# 1NC R1 UT

## 1

#### Lack of Strike Protection limits Suez Canal Strikes now.

* Edited for Ableist Language

Cunningham 14 Erin Cunningham 4-11-2014 "From Cairo to Suez, Egypt workers defy government with labor strikes" <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/from-cairo-to-suez-egypt-workers-defy-government-with-labor-strikes/2014/04/11/674171d0-a713-494d-a76b-b33f5d4bc505_story.html> (American University of Paris, BA in international and comparative politics)//Elmer

**Military involvement In Suez** province, **a critical** **industrial center and strategic hub of global maritime trade**, the **military** has been particularly **involved in suppressing factory workers’ strikes**, labor rights activists say. Those actions could indicate how a military-supported Sissi presidency would deal with the ongoing labor unrest. In August, military police stormed a worker sit-in at the privately owned Suez Steel Company. The workers accused management of failing to honor an agreement that granted them hazard pay, health care and a share of the company’s profits. Last month, a senior army commander in Suez helped eliminate the union leadership at a local factory belonging to international ceramics and porcelain producer Cleopatra Ceramics, according to workers. On March 3, Maj. Gen. Mohamed Shams summoned 23 of the union’s first- and second-tier leaders to the area’s army headquarters and threatened to have Egypt’s secret police investigate them for terrorism if they did not sign resignation letters and leave the company, Cleopatra workers and labor activists said. Factory owner Mohamed Aboul Enein — and former Mubarak heavyweight ally — had been locked in a years-long struggle with workers over a 2012 agreement for better salaries, overtime pay and food allowances. In a telephone interview, Enein said he was forced to sign the contract under duress, after employees barricaded him inside the factory overnight. “These people belong to the Muslim Brotherhood,” Enein said of the workers. The Egyptian government has banned the Muslim Brotherhood and declared the group a terrorist organization. But there is no evidence the union was acting on behalf of the Islamist group. “They always ask for money,” Enein said of the workers. “They are criminals.” But company labor leaders said Shams’s and Enein’s close advisers threatened to bring the leaders’ wives and children to the military base until they promised to leave. A spokesman for the Egyptian armed forces did not respond to requests for comment. “They kept saying that if we did not sign, we would go to prison,” said Ayman Nofal, one of the union members who was pushed out. **The move has [stunned**] ~~paralyzed~~ **worker organizing** there, current employees said. “Like any entity in power, **the military does not want strikes**,” Ramadan said.

#### Suez Strikes eviscerate Global Trade – expanding the scope and length of Strikes through legal protection makes their impacts unthinkable.

Rohar 11 Evan Rohar 2-10-2011 "Suez Canal Strike Could Rattle Egypt’s Regime" <https://labornotes.org/blogs/2011/02/suez-canal-strike-could-rattle-egypt%E2%80%99s-regime> (Former Dock Worker at the Suez Canal)//Elmer

**Workers in** the critical **Suez Canal** Authority have taken perhaps the most important action of all, **launching** a **6,000-strong sitdown strike** that began Tuesday evening. While their demands center on pay and working conditions, the **sheer force of** their **leverage** has implications for the entire Egyptian uprising. The action appears to be a wildcat strike. The **Suez Canal** **enables ships to travel from Asia to Europe by way of the Red and Mediterranean Seas**, bypassing a journey around the Cape of Good Hope at the tip of Africa that would take more than a week. The canal **handled 559 million tons of cargo** in 2009, nearly three times the tonnage handled by the Port of Los Angeles, the busiest port in the U.S. The canal handles cargo **amounting to** about **8 percent of global** maritime **trade**. It also transits up to 2.5 million barrels of crude oil each day, with oil-exporting countries using the canal to move their crude to market and to import refined petroleum products. The canal is of further importance for U.S. military interests; the U.S. navy counts on it for rapid deployment of vessels from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. So far, most industry analysts insist that canal traffic is either minimally affected or unaffected by the strike actions and will remain so. Many, such as the Journal of Commerce and Logistics Week, quote Egyptian government officials who have an interest in keeping a lid on the effectiveness of any protest. If canal workers affect traffic, or if the strikes spread, enormous international pressure would come down on the Mubarak regime to get the cargo flowing again. **Reports contradicting** the **official line** are **starting to appear.** Egypt’s state-controlled newspaper Ahram Online reported on Tuesday that “**disruptions to shipping movements, as well as disastrous economic losses, are expected if the strike continues**.” By Wednesday, the article had been changed to state that no delays are expected. Regardless, the waterway’s strategic and economic significance amounts to a massive bargaining chip for the pro-democracy protesters if leveraged correctly, and its importance won’t end with the uprising. If democracy prevails and the people of Egypt take power, the new regime could use the canal for any number of political and economic purposes. Egyptian authorities are beefing up security around the canal, claiming that Hamas and Hezbollah plan to dispatch saboteurs to aid the rebellion. Maybe they're acting on real intelligence, or maybe they're afraid of what the workers could do for themselves and for their revolution.

