporate (G) within a Utilitarian framework? For someone who believes that Galtung morally condemns all forms of violence, the answer must be no. If it’s possible for inequality to exist within a morally ideal state of affairs, then on Utilitarianism we may be morally required to produce and sustain instances of **(structural) violence.** And if it’s possible to produce a morally ideal state of affairs by causing harm to specific individuals, then on Utilitarianism we may be morally required to engage in acts of (interpersonal) violence. And Utilitarians generally believe that these are genuine possibilities. I have argued, however, that this is an indefensible reading of Galtung’s writings. Galtung, as we know, doesn’t offer anything like a comprehensive moral theory, or any other kind of principled normative theory that clearly endorses some, while clearly condemning other, specific forms of personal or political action. While Galtung strongly disapproves of personal violence and structural violence—as being intrinsically bad—he never explicitly says that violence must be morally condemned. To say that peace is a goal worth striving for is to say nothing about what may be done—which means may permissibly be employed—in pursuit of that goal. And in saying that violence may be “the least evil” available under difficult circumstances, it certainly seems as if Galtung leaves the door open for the popular Utilitarian judgment that we are sometimes morally required to engage in violence, as the best way of promoting peace.174 I want to conclude this chapter, then, by arguing that it may be useful to couch (G) within some kind of Consequentialist moral theory, but where it’s understood that Utilitarianism is just one particular kind of Consequentialism. It’s not plausible to view Galtung as a Utilitarian. However, if we can align his views with a broader class of Utilitarian-like theories, then we can solve three outstanding problems. First, as noted earlier, while Galtung does not require that any proposed definition of violence should command universal assent, he does require that any proposal should be “agreed to by many.” A serious proposal, in other words, should not be so subjective or idiosyncratic that it attracts the attention of only an eccentric few. Aligning (G) with a popular moral theory such as Consequentialism should, in principle, render (G) more attractive to a wider audience. Second, also as noted earlier, serious questions can be raised about the point of adopting such an encompassing definition of violence. As one critic has noted, “When almost everything is violence, then ultimately almost nothing is violence.”175 That is, (G) doesn’t seem to discriminate between actions and options in a way that could usefully serve to guide behaviour. Furthermore, if violence is virtually everywhere, then it seems that violence is unavoidable. And if violence “seems impossible to avoid, one has little incentive to try.”176 However, if (G) can be linked to a plausible theory of moral obligation, then (G) should be of interest to anyone—and especially anyone with Consequentialist leanings—who is concerned with leading a morally decent life. Finally, if (G) can be linked with a moral agenda in this fashion, then it hardly matters that (G) calls for a radical reformation of the way in which we normally talk, and therefore think, about violence. After all, Utilitarians have proudly been in the business of reforming moral beliefs and moral language for centuries now. If (G) can be used as an effective tool in moral education, then we should welcome, rather than resist, any damage that it may cause to the contours of ordinary discourse. (G) has a broadly Consquentialist character. On Galtung’s understanding of violence, what matters most is whether harm is produced. And this explains why Galtung pays relatively little attention to subjective considerations—such as what an agent takes herself to be doing, for example—and focuses instead on what an agent actually accomplishes; how she in fact influences the world around her. And this also explains why Galtung is especially concerned with ensuring that people act in an efficient and intelligent manner. If you’re interested in producing good in the world, then you want to do whatever you can to avoid counterproductive or selfdefeating forms of behaviour that succeed in eliminating one kind of harm somewhere in the world, only at the expense of escalating some other kind of harm somewhere else. That’s why Utilitarians are famously concerned with “trading off” harms and benefits. They are acutely aware of the fact that good and evil are often inextricably intertwined in such a way that, in attempting to achieve the (most) good, one must sometimes swallow a certain amount of evil. The fifth section of Galtung’s (1969) paper is therefore thoroughly Consequentialist in spirit. One of Galtung’s principal aims in that section is to issue a warning against a certain kind of fanatical or lopsided thinking that focuses exclusively on any one single (and presumably especially heinous) kind of violence. But violence has many faces, according to Galtung. And violence is virtually everywhere. And yet violence, as the face of evil, also has a remarkable capacity to remain hidden. So we need to be especially wary of strategies that attempt to reduce, and may even succeed in eliminating, certain forms of personal (structural) violence but that, as a result, succeed in nurturing even more dangerous (hidden) forms of structural (personal) violence elsewhere. And our awareness of these sorts of traps and self-defeating strategies will, of course, increase as we gain a fuller understanding of just how pervasive violence truly is. So within this Consequentialist style of reasoning, the claim that violence, in its many manifestations, exists virtually everywhere is no longer an embarrassing result. On the contrary, it becomes a mark of moral wisdom. Within the Utilitarian injunction to do the best that we can, we can identify two separate components. First, classical Utilitarians are hedonists who believe that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. Second, classical Utilitarians are maximizers who believe that we should produce the most good that we possibly can. So an act Utilitarian, for example, believes that each of us has a moral obligation to produce the best outcome that we possibly can (on each occasion of action), where the best outcome is the outcome that produces the most pleasure, on an impersonal ranking that is impartial in the sense that it doesn’t privilege any one person’s pleasure (or pain) above the pleasure (or pain) of anybody else. As we have already seen, Galtung is clearly not a (classical) Utilitarian, for any number of reasons. First, he is not a hedonist.177 Second, as noted earlier, he is not a maximizer. There is no indication that he is interested in, or that he takes seriously, any claim to the effect that we can even identify, much less be morally required to produce, the best outcome for all concerned. And finally, as I have also argued earlier, there’s no reason to suppose that Galtung would endorse an agent-neutral conception of morality that, within Utilitarianism, finds expression in the notion of an impersonal ranking. Anyone who is sceptical of the claim that you have exactly the same reason to alleviate the suffering of a distant stranger, as you do to alleviate any comparable suffering experienced either by yourself or your own child, for example, will rightly reject the moral significance (and perhaps even the very intelligibility) of any kind of impersonal ranking of outcomes. There are, however, a great many different (non-Utilitarian) forms of Consequentialism that define morally right action solely in terms of the production of good consequences, but that make no commitment of any sort to either hedonism or the goal of maximization. Progressive Consequentialism, for example, states that each of us has a moral obligation to produce only a better outcome—to leave the world a better place than we found it, if you will.178 Clearly, **Progressive Consequentialism** does not require anyone to produce the best outcome that is available to him or her, and the theory itself is neutral as to the nature of moral goodness.179 So a Progressive Consequentialist can admit that pleasure contributes to the moral value of an outcome—it contributes to human flourishing, for example—but she can also readily admit that an impersonal ranking of outcomes can take into account other aspects of human welfare as well. A Progressive Consequentialist can say that people can be harmed in ways that do not involve the infliction of pain, for example. Progressive Consequentialism, like other forms of Consequentialism, is an agent-neutral moral theory. So there may be aspects of this theory with which Galtung would not be comfortable. Furthermore, Galtung, I think, tends to have little sympathy for the idea—the Holy Grail of many moral philosophers—that there is some single principle or set of principles that categorically applies to everyone and that dictates how each person, in any context whatsoever, ought to behave. (This seems too authoritarian, I suspect, in Galtung’s judgment.) So I doubt that Galtung would embrace Progressive Consequentialism as a moral theory. Nonetheless, there are striking parallels between Progressive Consequentialism’s core intuition and a number of claims that Galtung makes, in his later writings, about the theoretical goals of peace research and the practical challenges of working for peace. In Peace by Peaceful Means, Galtung moves away from his classic binary or dichotomous understanding of peace as the absence of violence, to a more fluid and dynamic model according to which peace is defined as either the absence or the reduction of violence. And peace work is then defined accordingly as work that aims to reduce violence.180 This is an extremely important development since it acknowledges, more candidly than his earlier definitions, three important propositions. First, the goal of achieving peace by eliminating violence altogether is completely unrealistic. But, second, this does not negate the value of peace work since it is still possible to work effectively to reduce the level of violence within any particular sphere of activity, or within the world at large. And, finally, this definition suggests that there is a more intimate or more organic relationship—perhaps even a kind of interdependency—between violence and peace. If peace is merely the absence of violence then this suggests that, once peace is achieved, then violence is no longer on the scene—violence has been annihilated and the struggle is over. However, if peace can be created only by reducing violence then this suggests that violence is still present, in some fashion, within any “peaceful” situation, as are the forces responsible for that element or degree of violence. And this in turn suggests that peace and violence will always coexist, engaged in some kind of intimate dance, enduring struggle or perpetual tug of war. Invoking Taoist epistemology, Galtung advises us, along these lines, to look for “the violence in peace . . . and the peace in violence.”181 And a Progressive Consequentialist, I now want to suggest, can make good sense of this cryptic remark. Suppose that you combine Progressive Consequentialism with the claim, to which (G) commits us, that violence is virtually everywhere. Then, in your attempts to produce a better outcome, you will need to be especially mindful of the hold that violence has on our lives. This is true for several reasons. If violence is so pervasive, then the violence that others are responsible for and capable of may undermine—by taking advantage of—our own attempts to produce good. But, if (G) is true, then you must also recognize that your own efforts to produce good may themselves be tinged or tainted with violence. So if you are a **P**rogressive **C**onsequentialist, (G) teaches you to be mindful of the extent to which **we all** live lives that **are mired in violence**, and this in turn cautions you to be mindful of the forces that are at play that may undermine one’s own efforts to achieve even the relatively modest goal of producing a better outcome. Furthermore, because violence is virtually everywhere, it follows that we can never entirely eliminate violence from our own lives. Violence, if you will, is part of the human condition. It’s impossible, that is, to live a life that does not (somehow) inflict (serious) harm upon others. This does not mean that we cannot succeed in reducing the level of violence in our lives, or that we shouldn’t adopt this as a worthy goal. But it does mean that we should be accepting of the fact that successful attempts to create (more) peace may either leave or create some violence in its wake. This is the bad news. The good news is that if violence is virtually everywhere, then it’s possible for peace—in the form of human flourishing—to be virtually everywhere as well! If there is violence in peace, then there is also peace in violence. The trick is to juggle these two (mysterious) forces (the Yin and the Yang) in such a skillful and intelligent way that the human condition is improved in the process. So a Progressive Consequentialist who accepts (G) will be mindful of the violence that surrounds her and that taints her own existence, and she will be accepting of the fact that her efforts to eliminate violence will never be entirely successful. But if you’re a Consequentialist who is concerned, first and foremost, with producing good outcomes, why wouldn’t you still insist that everyone is under a moral obligation to produce the best outcome by reducing violence as much as possible? That is, why is a Progressive Consequentialist content with the more modest goal of producing an outcome that is merely better? There are many reasons for adopting Progressive Consequentialism. One is that **maximizing forms** of Consequentialism **are** simply **too demanding.** If people are required to constantly produce the best outcome (on an impersonal ranking) then, so this familiar argument runs, they will be required to sacrifice (virtually) everything that makes their own life meaningful and that contributes to their own personal well-being. But morality can’t require everyone to sacrifice their own happiness for the happiness of others. Not only is there something oddly paradoxical about any such requirement, but this interpretation of the moral point of view undermines the normative force of the moral judgments it is trying to uphold. If morality asks us to do the impossible, then people will lose interest in moral judgments since they will lose interest in trying to conform to an impossible and perpetually frustrating ideal.182

