# 1NC R4 UH

## 1

#### The standard is act hedonistic util. Prefer –

#### 1] Prep – small school debaters only need a few good generics like deterrence, the primacy disad, and the analytic counterplan to win every util round. But under kant, since contentions are less variable and analytics are more important, big-school block-writing hoses them every round. Blocks don’t matter nearly as much for util since innovation checks coaching bias.

#### 2] Innovation – there are simply more articles written in the context of util than in kant – simple Google search proves. Proves util incentivizes a wider variety of arguments than agonism, which causes recycling of old args – proven by the fact that the same agonism justifications have been read every phil round for decades. Think about it – new advantages are broken often, but phil contentions are established at the beginning of the topic and never change for two months.

#### 3] Ground – non-util philosophies conclude overwhelmingly on one side of most topics – for example, Kant won every neg round on the national service topic. Only util generates robust debates with equitable ground.

#### 4] Real-world – abstract debates about philosophy have much less grounding in the real world than util – discussing consequences gives students education about fopo, economics, IR, etc. Outweighs since portable skills are the ultimate goal of debate.

#### TJFs first – substance begs the question of a framework being good for debate – fairness is a gateway issue to deciding the better debater and education is the reason schools fund debate

#### Japan’s space industry is driven by private actors.

Jaxa 18 2-8-2018 "Focal Point on commercial space exploration in Japan" https://media.nature.com/full/nature-cms/uploads/ckeditor/attachments/8865/00\_Editorial\_UK.pdf (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency is the Japanese national aerospace and space agency. Through the merger of three previously independent organizations, JAXA was formed on 1 October 2003.)//Elmer

“The world’s space industry is in the throes of a major transformation,” says Masayasu Ishida. An energetic Tokyoite, Ishida is a principal at the management consulting firm A.T. Kearney and co-founder and president of the Spacetide Foundation, an organization dedicated to promoting space businesses globally. Historically, space has been the exclusive domain of government and multinational projects, but increasingly private enterprises are venturing above in a movement dubbed ‘new space’. Entrepreneurs such as Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk and Richard Branson have captured the headlines, but this movement is not restricted to famous entrepreneurs or huge corporations. Increasingly, small to medium-sized businesses are becoming involved. Ishida, who has written a book on promoting the space industry to the private sector, is excited about Japan’s involvement in new space. “I think Japan has the potential to be one of the world’s new-space industry hubs,” he says. “Future space exploration needs innovative technologies like robotics, artificial intelligence, advanced communication, and new materials, which will be brought by non-space industries,” he explains. “Japan is home to many of the world’s leading industries, and has a variety of technological assets. Their involvement could be of help in the global space exploration effort.” Yasuhiro Yukimatsu, deputy director-general of the National Space Policy Secretariat, Cabinet Office, notes that Japanese companies and universities have developed micro-, nano- and even pico-satellite technology, which allows countries that have yet to join the space community affordable access to space. Ishida concurs: “Japanese space-related business players have unique technologies and are working on projects such as small launchers, space debris removal, and space resource mining.” JAPAN IN SPACE Japan has a proud history of ‘old space’ government-funded exploration. It was the fourth country to venture into space, and the third one to send spacecraft to both Mars and the Moon. It has the distinction of being the only country to have brought a sample back from an extraterrestrial body besides the Moon, when Hayabusa landed in the Australian outback in 2010 with a sample collected from the surface a deep-space asteroid. But times are changing. “For the industry to realize sustainable growth, a shift from the government to the private sector is urgently needed,” says Masanori Tsuruda from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). This shift is driven in part by shrinking government budgets for big projects as well as the many emerging possibilities for enterprises to profit from space.

#### Japan space commitment re-vitalizes and modernizes the US-Japan Alliance.

Wright 20 John Wright 2-4-2020 "Where No Alliance Has Gone Before: US-Japan Military Cooperation in Space" <https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/where-no-alliance-has-gone-before-us-japan-military-cooperation-in-space/> (Major John Wright is a U.S. Air Force officer, pilot, and a Mike and Maureen Mansfield Fellow. He is a Foreign Area Officer who specializes in Japan, and recent author of the book “Deep Space Warfare: Military Strategy Beyond Orbit.” The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and not necessarily those of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Government, Mansfield Foundation, or any other government or government entity.)//Elmer

