# 1NC R4 UH

## 1

#### The standard is act hedonistic util. Prefer –

#### 1] Prep – small school debaters only need a few good generics like deterrence, the civilian casualties disad, and the ICJ counterplan to win every util round. But under agonism, since contentions are less variable and analytics are more important, big-school block-writing hoses them every round. Blocks don’t matter nearly as much for util since innovation checks coaching bias.

#### 2] Innovation – there are simply more articles written in the context of util than in agonism – simple Google search proves. Proves util incentivizes a wider variety of arguments than agonism, which causes recycling of old args – proven by the fact that the same agonism justifications have been read every phil round for decades. Think about it – new advantages are broken often, but phil contentions are established at the beginning of the topic and never change for two months.

#### 3] Ground – non-util philosophies conclude overwhelmingly on one side of most topics – for example, Kant won every neg round on the national service topic. Only util generates robust debates with equitable ground.

#### 4] Real-world – abstract debates about philosophy have much less grounding in the real world than util – discussing consequences gives students education about fopo, economics, IR, etc. Outweighs since portable skills are the ultimate goal of debate.

#### TJFs first – substance begs the question of a framework being good for debate – fairness is a gateway issue to deciding the better debater and education is the reason schools fund debate

#### Hacking towards Satellites is coming now – incentives and vulnerabilities align.

Culpan 21 Tim Culpan 11-2-2021 "The Next Big Hack Could Come From the Stars" <https://archive.is/XElln#selection-3035.0-3040.0> (Bloomberg Opinion Columnist)//Elmer

“As space becomes more important, there becomes unfortunately even greater incentives for malicious actors to disrupt, deny or alter our space-based assets,” Bob Kolasky, head of the Department of Homeland Security’s National Risk Management Center, told the same conference organized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. “With space, whatever you put in orbit is what you must live with. Systems must be designed so that they can address threats and hazards throughout their lifespan.” What makes satellites and their associated land-based infrastructure more vulnerable is that the data they transmit can be easily accessed by anyone on Earth with $300 worth of TV reception equipment, allowing you to eavesdrop on unencrypted financial data or download information from Russian and American weather satellites in real time. A nefarious actor with its own satellite could even cause interference or block the signal from these orbiting stations. But among the scariest of scenarios would be for an adversary to break into the control systems of a satellite, redirect its movement or even crash it into another satellite or the planet. That may have already happened. According to one account, a breach at the Goddard Space Flight Center in Washington, D.C., in 1998 led to a U.S.-German satellite called ROSAT being overtaken and turned toward the sun, damaging the ultraviolet filter on its image sensors. This allegation has been denied, yet whether real or apocryphal the incident (the filter was indeed destroyed by the sun) shows the challenges of repairing hardware 360 miles above the earth’s surface or even investigating the cause of the malfunction.

#### Megaconstellations solves satellite hacking – multiple warrants. Commercial Satellites are key due to production capacity.

Hallex and Cottom 20 Hallex, Matthew, and Travis Cottom. "Proliferated commercial satellite constellations: Implications for national security." Joint Forces Quarterly 97.July (2020): 20-29. (Matthew A. Hallex is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Travis S. Cottom is a Research Associate at the Institute for Defense Analyses.)//Re-cut by Elmer

