## 1

#### Interp: Debaters must have recordings of their speeches and send them if requested

#### Violation: They didn't record, that was cx

#### 1] Clipping- debaters can cheat and get away with clipping cards, hearing clipping in real time is near impossible unless its egregious since no one is following along the doc unconditionally. Recordings solve by having literal proof of verifiable clipping violations for theory shells or judges intervening to give an L 20. Cheating outweighs, the playing field isn’t procedurally balanced which comes prior. No regress, its disclosed on my wiki, online debate set a precedent to record so metrics are there

#### 2] Novice accessibility – local recordings can be sent to novices to learn technical debate, 99% of rounds aren’t recorded or posted on YouTube but having source recordings for your teammates or other debaters when they reach out is good- that outweighs, accessibility is an impact filter to all arguments

Graphical user interface, application

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

## 2

#### Interpretation: Debaters must always have their mask on unless eating or drinking.

#### Violation: They took it off

#### Prefer-

#### 1] Safety- Spreading without a mask is the most probable way of spreading COVID and germs – that leads to debaters getting sick and not being able to participate in debate tournaments – this also links into happiness/mental health since tournaments will continue online debate tournaments and close down in person ones when they see an influx incases. Happiness/mental health is an independent voter because it means debaters have no motivation to do debate/participate in they’re unhappy. Inclusion is a voter since its an impact filter to everything else

#### 2] Resolvability and Judge Intervention- masks force debaters to speak slower and more clearly. That guarantees judges catching everything on the flow in order to make the correct decision.

## 3

#### Interp: If the affirmative defends anything other than “Resolved: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.” then they must provide a counter-solvency advocate for their specific advocacy in the 1AC. (To clarify, you must have an author that states we should not do your aff, insofar as the aff is not a whole res phil aff)

#### Violation – No CSA in the doc

#### 1] Limits –infinite things you could defend outside the exact text of the resolution which pushes you to the limits of contestable arguments, even if your interp of the topic is better, the only way to verify if it’s substantively fair is proof of counter-arguments. Nobody knows your aff better than you, so if you can’t find an answer, I can’t be expected to. Our interp narrows out trivially true advocacies since counter-solvency advocates ensure equal division of ground for both sides.

#### 2. Research – Forces the aff to go to the other side of the library and contest their own view points, as well as encouraging in depth-research about their own position. CSAs encourage more in-depth answers since we have inroads to research. Key to education since we definitionally learn more about positions when we contest our own. No regress its disclosed

A picture containing text

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#### Education is a voter since it is the only portable and durable skill that influences our subject formation. Fairness is a voter since a] debate is a game, competition equity matters proven by desire for wins, b] is worthless without rules and equal access.

#### Drop the debater – a] deters future abuse through a loss and b] set better norms for debate since you are less likely to repeat a practice you can lose for

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear model of debate, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate through offense [c] offense defense paradigm is the best method for evaluation since you can compare benefits under both interps easier.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, if logic isn’t true then you should hack against them, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

## 4

#### The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement – their framing collapses since you must say it is true that a world is better than another before you adopt it.

#### They justify substantive skews since there will always be a more correct side of the issue but we compensate for flaws in the lit.

#### Most educational since otherwise we wouldn’t use math or logic to approach topics. Scalar methods like comparison increases intervention – the persuasion of certain DA or advantages sway decisions – T/F binary is descriptive and technical.

#### The ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means it’s constitutive and jurisdictional, that outweighs since it’s a procedural question it questions whether the judge should go outside the scope of the game

1] In**[[3]](#footnote-3)** used as a function word to indicate means, medium, or instrumentality but the resolution doesn’t specify so vote neg on presumption

#### 2] a[[4]](#footnote-4) “used when expressing rates or ratios; in, to, or for each; per” but there are no numbers in the rez

3] democracy**[[5]](#footnote-5)** The practice or principles of social equality but its logically impossible to be inside principles.

