### Cap K vs Non-T AFFs

#### The link is starting points– neoliberalism causes massive global dehumanization and requires unrelenting class-based politics before challenging other politics of difference.

McLaren 4

Distinguished Fellow – Critical Studies @ Chapman U and UCLA urban schooling prof, and Scatamburlo-D’Annibale, associate professor of Communication – U Windsor, ‘4 (Peter and Valerie, “Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’,” Educational Philosophy and Theory Vol. 36, Issue 2, p. 183-199)

The grosteque conditions that inspired Marx to pen his original critique of capitalism are present and flourishing. The inequalities of wealth and the gross imbalances of power that exist today are leading to abuses that exceed those encountered in Marx’s day (Greider, 1998, p. 39). Global capitalism has paved the way for the obscene concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands and created a world increasingly divided between those who enjoy opulent affluence and those who languish in dehumanizing conditions and economic misery. In every corner of the globe, we are witnessing social disintegration as revealed by a rise in abject poverty and inequality. At the current historical juncture, the combined assets of the 225 richest people is roughly equal to the annual income of the poorest 47 percent of the world’s population, while the combined assets of the three richest people exceed the combined GDP of the 48 poorest nations (CCPA, 2002, p. 3). Approximately 2.8 billion people—almost half of the world’s population—struggle in desperation to live on less than two dollars a day (McQuaig, 2001, p. 27). As many as 250 million children are wage slaves and there are over a billion workers who are either un- or under-employed. These are the concrete realities of our time—realities that require a vigorous class analysis, an unrelenting critique of capitalism and an oppositional politics capable of confronting what Ahmad (1998, p. 2) refers to as ‘capitalist universality.’ They are realities that require something more than that which is offered by the prophets of ‘difference’ and post-Marxists who would have us relegate socialism to the scrapheap of history and mummify Marxism along with Lenin’s corpse. Never before has a Marxian analysis of capitalism and class rule been so desperately needed. That is not to say that everything Marx said or anticipated has come true, for that is clearly not the case. Many critiques of Marx focus on his strategy for moving toward socialism, and with ample justification; nonetheless Marx did provide us with fundamental insights into class society that have held true to this day. Marx’s enduring relevance lies in his indictment of capitalism which continues to wreak havoc in the lives of most. While capitalism’s cheerleaders have attempted to hide its sordid underbelly, Marx’s description of capitalism as the sorcerer’s dark power is even more apt in light of contemporary historical and economic conditions. Rather than jettisoning Marx, decentering the role of capitalism, and discrediting class analysis, radical educators must continue to engage Marx’s oeuvre and extrapolate from it that which is useful pedagogically, theoretically, and, most importantly, politically in light of the challenges that confront us. The urgency which animates Amin’s call for a collective socialist vision necessitates, as we have argued, moving beyond the particularism and liberal pluralism that informs the ‘politics of difference.’ It also requires challenging the questionable assumptions that have come to constitute the core of contemporary ‘radical’ theory, pedagogy and politics. In terms of effecting change, what is needed is a cogent understanding of the systemic nature of exploitation and oppression based on the precepts of a radical political economy approach (outlined above) and one that incorporates Marx’s notion of ‘unity in difference’ in which people share widely common material interests. Such an understanding extends far beyond the realm of theory, for the manner in which we choose to interpret and explore the social world, the concepts and frameworks we use to express our sociopolitical understandings, are more than just abstract categories. They imply intentions, organizational practices, and political agendas. Identifying class analysis as the basis for our understandings and class struggle as the basis for political transformation implies something quite different than constructing a sense of political agency around issues of race, ethnicity, gender, etc. Contrary to ‘Shakespeare’s assertion that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet,’ it should be clear that this is not the case in political matters. Rather, in politics ‘the essence of the flower lies in the name by which it is called’ (Bannerji, 2000, p. 41).

#### Thus, the ROB - vote for the debater who has the better liberatory strategy to free us from neoliberalism. The alt is to reject consumerism and embrace socialism.; millennials prove feasibility

Lynch 19

Conor Lynch, *The Week*, “Think Young People Are Hostile to Capitalism Now? Just wait for the next recession.” 10/17/2019. Conor Lynch is a freelance journalist living in New York City. He has written for The New Republic, Salon, and Alternet. <https://theweek.com/articles/871131/think-young-people-are-hostile-capitalism-now-just-wait-next-recession> CAT

Though the panic that erupted during the summer months about a potential recession has cooled somewhat since, especially with the impeachment drama taking up most of our collective attention, signs of a looming economic downturn nevertheless remain. Job growth has slowed, levels of corporate and consumer debt have both reached all-time highs (surpassing levels last seen before the Great Recession), and the yield curve measuring the difference between 10-year and 3-month Treasury bond yields has been "inverted" for months. The economist Campbell Harvey, whose research showed that the inverted yield curve accurately predicted the last seven recessions, recently said that the indicator is "flashing code red." "It's not normal. It's something that foreshadows bad times," observed Campbell. A downturn is probably on the horizon, then, and while it may not be as devastating as the 2008 recession, which threatened to undo the entire financial system, there's a good chance that the public will respond with even more anger and intensity than 10 years ago. The last economic crisis contributed directly to the rise of populism over the following decade, but the next crisis will come squarely within the age of populism. It will also come in an age of extreme inequality and polarization, where capitalism is being questioned and critiqued more than in any other period since the end of the Cold War, especially by the generation that came of age during the Great Recession. The rise of populism wasn't just a response to the financial crisis and its painful consequences, though. It was a response to the fact that nothing fundamentally changed in its aftermath. The big banks remained too big to fail, executives who had overseen rampant fraud remained free (with their generous bonuses intact), income and wealth inequality continued to grow out of control, and wages continued to stagnate as billionaires saw their wealth multiply. In other words, the economy "recovered" for those on top, while the recession lingered for everyone else. In his modern classic, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, the French economist Thomas Piketty suggested that growing inequality in America contributed directly to the country's financial instability. One consequence of increasing inequality, he wrote, "was virtual stagnation of the purchasing power of the lower and middle classes in the United States, which inevitably made it more likely that modest households would take on debt, especially since unscrupulous banks and financial institutions, freed from regulation and eager to earn good yields on the enormous savings injected into the system by the well-to-do, offered credit on increasingly generous terms." A decade after the crisis, income inequality is the highest it's been in America since the Census Bureau began tracking it over five decades ago. And disparities in wealth are even more extreme. Meanwhile, household debt has exceeded levels seen in 2008, reaching $14 trillion earlier this year. This number is driven largely by student loans and credit card debt, which steadily grow as wages stagnate and jobs become more precarious. These trends disproportionately affect young people, although that hasn't stopped the financial class from blaming them for the "sluggish economy." Millennials are reportedly consuming less and saving more, which is causing an "economic imbalance." "The higher savings rate, we believe, has had disinflationary impact, driving the relatively slow growth and low inflation in this recovery," wrote an analyst for Raymond James, observing that younger people are "saving instead of purchasing like last generation, limiting demand growth." The fact that millennials are consuming less than their Gen-X and baby boomer elders may indicate a slight cultural shift from the consumerist mindset of previous generations, but the more likely cause is that they simply have less disposable income to throw around. A recent study that surveyed 4,000 American consumers found that, since 1996, the average net worth of consumers under 35 has dropped by 35 percent. This, along with declining real wages, increasing cost of living (home ownership has substantially declined for millennials), and swelling levels of debt, makes the growing millennial hostility towards capitalism perfectly sensible. People "behave more like their income than their age," said one of the study's authors, and just as the American working class became the middle class in the mid-20th century and thus embraced capitalism, young people in the 21st century are being proletarianized (or precariatized) and thus embracing socialism. Coming of age in the midst of the financial crisis and entering the workforce during the rise of the gig economy has given millennials an intuitive understanding of the deep instability and unfairness of our economic (and political) system. A recent survey from Quinnipiac revealed just how divided older and younger Democrats are on capitalism. Forty-four percent of those aged 18-34 supported the "democratic socialist" Bernie Sanders, compared to 22 percent for Elizabeth Warren (who is progressive but "capitalist to her bones") and 9 percent for Joe Biden. On the other hand, 41 percent of those over 65 supported Biden, compared to 26 percent for Warren and an incredible 2 percent for Sanders. The socialist platform of Sanders repels older voters who grew up in the so-called "golden age" of capitalism, while it naturally appeals to younger voters who grew up in the age of neoliberalism and economic crisis. Of course, it's not just about one's personal income or wealth, but the impact that capitalism is having on the future of the planet as well. The 16-year old Greta Thunberg captured well in her UN speech last month: "We are in the beginning of a mass extinction, and all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth." When the next recession comes, young people and the working class will no doubt be impacted the hardest, and this will only further radicalize their politics. The more they feel that the system is rigged against them, the more they will demand the system itself be overthrown. After the 2008 recession, President Obama and the Democrats effectively saved capitalism from itself; a more radical leadership would fight to replace it with a better system. This time around there may be far more pressure from below to do just that, especially with a more organized left and more class conscious young people. Politics is situational, and economic and political circumstances have changed drastically over the past few decades — especially since the financial crisis. The baby boomers grew up and spent their adult lives under very different conditions than most millennials today, and their contrasting worldviews reflect this reality. Millennials are set to overtake baby boomers this year as the largest generation in America, and after 10 years of tepid recovery, they will have a real say in how to respond to the next crisis. Don't expect them to take it quietly.

