# Deleuziocap AC v8

*(All in-card brackets are in the original text unless marked otherwise.)*

### Harms

#### [Bernis] Semiocapitalism controls the internal link to the “public health vs innovation debate” – it’s yet another capitalist trope in the form of a false dichotomy that needs to be broken.

Bernis 21

Joseph M. Franquet Bernis, “Globalization at the Beginning of the 21st Cenutry (Why are the rich in higher positions in poor countries?)” JOSEPH M. FRANQUET BERNIS Economic and Business Sciences PhD, Agricultural Engineer PhD, Diploma in Operational Research. Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED). Northeast Campus. Associated Center of Tortosa (Tarragona, Spain). <http://e-spacio.uned.es/fez/eserv/bibliuned:UNEDCentroAsociadoTortosa-Libros-8050/Franquet_Bernis_JoseMaria_Globalization.pdf> -CAT

In recent times, the debate on the internationalization of the economy "or, more properly, about the “economic globalization” has taken control of the major forums for discussion. Sound protests by groups of disparate and heterogeneous can be heard in many streets and squares of cities where CFO of the world order meet periodically. In fact, such events can be bitter fruits of disappointment. During the First World War they caused political parties to become increasingly ossified and bureaucratic. Brining about the protests on the following different issues: need for protection and safety, public health, equal working conditions for women, protection of ethnic minorities and the environment, removal of architectural barriers for disabled, eradication of illiteracy. This is just the beginning of a long string of incidents; some incurring major damage and some even deaths. Like for example the young Carlo Giuliani, who at 23 was killed at the hands of the Sicilian police 20 years ago in the Italian city of Genoa. These groups have also organized tumultuous demonstrations during G8 summits. Where representatives of the most powerful states in the world gather. It is composed of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Canada and Russia and as a group work alongside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). As no doubt our readers will recall, in the long-standing agenda of protests against economic globalization a geographical representation has been established with Seattle being the first, followed by other famous cities like, Washington, Prague, Melbourne, Porto Alegre, Okinawa, Nice, Davos, Quebec, Gothenburg and Barcelona. It was here in this Mediterranean city, on the occasion of the European summit of 2002 that that one such demonstration was aborted. That resistance to what is considered the ultimate manifestation of the capitalist system is based on major inequalities and poverty prevailing in large sections of the world's population1. This as well as the aim of overcoming the socio-political gap between civil society with the aid of transnational agencies, trying to carry out democratic action for social transformation that is closer to the interests of the majority of the population. The truth is that in the name of economic efficiency (efficiency at lower cost) many attempts are legitimized to enhance human exploitation and, above all the use of children. Under the umbrella of the free market, competition is impeded, while at the same time promoting the commercial exploitation, in some cases to exhaustion, of certain natural resources. Thereby, threatening the sustainability of the planet; it should be noted in connection to this, that the nations that pollute the most are those precisely more reluctant to limit their toxic emissions and also the most convinced advocates of economic globalization. In contrast, there seems no limit to speculative business or the lockouts or closures of companies, which while exacerbating the problems of unemployment, accrue the benefits that are easily obtained in financial markets for owners and shareholders alike. 1 Vide J. PERRAMON "Les disfuncions de la globalització" in newspaper Avui. Barcelona, July 16, 2001. 10 Moreover, its importance for our country, is most notably in the trade of agricultural products, which is by no means negligible. In such staples as well as other manufactured goods, some major exporting countries base their strong competitiveness on the low costs of raw materials in the production process, low tax thresholds, low respect for the environment, and the non-existent need for irrigation and, especially, the meagre salary levels of their workers. Regarding the idea of "globality", the first thing that surprises is its ambiguity. You have the image of a process born in the heat of the current deregulatory power or, at the dawn of XXI century, of a new phase of capitalism; perhaps the wildest, some might say. Other times one might think it is a constant dynamic in time and enrolled in a long process of historical events and that, for example, the largest known globalization process took place in the sixteenth century, and was led by the Spanish Empire2. If you consult the extensive literature on the "global economy", which powerfully calls attention to the absence of a rigorous definition of this concept that effects our entire planet in its most important economic scenarios, for better or for worse. One finds, with regard to this, a detailed description of a neat set of features of the current global economic system. It seems from these descriptions that the reader is offered little to assist his understanding of what the "global economy" might be. According to Federico García Morales, in many cases the concept of "Globalization" asserting itself as a brand-new reality that would come about to impose itself on any other reality, consuming it completely. Hence since devouring the alternate realities, there is only "Globalization" leaving economies, societies, political systems, and cultures that can only continue in any future as areas subject to it. Bearing this approach in mind the idea of “globalization", no longer needs to be justified: it is, in itself, justification for everything that occurs. The author himself says in his book "The Limits of Globalization", that globalizing capital inflation had other effects that uncovered unexpected outcomes: 1. The growth of savings and investment in peripheral areas and their subsequent cannibalization by transnational capital. 2. The recovery of Europe and Japan. 3. The development of the economies-bubble (the very Japanese, Southeast Asian). 4. The final phase of the Cold War that followed World War II, with its intense arms race that catapulted the U.S. to its hegemonic position in the Cold War. 5. The advantages gained by the new imperial centers in the stripping of old and new colonial areas (Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, Latin America). 2 Vide J. L. GARCÍA DELGADO. 11 6. The expansion of new technologies (computer science and molecular biology). 7. Unrestricted and accelerated exploitation of natural resources. 8. Reforms in food brokers. 9. The full commercialization of mass consumption and its growing concentration. 10. The rapid concentration of industrial capital and financial capital, both in schools and the suburbs. 11. Transnational hegemony over everything that goes with this process. 12. The development of extensive surveillance apparatus supranational economic and financial behavior. But if we move forward in the study of the intelligibility of this very broad and complex concept that fails to fully disclose its ambiguities, but instead highlighting as its name suggests the building of global relationships. We can arrive at the point that the development of the concept is something of a polythetic-construction with many alternate meanings. That the word itself could be placed at the level of that of “Kuhnian” paradigms. In this field, very soon the definitions are seen as inadequate and characterizations give way to where they distinguish between those very Habermas3, if not metaphysically, placed emphasis on entry into operation of the newest communication networks, and other sectors that wish primarily to highlight the determining value of consumer and financial production networks, so that the "globalization" is marked historically as a particular moment of capitalist development. In this latest trend, "globalization" becomes a theme of "global economy", to the extent that the global economic crisis can be described as a "crisis of globalization." Attached to the first sector are those who accept, as an immediate effect, a globalization that creates a huge political transformation, which suppresses the framework of national and state economies, while in the second sector are located those who watch more carefully the relationship between entrepreneurial class and nation states. "...Globalization has benefited some and has marginalized the most ... As is the dominant force in the last decade of the twentieth century, globalization has shaped a new era of interaction among nations, economies and peoples. But it has also fragmented production processes, labor markets, political entities and 3 Concerning the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, as opposed to positivism of Karl Popper (1902- 1980) and the hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). He constructed an interesting theory of communication activity. After having read Marx in a critical way, and not expecting anything particularly relevant for a proletarian revolution, it advocates a radical reformism, close to the ideals of social democracy. He has participated in numerous intellectual debates on fundamentalism, his effort to understand, through scientific knowledge and religious faith, substantial part of the current controversy. 12 societies." The study adds that the benefits and competitive global markets can only be secured if the globalization becomes a "human face." "As long as globalization is dominated by economic issues and the expansion of markets, human development will be limited ... we need a new approach to government, one that preserves the advantages offered by global markets and competition, but which allows, at the same time, human resources, community and environmental values, to ensure that globalization works for people and not for profit." Pablo González Casanova says, for example: ..."We have to think that globalization is a process of domination and appropriation of the world. The dominance of states and markets, societies and peoples, is exercised in politicalmilitary terms, financial -technological and socio-cultural. The appropriation of natural resources, ownership of wealth and ownership of over-production were made during the second half of the twentieth century in a special way in which scientific and more advanced technological development combined with ancient traditions. These include animal predation, distribution and parasitism, which now appear as phenomena of privatization, denationalization, deregulation with transfers, subsidies, exemptions and grants, on the one hand. While on the other a fact of deprivation, marginalization, exclusions, impoverished macro processes all of which facilitate the exploitation of workers and artisans, men and women, boys and girls. Globalization means a superficial way that is misleading, if not linked to processes of domination and appropriation"4. A book that provides a lot of definition in this area is the work we can attribute to John Saxe-Fernández5. Within the articles assembled, there stands a vision of globalization as "a dimension of the process of capitalism-old business from its origins in some cities in Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries." And it is linked to a broad set of economic and social factors, as is visible now in the context of capitalist economies. Or more precisely, within the framework of imperialist domination. It is therefore a historical phenomenon, not ahistorical as claimed by its apologists that intoxicate globalization and inflate the paradigm of this era. And those definitions that relate to the development of capitalism come to be just a hoax and can then be analyzed, as indeed the Saxe-Fernández, "only in the context of the sociology of knowledge", i.e., in the context of consideration of globalization as an ideology. Another important aspect to note is that globalization also has a touch offensive / defensive. It is a process rather than unite, divide, and geostrategic comes to settle on a torn struggle to overcome a deep crisis which has dragged on, over the last decade, amid increasingly fierce competition for the division of profits and of the territories. Globalization designed in such a way hides its major potential of aggravating conflicts. In this sense, it is not carrying messages of peace, 4 Vide P. GONZÁLEZ CASANOVA, “Los indios de México hacia el nuevo milenio”, in La Jornada, México, September 9, 1998. Full article can be accessed online through http://serpiente.dgsca.unam.mx/jornada/ 5 Vide J. SAXE-FERNÁNDEZ, Globalización: crítica a un paradigma. Ed.: UNAM/Janes. México, 1999. 13 democracy or progress at all. This can be seen in Chapters 2 ("Six common misconceptions about globalization", by Carlos Vilas) and 4 ("The Next World War: cycles and trends of the global system" by Christopher Chase-Dunn and Bruce Podohink). But such negativity can be seen simply by looking at the latest international developments. Another trait or characteristic of particular interest: the "whole" or "internationalization" of the economy (or the "Americanization" in successful expression of Tahar Ben Jelloun), often considered, explicitly or implicitly as a "proven fact or axiom, something that is there and should be treated as per se et essentialiter emerging from the "unstoppable forces of destiny", a conception that links really well with the "invisible hand of the Creator" of economic orthodox or classical doctrine. Almost no one stops to inquire about the explanatory causes of this situation. Believing that somehow it might be excusable to describe the situation in the simplest way possible and for the employer to deduce or for political strategy to be followed in order to maintain success in his business or their governance6. Nicola Matteucci, has an interesting approach to this from the Dictionary of Political coordinate with Norberto Bobbio, proposes the following thesis: "The road to an international collaboration ever closer has begun to erode the traditional powers of sovereign states. Influence mostly it calls supranational communities, trying hard to limit internal and external sovereignty of the Member States, supranational authorities have the ability to ensure and to affirm, through appropriate courts of justice, the way their supranational law should be applied by States to individual cases: the power has gone to tax and begins to be limited to mint coins. New forms of military alliances diverted to individual States the availability of part of its armed forces, or determine a limited sovereignty of the lesser powers against the hegemonic. But there are also new areas, no longer controlled by the sovereign state: the world market has allowed the formation of multinational companies that have a power of decision is not subject to almost anyone and are free from any control..." "The new mass media allowed the formation of global public exercises, sometimes with success, its own pressure for a state to accept, like it or not, to negotiate peace or to exercise the power to grant a pardon, which at one time was absolute and inscrutable...” "The fullness of state power is in decline. With this, however, the power does not go away and disappear. Leaving only a particular form of organization of power, which had its peak of power in the political-legal concept of sovereignty". This thesis was written in 1976, long before the widespread use of the term “globalization”. Since 1976 until today many of the phenomena reported by Matteucci have expanded, deepened and intensified. Though the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 brought about an end to the aggravation between the two greatest 6 Vide M. A. MARTÍNEZ-ECHEVARRÍA Y ORTEGA, “Competitividad en una Economía global”, in Status. BBVA Research Department. Bilbao (Spain), 1996. 14 economic and military powers in history, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, the territories and peoples that made up such a system have themselves passed through the very painful process of joining the global village, as Marshall McLuhan called it. The term globalization was proposed by Theodore Levitt in 1983 to designate a convergence of world markets. "Everywhere the same thing is sold in the same way", wrote Levitt. The absolute assertion of this seems unreal to me. The convergence rate referred to exists and is significant. Socially may be referred to a large part of the goods consumed by middle-income sectors of the world. To some extent, holds true for high-income sectors. The capital goods markets, however, are fairly segmented and, of course, the huge social spaces occupied by the still poor "Third World" are almost entirely local markets. This reality means that only a fraction of the demand is global7. 2. Homogenization business rules and regulations The current debate on economic globalization is probably nothing more than the old dilemma between state and market, but now taken internationally. At the time, had to establish what role should be in the market in allocating resources efficiently and even where to get government intervention to ensure the old principle of equal opportunities. In the advanced industrialized societies of the Western world, those doubts were resolved with the implementation of the model called the "Welfare State." Well, this debate is now posed on a global scale simply because of the integration of economies and the rise of telecommunications and information technologies, but with the added difficulty that, at the supranational level, no it has no policy and political counterweight to monitor this process of globalization and correct it, in a fair and equitable manner, the dangerous abuses that might arise there from. In fact, one of the best things that can happen to a developing country is its ability to access the protectionist markets most industrialized countries. But this liberalization should lead, in parallel, labor regulations, tax, environmental and social, with transparent rules and not linked to a specific state or transnational organization. And this is so because the internationalization of the economy has gone faster than its regulation and control by the democratilly chosen government -as often happens in other aspects of human activity-. The match started without any guarantee or just the game. It is simply, to ask that what is accepted and even required to meet national, it is also global; as appropriate, ultimately, is to decide at which level of government (local, regional, national or supra) should be managed every aspect of the problem or exercise each competition, taking into account the political principle of subsidiarity. 7 Vide J. WHITE, Globalización y Política Económica. The author is a member of the National Association of Economists and the Mexican Academy of Economics. 15 In fact, the debate raised is not protectionism against internationalism or of localism against globalization, but what form of internationalism must be applied. And it is clear that no attempt should be made to change the present model, which is considered sacred to international trade the right to private property but, instead, be condemned as a despicable form of "protectionism" in the underdeveloped countries, the right to strike, to organize, to enjoy vacations and work in decent conditions, and the duty (especially for large multinational companies) to pay taxes or to respect the environment. It seems also reasonable to assume that globalization requires the existence of a stable economic social order and commonality among the different economies, as well as an economic-social system more homogeneous in principle between the various business institutions. The market economy is, without doubt, this common meeting place in regard to the configuration of economic and social order, establishing such rules of competition to be accepted by all participants. But at the same time, the business system, which could be called “corporate constitution or statute”, must also be similar in competitor countries in terms of its fundamental characteristics, to achieve the transparent operation of their behavior. 3. The liberal panacea of international trade The statistics used to present a strange paradox that occurs often when speaking of international trade. On the one hand, and from a theoretical point of view, it tends to present international trade as being driven by a host of business initiatives, overcoming the obstacles and impediments hindering that oppose the different states, they can establish mutually beneficial trade relations among all countries on Earth. It seems, in short, as if only the free initiative of individuals were ultimately responsible and beneficial to the trade. However, on the other side is unanimously agreed that one of the main causes of the growth experienced by international trade lies in the articulation, at the end of the decade of the forties of the twentieth century, the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and Bretton Woods (the establishment of fixed exchange rates with the active participation in the making of John Maynard Keynes). Agreements, indeed, made possible thanks to the power and undisputed leader of the political and economic interests of the United States after the Second World War. Given this fact, most enthusiastic supporters of “freedom of international trade”, which both stress the role of private enterprises, usually tiptoe, as if walking on hot coals, to see that the largest country of the world, promoted everything. The recent history of international trade, in short, shows that momentum was not a result of the dynamic "individualistic" and "neutral" free market, but clearly promoted by a political pact between a small group of major powers, preceded by harsh negotiations, where the asymmetry of power was, and remains, quite obvious. 16 This is what globalization is; by far it is the work of governments rather than markets themselves. Just after the process became widespread, even among the poorest nations in the world, the biggest concern right now that assails the rulers, theorists and leaders of international organizations and agencies, is to find the magic formula to avoid so-called "force free" runaway market that might lead us to disasters that could be apocalyptic. Globalization has not caused a crisis to the pre-existing political institutions. Rather it has forced them to self-reform and catch up with the times. If anything, there will be a crisis in old and haggard concepts currently simply do not explain anything: this could be one of the few positive outcomes of globalization. Their future depends, almost all of these institutions. You can not globalize (which means, these days, creating large areas of free trade and economic competition) without action by governments, which are the first to have to agree to achieve the successful achievement of those goals. The effective dangers globalization does not come from the expansion of markets, but the disagreements that may arise between States of the nations involved in the process. Globalization, moreover, a strategy must be sustained by mutual agreement and subject to rules and rules decided among all, on the contrary, it will become a disaster. More than an economic content, has a political content and that almost all those responsible in the case have taken due note8.

