### Part 1: Why-ever

#### Identities are always dynamic – as time progresses, affective encounters with the things around us change both our physical constitution and identities, yet representational thought ascribes to them a limited essence – the neg’s model resists the imposition of microfascist labels and structures of sameness onto a chaotic world while the AFF encourages it.

Spangenberg ‘9

Yolanda Spangenberg (Department of Philosophy, University of Pretoria). “‘Thought without an Image’: Deleuzian philosophy as an ethics of the event.” Phronimon 10:1, 2009. Rc/Pat

According to Deleuze, a general category of things is necessarily still excluded due to the particular form of recognition. In other words, due to the fact that recognition proceeds by objectifying and comparing the new with what is already known or what has already been experienced. To put this differently, recognition operates by objectifying and referring difference back to that which has already been recognised and experienced. It discounts the new and virtual qualities of pure difference. For Deleuze, the problem with recognition lies in the fact that recognition necessarily depends on representation. To be able to recognize the object of a faculty, we have to consider the object in terms of an identity that we can conceive of, an analogy that we can judge, an opposition that we can imagine and a similarity that we can perceive (Williams 2005). According to Deleuze, the representational ‘image of thought’ perpetuates a reductive and damaging illusion that hides reality seen in terms of pure difference or difference ‘in itself.’ For Deleuze, pure difference exists in the form of intensities or forces and it is the virtual condition for (the possibility of) all actual identities; it is necessary for the explanation of significance and sensation in the realm of actual things. Although pure difference is nonidentifiable and is forever eluding the present, it underlies all identities and allows us to explain their actualizations, transformations and evolutions. The sense and significance that pure difference gives rise to involve incomparable events and movements that, for Deleuze, are uniquely significant to individuals. This pure difference that underlies all actual and trivial differences is objectified and excluded by representation. Representation cuts us off from the creativity afforded by virtual and intensive multiplicities. Deleuze’s opposition to identity is directed at the falsifying power and separative nature of identity in representation. Identity is opposed to the virtual intensities of pure difference in that these intensities are nonidentifiable, unrepresentable, uncountable and not open to a reductive logical or mathematical analysis. Deleuze’s critique of identity aims at correcting the mistake we make whenever we think merely in terms of actual things. In privileging identities and extended magnitudes we tend to overlook the intensive genesis of these identities and magnitudes. Identity works against and covers up the forces and virtual intensities of pure difference that are part of processes of becoming and transformation. Rather than existing as fixed and separate beings with identifiable and limited essences or predicates, all things are, according to Deleuze, connected to uncountable, non-identifiable and dynamic processes. Deleuze does not deny that recognition occurs and that identity and representation fulfil an important and necessary function. His answer however, is that thinking as well as communication is not only, or even primarily, a matter of identifying; it is in a crucial sense also expressive. “Its expressive momentum carries a charge of potential too great to be absorbed in any particular thing or event: too much to be born(e)” (Massumi 2006: xxxii). Although we represent what we think and talk about, a series of non-identifiable processes are always at work ‘behind’ that representation. For Deleuze, neither identity nor representation would’ve been possible without pure differences standing in the background as a condition for the illusory appearance of a pure, well-determined identity. Apart from the orderly, structured and representational way of our habitual thinking, there are always the chaos of chance happenings, and the irrationality and complexity of their ever-shifting origins and outcomes. We try to deal with the chaos and contradictory nature of pure difference by imposing structures, creating hierarchies, conceiving of things as ‘the same’ from one moment to the next, using definitions to limit meanings, and ignoring new and potentially creative experiences (James Williams in Parr: 2007).

#### Thus, the standard is embracing creative difference. The standard isn’t consequentialist – actions need to be consistent with advocating a fluid subject, rather than static representation of knowledge, identity, and ethics.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### a. Pedagogy – we need to tip the scales towards a nomadic repositioning to mobilize moments of relationality – thus the role of the judge is to be a disruptive educator. Through recognizing the fluidity of others, we further our own potential and movements that challenge dominant epistemologies.

Pires 14

[Marta, 5-2014, Doctor of Education, Montclair State, "De-Territorializing the Child : Towards a Theory of Affect in Educational Philosophy and Research" (2014). Theses, Dissertations and Culminating Projects. 66. <https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=etd>] //Recut CAT

As seen in plateau 3., understanding, or coding the child as the child of labor/work, and as lack, as lacking something – rationality, reason, intellectual ability, knowledge and information, discursive abilities, and experience – postulates that the child not only needs to be educated, but that the purpose of education is to fill, or fulfill that lack. This lack is predetermined by the adults that make decisions about children and, in what regards formal education, made official through policy, and circulated within the community of education professionals as the truth. It is then, to a bigger or lesser extent, implemented by schools and teachers, and as of late, scrutinized by the penalizing effects of standardized test results – not conforming will result in loss of funds and often loss of the tools necessary to fulfill the very goals the policy states as necessary for children to thrive socially and personally. In current United States, those in charge of making decisions about children are often influenced by corporate rhetoric and logic. Corporate needs, translated into corporate rhetoric, become the goals for formal, mostly public, education serving millions of children. The “truth” served to the community of education professionals about the lack that makes of children incomplete, incompetent beings, is thus the truth about corporate needs and the ways those can be addressed through formal education. If any compelling evidence of this was needed, President Obama’s words at the nation address in February 2013, during which he referred to children as “our most valuable resource” (http://www.c-span.org, 2013, p. 12), have provided it. And while I do believe in the importance of providing children with tools and resources for navigating their social and financial reality, I do not believe that this should be the primary or exclusive goal/purpose of formal education, nor do I believe that formal public **education** should be geared towards fulfilling the ideals and needs of private corporate interest. I believe, rather, that it should finally be geared towards serving the child – not the child as resource, but the child as life, as immanent being that participates of the world today and tomorrow, and exists simultaneously with its adult. This is the affective child, the child of life, and the child of potentiality. This child is not defined by what she [they] cannot do, **but** valuable for what she [they] can do, and is not equated with lack. The child that does not lack, does not need the education of the kind that is meant to fulfill that lack – that predetermined lack that overlooks that which it does not include in its “lacking list”. The affective child learns, engages in learning as a way to activate her power to become – whatever, whenever. Learning may or may not come from, or occur within, formal education, thus extending value to the minor and decreasing **the** possibilities for discriminatory practices to occur. Becoming becomes itself a way of living with profound **acceptance** of experiencing the world rather than holding information about it – learning that other human beings are only different if engaged with as such, that they are victims only if taken advantage of, and thatnature and the world are resource only when we act upon them as such. For teachers as for researchers, profound acceptance means being open to being changed in the process of engaging with the world. For the teacher, engaging with the students means engaging with other bodies like her own; accepting to be changed by the interactions with those bodies; and understanding the power that her actions have in the potential becomings of those bodies. Additionally, this teacher is willing to challenge the identifiers that children’s bodies have been assigned by social convention and categories, so as to allow them to become, thus increasing not only her [their] **own** power to effect change, but also that of **the** children as immanently engaged with the world. For the **researcher**, profound acceptance entails facing the research process as a nomadic journey into inquiry, and following the path of the nomadic research map as it folds and unfolds throughout that journey. Inflections and foldings in the map have the 171 potential to start a rhizome where a tree once stood unshakeable in its epistemic certainties. The rhizome pokes its way into existence through affect – a tiny prickling of discomfort, the affective poke; but the researcher has to be willing to accept it, to accept the possibility of displacement of her beliefs, and her apparently united self, and to embrace a profound fearlessness of change. In conclusion, understanding that “I” can become and live within the limitless confines of the play between territorialization and deterritorialization suggests an understanding of other manifestations of being as engaged in similar life – I live in the openness of the possibility/potentiality of being changed, and engage with the world knowing that my decisions can, and likely will, impact others, change them, and impact their becoming and further expanded becomings. While responsibility over my own becoming appears diminished in light of the impact that context, circumstance, and others have over my condition, responsibility for others and the world increases. We become responsible for one another and for the world because we understand that that which happens to others and what they become impacts our own becoming possibilities. We understand that becoming occurs in the encounter and engagement with others by way of affects. It is in this way that recognizing affect as a valid and valuable mode of social and political perception and expression has the potential to increase social and political possibilities.