#### And, dismantling capitalism o/ws under under any framework -- it’s the greatest existential threat and the biggest affront to human rights and structural inequalities. The consensus of recent studies prove that transition is possible but that requires radical rejection of current neoliberal politics

Ahmed 20

Nafeez Ahmed -- Visiting Research Fellow at the Global Sustainability Institute at Anglia Ruskin University's Faculty of Science & Technology + M.A. in contemporary war & peace studies + DPhil (April 2009) in international relations from the School of Global Studies @ Sussex University, “Capitalism is Destroying ‘Safe Operating Space’ for Humanity, Warn Scientists”, https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-06-24/capitalism-is-destroying-safe-operating-space-for-humanity-warn-scientists/, 24 June 2020, EmmieeM) -recut CAT

* The last paragraph shows that rapid peaceful transition is possible so put away that garbage Harris 02 transition wars card

The COVID19 pandemic has exposed a strange anomaly in the global economy. If it doesn’t keep growing endlessly, it just breaks. Grow, or die. But there’s a deeper problem. New scientific research confirms that capitalism’s structural obsession with endless growth is destroying the very conditions for human survival on planet Earth. A landmark study in the journal Nature Communications, “Scientists’ warning on affluence” — by scientists in Australia, Switzerland and the UK — concludes that the most fundamental driver of environmental destruction is the overconsumption of the super-rich. This factor lies over and above other factors like fossil fuel consumption, industrial agriculture and deforestation: because it is overconsumption by the super-rich which is the chief driver of these other factors breaching key planetary boundaries. The paper notes that the richest 10 percent of people are responsible for up to 43 percent of destructive global environmental impacts. In contrast, the poorest 10 percent in the world are responsible just around 5 percent of these environmental impacts: The new paper is authored by Thomas Wiedmann of UNSW Sydney’s School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Manfred Lenzen of the University of Sydney’s School of Physics, Lorenz T. Keysser of ETH Zürich’s Department of Environmental Systems Science, and Julia K. Steinberger of Leeds University’s School of Earth and Environment. It confirms that global structural inequalities in the distribution of wealth are intimately related to an escalating environmental crisis threatening the very existence of human societies. Synthesising knowledge from across the scientific community, the paper identifies capitalism as the main cause behind “alarming trends of environmental degradation” which now pose “existential threats to natural systems, economies and societies.” The paper concludes: “It is clear that prevailing capitalist, growth-driven economic systems have not only increased affluence since World War II, but have led to enormous increases in inequality, financial instability, resource consumption and environmental pressures on vital earth support systems.” Capitalism and the pandemic Thanks to the way capitalism works, the paper shows, the super-rich are incentivised to keep getting richer — at the expense of the health of our societies and the planet overall. The research provides an important scientific context for how we can understand many earlier scientific studies revealing that industrial expansion has hugely increased the risks of new disease outbreaks. Just last April, a paper in Landscape Ecology found that deforestation driven by increased demand for consumption of agricultural commodities or beef have increased the probability of ‘zoonotic’ diseases (exotic diseases circulating amongst animals) jumping to humans. This is because industrial expansion, driven by capitalist pressures, has intensified the encroachment of human activities on wildlife and natural ecosystems. Two years ago, another study in Frontiers of Microbiology concluded presciently that accelerating deforestation due to “demographic growth” and the associated expansion of “farming, logging, and hunting”, is dangerously transforming rural environments. More bat species carrying exotic viruses have ended up next to human dwellings, the study said. This is increasing “the risk of transmission of viruses through direct contact, domestic animal infection, or contamination by urine or faeces.” It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the COVID19 pandemic thus emerged directly from these rapidly growing impacts of human activities. As the new paper in Nature Communications confirms, these impacts have accelerated in the context of the fundamental operations of industrial capitalism. Eroding the ‘safe operating space’ The result is that capitalism is causing human societies to increasingly breach key planetary boundaries, such as land-use change, biosphere integrity and climate change. Remaining within these boundaries is essential to maintain what scientists describe as a “safe operating space” for human civilization. If those key ecosystems are disrupted, that “safe operating space” will begin to erode. The global impacts of the COVID19 pandemic are yet another clear indication that this process of erosion has already begun. “The evidence is clear,” write Weidmann and his co-authors. “Long-term and concurrent human and planetary wellbeing will not be achieved in the Anthropocene if affluent overconsumption continues, spurred by economic systems that exploit nature and humans. We find that, to a large extent, the affluent lifestyles of the world’s rich determine and drive global environmental and social impact. Moreover, international trade mechanisms allow the rich world to displace its impact to the global poor.” The new scientific research thus confirms that the normal functioning of capitalism is eroding the ‘safe space’ by which human civilisation is able to survive. The structures The paper also sets out how this is happening in some detail. The super-rich basically end up driving this destructive system forward in three key ways. Firstly, they are directly responsible for “biophysical resource use… through high consumption.” Secondly, they are “members of powerful factions of the capitalist class.” Thirdly, due to that positioning, they end up “driving consumption norms across the population.” But perhaps the most important insight of the paper is not that this is purely because the super-rich are especially evil or terrible compared to the rest of the population — but because of the systemic pressures produced by capitalist structures. The authors point out that: “Growth imperatives are active at multiple levels, making the pursuit of economic growth (net investment, i.e. investment above depreciation) a necessity for different actors and leading to social and economic instability in the absence of it.” At the core of capitalism, the paper observes, is a fundamental social relationship defining the way working people are systemically marginalised from access to the productive resources of the earth, along with the mechanisms used to extract these resources and produce goods and services. This means that to survive economically in this system, certain behavioural patterns become not just normalised, but seemingly entirely rational — at least from a limited perspective that ignores wider societal and environmental consequences. In the words of the authors: “In capitalism, workers are separated from the means of production, implying that they must compete in labour markets to sell their labour power to capitalists in order to earn a living.” Meanwhile, firms which own and control these means of production “need to compete in the market, leading to a necessity to reinvest profits into more efficient production processes to minimise costs (e.g. through replacing human labour power with machines and positive returns to scale), innovation of new products and/or advertising to convince consumers to buy more.” If a firm fails to remain competitive through such behaviours, “it either goes bankrupt or is taken over by a more successful business. Under normal economic conditions, this capitalist competition is expected to lead to aggregate growth dynamics.” The irony is that, as the paper also shows, the “affluence” accumulated by the super-rich isn’t correlated with happiness or well-being. Restructure The “hegemonic” dominance of global capitalism, then, is the principal obstacle to the systemic transformation needed to reduce overconsumption. So it’s not enough to simply try to “green” current consumption through technologies like renewable energy — we need to actually reduce our environmental impacts by changing our behaviours with a focus on cutting back our use of planetary resources: “Not only can a sufficient decoupling of environmental and detrimental social impacts from economic growth not be achieved by technological innovation alone, but also the profit-driven mechanism of prevailing economic systems prevents the necessary reduction of impacts and resource utilisation per se.” The good news is that it doesn’t have to be this way. The paper reviews a range of “bottom-up studies” showing that dramatic reductions in our material footprint are perfectly possible while still maintaining good material living standards. In India, Brazil and South Africa, “decent living standards” can be supported “with around 90 percent less per-capita energy use than currently consumed in affluent countries.” Similar possible reductions are feasible for modern industrial economies such as Australia and the US. By becoming aware of how the wider economic system incentivises behaviour that is destructive of human societies and planetary ecosystems critical for human survival, both ordinary workers and more wealthy sectors — including the super-rich — can work toward rewriting the global economic operating system. This can be done by restructuring ownership in firms, equalising relations with workers, and intentionally reorganising the way decisions are made about investment priorities. The paper points out that citizens and communities have a crucial role to play in getting organised, upgrading efforts for public education about these key issues, and experimenting with new ways to work together in bringing about “social tipping points” — points at which social action can catalyse mass change. While a sense of doom and apathy about the prospects for such change is understandable, mounting evidence based on systems science suggests that global capitalism as we know it is in a state of protracted crisis and collapse that began some decades ago. This research strongly supports the view that as industrial civilization reaches the last stages of its systemic life-cycle, there is unprecedented and increasing opportunity for small-scale actions and efforts to have large system-wide impacts. The new paper shows that the need for joined-up action is paramount: structural racism, environmental crisis, global inequalities are not really separate crises — but different facets of human civilization’s broken relationship with nature. Yet, of course, the biggest takeaway is that those who bear most responsibility for environmental destruction — those who hold the most wealth in our societies — urgently need to wake up to how their narrow models of life are, quite literally, destroying the foundations for human survival over the coming decades.