#### [Fukuda] The WTO is a product of that asymmetry.

Fukuda 10

Yasuo Fukuda, WTO REGIME AS A NEW STAGE OF IMPERIALISM: DECAYING CAPITALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVE World Review of Political Economy (2010). Yasuo Fukuda, Professor of Graduate School of Economics at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, and author of Modern Market Economy and Inflation (1992), Commodification of Land and Urban Problems (1993), Distribution of Wealth and Income in Modern Japan (2002) and Corporate Globalization and Local Sovereignty (2010). <https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/22161/0101106701.pdf> -CAT

Introduction The objectives of the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime are to liberalize trade in goods and services and force developing countries to introduce neo-liberal policies. The purpose is to advance deregulation, privatization, and free trade. T. Friedman (2006) characterized globalization after 2000 as the world becoming flat, whereby every company, organization, or individual can gain entry into a global marketplace, and where all people are free to start businesses which may benefit from a worldwide commercial network. However, this is just one side of globalization under the WTO regime. Multinational corporations as monopoly capital reap most of the benefits of the “flat” world economy. WTO Agreements have ushered in a new era of corporate globalization. The aim of this article is to show that corporate globalization represents a new stage of imperialism, whereby monopoly capital not only controls the world market, but writes the market rules as well. This new form of imperialism is nothing less than a decaying stage of capitalism in which, quite apart from people being guaranteed the chance to lead happy and stable lives, the very potential for doing so is undermined and destroyed. Finally, principles of localization are presented as an alternative to corporate globalization. A New Stage of Imperialism Studies on imperialism can be traced back to J. A. Hobson (1902) and R. Hilferding (1909). Based on their works, Lenin (1917) characterized imperialism as a regime of governance by monopoly capital, concluding that imperialism is a decaying stage of capitalism. Lenin outlined five pillars by which to define imperialism. The first is monopoly capital gaining control of the major industries of a country. The growth of monopoly capital is a consequence of market concentration caused by competition among firms. Once market concentration reaches a certain point, it becomes possible for a small number of winners to form collusions, such as cartels, which transform the nature of the economy, leading to the dominance of monopoly capital. The second pillar is the formation of business relationships between industrial and financial monopoly capital. Monopoly capital also forms cozy relationships with government through the financing of political campaigns and through revolving doors. In short, monopoly capital wields governing power over national economies through market concentration, collusions among large firms, and direct political influence. The third pillar is foreign investment. Drawing on its political influence, monopoly capital effects the transfer of wealth from workers, farmers, small to medium-sized businesses, and the self-employed to monopoly capital. The resulting distortion of income distribution causes disproportionate growth among industries—especially between manufacturing and farming—and suppresses consumption. This leads to over-accumulation, which forces monopoly capital to export merchandise and invest abroad. The fourth pillar is global divisions among monopoly capital through cartels. These divisions occur in the same way as those which take place at the national level; competition among large firms, and the market concentration which follows, leads to the formation of global cartel agreements. WRPE 1-3b text 486 27/10/2010 12:50 WTO REGIME AS A NEW STAGE OF IMPERIALISM 487 WRPE 1.3 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals WRPE.plutojournals.org The fifth pillar is colonization of less-developed countries by the Great Powers, operating at the behest of monopoly capital. Such colonization is an outcome of global competition among opposing elements of monopoly capital. Monopoly capital takes advantage of colonization to monopolize control of natural resources and export markets, and as a means to protect capital invested in less-developed countries against appropriation. Figure 1 shows how the five pillars are related. The figure starts with monopoly capital as governing powers, from which follows a causal relationship down to the last outcome, competition for colonization. In other words, colonization is the final outcome of the governing power of monopoly capital. This is why Lenin considered monopoly capital to be the key to imperialism.1 monopoly capital as governing power ↓ distorted income distribution and unbalanced growth ↓ accumulation of redundant capital ↓ merchandise export and foreign investments ↓ global competition and global collusion ↓ struggles for colonization Figure 1 Lenin’s “Imperialism” Looking at contemporary capitalism from the viewpoint of Lenin’s “Imperialism,” it is clear that four of the five pillars (excepting the fifth) are still applicable to capitalism under the WTO regime. First, a small number of multinational corporations typically control more than half the market-share of major industries. For example, in the commercial seed market, the world’s top three corporations (Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta of Switzerland) control almost half of the world market. Cargill, along with its top four competitors, handle 85 percent of world grain trade. In the pharmaceutical industry, the top ten corporations hold a combined 54.8 percent share of the world market (ETC Group 2008). In banking, the world’s top 45 banks account for nearly 40 percent of the gross tier 1 capital of the top 1,000, and about 45 percent of the total assets (The Banker, June 24, 2009). It hardly needs saying that these companies enhance their power considerably through close relationships with governments, and through political contributions, lobbying, revolving doors, and the like. WRPE 1-3b text 487 27/10/2010 12:50 488 Yasuo Fukuda World Review of Political Economy Second, industrial and financial monopoly capital establish political action groups as a means to advance common political goals. The negotiation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) represents a typical example of this sort of collusion between major companies of both the industrial and financial spheres. Third, no monopoly capital can survive without strategic foreign investment, including direct as well as portfolio investment. For instance, automobile companies will not survive without gaining access to Chinese and Indian markets. Fourth, in the course of intense competition over dominant market shares, large multinational corporations often collude to form price cartels (Connor 2001; Levenstein and Suslow 2001). The cartel-based character of monopoly capital culminated during GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, as large businesses cooperated to set market-rules specifically tailored to their own ends. There is no colonization occurring under the WTO regime. Modern capitalism lacks the fifth pillar of early 20th century imperialism. However, this does not mean that modern capitalism is without imperialism. Monopoly capital has gained new methods of obtaining the governing power over developing countries in place of colonization. First, major multinational corporations subcontract to firms in developing countries, thereby assimilating these firms into global business networks. For example, big food retailers such as Wal-Mart and Tesco have established global supply chain management networks which subcontract to farmers in developing countries, thereby bringing these farmers under centralized managerial control (South Centre and Traidcraft 2008). Here, prices fetched at farm gates are determined by monopolists at the top of the supply chain. Second, monopoly capital now dictates the rules of trade by directly involving itself in the crafting of trade policy. Big business coalitions took part in drafting the WTO Agreements. In the case of GATS, multinational corporations, including Citigroup, J. P. Morgan Chase, and Barclays Bank, drafted the proposal under the authorization of US and EU governments, and then used lobbying to push the agreement through at the time of negotiations (Balanyá et al. 2003). In the case of the negotiations for the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), it was the US Intellectual Property Committee (USIPC), a US business group, which wrote the initial draft, at the request of the US Trade Representative (Weissman 1996). Those party to the USIPC include Monsanto, Pfizer, DuPont, and IBM. Market and trade rules amount to a form of infrastructure vis-à-vis the markets. The body which decides the rules of trade has a considerable advantage over other stakeholders. Under the current setting, it is large multinationals, especially the agents of US monopoly capital, which control the rules of trade, specifically through cozy relationships with the US government.

#### [Bifo] Semiocapitalist structures are impossible to regulate because they move from striated spaces to smooth ones.

Bifo 15

Francesco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, *Heroes: Mass Murder and Suicide*, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2015, p. 89-92 -recut CAT

Absolute Capitalism How should we define the contemporary economic system? I reject the expression ‘cognitive capitalism’, since only labour can be defined as cognitive. Capital is not the subject of cognitive activity: it is only its exploiter. The bearer of knowledge, creativity and skills is the cognitive worker. I also avoid the definitions of ‘monetarism’ and of ‘neoliberal capitalism’, which seem to me to be inaccurate despite their widespread use. The variation in money supply was only a technical aspect, and Neoliberalism only the ideological justification, of an epochal transformation that took place in the last decades of the twentieth century. In the context of a long-term anthropological evolution, contemporary capitalism can be understood as the turning point beyond the age of Humanism. The modern bourgeoisie embodied the values of Humanist freedom from theological destiny, and bourgeois capitalism was a product of the Humanist revolution. But the combined effect of a preponderance of capital accumulation and of the deterritorialization of the production process have led to the end of the bourgeois characterization of the economic system. The production and exchange of abstract signs has taken the predominant place in the overall process of accumulation: semiocapitalism has taken the place of industrial capitalism. Financial abstraction is only the extreme manifestation of the predominance of semiosis in comparison with physical production. Semiocapitalism is, for me, a suitable definition of the present economic system at the global level. However, if we intend to grasp the political dimension of the transformation that Neoliberal deregulation has brought about, I think that it would be more correct to speak of ‘capitalist absolutism’. The English word ‘absolute’ descends from the Latin ab-solutus, a term translatable as ‘emancipated from any limitation’. In this context, ‘absolute’ means not limited by restrictions, unconditional, unconstrained by constitutional or other provisions. The bourgeoisie fought a battle against early modern absolutism, after taking advantage of the effects of national unification and social regulation that absolutist monarchs enforced on traditional societies. The bourgeois struggle against monarchic absolutism was part of the battle for the liberation of privately owned enterprise from the control of the state, but also for the limitation of the monarch’s actions under the rule of law. Once it managed to impose the rule of law over the power of the feudal aristocracy and of the monarch, the bourgeoisie also accepted a legal limitation to its own economic expansion. The bourgeoisie could not be indifferent to the destiny of the territory or the community of workers, which was obviously linked to the destiny of its own investments. Workers and the bourgeoisie shared the same urban space, and the same future. If the economy crumbled, it was a disgrace also for the owner, although it was a much worse disgrace for the workers and their families. This is why the bourgeois class accepted the democratic deal, and the negotiation with the working class. The rise of financial capitalism, the deterritorialization of production and exchange, and finally the emergence of a virtual class without territorial identity have been accompanied by a general process of deregulation. The globalization of corporate trade hindered and rendered impossible any all-encompassing legal control on their activity. The sovereignty of nation states made way for global corporations acting with absolute freedom, disregarding the local authority and shifting their immaterial assets from one location to another. This is particularly evident in reference to the environmental crisis, as the legal limits to the exploitation of physical resources and the pollution of the environment are systematically (and ultimately, suicidally) ignored by corporations. At the same time, the globalization of the labour market destroyed the unionized power of workers, and opened the way to a general reduction of salaries, increased exploitation and the erosion of regulations covering working conditions and working hours. This is why I believe that the contemporary global system should be defined as one of absolute capitalism, in which the only effective principles are those of value-accumulation, profit-growth and economic competition. These are its all-encompassing priorities, and the overwhelming impetus at its core. All other concerns, including the survival of the planet or the future of the next generation, are subsumed to these greater goals. Compared to the past situation of bourgeois industrial capitalism, the relationship between social welfare and financial profit is now inverted. In the industrial economy, profits increased when citizens acquired enough money to buy the goods that were produced in the factories. In the sphere of financial capitalism, financial indicators go up only if social welfare crumbles and salaries fall. Unsurprisingly, those few hundred billionaires listed in Forbes magazine have hugely increased their capital in 2010, 2011 and 2012, years which were dramatically marked by rising unemployment, poverty and cuts to social welfare. Far from emancipating society from any rule, Neoliberal deregulation has emancipated capital from the political law and social needs, while subjecting society to the blind adherence to the law of financial accumulation. It has marked the beginning of an age of capitalist absolutism, in which capital accumulation and particularly financial accumulation are entirely independent (ab-solutus, untied) from the social interest. In this way, the Humanist tradition, which was based on the idea that human destiny is not subjected to any theological law or necessity, is finally obliterated.