### NC

#### The right to strike legitimizes and perpetuates violence as a response to economic inequalities

Caruso 19

Amerigo Caruso, [Joining Forces against '**Strike Terrorism**': The Public-Private Interplay in Policing Strikes in Imperial Germany, 1890–1914](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0265691419864007) – European History Quarterly (2019). <https://bonndoc.ulb.uni-bonn.de/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.11811/9035/Caruso_Armed_Bands_of_Strikebreakers.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y> -CAT

The aim of this chapter is to shed new light on the structure of internal violence and its media representation in late Imperial Germany. In doing so, I will argue Strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany 187 that repressive functions carried out by militarised citizens were more widespread and more readily tolerated when social conflicts and political antagonism were perceived as a major threat to the established order and when state-led repression triggered divisive discussions concerning the legitimate use of violence. Although the erosion of trust in the state and political violence reached unprecedented levels after 1918, violent confrontations between strikers and strikebreakers had already been an integral part of the social reality and public discourses before the outbreak of the war. However, while debates about legitimate repression and “class justice” were led by the Social Democratic milieu in the pre-war period, it was the radical left that redirected them against the moderate SPD after the brutal repression of the Spartacist uprising. This chapter focuses on the violence perpetrated by armed bands of professional strikebreakers before 1914, i.e. in a period in German history of massive but largely non-violent protest and relatively few episodes of brutal repression. 5 The first section examines the structure of violence in late Imperial Germany, with particular focus on the fact that it was not only ideological antagonism but also the glamorisation and sensationalisation of violence in the modern media that played a crucial role in intensifying political polarisation, hence setting the preconditions for political violence. Section two presents the context in which violent strikebreaking tactics emerged and became part of the social reality and the media reconstruction of it. Sections three to five analyse several episodes of violence, namely eight murders carried out by armed strikebreakers in the decade before the outbreak of the First World War. The sixth section explores the repertoire of action by professional bands of armed strikebreakers, including those led by Katzmarek and Hintze. This is followed by some concluding remarks. Violence in late Wilhelmine Germany According to Alf Lüdtke in his studies of the history of everyday life, low-level violence against outsiders and potential revolutionaries is a widespread and routine practice in modern societies. 6 Throughout the nineteenth century European states were increasingly successful in establishing a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force, although violence perpetrated by private citizens was far from marginalised. Private violence survived as a form of counter-violence against the state, or, in contrast, as a form of private law enforcement and support for the established order. After the emergence of a modern private security industry around 1900 ,7 privately organised coercion was more frequently driven by economic than political reasons. The rise of armed strikebreaking was politically motivated in that it was a counter-strike strategy supported by the so-called loyal classes, but it was also, and probably more importantly, economically motivated by the steady growth in demand for replacement workers and for the “protection” of non-strikers in the decades before 1914. As mentioned in the introduction, collective violence and brutal repression were relatively infrequent in Wilhelmine Germany, and it is common knowledge that the SPD and the Free Trade Unions discouraged violence as counterproductive. 188 Amerigo Caruso The picture changes, at least in part, if we take a micro-historical approach and examine the low-level aggression and violent confrontations that became a widespread phenomenon during mass demonstrations and strikes, especially where strikebreakers and pickets were involved. 8 The armed strikebreakers’ repertoire of strategies included repressive practices and mafia-like activities, such as provocation, harassment, intimidation and even murder. What makes the episodes of “strike terrorism” and the activities of armed strikebreakers remarkable is that violent confrontations during labour disputes were some of the most frequently discussed and polarising topics in German newspapers. Widespread “threat communication” made conflicts and violence more visible. 9 As noted by Ian Kershaw, the processes of enlargement of the public sphere and massification of society often led to the “glamorisation of violence”. 10 Sensational media reports of “strike terrorism” had an impact not only on the political debate, but also on the popular culture and everyday life. In 1910, for example, the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung reported that instead of playing “cops & robbers” or “cowboys & indians”, children in Berlin were playing “strikebreakers & unionised workers”.11 The heightened media attention on violent strikebreaking reflected a social reality that emerged during the decade before the First World War, when transnationally active bands of strikebreakers spread throughout the highly industrialised regions of Central Europe. The innovative aspect of their activity was that they not only replaced striking workers, they also organised multiple services, such as transportation and supplying and housing “blacklegs”. Strikebreaker agents also organised “self-defence” against “strike terrorism”, and intimidation of unionised workers was an integral part of their business. They were almost always armed, mostly with revolvers, sticks and daggers. Cheap handguns could be obtained with no legal restrictions, and the wide circulation of firearms became a destabilising factor in an age of class conflict, fear of social disintegration and radical nationalism.12 Bands of strikebreakers were therefore involved not only in the broader class struggles and political antagonism of late Imperial Germany, but also in the dynamics of violent masculinity and firearm obsession that characterised the “Browning generation”, i.e. those born in the late nineteenth century with no greater desire than to buy (and use) a revolver. 13 Strikebreaking in context In North America, the business of providing strikebreakers and armed guards during labour conflicts had already become widespread in the late nineteenth century. Several detective agencies and private police forces were widely employed to protect “blacklegs” and intimidate striking workers. 14 At the same time, famous strikebreaking agents, such as Jack Whitehead and James Farley, the latter portrayed in Jack London’s novel Iron Heel (1907), assembled permanent groups of replacement workers to be deployed throughout the country. 15 In Great Britain, “free labour” organisations such as the National Free Labour Association (1893) led by William Collison, self-proclaimed “king of the blacklegs”, also emerged Strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany 189 around 1900. 16 Only a few years later, however, strikebreaking became increasingly professionalised, more widespread and violent in Imperial Germany as well. The intensification of strikes and social conflicts created a new sense of urgency among employers, who were interested not only in the rapid recruitment of replacement workers, but also in private security services. In the years leading up to World War I, the Social Democratic press in Germany complained on an almost daily basis about legal discrimination against unionised workers and the intensification of violence and intimidation perpetrated by armed bands of strikebreakers, which went largely unpunished. The SPD party newspaper, Vorwärts, was openly critical of the fact that violent repression against the labour movement was de facto considered a legitimate course of action, while the impunity of strikebreakers represented a major threat to the rule of law in Wilhelmine society. 17 The Social Democratic propaganda pointed out that classbased justice was the result of the general incompatibility of interests and values of the working class and the capitalist elites. 18 This emotionally charged narrative of left-wing newspapers tended to exaggerate – or even invent – episodes of anti-labour repression, while, by contrast, conservative newspapers placed greater emphasis on the violence against and intimidation of strikebreakers. With the discourse radicalised on both sides, unionised workers and strikebreakers alike were accused of “terrorism”. 19 However, aside from these politically motivated overstatements, violent clashes between strikebreakers and unionised workers undoubtedly intensified around 1910. What is also remarkable is that the SPD party press and its agitationary journalism were able to use sensationalised and tendentious reports as an effective political and moral weapon in the context of emerging mass communication. 20 In doing so, Social Democratic opinion making managed to create a political culture of opposition in an era in which the SPD and the “free” trade unions were unassimilated forces in Wilhelmine society. 21 At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the threat to national interests by “strike terrorism” and growing fears of revolution were enough in the eyes of the “parties of order” to justify violent intimidation and repression of the labour movement. The right wing saw counter-strike actions by “yellow” unions and professional strikebreakers as necessary and urgent. Rudolf Lebius, a former Social Democratic journalist who founded the Federation of Yellow Unions ( Gelber Arbeiterbund) in 1907, described the emerging yellow movement as a “fighting force” ( Kampforganisation) against “strike terrorism”. 