#### Collapse of Trade causes Hotspot Escalation – goes Nuclear.

Kampf 20 David Kampf 6-16-2020 “How COVID-19 Could Increase the Risk of War” <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28843/how-covid-19-could-increase-the-risk-of-war> (Senior PhD Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School)//Elmer

But that overlooked the ways in which the risk of interstate war was already rising before COVID-19 began to spread. Civil wars were becoming more numerous, lasting longer and attracting more outside involvement, with dangerous consequences for stability in many regions of the world. And the global dynamics most commonly cited to explain the falling incidence of interstate war—democracy, economic prosperity, international cooperation and others—were being upended. If the spread of democracy kept the peace, then its global decline is unnerving. **If globalization and** economic **interdependence kept** the **peace, then** a looming global depression and the **rise of** nationalism and **protectionism are disconcerting**. If regional and global institutions kept the peace, then their degradation is unsettling. If the balance of nuclear weapons kept the peace, then growing risks of proliferation are disquieting. And if America’s preeminent power kept the peace, then its relative decline is troubling. Now, the pandemic, or more specifically the world’s reaction to it, is revealing the extent to which the factors holding major wars in check are withering. The idea that war between nations is a relic of the past no longer seems so convincing. The Pessimists Strike Back More than any other individual, it was cognitive scientist Steven Pinker who popularized the idea that we are living in the most peaceful moment in human history. Starting with his 2011 bestseller, “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined,” Pinker argued that the frequency, duration and lethality of wars between great powers have all decreased. In his 2019 book, “Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress,” he wrote that war “between the uniformed armies of two nation-states appears to be obsolescent. There have been no more than three in any year since 1945, none in most years since 1989, and none since the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.” Optimists like Pinker held that, rather than the world falling apart, as a quick glance at headline news might suggest, the opposite was true: Humanity was flourishing. More regions are characterized by peace; fewer mass killings are occurring; governance and the rule of law are improving; and people are richer, healthier, better educated and happier than ever before. In their book, “Clear and Present Safety: The World Has Never Been Better and Why That Matters to Americans,” Michael A. Cohen and Micah Zenko argued that the evidence is so overwhelming that it is difficult to argue against the idea that wars between great powers, and all other interstate wars, are becoming vanishingly rare. Even when wars do break out, they tend to be shorter and less deadly than they were in the past. John Mueller, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, also reasoned that the idea of war, like slavery and dueling before it, was in terminal decline, while Joshua Goldstein, an international relations researcher at American University, credited the United Nations and the rise of peacekeeping operations for helping win the “war on war.” But in recent years, a range of critics have begun to poke holes in these arguments. Tanisha M. Fazal, an international relations professor at the University of Minnesota, contends that the decline in war is overstated. Major advances in medicine, speedier evacuations of wounded soldiers from the field of battle and better armor have made war less fatal—but not necessarily less frequent. Fazal and Paul Poast, who is at the University of Chicago, further assert that the notion of war between great powers as a thing of the past is based on the assumption that all such conflicts resemble World War I and II—both are historical anomalies—and overlooks the actual wars fought between great powers since 1945, from the Korean War and the Vietnam War to proxy wars from Afghanistan to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Bear F. Braumoeller, an Ohio State political science professor, analyzed the same historical data on conflicts used by Pinker, Mueller and Goldstein, and found no general downward trend in either the initiation or deadliness of warfare over the past two centuries. What’s more, Braumoeller contends that the so-called “long peace”—the 75 years that have passed without systemic war since World War II—is far from invulnerable, and that wars are just as likely to escalate now as they used to be. Just because a major interstate war hasn’t happened for a long time, doesn’t mean it never will again. In all probability, it will. And by focusing solely on interstate wars, the optimists miss half the story, at least. Wars between states have declined, but civil wars never disappeared—and these **internal conflicts** **could easily escalate into regional or global wars**. The number of conflicts in the world reached its highest point since World War II in 2016, with 53 state-based armed conflicts in 37 countries. All but two of these conflicts were considered civil wars. To make matters worse, new studies have shown that civil wars are becoming longer, deadlier and harder to conclusively end, and that these internal conflicts are not really internal. Civil wars harm the economies and stability of neighboring countries, since armed groups, refugees, illicit goods and diseases all spill over borders. Some 10 million refugees have fled to other countries since 2012. The countries that now host them are more likely to experience war, which means states with huge refugee populations like Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey face legitimate security challenges. Even after the threat of violence has diminished in refugees’ countries of origin, return migration can reignite conflicts, repeating the brutal cycle. A Yugoslav Federal Army tank. Perhaps most importantly, recent research indicates that civil wars increase the risk of interstate war, in large part because they are attracting more and more outside involvement. In a 2008 paper, researchers Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan and Kenneth Schultz explained that, in addition to the spillover effects, two other factors in civil wars increase international tensions and could possibly provoke wider interstate wars: external interventions in support of rebel groups and regime attacks on insurgents across international borders. Immediately after the Cold War, none of the ongoing civil wars around the world were internationalized. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, there were 12 full-fledged civil wars in 1991—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and elsewhere—and foreign militaries were not active on the ground in any of them. Last year, by contrast, every single full-fledged civil war involved external military participants. This is due, in part, to the huge growth in U.S. military interventions abroad into civil conflicts, but it’s not only the Americans. All of today’s major wars are in essence proxy wars, pitting external rivals against one another. Conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya are best understood not as civil wars, but as international warzones, attracting meddlers including the United States, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, France and many others, which often intervene not to build peace, but to resolve conflicts in a way that is favorable to their own interests. These internationalized wars are more lethal, harder to resolve and possibly more likely to recur than civil wars that remain localized. It is not that difficult to imagine how these conflicts could spark wider international conflagrations. Wars, after all, can quickly spiral out of control. As Risks Increase, Deterrents Decline To make matters worse, most of the global trends that explained why interstate war had decreased in recent decades are now reversing. The theories that democracy, prosperity, cooperation and other factors kept the peace have been much debated—but if there was any truth to them, their reversals are likely to increase the chance of war, irrespective of how long the coronavirus pandemic lasts. Democracy is often considered a prophylactic for war. Fully democratic countries are less likely to experience civil war and rarely, if ever, go to war with other democracies—though, of course, they do still go to war against non-democracies. While this would be great news if democracy and pluralism were spreading, there have now been 14 consecutive years of global democratic decline, and there have been signs of additional authoritarian power grabs in countries like Hungary and Serbia during the pandemic. If democracy backslides far enough, internal conflicts and foreign aggression will become more likely. Other theories posit that **economic bonds between countries** have **limited wars** in recent decades. Dale Copeland, a professor of international relations at the University of Virginia, has argued that **countries work to preserve ties when there are high expectations for future trade**, **but war becomes** increasingly **possible when trade is predicted to fall.** If **globalization brought peace**, the recent wave of far-right nationalism and populism around the world may increase the chances of war, as tariffs and other trade barriers go up—mostly from the United States under President Donald Trump, who has launched trade wars with allies and adversaries alike. The coronavirus pandemic immediately elicited further calls to reduce dependence on other countries, with Trump using the opportunity to pressure U.S. companies to reconfigure their supply chains away from China. For its part, China made sure that it had the homemade supplies it needed to fight the virus before exporting extras, while countries like France and Germany barred the export of face masks, even to friendly nations. And widening economic inequalities, a consequence of the pandemic, are not likely to enhance support for free trade. This assault on open trade and globalization is just one aspect of a decaying liberal international order, which, its proponents argue, has largely helped to preserve peace between nations since World War II. But that old order is almost gone, and in all likelihood isn’t coming back. The U.N. Security Council appears increasingly fragmented and dysfunctional. Even before Trump, the world’s most powerful country ratified fewer treaties per year under the Obama administration than at any time since 1945. Trump’s presidency only harms multilateral cooperation further. He has backed out of the Paris Agreement on climate change, reneged on the Iran nuclear deal, picked fights with allies, questioned the value of NATO and defunded the World Health Organization in the middle of a global health crisis. Hyper-nationalism, rather than international collaboration, was the default response to the coronavirus outbreak in the U.S. and many other countries around the world. It’s hard to see the U.S. reluctance to lead as anything other than a sign of its inevitable, if slow, decline. The country’s institutionalized inequalities and systemic racism have been laid bare in recent months, and it no longer looks like a beacon for others to follow. The global balance of power is changing. China is both keen to assert a greater leadership role within traditionally Western-led institutions and to challenge the existing regional order in Asia. Between a rising China, revanchist Russia and new global actors, including non-state groups, we may be heading toward an increasingly multipolar or nonpolar world, which could prove destabilizing in its own right. Finally, the pacifying effect of nuclear weapons could be waning. While vast nuclear arsenals once compelled the United States and the Soviet Union to reach arms control agreements, old treaties are expiring and new talks are breaking down. **Mistrust is growing**, and the **chance of an** unwanted **U.S.-Russia nuclear confrontation is** arguably as **high** as it has been since the Cuban missile crisis. The theory of nuclear peace may no longer hold if more countries are tempted to obtain their own nuclear deterrent. Trump’s decision to abandon the Iran nuclear deal, for one thing, has only increased the chance that Tehran will acquire nuclear weapons. It’s almost easy to forget that, just a few short months ago, the United States and Iran were one miscalculation or dumb mistake away from waging all-out war. And despite Trump’s efforts to negotiate nuclear disarmament with Kim Jong Un’s regime in Pyongyang, it is wishful thinking to believe North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons. At this point, negotiators can only realistically try to ensure that North **Korea’s** **nuclear menace** **doesn’t get** even **more potent**. In other words, by turning inward, the United States is choosing to leave other countries to fend for themselves. The end result may be a less stable world with more nuclear actors. If leaders are smart, they will take seriously the warning signs exposed by this global emergency and work to reverse the drift toward war. If only one of these theories for peace were worsening, concerns would be easier to dismiss. But **together**, they are unsettling. While the world is not yet on the brink of **World War III** and no two countries are destined for war, the odds of avoiding future conflicts don’t look good. The pandemic is already degrading democracies, harming economies and curtailing international cooperation, and it also seems to be fostering internal instability within states. Rachel Brown, Heather Hurlburt and Alexandra Stark argue that the coronavirus could in fact sow more civil conflict. If this proves accurate, the increase in civil wars is likely to lead to more external meddling, and these next **proxy wars** **could** soon **precipitate all-out international conflicts** if outsiders aren’t careful. **With** the **usual deterrents to conflict declining** around the world, **major wars could soon return**.