#### [Ciuriak 1] You’ll say “Biden’s reversing course,” but a history of American exceptionalism disproves this.

Ciuriak 21

Dan Ciuriak is a senior fellow at CIGI, where he is exploring the interface between Canada’s domestic innovation and international trade and investment. He is the director and principal of Ciuriak Consulting, Inc. “Into the Post-Pandemic: On the New World Orders and Their Would-Be Architects.” Centre for International Governance Innovation. May 31, 2021. <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/into-the-post-pandemic-on-the-new-world-orders-and-their-would-be-architects/> Accessed 8/8/21. CAT

Under the Trump administration, the United States withdrew support for the multilateral institutions that it midwifed into existence in the aftermath of the world wars of the twentieth century (including leaving the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Paris Agreement on climate change, and the World Health Organization). It also sidelined the World Trade Organization (**WTO**) **dispute resolution mechanism** and marginalized the major “clubs” that had provided fora to organize concerted action (the Group of Seven, the Group of Twenty, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]), including, perhaps most notably, by withdrawing from the negotiations being conducted under the auspices of the OECD for taxation of multinational enterprises in the digital age. The highly elaborated multilateral framework was replaced by an emphasis on bilateral relations, complemented by **ad hoc coalitions of convenience**, an approach that has long been familiar in the foreign policy sphere, as is evident from James Chace’s description of President George W. Bush’s modus operandi: “When unilateral actions seem impossible or unwise, Mr. Bush will seek allies, but not to make decisions that would require their approval. His preferred approach is to seek ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing,’ what Richard Haas, a former adviser to Secretary of State Colin Powell, has called **‘à la carte multilateralism.’**” The Biden administration in its first 100 days walked back some of the Trump administration’s Alleingänge, with the United States rejoining the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization and agreeing to the appointment of a new WTO director-general. This has **poured diplomatic balm on diplomatic wounds**. At the same time, little of substance has changed: the Trump administration’s tariffs and technology restrictions toward China remain in place; Into the Post-Pandemic: On the New World Orders and Their Would-Be Architects - Centre for International Governance Innovation https://www.cigionline.org/articles/into-the-post-pandemic-on-the-new-world-orders-and-their-would-be-architects/[8/8/2021 7:30:49 PM] the bilateral US-EU civil aircraft tariffs remain in place; the unilateral Section 232 “national security” measures remain in place; WTO Appellate Body appointments have not been made; the Trump administration’s America-first agenda has been maintained (including in its Buy American procurement policies and in a diplomatically damaging refusal to share COVID-19 vaccines with India — since walked back — as the latter lurched into the most severe crisis to date in the pandemic). In the critical area of command of the digital economy, the Biden administration has not meaningfully changed course from the one charted by the Trump administration. The United States has mainly sought to slow China’s technological advance by denying access to US-involved technology and by excluding Chinese competitors from the contest for rents in the US digital domain, and indeed elsewhere outside of China as well — for example, a new “Scramble for Africa” is under way, redolent of the nineteenth-century European competition for colonial domination. In the critical area of command of the digital economy, the Biden administration has not meaningfully changed course from the one charted by the Trump administration. The China containment policy involves a search for coalitions. In the first instance, this has involved a shift from an Asia-Pacific to an Indo-Pacific framing of US regional policy, as actuated through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Japan, Australia and India (the “Quad”). A parallel/overlapping idea being floated is the formation of a “T-12” — a group of a dozen techno-democracies — with the purpose of confronting “digital authoritarianism.” None of this is the least bit multilateral in scope — and directly at odds with the policy stance of groups such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which play a balancing game vis-à-vis the major powers, which means economic engagement with both the United States and China, as well as the security relationship with the former. A second front in the digital wars concerns taxation of the new technology rents presently being captured by US firms. The digital services tax issue pits the United States against the European Union, Canada and many developing countries that otherwise would have difficulty participating in the data-driven Into the Post-Pandemic: On the New World Orders and Their Would-Be Architects - Centre for International Governance Innovation https://www.cigionline.org/articles/into-the-post-pandemic-on-the-new-world-orders-and-their-would-be-architects/[8/8/2021 7:30:49 PM] economy. The United States withdrew from OECD talks on this issue in 2020, but has returned to the table under the Biden administration, with new proposals; however, the essential dynamics remain adversarial. In short, the convening power of the United States to “write the rules” of the post-pandemic is much eroded. After the United States, the European Union has the strongest hand in terms of convening power. However, it, too, faces challenges. Europe has historically been a zone of dissonance. Its internal harmonics predispose it to fracture and, historically, fracture has been the rule, not the exception. It took the cataclysm of World War II to allow its political elites to staple together a workable framework for peace and economic cooperation and create a single market, a single currency, and the borderless Schengen Area. Now the European Union has had its first exit, with the United Kingdom crashing out rancorously at the end of 2020, and faces unprecedented internal governance challenges with member states flouting the bloc’s governance norms. The European Union is also fiscally limited. Germany might be able to underwrite the recovery of a shrunken European Union post-Brexit, given its relatively good economic and pandemic management performance, but the European Union lacks the fiscal resources to underwrite an international order. The European Union does have long-term geo-economic assets (particularly in terms of being the other major economies’ largest trading partner), but these fall mainly into the category of soft-power assets. Moreover, in the digital/technological space, the European Union’s leverage on global standards is questionable, and its goal of digital/technological sovereignty aligns better with French and German interests than with those of other member states. In the critical digital technologies, the European Union has some assets but has not succeeded in capturing market share in the data-driven economy. Its perceived vulnerability in this regard is driving it to develop the regulations to minimize the negative impacts of technologies that it does not own, while it strives to achieve its newly articulated goal of technological/digital sovereignty and to develop its own champions in its Digital Single Market. While the European Union is showing some encouraging results in this regard — it has recently had a strong run of producing unicorns — it finds itself in a majorleague contest in this regard, as both the United States and China throw around exorbitant amounts of money to win the technological race. Finally, with its missteps in management of the pandemic, the European Union’s energies and political capital will likely be absorbed in the effort to preserve its Into the Post-Pandemic: On the New World Orders and Their Would-Be Architects - Centre for International Governance Innovation https://www.cigionline.org/articles/into-the-post-pandemic-on-the-new-world-orders-and-their-would-be-architects/[8/8/2021 7:30:49 PM] own internal union and secure its own foothold in the post-pandemic digitally transformed economy. China is the main “near peer” potential competitor for the US role as hegemon, although it says it wants nothing of this game (at least for now). Its foreign minister, Wang Yi, has publicly stated that China “is not the former Soviet Union … and [has] no intention to become the next United States.” China does claim sovereignty over its cyberspace, which it defends behind its Great Firewall, while it mobilizes to achieve technological independence from the United States — an existential issue for China, given the US technology embargo. This commitment to securing its technological supply chain is unlikely to change, regardless of how the US-China relationship unfolds. China is the main “near peer” potential competitor for the US role as hegemon, although it says it wants nothing of this game (at least for now). In geo-economic terms, China has some assets — in particular, its large internal market is important for international business, and China has used denial of access as a stick in the form of tit-for-tat trade remedy actions. China also has allocated massive funding to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which serves as a strategy to both counter US containment and gain access to markets — for example, Africa largely runs on Chinese technology and the rail link between China and Europe has seen a boom in freight traffic. However, as the BRI is investment-led, it exposes China much more than its borrowers, notwithstanding all contentions to the contrary, and sustainability of the project remains an open question. The signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with the 10-member ASEAN group, plus Australia, New Zealand, Korea and Japan, improves China’s position (although, from the perspective of its RCEP partners, this is an inherent part of the balancing equation — economic cooperation as a balance to strategic hedges). The overture to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is an interesting signal, but this is not a sign of geo-economic strength since it involves China joining a club forged by others. China remains geo-economically weak on other grounds. First, it has not managed to significantly internationalize its currency, although the introduction Into the Post-Pandemic: On the New World Orders and Their Would-Be Architects - Centre for International Governance Innovation https://www.cigionline.org/articles/into-the-post-pandemic-on-the-new-world-orders-and-their-would-be-architects/[8/8/2021 7:30:49 PM] of the digital yuan, formally known as the DCEP (digital currency/electronic payment), is thought by some as potentially changing that. Second, it remains vulnerable on technology rather than being able to use technology denial to its advantage — although, arguably, the shift of innovation into machine space accelerates technological convergence, meaning the window of technological vulnerability will close more quickly than historical experience would suggest. In geopolitical terms, China is flush with vulnerabilities, given that its periphery is a chain of geopolitical hot spots: East China Sea (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with Japan); South China Sea (disputed territorial boundaries); Taiwan and Hong Kong (independence desires); the disputed border with India (where surreal fights with sticks and stones have broken out); and the ethnic autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet and Xinjiang), where unrest has been met with a level of repression that has put China in the dock on human rights violations. The military coup in Myanmar, which has resulted in attacks on Chinese factories, is just the latest flare-up on China’s border – and in a country that is a key part of the BRI. China can be under no illusions about its roster of friends. Its “near abroad,” by the logic of realpolitik, balances against it. In the United States, public opinion on China has fallen to historical lows, swayed by unceasing inflammatory rhetoric. The European Union has been trying to find a balance on its China posture but, overall, its position has hardened against China. China’s diplomatic overtures in the course of the five-nation European tour by Wang Yi in August 2020 had mixed results at best and rather served to put a spotlight on the extent to which EU-China relations had deteriorated. While the surprise signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment at the end of 2020 momentarily created the appearance of a breakthrough, relations almost immediately soured with an exchange of sanctions after the European Union, in its Official Journal, accused several Chinese officials of a “large-scale surveillance, detention and indoctrination programme targeting Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnic minorities,” “systematic violations of their freedom of religion or belief” and other offences. Of the remaining countries, the BRICS, excepting China (so, Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa) have been unable to parlay their spectacular rise in the era preceding the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) into a sustained geo-economic presence in the post-GFC data-driven economy era. They are now among the most severely impacted by the pandemic, both health-wise and in terms of the depth of economic downturns. Geopolitically, the BRICS, as a group, are no longer a force. Into the Post-Pandemic: On the New World Orders and Their Would-Be Architects - Centre for International Governance Innovation https://www.cigionline.org/articles/into-the-post-pandemic-on-the-new-world-orders-and-their-would-be-architects/[8/8/2021 7:30:49 PM] India has moved firmly into the US camp, signing on to the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Following its border spat with China, India expelled the major Chinese technology firms, creating space for its own domestic champions while accommodating US interests. However, the signing of the RCEP without its participation weakens its value proposition for regional supply chains. The digital economy is a world of superstar firms. These are concentrated now in Northeast Asia — China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, between them, have hundreds of Fortune 500 companies. These firms draw energy and scale from the integrated Northeast Asian economy. As noted, the RCEP will work to further deepen these networks.Brazil, which has long-standing relationships with Huawei, was offered financing by the United States to make a break and go elsewhere for its fifth-generation (5G) network technology; however, the access to vaccines provided by China reopened the door to the Chinese supplier. Russia has moved closer to China, in part under duress from US sanctions. South Africa is also doing business with China, including relying on Huawei for its 5G rollout, but without obvious alignment. Conclusion As the world moves into the post-pandemic period, changed and shaken by the shocks of 2020–2021, there is widespread agreement that institutional reforms are required — indeed, there have been calls for a new Bretton Woods moment to reset the international institutional framework to make it fit for purpose for the digital era, not to mention to deal with the plethora of other issues ranging from fiscal debt to income distribution. At the same time, it is not obvious that any of the major economies is in a position to underwrite a new framework. This is an important consideration, given that the issues that need to be addressed mostly do not promise the “win-win” gains that the postwar industrial-era trading system offered to induce cooperation; a new system may require an underwriter. Quite apart from who might hold the pen on the new Bretton Woods is the question of whether the time is ripe. In this regard, James Boughton argues that the lessons from Bretton Woods success are threefold: there must be a clear vision of what needs to be done; there must be cooperative leadership from the major countries; and sufficient time must be provided to lay the groundwork. Today, the world strikes out on all three counts, particularly as regards preparedness to reform the institution that will be central to a new world economic order — the WTO. Into the Post-Pandemic: On the New World Orders and Their Would-Be Architects - Centre for International Governance Innovation https://www.cigionline.org/articles/into-the-post-pandemic-on-the-new-world-orders-and-their-would-be-architects/[8/8/2021 7:30:49 PM] The issues that need to be addressed mostly do not promise the “win-win” gains that the postwar industrial-era trading system offered to induce cooperation; a new system may require an underwriter. First, there is no clear vision on what needs to be done. Restarting the WTO as is — for example, by the Biden administration agreeing to restore the Appellate Body — would have little if any impact on global commerce, not least because the irritants used as an excuse to shut down the Appellate Body have not been shown to be of any commercial consequence.. More importantly, the WTO was on the sidelines for the major fight between the United States and China over the latter’s economic governance, and this issue is unlikely to be resolved through appeal to the WTO (recall, in this regard, that the comparable US-Japan frictions in the 1980s were dealt with outside the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, through the Structural Impediments Initiative pressed on Japan by the United States using its Super 301 mechanism). And, perhaps most importantly, the substance of a rules framework suitable for the data-driven economy is in the very early stages of development, as shown by the thinness of the treatment of the many novel issues raised by this economy in the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA), which was agreed by Chile, New Zealand and Singapore, which makes it a stalking horse for a larger agreement. Second, the world’s three major economic powers have major conflicting interests in a contest for rents in the data-driven economy that is far from being decided. Indeed, where Bretton Woods was held in the anticipation of the end of a war, the escalating rhetoric (including characterization of the US-China conflict as preparing to use “all means short of war”) is raising concerns that actual kinetic war is a very real possibility in the near future. Moreover, each of the major powers faces its own sea of troubles going forward in the early years of the post-pandemic and, as argued above, will have limited political capital to underwrite a new system, unlike the United States at Bretton Woods, which had an economy untouched by the war and roaring at capacity to supply the machinery of war. Third, the extraordinary pace of technological developments does not allow the time to carefully lay the groundwork. Countries are moving apace to develop regulatory interventions in a context of asymmetric information and power Into the Post-Pandemic: On the New World Orders and Their Would-Be Architects - Centre for International Governance Innovation https://www.cigionline.org/articles/into-the-post-pandemic-on-the-new-world-orders-and-their-would-be-architects/[8/8/2021 7:30:49 PM] between would-be regulators and the sophisticated superstar firms dominating the modern economy, and with limited understanding of the behavioural responses to regulations. In order to address the pressing global issues of the pandemic and climate change/species extinction, a working relationship has to be re-established between the United States, the European Union and China, even as competition continues more or less unbridled on the trade and technology front (which seems unavoidable, given the stakes). Europe is seemingly there to some extent, as reflected in the line it has adopted on China — strategic competitor in some spheres and strategic partner in others — but there seems little partnership there for the moment. For the United States and China, moving ahead will require finding a formula under which both sides save face while narrowing bilateral conflict to an agreed scope. In theory, nations should be able to identify the scope of “agreed competition” or “agreed battle” and, through tacit bargaining, create “more stable expectations of acceptable and unacceptable behavior.” There are ways to de-escalate the economic frictions, including unilateral actions that China can take to address concerns of international business (many of which indeed it has been taking out of self-interest), and, as Mark Kruger suggests, finding reasonable compromises on the definition of “government” and the calculation of subsidies to accommodate systemic differences (which, as I argue, are less problematic than generally made out to be). Perhaps to get to a second Bretton Woods moment, we first need a second Yalta moment (recalling the meeting of the triumphant Allied powers in Yalta in 1945 at which the shape of the postwar world and — importantly — the spheres of influence of the Soviet Union and the Western powers were agreed). In this case, what would be required would be the United States and China agreeing on the scope of competition while also committing to forbearance on using “anything short of war” measures, dialling down the rhetoric and refraining from pressing against redlines to buy time for the groundwork for a viable framework for the post-pandemic economy to be set out. The Biden administration’s first meeting with China in Anchorage in March does not appear to have served that purpose. The moment that does allow the move to a new détente may be quite some time and distance away.