#### b. Spatial creativity requires non-authoritative understandings of power – 8 implications:

Grosz et al 12.

Elizabeth Grosz, Duke University. Kathryn Yusoff, Lancaster University. Arun Saldanha, University of Minnesota. Catherine Nash, Queen Mary, University of London. Nigel Clark, Open University. “Geopower: a panel on Elizabeth Grosz’s ‘Chaos, territory, art: Deleuze and the framing of the earth.’” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2012, volume 30, pages 971 – 988. CAT

I would like to use this opportunity to discuss some of the concepts from my 2008 book, Chaos, Territory, Art that I think may be of interest to geographers. I want to be as compressed as I can, so let me proceed with a point-form breakdown of some concepts and claims that may be relevant to thinking about geography in its most open senses. Let me also be as bold, un-nuanced and provocative as I can: 1. The earth, the world, the universe is made up not only of objects, but above all, of forces, forces that interact, clash and coexist creating both stable, predictable orders of organization – objects and their relations – and zones of indeterminability – events and their singularities. 2. These forces, while they must be considered material, must also be understood as incorporeal, as having a dimension of sense, ideas or conceptuality. Before life emerges as such, before it has even the possibility of emergence, matter must already contain the immaterial, the capacities to make sense or to have meaning. 3. If and when life emerges from the forces of the earth, forces that cannot be separated into different categories, life carries with it this excess over corporeality that the material has always contained, a virtuality that enables it to transform itself or to emerge as life. Life capitalizes on the two-faced orientation of the earth and its forces, erupting into materiality as a bounded and self-producing cohesion that is also always ‘thinking’, that is to say, is always oriented by the senses of the earth inherent in its materiality. Life is **the provisional binding of an order of conceptuality with an order of organic cohesion**, the temporary protraction and delaying of the forces of the universe itself. 4. The emergence of animal life, life suited to its particular part of the earth by natural selection, enables new orders of emergence, new modes of actualization of the virtual forces of the earth itself. Life enables the production of forces that reframe and reorganize materiality/ conceptuality – even, beginning with the human intervention in early Greek philosophy, to divide these forces into mutually exclusive categories, matter and ideality – bringing about new combinations, new forms of intermingling, new modes of organization of matter-thought. These powers of rearrangement, the very powers that life must utilize to transform the world into its world, both bring new orders of virtuality, new forces to bear on those that pre-exist it, but also bring out the latent possibilities or potentialities that the earth and its forces already contain. 5. Life in its vegetative and animal forms, as attuned to a milieu or environment as it might be, bring new forces into existence that harness the forces of the earth. These new forces are ways of living, modes of framing and organizing the earth’s spatial and temporal qualities so that they intensify and transform living forms – a kind of diversion of these imperceptible terrestrial forces through the delays and transformations life elaborates. Art in its most general sense is a way of experiencing the singularities, the particular qualities of the earth and its living and unlivable forces, as bodily intensities. Art, even human art, is a derivation of the animal’s and plant’s capacities to harness the forces of the earth not only to live, but to intensify itself, to maximize its sensations. Plants not only live, they require the interaction of insects whose engagements ensure plants reproduce with variation. Plants intensify the sensation they may generate in those living forms they require to ensure fertilization: they become vivid and intense, not for themselves as a way of addressing their environment but as a form of provocation to the insects that fertilize them. The brighter the color, the stronger the aroma, the more lush the leaves, the more likely the plant is to proliferate offspring through its symbiotic connections with other living forms. Art is the capitalization of these intensities. 6. Life is thus not only caused and framed by an inorganic or geographical environment, but also by other forms of life. Life is attracted to and engages with other forms of life to the extent that these engagements provide opportunities to maximize its capacities, including its sensory capacities. Sexuality, the attraction and sexual/ pleasurable engagement of living and non-living forces, is not just the mode of reproduction, but is more an expression of living bodies’ capacities for intensification. This capacity for intensification is the condition for art, which at its most elementary level involves the capacity to reframe, to move, to decontextualize qualities, properties, forces that come from a particular place. The condition of **art, as Deleuze and Guattari make clear,** **is deterritorialization**, the movement from a given location to any other, a fundamental spatial and geographical concept. This movement is the unleashing of some of the virtualities in objects that intensify, attract and appeal to living forces. Art is thus geographical (rather than psychological): it involves the earth and the movement of its qualities so that they may intensify the sensations of living beings with otherwise imperceptible forces. 7. Life is thus not a special force, a vital energy that must distinguish itself from materiality, considered as inert and given. If matter, the materiality of the earth is also ideal, carrying a thin film of ideality on the surface of all events and in parallel with all objects, then life can only be distinguished from the inorganic forces that make up the larval, tectonic and earth-forming order that constitute the earth by a difference of degree rather than a difference in kind. Equally, the emergence of animal from plant forms, and of human from animal forms, if there is such an emergence, is a matter of degree rather than a difference in kind. Life partakes of the earth, requiring its forces to survive; but in turn, life elaborates the forces of the earth in ways that would and could not occur otherwise, developing certain potentialities in one direction or another, converting the qualities of the earth and its products into other qualities useful to or enhancing life. It is a temporary detour of the forces of the earth through the forces of a body, making them an endless openness. 8. The relations between the earth and its various forces, and living beings and their not always distinguishable forces, are forms of geo-power, if power is to be conceived as the engagement of clashing, competing forces. This means that before there can be relations of oppression, that is relations between humans categorized according to the criteria that privilege particular groups, there must be relations of force that exist in an impersonal, preindividual form that are sometimes transformed into modes of ordering the human. What we understand as the history of politics, the regulations, actions and movements of individual and collectives relative to other individuals and collectives, is possible only because geopower has already elaborated an encounter between forms of life and forms of the earth. Our everyday understanding of power draws on yet brackets out this primordial interface that sustains it in its ever-changing forms. It is because local and global forms of power are elaborated on a plane of forces that they can generate their very real effects on particular categories of bodies. But we must be careful to distinguish these different orders of force, or violence, that structure life at its very eruption and its subsequent elaboration: geopower, the relations between the earth and its life forms, runs underneath and through power relations, immanent in them, as their conditions of existence. Power, the relations between humans or perhaps even between living things, is a certain, historically locatable capitalization on the forces of geopower.