22 This narrative was rooted in anti-socialist discourses that spread more rapidly after the Social Democratic victories in 1903 and were supported by nationalist pressure groups such as the Imperial League against Social Democracy. 23 As a result of partly spontaneous but partly orchestrated fears of revolution and “strike terrorism”, the formation of professional groups of armed strikebreakers was seen as both economically and politically necessary. The idea of rallying anti-socialist forces together, which was typical of the so-called Bülow Bloc, resulted in strikebreakers being considered part of the loyal classes and deserving of special protection, or a sort of extended right of self-defence against supposed terrorism. Hence, when two strikebreakers killed a worker during a pub brawl 190 Amerigo Caruso in north-eastern Bavaria in 1907, Vorwärts polemically argued that since state authorities protected strikebreakers as “useful members of the community”, the murder was therefore a state crime ( Staatsverbrechen).24 Karl Otto Uhlig, a Social Democratic member of the Saxon Landtag, accused bands of strikebreakers of persistent immorality and criminal acts that threatened not only the unionised workers but also the entire community, and he considered it unacceptable that the police protected them. 25 What is remarkable is that non-state armed groups, such as pirates, mercenaries and bandits, were primarily characterised by their recourse to violence without state authority or in opposition to it. 26 However, these armed groups – and professional strikebreakers clearly were – could also serve as a source of extra-legal repression and law enforcement. “We can kill striking workers without being prosecuted” According to Vorwärts and other left-wing newspapers, strikebreakers had good reason to claim that they could “kill striking workers without being prosecuted”. 27 This catchphrase was attributed to a strikebreaker flaunting his impunity, and it became a widespread slogan against counter-strike action and “class justice”. After being mentioned for the first time in 1906, the phrase was used and reused by many left-wing newspapers in Germany, Austria and the Swiss Confederation before 1914. 28 In the summer of 1906 when there had already been widespread debates about the impunity of violent strikebreakers, a brutal fight between unionised workers and strikebreakers took place outside the “Union” motor vehicle factory near Nuremberg in Bavaria. On the morning of 17 August, during the ongoing labour dispute, the management of the company incited the strikebreakers to intimidate the leaders of the local trade unions standing outside the factory. On the evening of the same day, a group of strikebreakers assaulted striking workers with revolvers, sticks and knives. Maurer, the director of the factory, led the attack; he drove his car into the fighting crowd and used an air pump as a weapon. Vorwärts and the Austrian Arbeiter-Zeitung reported that the police were present but did not intervene to stop the attacks.29 During the fight, 22-year-old strikebreaker Ernst Thiel fired three times at Melchior Fleischmann, one of the local trade union leaders, who died two days later. Claiming self-defence, Thiel went unpunished. In court, the company and the strikebreakers successfully accused the striking workers of being responsible for the escalation of violence outside the factory. 30 Thiel was not the only strikebreaker armed with a revolver; another, by the name of Fackelmeier, carried weapons and threatened unionised workers with his revolver. 31 The fact that the police ignored calls to take the weapons away from the strikebreakers provoked quite frequent violent outbursts by the crowd against strikebreakers and police forces.32 The court case on the 1906 riot in Nuremberg resulted in five striking workers being sentenced to prison for upwards of three months. By contrast, the armed strikebreakers Fackelmeier and Thiel (who had murdered Fleischmann) went unpunished because their actions were deemed legitimate self-defence against Strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany 191 the provocations and attacks of unionised workers. 33 Liberal newspapers such as the Allgemeine Zeitung defended the plea of self-defence and blamed the unionised workers who had attacked the strikebreakers. 34 The paper confirmed that Fleischmann had been killed by Thiel, although it presented the murder in a completely different way to Vorwärts. The Allgemeine Zeitung denounced the striking workers outside the “Union” factory as violent alcoholics and published detailed reports on the trial endorsing the claim of legitimised self-defence against “strike terrorism”.35 Murders carried out by armed strikebreakers before 1914 Although the Nuremberg riot of 1906 and the murder of Fleischmann had a huge echo in the Social Democratic press, it was only after popular protests erupted in 1910 in Moabit, an industrial suburb of Berlin, that the debate about “strike terrorism”, “excessive strikes” and claims for better protection of “willing workers” spread more rapidly. 36 It reached its peak in the last years before the First World War when, after the first murder case in Nuremberg, several more workers were killed by strikebreakers, strikebreaking agents and armed employers (see Table 11.1 ). It is not surprising that liberal and conservative newspapers tended to overlook episodes of anti-labour violence while left-wing newspapers overstated them. Even though the narrative of “class justice” emphasised by Social Democrats needs critical reassessment, it seems clear that the Kaiserreich’s judicial system took a very permissive attitude towards strikebreakers’ armed self-defence. 37 The quasi-impunity of armed strikebreakers was clearly demonstrated by the Nuremberg case and many similar episodes in the following years. The most sensational of these episodes involved Paul Keiling, a well-known strikebreaking agent who had 17 prior convictions for theft, violence, robbery and other crimes. 38 In February 1914, despite being well known to the police, he was able to leave German territory and offer his strikebreaking services in Austria-Hungary, where he killed the bookbinder Johann Solinger during a strike in Silesia. Keiling was sentenced to only eight months in prison in what was one of most extensively discussed murder cases in German, Swiss and Austrian newspapers until the outbreak of war. 39 Prior to the Keiling case, the most prominent and most important transnationally, another murder had been carried out by an armed strikebreaker in Duisburg in September 1911 during the Rhineland transport company strike. Strikebreaker and former police officer Brackhage fired his revolver and killed the dockworker Meierling. 40 Brackhage’s crime was also deemed to be self-defence and this unpunished murder had a huge impact on the working class. Postcards were printed to commemorate the victim and to denounce the Kaiserreich’s class-based justice system. 41 A few months before Meierling’s murder, another episode of violence in Lübeck outraged the left-wing newspapers. In the old city port, a group of 40 strikebreakers armed with revolvers and sticks were responsible for a night of terror as pubs and stores were plundered and many citizens injured. 42 In September 1912, a striking worker was killed by Joseph Ruppert, a prominent strikebreaking agent, near Magdeburg. Here, too, the murderer was acquitted 192 Amerigo Caruso Table 11.1 Workers killed by German strikebreakers, strikebreaking agents and armed employers between 1906 and 1914 Date Place Incident Court decision 17 August Nuremberg 1906 1907 Wunsiedel (Bavaria) 27 September Duisburg 1911 14 September Burg 1912 (Magdeburg) 21 April 1912 Zurich 6 May 1912 Aachen 4 June 1913 Frauendorf/ Golęcino (Stettin) 4 October Magdeburg 1913 8 February Tetschen/Děčín 1914 (Bohemia) Strikebreaker Ernst Thiel fired at one of the local trade union leaders, Melchior Fleischmann, who died two days later Two strikebreakers employed by the local porcelain factory, fatally stabbed the worker Schödel Strikebreaker and former police officer Brackhage killed dockworker Meierling Joseph Ruppert, a professional strikebreaker, killed striking worker Karl Fritsche German strikebreaker Otto Kaiser killed Swiss worker Karl Wydler Employer Von der Hecken, armed with a revolver, killed Dutch worker Hieronymus Stroet Strikebreaker Brandenburg stabbed striking worker Kühl with a bread knife Strikebreaking agent Karl Katzmarek caused a traffic collision killing a pedestrian, retired tailor Kühne Strikebreaking agent Paul Keiling killed foreman Johann Solinger during a bookbinders’ strike Acquitted (acting in self-defence) Unknown Acquitted (acting in self-defence) Acquitted (acting in self-defence) Acquitted (acting in self-defence) Sentenced to three months in prison, later reprieved Acquitted (acting in self-defence) Sentenced to one month in prison Sentenced to eight months in prison (in AustriaHungary) by a German court because he was deemed to have been exercising his right of legitimate self-defence. 43 A few months before Magdeburg, there was another case of a strikebreaker shooting and killing a striking worker in Zurich. The perpetrator was the German strikebreaker Otto Kaiser and the victim the unionised worker Karl Wydler, who was shot with a revolver and died a few days later. 44 Kaiser was acquitted, this time by a Swiss tribunal, because he was deemed to be acting in self-defence. This new case of “class justice” and “terrorism” once again sparked off emotionally charged discussions in the German, Swiss and Austrian press. 45 One year after Wydler’s murder, on the evening of 4 June 1913 in the port city of Stettin, a strikebreaker named Brandenburg stabbed a striking worker with a bread knife. The victim, named Kühl, died almost instantly. 46 Strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany 193 Alongside these cases of striking workers killed by strikebreakers, there is a very long list of workers seriously injured by armed strikebreakers. In 1913, for example, three blacklegs who were working in Kassel fired their revolvers at the striking worker Ostertag, who miraculously escaped death. 