#### [Ciuriak 2] Corporations build skyscrapers while activists build pillow forts. Efforts that keep underlying structures in place only re-entrench corporate stability. We can’t “build back better,” we have to break down barriers instead.

Ciuriak 21

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The year 2020: one we won’t forget, a span of 12 months in which the world completed the journey from the “[end of history](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184?seq=1)” to the firehose of history. The pandemic-induced economic crisis served to merge, amplify and accelerate changes driven by a slew of technological, political and natural shocks: the populist reaction to the [distributional excesses of globalization 2.0](https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2938766); the global supply chain’s restructuring and decoupling, driven in the first instance by the trade and technology war that flared as the United States moved to [counter China’s technological rise](https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3663385), and amplified by ad hoc economic nationalism measures to address supply chain risks in critical areas highlighted by the pandemic; the digital transformation, which was disrupting established business models, leaving many established enterprises vulnerable to shocks while generating a plethora of new economic, societal and security concerns and regulatory challenges; and the urgent need to transform economies and infrastructure to address the twin crises of climate change and species extinction, a need highlighted by apocalyptic images emerging from extreme weather events and growing concerns about imminent tipping points that would drive irreversible changes in global environmental systems. With the global economy now in recovery mode, societies are leveraging the crisis to “build back better,” deploying massive debt-financed economic stimulus to green the economy, rebalance income distribution, carve out competitive niches in the modern data-driven economy, and respond to the national security pressures and geopolitical challenges of the day. The [“solution space”](https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3249496) to which the economy is being pushed will look different from the one disrupted by the pandemic. What we produce, and how we produce it, will change and, by extension, so will the ways in which we share this production internationally and exchange it through the trading system, as will, indeed, our approach to how the system is governed. As the world moves into the post-pandemic period, there is **widespread agreement** that institutional reforms are required. There have been calls for a new [Bretton Woods moment](https://www.cigionline.org/articles/post-covid-19-digital-bretton-woods) to reset the international institutional framework to make it fit for purpose for the digital era, not to mention to deal with the plethora of other issues, ranging from fiscal debt to income distribution. But numerous questions remain open: How extensive are the required changes? What will be the defining issues? Who will be the architects? And, ultimately, how and when is this all to come about? New Tensions between Globalization and Economic Nationalism The pandemic and the trade and technology war have made countries acutely aware of the risks inherent in a trade-oriented economic strategy, exemplified by the pandemic-induced widespread disruption of supply chains because of lockdown of firms, regions and even entire economies and the disruption of transportation logistics, including the normal movement of containers and the role of passenger airlines in shipping high-value, time-sensitive cargo. In parallel, the geopolitically motivated restrictions mounted by Donald Trump’s administration and continued under Joseph Biden’s administration on the export of US-involved technology to China served to tighten global supplies of semiconductors (due in part to reduction of Chinese supply and anticipatory stockpiling by Chinese firms), even as the demand for semiconductors was boosted by the scramble for equipment to facilitate remote work and soaring e-commerce activity, induced by the pandemic, and the accelerating secular trend to smart devices of all sorts, including in automobiles. Certainly, trade [creates exposure to specific risks](https://www.forbes.com/sites/harrybroadman/2020/04/30/covids-pandemic-is-not-the-end-of-globalization-it-will-even-spur-newer-global-supply-chains/?sh=147230923744), which can prompt thoughts of repatriating production and pulling up the drawbridges. At the same time, trade diversification is a way to mitigate risk. A [quantitative assessment](https://www.nber.org/papers/w27224) by Barthélémy Bonadio, Zhen Huo, Andrei A. Levchenko and Nitya Pandalai-Nayar found that the global average real GDP decline due to the pandemic shock of –31.5 percent (of which –10.7 percent, or about one-third, was due to transmission through global supply chains) would have been greater in a world with renationalized supply chains (–32.3 percent). As for repatriation or relocation of supply chains, this is neither simple nor cost-free. It is one thing to take a factory out of China, as was much discussed in the early stages of the pandemic; it is another to replicate the supporting supply web. The sunk costs of finding and establishing relationships with new suppliers are non-trivial. Moreover, if a significant portion of the supply web remains in China, supply chain risk is not mitigated, as [Manisha Mirchandani reported.](https://www.brinknews.com/coronavirus-global-supply-chain-reliance-china-manufacturers-economic-recession-risk/) Nintendo ran into this problem when production of its consoles, which it had moved from China to Vietnam in 2019, was interrupted because of a lack of key components from China. India, one of the countries first proposed when the topic of relocating production for geopolitical reasons comes up, has a very different trade specialization from China, which suggests that the [in-country supporting supply chains](https://www.cigionline.org/articles/contested-framing-indo-pacific) are very different between the two countries. India’s own slide into pandemic crisis in its second wave, which shut down its global vaccine exports, highlights that there is no safe haven to which supply chains can run. More fundamentally, trade and the organization of global value chains are dominated by large firms — and Northeast Asia contains the world’s largest concentration of such firms, led by China. Not surprisingly, firms are looking to finesse the geopolitically motivated decoupling pressures by finding ways to be on both sides of the new cold war’s “[silicon curtain](https://reason.com/2021/01/09/a-silicon-curtain-descends/)”; for many firms, this does not mean abandoning China but heading to China — as underscored by China’s [leading the world in inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2020](https://unctad.org/news/global-foreign-direct-investment-fell-42-2020-outlook-remains-weak), even as global FDI fell by 42 percent due to the pandemic-induced recession. A second feature of the pandemic has been to underscore the reality that, in a pinch, a country may find it has no friends, as all countries scramble to “look after number one” first. This was the realization that [confronted Ontario Premier Doug Ford](https://toronto.ctvnews.ca/ontario-premier-slams-donald-trump-s-decision-to-cease-exports-of-n95-masks-to-canada-1.4881717) when the United States blocked shipments of medical equipment to Ontario. Again, there is a counterpoint to the story: when President Trump banned the sale of medical masks to Canada, it was [pointed out](https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2020/04/trump-stops-masks-from-going-to-canada.html) that Canada supplies the unique pulp that is used for the manufacture of these masks. Economic interdependence [cuts both ways](https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-trudeau-warns-us-over-restricting-the-trade-of-essential-goods-into/), a reality that serves to discipline behaviour. A second feature of the pandemic has been to underscore the reality that, in a pinch, a country may find it has no friends, as all countries scramble to “look after number one” first. A third warning shot over the bow of globalization — as we understood it, before the pandemic — was the rebuffed attempt by the United States to buy a German pharmaceutical company working on a vaccine in order to secure the treatments for the United States first. The world has since moved en masse to protect such “vulnerable assets.” But there are counterpoints here as well. A pandemic story that started with a focus on supply chain disruption evolved into a story of extensive transnational cooperation in vaccine development: as Scott Lincicome summarized in a [tweet](https://twitter.com/scottlincicome/status/1334896646971400208), BioNTech, a German company founded by Turkish immigrants, developed a vaccine and partnered with US pharmaceutical giant Pfizer, whose CEO is a native of Greece, to produce it in US and Belgian facilities, using Canadian, European Union and US inputs, and shipping it worldwide using US transportation networks. This is globalization as teamwork. Moreover, while inward FDI restrictions can make sense for knowledge assets with powerful local externalities that warrant public sector intervention, they make little sense for traditional industrial assets. This reality will likely reassert itself as we move into the post-pandemic period. In short, the centripetal and centrifugal forces in play ensure that the trading system will not revert to peak globalization, nor move toward autarky. This raises questions about the rules framework that will emerge to manage and facilitate trade in the “new normal” to come — will it be a tweak on the current framework, or will it reflect more fundamental reforms to address the changed economic conditions and terms of trade in the digital era?