#### Perms shift the Overton window to the right, preventing us from actualizing a post-capitalist economy.

Naschek 18

Melissa - member of the Democratic Socialists of America, “The Identity Mistake,” 8/28/18, <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/08/mistaken-identity-asaid-haider-review-identity-politics>

We Can’t “Do Both” Today, with the popularity of Bernie Sanders and a resurgence in trade union activity, circumstances are finally re-emerging for a political program capable of fostering mass working-class solidarity. Instead, Haider would have us turn to the model that has failed the working class for years: rhetorically accepting identity-based particularism at the implicit expense of class-based universalism. Of course, Haider does not overtly suggest that this is an either/or. Instead, he insists that we must do both — working-class politics and identity politics. But “doing both” is easier said than done. Identity politics and class politics understand capitalist power structures in distinct ways and therefore lead to distinct political strategies. More importantly, however, “doing both” misreads the balance of power in America today: institutionally on the Left, we have nothing but a fraction of the already miniscule labor movement to back our platform and our analysis. But liberalism has a major political party, the media, academia, and the entire world of nonprofits, which today controls about as much wealth as the Church did before the French Revolution. And it’s in the “do both” strategy that these powerful enemies of the Left (and allies of capital) worm their way into our coalition and play up identity to reshape working-class demands until they’re neutralized. Haider fails to recognize the profound asymmetry between the power of institutions of the working-class and the advocates of universal class-based reforms, and those of the liberal establishment and their own embrace of identity-based particularism. Concretely, this asymmetry does not lead to the best of identity politics and the best of universal demands in some sort of synthesis. Instead, the lopsided advocacy for particularist demands serves only to further marginalize the universalist demands. An anticapitalist politics capable of fighting against such forces must appeal to the whole working class to build a mass movement. Masses of people become interested in politics when organizations offer a real possibility to change their lives for the better. The only way to forge a movement capable of achieving that is by fighting for shared working-class political and economic interests. This remains the only plausible path to harnessing the only power offered to workers in society: their position as an exploited majority. The good news is that the needs for affordable medical care, a livable planet, quality education, and respect and security in the workplace satisfy such a mandate. It is two of Mistaken Identity’s supposed interlocutors, Barbara J. Fields and Karen Fields, who note that downplaying class demands “is a devastating, intolerable mistake. It leads people to say that race is fundamental — not economics, not class — and if you bring class in then you’re trying to deny the reality of human existence and identity. That is the big mystification achieved by racecraft.” While Haider rightly identifies the ineptitude of identity politics, he does not craft a political strategy that could serve as the basis for a socialist politics. Ultimately, Mistaken Identity is a manifesto of the Zombie New Left, claiming to overcome identity politics but leading us down the same dead end.

## Case

### Framing

#### Proposing and engaging with modest political changes isn’t faith in liberal progress or Enlightenment subjectivity—rather, it’s an antagonistic misinterpellation to expose the system’s fatal flaws—that’s key to radically upend liberalism’s foundational assumptions by turning the system against itself.

Martel 16

James R. Martel, Professor of Political Science—SFSU, PhD-Poli Sci from Berkeley, The radical kernel of the Haitian Revolution: A case study of Misinterpellation, May 19, 2016, http://www.essaydocs.org/the-radical-kernel-of-the-haitian-revolution-a-case-study-of-m.html

What for Toussaint is a complex engagement with ideas of freedom and equality, a love hate relationship with France and the enlightenment, is for the ex-slaves boiled down to a simple premise; their refusal, at all costs, to be reinslaved. With such a denuded and basic conviction as the anchor for the entire spectrum of their resistance, the ex slaves’ engagement with phantasm is necessarily also more limited; the ex-slave population as a whole therefore proved itself to be much less persuaded by the blandishments of enlightenment thought than Toussaint himself. And the experience of slavery more generally resists liberal notions of freedom. An exploited wage earner may (often does) consider herself to be free. A slave knows that she is not. When abstract notions like freedom became simply the fact of not being a slave, of tilling one’s own land without a master, there is no longer much space for ideology or phantasm. And this simplicity, this denuding of rights to the point where it is no longer totalizing and determinant (so that it is not a “hesitation” as with Toussaint but a full throttled subversion in their case) can spread, as we already saw, from the colony to the metropole. Here, the radical, largely phantasm proof kernel of Haitian radicalism was exported to other contexts, other revolutions. As we have seen, James tells us that it is the experience of the slave uprising in Haiti that helped to radicalize the masses in France. After they witnessed the experience of the slaves in Haiti, when the idea of freedom became as tangible, as legible as casting off of actual chains, the Parisian masses were able to subvert their own phantasms, similarly using a notion of freedom that was not really intended for them as a means to upend their own subservience to liberal ideology. And, of course, the French revolution went on to become the revolution, the model for leftist uprisings (and even not so left ones) ever since, hence smuggling the Haitian revolution’s radicalism in a new and “universal” (because French) guise. By showing how a false right like freedom can be the basis for its own resistance, for producing, if not “authentic” and “true” freedom then at least a freedom that serves, a freedom that is not part of the intentions of phantasmic capitalism, the slaves of Haiti show us all not only that it is possible to subvert idolatry through misinterpellation but further that it has been done, not just in small individual moments (something that Benjamin informs us happens all the time, at every moment) but in a widespread and collective movement that changed the whole world. In order to conclude, let me briefly discuss a few political implications of this idea of misinterpellation. One idea I’d like to stress is how this reading differs (maybe for obvious reasons) from general liberal views on the question of rights and callings. Although Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” has been widely debunked (these days, it certainly doesn’t feel like history has ended or will end anytime soon), a lingering effect of this theory, which is actually quite central to liberalism’s own self conceit, is that liberalism has basically resolved the world’s problems and that it is only lingering prejudice that leads to its imperfect application. We can see therefore that a liberal reader would deny the function of misinterpellation in favor of saying something like “although the framers of these rights may not have intended for these rights to be applied to non western, non white people (or, alternatively, only to men, or to the upper classes) the rights themselves held an inherent power that, over time, overcame the narrow prejudices of the authors, allowing them to come to their fullest expression.” In this reading, the problem is not with liberal notions of rights but only with their application. It is not a question of who is called, or when, the right itself has a universal basis and application so no one that hears the call hears it wrongly. Thus, this argument concludes, it is no accident of misinterpellation, but only the process of time is required to complete what is inherent in the rights themselves. Turning to a notion of misinterpellation thus offers an alternative explanation to liberalism’s own self-understanding. Change comes, in this (my own) view not from the successes of liberalism but its failures; insofar as liberalism’s own norms and rights are saturated through and through with questions of domination and exploitation, resistance comes not from the innate righteousness of liberal rights but rather from the way they sometimes misfire and are misheard, misread, and misunderstood. In this view, the “right” in question is rotten to the core. There is nothing universal about it; there is no universal at all**.** No passage of time would lead it to a fuller expression; there is no built in process by which it is extended to other people and nothing is inevitable about any extension or complication of the concept of rights. Instead, it is the expectation that these rights produce in unintended populations, and the rage and reaction that occurs when it becomes clear that such expectations are misplaced, that creates something else, a new kind of “right,” that comes from the contingent and agonic struggle of subject peoples. Another question worth spending time on is whether the idea of misinterpellation diminishes the agency and intention of the people who engage with it.. The question to ask here is aren’t a colonized or subjected people capable of recognizing on their own that their condition is unjust? Doesn’t it reduplicate the marginalization of a community to suggest that their own movement towards freedom comes only through a form of misunderstanding, an act of misinterpellation? Does that in turn suggest that people are doomed to being dominated unless and until such a moment as their colonial or economic masters makes some kind of critical error, some lucky accident that sets things into motion? To argue such both trivializes the role of the revolutionary communities I am speaking of as well as suggests a kind of inevitability that is itself part of how liberal capitalism continues to operate (that is, its own projected sense of invulnerability and irresistibility is part of how it keeps itself relatively invulnerable and irresistible). Clearly, when a community is first confronted by a would-be conquerer, its response is to fight back as did every community in the world that came under first the threat and then the rule of liberal capital imperialism. This resistance did not end with effective conquest but continued in varying degrees of intensity for the duration of colonialism (and on into its afterlife as neocolonialism); the history of liberal capital domination is marked by continual uprising, revolt and resistance in forms both overt and more subtle. But with a few important exceptions—the case of Haiti being perhaps the paradigmatic one—violent resistance to colonialism and other forms of oppression didn’t generally amount to getting rid of domination itself. Often resistance itself became a justification for further colonialism (and sadly, the same can be said for neo colonial forms of domination). Just as critically (if not more), as Frantz Fanon explains so clearly in The Wretched of the Earth, colonialism produced a kind of “unreality,” its own series of phantasms that created authority and subjectivity (with subjectivity having its double sense as creating self-conscious individuals and also individuals who are subjected to some form of domination or rule). Thus, there is a psychology to colonialism, a kind of subjectivity that is complicated by its own relationship to reality, to normativity, and to the means of power and authority. It is this element, what Fanon calls “a massive psychoexistential complex,” that misinterpellation interrupts. To do so does not reveal the “truth” behind the phantasm so much as disrupt the phantasm from within. Misinterpellation, once again, does not come from “outside” the arena of liberal capitalist domination. It is an internal phenomenon but, for that very reason, a very powerful and radical one. Furtherrmore, I don’t want to rule out other sources of resistance either; misinterpellation may not tell the whole story but it surely tells part of it (an important part, I’d argue). And there are other and more recent examples of misinterpellation I could turn to as well that do not involve a western master. In the case of the Arab Spring, for example, we could read Mohamed Bouazizi’s act of self immolation as leading to a widespread, and fortuitous, case of misinterpellation. It is doubtful that Bouazizi’s act was anything other than an act of despair, a protest against his own immiseration and degradation at the hands of the state and the market. But his act was read by millions as a call to revolution, a call which was answered (and continues to be answered) decisively. Finally, and very briefly, I’d like to talk about the connection between misinterpellation and anarchism. In my view, anarchism involves the recuperation of local decisions, actions and politics that are eclipsed and denuded by the archaism—in our time anyway-- of liberal capitalism. Another parable by Kafka might help to explain this. Kafka’s story “The City Coat of Arms” describes the attempt to build the tower of Babel. While people schemed about the heights and majesty of the tower, they built an entire city around the circumference of the imagined building. Of course the tower never got built—it was pure phantasm. But in the meantime a real city emerged, a circular city with an absent center. In my view, this perfectly describes our situation both during the Haitian revolution and today. The empty tower is the false rights, the dreams and phantasms of international liberal capitalism. The city at its periphery is the life we are actually living, the local decisions and so forth that we make all the time and which we erroneously believe are oriented for the sake of sovereignty and other archisms. Misinterpellation, in my view, exposes, however temporarily the non-existence of the tower and, by extension, the presence of the circle shaped city at its feet. It allows us to recuperate a sense of what we are doing when we are not overwhelmed by the spectacle of liberal universality. It dramatizes the distinction between the phantasms of rights we are promised and the facts of our situation and, as such, invites us to reassert our own forms of living and reality. As the Haitian example shows, such a recuperation can lead, at least potentially to a radical upending of liberal truisms. It doesn’t always lead to a happy ending—it certainly didn’t in Haiti—but it does offer a chance—a rare and wonderful chance—to start over, to stop responding to the calls of domination and begin to think about other, more subversive, forms of subjectivity.