## 2

#### Permissibility and presumption negate

#### 1] Obligations- the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove an obligation, policies require positive justification and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation.

#### 2] Falsity- Statements are more often false than true because proving one part of the statement false disproves the entire statement. Presuming all statements are true creates contradictions which would be ethically bankrupt.

#### 3] Negating is harder – A] Aff gets first and last speech which control the direction of the debate B] Affirmatives can strategically uplayer in the 1ar giving them a 7-6 time skew advantage, splitting the 2nr C] They get infinite prep time

#### 4] Affirmation theory- Affirming requires unconditionally maintaining an obligation

Affirm [is to]: maintain as true.

That’s Dictionary.com- “affirm” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm

#### The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement – their framing collapses since you must say it is true that a world is better than another before you adopt it.

#### They justify substantive skews since there will always be a more correct side of the issue but we compensate for flaws in the lit.

#### Most educational since otherwise we wouldn’t use math or logic to approach topics. Scalar methods like comparison increases intervention – the persuasion of certain DA or advantages sway decisions – T/F binary is descriptive and technical.

#### The ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means it’s constitutive and jurisdictional, that outweighs since it’s a procedural question it questions whether the judge should go outside the scope of the game

#### 1] a[[3]](#footnote-3) “used when expressing rates or ratios; in, to, or for each; per” but there are no numbers in the rez

#### 2] just[[4]](#footnote-4) describes what is “(of treatment) deserved or appropriate in the circumstances” but the res doesn’t specify circumstances

#### 3] government[[5]](#footnote-5) is “direction; control; management; rule” but a direction can’t perform an action

#### 4] to[[6]](#footnote-6) is to “expressing motion in the direction of (a particular location)” but the rez doesn’t have a location

#### 5] recognize[[7]](#footnote-7) is to “(of a person presiding at a meeting or debate) call on (someone) to speak” but a right can’t speak

#### 6] an[[8]](#footnote-8) “forming names of organic compounds, chiefly polysaccharides” but a right isn’t an organic compound