While potentially threatening the sustainability of safe orbital operations, new proliferated constellations also offer opportunities for the United States to increase the resilience of its national security space architectures. Increasing the resilience of U.S. national security space architectures has strategic implications beyond the space domain. Adversaries such as China and Russia see U.S. dependence on space as a key vulnerability to exploit during a conflict. Resilient, proliferated satellite constellations support deterrence by denying adversaries the space superiority they believe is necessary to initiate and win a war against the United States.28 Should deterrence fail, these constellations could provide assured space support to U.S. forces in the face of adversary counterspace threats while imposing costs on competitors by rendering their investments in counterspace systems irrelevant. Proliferated constellations can support these goals in four main ways. First, the extreme degree of disaggregation inherent in government and commercial proliferated constellations could make them more resilient to attacks by many adversary counterspace systems. A constellation composed of hundreds or thousands of satellites could withstand losing a relatively large number of them before losing significant capability. Conducting such an attack with kinetic antisatellite weapons—like those China and Russia are developing—would require hundreds of costly weapons to destroy satellites that would be relatively inexpensive to replace. Second, proliferated constellations would be more resilient to adversary electronic warfare. Satellites in LEO can emit signals 1,280 times more powerful than signals from satellites in GEO.29 They also are faster in the sky than satellites in more distant orbits, which, combined with the planned use of small spot beams for communications proliferated constellations, would shrink the geographic area in which an adversary ground-based jammer could effectively operate, making jammers less effective and easier to geolocate and eliminate.30 Third, even if the United States chooses not to deploy national security proliferated constellations during peacetime, industrial capacity for mass-producing proliferated constellation satellites could be repurposed during a conflict. Just as Ford production lines shifted from automobiles to tanks and aircraft during World War II, one can easily imagine commercial satellite factories building military reconnaissance or communications satellites during a conflict. Fourth, deploying and maintaining constellations of hundreds or thousands of satellites will drive the development of low-cost launches to a much higher rate than is available today. Inexpensive, high-cadence space launch could provide a commercial solution to operationally responsive launch needs of the U.S. Government. In a future where space launches occur weekly or less, the launch capacity needed to augment national security space systems during a crisis or to replace systems lost during a conflict in space would be readily available.31

#### Hacking on Satellites goes Nuclear.

Miller and Fontaine 17 James Miller and Richard Fontaine 11-26-2017 "Cyber and Space Weapons Are Making Nuclear Deterrence Trickier" <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/11/cyber-and-space-weapons-are-making-nuclear-deterrence-trickier/142767/> (James N. Miller, Jr. is a member of the Board of Advisors of the Center for a New American Security. He served as U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 2012 to 2014.)//Elmer

Cyber weapons are not, of course, the sole preserve of Russia. Washington has acknowledged its own development of them, and senior U.S. officials have highlighted their use against ISIS. Their possession by both Russia and the United States complicates traditional notions of strategic stability. Using non-kinetic, non-lethal cyber tools is likely to be very attractive in a crisis, and certainly in a conflict. Yet with both sides possessing the means to disrupt or destroy the other’s military systems and critical infrastructure – both war-supporting infrastructure as well as purely civilian infrastructure - a small “cyber-spark” could prompt rapid escalation. Such an attack could inadvertently “detonate” a cyber weapon that had been intended to lay dormant in the other side’s systems. Or a spark produced by sub-national actors – “patriotic hackers” inside or outside the government – could generate unintended cascading effects. The spark could even come via a false flag attack, with a third-party trying to pit the United States and Russia against one another. A second scenario could appear if armed conflict looks likely. At the outset, there would exist strong incentives to use offensive cyber and counter-space capabilities early, in order to negate the other side’s military. The U.S. and Russian militaries depend (though not equally) on information technology and space assets to collect and disseminate intelligence, as well as for command, control, and communications. Hence the incentive to use non-kinetic cyber or space attacks to degrade the other side’s military, with few if any direct casualties. By moving first, the cyber- or space-attacker could gain military and coercive advantage, while putting the onus on the attacked side to dare escalate with “kinetic” lethal attacks. Would the United States or Russia respond with, say, missile strikes or a bombing campaign in response to some fried computers or dead robots in outer space? Given the doubt that they would, large-scale cyber and space attacks – before a kinetic conflict even starts – are likely to be seen as a low-risk, high-payoff move for both sides. A third scenario plays out if one side believes that its critical infrastructure and satellites are far less vulnerable than the other side. In that case, a severe crisis or conflict might prompt the country to threaten (and perhaps provide a limited demonstration of) cyber attacks on civilian critical infrastructure, or non-kinetic attacks on space assets. Such a move would require the attacked side to respond not in kind but by escalating. So far, the three scenarios we have described could well undermine stability between the United States and Russia, but need not implicate nuclear stability. Yet consider this: U.S. and Russian nuclear forces rely on information technology and space assets for warning and communications. Attack the right satellites, or attack the right computers, and one side may disrupt the other’s ability to use nuclear weapons – or at least place doubt in the minds of its commanders. As a result, a major cyber and space attack could put nuclear “use-or-lose” in play early in a crisis. While we are generally accustomed to thinking about nuclear use as the highest rung on the escalatory ladder, such pressures – generated via non-nuclear attacks – could bring the horrors of a nuclear exchange closer rather than substituting for them.