47 Although the multiple episodes of violence mentioned here involved German-speaking strikebreakers and striking workers, the conflicts between unionised workers and strikebreakers, and hence the ideological antagonism between left-wing and bourgeois newspapers, became radicalised when foreign “blacklegs” were employed. In June 1906, Vorwärts reported from Cologne that armed strikebreakers from “semi-civilised regions”, such as the Balkans and Italy, not only threatened striking workers but terrorised the entire city with their violence and criminal activities. 48 If bands of strikebreakers used a broad repertoire of violence against labour, it is also true that exploited and vulnerable migrant workers were frequently discriminated against, insulted and attacked by striking workers. Socialist and trade union newspapers used an extremely harsh tone in speaking of strikebreakers, who were not only morally stigmatised but also physically threatened. The home addresses of notorious strikebreakers were often published in left-wing newspapers, and posters with explicit death threats were frequently printed during strikes. 49 In Basel, for example, posters with explicit death threats against strikebreakers were frequently translated into Italian. 50 Xenophobic discourses against strikebreakers also clearly emerged during transport workers’ strikes in Berlin, when for instance Russian replacement workers were stigmatised as “Pollacken” (a disrespectful term for “Polish”) or “Müllkosaken” (rubbish Cossacks).51 More than isolated cases of violence? As early as 1904, two years before the first murder case in Nuremberg, Vorwärts had extensively reported on the violent clashes between armed strikebreakers and unionised workers in Berlin. The SPD party newspaper argued that at least two companies in the industrial area of Berlin (Krey and Zürn & Glienicke) systematically distributed weapons to strikebreakers. Armed with sticks, they formed an “assault column” ( Sturmkolonne) against strike pickets. 52 The newspaper of the Federation of Yellow Unions echoed these rumours and boastfully reported on the increasing number of armed strikebreakers in, for example, Wittenau near Berlin, where they were all armed with revolvers. 53 Sometimes employers did not limit themselves to arming strikebreakers but were themselves armed and actively participated in “selfdefence”. This was the case with the iron industry employer, Von der Hecken, from Aachen, who not only distributed revolvers to his strikebreakers, but also armed himself and killed the Dutch worker Hieronymus Stroet during a strike in 1912. 54 What is remarkable is that it was not only the professional and hierarchically organised groups of strikebreakers, such as those led by Hintze and Katzmarek, that were armed: the more ad hoc groups also obtained weapons. However, while armed intimidation was a fundamental aspect of the business of professional strikebreakers, who were already equipped with revolvers, unorganised strikebreakers were mostly provided with weapons by the employers. Eventually, the 194 Amerigo Caruso problem of armed strikebreakers was discussed in the Reichstag. During a debate in 1907, the Social Democratic member of parliament Paul Singer showed the assembly a photograph of armed strikebreakers in Cologne symbolically carrying their weapons to “defend” the company of the industrial magnate Kohl. 55 Another SPD parliamentarian, Theodor Bömelburg, created a huge sensation when he showed the Reichstag assembly one of the steel-reinforced sticks that had been distributed to strikebreakers in the Ruhr area.56 The first reports of “blackleg gunfighters” ( arbeitswillige Revolverhelden) and employers’ attempts to militarise strikebreakers had appeared already around 1900 but intensified in the decade before the war. 57 Liberal newspapers also frequently reported on armed strikebreakers. Between September 1906 and March 1907, for example, the Allgemeine Zeitung published three articles about strikebreakers armed with revolvers in Munich, Nuremberg and Cologne.58 These armed strikebreakers were labelled “gunfighters” by the left-wing newspapers, a term that was broadly used to demonise gun violence and criminal gangs and hence created a semantic connection between the criminal underworld and professional strikebreakers. 59 Highly evocative notions, such as “gunfighters”, or “worker’s murder” ( Arbeitermord), suggested that bands of strikebreakers serving to secure capitalist interests were similar to street gangs and that violence was an integral part of their service. Although left-wing newspapers dramatically emphasised the strikebreakers’(illegal) use of violence, the polemic against “blackleg gunfighters” did partly reflect the social reality after the turn of the century when strikebreakers began systematically to use weapons, partly in selfdefence and partly with the aim of intimidating workers and offering private security services to employers. It is therefore not surprising that Vorwärts also explicitly compared strikebreaking agents like Friedrich Hintze with Pinkerton’s National Detective Agency. 60 Bands of strikebreakers: “Yellow Katzmarek” and “Hintze’s soldiers” In the decade up to 1914, the groups led by Friedrich Hintze in Hamburg and Karl Katzmarek in Berlin emerged as the most important strikebreaking agencies in Imperial Germany. Both bands of strikebreakers were highly professionalised and active in almost the whole of German-speaking Central Europe. They were well known for their brutality and for their use of weapons as a major part of their everyday business. Katzmarek’s and Hintze’s activities resulted in these leaders becoming synonymous with violent, professional strikebreaking activities. In describing the broader phenomenon of strikebreaking, left-wing newspapers used their names as negative terms for violent strikebreaking ( Katzmareks, Hintzegardisten and Hintzebrüder).61 Katzmarek, in particular, had a great interest in his selfrepresentation. Nicknamed “Yellow Katzmarek”, he was a member of the board of the Federation of Yellow Unions and had a personal link with Rudolf Lebius, leader of the Federation. 62 “Yellow Katzmarek” was always armed with revolvers and daggers and he owned a car, which was not at all common at the time. On the Strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany 195 night of 4 October 1913, on his way back to Magdeburg in his car, he caused a traffic collision killing a pedestrian. Socialist newspapers reported that during the trial Katzmarek tried to defend himself with the argument that he was a prominent strikebreaking agent and therefore a useful member of the community deserving of special protection. Although he had previous convictions for violence, insults and robbery, he was sentenced to only one month in prison. 63 In 1912, during a strike in Berlin, Katzmarek joined forces with Hintze to mobilise an armed band of strikebreakers that terrorised unionised workers. 64 According to sensationalised reports in the SPD party press, violent intimidation of both striking workers and the Social Democratic milieu was the trademark activity of Katzmarek’s and Hintze’s bands. In 1911, during a strike in the small city of Güstrow in Mecklenburg, Katzmarek’s band arrived from Berlin and took de facto control of the town and established a “rule of violence” ( Gewaltherrschaft).65 The same strategy had been adopted by Hintze a year earlier during a mineworkers’ strike in Finkenheerd, another small town in northern Germany. When the 15 members of “Hintze’s guard” arrived in Finkenheerd, they immediately set about organising a shooting range for weapons training, sending a clear message to the striking workers.66 After the Moabit riot in 1910, Hintze became the most notorious German strikebreaker, ironically nicknamed “the hero of Moabit” by Vorwärts because of his having led the so-called patriotic forces that helped to restore order after two weeks of rioting. 67 The Moabit riot was actually a labour dispute that escalated into widespread popular protests, especially after violent clashes between striking workers and strikebreakers. 68 According to the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, fighting escalated on the evening of 28 September with more than 90 injured. 69 “Hintze’s soldiers” undertook two tasks during the riot: they supplied substitutes for striking workers, helping to deliver coal during the day, and at night they cooperated with the police to combat “strike terrorism”. Hintze and his strikebreakers had access to a temporary prison camp for arrested striking workers, where, in collusion with the police authorities, they savagely beat the prisoners. It was not only Vorwärts but also the liberal Vossische Zeitung that reported on the quasi-paramilitary organisation of Hintze’s band during the Moabit uprising.70 In October 1910, Hintze gave a long interview to the popular newspaper Berliner Morgenpost, in which he described his career as a professional strikebreaker and provided insights on how he organised his business. 71 Initially, Hintze worked for the well-known strikebreaker agent August Müller in Hamburg, but shortly after Müller’s death, the 21-year-old Hintze established his own organisation. He claimed to have more than 6,000 strikebreakers whom he could mobilise in only eight days. Despite this obviously exaggerated statement, Hintze was able to organise quite large groups of armed strikebreakers with long-range mobility. In 1911 Vorwärts reported that hundreds of “Hintze’s soldiers” had travelled from Hamburg to the East Prussian city of Königsberg, which was almost 1,000 kilometres away. 72 Berlin and Hamburg were the most important logistic centres for the distribution of strikebreakers to distant cities such as Königsberg or Basel, but 196 Amerigo Caruso they more frequently operated in the regional areas of cities such as Bremen and Kassel as well as many small towns in Mecklenburg and Brandenburg. 