### Part 2: What-ever

#### We need new modes of alternative passage, usage, and constituent flight beyond the political.

Hardt 14

Hardt, Michael. “Reading Notes on Deleuze and Guattari Capitalism & Schizophrenia.” People.duke.edu. July 9, 2014. http://people.duke.edu/~hardt/Deleuze&Guattari.html. Accessed July 22, 2021. CAT

Politics ���� Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are all conducted on an explicitly political terrain.� I want to ask first of all in what way these sections are political and what is meant by politics.� One of the preconditions and really one of the bases for the arguments about linguistics and semiology in the first two of these chapters is that language is not the model for all structures and organizations (as structuralism or some currents in structuralism would have it) but rather that the question of language is merely a subset of the larger question of regimes of signs, the question of semiotics.� I don't think it's best to understand what a regime of signs or what semiotics is by starting from language and then expanding or extrapolating.� It is better rather to start on a completely different track.� I would say as a first approximation that a regime of signs is a society.� Consider, for example, the ancient history of the Jews around the period of the destruction of the temple that D&G present.� "There is a Jewish specificity, immediately affirmed in a semiotic system.� This semiotic, however is no less mixed than any other.� On the one hand, it is intimately related to the countersignifying regime of the nomads" (p. 122), the Jews the wandering people, but "on the other hand, it has an essential relation to the signifying semiotic" (pp. 122-23) by which the Jews dream or reestablishing an imperial society, and finally, perhaps most importantly it is characterized by a specific postsignifying, passional regime.� Now this mixed regime of signs, this mixed semiotic, is nothing other than ancient Jewish society.� It is not that this regime is also social (just as sociolinguists like Labov will argue that language is also social or that it necessarily relates to society).� No this regime is society itself; society is nothing other than this regime of signs.� (Or I guess we would have to say that society is also a regime of bodies, a physical system that is distinct from the sign system, but let's leave that question aside for the moment.)� Once we cast the question of language in the larger and proper framework of a regime of signs, then, and once we recognize a regime of signs as a society, it is clear a priori that this is a political terrain, simply in the sense that all questions are immediately questions of the polis, of the social field.� "For language is a political affair before it is an affair for linguistics; even the evaluation of degrees of grammaticality is a political matter" (139- 40).� ���� Being a political matter, however, simply in the sense of referring to or having social consequences, doesn't yet really grasp what I mean by political here.� Last week I talked rather vaguely about ethics in order to refer to the possibility of alternatives and action.� Perhaps rather than ethics I should talk about pragmatics.� This is the opening in these chapters toward political action.� "Pragmatics is a politics of language," (82) or perhaps more generally, pragmatics is a politics of semiotics.� What do they means by political here?� How does one do politics in D&G's universe?� It is of course a practical matter, but I would argue that the first thing one needs is criteria for political action, and that is what D&G provide.� You can recognize when D&G are proposing criteria for political action when they start talking about usage or particular two different usages for something.� The difference between major and minor is perhaps the clearest criterion we get in these chapters.� "'Major' and 'minor' do not qualify two different languages but rather two usages or functions of language" (104).� The major usage of language insists on language's unity and uniformity, on the fixity of its constants.� The minor usage operates a reduction of constants and proliferates variations of the language.� "The major and minor modes are two different treatments of language one of which consists in extracting constants from it, the other in placing it in continuous variation" (106).� Maybe we should even distinguish here between the majority usage of language that is the dominant standard, the minority usage that also poses a standard but a subordinated one, a stable ghetto language, and finally a minoritarian usage that poses no standard but only variation, that deterritorializes the major language.� According to this understanding all great authors invent a minor language, or more properly, they make minoritarian usage of the language.� In the beautiful expression of Proust that D&G cite, every great book is written in a kind of foreign language.� This minor language or minor literature is more or less the center of D&G's little book about Kafka. ���� We should also cast this difference on a larger plane, not just as two usages of language, two ways of speaking or writing, but as usages of society, two ways of living.� The major or majority way of living refers to the standard of the society, to the "adult-white- heterosexual-European-male" (105) as D&G say.� The minor or minority refers then to nonstandard ways of living.� The difference between majority and minority has nothing to do with numbers, because in fact the minorities are most often larger in number.� It is probably not wrong to say that the difference is not one of number but of power, that the difference between the majority and the minority is a power difference, but D&G rather refer directly to the social standard or constant as the mark of the majority.� The minority way of living, then, would refer to a subordinate system, or a subsystem -- one, however, that still maintains a standard.� I think it would be accurate to link this to our notion of subculture (and it would be interesting to situate the question of subculture developed in British cultural studies in this context -- I'm thinking specifically of Dick Hebdige's book).� Finally, minoritarian is something different: "we must distinguish between: the majoritarian as a constant and homogeneous system; minorities as subsystems; and the minoritarian as a potential, creative and created, becoming" (105-06).� It might be true (I wonder about this) that the minorities as subsystems or subcultures would have more access to a minoritarian becoming than those closer to the dominant standard: Kafka as a Czech Jew writing in German was perhaps in a better position than Goethe to deterritorialize the German language, to invent it as a foreign language.� This might be an interesting point at which to link this to Hebdige's notion of subcultures and their creativity. ���� The minoritarian usage, then, is not simply the usage that is proper to subordinated populations.� It is defined rather by its creativity.� In fact, the minoritarian is the only source of creativity or production among these three.� The majority usage just repeats the dominant standards, and the minority usage repeats the subordinated standards.� There is no majority or even minority becoming, because they are both stuck in homogeneous repetitions.� Only the minoritarian usage is a becoming; and it is only a becoming.� ���� Back in the context of D&G's order-words, we should recognize that there are two usages of order-words.� The major usage of them is as commandments or orders -- **"**You will **do this,** you will not **do that"** -- each of which, according to D&G, is a little **death sentence**.� The major usage of order words is always a verdict.� But of course that is not the only usage possible: "the order-word is also something else, inseparably connected: it is like a warning cry or a message to flee" (107).� The minoritarian usage of order-words is part of a line of flight.� ���� We have seen these lines of flight posed as the political alternative before, but what interests me here is that flight or escape is not enough.� "In the order-word life must answer the answer of death, not by fleeing, but by making flight act and create," by transforming "the compositions of order into components of passage" (110).� Flight must be creative.� It must not only be the refusal of the major usage, the refusal of the standard, the norm, the law, but a creation of an alternative.� In other words, **flight cannot be just flight -- that would be negative and empty**.� **Flight must be positive and creative: constituent flight.**� Now, when I say constituent we can't just mean the constitution of an new order, new norms, a new majority.� As D&G say in the passage I just cited, it involves a transformation of "the compositions of order into components of passage."� The passage is what I'm calling constituent flight.� Another way of approaching this is to say that D&G are proposing not a new order nor a new standard, but rather a new usage, or maybe a new way of life, a new mode of life.� So this is my answer to the question about what does politics means here in its most summary form: **alternative usage, passage, constituent flight**.