## 2

#### Permissibility and presumption negate

#### 1] Obligations- the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove an obligation, policies require positive justification and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation.

#### 2] Falsity- Statements are more often false than true because proving one part of the statement false disproves the entire statement. Presuming all statements are true creates contradictions which would be ethically bankrupt.

#### 3] Negating is harder – A] Aff gets first and last speech which control the direction of the debate B] Affirmatives can strategically uplayer in the 1ar giving them a 7-6 time skew advantage, splitting the 2nr C] They get infinite prep time

#### Skepticism negates

#### 1] Resolution can never be true because the aff has to prove they prescribe an obligatory moral action, but no moral actions negates textually, it makes no sense to affirm if they cant win not appropriating is good

#### 2] Aff has 100% burden of proof, agents are categorically bound by your framework, if we don’t fulfill obligation under that then we are acting immorally since we are omitting. Those ethical obligations have to be 100% correct and have a 100% certainty behind them because ethical theories will collapse if obligations can be contingent

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” //Massa

But **justice,** however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It **is that which must not wait.** To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: **a just decision is always required immediately, "right away." It cannot furnish itself with** infinite information and the **unlimited knowledge of conditions,** rules or hypothetical imperatives **that could justify it.** And **even if it did** have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, **the moment of decision,** as such, **always remains a finite moment of urgency** and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effectof this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, **since it always marks the interruption of the** juridico- or ethico- or politico-**cognitive deliberation that precedes it,** that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. **Even if time** and prudence,the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions **were** hypothetically **unlimited, the decision would be structurally finite,** however late it came, decision of urgency and precipitation, **acting in** the night of **non-knowledge and non-rule**

#### Objective knowledge of the external world is epistemically nonsensical.

**Neta**, Ram. “External World Skepticism.” The Problem of The External World, **2014**, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-the-External-World.pdf. //Massa recut CVHS SR

You take yourself to know that you have hands. But notice that, **if you do have hands**, then **you are not merely a brain** floating **in a vat of nutrient fluid and being electrochemically stimulated to have the sensory experiences** that you have now: such a brain does not have hands, but you do. So if you know that you do have hands, then you must also be in a position to know that you are not such a brain. But **how could you know that you are not such a brain? If you were such a brain, everything would seem** exactly **as it does now**; **you would** (by hypothesis) **have all** the same **sensory experiences** that you’re having **right now**. Since your **empirical knowledge of the world** around you **must somehow be based upon your sensory experiences, how could these experiences**—the very same experiences that you would have if you were a brain in a vat—**furnish you with knowledge that you’re not such a brain? And if you don’t know that you’re not such a brain, then you cannot know that you have hands.**

## 3

#### Interp: debaters must record their speeches

#### Violation: They didn’t record, that was cx

#### A] Cheating – debaters can fake internet drop offs and then steal prep which decks reciprocity. O/Ws since it destroys competitive incentives and educational value.

#### B] Accidents

#### Education is a voter since it is the only portable and durable skill that influences our subject formation. Fairness is a voter since a] debate is a game, competition equity matters proven by desire for wins, b] is worthless without rules and equal access.

#### Drop the debater – a] deters future abuse through a loss and b] set better norms for debate since you are less likely to repeat a practice you can lose for

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear model of debate, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate through offense [c] offense defense paradigm is the best method for evaluation since you can compare benefits under both interps easier.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, if logic isn’t true then you should hack against them, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

## 4

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose a finalized version of the 1AC 10 minutes before the round

#### Violation: They don’t

#### Standards

#### A] Hiding tricks

#### Tricking novices

#### Accessibility is an IVI

#### B] Clash