With the United States’ December 21, 2019 creation of a separate and sovereign branch of its military completely devoted to space, the U.S. Space Force, the global race to emancipate a portion of national military power from terrestrial shackles and place it firmly into orbit is on. The announcement also unleashed a somewhat unexpected cascading effect: the increased attention paid to military space activities by U.S. allies and partners, who have no choice but to follow where the U.S. military moves its gravitational pull. In particular, Japan has made announcements in recent days that indicate its intention to remain in lockstep with the United States, at least in terms of defense. On January 5, 2020, scarcely two weeks following the U.S. Space Force announcement, the Japanese government indicated it plans to rename the Japan Air Self Defense Force to the Japan Aerospace Defense Force. Not coincidentally, on January 21, during a speech given on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe vowed to make the alliance “a pillar for safeguarding peace and security in both outer space and cyberspace.” While words are good, actions are better. In a less-noticed but more consequential move, the Ministry of Defense is finalizing a bill to be placed before the Diet that asks to craft a space operations-exclusive military unit staffed with 20 personnel. While this paltry number of people can barely be expected to efficiently run their task of monitoring space debris and “suspicious satellites,” the move is a significant step for a nation that often struggles with global defense developments due to Japan’s unique domestic restrictions and legal concerns. In many ways, it is surprising to see Japan, a nation that still sorties 1960s-era F-4 aircraft (though there are plans to replace them with F-35s), and is fielding their very first military Remote Piloted Aircraft (a model the United States has been flying for nearly 20 years) in 2021, take its defense posture in space seriously. These initiatives have several implications. First, the Japanese government’s attitude toward space and its place in the U.S.-Japan alliance reflects what’s at stake during the next major conflict, which will surely involve space. As an increasing number of government and commercial systems depend on space assets and space support, space can no longer be ignored as a future theater; the time is now to incorporate space into alliance strategy. This strategy, however, needs to catch up. Currently, Japan refers to space as a “new domain” in the 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines and briefly discusses space defense in the annual 2019 Defense of Japan white paper. Space is completely left out of the now-outdated 2015 Guidelines for U.S.- Japan Defense Cooperation. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Second, Japan’s emphasis is a good move for the alliance as a whole, and enhances its survivability. If Japan takes measurable steps to join its ally and if Japan meaningfully contributes to space security, space is less likely to become another seam where the alliance could come undone. Further, there is a strategic advantage to taking a stance on both position and form when it comes to space. While other nations will struggle to “get serious” about space, and will need to decide between size, scope, and capability of their forces, Japan has confirmed its political and defensive outlook toward space, which means it has also acknowledged space’s effect on combined alliance defense. This is good, since the political dangers posed in space are very real. Despite the existence of the well-intentioned but toothless Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which prohibits use of force activities in space, the obvious future is that space will act as yet another stage upon which the political games of earthbound nation-states will play out. Nation-state competition will not disappear as states found and fund forces to travel, explore, and exploit the inky blackness of space; rather, competition will intensify, as discoveries with both economic and defense applications are made, and as states better understand how vulnerable they are without proper space defense and deterrence. This is the political reality of space, and the fact that both members of the U.S.-Japan alliance understand this means the alliance has much less danger of breaking apart upon first contact with space-centric competition. If anything, mutual interest in the same environment will lead to cooperative efforts and a strengthened alliance here on Earth. Notably, the odds of military confrontation in space have also increased. By funneling U.S. military space power into the highest echelon of military independence and funding (an independent service), escalation and competition is not far behind. It will not be surprising if we see several other competitors forming their own service-level forces by year’s end, though their actual forms will likely vary greatly. The fact that the United States has “jumped” to a service-sized solution to military space competition, and not a smaller organization like a corps or geographic command, means other nations have no real strategic options but to match the U.S. precedent as close as they can in size and capability. The U.S.-Japan alliance must prepare for this eventuality. Japanese government decisions to strengthen its space defense capabilities thus come from a mix of terrestrial strategy, political realities, and prudent alliance management. However, significant challenges remain. For one thing, today’s nation-states (including the United States) are understandably gun-shy about sharing space defense capabilities and space-centric technology, which means alliance military space activity will naturally move at the speed of the slowest member. For another, we do not yet know just what space-on-space conflict will look like between combatants who possess similar space-based strength, which makes warfare difficult to plan for and will present an immediate challenge to alliance coordination should such a conflict occur. Despite these doubts, recent Japanese government announces are positive and will help usher both the alliance and U.S.-Japan relations through its current comparatively rocky period of trade spats and quibbles over military basing. Without a doubt, the political impact of allied space defense could easily result in the U.S.-Japan alliance extending its prerogatives beyond Earth’s territorial confines.