### ROJ & ROB

#### [ROJ – Munro & Thanem 1] Thus, the ROJ is to vote for the debater whose strategy best critiques the capitalist axiomatic of political discourse in the context of the resolution. It’s not a metaphor, and contrary understandings of D&G miss the boat:

Munro and Thanem 17

Iain Munro (Newcastle University), Torkild Thanem (Stockholm University). “Deleuze and the Deterritorialization of Strategy.” Critical Perspectives in Accounting 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2017.03.012>. CAT

A depoliticized misreading of DeleuzoGuattarian strategy The most influential contributions to this literature in management and organization studies tend to serve up a rather bland version of Deleuzian and DeleuzoGuattarian thought. Chia’s (1999) widely referenced argument for a processual and ‘rhizomic [sic] model’ of organizational change and transformation is a typical example. The core of Chia’s argument is that a Deleuzian process ontology of ‘rhizomic’ becoming alters the premises for strategic management and organizational change. According to Chia (1999: 222), the rhizome “depict[s] the essentially heterogeneous and indeterminate character of reality. One of its central operating principles is that unlike the root-tree which plots a point and fixes an order, spreading outwards predictably according to a binary logic […], the rhizome connects any point to any other in an essentially heterogeneous collective assemblage of occurrences […].” This does well in bringing out the main points of Deleuze’s processual ontology, and in criticizing mainstream perspectives on strategic management for putting too much emphasis on the frames, hierarchies and structures that managers utilize in order to fix reality and manage change. As Chia (1999: 211) argues, mainstream perspectives 6 prevent us from “understanding the inherently creative nature of change processes occurring in organizational renewal and transformation”. However, Chia glosses over the radical political agenda that underpins Deleuze and Guattari’s processual conception of capitalism, and he ignores their critique of the ‘capitalist axiomatic’ which continually invents new strategies for extracting surplus value from the deterritorialized flows of labour, energy and commodities. This leads him to make a dubious leap from processual ontology to normative political economy. Specifically, Chia claims that the ‘rhizomic [sic] model’ of organizing implies a “‘hands-off’ attitude towards change” (1999: 225), which “eschews the control-oriented strategies preferred in conventional approaches to managing change” (1999: 211). Although Chia mentions that ‘rhizomic’ change is “multiple, unending, […] unexpectedly other” and instigated from “marginal locations” (1999: 225), he neither specifies which ‘others’ and which ‘marginal locations’ may be involved, nor does he discuss how the power and powerlessness of marginalized groups in organizations and society may affect such processes in subverting and radically changing organizational structures. Rather, Chia’s hands-off approach to organizational change comes out as a depoliticized gesture towards laissez faire liberalism, where the processual emergence of order and organization becomes a quasi-natural phenomenon in much the same way as liberal economics portrays the market. In Chia’s account of the rhizome, rather than developing a critique of capitalism, Deleuze is turned on his head where ‘the marginal' is presented as little more than a resource to be co-opted, harnessed and exploited for purposes of organizational creativity, change and renewal. His affection for free market liberalism is made more explicit in his later work on ‘strategy without design’, where the free market is described in admiring terms, as a quasi-natural spontaneous order: 7 “It is almost a Platonic form of what we mean by an economy of material force; its affects are peerless. Efficiency, and the liberty and flourishing it brings, are manifest not in what is designed, or hoped for, but in what simply exists and exists well.” (Chia and Holt, 2009: 34). This is a common theme in the literature in management and organization studies that draws on Deleuze, where similar pro-market arguments have been pursued in efforts to rethink creativity, entrepreneurship and strategic management. For instance, Styhre (2002) claims that Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) notion of ‘smooth space’ may assist students of strategic management to think in more open-ended ways beyond fixed categories, and to better understand e-business and virtual organizations. Styhre and Sundgren (2003: 431) also invoke a ‘rhizome model’ to understand creativity in the biotech industry, and aping the style of a corporate advertisement they conclude that creativity is about “making connections possible”. In a similar vein, Hjorth (2007) draws on Deleuze’s concept of ‘the event’ to depict occasions of entrepreneurship that disrupt dominant corporate strategies. The entrepreneurial opportunity creation that is idealized in this paper is itself embedded in and driven by a logic of commercial enterprise, invoked as a creative and properly capitalist solution to problems caused by overly stratified forms of strategic organization. These domesticated versions of Deleuzian theory are shorn of its original radical intent, perhaps in an attempt to appeal to a business school audience by creating a new managerial jargon with a veneer of philosophical sophistication. Even research that has claimed to address Deleuze’s analysis of capitalism ignores his radical critique of this system. In the entry for Deleuze in the Oxford Handbook of 8 Process Philosophy and Organization Studies authors such as Chia and Styhre are described as being concerned with ontological questions of organization and celebrated for having grasped the true nature of the process of change (Kristensen et al., 2014). Meanwhile, the section that is explicitly devoted to understanding capitalism in Deleuzian terms does not have a single mention of Marx or the centrality of Marx’s work to Deleuze’s own conception of capitalism. The political forces that are implicated in forms of late capitalist exploitation are explained away as aspects of the ‘flux of becoming’ rather than as new forms of the capitalist axiomatic where exploitation has become so interwoven into the social fabric that all labour has become surplus labour (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). In an almost parodic reading of Deleuze’s work, the ontology of ‘becoming’ replaces any analysis of political economy on the grounds that it better understands the “pervasive nature of change within the field of organization and management studies” (Kristensen et al., 2014: 507). In all these texts Deleuze and Guattari’s radical politics and their anti-capitalist theory of organization are conveniently overlooked and their concepts domesticated for the purpose of publication. This appropriation of Deleuze’s work is a perfect example of how initially radical ideas and identities have been captured and exploited by the very forces that they set out to critique. Deleuze is presented as nothing more than a process philosopher interested in the question of ‘becoming’. His analysis of the organization of social life is conveniently passed over. But if we are to make more out of Deleuze, and if we are to see what he can do to strategy, we need to engage more seriously with the strategy that runs throughout his philosophy. In order to do so, it is worth bearing in mind that Deleuze (2004) himself criticized previous process philosophers from Heraclitus to 9 Hegel precisely because of their inattention to political economy and strategy, and he reinterpreted the Heraclitean aphorism that “all things become fire” in explicitly strategic terms as a proliferation of ‘local fires’ resisting US imperialism. Meanwhile, we should acknowledge that there are politically sensitive approaches to Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas in organization studies, which have engaged with their battery of concepts to explore micro-political resistance strategies in light of the omnipresent yet fundamentally precarious nature of social order and organization. For example, Wood and Brown (2010) have shown how solo rock climbing, despite elements of narcissistic self-indulgence, may constitute a line of flight away from the subjugated life forms and mass consumption regime of contemporary modernity, by involving people in a wild state of intensely lived experiences. Similarly, Thanem (2004) has discussed how transgendering might involve creating a body without organs, which upsets the dominant sexual-social order. In rather different veins, Sørensen (2005) has gestured towards the power of eccentricity to subvert fascist mass psychosis, and Kaulingfreks and Warren (2010) have explored the sudden nomadic movements of swarming flash mobs in public space and their potential to resist government despotism. We now turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s own work and the strategic concepts they developed in their radical critique of contemporary capitalism. The groundwork for this was laid in Anti-Oedipus, where Deleuze and Guattari (1984) show how capitalism operates through the extensive deterritorialization of the world in corporate colonization and through the intensive reterritorialization of the self by reducing desire to consumption. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) continue the analysis of how social relations are increasingly ‘subsumed’ under capital, but they also 10 show how sedentary forms of strategy and organization, such as the barriers of entry prescribed by Porter, are subverted by the rhizomatic movements of nomadic war machines operating in smooth space. Strategies of capture, control and machinic enslavement In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari argue that capitalism is defined by its deterritorializing lines of escape, and that it evolves by following these lines in the accumulation of capital. It is impossible to ignore the influence of Marx on their analysis. In Capital, Marx (1976) shows how the Industrial Revolution created a vast army of deterritorialized labourers ‘freed’ from the land they had previously worked and the landowners they had previously worked for, ‘free’ to sell their own labour power on the labour market. The invention of the joint stock company also allowed the deterritorialization of capital from the nation State in an extensive movement beyond existing territorial boundaries. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that the capitalist axiomatic worked not only in terms of ‘freeing’ flows of abstract labour, but through the subjectification of the entire social field in the image of capital. In other words, capitalism develops a network of reterritorializing forces to moderate its forces of deterritorialization and to save itself from itself. While Marx termed these social transformations ‘wage slavery’ and the ‘subsumption’ of labour under capital, Deleuze and Guattari rename them ‘machinic enslavement’, which transforms labour capacity into labour power, audiences into consumers, and subjectivity itself into just another input in the system of exploitation and ‘value’ extraction. 11 The originality of Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of capitalism lies in how they connect the capitalist political economy to the libidinal economy, that is, how they connect the matrix of labour, capital and State to the production of desire. They argue that capitalism’s drive to transform all social relations into forms of capital has a schizophrenic tendency to decode traditional forms of desire that are bound up with the religious, feudal and social codes that limit the degree to which desire can be exploited by capital. The problem for the capitalist and the capitalist State is that an absolute deterritorialization of desire will itself lead to capitalism’s collapse,

#### [ROB – Thorsteinsson] Thus, the ROB is to prefer nomadic resistance strategies which deterritorialize the Body of Capital in a way that is practically conceivable. Our solution constitutes a transformation of transnational assemblages to qualitatively re-envision the common as BwO.

Thorsteinsson 10

Vidar Thorsteinsson, “The Common As Body Without Organs,” Ohio State University, Deleuze Studies Volume 4: 2010 supplement: 46–63 DOI: 10.3366/E1750224110001121 © Edinburgh University Press <https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/37637848/The_Common_as_Body_Without_Organs__2.pdf?1431654068=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DThe_Common_as_Body_Without_Organs.pdf&Expires=1630277195&Signature=W68Y8E4WETrg3UCBsgjXagT0~ZlKk9ICzlds~d~GwO2EkUxX5ikWesAyDs875uBR22fhzUI06U2CCMCp5UQ6zxD0f-pw2R81QrV2eFg3yRxir8oOLigyhawSWbPIvF8YLNBgay-rU9wMOvvJB964QIMBevjdbmXrj9Isjz4e8T0V7aaEisJnEkdT9mSMfp4Jc1naTEEXY81Z8MayxUTHWPZnln~95fVfnTXQBzuZo4AeNY7agFGH9L4QdeDnJRaOa3x8BazEWMnK6FXnd~g7cxwIwYKI8KcOz-A1gFo~-AXD72Xi1xFHETgmgv3zGaPJdnH0j75Tdz5NSvm3yucvNA__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA> -CAT