### Method

#### Anti-humanism, anti-colonial discourse, and poetic interventions are all theoretical shortcuts to elide pragmatic analysis of alternative visions of freedom – strategically deploying humanism is necessary for political struggle.

**Wilder 16**

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These key terms illuminate crucial aspects of what made Césaire a distinc- tive thinker whose critical voice may continue to resonate for us today. But in order to attend to Césaire as he did his predecessors—as a contemporary— we should recognize how his intellectual orientation and insights brush against the grain of many current theoretical tendencies. In both critical theory and postcolonial studies, the standard operation is to unmask pur- portedly universal categories as socially constructed, culturally particular, and implicated in practices, systems, and logics of domination. These are indispensable critical moves. But this approach often devolves into a hunt for traces of universalism or humanism, whether in textual artifacts or political projects, in order to reveal the regressive or oppressive essence of the object. This “aha” moment thus becomes the punch line of the discussion rather than the starting point for analysis. Such fears of complicity with power do not only belie a longing for intellectual and political purity. They also make it difficult to think dialectically, to identify aspects of given arrangements that may point beyond their actually existing forms. The current insistence on negative critique also makes scholars reluctant to identify desirable alternatives and specify the kind of world they might want to create. But what do we concede if we are unable or unwilling to risk affirming more just, more human, ways of being to which we can say “yes”? It is not easy for radical thinkers to reconcile a nonprescriptive orientation to a radically open future with the imperative to envision more desirable arrangements (Coronil 2011). But ignoring or deferring the challenge does not make it disappear. Following anticolonial thinkers like Césaire, especially those located within the black Atlantic critical tradition, may remind us not to forfeit categories such as freedom, justice, democracy, solidarity, and humanity to the dominant actors who have instrumentalized and degraded them. Given this dilemma, the attention paid to Vivek Chibber’s recent polemic against subaltern studies is not surprising. Such attention, however, seems to be less about the merits of his universalist Marxism than about a sense of some of the limitations and impasses into which certain currents of postcolonial thinking have led (Chibber 2013).7 Partha Chatterjee himself has recently written, “The task, as it now stands, cannot . . . be taken forward within the framework of the concepts and methods mobilized in Subaltern Studies . . . what is needed are new projects” (2012a: 44). He suggests that such projects should probably focus on “cultural history” and “popular cul- ture” with a renewed focus on visual materials and embodied practices rather than written texts and on ethnography rather than intellectual his- tory. Moreover, he links this invitation to study “the ethnographic, the practi- cal, the everyday and the local” to a focus on subnational “regional forma- tions” and “minority cultures” and languages whose specificities, he observes, had not been sufficiently engaged by earlier subaltern studies research on “India,” “Pakistan,” or “Bangladesh” (47–49). Valuable as such studies would surely be, it is not clear how a renewed focus on locality, with place-based assumptions about territory, consciousness, and categories, could do the kind of critical work necessary to grasp the deep shifts in political logics, structures, and practices that characterize the world-historical present. On the contrary, such approaches risk reproducing precisely the culturalist and territorialist assumptions about political identification and affiliation that need to be rethought in light of contemporary conditions.8 Chatterjee’s surprising emphasis on local ethnography seems consis- tent with one trend in postcolonial thinking that risks reviving the types of civilizational thinking, and associated assumptions about origins and authenticity, that it had earlier set out to dismantle (Chakrabarty 2007; Mah- mood 2005; Mignolo 2011). Consider the important ways that Talal Asad has invited us to rethink liberal assumptions about “tradition,” with respect to liberal and nonliberal forms of life. In dialogue with Ludwig Wittgenstein and Alasdair MacIntyre, Asad (1986) has developed a powerful critique of liberal secularism—and the secularist logic that subtends many modern lib- eral states—from the standpoint of embodied and discursive traditions. On the one hand, he reminds us that “Islamic tradition” is neither singular nor unchanging; it is a structured and dynamic space for reasoned argument. On the other hand, he reminds us that despite liberalism’s claims to post- traditional neutrality, it too constitutes a particular tradition (albeit one that defines itself in opposition to inherited, embodied, and practice-oriented forms of tradition-based reasoning). Asad’s genealogical insights have rightly informed recent critiques of Western liberal ideologies, states, and politics especially regarding their arro- gant, condescending, and violent responses to tradition-rooted practices and practitioners, whether outside or inside the West. But his interventions, how- ever unintentionally, have also led scholars to establish dubious chains of equivalence between modernity, the West, and liberalism. Such operations seem to disregard Asad’s important invitation to understand traditions as capacious, heterogeneous, and dynamic spaces of inquiry, disputation, and revision, not simply as a set of rigid behavioral scripts, unchanging cultural formulas, or dogmatic ideological precepts. This reduction of political moder-nity to a one-dimensional liberalism obscures, for example, the many currents of progressive antiliberalism within the tradition of modern Western political thought. It fails to recognize the significant number of non-European colonial intellectuals engaged in anti-imperial struggles who were active participants in such “traditions within traditions.” It also disregards the contradictions within and redeemable fragments of even liberal political thinking, fragments that, if realized, might point far beyond, and possibly explode, liberalism itself. To reify modern or Western politics into a static and stereotypical liber- alism is to risk practicing an unfortunate form of “Occidentalism” that would reinforce archaic civilizational assumptions about incommensurable and unrelated worlds (and worldviews) and disregard the actual history and open possibilities for practices of cross-cultural solidarity whereby anti- imperial actors outside Europe could enter into dialogue or affiliate with, or even discover ways that they are already situated within, counterhegemonic “Western” political traditions. Critics have rightly mobilized singularity, incommensurability, or untranslatability against liberal attempts to discover an abstract humanity and thereby discount situated and embodied forms of life. But the question is whether we treat incommensurability or untranslat- ability as an epistemological or political limit or as an always imperfect start- ing point for practices of dialogue, coordination, affiliation, reciprocity, soli- darity. For isn’t the impossibility of full transparency or undifferentiated unity simply the unavoidable condition within which all communication, sociality, and politics must be attempted?9 My point is not to congratulate dissident currents within the West, let alone to recuperate liberalism. It is rather to approach radical and emancipa- tory politics from a place of not-already-knowing, of not presuming to know a priori which aspects of a tradition are irredeemable, which traditions may become allies or habitations, what the boundaries of (thoroughly plastic) tra- ditions must be. This nondogmatic and experimental orientation to politics, traditions, and concepts is one of the most precious and timely gifts that Césaire may offer to us now. He practiced a concrete cosmopolitan relation- ship to modern traditions of philosophy, aesthetics, and politics, one that was highly developed by the robust tradition of black Atlantic criticism within which he was firmly rooted along with predecessors (e.g., Toussaint and W. E. B. DuBois), contemporaries (e.g., C. L. R. James, James Baldwin, Suzanne Césaire, Senghor), and descendants (e.g., Fanon, Edouard Glissant, Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, Achille Mbembe, David Scott). Understandable concerns about totalizing explanation and Eurocentric evaluation have led a generation of scholars to insist on the incommensurable alterity of non-European forms of thought. But perhaps we should be con- cerned less exclusively with unmasking universalisms as covert European particularism than with also challenging the assumption that the universal is European property. I read Césaire not in order to provincialize Euro- pean concepts but to deprovincialize Antillean thinking. Césaire’s critical reworkings remind us that the supposedlyEuropean categories of political modernity properly belong as much to the African and Caribbean actors who coproduced them as to the inhabitants of continental Europe. Similarly, Afri- can and Caribbean thinkers, no less than their continental counterparts, produced abstract and general propositions about “humanity,” “history,” and “the world.” In contrast to invocations of multiple modernities, Césaire never granted to Europe possession of a modernity or universality or humanity that was always already translocal and fundamentally Caribbean. He never treated self-determination, emancipation, freedom, equality, or justice as essentially European and foreign. Césaire’s intellectual and political inter- ventions radically challenged reductive territorialist approaches to social thought. He refused to concede that “France” was an ethnic or continental entity, that Martinique was not in some real way internal to “French” society and politics, or that he was situated outside of modern critical traditions. Thus his ongoing and unapologetic engagements with Hegel, Marx, Proud- hon, Nietzsche, Lautréamont, Rimbaud, Mallarmé, Bergson, Freud, Breton, Frobenius, and Lenin, alongside his many African, Antillean, and African American interlocutors. The sonic blurring between “here” and “hear” in the title of this essay is meant to signal not only the contemporaneity of Césaire’s thought for us here now but the imperative that we open ourselves to his presence and recognize his actuality across the epochal divide by hearing what he actually said. This gesture builds on Walter Benjamin’s insight that every now is a “now of rec- ognizability” whereby “what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation” through which past epochs become newly legible (1999: 462). I also follow Césaire himself, who engaged in dialogue with pre- decessors as if they were contemporaries and who addressed future interlocu- tors directly as if they were already present. Like Benjamin, Césaire practiced a form of radical remembrance that connected outmoded pasts to charged presents. This attention to vital histories was bound up with a poetic politics that identified transformative possibilities dwelling within existing arrangements and a proleptic politics that anticipated seemingly impossible futures by trying to enact them concretely in the here and now. But Césaire can only speak to us now if we listen rather than presume to know what someone like him in his situation must have, or should have, been saying. Until very recently, scholarship on his work has been overdetermined by methodological nationalism (that puzzles over his refusal to pursue state sovereignty), identitarian culturalism (that debates how adequately Césaire expressed Antillean lived experience and whether or not he was an essential- ist), and a disciplinary division of labor (that too often splits his poetry, criti- cism, and politics into separate domains). Generally, Cold War scholarship was shaped by a need to evaluate him in relation to canonical anticolonial nationalists and fit him into a narrative of decolonization-as-national-inde- pendence. This has made it difficult to recognize the epochal character, world-making ambition, and global sensibility of his political reflections. Faced with the promise of decolonization, Césaire conjugated concrete acts with political imagination in ways that displaced conventional opposi- tions between aesthetics and politics, realism and utopia, pragmatism and principle. Such efforts were animated by what I have been calling radical lit- eralism and utopian realism and which he called inflection and poetic knowledge. He regarded freedom as a problem whose institutional solution was not self-evident and could only be situational. His interventions demon- strated the nonnecessary relationship between colonial emancipation, popu- lar sovereignty, and self-determination, on the one hand, and territorial state sovereignty and national liberation, on the other. He pursued cosmopolitan aims concretely through transcultural practices and by attempting to invent new political forms through which to ground plural and postnational demo- cratic arrangements. We should recognize that Césaire formulated a critique not of Western civilization from the standpoint of African or Antillean culture but of modern Western racism, imperialism, and capitalism from the standpoint of Antil- lean and African historical situations and experiences. More generally, it was a critique of an alienated and alienating modernity from the standpoint of embodied and poetic ways of being, knowing, and relating (to self, others, and world). Above all, Césaire recognized residues of, and resources for, more just, human, and integrated ways of living together within Antillean, African, and European texts, traditions, forms, histories, and conditions. In his view, Antilleans—as culturally particular actors, imperial subjects, New World denizens, moderns, and humans—were their rightful heirs. He was con- cerned less with defining culturally authentic concepts, spaces, and arrange- ments for Antilleans (apart from Europe or uncontaminated by modernity) than with overcoming imperialism, in solidarity with other struggling peo- ples, in order to establish less alienated forms of human life globally. Remembering Césaire’s insistence that modern currents of radicalism were shared legacies and common property may help us to rethink inherited assumptions about the relation between territory, ethnicity, consciousness, and interest (Buck-Morss 2009, 2010). They invite us to deterritorialize social thought and to decolonize intellectual history. This is a matter not of valorizing non-European forms of knowledge, as important as such a move certainly is, **but of** questioning the presumptive boundaries of “Europe” itself—by recognizing the larger scales on which modern social thought was forged and of appreciating that colonial societies produced self-reflexive thinkers concerned with large-scale processes and future prospects. We can thereby recognize Césaire as a situated postwar thinker of the postwar world, one of whose pri- mary aims was to place into question the very categories “France,” “Europe,” and “the West” by way of an immanent critique of late imperial politics. He envisioned postnational arrangements through which humanity could attempt to overcome the alienating antinomies that had impoverished the quality of life in overseas colonies and European metropoles. His situated humanism and concrete cosmopolitanism should thus be placed in a constel- lation of modern emancipatory thinking oriented toward worldwide human freedom that included antiracist, anti-imperial, internationalist, and socialist thinkers from a range of traditions: black Atlantic, First Internationalist, global anarchist, Western Marxist, Marxist humanist, Third Worldist.