#### 7] of[[9]](#footnote-9) “expressing an age” but the rez is atemporal

#### 8] a worker[[10]](#footnote-10) “a person who produces or achieves a specified thing” but the rez doesn’t spec

#### 9] strike[[11]](#footnote-11) is to “cause (someone) to be in a specified state” but the rez doesn’t spec

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” //Massa

But **justice,** however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It **is that which must not wait.** To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: **a just decision is always required immediately, "right away." It cannot furnish itself with** infinite information and the **unlimited knowledge of conditions,** rules or hypothetical imperatives **that could justify it.** And **even if it did** have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, **the moment of decision,** as such, **always remains a finite moment of urgency** and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effectof this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, **since it always marks the interruption of the** juridico- or ethico- or politico-**cognitive deliberation that precedes it,** that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. **Even if time** and prudence,the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions **were** hypothetically **unlimited, the decision would be structurally finite,** however late it came, decision of urgency and precipitation, **acting in** the night of **non-knowledge and non-rule**

#### Objective knowledge of the external world is epistemically nonsensical.

**Neta**, Ram. “External World Skepticism.” The Problem of The External World, **2014**, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-the-External-World.pdf. //Massa recut CVHS SR

You take yourself to know that you have hands. But notice that, **if you do have hands**, then **you are not merely a brain** floating **in a vat of nutrient fluid and being electrochemically stimulated to have the sensory experiences** that you have now: such a brain does not have hands, but you do. So if you know that you do have hands, then you must also be in a position to know that you are not such a brain. But **how could you know that you are not such a brain? If you were such a brain, everything would seem** exactly **as it does now**; **you would** (by hypothesis) **have all** the same **sensory experiences** that you’re having **right now**. Since your **empirical knowledge of the world** around you **must somehow be based upon your sensory experiences, how could these experiences**—the very same experiences that you would have if you were a brain in a vat—**furnish you with knowledge that you’re not such a brain? And if you don’t know that you’re not such a brain, then you cannot know that you have hands.**

## 3

#### Interp: If the affirmative defends anything other than “Resolved, a just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike” then they must provide a counter-solvency advocate for their specific advocacy in the 1AC. (To clarify, you must have an author that states we should not do your aff, insofar as the aff is not a whole res phil aff)

#### Violation

#### Prefer

#### 1. Limits – there are infinite things you could defend outside the exact text of the resolution which pushes you to the limits of contestable arguments, even if your interp of the topic is better, the only way to verify if it’s substantively fair is proof of counter-arguments. Nobody knows your aff better than you, so if you can’t find an answer, I can’t be expected to. Our interp narrows out trivially true advocacies since counter-solvency advocates ensure equal division of ground for both sides.

#### 2. Research – Forces the aff to go to the other side of the library and contest their own view points, as well as encouraging in depth-research about their own position. Having one also encourages more in-depth answers since I can find responses. Key to education since we definitionally learn more about positions when we contest our own.

## 4

#### Interpretation—the aff must disclose the plan text, framework, and advantage area 30 minutes before the round. To clarify, disclosure can occur on the wiki or over message.

#### Violation—they didn't, they disclosed 15 minutes before the round and lied about disclosre, competing interps means hold them to the norm they justified

A screenshot of a phone

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

#### Vote neg for prep and clash—two internal links—a) neg prep—4 minutes of prep is not enough to put together a coherent 1nc or update generics—30 minutes is necessary to learn a little about the affirmative and piece together what 1nc positions apply and cut and research their applications to the affirmative, 15 minutes is far too little b) aff quality—plan text disclosure discourages cheap shot affs. If the aff isn't inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, it should lose—this will answer the 1ar's claim about innovation—with 30 minutes of prep, there's still an incentive to find a new strategic, well justified aff, but no incentive to cut a horrible, incoherent aff that the neg can't check against the broader literature.

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.google.com/search?q=a+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=a+definition+&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i64l3j69i60l2j69i61.1923j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. <https://www.google.com/search?q=just+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=just+defi&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i57j69i60l3.1304j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/government> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. <https://www.google.com/search?q=to+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=to+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60l3.1415j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. <https://www.google.com/search?q=recognize+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=recognize+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57.4104j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. <https://www.google.com/search?q=an+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=an+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i64j69i60j69i61l2.1776j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. <https://www.google.com/search?q=of+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=of+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i61l3.1473j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. <https://www.google.com/search?q=worker+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=worker+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57.3726j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. <https://www.google.com/search?q=strike+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=strike+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57.3064j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-11)