4] free**[[6]](#footnote-6)** conveying only the broad sense; not literal, so literal objectivity is impossible, vote neg on presumption

5] press**[[7]](#footnote-7)** Move or cause to move into a position of contact with something by exerting continuous physical force, but theres no movement in the resolution

6] to**[[8]](#footnote-8)** means “expressing motion in the direction of (a particular location)” but the rez doesn’t have direction or location

7] objectivity**[[9]](#footnote-9)**  means the state or quality of being objective and fair, but news has to have one correct literature base

8] over**[[10]](#footnote-10)**  means above or higher than something else, sometimes so that one thing covers the other; above, but theres no positions in the resolution

#### 9] advocacy[[11]](#footnote-11) means the work of defending people in court, but there are no courts in the resolution.

## 5

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not stop the timer in between their speeches

#### Violation – They did when they had to sneeze

#### A] Justifies stealing time by faking reasons to stop, reorganize docs, or steal additional prep time, that outweighs, cheating procedurally decks the playing field that was abov e

#### B] Confused timer synchronization between everyone which means that we can’t check if you went over time since we don’t pre emptively know, that outweighs since it decks procedural time constraints

## 6

#### Reject 1AR Theory arguments – 1) double bind – either you can put minor ink next to answer of my responses and extend your arguments to auto-win or the judge has to intervene to see if the 2ar answers to the 2n are good enough. Intervention o/w since it takes the round out of debater’s hands 2) they have 2 speeches on theory while I have 1 which means they can structurally preempt my answers and respond to them and I can’t do either 3) infinite abuse in the context of aff abuse doesn’t make sense since you can read 1ac theory and uplayer with other 1ar offs like Ks 4) they have 1 more minute on the theory debate due to a 7-6 skew which o/w since theory is mainly about substance 5) they can blow up dropped arguments , we cant frame them out but they can which means only dropped arguments for them are game over.

#### 1AR theory is drop the argument – they can initiate theory in the aff and the 1ar which means they have 2 speeches to devastate the 1n with no risk auto-loss issues.

#### All theory paradigm issues the aff thinks are good must be in the 1ac since they have 1 more speech than me on theory so they should take a stance sooner so I don’t have to answer all of them in one speech while they can go for them in multiple – 2n issues are reciprocally answered by the 2ar.

#### Negating is harder – 1] Infinite prep time to control the direction of the debate, that link turns NC reactivity warrants and skews pre round and in round prep. 2] 7-6 skew on 1ar theory 3] 2AR judge psychology is uniquely bad because 2NR warrants all get responded to

## Case

### Vaccines

#### No extinction from disease:

#### 1] Resilience and countermeasures prevent spread – distinct from burnout

Adalja 16

Amesh Adalja is an infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh, The Atlantic, June 17, 2016, “Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?”, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/

But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained.

I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience.

For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases were the existential threat to humanity—and for good reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death decimated a third of Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed half of all humans who have ever lived.

Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our species’ recent explosion in lifespan is almost exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation, vaccination, and antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the 8th decade of life. Childhoods are free from watching siblings and friends die from outbreaks of typhoid, scarlet fever, smallpox, measles, and the like.

**2] Intervening actors check**

**Zakaria 9—**Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935)

Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize

It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. **After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered** something more like **the usual seasonal influenza**. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic" and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. **Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected** by the disease. **But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases** of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? **Why did** the **predictions of a pandemic turn out to be so exaggerated**? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when they were warning of catastrophe. I think **there is a** broader **mistake in the way we look at the world.** Once we see a problem, we can describe it in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But **we** can **rarely anticipate the human response to that crisis. Take** **swine flu. The virus** **had crucial characteristics** **that led researchers to worry that it could spread far and fast**. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. **But it did not go unchecked**. **In fact, swine flu was met by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter**, **Mexico. The Mexican government reacted quickly** and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. **The noted expert on this subject,** Laurie **Garrett, says, "**We should all stand up and scream, **'Gracias, Mexico**!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events. **They** basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby **really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected**, writers and **officials bring up the Spanish influenza** epidemic **of 1918** in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W. Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. **But the world we live in today looks nothing like 1918. Public health-care systems are far better** and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War. **Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system**—far better than anything Britain or France had in the early 20th century.