#### The most pressing avenue for creative expression today is our fascination with outer space – even if it’s only a horizon rather than a goal.

Grossberg 99

Grossberg, Lawrence. “(Re)Con-Figuring Space: Defining a Project.” Space and Culture, vol. 2, no. 4–5, Aug. 1999, pp. 13–22, doi:[10.1177/120633120000100402](https://doi.org/10.1177/120633120000100402). CAT

`Space...' Anyone who has ever seen, or even heard of, Star Trek will undoubtedly automatically complete the sentence: 'the final frontier.' Space as a frontier. But a frontier as a borderline—a set of boundary conditions to be crossed and traversed? Or a frontier as a border zone—a boundary space to be conquered, inhabited and exploited? In either case, space points to the existence of chaos. Space is chaos and conquering it was the American dream. The Russians, on the other hand, were never big on outer space; instead they talked about the cosmos: treating the universe as an ordered and harmonious system (Mazin & Turkina forthcoming). Yet in either case, space is in some way an impediment to expansion and mobility, something to be transgressed and, at the same time, civilized. Civilization as transgression. Somewhere in the space between these two spaces, is the very question of space, of the power of space and the spatiality of power. Space is after all everywhere—not only encircling and perme­ating the real, but also in literature, the visual and plastic arts, media arts (film, television, recorded sound), theory, etc.—and yet nowhere that we can lay our hands on it, so to speak. What cultural practice is there that does not mobilize space? Are those that appear to foreground space merely challenging the taken for grantedness of space, or the commonsensical configuration of space? It is not enough that space has always been there but that it is suddenly there in a new way, as if the interrogation of the present depended upon the magnification of space itself. In fact the question of space is unavoidable if we are to begin thinking about alternative futures, alternative modernities, alternative theories and alternative politics. Discourse, capital, and power are inextricably tied up with relations in and of space. Perhaps the very insanity of the real (that seems to mark the end of our epoch) is a function of the space we are inhabiting—like a famous episode of Star Trek, famous in part because it has been repeated in the space of each series: it is the placing of space that is driving us crazy. The question remains where it has never been: not a millennial apocalypse, nor a fin de siecle despair, but a new sort of spatial boundary—opening and closing off the possibilities for culture-ing, deploying and organizing space (e.g., at its most obvious, in the changing forms of globalization and localization).

### Part 3: Performance

#### In the absence of debate, only performance is a meaningful aspect of creative expression. Thus, we should embrace a creative reshaping of the ballot through noncommodifiable performance as an antithesis of labels.

#### Grosz sees indigenous artwork as the least commodifiable form of expression. Thus, we offer the following in the doc:

A picture containing star, night sky

Description automatically generated

(Alma Nungarrayi Granites – “Seven Sisters Dreaming”)

<https://japingkaaboriginalart.com/collections/warlpiri-star-gazers/>

#### Becoming isn’t easy, and success isn’t inherent: if performativity fails, vote neg on presumption – it’s the least restrictive option since a) failure to deconstruct faciality means we cannot (yet) embrace deterritorialization, and b) making an incomplete assessment only reifies institutional harms.

#### You say art is hyperreal, so we meet your ROTB, but you don’t – since our performance reshapes the focus of hyperreal art towards the creative expression of outer space – appropriation is not a negative term, corporations play the role of the bad opposition, they want you to think they’re evil so you think your glitches take them down but they actually reinstate themselves.

### Part 4: Who-ever

#### Habit requires unrestrained habitation, only the NEG approach can begin to solve through deconstructing individual habits.

Grosz 13

Elizabeth Grosz, Rutgers University. “Habit Today: Ravaisson, Bergson, Deleuze and Us.” Body & Society. 19(2&3) 217–239. 2013. DOI: 10.1177/1357034X12472544. CAT

Habit, which is considered to be very low on the scale of life for most philosophies, particularly for the forms of philosophy that privilege consciousness, is regarded as something that attests largely to man’s animal nature rather than to the uniquely human, is utterly transformed in the lineage that runs from Ravaisson to Bergson and then to Deleuze (a lineage that, if stretched backward, would also have to include Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume and others). This is a history of various struggles to understand the forces of self-overcoming that generate the possibilities of matter transforming itself, and life transforming itself through the transformations that matter generates. Habit not only anchors a site of regularity in a universe of perpetual change; it initiates change in the apparently unchanging, it opens up the possibility of understanding the very force of temporality itself, the force that adheres the past to the present and orients both to the possibilities of action in the future. Habit is not the inert in us that reveals our affinity with the animal: it is, paradoxically, a dynamic force that opens up the universe, both its living and non-living forces, to contraction, to contemplation, and thus, by way of deflection, to free action, to radical change. Habit, on the border between the absolutely constrained and the radically free, transforms the constrained into degrees of freedom, degrees of openness. Habit, in enabling an ease of action and diminishing feeling or sensation, as Ravaisson recognized, not only opens up the living being to the acquisition of newcharacteristics and capacities, it also opens up the universe itself to being otherwise, to accommodating multiple forms of life with its own openness, with its necessary duplication of the present and the actual with the unspent forces of the past and the virtual. What is this to us in the present, we who are habituated to think of philosophy as redundant or unnecessary? Habit has been the object of numerous strategies and tactics: the acquisition of ‘good’ habits and the ‘war’ on ‘bad’ habits, especially those habits that become life-endangering (even if life-intensifying), addictions of all kinds, have required the intervention of government agencies and institutions. Governments, indeed economic systems, have risen or fallen Grosz 233 Downloaded from bod.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 according to how the habits of segments of populations are elaborated, encouraged or transformed. Habit has been regarded as something to be managed and regulated, privileging good habits (saving, wise investment, healthy lifestyles) and punishing bad ones (the criminalization of drug addiction, and the medicalization of many other types of addiction) in order to attain a desired outcome (evergrowing needs, which are all capable of modification as the economy requires). It has thus occupied the scrutiny of many disciplines and social practices, from the natural and medical sciences to the social sciences and even the humanities. Most of these disciplines, while less interested in adjusting habits so that they conform to social needs and expectations than various social institutions whose object is the regulation of social bodies, nevertheless assume that habits are the part of us that can be adjusted, altered, oriented in one way or another, that they are the part of us that can be manipulated, perhaps even from the outside, to attain various goals. Habits directed to chosen goals (regular exercise, the right kind of diet and so on) are to be encouraged while habits that debilitate or defy can be worked on and adjusted. Philosophical reflection may be able to provide another angle on habits. It does not help us to order or regulate habits, for the goal of philosophy is not the transformation of behaviour so much as the creation of concepts which may or may not address any particular form of behaviour. It may thus be able to discern another dimension to habits than those that make habit the object of social manipulation. Habit is one of the modes of connection that link living beings to a world which is open to innovative behaviour: it is the link that bridges the relations between the organic and the inorganic, introducing the needs of the organism to its environment and inserting its environment into the behaviour of the organism. Habit deserves to be understood not simply as one of the objects of social regulation, the attainment of good habits and the elimination of bad habits; it deserves to have its ontological place restored, to have this rich lineage which produced it as a philosophical concept continued into the future. Understanding habit in terms beyond automatism implies a new understanding of the inorganic universe and a new understanding of its processes of generating, supporting and moving towards the organic, its becoming-brain. This is what we have inherited from the 19th and 20th centuries, and what presses on us now: an 234 Body & Society 19(2&3) Downloaded from bod.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 understanding of the inter-implications of forms of life with inorganic forces, the processes by which the universe comes to contemplate itself.