#### That outweighs, three reasons –

#### First is longevity.

#### The effects of their method are short-lived and not retained as valuable information when opportunities to create real change present themselves.

**Goodin and Niemeyer 03**

Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf> -CAT

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is **likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think** about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### Second is competition.

#### The AFF method creates unforeseen friction and resistance, leading to hyperpartisanship and a regression of allyship due to lack of consideration for the negative’s role in this space and the way they can contribute to the AFF’s roadmap for broader change.

#### **Atchison and Panetta 09**

Atchison and Panetta, 09 (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia, Assistant Professor and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd Rhetoric Associate Professor University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication, Historical Developments and Issues for the Future, â€œIntercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,â€ The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317-334)

Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the "debate as activism" perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents' academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes mat each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.

#### Third is intersectionality.

#### The K papers over necessary intersectional voices that could greatly bolster its widespread effectiveness in a collaborative environment, and instead turns them away – saying they aren’t welcome in the world of the Affirmative.

Crenshaw 91

Crenshaw: Crenshaw, Kimberlé Williams. [Professor of Law, UCLA] “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color.” Stanford Law Review, Vol. 43, July 1991. CH -recut CAT

The problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend difference, as some critics charge, but rather the opposite- that it frequently conflates or ignores intra group differences. In the context of violence against women, this elision of difference is problematic, fundamentally because the violence that many women experience is often shaped by other dimensions of their identities, such as race and class. Moreover, ignoring differences within groups frequently contributes to tension among groups, another problem of identity politics that frustrates efforts to politicize violence against women. Feminist efforts to politicize experiences of women and antiracist efforts to politicize experiences of people of color' have frequently proceeded as though the issues and experiences they each detail occur on mutually exclusive terrains. Although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of real people, they seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices. And so, when the practices expound identity as ‘woman’ or ‘person of color’ as an either/or proposition, they relegate the identity of women of color to a location that resists telling.

#### She adds:

The concept of political intersectionality highlights the fact that women of color are situated within at least two subordinated groups that frequently pursue conflicting political agendas. The need to split one's political energies between two sometimes opposing political agendas is a dimension of intersectional disempowerment that men of color and white women seldom confront. Indeed, their specific raced and gendered experiences, although intersectional, often define as well as confine the interests of the entire group. For example, racism as experienced by people of color who are of a particular gender--male—tends to determine the parameters of antiracist strategies, just as sexism as experienced by women who are of a particular race-white- tends to ground the women's movement. The problem is not simply that both discourses fail women of color by not acknowledging the "additional" burden of patriarchy or of racism, but that the discourses are often inadequate even to the discrete tasks of articulating the full dimensions of racism and sexism. Because women of color experience racism in ways not always the same as those experienced by men of color, and sexism in ways not always parallel to experiences of white women, dominant conceptions of antiracism and feminism are limited, even on their own terms. Among the most troubling political consequences of [T]he failure of antiracist and feminist discourses to address the intersections of racism and patriarchy is the fact that, to the extent they forward the interest of people of color and "women," respectively, one analysis often implicitly denies the validity of the other. The failure of feminism to interrogate race means that the resistance strategies of feminism will often replicate and reinforce the subordination of people of color, and the failure of antiracism to interrogate patriarchy means that antiracism will frequently reproduce the subordination of women. These mutual elisions present a particularly difficult political dilemma for women of color. Adopting either analysis constitutes a denial of a fundamental dimension of our subordination and works to preclude the development of a political discourse that more fully empowers women of color.

### Harms

#### Race is a material, historical formation—understanding it as transcendental reaffirms racism because the ideology of race is a product of colonialism that has its roots in class ideology. Only challenging the very terms of this ideology can render racial categories themselves contingent and reversible.