#### Strong US-Japan alliance prevents a range of existential threats.

Hamre 16 John Hamre, President and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Former Under Secretary of Defense, and Richard Armitage, President of Armitage International, Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, co-chairs of the U.S.-Japan Commission on the Future of the Alliance, et al., “The U.S.-Japan Alliance to 2030: Power and Principle”, Report of the Commission on the Future of the Alliance, 2/29/2016, p. 1-5

The U.S.-Japan Alliance has helped to provide security and prosperity to the Asia-Pacific region and the broader international community for more than half a century. The Alliance enabled the United States and Japan to prevail in the Cold War, based on the principles of deterrence, democratic values, and free market dynamism. Today, the U.S.-Japan Alliance is as strong as it has been at any time during its existence. The Commission believes the Alliance will need all of its current strength and more, since the international security environment over the next 15 years will be as challenging and uncertain as any the United States and Japan have faced. In addition to challenges from a rising China and aggrieved Russia, the United States and Japan both have vital interests in the Middle East, which is an increasingly unstable and violent region. Global challenges such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and climate change will also require wise policy and firm action. One central characteristic of this emerging strategic dynamic will be intensified competition for power and influence across ideological, economic, and security spheres between liberal democracies on the one hand and ambitious or aggrieved authoritarian regimes on the other. The Commission believes that this competition need not—and in fact is unlikely to—result in war. Moreover, there are many areas in which countries from across the ideological spectrum can and will increase mutual cooperation, including macroeconomic coordination, countering violent Islamic extremism, responding to climate change, and reversing nuclear proliferation by states such as North Korea. Nevertheless, there remain fundamental questions about international norms where leading democracies like the United States and Japan will hold starkly different views from more authoritarian states. These include: the rights of citizens to choose their own governments; the rights of minorities within nations; the independent role of the judiciary and the press; the role of the private sector in the economy; freedom of navigation and flight in international sea and air space; and freedom of the Internet. In Asia, the United States and Japan will have to shape the strategic environment by encouraging responsible Chinese behavior and imposing costs for destabilizing activities. To that end, the United States and Japan will have to build up their own power, and use it wisely and firmly, to preserve a world order that favors both allies’ shared values. The United States and Japan have taken a number of very important actions in the recent past to strengthen the Alliance. These include Japan’s issuance of its first national security strategy, establishment of a National Security Council (NSC) and an associated permanent staff organization, increases in the defense budget, and passage of security legislation authorizing closer cooperation with the United States. The United States has stated an intention to rebalance U.S. strategic attention and military forces towards the Asia-Pacific region. Both countries have concluded updated bilateral Defense Guidelines for closer security cooperation and have reached an agreement for wider and deeper economic cooperation through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). These achievements provide a solid foundation for the continued actions that the Commission recommends in this report. The United States and Japan have unmatched strengths for the competitive environment they will face. Together the two allies account for 28 percent of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 43 percent of the world’s wealth. The economies of both countries use and produce the highest levels of technology, and have the research and development systems to stay at the cutting edge of discovery and innovation. Their citizenries are well educated, hardworking, and innovative. Their armed forces are among the world’s most advanced and are well led and trained. Their values of freedom and democracy have a universal appeal that has been repeatedly demonstrated in all parts of the world and particularly in Asia. The U.S.-Japan Alliance has endured for 60 years and adapted to meet an array of new internal and external challenges. The Commission believes that the United States and Japan must develop a shared vision of the world both nations seek in the next 15 years. Democracies need a vision to inspire their own citizens and to synchronize the efforts of their governments and private organizations. As partners in an increasingly interconnected and competitive world, the United States and Japan must also offer a vision that will gain the support of other countries. The Commission proposes the following vision for the U.S.-Japan Alliance: The United States and Japan seek a world in 2030 in which all nations are secure, peaceful, prosperous, and free. Working to build this world, the United States and Japan will make national contributions that reflect each nation’s respective capabilities, legal obligations, and traditions, but will always remain united on shared goals. The United States and Japan are global powers with global responsibilities, but their Alliance will continue to focus as it always has on the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Peace and Security: The United States and Japan will work together to:  preserve peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region based on the Mutual Security Treaty through bilateral efforts to maintain a favorable balance of power and to deter and, if necessary, to defeat armed aggression and attempts at coercion against their own interests, and those of their allies and friends;  defend and preserve the existing order based on established international rules and norms;  seek peaceful, negotiated resolution of issues between nations, free from military force or coercion;  support multilateral organizations in developing solutions to global challenges; and  lead and participate in international actions against state and non-state actors that use terrorist tactics and criminal actions or otherwise threaten the safety of their citizens and those of their allies and friends. Prosperity: The United States and Japan will work together to:  support the unimpeded international flow of investment, goods, and services to raise the prosperity of all nations, especially those at lower levels of development;  provide assistance both through international organizations and directly to developing nations to improve all the aspects of economic development and governance, private sector competence, and human capacity, including women’s empowerment;  strengthen existing institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund that provide development assistance and seek to promote principles of good governance; and  play leading roles in reducing environmental threats to the health, and potentially the safety, of their own citizens and others around the world. Freedom: The United States and Japan will work together to:  support advancement of the principles expressed in the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights;  ensure the observance