#### Space acquisition is but one facet of creative expression. The AFF is sealing off the future of knowledge and scientific discovery by limiting access to ONLY the state. The universe is the ultimate fluid subject – it’s always expanding, and without access to it, we are denied the realization of fluidity within ourselves.

Grosz 13

Elizabeth Grosz, Rutgers University. “Habit Today: Ravaisson, Bergson, Deleuze and Us.” Body & Society. 19(2&3) 217–239. 2013. DOI: 10.1177/1357034X12472544. CAT

For Ravaisson, habit is both a state of the organism and a virtue or accomplishment. It is a state to the extent that habit is a ‘general and permanent way of being’ (2008 [1828]: 25), a way of ordering a series of successively related acts (‘an existence considered . . . as a unity of its elements or as the succession of its different phases’). It is a state that ensures a change in its agent, that is acquired through accommodating change and remains even when the change subsides. A habit changes its agent so that its past experiences act to anticipate what its future may require. But it is more than an acquired characteristic, an anticipatory action, for habit persists, or rather subsists, as it were beneath the changes that it is to accommodate or meet (it is not ‘simply acquired habit, but habit that is contracted, owing to a change, with respect to the very change that gave birth to it’ [2008 (1838): 25]). This transforms it from something one does to a virtue or capacity that one has. Habit is change contracted, compressed, contained. In this sense, habit’s contracting capacities outstrip the change it is to address. It remains there as possible or potential action even when the change 220 Body & Society 19(2&3) Downloaded from bod.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 which brought it about ceases. It thus anticipates a possible change. It is, in other words, a potentiality, a possibility, a virtual mode of addressing a future change. It is this that transforms it from an activity to a disposition, or, as Ravaisson calls it, ‘a virtue’, a way of behaving in the world. Habit is a change in behaviour, a virtue that is activated whether it is called for or not, a permanent or semipermanent modification of the agent of action.2 There are two vectors at work in habits: a temporality that is openended, in which the future is not contained in the present, but where the present establishes certain regularities to anticipate what the future may involve; and a living being whose activities can be modified by the incorporation of stereotyped or stylized behaviours. Habits change the disposition to action; they entail a change, a new virtuality, a new tendency to act, a new potentiality. They bring about a new ability, the capacity to persist, thrive, change and grow in the face of a world that is itself subject to endless and often random change. Habits provide the ability to change one’s tendencies, to reorient one’s actions to address the new, and to be able to experience the unexpected.

### Part 5: How-ever

#### Their claim that ‘the appropriation of Star Trek by Jeff Bezos is unjust’ is invalid insofar as we indict the AFF as a mechanistic order which imposes authoritative burdens on the realm of creativity. Thus, the alternative is a rejection of the affirmative mindset as a means of embracing continuous expressions of creative difference.

Grosz 13

Elizabeth Grosz, Rutgers University. “Habit Today: Ravaisson, Bergson, Deleuze and Us.” Body & Society. 19(2&3) 217–239. 2013. DOI: 10.1177/1357034X12472544. CAT