#### Natural pandemics don’t cause extinction

Sandberg 6/11/14 (Anders, James Martin Research Fellow at University of Oxford, “The five biggest threats to human existence”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/06/11/the-five-biggest-threats-to-human-existence/)

Natural pandemics have killed more people than wars. However, natural pandemics are unlikely to be existential threats: There are usually people resistant to the pathogen, and the offspring of survivors would be more resistant. Evolution also does not favor parasites that wipe out their hosts, which is why syphilis went from a virulent killer to a chronic disease as it spread in Europe.

#### Disease outbreaks will be defeated with quarantines

**Szalai 7/26** [(Jennifer Szalai - author for the NYT) “The Extradordinary History (and likely busy future) of quarantine” The New York Times. 7-26-2021]

**Quarantine can be lifesaving**; it can also be dangerous, an exercise of extraordinary power in the name of disease control, a presumption of guilt instead of innocence.

In “Until Proven Safe,” a new book about quarantine’s past and future, Geoff Manaugh and Nicola Twilley do an impressively judicious job of explaining exactly why fears of quarantine are understandable and historically justified, while also showing how in coming years “we will almost certainly find ourselves more dependent on quarantine, not less.” Quarantine has to do with risk and uncertainty, and its logic is simple: “There might be something dangerous inside you — something contagious — on the verge of breaking free.”

**While medical advances have made some diseases more diagnosable** and less deadly, newfound knowledge can also accentuate the depths of our ignorance. The more we know, the more we know how much we don’t know — not to mention that **modern life, with escalating numbers of people and goods churning** their way **around the world**, has **increased the opportunities for contagion.**

Quarantine is distinct from isolation, even if the terms are often used interchangeably. Someone is isolated when they are known to be sick; **someone is quarantined when they might be but we cannot be sure**. Manaugh, an architecture and technology blogger, and Twilley, the co-host of a podcast about the science and history of food, bring an impressively wide range of interests to bear on a subject that involves not only infectious disease but also — in their ambitious yet seamless narration — politics, agriculture, surveillance and even outer space.

#### No risk of bioterror

Keller 13 (Rebecca, 7 March 2013, Analyst at Stratfor, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,” Stratfor, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)

The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits. Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal. The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.

#### Chinese shots are effective – studies prove.

Van Beusekom 7-9 Mary Van Beusekom 7-9-2021 "China's CoronaVac vaccine shows good efficacy in 2 studies" <https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2021/07/chinas-coronavac-vaccine-shows-good-efficacy-2-studies> (Medical Editor at Hennepin Healthcare Research Institute)//Elmer

Two new large studies of China's CoronaVac COVID-19 vaccine showed **good efficacy against symptomatic infection and severe disease**, albeit with lower efficacy than the two mRNA coronavirus vaccines currently in use. Overall **83.5% efficacy against infection** Interim efficacy and safety results from a phase 3 trial in Turkey were published yesterday in The Lancet. A team led by researchers from Hacettepe University School of Medicine in Ankara randomly assigned either the inactivated whole-virion CoronaVac vaccine or a placebo to 10,214 healthcare and community volunteers aged 18 to 59 years at 24 centers from Sep 14, 2020, to Jan 5, 2021. Participants received two doses of the vaccine or placebo 14 days apart. Phase 3 trials have been testing CoronaVac since mid-2020 in **Brazil, Indonesia, Chile, and Turkey**, the authors noted. Over a median follow-up of 43 days in the Lancet study, 9 of 6,646 (0.14%) participants in the vaccine group and 32 of 3,568 (0.90%) in the placebo group had symptomatic COVID-19 at least 14 days after their second dose, for a vaccine efficacy of 83.5%. **No vaccinees were hospitalized**, compared with six in the placebo group, for a vaccine efficacy against coronavirus-related hospitalization of 100%. While the analysis of immunologic tests done on a subset of participants is ongoing, early results show that 89.7% of vaccinees had antibodies against the coronavirus's spike protein. Adverse events occurred in 18.9% of vaccinees and 16.9% in placebo recipients. No deaths or serious adverse effects were reported. The most common systemic reaction was fatigue (8.2% in the vaccine group, 7.0% in the placebo group), and the most common local reaction was injection-site pain (2.4% in vaccinees, 1.1% in placebo recipients).