of these principles in their own countries;  speak out and take clear public stands in the support of those principles; and  work over the long term, and when opportunities arise in the short term, to advance those principles in authoritarian countries as well as failing states. In this report, the Commission recommends a set of coordinated policies that will move the Alliance closer to achieving its shared vision of a peaceful, secure, prosperous, and free world. As major economic powers and democracies, Japan and the United States should continuously stress two foundational pillars of the Alliance. First, leaders and opinion makers in the United States and Japan need to strengthen and sustain public support in both countries for active international leadership, using the full range of foreign policy tools, including military capabilities when necessary. In the United States, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused debates in both the Republican and Democratic parties about the utility of force, particularly with respect to the Middle East. In Japan, although security legislation was enacted in 2015 to allow the exercise of the right to collective self-defense, there is persistent and substantial opposition to a more active security role for the military, and misgivings about the use of military force—even for purely defensive purposes. The Commission recognizes that military power cannot be the sole or even the primary instrument of national security policy. However, the potential employment of military force is often necessary to support diplomacy, deter aggression, and keep the peace; and the utilization of the armed forces, whether in the form of advisers, peacekeepers, or combat units, will remain essential to deal with some threats to peace and security in the future. The United States and Japan must have fully-funded, modern, and highly capable military forces, and they must be willing to employ them in support of the peaceful, secure, prosperous, and free world that they seek. Leaders in both countries have a responsibility to explain these realities to their publics. Second, in order to provide the foundation for the policies outlined in this report, both countries need to take action to support their economies, to resume economic growth in the case of Japan, and to sustain recovery from the recession of 2008 in the case of the United States. Without higher rates of economic growth, the United States and Japan will face significantly greater difficulties managing the international challenges that are likely to emerge over the coming 15 years. Both countries have the fiscal and monetary policy tools necessary to stimulate growth, but both must also undertake structural changes that require continued political attention. In the case of Japan these include: growing the workforce in the face of a falling national birth rate; increasing productivity through more widespread adoption of information technology; and reversing the growth of the highest debt levels of any advanced country. In the case of the United States these include: modernizing the country’s aging physical and cyber infrastructure; containing the costs of medical care and social security payments for the large generation now retiring; and providing real energy security by coupling the increased production of domestic oil and gas with reduced dependence of the transportation sector on oil. Both countries must also improve their educational systems to create the digital workforce of the future. II. The Strategic Environment through 2030 For the first time in nearly a quarter century, the world is witnessing multiple momentous challenges to the international order. China’s emergence, Russia’s resurgence, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL’s) barbarity are forcing the United States and Japan to address simultaneous, diverse threats to the international order. Within Asia, increasing prosperity and economic interdependence coincide with intensifying friction among the major powers. Changes in relative power, rapid expansion in the military budgets of some states, territorial disputes, historical animosities, irregular threats, and nuclear proliferation all present serious risks to regional security. Managing these challenges will require an understanding of how long-term trends, such as demographics, technology, and climate change, are likely to affect the strategic environment. Asia is the world’s most dynamic region, so understanding current trends and potential future discontinuities is essential if the United States and Japan are to adopt an overall strategy that is capable of adapting effectively to rapid shifts in the security environment. While regional trends in the Asia-Pacific region favor continued growth and economic integration, there are pockets of uncertainty that could threaten both economic progress and political stability. These include: obstacles to China’s economic transition from its past export-led growth model to a domestically driven model; the shrinking working age population in Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, and Singapore; and the over-reliance of countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Australia on Chinese momentum to drive their own growth. Economic growth and integration in Asia have been driven by intra-regional trade as well as global investment flows and production networks, underpinned by the international financial institutions established at Bretton Woods and sustained since then with the active support of Japan and the United States. However, as the international economy has diversified, the original managers of global financial governance, such as the G-7, have lost ground to more inclusive but less effective groupings, such as the G-20. Moreover, progress on global trade liberalization at the World Trade Organization (WTO) has stalled. China is challenging the existing international financial institutions with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its new “One Belt, One Road” initiatives. At the same time, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), led by the United States and Japan, has the potential to reboot international trade liberalization and governance. Passage of TPP in Japan, the United States, and the ten other participating countries would boost economic growth in Asia by reducing barriers, establishing standards for ensuring protection of intellectual property in new areas such as e-commerce, empowering China’s economic reformers as Beijing is drawn by preferential tariffs to join TPP, animating negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and perhaps eventually helping to revitalize the pursuit of global free trade agreements through the WTO. Governance of global trade and finance is in flux, but the forces of liberalization and integration are still present. Beyond these economic concerns the dangers of climate change and ecological degradation threaten the region. The ability of the major Asia-Pacific economies to cooperate in the face of all these transnational challenges will have important implications for the future strategic environment. While China and the United States are the world’s leading emitters of greenhouse gases (in that order), Japan is the world’s superpower in clean technology and energy efficiency. There are encouraging signs of U.S. and Chinese initiatives to curb greenhouse gas emissions as well as the recent agreement at the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, but these promises remain aspirational and unenforceable, requiring further efforts at bilateral, regional, and global cooperation to reduce carbon emissions.