Habit, for Bergson, is the production of a form of stability that does not anchor living beings to their environment, but that enables free acts, acts that remain inherently unpredictable, and that in-form and produce specific types of subjectivity, to emerge from the background of habits and quasi-automatized acts. Without habits and their tendency to automatism, living beings would not have the energy and singularity of purpose that enables them to survive and to create, to produce the new, to live artistically. Habits are the movements that address an open relation to the world, a relation that is not the constraint on behaviour that instincts are, but that, by degrees, is the promise of freedom. It is only because there is some orderly repetition in both the regularities of the world and in the performative possibilities of bodies that habits can ease the burden of a creative freedom. Bergson suggests that automatism begins the gradual evolutionary movement that directs itself to freedom: habit is an intermediary state between instincts and free acts. Intensities, sensations, forces are themselves the first signs in the history of living beings that they can rise above automatism. For him, living beings are propelled into freedom, into the various degrees of freedom that mark life, through the generation of sensations, whose force enervates and transforms actions from the givenness of a fixed reaction to the openness of free acts. Pleasure and pain are expressions of something that intervenes between stimulus and reaction to sever their direct connection, and enable a new kind of reaction, a free act, to emerge. Habit is how we modify instinct to produce the possibility of sometimes quite rare acts of freedom.9 Sensations are the mark of the emergence of unpredictability, a delay or gap between stimulus and response. Sensation is that which resists the direct transition from one to the other, sensations (of pleasure and pain, among others) insert a delay, a gap, between stimulus and response. Pleasure and pain are forces which unhinge automatism: they provide an outline of incipient actions, actions one could insert as a response to the stimulus but which are in no way guaranteed by it (as is instinctive behaviour). They are antidotes to automatism and provocations to the generation of new actions, actions whose repetitions will also yield pleasure. Habit is created, not through the degeneration of consciousness, but precisely as a stimulus to consciousness, as the movement from instinct to free act; they are forms of desire. Grosz 225 Downloaded from bod.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 From his first text, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (1959), Bergson understands habit and its capacity to transform living beings into free beings. Habit not only mediates nature and culture, inside and outside, but particularly freedom and necessity, as well as perception and memory. The notion that habit is a pivotal capacity in the elaboration of freedom marks all of his writings and culminates in Creative Evolution (1944), the text where he understands the evolutionary emergence of sentience and sensation as a function of the emergence of degrees of increasingly unpredictable movement. Movement is the condition of both sentience and of freedom. Habit constitutes a kind of substratum that supports and enables acts of great unpredictability and creativity. Without habits to support the movements that constitute our daily activities, we would not have the backdrop of assured actions against which freedom and unpredictability are highlighted. Free acts, acts not bound to habit, are, for Bergson, quite exceptional. We are not, as the existentialists claim, thoroughly free, free in every act: rather, all living things exhibit degrees of freedom, linked to the openness of movements, of actions, that such beings are capable of performing. Freedom is not the contemplation of abstract possibilities of choice as the tradition of liberal philosophy has suggested, for it is not the opposite of determinism. Rather, it is associated with acts, with the capacity to act, and to undertake acts which help form a self or subject. Acts are free only to the extent that they stand out from the bulk of our activities that are routinized. Bergson cites the familiar reaction we have to an alarm clock early in the morning, part of the habitual routine of each work-day. The alarm summons up a chain of actions: opening our eyes, turning off the alarm, getting out of bed, putting on slippers and beginning the day. It is only because we undertake these activities in a state of half-consciousness that we have the energy and interest to undertake less routinized actions, to elaborate relatively free acts. Habits, incorporating memories of past performances in similar contexts, leave both consciousness and the energetic forces of the body able to address other issues than the habitual only because the habitual accommodates so much of what is required from us. It is not subjects who are free or not free; it is acts that, in expressing a consonance with their agent, are free. An act is free, for Bergson, to the extent that it satisfies two requirements: ‘the self 226 Body & Society 19(2&3) Downloaded from bod.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 alone will have been the author of it, and . . . it will express the whole of the self’ (1959: 165–6). Free acts are those that spring from the subject alone (and not from any psychical state of the subject or any manipulated behaviour around the subject); they not only originate in or through a subject, they express all of that subject, in other words, they are integral to who or what the subject is. Free acts erupt from the subject insofar as they express the whole of that subject: ‘we are free when our acts spring from our whole personality, when they express it, when they have that indefinable resemblance to it which one sometimes finds between the artist and his work’ (1959: 172). Acts are free not insofar as the subject is always the same, an essence, an identity, but insofar as the subject is transformed by and engaged through its acts, becomes through its acts.10 If freedom is located in acts rather than in subjects, then the capacity to act is to a large extent structured by the ability to harness and utilize matter for one’s own purposes. Freedom is not a transcendent quality inherent in subjects but is immanent in the relations that the living being has with the material world, including other forms of life. Thus habit is required to attain this accommodation: it frees energy and consciousness to act on its conscious intentions by directing itself to the accomplishment of acts, behaviour, an active engagement with materiality. Bergson further develops his account of habit in Matter and Memory. Habit is one of two ways of addressing and recalling the past, of making something of the past present in the life of living things. The past is preserved in itself and is always carried along with the present in the manner of a snowball that eternally accumulates in the life of the universe; but in the case of a living thing, although it carries the history it has accumulated in its body, which is the result of eons of successive generations and their struggles for existence, one cannot retain in consciousness even a tiny fraction of this vast and ineradicable history. The past survives in and through the present, or actualizes its virtual forces, through two means – in bodily habits and in recollections, which are modes of conscious remembering of specific events, events which are locatable in a definite moment of time, are remembered in perceptual terms, in detail, and are capable of a more in-depth elaboration with effort.11 These memories, the objects of both consciousness and the unconscious, are the ways in which the past returns as an image in the present. In order to attend to such memories, we require Grosz 227 Downloaded from bod.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 preparation, a mode of cutting ourselves off from the teeming distractions of regular perception. Often we close our eyes or stare blankly when we try hard to retrieve a particular memory (‘my sixteenth birthday’, ‘my first day at school’). Remembering in this sense is quite laborious. It requires considerable effort to sustain, or at least an environment whose perceptual requirements are minimized.12 Bergson understands habit as a kind of rote form of memory. He suggests that, like learning lines by heart, habit is acquired through repetition which binds various actions, bodily performances and forms of muscular exertion gradually into a continuous whole. Habits have three particular characteristics: they are acquired by repetition; they demand a decomposition and recomposition of various actions or practices; and they are contracted, that is, ‘stored up in a mechanism which is set in motion as a whole by an initial impulse, in a closed system of automatic movements which succeed each other in the same order and, together, take the same length of time’ (1988: 81). Habits reconstitute what would be or could be considered conscious movements by a process of analysis or decomposition. Habits are forms of contraction, forms of inherence or subsistence. All the actions are telescoped into the first movement that triggers habitual behaviour. Habits are thus memories that are activated unconsciously and without effort as preparatory for action. If memory-proper encourages invention and newness by opening up the actual world of perception to the unused up or virtual resources of the past, habit provides the energy and intellectual resources for newness by attempting to order and regulate the bulk of our energies to non-habitual actions. Habit is incipient action, action anticipated; it is memory accumulated in order to act. Memory-proper is contemplation, reverie, the slowing down, arrest or simplification of movement: habit is the complexification of movement through it routinization. Habit is a form of accumulation of memory and repetition in the body. Where memory represents and imagines the past, habit acts and repeats it.13 Habit is not memory-proper repeated indefinitely. Memory-proper does not bear indefinite repetition. Each repetition constitutes another concrete and particular memory that is carried with the next repetition. Memory individuates to the extent that habit routinizes. Habit is memory oriented to action, to practice: it is memory which has a vested interest in the present. As for Ravaisson, for Bergson it 228 Body & Society 19(2&3) Downloaded from bod.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 lies mid-way between an instinct and a consciously chosen action. Habit becomes conscious only to the extent that it does not attain its habituated end. Otherwise it is memory lived as bodily preparedness. The past is stored up, for Bergson, either in the form of recollections, which add to and complicate our free actions in the present, or in the form of corporeal habits which enhance our free actions by routinizing and containing all other actions. Memory-proper inhibits nature for it generates the possibility of inserting the unpredictable or the uncontainable into the present. It accounts for free actions, for inventions, for the efficacy of the non-habitual. But it is only because habit provides an anchor in a world that is ever-changing that the past is able to stabilize and orient the present. Habit is the acquired part of our nature, a nature directed outward to action.

#### This starts by dismantling faciality through lines of flight.

Hardt 14

Hardt, Michael. “Reading Notes on Deleuze and Guattari Capitalism & Schizophrenia.” People.duke.edu. July 9, 2014. http://people.duke.edu/~hardt/Deleuze&Guattari.html. Accessed July 22, 2021. CAT