#### China vaccinates Africa

AP News 5-20 5-20-2021 "China says providing vaccines to almost 40 African nations" <https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-africa-china-business-coronavirus-pandemic-ad395006fe0c4daf0e13c3be02f07cc7> //Elmer

BEIJING (AP) — **China said** Thursday **it is providing COVID-19 vaccines to nearly 40 African countries**, describing its actions as purely altruistic in an apparent intensification of what has been **described as “vaccine diplomacy.”** The vaccines were **donated or sold at “favorable prices**,” Foreign Ministry official Wu Peng told reporters. Wu **compared China’s outreach to** the **actions of “some countries that have said they have to wait for their own people to finish** the vaccination before they could supply the vaccines to foreign countries,” in an apparent dig at the United States. “We believe that it is, of course, necessary to ensure that the Chinese people get vaccinated as soon as possible, but for other countries in need, we also try our best to provide vaccine help,” said Wu, who is director of the ministry’s Africa department. While the U.S. has been accused by some of hoarding vaccines, President Joe Biden on Monday pledged to share an additional 20 million vaccine doses in the coming six weeks, bringing the total U.S. commitment to 80 million. The Biden administration hasn’t said which countries will receive them.

### China Rise Good

#### China’s rise will enforce liberal trade values, not revise the order- views on national sovereignty will decrease interventionism and nuclear deterrence solves US-China war.

Xuetong, PhD, ‘19

(Yan, PoliSci@Berkeley, ProfIR@TsinghuaUniversity, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-12-11/age-uneasy-peace>, January/February) BW

Indeed, much as Chinese leaders hope to be on par with their counterparts in Washington, they worry about the strategic implications of a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order. American leaders balk at the idea of relinquishing their position at the top of the global food chain and will likely go to great lengths to avoid having to accommodate China. Officials in Beijing, in no hurry to become the sole object of Washington’s apprehension and scorn, would much rather see a multipolar world in which other challenges—and challengers—force the United States to cooperate with China. In fact, the United States’ own rise in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provides something of a model for how the coming power transition may take place. Because the United Kingdom, the world’s undisputed hegemon at the time, was preoccupied with fending off a challenger in its vicinity—Germany—it did not bother much to contain the rise of a much bigger rival across the pond. China is hoping for a similar dynamic now, and recent history suggests it could indeed play out. In the early months of George W. Bush’s presidency, for instance, relations between Beijing and Washington were souring over regional disputes in the South China Sea, reaching a boiling point when a Chinese air force pilot died in a midair collision with a U.S. surveillance plane in April 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks a few months later, however, Washington came to see China as a useful strategic partner in its global fight against terrorism, and relations improved significantly over the rest of Bush’s two terms. Today, unfortunately, the list of common threats that could force the two countries to cooperate is short. After 17 years of counterterrorism campaigns, the sense of urgency that once surrounded the issue has faded. Climate change is just as unlikely to make the list of top threats anytime soon. The most plausible scenario is that a new global economic crisis in the coming years will push U.S. and Chinese leaders to shelve their disagreements for a moment to avoid economic calamity—but this, too, remains a hypothetical. To make matters worse, some points of potential conflict are here to stay—chief among them Taiwan. Relations between Beijing and Taipei, already tense, have taken a turn for the worse in recent years. Taiwan’s current government, elected in 2016, has questioned the notion that mainland China and Taiwan form a single country, also known as the “one China” principle. A future government in Taipei might well push for de jure independence. Yet a Taiwanese independence referendum likely constitutes a redline for Beijing and may prompt it to take military action. If the United States were to respond by coming to Taiwan’s aid, a military intervention by Beijing could easily spiral into a full-fledged U.S.-Chinese war. To avoid such a crisis, Beijing is determined to nip any Taiwanese independence aspirations in the bud by political and economic means. As a result, it is likely to continue lobbying third countries to cut off their diplomatic ties with Taipei, an approach it has already taken with several Latin American countries. Cautious or not, China set somewhat different emphases in its approach to norms that undergird the international order. In particular, a more powerful China will push for a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty in international law. In recent years, some have interpreted public statements by Chinese leaders in support of globalization as a sign that Beijing seeks to fashion itself as the global liberal order’s new custodian, yet such sweeping interpretations are wishful thinking: China is merely signaling its support for a liberal economic order, not for ever-increasing political integration. Beijing remains fearful of outside interference, particularly relating to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, as well as on matters of press freedom and online regulations. As a result, it views national sovereignty, rather than international responsibilities and norms, as the fundamental principle on which the international order should rest. Even as a new superpower in the coming decade, China will therefore pursue a less interventionist foreign policy than the United States did at the apex of its power. Consider the case of Afghanistan: even though it is an open secret that the United States expects the Chinese military to shoulder some of the burden of maintaining stability there after U.S. troops leave the country, the Chinese government has shown no interest in this idea. Increased Chinese clout may also bring attempts to promote a vision of world order that draws on ancient Chinese philosophical traditions and theories of statecraft. One term in particular has been making the rounds in Beijing: wangdao, or “humane authority.” The word represents a view of China as an enlightened, benevolent hegemon whose power and legitimacy derive from its ability to fulfill other countries’ security and economic needs—in exchange for their acquiescence to Chinese leadership. BIPOLARITY IN PRACTICE Given the long shadow of nuclear escalation, the risk of a direct war between China and the United States will remain minimal, even as military, technological, and economic competition between them intensifies. Efforts on both sides to build ever more effective antimissile shields are unlikely to change this, since neither China nor the United States can improve its antimissile systems to the point of making the country completely impervious to a nuclear counterattack. If anything, the United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty will encourage both sides to build up their nuclear forces and improve their second-strike capabilities, ensuring that neither side will be confident it can launch a nuclear attack on the other without suffering a devastating retaliation. The threat of nuclear war will also keep Chinese tensions with other nuclear-armed powers, such as India, from escalating into outright war.