There are many ways to picture the juxtaposition of the common with capital and how it might successfully replace the conceptually and practically untenable distinction between capital and labour. I argue that its most explosive aspect, however, is contained in the incompatible modes of valorisation intrinsic to the respective bodies of the common and capital. The actual relationship between the two bodies as they currently exist, in Hardt and Negri’s description, is such that while the common forms the body of autonomously organised biopolitical production, capital forms the exploitative body which hovers over it – having to invent novel ways of extracting surplus value from it. These ways of exploitation are part new and part old. They are old in the sense that they involve a recourse to what Marx termed ‘primitive accumulation’: ‘And insofar as today’s neoliberal economy increasingly favors accumulation through expropriation of the common, the concept of primitive accumulation becomes an even more central analytical tool’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 138). But they are new in the sense that they account for the growing hegemony of the most advanced form of capital, finance capital: ‘The key for finance is that it remains external to the production process. It does not attempt to organize social labor-power or dictate how it is to cooperate. It grants biopolitical production its autonomy and manages nonetheless to extract wealth from it at a distance’ (289). Postmodern, financialised capital, then, depends on and exploits the common in a way that is different from Fordist capitalist management. We have already seen how the exploiter (capital) and the exploited (the common) have acquired two distinct BwOs, which form essentially different productive regimes. This means that exploitation – the extraction of surplus value – has to adapt itself to this reality with a fitting mode of valorisation. The BwO of capital that Deleuze and Guattari describe in Anti-Oedipus involves some characteristics that can be directly related to the new mode of valorisation that is a fundamental and novel part of Hardt and Negri’s theory of the common. Deleuze and Guattari write that the BwO of capital will give to the sterility of money the form whereby money produces money. It produces surplus value . . . It makes the machine responsible for producing a relative surplus value, while embodying itself in the machine as fixed capital [i.e. machinery]. Machines and agents cling so closely to capital that their very functioning appears to be miraculated by it. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 10–11) 58 Vidar Thorsteinsson Here, Deleuze and Guattari are of course dealing with the riddle of how money seems able to generate more money – a capacity for limitless multiplication that the common and finance capital actually seem to share. Interestingly, Deleuze and Guattari seem inclined to solve this riddle by referring to the classical Marxist distinction between labour and capital, quoting Marx’s discussion in the third volume of Capital of how the ‘productive powers and the social interrelations of labour time . . . seem transferred from labour to capital’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 11). Deleuze and Guattari seem content to describe capitalist valorisation as completely explainable by the labour–capital distinction, speaking of the ‘apparent objective moment’ (11) of money begetting more money as ‘fetishistic’ and ‘miraculated’ – always requiring the input of abstract labour, the cornerstone of Marx’s theory of value. At other points, however – and much more in line with the real subsumption thesis, whereby labour becomes increasingly indistinguishable from capital and hence unable to account on its own for the creation of value – Deleuze and Guattari seem to be advancing a more complex theory of how surplus value would actually be created on the BwO of capital. Indeed, as Thoburn points out, Deleuze and Guattari maintain that capitalism depends less on the quantitative extraction of surplus value via exploitation of labour and more on a ‘complex qualitative process’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 543), although this process remains largely unexplained. This kind of surplus value cannot be accounted for by hypothetical allocation of socially necessary labour time and would require a whole new theory of value. Such a theory, Thoburn argues with reference to Guattari’s work, would have to conceptualise what Guattari calls machinic surplus value as ‘based on qualitative intensity and variation of work’ (Thoburn 2003: 97). However, Deleuze and Guattari’s emergent value-theory of qualities remains ambiguous as to how machinic surplus value is really created, and does not detach itself fully from the classical Marxist notion that such an ‘abstract-machinic’ or ‘social’ surplus value would have to be understood as somehow untenable, fetishistic or miraculated. A theory of qualitative value, however, is unequivocally demanded by Hardt and Negri in Commonwealth. They seem to argue that such a new theory of value could not truthfully apply to capital, which on their thesis is always and inevitably ‘constrained by the logic of scarcity’ (Hardt and Negri 2009: 283). The biopolitical cycle, on the other hand, has ‘to be understood now in relation to the qualities of the common’ (284). These qualities are not translatable onto the surface of the BwO of capital and this incommensurability is demonstrated by the The Common as Body Without Organs 59 fact that ‘when capital accumulates the common and makes it private, its productivity is blocked or lessened’ (288). Here we see an emerging juxtaposition of two modes of valorisation, corresponding to the two different modes of production: the quantitative logic of scarcity that is a by-product of capital, and the qualitative logic of excess and growth that belongs to the common. On the body without organs of the common, the apparatuses of capture of the capitalist BwO appear as fetters and limitations to productivity, perhaps akin to the elements that ‘botch’ the BwO as described in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 166). Hardt and Negri give an outline of a new theory of value that could account for these problems: The critique of political economy, too, including the Marxist tradition, has generally focused on measurement and quantitative methods to understand surplus value and exploitation. Biopolitical products, however, tend to exceed all quantitative measurement and take common form, which are easily shared and difficult to corral as private property. (Hardt and Negri 2009: 135–6) Subsequently, Hardt and Negri draw a comparison with the standard numerical columns of debit and credit in conventional quantitative economy, and move on to pose the question thus: ‘How can one create an economic table filled with qualities?’ (Hardt and Negri 2009: 287). Although this question remains an open one in Commonwealth, I suggest that we interpret it as opening towards a solution of Deleuze and Guattari’s problematic notion of machinic surplus value. It seems that the BwO of capital is actually not capable of any valorisation other than of the quantitative kind. This, then, would be a description commensurable with both Marx’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of capital as a quantitative axiomatic in which exchange value (quantitative by nature) fully dominates. The features that seem to contradict this – that is, abstract-machinic surplus value, qualitative social production, the production of subjectivities and so forth – can now be understood as part of biopolitical production, not properly belonging to the BwO of capital, but to the BwO of the common. This machinic surplus value might of course still appear as ‘miraculated’ on the BwO of capital, but only if we fail to perceive that it is in fact created (not miraculated) on another BwO: the BwO of the common. V. A Common Program Let us now readdress Toscano’s challenge: to ‘think an antagonism’ closely related to ‘the conditions of production and reproduction of 60 Vidar Thorsteinsson contemporary capitalism’ while holding ‘a certain degree of determinateness’ (Toscano 2009: 127). What the common brings together and clarifies are two aspects of biopolitical production: First, social production, which is now understood as the social production of the common as a new relation of production, or a new BwO. Thus, social forces do not necessarily constrain the movements of the multitude, as Thoburn argues with reference to Deleuze and Guattari (Thoburn 2003: 90); rather, the multitude produces its own socius because the ‘surplus’ of social production under biopolitical capitalism is, of course, also social in nature: it is the common. Second, the common seems to provide us with a new kind of BwO on which it would be possible to theoretically account for the creation of qualitative machinic surplus value – social in nature, which could be called ‘abstract-machinic surplus value’. On the BwO of the common, such a social surplus value would neither have to be seen as ‘miraculated’ or fetishised as Deleuze and Guattari would have it, nor as requiring a recourse to a pre-biopolitical labour-theory of value which makes an untenable distinction between labour and capital.8 Eugene W. Holland writes that considerations of the ‘different relations of production’ that could potentially free difference (meaning surplus value) from capitalist axiomatisation – such as the productive relations here ascribed to the common – ‘already point well beyond any capitalist horizons, about which Deleuze and Guattari are not inclined to say very much at all’ (Holland 1997: 531). The common certainly points beyond these horizons, and, primarily because of the novel ways in which value can be created by and within the common, arguably does so better than Hardt and Negri’s previous concept of autonomyin- production. The merit, hence, of introducing what I am here calling the BwO of the common is that it links the notion of the common to Deleuze and Guattari’s insightful analysis of capitalist valorisation and social production, while also transcending their silent or ‘minor’ horizon. It articulates a dimension of conflict with capital that reaches a truly ‘social’ level; immanent to the social field, yet extending beyond the cramped and minor position Deleuze and Guattari limit themselves to. It falls outside the scope of this essay to describe what concrete forms the antagonism between capital and the common might take in future social struggles. Let it suffice to mention two practical advantages offered by insisting on the capital–common distinction: First, the common is a **very apt tool for** analysis of the evolving and complex dynamics of post-Fordist capitalism, especially as they relate to immaterial labour and production, direct exploitation, financialisation, and **debates over intellectual property**. Thus, the common contributes The Common as Body Without Organs 61 significantly to a Jamesonian ‘cognitive mapping’ of the apparent mysteries of postmodern capitalism. Second, the common offers a framework for political activism that is grounded in the economic contradictions of the current social order. Such a framework does not limit itself to, say, minor lines of flight, voluntarism, racial and gender identity politics, communicative action or antagonism within social discourse, to name only a few examples of the modest terrains marked out by leftist theory over the last decades. The common offers an opportunity to revisit the old Marxist insistence on the social embeddedness of any radical ideology; communism not only as an idea but also as a movement springing from within the social body. Perhaps unexpectedly for a consistent critic of Hardt, Negri and poststructuralist tendencies within Marxism in general, Slavoj Žižek has in fact emphasised the importance of Hardt and Negri’s concept of the common for the first three of what he calls the four ‘possible antagonisms’ contained in contemporary capitalism: ecological catastrophe, intellectual property, biogenetics and social exclusion (Žižek 2009: 53). Even though Žižek implies mistakenly that the fourth antagonism does not fall within the domain of the common, his acceptance of the common as a designator for the revolutionary challenges of the near future indicates that the common–capital distinction could become the basis of a communist programme extending well beyond the scope of Hardt and Negri’s current readership.9

### Plan

#### The plan: The member nations of the WTO should Occupy the UN to abrogate all commitments to neoliberal structures that entrench corporate rulemaking within international arrangements, including TRIPS.

#### [Weeks] The AFF is key - targeted political interventions that de-link from institutions of global capital are a key starting point and pre-cursor to broader revolution

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Samuel Weeks (Assistant Professor of Anthropology; Thomas Jefferson University). “A Politics of Peripheries: Deleuze and Guattari as Dependency Theorists.” Deleuze and Guattari Studies 13.1 (2019): 79–103. JDN. https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/dlgs.2019.0342?journalCode=dlgs

Given the pair’s unconventional positions on Marxism, linguistics, psychoanalysis, history, aesthetics, geography and semiotics, among other fields, it would be naïve to expect Deleuze and Guattari to follow all of the premises of dependency theory, a total engagement not even found among the likes of Frank, Wallerstein, Amin, Cardoso and Faletto. Nevertheless, the pair did interact considerably with this system of thought, to an extent similar to their concomitant readings of the works of the Italian Marxist autonomia current (Thoburn 2003) and the ‘anarchism’-inspired ethnography of Pierre Clastres (Viveiros de Castro 2010). In what follows, I show how the pair uses aspects of dependency theory as an additional radical political current in ATP. The major components of this scholarship they utilise are the persistence of asymmetries dating from the colonial era, the integral nature of the capitalist order, the heterogeneity that marks the peripheral and core areas of the world system and the tendency of surpluses to be captured from within the flows of global commerce. Moreover, it is certain that both Deleuze and Guattari and the dependency theorists favour ‘a non-economistic reading of the economy, a reading not based on exchange but rather on an asymmetrical creditor-debtor power relation’ (Lazzarato 2012: 72). As should also be expected with Deleuze and Guattari, however, the pair omits some key tenets of dependency theory – for example, its Marxist-inspired conceptions of history and class struggle – while rejecting (implicitly) others, namely the use of ‘development’ and the ‘nation-state’ as two principal units of analysis. The pair’s recurring engagement with dependency theory in ATP does, pace Badiou and Hallward, point to some specific areas of intervention for a possible Deleuzo-Guattarian political project. Both Deleuze and Guattari and the dependency theorists conclude that even as countries feature differing forms of socio-economic organisation, they are always assimilated into the global order of capitalism. Similar to the position of Marx a hundred years earlier, all the thinkers discussed herein acknowledge the protean and dynamic character of worldwide capitalism, even as they recognise the necessity of disrupting its violent and exploitative nature. The challenge thus becomes how to formulate a revolutionary politics that can overcome the might of global capital and its ruinous ‘economy of debt’ (Lazzarato 2012: 96) with an eye to creating genuinely ‘popular’ forms of social organisation. Once again, the thought of Deleuze and Guattari and that of the dependency theorists converges upon some political and conceptual strategies for achieving this aim. In Critique and Anti-Critique (1984), Frank posits that real revolutions on the global periphery must first require political independence by means of a ‘delinking’ from the core capitalist countries. As he insists, the scope and power of multinational capital make the establishment of autonomy a must if imperial ties with the centre are to be severed. Only by delinking from global capitalism can peripheral countries develop the kinds of social and economic organisation more appropriate to the needs of their populations. Frank also asserts that delinking can create the internal political conditions necessary for combating socio-economic inequality, a logic which can later be used to structure any dialogue with representatives from the institutions of global capitalism. The overarching aim for the process of delinking is thus to find alternatives to the hegemonic ‘structural adjustment’ policies advocated by the core countries, which oblige peripheral governments to tailor their agendas to the demands of international capital, to the detriment of the social, cultural and economic interests of a majority of their inhabitants. Continuing Frank’s line of analysis, Amin, in Delinking: Toward a Polycentric World (1990), concludes that only with political autarky can the global periphery possess any basis for autonomy on social and economic matters. He asserts that the decision to maintain or sever ‘linkages’ with the capitalist system should be entirely pragmatic – ‘Is X really to our people’s benefit or not?’ – and based strictly on particular interests within the peripheral country in question. Amin simplifies the calculus: the arrangements bringing the fewest benefits and extracting the greatest costs should be discontinued immediately. If these steps were to be taken en masse, he supposes, then the policies of institutions such as the IMF, WTO and World Bank would need to be revised, thus putting peripheral countries in a better position to implement development projects that are endogenously oriented, as opposed to being solely at the whim of financial markets that have them ‘by the throat’ (Surin 2009: 127). Not only do Deleuze and Guattari seem to converge on these positions of Frank and Amin, the pair also offers a potent concept that could underlie efforts at the periphery to ‘delink’ from the core: the war machine. In fact, any possible political and theoretical rapprochement of Deleuze and Guattari and the dependency theorists must involve aligning the dynamism of the war machine to the radical project of delinking. Comprised of thought and action that is situational rather than scientific, the war machine ‘appeals to a people instead of taking itself for a government ministry’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 378). This revolutionary device operates at the periphery en plein air with whatever resources happen to be at hand, rather than adhering to the supposed ‘laws’ or ‘science’ formulated by the sedentary states and their apparatuses of capture at the core of the world system. In the words of Patton, the war machine implies a ‘theoretical domain conceived as a milieu, rather than a territory, within which we may assemble and deploy whatever kinds of theoretical apparatus may prove useful, or necessary to the enterprise in which we are engaged’ (Patton 1988: 132). The war machine, then, is neither possessed by a particular group or current nor maintained by a vanguard party, but rather is ‘a mode of engagement, an open set of political parameters and techniques, and a site of problematisation’ (Thoburn 2003: 9). Thus, the tactics and disposition of the war machine will no doubt be essential in any attempt at the periphery to delink from the core capitalist institutions. As Deleuze and Guattari warn, however, there are no pre-given laws or guarantees to shape this outcome, either at the periphery or in the core; only by struggle and experimentation, and the failure that always accompanies any success in this process, can the desire to ‘delink’ be fulfilled (Surin 2009: 261). As it builds, the political project of delinking might even be turned into a global war machine of revolution, one ‘of smashing capitalism, of redefining socialism . . . whose aim is neither the war of extermination nor the peace of generalized terror, but revolutionary movement’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 472–3). The lone alternative offers little consolation: acceptance of a profoundly asymmetric world system that continues to be marked by US hegemony, an exploitative ‘debt economy’ (Lazzarato 2012: 20) and ‘neo-imperialist wars . . . that criminalize any force of contestation’ (Sibertin-Blanc 2016: 175). In conclusion, by employing a number of important ideas from the repertoire of dependency theory, Deleuze and Guattari again disprove their more trenchant critics’ assertions (for example, Badiou 2000; Hallward 2006) that their work lacks specifically political registers of thought. In this light, we can interpret Deleuze and Guattari’s inclusion of dependency theory in ATP to be a ‘war machine’ against the forces of technocratic elitism and in favour of a ‘delinking’ politics that seeks to create more equitable forms of social organisation. Furthermore, the pair shares the belief of the dependency theorists that peripheries can be the sites for mobilising a revolutionary politics. As such, these thinkers strongly believe that even a global revolution might emerge from the smallest of political experiments on the margins of the world system (cf. Nail 2012: 4).