1. Faciality Faciality is not an easily concept to grasp. I think a good place to start is by contrasting it to a dialectical conception of identity and identity formation. In other words, I would propose as a backdrop to D&G faciality, Sartre's and Fanon's conceptions of race and racial identity as dialectical. The Sartre/Fanon dialectic runs like this. First the dominant subject (the white European) creates the dominated subject as a coherent identity. As Sartre says, it's the anti-semite who creates the Jew. Or in Fanon, it is the European colonizer who creates the African "native" as a fixed identity. And Said's work on Orientalism proceeds roughly along the same line: the "oriental" is created in European scholarship, European art, travel logs, etc. None of this is to claim that the subalterns in question (Jew, Africans, Orientals) did not exist before their creation by the dominant European imaginary; the claim is rather that this identity, which overdetermines the existing subjectivities, was created and imposed by the colonial power. Jews existed but the anti-semite created "the jew"; Africans existed but the colonizing power created "the native" as it did "the oriental." The colonizer and racist created these negative identities, and pushed alterity to its extreme, inventing the Other, posing a rigid boundary of exclusion through the middle of the world. As Fanon says, the colonial city is a world cut in two, between European Self and Native Other. The dialectical conception doesn't stop, however, with this first act of creation -- and this is the brilliance, I think, of Sartre and Fanon. The White European Self does not actually exist before this creative encounter, this invention of the Other. The European Self is rather the final result of the process. The White European Self is only arrived at through its opposition to the Other, its difference from the Jew, the Native, the Oriental. After the creation of the negative identity, the Other, the Self arises as a negation of that negation, and hence the dialectical structure. The White European Self depends on its negative Other because only through negation of that Other can it invent and maintain its own identity. Now, I think this dialectical theory of identity is a good starting point for understanding D&G's notion of faciality because it is first of all decidedly nondialectical. In other words, faciality is a theory of racism (among other things), but it is not a theory of racial Others. "If the face is in fact Christ, in other words, your average ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the first divergence-types, are racial: yellow man, black man, men in the second or third category. They are also inscribed on the wall, distributed by the hole. the white man's claim has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other (...). Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves (...). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside" (p. 178). So, in this nondialectical conception of racism, there are no Others, no one on the outside. In other words, racial difference or alterity is not configured in terms of the Other, of polar difference, but rather in terms of degrees of deviance from the standard of White-Man face. Really there is no exclusion properly speaking. On the contrary, European racism functions precisely by including everyone on the white screen and in the black holes -- including them and arranging them in a hierarchy defined by degrees of deviance from the dominant standard. That's the first thing to understand about faciality, then, that it is based not on a negative dialectic of identities but degrees of deviance, and that although it does not function through exclusion it nonetheless establishes a hierarchy of types. (Does faciality have to do with identity? Is a face an identity?) What, then, is faciality? So far we have only that it is a nondialectical machine of hierarchy or domination. "This machine is called the faciality machine because it is the social production of face, because it performs the facialization of the entire body and all its surroundings and objects, and the landscapification of all worlds and milieus" (p. 181). The machine imposes a face on a body or a landscape on a world. One might assume at first that a face or a landscape is an identity that is stamped onto the body or the world, and that notion of facialization as an identity-producing machine might end up being pretty accurate, but D&G take a different tack. The face that is created by this machine is a combination of a white wall or screen with black holes. The white screen is the surface on which meanings appear; it is a system of signification. The black holes, on the other hand, are the points of passion and subjectification. One should remember at this point that a few chapters back, On Several Regimes of Signs, D&G described four regimes that all centered around signification: the primitive pre-signifying regime, the counter- signifying, the signifying, and the post-signifying regime, which is also the subjective and passional regime. A face, then, is a coordinated arrangement of these last two regimes, signification and subjectification. Specifically, they told back in that chapter that faciality is the substance of expression. It is the material locus for signification and subjectification. "Faciality reigns materially over that whole constellation of signifiances and interpretations (psychologists have written extensively on the baby's relations to the mother's face, and sociologists on the role of the face in mass media and advertising). The despot-god has never hidden his face, far from it; he makes himself one or even several" (115). The face is thus a field or a milieu on which signification or subjectification can take place, but it is not a neutral field or milieu. It is constructed so as to make certain meanings and subjectivities appear. The baby's relation to the mother's face is an interesting example, and maybe gives us a reason for calling this face. But clearly this doesn't just have to do with what we normally call faces. This face in general is a constructed field or milieu that determines the possible signification and subjectification. We might be better off, then, understand the face as close to what Debord called a spectacle. Like the spectacle the face determines what can appear, what meanings and what subjectivities. And like the spectacle, the face corresponds to or determines a form of rule. "The face is a politics" (181). The despotic facial machine gives priority to the white wall and signification; while the authoritarian facial machine gives priority to the black holes and subjectification. The two, of course, mix and function together. Every face is a mixture of a despotic regime and an authoritarian regime, signification and subjectification. The revolutionary politics to counter or contest this, then, is not to return to any primitive, pre-facial regime -- nor is it to create any identity (which I assume would be to create a new face). The course D&G propose instead is to unmake the face. "If the face is a politics, dismantling the face is also a politics involving real becomings, an entire becoming-clandestine. Dismantling the face is the same as breaking through the wall of the signifier and getting out of the black hole of subjectivity. Here, the program, the slogan, of schizoanalysis is: Find your black holes and white walls, know them, know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight" (188). Here I think the difference between the face and the spectacle becomes more clear. Spectacles in Debord are always something external on us, projected for us, maybe at the limit on us. The faces, on the other hand, are us. They constitute us, our black holes and white walls. Dismantling our faces will be to a large extent dismantling ourselves. We have no choice but to start out from our faces on our lines of flight. 2. Love This question of dismantling the face and the lines of flight involved in it brings up once again the problem that this flight might be misconceived as purely negative (and the term dismantling certainly doesn't help that). D&G insist that this dismantling involves real becoming, and more important it is a positive and creative flight, what I tried to call last week constituent flight. But that positive aspect is not always the easiest to recognize. I do see a way in which this positive aspect, this creative flight is working in this part of the book, particularly in the Three Novellas plateau, but I have to shift gears from the politics of the face to love. D&G do presents several description of love here that I find quite beautiful. Love, it seems to me, is precisely a constituent flight. Let me try to derive this from what D&G are saying. Here D&G are talking about dismantling the face and saying we have to begin with the face we have (its white wall and black holes) and move from there. "Only in the black hole of subjective consciousness and passion do you discover the transformed, heated, captured particles you must relaunch for a nonsubjective, living love in which each party connects with unknown tracts in the other without entering or conquering them, in which the lines are composed together like broken lines" (p. 188). Living love here is opposed to the dead love of the couple I imagine, or maybe it's a reference to living labor. And it arrives only in the process of dismantling the face, breaking through its white wall and escaping from its black holes. That's the first step of this love, flight from the face, or really abandon. "I have become capable of loving (...) by abandoning love and self" (199). The lines of flight that operate the dismantling the face are here the abandonment of the self, evacuating the self and the love associated with it. This evacuation of the self is what I would call exposure. But this exposure is not somehow revealing the hidden secret, the real me that no one sees, it is revelation in which there is no identity left, no secret to reveal. "It's because we no longer have anything to hide that we can no longer be apprehended. To become imperceptible oneself, to have dismantled love in order to become capable of loving. To have dismantled one's self ..." (197). Becoming imperceptible, dismantling the face, evacuating the self, exposure -- these are the conditions of loving. There is no longer a secret to reveal and no longer a Self to love. That, however, is only the first step, the pre-condition. The first step of loving is flight, abandoning the Self, but the second is composition or constitution -- the lines or spaces are composed together, or in the quote I read earlier, "each party connects with unknown tracts in the other without entering or conquering them, in which the lines are composed together like broken lines." So in love the elements that escaped the organization of the face come into contact. There is no longer a Self here to love, or Selves, or Self and Other. Rather this encounter of lines and spaces that have escaped the face and the Self have the potential to give rise to new compositions, new relationships. This new relationship, this new composition of the elements escaped from the face, from the Self, is love. The question in love is about compatability of these elements, as D&G say of compossibility -- that is how they can make a new composition, a new constitution. This new composition is the creativity, the positivity of the lines of flight. (Here is where D&G have to make good on the claim that lines of flight, dismantling, abandonment is not merely negative.) Here, as always, there are dangers or risks, but I think that the dangers help clarify what the process itself is. "It can happen in love that one person's creative line is the other's imprisonment. The composition of the line, of one line with another, is a problem, even of two lines of the same type. There is no assurance that two lines of flight will prove compatible, compossible. there is no assurance that the body without organs will be easy to compose. There is no assurance that a love, or a political approach, will withstand it" (205). Lines of flight have to meet and in the encounter have to compose together a new relationship. This encounter and this composition are not given (there is no assurance); this is rather the task of love. Discover compatible, compossible lines. Finally, just as it is with love so it is with politics. It seems that the positive, creative political approach that comes with or after the lines of flight operates through love, or rather through the same logic of encounter and composition defined by love. That's obviously a leap that has to be worked out further (from love to politics) but that path is the strategy I see D&G taking in the Three Novellas plateaux.