#### China’s drive for regional hegemony is peaceful and not zero-sum with the U.S.---the only scenario for an aggressive rise to power is in response to signals that the U.S. could successfully deny China’s status claims

Paul Heer 19, National Intelligence Officer for East Asia in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from 2007 to 2015, the Robert E. Wilhelm Research Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies and an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, 1/8/19, “Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia,” <https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972>

First, China is pursuing hegemony in East Asia, but not an exclusive hostile hegemony. It is not trying to extrude the United States from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have long recognized the utility—and the benefits to China itself—of U.S. engagement with the region, and they have indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence and overlapping spheres of influence with the United States there. Moreover, China is not trying to impose its political or economic system on its neighbors, and it does not seek to obstruct commercial freedom of navigation in the region (because no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself). In short, Beijing wants to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but not as part of a “winner-take-all” contest.

China does have unsettled and vexing sovereignty claims over Taiwan, most of the islands and other features in the East and South China Seas, and their adjacent waters. Although Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to use force in defense or pursuit of these claims, it is not looking for excuses to do so. Whether these disputes can be managed or resolved in a way that is mutually acceptable to the relevant parties and consistent with U.S. interests in the region is an open, long-term question. But that possibility should not be ruled out on the basis of—or made more difficult by—false assumptions of irreconcilable interests. On the contrary, it should be pursued on the basis of a recognition that all the parties want to avoid conflict—and that the sovereignty disputes in the region ultimately are not military problems requiring military solutions. And since Washington has never been opposed in principle to reunification between China and Taiwan as long as it is peaceful, and similarly takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the other disputed features, their long-term disposition need not be the litmus test of either U.S. or Chinese hegemony in the region.