73 Hintze’s name became a synonym for professional strikebreaking with brutal methods. According to the SPD parliamentarian Cohn, Hintze recruited violent teenagers from the poorest districts of Berlin. 74 In his interview to the Morgenpost, Hintze mentioned that his agency was doing very well and that he was paid ten marks for each strikebreaker he delivered. He explicitly stated that he offered not only labour replacement but also supply services, logistics (he had three cars) and, of course, organisation of the strikebreakers’ “self-defence”. He was aware that the interview with the Morgenpost was a great opportunity for free publicity and mentioned that his strikebreakers would do any kind of job that the company would pay for, but, more importantly, they could effectively intimidate unionised workers. The agent proudly proclaimed that “with thirty men I can terrify five hundred strikers”. 75 Hintze’s agency was not only active during strikes, it also offered its services to private companies in the aftermath of unrest to prevent the expansion of labour unions. 76 Hintze also mentioned that he was already involved in 15 different strikes and that the most important aspect of his business was to create a military-like organisation and establish military discipline among the strikebreakers. Bands of strikebreakers combined violence, a quasi-paramilitary organisation and street gang behaviour with a highly professionalised business. It was not only Hintze who made an effort to publicise his semi-legal strikebreaking agency: Katzmarek distributed marketing brochures informing potential employers that they were to pay his strikebreakers five marks per day and that they should also pay for transportation, food supplies and housing. Katzmarek’s brochure also stated that he was able to recruit service staff and cooks and to provide cooking utensils for the strikebreakers as well as “resolute foremen” and armed guards. 77 His band of strikebreakers was hierarchically organised and well known not only in Germany but also in Austria and the Swiss Confederation. Katzmarek had a right-hand man, Gründke, and a group of foremen who oversaw the other strikebreakers.78 After his election to the central committee of Lebius’s Federation of Yellow Workers in January 1908, Katzmarek was described by Lebius as someone with a charismatic but dangerously self-overestimated personality and “gipsy blood” (Zigeunerblut).79 Although Katzmarek cooperated with other notorious strikebreakers, such as Hintze, he also tried to protect his lucrative business using illegal methods against his competitors. In 1913, for example, he sent falsified letters purporting to be from private companies to other strikebreaking agents resulting in these delivering “blacklegs” to the wrong place and therefore receiving no pay. 80 Joseph Ruppert was another professional strikebreaker who killed a worker near Magdeburg in 1912 and who, during his trial, tried to justify always carrying his revolver with the argument that “weapons are the tools of our trade”. 81 He was accused by Vorwärts of being one of the most dangerous members of Katzmarek’s band.82 More often, Ruppert worked independently with his partner Anton Meinel, another notorious strikebreaker who was also accused of being a procurer. 83 Strikebreakers in late Imperial Germany 197 They were involved in several episodes of violence and intimidation not only in Magdeburg but also in Berlin, Thuringia (Zeulenroda) and Nesseldorf in the Moravian-Silesian region. The Social Democratic Arbeiter-Zeitung reported that Meinel threatened unionised workers during a strike in Berlin claiming: “I can do what I want, I am allowed in certain circumstances to shoot, I can even kill a man”.84 Like the other “blackleg gunfighters” mentioned in this chapter, the focus of Ruppert’s and Meinel’s activities was less on replacing striking workers and more on intimidating them.85 Conclusion Greater protection for strikebreakers had already begun to be sought by conservative politicians and employers at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1897, the Kaiser announced a programme of “protection for the national labour of the productive classes, . . . ruthless repression of all revolutionary subversion and the heaviest penalty for anyone who dares to hinder his neighbour, who wants to work, in his freedom to work”. 86 This political manifesto against organised labour formed part of the so-called Zuchthausvorlage, the penitentiary bill designed to penalise picketing that was presented to the Reichstag in 1899 but defeated by the parliamentary opposition. 87 However, the spirit of the Zuchthausvorlage remained embedded in the Prussian courts, at least from a Social Democratic standpoint, even after its defeat in the Reichstag. The de facto impunity of armed groups of strikebreakers can be explained as an extra-legal response aimed at protecting the “productive classes” after leading conservatives recognised that the intensification of repressive authoritarian practices against the labour movement was rather unpopular and could not be legally imposed. The advent of mass politics, especially the introduction of universal male suffrage and the rise of mass-produced newspapers, set new limits on state repression and authoritarian control. At the same time, “threat communication” and the radicalisation of the debates on “strike terrorism” gave greater visibility and urgency to social conflicts. As a result, strikebreaking became more professionalised and militarised after the turn of the century. This shows that the transition to democracy and mass politics opened up new horizons for privately organised coercion and motivated the redistribution of coercive tasks to nonstate actors. The debate about “strike terrorism” reached a new peak in 1907 when some of the most influential members of the conservative party stressed the urgency for greater protection for those “patriotic and loyal workers” who opposed the “red terror”. 88 During a debate in the Reichstag in 1907, Arthur von PosadowskyWehner, the Prussian secretary of state of the interior and vice chancellor, openly encouraged presumed victims of the “red terror” to organise themselves against the intimidation and violence inflicted on them by the labour movement. Posadowsky openly supported the formation of yellow unions and armed groups of strikebreakers and assured them that Prussian courts and police authorities would tolerate counter-strike actions. 89 This proposition was well received and was taken up by 198 Amerigo Caruso the leader of the Federation of Yellow Workers, Rudolf Lebius, as stated in his pamphlet Gelbe Gedanken (Yellow Thoughts), published in 1908. 90 In his articles for the federation’s newspaper and for several other publications, Lebius stressed the fact that the yellow unions were born out of the right to self-defence of patriotic workers who organised themselves against terrorism: “Red terrorism is the initiator of the yellow movement”. 91 The Federation of Patriotic Workers ( Bund Vaterländischer Arbeitervereine), another anti-labour organisation, created in 1907, used the same argumentative strategy as Lebius. Deutsche Treue, the newspaper of the “patriotic workers”, claimed that “true German men” should not wait for state protection, but had to mobilise against labour militancy and socialist propaganda. 92 In 1910, German industrialists launched a fresh campaign for better protection of “willing workers”, calling for the army’s intervention and the demonstrative use of machine guns against striking mineworkers in the Ruhr area. 93 State-led repression and repressive practices on the part of extra-legal groups, such as the armed bands of strikebreakers, had something in common: they all involved “collective violence”. In Charles Tilly’s definition, collective violence includes a vast range of social interactions and excludes “purely individual action”. 94 It is therefore grounded in complex interactions and is also closely related to the perceived urgency to defend the established order against emerging social movements and their claims. Therefore, violence carried out by armed strikebreakers was, again following Tilly’s definition, not simply “individual aggression writ large” but was significantly affected by “social ties, structures and process” as well as by the political discourses and media representations in Wilhelmine Germany. 95 Defining repressive practices carried out by armed strikebreakers as collective violence raises further, more general questions: why did strikes and mass demonstrations in the first decades of the twentieth century increasingly shift into collective violence (both in late Imperial Germany and much more dramatically in the early Weimar years)? What impact did different political regimes (semiauthoritarian before 1918, democratic after 1918) have on the levels and forms of collective violence? What impact did the glamorisation and sensationalisation of collective violence in the modern media have in different political contexts? Although further studies are needed to provide exhaustive answers, the rise of armed groups of professional strikebreakers examined in this chapter is an important yet less well-studied issue within the broader framework of authoritarian responses to social conflicts. The impunity of Katzmarek, Hintze and other notorious strikebreakers gives new insights into the privatisation of repressive strategies and the mobilisation of non-state actors in defence of the bourgeois order. In the decade up to 1914, strikebreaking agents were almost always armed and frequently used mafia-like methods to intimidate unionised workers. Along with providing labour replacement, the main aim of these “gunfighters” was to effect non-bureaucratic repression of the labour movement. The violence carried out by bands of strikebreakers demonstrates that the Kaiserreich’s authorities were inclined to tolerate, to a certain extent, privately organised coercion, especially where social movements, democratic institutions and the modern media were effective in thwarting legal, state-led authoritarian responses.