Haider 18. Asad Haider, founding Editor of Viewpoint Magazine, “Racial Ideology,” *Mistaken Identity: Race & Class in the Age of Trump*, Verso

How is it that a category that identity politics takes to be a fixed essence turns out to be so indeterminate? Indeed, how can something that is absolutely visible and obvious, right before our eyes, still manage to escape our grasp? Althusser pointed out that obviousness is one of the primary features of ideology; when something appears to us to be obvious, like the notion that human beings must compete with each other to gain access to what they need for survival, we know we are in the world of ideology.” “There is no intrinsic reason for organizing human beings on the basis of characteristics that ideology tells us are “racial.” The ideology of race claims that we can categorize people according to specific physical characteristics, which usually revolve around skin color. But this is an arbitrary form of classification that only has any meaning at all because it has social effects. Racism equates these social effects of the categorization of people with biological qualities. Such a reduction of human culture to biology is generally rejected and viewed as abhorrent. But it is possible to reject racism while still falling victim to the ideology of race. Taking the category of a race as a given, as a foundation for political analysis, still reproduces this ideology. This is not innocent, because in fact the ideology of race is produced by racism, not the other way around. There are many instances of the phenomenon of race, and they are all quite different. In order to understand how they operate, we have to talk about these instances in their specificity. Consider the following examples: Spanish settler colonialism and Dutch settler colonialism; English colonialism in India and Japanese colonialism in Korea; ethnic conflict in postcolonial Africa and ethnic conflict in the post-socialist Balkans. All of these examples are caught up with various ideologies of race. But we gain nothing by reducing these concrete instances to a single abstraction, which we then try to explain in isolation from the specific circumstances. As I have already suggested, the better way of proceeding is to recognize that this abstraction of “race” is already an active component of our ways of understanding the world, but to explain it by adding back all the specific, concrete factors that have generated it—moving from our thoughts to the material world and its history. We also have to break with the presumption that “race” only describes what is different, secondary, and “Other.” The primordial form of “race” is the “white race,” and we cannot accept it as the neutral, universal standpoint from which a theory of race as “difference” is advanced. In the discourses of identity politics, the category of the white race is rarely theorized because it is instrumentalized as the basis for white privilege. The history of this term is a contradictory one. It is usually associated with white author Peggy McIntosh and her influential article, “White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack.” Here, in a well-intentioned attempt to encourage more civilized behavior among whites, we see a clear example of an idealist movement from the concrete to the abstract. Of course, McIntosh was not the first to try to describe the consequences of whiteness. W.E.B. Du Bois famously wrote of the legal and social advantages granted to whites in Black Reconstruction: It must be remembered that the white group of laborers, while they received a low wage, were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage. They were given public deference and titles of courtesy because they were white. They were admitted freely with all classes of white people to public functions, public parks, and the best schools. The police were drawn from their ranks, and the courts, dependent on their votes, treated them with such leniency as to encourage lawlessness. Their vote selected public officials, and while this had small effect upon the economic situation, it had great effect upon their personal treatment and the deference shown them.1 However, McIntosh’s article operates at a very different register from Du Bois’s historical investigation of the class composition of the postbellum United States. This is because McIntosh refers throughout her article, interchangeably, to “my race,” “my racial group,” and “my skin color.” The first “white privilege” she names is: “I can if I wish arrange to be in the company of people of my race most of the time.” Another is that she can “go into a music shop and count on finding the music of my race represented.”2 We will set aside what appears to be a lack of familiarity with the history of American popular music. What is significant is the equation of skin color, the category of “race,” and discrete groupings of human beings. With this equation, white guilt reproduces the founding fiction of race: that there is a biological foundation, expressed in physical phenotypes, for separate groups of human beings who have separate cultures and forms of life. The “white race” as a specific historical formation is obscured by the metaphor of the knapsack. McIntosh writes: “White privilege is like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, tools and blank checks.”3 The knapsack is carried by an individual navigating an entirely open social field. It contains tools that enable the individual to navigate this field with greater effectiveness than those whose knapsacks are comparatively empty. The resources contained in the knapsack constitute whiteness as privilege, because the knapsack is carried by an individual who belongs to the white identity. If the knapsack of privileges is carried by an individual already identifiable as white, then whiteness must necessarily be understood as a biological trait. The falseness of this notion is evident: the people who are currently described as white have a wide and complex range of genetic lineages, many of which were previously considered to be separate “races” of their own. As Nell Irvin Painter points out in her revelatory The History of White People, “For most of the past centuries—when race really came down to matters of law—educated Americans firmly believed in the existence of more than one European race.”4 We might conclude that there has only been a minor error of description: in reality, whiteness itself is constituted by the contents of the knapsack. The constitution of whiteness as identity and its constitution as privilege are simultaneous: the knapsack’s provisions confer not only advantages but also identity upon its bearer. But how do we know, then, that the content of the identity conferred has something to do with “whiteness”? Surely, in addition to the specific items conferring a privilege, one would find in any knapsack of identity an infinity of arbitrary details: hair length, gait, dietary preference, computer skills, etc. That is, in order to describe an individual’s identity, the knapsack would have to contain everything constituting the this-ness of that particular individual. It would offer us no insight as to the organizing principle that constitutes these traits as something which can be called “white.” There would be no way to distinguish “white” characteristics from human ones, Pennsylvanian ones, or heavy-metal ones. This is the failure of liberal thought. A political formation such as whiteness cannot be explained by starting with an individual’s identity—the reduction of politics to the psychology of the self. The starting point will have to be the social structure and its constitutive relations, within which individuals are composed. And it is too often forgotten that decades before McIntosh’s knapsack, the term white privilege originated with such a theory. The theory of “white-skin privilege” was advanced by members of an early antirevisionist split-off from the Communist Party USA (the Provisional Organizing Committee), and would come to have an enormous influence on the New Left and the New Communist Movement. A series of essays by Theodore Allen and Noel Ignatiev, collected as the pamphlet White Blindspot, offered the initial formulation. Ignatiev and Allen’s argument was that the legacy of slavery was the imposition of white supremacy by the ruling class as an instrument of class division and social control. But this was a political theory, not a cultural or moral one, and it held that “white chauvinism” was actually detrimental to white workers, preventing unity with black workers. So fighting against white supremacy was in fact a central part of a political program that favored the self-organization of all workers. Ignatiev argued vehemently that “the ending of white supremacy is not solely a demand of the Negro people, separate from the class demands of the entire working class.” It could not be left to black workers to fight against white supremacy as their own “special” issue, while white workers did little more than express sympathy and “fight for their ‘own’ demands.” The fight against white supremacy was central to the class struggle at a fundamental level: The ideology of white chauvinism is bourgeois poison aimed primarily at the white workers, utilized as a weapon by the ruling class to subjugate black and white workers. It has its material base in the practice of white supremacy, which is a crime not merely against non-whites but against the entire proletariat. Therefore, its elimination certainly qualifies as one of the class demands of the entire working class. In fact, considering the role that this vile practice has historically played in holding back the struggle of the American working class, the fight against white supremacy becomes the central immediate task of the entire working class.5 As this language was taken up by the New Left, however, it went through considerable ideological transformations. The manifesto, “You Don’t Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows,” circulated at the turbulent Students for a Democratic Society conference of 1969, proposed a politics centered on white guilt rather than proletarian unity. The Weather Underground used the language of “privilege” to reject the working class as a force for revolutionary change, writing, “Virtually all of the white working class also has short-range privileges from imperialism, which are not false privileges but very real ones which give them an edge of vested interest and tie them to a certain extent to the imperialists.”6 In practice, this meant that the Weather Underground equated political struggle with vanguard groups like itself, who attacked their own privilege by adopting a revolutionary lifestyle. What this amounted to was the self-flagellation (with explosives) of white radicals, who substituted themselves for the masses and narcissistically centered attention on themselves instead of the black and Third World movements they claimed to be supporting—reducing those movements to a romantic fantasy of violent insurrection. In other words, the project of black autonomy and “self-liberation—which implied the overall self-liberation of the poor and the working class—was effectively ignored by the Weather Underground’s race thinking. Ignatiev ruthlessly attacked the Weatherman problematic in a paper called “Without a Science of Navigation We Cannot Sail in Stormy Seas,” which is today a jarring discovery: White supremacy is the real secret of the rule of the bourgeoisie and the hidden cause behind the failure of the labor movement in this country. White-skin privileges serve only the bourgeoisie, and precisely for that reason they will not let us escape them, but instead pursue us with them through every hour of our life, no matter where we go. They are poison bait. This view of white supremacy entailed a very different conception of the politics of white privilege, as Ignatiev elaborated: To suggest that the acceptance of white-skin privilege is in the interests of white workers is equivalent to suggesting that swallowing the worm with the hook in it is in the interests of the fish. To argue that repudiating these privileges is a “sacrifice” is to argue that the fish is making a sacrifice when it leaps from the water, flips its tail, shakes its head furiously in every direction and throws the barbed offering.7 Today’s privilege politics cannot possibly permit a position of this kind. We are instead left with endless variations on the Weatherman position, though without the appeals to armed struggle, bank robberies, and Lenin’s theory of imperialism. When contemporary white liberals adapt the Weatherman position, they often end up claiming that a new wave of “pro-white” socialists has arisen to defend the “white working class.” But their caricature obscures the important point, made by black revolutionaries throughout American history, that the project of emancipation requires overcoming the ideology of race. Although he characterized the material advantages of whiteness as a “psychological wage,” W.E.B. Du Bois did not reduce whiteness to an effect of individual psychology. In fact, immediately preceding the passage on the psychological wage, Du Bois wrote: The theory of race was supplemented by a carefully planned and slowly evolved method, which drove such a wedge between the white and black workers that there probably are not today in the world two groups of workers with practically identical interests who hate and fear each other so deeply and persistently and who are kept so far apart that neither sees anything of common interest.8 When Du Bois suggested that white and black workers have “practically identical interests,” he was not making an appeal to some mythical “white working class.” Still less was he guilty of some kind of “class reductionism,” which decides in the abstract that class is more fundamental than race. Of course, some people really do make this argument—and they play right into the hands of identitarian liberals, who ask how the young woman seeking an abortion and the evangelical protester, the undocumented immigrant and the salaried worker, can possibly have the same “interests. But this challenge is afflicted by the same condition it claims to diagnose. It mistakes the casual description of a shared trait for a claim about identity. We all have numerous interests that are related to our identities but also to where we work and where we live. To say that these different spheres of life interact and intersect is a banal truism which explains neither how our society is structured and reproduced nor how we might formulate a strategy to change this structure. Du Bois was recognizing the lived reality of the working class, which contains white people and people of color, people of all genders and sexualities, the employed and the unemployed—a multitude of people irreducible to any single description. A meaningful common interest between them does not somehow exist by default. We cannot reduce any group of people and the multitudes they contain to a single common interest, as though we were reducing a fraction. A common interest is constituted by the composition of these multitudes into a group. This is a process of