### On Case

### OV

#### Hiding your secrets is bad, you put “(I can clarify anything in cross)” when in fact you remain unable to clarify your AFF itself. Debate is a micro-fascist structure of organization that if you want to affirm requires abiding by – only the NEG gets to detach from it because we’re not beholden to a political departure from the squo.

### Shapiro

#### The 1AC advocacy further corrupts the plane of immanence – it is not the appropriation of outer space, but rather the war machine’s transcendence between the striae and the smooth that the AFF sees as unjust. They produce a mere glitch in the matrix but the matrix remains.

Hardt 14

Hardt, Michael. “Reading Notes on Deleuze and Guattari Capitalism & Schizophrenia.” People.duke.edu. July 9, 2014. http://people.duke.edu/~hardt/Deleuze&Guattari.html. Accessed July 22, 2021. CAT

Axiomatics However complex the nuances of this elaboration of immanence, immanence's distinction from and priority over transcendence remains up to this point relatively straightforward and unproblematic -- precisely because immanence at each point can be evaluated as preferable to transcendence, prior in terms of creativity and production. Immanence at each moment is associated with creativity or productivity and freedom, whereas transcendence is merely a product that brings with it subordination and control. At this point we could easily correlate the evaluation of immanence over transcendence with Deleuze's analysis of active and reactive forces in Nietzsche as a criterion of evaluation. Immanence is always active, creative, productive; transcendence (**the State, striae, Subject, Object) is always** reactive, **repressive**, inert. So, as I said, defining immanence may be a complex affair, but evaluating it is at this point quite clear. In fact, I would be tempted to point to this as the operative criterion for all of D&G's politics: in every instance value immanence over transcendence (in line with the evaluation of active over reactive forces). In Capitalism and Schizophrenia, however, this clear evaluation is thrown into question by one primary stumbling block, capitalism -- and perhaps also fascism. (I want to leave fascism aside here. The question in any case is, Is fascism an immanent form of rule, and if so how is it distinct from democracy? If not, it is not really a stumbling block for this criterion of evaluation.) Capitalism is a stumbling block precisely because it operates on the plane of immanence, capital operates as Marx says through immanent laws, and as D&G say through a general deterritorialization and decoding of flows. And yet capitalism deploys the most severe forms of subordination and control. If such a machine of immanence is so oppressive how can we maintain our notion of immanence as the central political criterion? In order to understand this paradox of capitalism as a repressive machine that develops on the plane of immanence, or really that itself remains a plane of immanence, D&G pose the axiomatic as the core of capitalism; capitalism is a general axiomatic of decoded and deterritorialized flows. I understand axiomatic here from its mathematical definition as an open set of equations that pose fixed relationships among variables. (One axiom of capitalism, for example, is the tendential fall of the rate of profit.) The axiomatic is open in the sense that new axioms can continually be added. (So to counter the axiom of the tendential fall of the rate of profit, another axiom might be added to transfer certain sectors of the core economy, say heavy industry, to the periphery.) The openness and plural character of the axiomatic means that it can at times come up with multiple solutions to a problem or face and manage other problems that are insoluable. Neither of these situations are catastrophic for the axiomatic. It is accustomed to functioning through partial, tentative, and even overdetermined solutions to its equations. (This is perhaps the best way to understand what D&G mean when they say the capitalism functions by breaking down.) My main point, though, is about immanence. The axiomatic is immanent precisely in that it is not a series of fixed statement, but a set of equations of variables. The variables are the whichever elements, le quelconque. For example, the labor that is plugged into the equation of capitalist valorization Marx calls abstract labor but we might also call it whichever labor, travail quelconque. That is what really means by abstract here: whichever, labor, the labor of the tailor, the weaver, the carpenter, whichever. The variables are what make the axiomatic smooth and immanent. Really there are no Subjects or Objects in the axiomatic itself; there are rather variables for which Subjects and Objects can be substituted in each deployment of capitalism. The axiomatic variables are whichever subjectivities, whichever objectivities. In this way, the axiomatic remains a plane of immanence because it is separate from every transcendence of the subject and the object. Capitalism against the State It seems to me that this notion of the capitalist axiomatic as a plane of immanence poses capitalism in conflict with the State and with all the correlated forces of striation. Now I think this is true but it does not mean that capitalism does not at times converge with State striation. I see emerging in D&G's analysis two phases of the relationship: a first in which capitalism uses the State-form and its striation and a second in which capitalism discovers a smooth form of rule beyond the State. (These phases are perhaps more my invention than theirs.) You can see the relationship of the first phase in D&G's description of Work as striation. "The physicosocial model of Work pertains to the State apparatus, it is one of its inventions, and for two reason. (...) Second, labor performs a generalized operation of striation of space-time, a subjection of free action, a nullification of smooth spaces, the origin and means of which is the essential enterprise of the State, namely, its conquest of the war machine" (490- 91). It's easy to recognize the regimentation of capitalist wage labor as a striation of space-time: space for example in the construction of the factory and the coding of its spaces (with the tasks along the assembly line for instance) and time in the divisions of the day into work and leisure and then the elaborate coding of the times of the work day. This phase is also characterized by the nation-State as the ruling structure for the operation of capitalism. (That should be explained but I'm moving fast now.) These striation, however, are not proper to capitalism, and striated capital is not the only form of capital. There is also smooth capital. Actually, I would like to pose these as phases of capitalism and we are moving today from the striated phase to the smooth. "The present-day accelerated forms of the circulation of capital are making the distinction between constant and variable capital, and even fixed and circulating capital, increasingly relative; the essential thing is instead the distinction between striated capital and smooth capital, and the way in which the former gives rise to the latter ..." (492). The former gives way to the latter, the striated gives way to the smooth, I would argue, precisely because capitalism is at heart an axiomatic, and hence a plane of immanence, a smooth space. The passage to the smooth phase of capital is actually capitalism's realization, the realization of its smooth essence. Now the form of rule of this realized smooth capital is not the State-form nor any kind of transcendence. Integrated world capitalism must correspond not to a State but to a global war machine. The global war machine rules over a smooth space with a peace more terrifying than any war -- and most important for my argument here it operates precisely through an axiomatic. D&G only give a hint of the axiomatic of the global war machine by telling us that it functions through the **whichever enemy**, l'ennemi quelconque. My point in this section is simply that this global war machine and not any State is the form of rule really adequate to capitalism precisely because like capitalism it operates on a plane of immanence through an axiomatic. Now **the question** all this discussion of the axiomatics of both capitalism and **the global war machine raises is,** **does the axiomatic's combination of immanence and repression really derail any utility of** the category of **immanence** as central political criterion (as I was claimed it functions)? Or are the immanence they want to affirm and the immanence of these axiomatics distinct and distinguishable in some way? Is the axiomatic really a false kind of immanence, an immanence held back, diverted?

#### Thus, you should refuse to submit the ballot for a debater who authoritatively endorses post-political power structures that destroy fluidity through microfascist labels and affective genocide.