#### That escalates police militarization and domestic securitization.

Asaro 19 (Peter Asaro, Professor Peter Asaro is a philosopher of science, technology and media. His work examines artificial intelligence and robotics as a form of digital media, the ethical dimensions of algorithms and data, and the ways in which technology mediates social relations and shapes our experience of the world, Summer 2019, “Algorithms of Violence: Critical Social Perspectives on Autonomous Weapons,” *Social Research* vol. 86 (2), <https://peterasaro.org/writing/Asaro_AlgorithmsViolence.pdf>) -CAT

We have seen how autonomous weapons could be used to protect the political authority of a regime; i.e., its authority to make and adjudicate the rules of society. But while in many cases there is a large overlap between the economic and political elites in a society, they are often different even if closely aligned, and sometimes in conflict with each other. Here we consider the use of autonomous weapons in maintaining economic inequality, and preserving or establishing an economic order. The role of a police force in society is twofold: to protect the rights of individuals from being infringed on by other individuals, and to protect the socio-political-economic order itself. The two are tied together insofar as the economic system—the rules of exchange governing the distribution of goods and resources, as well as state imposed duties and taxes—establishes property rights that are then enforced through state-sanctioned violence. To the extent that the distribution of economic goods is unequal and perceived as unjust or illegitimate, there is a risk of protests, rebellion, and revolution either by powerful individuals and organized groups, or by popular masses. Autonomous weapons could, through the use of violent force, support greater levels of economic inequality and injustice than would otherwise be possible—greater even than what could be supported with human slaves and soldiers—and for many of the same reasons that they could entrench despotic and tyrannical regimes. And since even soldiers and police need to eat, such an order could also require spending fewer economic resources on the police and military needed to maintain it. More generally, increasing automation across all sectors of the economy could result in larger percentages of the population becoming outsiders to the economy, such as the landless, the jobless, the disenfranchised, and the economically irrelevant. This is a central fear among those warning of mass technological unemployment due to automation and artificial intelligence, but rarely do they explicitly consider how technological unemployment might transform security forces. Clearly automation has served to disempower workers, though perhaps not as much as have the politics and laws undermining the power of workers and unions. But we have not really thought through the implications of disempowering police and military forces.6 It is also important to consider that the use of automated violence in imposing economic arrangements need not be conducted only by states and governments. Private organizations and individuals could also acquire such systems. One of the early applications for autonomous weapons is likely to be sentry guards—autonomous robots that patrol and protect private property such as factories, warehouses, and homes from intruders. A central question will be whether these will be simply fancy alarm systems, or systems authorized to use violent force against intruders or to arrest and detain them until human authorities arrive. Similarly, wealthy individuals might obtain autonomous weapons to protect their gated communities and homes, or even as personal bodyguards. Such systems would allow the elite to enjoy their wealth even when there are vast numbers of disenfranchised people willing to act violently towards these beneficiaries of an egregiously unjust economic order. Indeed, we have already seen the deployment of weaponized remote-operated systems for private security. The Skunk drone was developed by Desert Wolf, a South African company, for the specific purpose of crowd control. Its first sales were to the private security forces of mining companies, for use in managing violent encounters with the protesting union workers (Kelion 2014). The system is a small drone that is armed with paintball guns and also capable of deploying tear gas pellets. The fact that one of the first acquisitions of private armed drones was specifically to deal with organized labor protests is a good indication that such systems would also be at the forefront of the development of autonomous weapons for private applications. Some police forces have also obtained the Skunk drone, and Israeli Border Police have used their own tear gas–deploying drones against protestors on the Palestinian border (Times of Israel 2018). This 552 social research raises further questions about how autonomous weapons might be deployed along borders in the future to stop refugees seeking safety and migrants seeking economic opportunity. As climate change and environmental degradation drive more and more people from their homes and countries, autonomous weapons could be deployed at scale to prevent them from crossing certain borders, thereby reinforcing economic and environmental inequalities, even though it is a human rights violation to refuse entry to refugees.

#### And, backlash to liberal policies empowers young right-wing conservatives to support increasing violence and fascism.