political practice. White supremacy is the phenomenon whereby the plurality of interests of a group of people is reorganized into the fiction of a white race whose very existence is predicated on the violent and genocidal history of the oppression of people of color. The self-organized struggles of oppressed people against white supremacy have managed to significantly undermine, though by no means eliminate, this kind of organization. It was no accident that these struggles ultimately put forward the insight that it was necessary to constitute a common interest through class organization, which extends to an opposition to the whole capitalist system—because it is the structure of the capitalist system that prevents all people who are dispossessed of the means of production, regardless of their identities, from having control over their own lives and thus from pursuing whatever interests they may have, in all their particularity. This does not mean, however, that a “class reductionist” argument is a viable position. As long as racial solidarity among whites is more powerful than class solidarity across races, both capitalism and whiteness will continue to exist. In the context of American history, the rhetoric of the “white working class” and positivist arguments that class matters more than race reinforce one of the main obstacles to building socialism. Allen and Ignatiev turned to this question in their further research, inspired by the insights of Du Bois. In the process they presented an exemplary model of a materialist investigation into the ideology of race, one that went from the abstract to the concrete. This work emerged alongside that of Barbara Fields and Karen Fields, David Roediger, and many others as a body of thought devoted to exposing race as a social construct. All of this research, in varying ways, has examined the history of the “white race” in its specificity. The guiding insight that must be drawn from it is that this racial phenomenon is not simply a biological or even cultural attribute of certain “white people”: it was produced by white supremacy in a concrete and objective historical process. As Allen put it on the back cover of his extraordinary vernacular history The Invention of the White Race: “When the first Africans arrived in Virginia in 1619, there were no white people there. At the most immediate level, Allen was pointing to the fact that the word white didn’t appear in Virginia colonial law until 1691. Of course, this doesn’t mean that there was no racism before 1691. Allen’s argument was to show that racism was not attached to a concept of the white race. There were ideas of the superiority of European civilization, but this did not correspond to differences in skin color. The clearest example is that of the Irish, whose racial oppression by the English precedes their racial oppression of Africans by several centuries. Today white nationalists distort this history, attempting to use the racial oppression of the Irish to try to dismiss the history of white supremacy. Yet this example actually demolishes their entire framework. What the example of the Irish illustrates is a form of racial oppression that is not based on skin color and that in fact precedes the very category of whiteness. Indeed, the early forms of English racial ideology represented the Irish as inferior and subhuman, and this ideology was later repeated word for word to justify both the genocide of Indigenous people in the Americas and the enslavement of Africans. Nor was it only a matter of words: the very practices of settler colonialism, land seizures, and plantation production were established in Ireland. Allen demonstrates this with reference to specific laws: If under Anglo-American slavery, “the rape of a female slave was not a crime, but a mere trespass on the master’s property,” so, in 1278, two Anglo-Normans, brought into court and charged with raping Margaret O’Rorke were found not guilty because “the said Margaret is an Irishwoman.” If a law enacted in Virginia in 1723, provided that, “manslaughter of a slave is not punishable,” so under Anglo-Norman law it sufficed for acquittal to show that the victim in a slaying was Irish. Anglo-Norman priests granted absolution on the grounds that it was “no more sin to kill an Irishman than a dog or any other brute.”9 So racial oppression arises in the Irish case without skin color as its basis. We are forced to ask how we end up with a racial ideology revolving around skin color that represents African people as subhuman and that considers both Irish and English to be part of a unitary “white race. The historical record quite clearly demonstrates that white supremacy and thus the white race are formed within the American transition to capitalism, specifically because of the centrality of racial slavery. However, we have to resist the temptation, imposed on us by racial ideology, to explain slavery through race. Slavery is not always racial. It existed in ancient Greece and Rome and also in Africa, and was not attached specifically to a racial ideology. Slavery is a form of forced labor characterized by the market exchange of the laborer. But there are various forms of forced labor, and its first form in Virginia was indentured labor, in which a laborer is forced to work for a limited period of time to work off a debt, often with some incentive like land ownership after the end of the term. The first Africans to arrive in Virginia 1619 were put to work as indentured servants, within the same legal category as European indentured servants. In fact, until 1660 all African American laborers, like their European American counterparts, were indentured servants who had limited terms of servitude. There was no legal differentiation based on racial ideology: free African Americans owned property, land, and sometimes indentured servants of their own. There were examples of intermarriage between Europeans and Africans. It was only in the late seventeenth century that the labor force of the American colonies shifted decisively to African slaves who did not have limits on their terms of servitude. As Painter points out in The History of White People, these forms of labor and their transformations are fundamental in understanding how racial ideology comes about: Work plays a central part in race talk, because the people who do the work are likely to be figured as inherently deserving the toil and poverty of laboring status. It is still assumed, wrongly, that slavery anywhere in the world must rest on a foundation of racial difference. Time and again, the better classes have concluded that those people deserve their lot; it must be something within them that puts them at the bottom. In modern times, we recognize this kind of reasoning as it relates to black race, but in other times the same logic was applied to people who were white, especially when they were impoverished immigrants seeking work.10 In sum,” Painter writes, “before an eighteenth-century boom in the African slave trade, between one-half and two-thirds of all early white immigrants to the British colonies in the Western Hemisphere came as unfree laborers, some 300,000 to 400,000 people.”11 The definitions of whiteness as freedom and blackness as slavery did not yet exist. It turns out that defining race involves answering some unexpected historical questions: How did some indentured servants come to be forced into bondage for their entire lives rather than a limited term? How did this category of forced labor come to be represented in terms of race? Why did the colonial ruling class come to rely on racial slavery when various other regimes of labor were available? The first economic boom of the American colonies was in Virginia tobacco production in the 1620s, and it was based on the labor of primarily European indentured servants. African Americans were only about a fifth of the labor force: most forced labor was initially European, and the colonial planter class relied on this forced labor for its economic growth. But they couldn’t just rely on European indentured labor because it was based on voluntary migration, and the incentive to participate in a life of brutal labor and die early was not sufficient to generate a consistently growing workforce. As Barbara Fields puts it, “Neither white skin nor English nationality protected servants from the grossest forms of brutality and exploitation. The only degradation they were spared was perpetual enslavement along with their issue in perpetuity, the fate that eventually befell the descendants of Africans.”12 African Americans, on the other hand, had been forcibly removed from their homelands. So the ruling class began to alter its laws to be able to deny some laborers an end to their terms of servitude, which they were only able to accomplish in the case of African laborers. What really changed everything was Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676. This began as a conflict within the elite planter class, directed toward a brutal attack on the Indigenous population. But it also gave rise to a rebellious mob of European and African laborers, who burned down the capital city of Jamestown and forced the governor to flee. The insurrectionary alliance of European and African laborers was a fundamental existential threat to the colonial ruling class, and the possibility of such an alliance among exploited peoples had to be prevented forever. Here we see a watershed moment in the long and complex process of the invention of the white race as a form of social control. The ruling class shifted its labor force decisively toward African slaves, and thus avoided dealing with the demand of indentured servants for eventual freedom and landownership. It fortified whiteness as a legal category, the basis for denying an end to the term of servitude for African forced labor. By the eighteenth century the Euro-American planter class had entered into a bargain with the Euro-American laboring classes, who were mostly independent subsistence farmers: it exchanged certain social privileges for a cross-class alliance of Euro-Americans to preserve a superexploited African labor force. This Euro-American racial alliance was the best defense of the ruling class against the possibility of a Euro-American and African American working-class alliance. It is at this point, Nell Painter concludes, that we see the “now familiar equation that converts race to black and black to slave.”13 The invention of the white race further accelerated when the Euro-American ruling class encountered a new problem in the eighteenth century. As the colonial ruling class began to demand its independence from the divinely ordained executives and landed wealth of the English nobility, they made claims for the intrinsic equality of all people and the idea of natural rights. As Barbara Fields puts it: Racial ideology supplied the means of explaining slavery to people whose terrain was a republic founded on radical doctrines of liberty and natural rights, and, more important, a republic in which those doctrines seemed to represent accurately the world in which all but a minority lived. Only when the denial of liberty became an anomaly apparent even to the least observant and reflective members of Euro-American society did ideology systematically explain the anomaly.14 In other words, the Euro-American ruling class had to advance an ideology of the inferiority of Africans in order to rationalize forced labor, and they had to incorporate European populations into the category of the white race, despite the fact that many of these populations had previously been considered inferior. This racial ideology developed further as the new American nation encountered the phenomenon of the voluntary migration of free laborers from Europe, many of whom came from populations that were viewed as distinct European races: the Italians, Eastern Europeans, and Jews, but especially the exemplary case of the Irish, whose emigration to the US spiked with the famines of the mid-nineteenth century produced by English colonialism. The Irish, among the most oppressed and rebellious groups in Europe, were offered the bargain that had protected the American ruling class. Frederick Douglass pointed this out very clearly in 1853, at the anniversary meeting of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society in New York: The Irish, who, at home, readily sympathize with the oppressed everywhere, are instantly taught when they step upon our soil to hate and despise the Negro. They are taught to believe that he eats the bread that belongs to them. The cruel lie is told them, that we deprive them of labor and receive the money which would otherwise make its way into their pockets. Sir, the Irish-American will find out his mistake one day.15 Douglass had gone to Ireland to avoid being returned to slavery and said he was for the first time in his life treated as an ordinary person, exclaiming in a letter to the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, “I breathe, and lo! the chattel becomes a man … I meet nothing to remind me of my complexion.”16 Of course, this was not because of some intrinsic kindness of the Irish. It was rather because, at this stage in history, there were no white people there. This was clear to Douglass because he arrived during the Great Famine. Writing in his memoirs of the songs sung by slaves on the American plantations, he added: “Nowhere outside of dear old Ireland, in the days of want and famine, have I heard sounds so mournful.”17 But what Irish immigrants realized after immigrating to the United States is that they could ameliorate their subjugation by joining the club of the white race, as Ignatiev has recounted.18 They could become members of a “white race” with higher status if they actively supported the continuing enslavement and oppression of African Americans. So the process of becoming white meant that these previous racial categories were abolished and racialized groups like the Irish were progressively incorporated into the white race as a means of fortifying and intensifying the exploitation of black laborers. It was the great insight of Frederick Douglass to describe this as the Irish-American’s mistake. Douglass clearly emphasized the novelty of the very description of people as white: “The word white is a modern term in the legislation of this country. It was never used in the better days of the Republic, but has sprung up within the period of our national degeneracy.”19 Let us be clear on what the invention of the white race meant. It meant that Euro-American laborers were prevented from joining with African American laborers in rebellion, through the form of social control imposed by the Euro-American ruling class. In exchange for white-skin privilege, the Euro-American workers accepted white identity and became active agents in the brutal oppression of African American laborers. But they also fundamentally degraded their own conditions of existence. As a consequence of this bargain with their exploiters, they allowed the conditions of the Southern white laborer to become the most impoverished in the nation, and they generated conditions that blocked the development of a viable mass workers’ movement.