Of course, China would prefer not to have forward-deployed U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific that could be used against it, but Beijing has long tolerated and arguably could indefinitely tolerate an American military presence in the region—unless that presence is clearly and exclusively aimed at coercing or containing China. It is also true that Beijing disagrees with American principles of military freedom of navigation in the region; and this constitutes a significant challenge in waters where China claims territorial jurisdiction in violation of the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea. But this should not be conflated with a Chinese desire or intention to exclusively “control” all the waters within the first island chain in the Western Pacific. The Chinese almost certainly recognize that exclusive control or “domination” of the neighborhood is not achievable at any reasonable cost, and that pursuing it would be counterproductive by inviting pushback and challenges that would negate the objective.

So what would Chinese “hegemony” in East Asia mean or look like? Beijing probably thinks in terms of something much like American primacy in the Western Hemisphere: a model in which China is generally recognized and acknowledged as the de facto central or primary power in the region, but has little need or incentive for militarily adventurism because the mutual benefits of economic interdependence prevail and the neighbors have no reason—and inherent disincentives—to challenge China’s vital interests or security. And as a parallel to China’s economic and diplomatic engagement in Latin America, Beijing would neither exclude nor be hostile to continued U.S. engagement in East Asia.

A standard counterargument to this relatively benign scenario is that Beijing would not be content with it for long because China’s strategic ambitions will expand as its capabilities grow. This is a valid hypothesis, but it usually overlooks the greater possibility that China’s external ambitions will expand not because its inherent capabilities have grown, but because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive in response to external challenges to Chinese interests or security. Indeed, much of China’s “assertiveness” within East Asia over the past decade—when Beijing probably would prefer to focus on domestic priorities—has been a reaction to such perceived challenges. Accordingly, Beijing’s willingness to settle for a narrowly-defined, peaceable version of regional preeminence will depend heavily on whether it perceives other countries—especially the United States—as trying to deny China this option and instead obstruct Chinese interests or security in the region.

#### China is reactionary not pre-emptively aggressive – US has to be the first mover

Prueher 16 Joseph Prueher 12-12-2016 “How America Can Lead in Asia” <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-america-can-lead-asia-18720?nopaging=1,%2520Accessed%252012-15-2016> (former career U.S. Naval officer, having served as Commander of the Pacific Command, along with J. Stapleton Roy who is a former senior career U.S. diplomat specializing in Asian affairs, Paul Heer who is a former career U.S. intelligence official who served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, David M. Lampton who is Professor and Director of China Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Michael D. Swaine who is a career policy analyst specializing in Asian security issues, especially those involving the U.S.-China relationship, and Ezra Vogel who is Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus at Harvard University)//Elmer

In the security realm, for the first time in modern history, China is developing military capabilities that significantly improve its ability to defend its interests within at least the “first island chain” that extends from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines to continental Southeast Asia. This represents a challenge to traditional U.S. air and sea superiority in the western Pacific, a status that the United States has enjoyed since the end of World War II. In particular, China’s growing military capabilities directly impact U.S. defense alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines, and U.S. security commitments with respect to Taiwan. While China’s growing military capabilities and ambitions certainly create challenges for the United States, they do not necessarily reflect aggressive or expansionist intentions and instead derive largely from Beijing’s difficult security environment and historical experience. China has land borders with fourteen countries, some small and inconsequential but others, like Russia and India, wielding significant power and resources. Four of these neighbors have nuclear weapons, and the United States has a nuclear umbrella over Japan and South Korea. China's “near abroad” also includes major countries such as Indonesia and Iran. While China can develop formidable naval capabilities along its coastal areas, it lacks unfettered access to the open seas, whether the Pacific, Indian, or Arctic Oceans. It does not control the island chains on its eastern flanks, and narrow straits restrict its naval access to the Indian Ocean. In this sense, anti-access and area denial, a concept often applied to China’s military strategy along its maritime periphery, can also work against it. Modern history has not been kind to China. It lost vast swathes of its territory because of its earlier weakness, and it lagged behind Japan in modernization. In the 19th and 20th centuries, multiple wars were fought inside China or on its borders. In addition, vast sweeps of China's western regions are occupied by ethnic minorities, such as the Tibetans and the Uighurs in Xinjiang, living in their historic homelands. These regions are vulnerable to separatist sentiments, which reinforces the importance China attaches to preserving national unity and territorial integrity. Understandably, the Chinese believe that over the last two hundred years they have been bullied and victimized by stronger powers. They are determined not to let this happen again, and genuinely believe their own rhetoric that their goal is not to dominate but to avoid being dominated. Their neighbors, not surprisingly, are skeptical of this claim. Moreover, the Chinese may be poor judges of their own future behavior since their military modernization gives them growing capabilities to bully weaker countries around their periphery.