Krigel 20

Noah Krigel, “We’re not the party to bitch and whine”: Exploring US democracy through the lens of a college Republican club Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article Volume 12 (1): 492 – 514 (July 2020) Noah Krigel holds a B.A. in Sociology with minors in Science, Technology, & Society and Women & Gender Studies. He lives in San Francisco and can be contacted at noahkrigel AT gmail.com. <https://www.interfacejournal.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Interface-12-1-Krigel.pdf> -CAT

* [The article title has an offensive gendered term that I don’t read but it’s present in the large text; I don’t endorse that]
* [CR = College Republicans]

A respite from the perceived hostility and sense of victimhood faced on campus, club meetings and events became an important site for community development and group thought. CRs encouraged each other to become unabashedly conservative, by being provocative publicly. When asked what constituted successful events, Lynn, a white Christian female upper-level and board member who reflected many other CR perspectives, said: ‘Every year, we have a free speech wall. Literally, all we do is put up a wall and people go crazy. I think it’s important to do things that are outrageous and provocative to see that the basic concept of these liberal policies can be outrageous. … Like oh, whoa, that is kind of a crazy idea.’ A free speech wall, intended to commemorate the fall of the Berlin Wall, is a common political event that has been noted at other college Republican clubs for at least the past 15 years (Binder & Wood, 2012). At WestU, however, this large plywood board in the middle of campus was more commonly recognized as a vehicle to spark reactions due to the Islamophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, misogynistic and transphobic slurs written by students. This, in turn, provoked frequent op-eds in the WestU newspaper, protests across campus, and occasional news coverage by national media outlets. In previous years, CRs also hosted “Empty Gun Holster Day” to encourage CRs to parade around campus with an empty gun holster, as well as invited self-identified far-right speakers who preached racial superiority. Events such as these felt empowering to CRs who believed it helped foster an important sense of community. As Randy, a white Catholic male under-level and board member, explained, “The free speech wall, I helped put the nails in that. I love being part of something bigger.” Events and social gatherings produced a sense of electrifying excitement and a social cohesion. At meetings and events, particularly those that sparked protests outside, CRs welcomed each other with large smiles and hugs, rarely permitting anyone to sit alone. After one such contentious event, when CRs were met with a Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article Volume 12 (1): 492 – 514 (July 2020) Krigel, “We’re not the party to bitch and whine” 504 group of about seven protesters wearing black hoodies and with handkerchiefs over their faces, yelling and taking photos, CRs began wrapping their arms around each other, chuckling as they walked by. “Good to know that they’re brave people” one white male CR said sarcastically, while another joked, “I’m a little underwhelmed.” Comradery among CRs appeared to be reinforced by verbal attacks from other students, helping legitimize their actions. During one club meeting, while discussing a recent on-campus racist event, a white male general member proudly regaled CRs with stories from attending an open-forum put on by the WestU student government. Dismissing the emotional toll that the racist event had on multiple student communities (particularly the Black, Latinx, and queer communities), the member proudly explained how he represented the club’s voice: “I was the only one who wasn’t crying and stuff. It makes us look really good. We’re not the party to bitch and whine.” CRs relished the belief that their inflammatory actions, which represented their collectivized standpoint, would be propagated to by other students.6 During another interview, when asked about inclusion on campus, Kevin, a white Catholic male upper-level and general member who also identified as a member of the on campus Turning Point USA club, said, “I’m always open-minded, but excluding Turning Point USA, the Republican club is the most open-minded club on campus. The rest of the clubs are basically fucking Communists. It’s really sad.” Many CRs, some of whom were also members of the on campus Turning Point USA club, drew boundaries around tolerance, suggesting that acceptance was found only in libertarian and conservative spaces, while insinuating that liberals reflected or were manipulated by radical-left thought. **There also appeared to be an ostensibly growing consensus to refuse ruling out violence against liberals**. Kevin, when asked what he thought about CR’s record of inviting provocative speakers, explained, “We need someone to [verbally] punch back and hit people. I’m willing to accept [a speaker] who is a little rough around the edges but is able to fight for us. It’s either that or capitulating.” Similarly, when asked what he would do if he faced provocative protests from liberal groups, John, a white male upper-level and general member, said, “It’s good to get a little bruised up sometimes.” Violent rhetoric was also common during meetings and social events. During one meeting, a white female board member suggested CRs even host an “alt-Right fight night” and pit a liberal against a CR. Legitimized viewpoint While there was some internal debate regarding the club’s official view on issues such as local candidates during elections, CRs vehemently defended almost every statement/action expressed by Trump, coalescing around him rather than 6 While I did not explicitly study relationships between CRs and other WestU clubs, relations seemed mutually antagonistic. Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article Volume 12 (1): 492 – 514 (July 2020) Krigel, “We’re not the party to bitch and whine” 505 an ideology. Life-size cutouts of Donald and Melania Trump and flags stating “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) – the official slogan during Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign – commonly draped the walls of club meetings and events. CRs also adapted the MAGA slogan, signing most emails, “Make WestU Great Again” and selling $25 red hats with the slogan as well. Meeting PowerPoints almost always included pictures of Trump and frequently included Trump-themed dating advice. At one meeting, for example, a risqué picture of Melania Trump was followed by the words, “Work hard so you can land someone banging and way out of your league like Trump did.” During the weekly club meeting speed-dating activity in which CRs were paired together, the Board asked questions such as, “Why is Hilary Clinton the worst?”; “Why do you like Trump?”; and “Which of Trump’s policies is your favorite?”. The Wi-Fi password at the unofficial house for club parties was, “Trump2020,” and the group text for all CRs was entitled, “God King Trump.” Anyone who disagreed with or did not support Trump was excluded from the club. Said Annie, a white Christian under-level in the process of leaving the club: 'Ever since winter last year, it went downhill. The Libertarians that wanted to drink and have fun were pushed out because they weren’t conservative enough. They were considered RINOS – Republican in name only. The club thought my friends weren’t conservative enough because they didn’t like Trump. To be conservative in the club now is to be as right-wing as you can. … Our club has become the most extreme conservatives on campus, some of the most extreme right-wingers. That’s why I’m not that involved this year. I don’t even challenge them. I feel outnumbered. I don’t want to be on the girls’ bad side. I’m worried they’re going to spread rumors about me. … They witch-hunted a lot of people out of the club.’ After Trump was elected, the board created socially unpleasant experiences for those who did not support the new president, using gossip to attack dissenters’ social reputations and encouraging them to leave the club. Members who stood up to voice disagreement with this practice were met with a similar reaction. One such member, Tim, a Catholic Asian male upper-level and former CR who was forced out of the club after criticizing this exclusionary tactic, said, “The purpose of the club is to be Trump’s puppets. …They go out of their way to defend [Trump] on every basis imaginable.” More than merely defend Trump, however, it seemed that CRs did not tolerate almost any form of disagreement. In fact, for the most part, CRs did not challenge the board’s decisions. Many CRs did not feel comfortable explaining what they disliked about the club, fearful of becoming social pariahs. One CR during our interview frequently asked to obscure their demographic information, as well as speak “off the record.” Another interviewee, Cheryl, a white Catholic upper-level and general member, felt comfortable saying only, “If you’ve done something to upset one or multiple women on the board then it can kind of, word spreads quickly.” Suggesting that backlash came from the female-dominated board, Cheryl hinted at the policing, Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article Volume 12 (1): 492 – 514 (July 2020) Krigel, “We’re not the party to bitch and whine” 506 but quickly asked to move on to the next question. Fear was a powerful vehicle in the club’s regulation of their internal discourse. This policing extended outside the club as well. At one meeting, after receiving backlash from the Republican party for inviting a controversial speaker to campus, a white Christian female under-level and board member said to her fellow cheering CRs, “Local Republicans are pushing against us. I say they’re not real Republicans.” In another incident, in response to a WestU policy that increased student fees for out-of-state students to support working-class students – who were more likely to be students of color – a different white female board member spoke on a national conservative media outlet where she argued that WestU was cutting enrollment for white students. After WestU immediately released a counterstatement pointing out that it was illegal for the University to consider race in its enrollment process, the national media outlet apologized for falsely reporting on the issue. In response, CRs then released their own statement, denouncing both the conservative media outlet and WestU for their “promotion of identity politics.” Despite receiving financial support from the off-campus Republican party, CRs still challenged those Republicans for disagreeing with them. Preaching dogma which, in its dominant form, rested on an unwavering idolization of Trump, CRs regulated discourse and ostracized those with whom they disagreed.