## 2

#### Permissibility and presumption negate

#### 1] Obligations- the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove an obligation, policies require positive justification and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation.

#### 2] Falsity- Statements are more often false than true because proving one part of the statement false disproves the entire statement. Presuming all statements are true creates contradictions which would be ethically bankrupt.

#### 3] Negating is harder – A] Aff gets first and last speech which control the direction of the debate B] Affirmatives can strategically uplayer in the 1ar giving them a 7-6 time skew advantage, splitting the 2nr C] They get infinite prep time

## 3

#### Interp: debaters must record their speeches Violation: They didn't record, that was cx A] Cheating – debaters can fake internet drop offs and then steal prep which decks reciprocity. O/Ws since it destroys competitive incentives and educational value since they are structurally ahead

#### B] Accidents possible, external conditions like power going out, wifi dropping off, or excessive background noise make it impossible to hear in real time, recordings ensure that a speech isn’t given twice, which allows them to remodify and change their strat No regress, its disclosed on my wiki

A picture containing chart

Description automatically generated

#### Education is a voter since it is the only portable and durable skill that influences our subject formation. Fairness is a voter since a] debate is a game, competition equity matters proven by desire for wins, b] is worthless without rules and equal access.

#### Drop the debater – a] deters future abuse through a loss and b] set better norms for debate since you are less likely to repeat a practice you can lose for

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear model of debate, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate through offense [c] offense defense paradigm is the best method for evaluation since you can compare benefits under both interps easier.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, if logic isn’t true then you should hack against them, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices


## 4

#### Interpretation: The aff must disclose all previously read positions as well as round reports for each previous round detailing which positions were read within an hour of the bracket being posted, including open sourced documents . This disclosure must occur on a wiki page corresponding to the debater’s entry.

#### Violation: You don’t we have screenshots

Graphical user interface, application

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#### Standards:

#### 1] Reciprocal Engagement—Irreciprocal disclosure creates the scenario in which one debater is able to view the entirety the opponent’s positions the night before the round, but the opponent is unable to view any of theirs. The aff debater is able to adapt their aff prep to every single neg position we’ve read but not vice versa, creating a massive in-round bias in ability to engage and readiness. Even if we read new arguments, we can’t adapt those arguments to what they’ve already read, but they can to us. That’s a substantially easier path to the ballot. Controls the internal link into accessing any other benefit in the round.

#### 2] Research—Disclosure creates a high incentive to do deeper and more focused research, since debaters quickly learn the stock arguments and can do specific research that they know will be useful.

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#### Treat this as a normal open source shell as well