### LBL

### On durazo (colonialism)

#### The 1AC is a settler move to innocence which makes settlers feel good, pushes off decolonization, distracts from action, and homogenizes colonial experiences

Eve **Tuck and** K. Wayne **Yang** 20**12** (State University of New York at New Paltz) (University of California, San Diego) “Decolonization is not a metaphor” <https://www.latrobe.edu.au/staff-profiles/data/docs/fjcollins.pdf> cbrooks

Moves to innocence IV: Free your mind and the rest will follow Fanon told us in 1963 that decolonizing the mind is the first step, not the only step toward overthrowing colonial regimes. Yet we wonder whether another settler move to innocence is to focus on decolonizing the mind, or the cultivation of critical consciousness, as if it were the sole activity of decolonization; to allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable task of relinquishing stolen land. We agree that curricula, literature, and pedagogy can be crafted to aid people in learning to see settler colonialism, to articulate critiques of settler epistemology, and set aside settler histories and values in search of ethics that reject domination and exploitation; this is not unimportant work. However, the front-loading of critical consciousness building can waylay decolonization, even though the experience of teaching and learning to be critical of settler colonialism can be so powerful it can feel like it is indeed making change. Until stolen land is relinquished, critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism. So, we respectfully disagree with George Clinton and Funkadelic (1970) and En Vogue (1992) when they assert that if you “free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow.” Paulo Freire, eminent education philosopher, popular educator, and liberation theologian, wrote his celebrated book, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, in no small part as a response to Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth. Its influence upon critical pedagogy and on the practices of educators committed to social justice cannot be overstated. Therefore, it is important to point out significant differences between Freire and Fanon, especially with regard to de/colonization. Freire situates the work of liberation in the minds of the oppressed, an abstract category of dehumanized worker vis-a-vis a similarly abstract category of oppressor. This is a sharp right turn away from Fanon’s work, which always positioned the work of liberation in the particularities of colonization, in the specific structural and interpersonal categories of Native and settler. Under Freire’s paradigm, it is unclear who the oppressed are, even more ambiguous who the oppressors are, and it is inferred throughout that an innocent third category of enlightened human exists: “those who suffer with [the oppressed] and fight at their side” (Freire, 2000, p. 42). These words, taken from the opening dedication of Pedagogy of the Oppressed, invoke the same settler fantasy of mutuality based on sympathy and suffering. Fanon positions decolonization as chaotic, an unclean break from a colonial condition that is already over determined by the violence of the colonizer and unresolved in its possible futures. By contrast, Freire positions liberation as redemption, a freeing of both oppressor and oppressed through their humanity. Humans become ‘subjects’ who then proceed to work on the ‘objects’ of the world (animals, earth, water), and indeed read the word (critical consciousness) in order to write the world (exploit nature). For Freire, there are no Natives, no Settlers, and indeed no history, and the future is simply a rupture from the timeless present. Settler colonialism is absent from his discussion, implying either that it is an unimportant analytic or that it is an already completed project of the past (a past oppression perhaps). Freire’s theories of liberation resoundingly echo the allegory of Plato’s Cave, a continental philosophy of mental emancipation, whereby the thinking man individualistically emerges from the dark cave of ignorance into the light of critical consciousness. By contrast, black feminist thought roots freedom in the darkness of the cave, in that well of feeling and wisdom from which all knowledge is recreated. These places of possibility within ourselves are dark because they are ancient and hidden; they have survived and grown strong through darkness. Within these deep places, each one of us holds an incredible reserve of creativity and power, of unexamined and unrecorded emotion and feeling. The woman's place of power within each of us is neither white nor surface; it is dark, it is ancient, and it is deep. (Lorde, 1984, pp. 36-37) Audre Lorde’s words provide a sharp contrast to Plato’s sight-centric image of liberation: “The white fathers told us, I think therefore I am; and the black mothers in each of us - the poet - whispers in our dreams, I feel therefore I can be free” (p. 38). For Lorde, writing is not action upon the world. Rather, poetry is giving a name to the nameless, “first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action” (p. 37). Importantly, freedom is a possibility that is not just mentally generated; it is particular and felt. Freire’s philosophies have encouraged educators to use “colonization” as a metaphor for oppression. In such a paradigm, “internal colonization” reduces to “mental colonization”, logically leading to the solution of decolonizing one’s mind and the rest will follow. Such philosophy conveniently sidesteps the most unsettling of questions: The essential thing is to see clearly, to think clearly - that is, dangerously and to answer clearly the innocent first question: what, fundamentally, is colonization? Because colonialism is comprised of global and historical relations, Cesaire’s question must be considered globally and historically. However, it cannot be reduced to a global answer, nor a historical answer. To do so is to use colonization metaphorically. “What is colonization?” must be answered specifically, with attention to the colonial apparatus that is assembled to order the relationships between particular peoples, lands, the ‘natural world’, and ‘civilization’. Colonialism is marked by its specializations. In North America and other settings, settler sovereignty imposes sexuality, legality, raciality, language, religion and property in specific ways. Decolonization likewise must be thought through in these particularities.

#### Performative contradiction

They say:

#### “The topic assumes a common political sphere where all subjects can participate in projects that shape their lives. Buying into this understanding of the political is wrong and dangerous-- for blacks the political is a death-making machine. Any analysis that does not start with the black femme body while wildly pushing them back towards the state cannot understand the way that Necropolitics structures the world. “

And

#### “Topical affs are violent- they force respectability politics by insisting that the black non-citizen choose its master. Debate’s crowding out of black women’s political discourse is Black rage.

“

They’re talking about the topic without really engaging, either don’t grant them solvency or don’t grant them the impacts of makalani 1

### Makalni 2

### Gumbs