### Solvency

#### [Fournier] Discourse about the political isn’t inherently political – it’s the foundation of an escape strategy, not its becoming.

Fournier 08

Fournier, Valérie (University of Leicester School of Management, Leicester, UK). "Escaping from the economy: the politics of degrowth." International journal of sociology and social policy, Vol. 28 No. 11/12, pp. 528-545. 24, October 2008. <https://doi.org/10.1108/01443330810915233>. CAT.

Any talk of democracy or citizenship begs questions about inclusion and exclusion: who will be willing/able to take part in civil society? Will it be, as environmental politics are often represented, the preserve of a small minority? (e.g. Latta, 2007; Schosberg, 1999) Or can it be made to involve, and appeal to, a broader audience? As noted earlier, there is a potential tension between environmentalism and democracy (Torgerson, 1999; Latta, 2007). On this issue, the degrowth movement is clear that it would stand for democracy before ecology, and as I discussed earlier is wary of ‘‘ecological imperative’’ discourse. By foregrounding choice and democracy in its attempt to politicise the economy, it is careful not to fall into another form of determinism, ecological or otherwise, and is insistent that whilst the material conditions defined by limited ecological space and its unfair distribution create an imperative for radical change, they do not in themselves dictate the ways in which this should be done; indeed, this ecological crisis could be seen as an opportunity to shape our future. In addition, the foregrounding of citizenship in the degrowth movement as well as in some recent work within environmentalism (e.g. Dobson, 2003, 2006; Doherty and de Geus, 1996) calls upon us all to participate in environmental actions. Environmental degradation is not a problem to be solved exclusively by government policy but through the everyday decisions and actions of all of us (e.g Berglund and Matti, 2006). If, following Dobson (2003), we define citizenship in terms of material relations grounded in ecological scarcity, then we are all drawn in as citizens, called to act and participate in the fair distribution of limited natural resources; we are all in relations of obligations, in a position of owing or being owed ecological space (Dobson, 2006). However this potentially all inclusive definition of (ecological) citizenship leaves two questions open. The first one concerns the mechanisms through which we are called upon as citizens (how do we get the call?), the second concerns our willingness to answer that call, in other words why should we want to be a citizen? Turning to the first point, the degrowth movement may have some interesting contributions to make. It has proposed or organised the creation of various spaces of civil society, of citizenship, from one day event such as the ‘‘Buy Nothing Day’’, to the more ambitious general consumption strike, to month long events such as the Marches pour la De´croissance, or attempts to re-embed markets within local fabric and politics. However, if degrowth proponents are keen to open up spaces for the enactment of local democracy, they are equally wary of the danger of leaving political participation to these relatively small and local levels, for, they argue, this could lead to parochialism, and to the confinement of critique and alternatives to a few marginal groups. Thus, to challenge the supposed neo-liberal consensus around growth, and re-politicise economic debates and practices, there is a need to engage with a wider public. For degrowth to be inclusive, it cannot be left in the hands of local or direct participation but needs to be articulated at broader levels, it needs to become a mass movement. This is not to deny the importance of grassroots initiatives, of local politics and ‘‘small events’’; but for proponents of degrowth, we also need to develop mechanisms that will link up local spaces and actions into a broader political movement, and that will bring debates to a broader audience; an this involves entering parliamentary politics (Arie`s, 2007). It is for this reason that the Parti pour la De´croissance was created, and that proponents of degrowth support representative democracy. They argue that whilst direct democracy is appropriate at small local level, it cannot be organised beyond small groups of 50 people, thus excluding the majority of citizens (Cheynet, 2007). For supporters of degrowth, representative democracy is essential to the organisation of inclusive collective action and debate. And indeed it seems that this strategy has succeeded in bringing the notion of degrowth to public debate, for as noted earlier, it has become a term with which the press and mainstream politicians have had to engage with (although usually not embrace). The second issue raised by the emphasis on citizenship concerns motivation is; considering the comfort many of us in the North enjoy as consumers, why would we want the burden, obligations, responsibility of citizenship? Indeed, a quick perusal at the reactions of governments or individuals in the face of rapidly escalating environmental degradation does not bring much hope. Whilst there is a growing number of people and governments who recognise the urgency of ecological threats, they remain unwilling or unable to do anything other than ‘‘sustain the unsustainable’’ to borrow a phrase from Blu¨hdorn (2007); this is, indeed, a response I am commonly faced with when talking to students about the sort of alternative economies we could build in response to environmental and social degradation. Whilst many of the students seem well aware of the environmental and social wreckage caused by Western style consumption and production, they admit that they remain unwilling to do away with fast food, designer clothing or cheap consumer goods. So short of the authoritarian responses that would eschew the motivation question and that the degrowth movement is so keen to avoid, what could drive people to abandon the comfort of consumerism and take on the obligation of citizenship? Various suggestions have been offered. For example, Dobson (2003, 2006) in his discussion of ecological citizenship argues that it is justice that will motivate us to acknowledge, and act upon, our obligations. He agrees that simply pointing to material asymmetries in the use of ecological resources will not provide sufficient ground for action; there need to be reasons that link the facts of asymmetries to conclusions about how we should act. For him, this is the role of justice: ‘‘Justice is the reason that links the facts (unequal occupation of ecological space) to the normative conclusion (act so as to reduce the occupation of ecological space where appropriate’’ (Dobson, 2006, p. 450). However, this still leaves open the question of why we should be motivated by justice. Dobson (2006) deals with this in a footnote, where he claims ‘‘I hope I will not be asked to explain why people should feel motivated to do justice, as this is a task that has confounded much more powerful minds than my own’’ (p. 451). Indeed, but then we are back to the beginning. In a rebuttal of Dobson’s thesis, Hayward (2006) tries to eschew the question of motivation by putting forward ‘‘resourcefulness’’ as the main ecological virtue; this he argues ‘‘involves the development and exercise of human capacities, and this fulfils part of the substance of a good human life; it also eases the pressure on finite natural phenomena that are needed as resources in (roughly) inverse proportion to resourcefulness’’ (p. 442). For Hayward, the very definition of resourcefulness avoids the problem of motivation behind Dobson’s justice; since resourcefulness relies on the development of human capacities, it also defines the good life. In other words it is what we should all want to develop if we are to become fully human, to realise our potential as human beings. Thus resourcefulness conveniently aligns ecological concerns and personal interests; as individuals deploy ingenuity to reduce their use of resources, they will also develop themselves or realise their human capacities. But as Dobson (2006) notes, it is not clear what is ecological about resourcefulness; indeed, humans can, and have, put their ingenuity to work on many projects, from space exploration, to the exploitation of resources, or the design of war machines and nuclear weapons; and the reduction in the use of natural resources has, so far at least, not been at the forefront of these projects. Both the values of justice and resourcefulness could be read within a degrowth framework; concerns for justice underpin its avowed republican values of democracy, equality and solidarity, and its articulation of democratic choice and citizenship. A case could also be made for the existence of a parallel between Hayward’s resourcefulness and the degrowth movement’s emphasis on humanistic value; thus, for example, Arie`s’ (2005) claim that he would stand for degrowth even without the ecological crisis, but simply to be ‘‘human’’ hints at the development of human capacities beyond that of ‘‘consuming’’. However, maybe the point is not to find what could motivate us to be ‘‘good ecological citizens’’, as any simple answer to this question is bound to be flawed and could be co-opted into another set of instrumental measures, but rather to create spaces where we can act as citizens rather than as consumers, whatever our motives for doing this might be (social justice, environmental justice, self-development). In other words, instead of trying to work out our motivations for acting as citizens, we could simply create as many spaces as possible where we would be defined in terms other than economic rationality: not as consumers who want more (for less), who are after value for money, or the latest cheap deal. Whilst the degrowth movement is no more able to answer the big motivation question as any other environmental writers or theories, it can make a small contribution to environmental politics by opening up such spaces. As I have suggested earlier, degrowth is not merely about consuming and producing less, it is first and foremost about providing a critique of the economy and its colonising effect, and pointing to escape routes. Escaping from the economy thus provides an essential starting point for conceptualising forms of social organisation that do not rely on economic vocabulary, for imagining practices such as consumer strikes that break up with economic rationality, for developing spaces such as local markets in which we can experiment non-economic relations and identity. Thus maybe the main contribution of the degrowth movement to environmental politics and debates is that through its emphasis on ‘‘escaping from the economy’’ it provides both conceptual and practical strategies for challenging the growth economy; and it does this by inviting us to rethink economic practices in terms of democratic choices and acts of citizenship. This is not to say that these non economic spaces do not exist already; the myth of universal commodification tends to ignore the fact that many of us spend a significant proportion of our time providing for ourselves, or helping others provide for themselves, without relying on the market (e.g.Williams, 2004, 2005a, b). In addition, others have made similar points about the need to escape from ‘‘orthodox’’ economic framing; as was mentioned earlier Gibson-Graham (1996, 2002, 2006) have called for a reconceptualisation of economic relations and identity away from capitalocentric thinking. However, considering the serious nature of the ecological and social crisis facing us, multiplying the calls to escape from the economy, and finding as many points of exit as possible may be far from a redundant exercise.

#### [Munro & Thanem 2] Noncommodifiable academic spaces constitute a nomadic resistance strategy against the digital corporatocracy that’s omnipresent in international arrangements.

Munro and Thanem 17

Iain Munro (Newcastle University), Torkild Thanem (Stockholm University). “Deleuze and the Deterritorialization of Strategy.” Critical Perspectives in Accounting 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2017.03.012>. CAT