#### Independently, democratic backsliding causes nuclear war; that’s a linear risk to extinction

**Corr 17** Anders, PHD in Government from Harvard and works in military intelligence, 5/21/2017, “The New Cold War: Democracy Vs. Autocracy”, Political Risk Analysis, [https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/05/21/the-new-cold-war-democracy-vs-autocracy/2/#](https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/05/21/the-new-cold-war-democracy-vs-autocracy/2/) JS

Over the past 8 days, North Korea successfully tested two nuclear-capable missiles, making a mockery of President Trump’s tough approach on North Korea. He has meanwhile opened his arms of friendship to Russia and China, the biggest global threats to democracy. His public excuse is the need to work with Russia on terrorism, and with China on North Korea. That help has not materialized, which will be a test of Trump’s mettle. If he fails to take action against North Korea, and leaves his many concessions to China in place, he got played. The North Korean launches are the latest in decades of events that show an animosity of authoritarian rulers toward democracies. Shortly after the Soviet Union disintegrated in the 1990s, many U.S. analysts saw democracy and liberalism as triumphant over autocracy, and even presaged the “end of history.” Russia and China were proceeding toward market liberalization and democratization. The democratic peace would soon take hold and the world would evolve in a utopic manner, they thought. But that dream now seems far-flung, with low-grade Russian and Chinese offensives in Eastern Europe and Asia respectively. These offensives are calibrated in such a manner as to make territorial gains, while not provoking a military response. They utilize alliances with Iran and North Korea to encourage rogue state action that distracts global public attention from Chinese and Russian territorial offenses. Conversely, the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the European Union and others are in a relatively loose alliance based on the common values of democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech. But the alliance is divided by the strong democratic desire for peace, and domestic elites with individual incentives to value trade and investment over the defense of values like democracy. It is subject to free riding, which President Trump has successfully pushed, including at an upcoming meeting in Brussels on May 25. What could be called an autocratic bloc is provoking, through territorial expansion and destabilizing nuclear development, an interrelated set of conflicts developing in the direction of a New Cold War between autocracies on one side, and democracies on the other. As with the old Cold War, the locus of the conflict is everywhere, including the South China Sea, East China Sea, North Korean and Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile development, the Russian occupation of Crimea in Ukraine, Russia’s attempt to reclaim influence in the former Soviet Union, including through occupation of part of Georgia, China’s attempt to push the U.S. out of Asia and claim it as a sphere of influence, the Arctic, space, undersea exploration, and Russian and Chinese attempts to influence politicians and even voting outcomes in democratic countries. To institutionalize its growing power and leadership of autocratic countries, and many democratic hangers-on, China attempts to reform global governance not through democratization that might help countries like Japan, India, Brazil and Germany to positions of greater influence in places like the U.N. Security Council, but to uniquely reflect and accommodate China’s own growing economic and military power. Democracies are being challenged worldwide by this autocratic bloc. If democracies do not have a clear-eyed understanding of the threat, and a grand strategy to defeat or at least deflect the challenge, democracies will be weakened in such a way as to make future challenges even more difficult to overcome. The outcomes of the challenges that democracies face today will determine future outcomes, in a process that is increasingly path dependent. Nowhere are the challenges and path dependence greater than in defending democratic voting processes from autocratic influence, and in defending front-line democratic territory in places like Eastern Europe, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Himalayas, and Taiwan. Decisions on defensive actions or inactions by allied democracies on these fields of economic, diplomatic, and military battle will profoundly affect the future of democracy, peace, and stability for decades, if not centuries, to come. Positive outcomes will require not just grand strategies by major powers, but comprehensive citizen involvement by people of many nations who care about a future that is democratic and at peace.

### CP - Violence

#### CP: The government may recognize a general right to strike, but if those strikes turn violent, the courts should have a duty to intervene.

Tenza 20

Mlungisi Tenza (Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal). “The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa.” Obiter vol.41 n.3 Port Elizabeth 2020. JDN. <http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1682-58532020000300004>

4 1 Strikes should only be allowed to continue if they are lawful

The definition of "strike" lends itself any obstruction of work that is lawful.51So, if workers refuse to undertake "work" that is illegal and unlawful, this will not constitute a strike.52 Where employees refuse to work in support of an unlawful demand (for example the removal of a supervisor without following due process), this will also not constitute a strike.53 Therefore, where the action involved does not constitute a strike, participants do not enjoy the protection offered by section 67(1) of the LRA.54 If the means used by strikers to obstruct work constitute unlawful conduct such as violence,55then the conduct will not qualify as a strike, and will thus not be protected.55 **If a strike becomes violent** and no longer pursues legitimate or lawful demands, **the court should intervene** as violent and unruly conduct is the antithesis of the aim of a strike, which is to persuade the employer through peaceful withholding of work to agree to the union's demands.56 For a court to intervene, Rycroft argues that the following question needs to be asked: "has the misconduct taken place to an extent that the strike no longer promotes functional to collective bargaining, and is therefore no longer deserving of its protected status."57 The Labour Court in National Union of Food Beverage Wine Spirits & Allied Workers v Universal Product Network (Pty) Ltd58adopted Rycroft's functionality test which entails that the Labour Court could assume the power to alter the59protected status of a strike to unprotected action on the basis of violence.59 This entails the weighing up of the level of violence against the efforts of the trade union to curb it in order for a court to determine whether a strike's protected status is still functional to collective bargaining.60

Rycroft further argues that there is an inseparable link between strikes and functional collective bargaining and justifies this on three grounds. First, the Interim Constitution of South Africa 200 of 1993 provided that "workers have the right to strike for the purposes of collective bargaining."61 Secondly, strikes must be orderly. And lastly, the strike must not involve misconduct. This he infers from the fact that employees engaged in misconduct can be dismissed irrespective of whether the strike is protected or not.62 Informed by the decision of Afrox Ltd v SACWU 2,63Rycroft argues that **a strike can lose its protection** if it is no longer functional to collective bargaining. So if a strike is no longer functional to collective bargaining, it is bound to lose protection, and those who participate in such activities will face dismissal or an action for damages can be instituted against those responsible.

#### It competes and is feasible — the CP uses proportionality to balance strikes against rights against violence. That’s a legally recognized condition on the right to strike.

Fabbrini 12

Federico Fabbrini (PhD Researcher in the Law Department at the European University Institute) “Europe in Need of a New Deal: On Federalism, Free Market, and the Right to Strike.” Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, 2012. JDN. https://www.iuscommune.eu/html/activities/2012/2012-11-29/workshop5\_Fabbrini.pdf

The most characteristic feature of the German regulatory model, however, is represented by the so-called principle of ultima ratio. This principle represents the application in the field of labor law of the general constitutional principle of Verhaltnismaßigkeit, or **proportionality.**70 According to this principle, “a strike is only legal if it is necessary and the ultimate measure to solve the industrial conflict.”71 As a consequence, trade unions **do not enjoy an unconditional right** to pursue collective action, even when, in their view, a strike would be the most effective tool to strengthen their bargaining position. “In keeping with the principle of last resort, all possibilities of a peaceful negotiation for settlement must have been exhausted” before a trade union can go on strike.72 Labor courts are therefore empowered to assess the proportionality of the industrial action undertaken by the trade unions and can sanction illegal strikes by requiring offending trade unions to pay damages. Historically, industrial relations between employees’ unions and employers’ associations have been very cooperative in Germany, and this has kept industrial action to a minimum.73 Yet by permitting strikes only when they are proportionate, German law designs a rather **restrictive** model of **regulation of the right to strike**, which ensures wide protection for other constitutional values, such as the right to property and freedom of commerce.74