Piracy has been a major force in decentralizing and accelerating the spread of music. The key event in this transformation was when the music sharing service Napster first went online in July of 1999. Napster created a central database that enabled music enthusiasts to browse each others’ MP3 files and to share and communicate by text in real time as they were doing so. This caused tremors throughout the music industry, 21 and prompted a severe legal response by the Recording Industry Association of America to shut down this new model of music distribution. Napster polarized artists: whereas some regarded it as a great new marketing tool to reach new audiences, others argued that it facilitated the theft of their intellectual property. The business model was based upon advertising revenues of companies who paid to place promotional material on the central webpage, a mode that was to be quickly duplicated by subsequent file sharing websites such as Pirate Bay and Megaupload. Within the first year Napster had gained over 25 million users. By July 2001 Napster had to close its operations as a result of a court injunction from the US recording industry since it was apparent that Napster’s users were sharing copyrighted material without paying royalties to the copyright owner. After their success against Napster the recording industry has pursued a host of other file sharing networks. This has been followed by increasingly restrictive legislation regulating the use of communication technology and the movement of intellectual property, including the 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). A commentary on these events by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (2008: 2) remarked on the rapidity with which new kinds of networks were created in response to the apparent weaknesses of the earlier networks that came to light with each new counter attack from industry: “After Napster was shut down, new networks quickly appeared. Napster was replaced by Aimster and AudioGalaxy, which were supplanted in turn by LimeWire, Morpheus and Kazaa, which were then partially supplanted by eDonkey and BitTorrent.” Each new development has created a more diffuse network bringing to bear a greater power of deterritorialization than the last. 22 Again, we can see how peer-to-peer networks have attempted to create their own smooth spaces for the flow of information. They have only been partially successful in so doing, since many of these networks still relied upon centralized servers as a key part of their infrastructure. Napster still relied upon a central database that contained the IP addresses of all its users and so only mimicked a genuine peer-to-peer, distributed network. Many subsequent innovations have attempted to overcome this problem by two key tactics: (i) the development of genuine peer-to-peer software where no central database exists (as in the case of Gnutella and Morpheus), which makes it difficult for the law to control its distribution and use; and (ii) situating the website on an internet service provider in a territory that is not subject to rigid IP legal regulation, and where US corporations are unlikely to have much political influence. The Napster case began an on-going war over intellectual property between the big oligopolistic retailers, the music consumers, the ‘pirate’ distributors, and the artists. The artists themselves remain divided. Whereas some believe their main enemy are the pirates who illegally copy and pass on songs via peer-to-peer networks, others see their prime enemy in the big businesses that take the vast bulk of the profits resulting from sales and merchandising. Interestingly, the latter camp counts many high-profile artists who have spoken out for unrestricted music distribution, including Radiohead, Neil Young, Lady Gaga, Jack White and David Grohl. Over the past 15 years the structural changes of the music industry have been substantial, and its oligopolistic corporations are in significant decline. In the US alone, revenues from the sale of music declined from $19 billion in 1999 to $3 billion in 2013. David Byrne (2012) has summarized these changes as follows: (i) recording costs are approaching zero; (ii) manufacturing and distribution costs are approaching zero; (iii) 23 artists no longer get big advances; and (iv) performing is now viewed as a source of income. Byrne details the rise of a host of new distribution models that have moved away from the oligopoly, particularly the fact that more organizational work is done by the artists themselves in self-distributing and self-promoting their music via live events and social media such as MySpace, Youtube and SoundCloud. Moreover, new companies such as Bandcamp, Topspin and CDBaby have emerged to support the DIY approach. Whilst big brands persist, these movements represent a massive transformation in the industry towards increasingly decentralized and dematerialized production and distribution, and greater autonomy for the artist (Byrne, 2012). The new peer-to-peer networks and MP3 technology have thus been a new vector of deterritorialization for music production and distribution, where many of the traditional media monoliths have attempted reign in such ‘information nomadism’ (Munro, 2010) through the law courts and others have responded by providing new services to support the newly decentralized means of production and distribution. The deterritorialization of Porter’s barriers to entry The deterritorializing flows that are transforming the media industry and the music industry constitute a radical challenge to the work of Michael Porter and its emphasis on regulating flows through ‘barriers to entry’. Porter’s (2001) classic account of ‘Strategy and the Internet’ in the Harvard Business Review repeatedly emphasizes that the fundamentals of business strategy have not changed, and claims that those who have argued otherwise are misguided. His main argument is that the use of the Internet has created greater efficiencies in the value chain due to competition. Porter mentions the 24 entrance of new retail businesses such as the auction site eBay and Amazon.com, but otherwise argues that not much has changed – for strategists, then, it is business as usual. Speaking about the music industry a year after the launch of Napster, he had this to say about the effects of the Internet: “Even in the music industry, many traditional activities, such as finding and promoting talented new artists, producing and recording music, and securing airplay will continue to be highly important.” (Porter, 2001: 73). There is nothing in Porter’s strategic vision that prepared the industry for what happened in the following months and years – a decline in retails sales of 41% between 2000 and 2013 and a total collapse in revenues (Midiaconsulting, 2014). Although we appreciate that Porter did not have the benefit of Byrne’s hindsight, Porter did not even discuss the profound effects of Napster on the industry even though it had already proven to be a ‘disruptive’ technology by the time that he made these comments. Neither did he foresee the complete transformation of the music industry from completely alien ‘new entrants’, such as iTunes, Spotify and Youtube, who better understood the transformational potential of the technology pioneered by Napster. Porter, then, failed to notice the huge transformations within the industries that he was purporting to analyse, perhaps because the rise of peer-to-peer file sharing and open source programming was pioneered by actors and communities that were not traditional business organizations. Specifically, his analysis misses out on key peculiarities of informational commodities: the fact that informational commodities are imperfectly excludable (i.e. my access and use of the commodity does not necessarily exclude others from accessing it and using it), and the fact that they are non-rivalrous (i.e., they 25 are not diminished by being consumed) (Berry, 2008; Lessig, 2002). To use Kenneth Arrow’s (1974) terms, this makes information a ‘leaky’ commodity that it is extremely difficult to contain. However, it is this leakiness, the fact that informational commodities can be shared, which generates the network externalities and extraordinary benefits of informational commodities in the first place. As Terranova (2000, 2004) has argued, this is not unequivocally beneficial to the non-business creatives who generate these values. The products of their free labour are subject to on-going expropriation by big business, and the wide availability of news and music free of charge is undermining the subsistence of journalists and artists. However, these new forms of production, distribution and consumption also enable values to be generated and enjoyed in ways that evade exploitation by big business. These cases suggest that Deleuze and Guattari’s work may be more relevant for understanding the destratified workings and deterritorializing forces of business strategy under contemporary capitalism than the models provided by those who work in the institutionalized discipline known as strategic management. Of course, this is not the first time that the critics of capitalism do the analytical work for the academic spokespersons of capitalism. Perhaps Deleuze and Guattari are to contemporary capitalism what Marx and Engels were to industrial capitalism. But like Marx and Engels, they do not merely provide us with an astute analysis of the workings of capitalism, but also with the conceptual and strategic tools for exploring how capitalism can be subverted, resisted and exceeded. Case 3: Nomadic resistance strategies in the Occupy movement 26 A number of commentators on the Occupy movement have already explained the distinctive tactics of this movement by utilizing ideas from Deleuze and Guattari (Harcourt, 2013; Nail, 2013). Indeed, the political journalist Paul Mason (2012) notes that the sudden proliferation of Occupy movements in Middle Eastern and Western countries appears to have learned lessons from failed revolutions of the past in part through Deleuze and Guattari’s, and Hardt and Negri’s, work. In many of the Occupy camps that Mason visited, people passed around copies of their books and seemed to draw inspiration from their accounts of leaderless, nomadic and heterogeneous forms of organizing. Furthermore, several commentaries have observed the unusual structures and communication flows of Occupy encampments. The structure of the occupation was not that dictated by a party or a vanguard, but emerged as an accented, leaderless ‘rhizome’ (Castells, 2012; Harcourt, 2013; Nail, 2013). Under the slogan ‘We are the 99%’, this brought together a variety of different groups, including anti-consumerists, environmentalists, homeless activists, LGBT organizations, students, trade unionists, artists, hackers, ecological farmers, and small business coops. The movement made use of a powerful combination of local and global communications networks. Local forms of communication included ‘people’s assemblies’, which evolved rules for inclusive, non-hierarchical forms of decision-making, and the ‘human mic’, which amplified and embedded the speeches of the occupiers. Globally, Occupy camps communicated with each other through social media channels such as Facebook and Twitter, but also through the traditional media, as when the activists of Tahir Square, Cairo, sent a letter 27 of support to the Occupants of Zuccotti Park, New York, announcing ‘To the Occupy movement: the occupiers of Tahir Square are with you’. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, the Occupy movement turned what previously had been strictly policed striated spaces of the city into smooth spaces governed autonomously by the occupiers themselves. These physical smooth spaces were complemented by a virtual smooth space on the Internet, where local Occupy encampments created their own webpages whereby they could better coordinate activities and share information about their occupation with other encampments and the outside world. The seed of the movement was an online posting from Adbusters on September 16th 2011: On September 17, we want to see 20,000 people flood into lower Manhattan, set up tents, kitchens, peaceful barricades and occupy Wall Street for a few months. Once there, we shall incessantly repeat one simple demand in a plurality of voices… It’s time for DEMOCRACY NOT CORPORATOCRACY. (https://www.adbusters.org/blogs/adbusters-blog/occupywallstreet.html) This call explicitly allied itself with other democratic movements across the world, most notably the Egyptian occupation of Tahir Square, but also with anti-austerity protests against greedy banks and stingy government cuts in Spain. The next day the park was occupied, and a year later there were Occupy encampments in 962 cities across 85 different countries (Mason, 2012). 28 By refusing to make concrete demands beyond the demand of bringing power back to the people, the Occupy movement manifests one of the key strategic elements of schizoanalysis – the refusal to take power and the refusal to speak in the name of others (Mitchell, 2013). With this starting point, the movement developed a wide range of tactics for self-organization and propagation, including the use of social media to coordinate activities, disseminate their message and publicize protests. But beyond protest, it developed new ways of reclaiming public space and creating new spaces of conviviality, and it revived old forms of production and consumption. Through the political art project ‘Occupied Real Estate’, idle real estate was reclaimed for public use by advertising buildings that were ideal for squatters through ‘For Squat’ notices (Treibitz, 2012). The non-hierarchical and heterogeneous make-up of the Occupy movement deterritorializes conventional notions of political protest and resistance such as the Marxist notion of ‘class struggle’ as well as organicist notions of ‘the mass’, ‘the mob’ and ‘the body politic’. As we have pointed out previously (Thanem, 2011), the Occupy movement is perhaps closer to Hardt and Negri’s (2000, 2004) notion of the multitude. Unlike ‘the people’, the multitude is not a homogeneous organized unity that can be represented by members of parliament, but a heterogeneous assemblage of people who care about the same issues. And unlike ‘the mob’ or ‘the mass’, the multitude is not a passive, violent, dangerous and easily manipulated force, but positive, politically creative and economically productive. While Deleuze and Guattari’s (1984) schizoanalysis extends Marx’ analysis in showing how capital goes ever further in exploiting our bodies, intellects and networks, it gestures implicitly towards the multitudinal power of forces such as the Occupy movement. Beyond political protest, 29 the Occupy movement constitutes a powerful case of desiring-production, living labour and ‘the commons’, wherein the creation of economic and political value exceeds and subverts the monetary flows of capitalist markets and the State-parliamentary regulation of politics. Strategic lines of flight: Conclusions and openings The work of Deleuze and Guattari opens up a number of lines of flight for developing the theory and practice of strategy. We might start with the first danger facing strategists stated at the beginning of this paper: ‘do not become enamoured of power’. In terms of a Deleuzian re-evaluation of strategy we must develop the schizophrenic tendency to pursue “the very limit of capitalism [...] its inherent tendency brought to fulfilment, its surplus product, its proletariat, and its exterminating angel” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 35). In the present paper we have explored these tendencies in terms of three key ideas: (i) that strategic movements within contemporary capitalism follow vectors of deterritorialization; (ii) that they create and occupy smooth spaces; and (iii) that the struggles and rapid transformations that thus are brought about operate through nomadic war machines. We have demonstrated where these mutations are taking place today, in the productive heart of the economy and on the fringes of the socius, in the free flow of music and media, and in the re-appropriation of politics in public space. In the strategic terms of Deleuze and Guattari, these movements bear witness to how we can “deterritorialize the enemy by shattering his territory from within” (1988: 412). 30 We are not arguing that the deterritorialization of the media industry and the music industry is absolute, or that it provides a total account of contemporary capitalism. Sedentary structures and business models continue to exist, much due to the ability of capitalism to restrict itself and innovate creative forms of exploitation. Similarly, professionalized trade unions and identity-based social movements continue to exist alongside the Occupy movement, perhaps influencing the distribution of resources and the recognition of identities more directly than a loose association such as Occupy. But more importantly, Deleuze and Guattari enable us to bring out the distinct features of contemporary capitalism and its subversion – that which differentiates current patterns of production, distribution, consumption and protest from earlier variants. Whereas previous co-optations of Deleuze by writers in the strategy literature have de-politicized his work, apparently in order to make it palatable and applicable to the strategic management of firms in the capitalist political economy, we repeat that business strategists can learn nothing from Deleuze, or Guattari. The nomadic strategies depicted by Deleuze and Guattari confront and overflow the limits of capital and will always outpace the strategic plans and two-by-two matrices of corporate managers intoxicated by Porter’s protectionist strategy of oligopolistic competition and Chia’s laissez faire strategy of non-interventionist processualism. The action takes place somewhere else across the smooth space that managers and strategy scholars confront only after the fact, as they desperately seek to stratify and reterritorialize its nomadic flows. Yet, as business strategists engage in a compulsive quest for new markets and new targets of exploitation, they are also effecting lines of deterritorialization. The sites of struggle that were examined in this paper highlighted how these deterritorializing 31 lines of flight are pushing capitalism towards its own limit and its own eventual implosion. This is the end, and beginning, of strategy.

#### [Alexander] That rapidly reaches critical mass—enough for grassroots movements to take hold

**Alexander 14**


Dr. Samuel Alexander 14, lecturer with the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne, and research fellow, Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, February 2014, “Post-Growth Economics: A Paradigm Shift in Progress,” <http://www.sustainable.unimelb.edu.au/files/mssi/Post-Growth%20Economics.pdf> -CAT

Despite the dominance of this growth model of progress around the world, it has never been without its critics, and as this paper will outline, there are reasons to think that grounds for opposition are growing in number, strength, and sophistication. It was the philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn (1962), who argued that paradigm shifts in the natural sciences occur when the existing paradigm finds itself increasingly unable to solve the critical problems it sets for itself. As anomalies increase in number and severity, the need for an alternative paradigm becomes clearer, and eventually a new paradigm is developed that can solve more problems than the old one. At that stage a paradigm shift is set in motion, and over time the new paradigm becomes accepted and the old one loses its influence, sometimes quite abruptly. In much the same way, this paper proposes that a paradigm shift in macroeconomics is underway, with a post-growth economic framework threatening to resolve critical anomalies that seem irresolvable from within the existing growth paradigm. We will see that a growing array of theorists, from various disciplinary backgrounds, are questioning the feasibility and even the desirability of continuous growth, especially with respect to the most highly developed regions of the world. Increasingly there is a call to look ‘beyond growth’ (see, e.g., Costanza et al, 2014; Kubiszewski et al, 2013; Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2010), on the grounds that growth may now be causing the problems it was traditionally hoped to solve. Not only can it be argued that a post-growth paradigm shift is in progress, it seems the fundamental importance of this shift lies in the fact that it is inrelation to *progress*. That is, it is changing the very nature of what ‘progress’ means.

### U/v

### 1AC Disclosure (0:25)

#### Interp- on my wiki, we’ll insert this screenshot



#### Violation - you didn’t disclose at least rounds 1 and 5 from greenhill…

A picture containing graphical user interface

Description automatically generated

#### Graphical user interface, application Description automatically generated

#### I disclose every round, plus round reports, plus open source, even when lay.

#### Standards:

#### 1] Evidence ethics – I have no way to verify that your cards aren’t miscut or highlighted/bracketed unethically. That’s a prerequisite to other standards like clash and ground.

#### 2] Reciprocity – I disclose on my wiki and email the 1AC when asked.

#### 3] Inclusion— lack of disclosure shuts out small school debaters. Inclusion o/ws since your args assume you can access the space.

#### Voters:

#### 1] Education – it’s why schools fund debate and teams mandate disclosure

#### 2] Fairness – vote for the better debater not the better cheater.

#### Paradigm issues

#### DTD:

#### 1] Actual abuse - I had to alter my strat

#### **2] Deters future abuse – norm-setting**

#### Competing interps:

#### 1] brightline

#### 2] race to the top – we find the best possible norms

#### No RVIs: You don’t get a cookie for playing by the rules.