#### US retreat from soft engagement is key to Chinese softpower

Ikenberry and Lim 17 – Ikenberry is the Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Lim is a lecturer in International Relations at the Australian National University  
“What China’s institutional statecraft could mean for the international order”; G. John Ikenberry and Darren Lim; April 13, 2017; <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/04/13/what-chinas-institutional-statecraft-could-mean-for-the-international-order/>; mbc  
\*\*Trump is ceding leadership in areas such as climate change and global trade, Xi is stepping forward to fill the gap  
\*\*China didn’t offer substantive concessions despite pressure which has boosted his credibility  
\*\*Chinese institutional statecraft such as AIIB, but China won’t overturn the existing order because of vested interests in its original creation

Last week’s inaugural face-to-face meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping unfolded amidst a backdrop widely considered unique: Whereas Trump’s America appears to be **ceding leadership** and credibility in international issues areas from climate change to global trade, **Xi is stepping forward to “play the role of global adult.”** The prospect of retrenchment by Washington **offers Beijing further opportunity to expand its leadership credentials.** While Trump’s snap decision to authorize a missile attack against Syria may have briefly interrupted the gathering momentum, the two-day summit nevertheless reinforced the narrative that China is increasingly capable of assuming a greater leadership role. Beijing offered no substantive concessions despite U.S. pressure, and photographs of Xi appearing calm and sitting upright next to a slouching Trump appeared prominently in Chinese newspapers and other media sources. The image of Xi as a “globe-trotting statesmen” only burnishes his nation’s leadership credentials. Global leadership is of course more than composure and good posture. In a recent report published by the Brookings Institution’s Project on International Order and Strategy, we examine a new facet of China’s growing leadership role: the creation of new international institutions, in particular the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). We ask, what is the logic of China’s emerging “institutional statecraft”?

RESPECT, REJECT, OR BUILD ANEW More so than ascending great powers of centuries past, rising China faces an existing international order that is highly institutionalized. Multilateral institutions were a foundational pillar of the post-war international system, a system that has contributed significantly to states’ security, stability, and economic development. The current liberal international order is not, however, a single entity but a complex and multilayered network of rules, norms, and institutions. All states, even the United States as leader, can and have selectively chosen to participate in, ignore, or oppose aspects of it. While “liberal internationalism” writ large may be difficult to overturn, rising powers like China enjoy a spectrum of strategic options regarding how to approach individual institutions within the system. At one end of the spectrum, where China’s interests are broadly consistent with institutional rules and structures, **we expect participation that is broadly system-respecting**—one example is Beijing’s participation in the World Trade Organization. A related strategy also essentially respects status quo institutions but sees the rising power pursue greater authority over decisionmaking processes—as seen through Beijing achieving greater voting power in the International Monetary Fund. Where China’s interests are at odds with existing institutions, it may choose to act from within, using its membership to alter, impede, or contain the pursuit of undesirable rules, practices, and norms. For example, one emerging norm China has accepted is the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P); however, Beijing has also acted to limit R2P’s definition and usage. Alternatively, China may simply choose to ignore and/or oppose the institutional framework in a given issue area outright, and simply act outside—and likely in violation of—the established system. Dismissing international legal pronouncements on the status of features in the South China Sea would fall into this category. A final option—and the major focus of our report—is where a rising power elects to build a new institution, as Beijing has done with the AIIB. New institutions can serve multiple strategic objectives. They offer an alternative node of interstate cooperation, potentially providing services in competition with existing institutions. Second, they offer a new instrument of statecraft through which the rising power uses its authority to build bilateral or multilateral influence. Third, the new institution offers a means to challenge and potentially replace two components of the existing order within the specific policy domain: the authority and leadership of dominant state, and the prevailing rules and norms within the issue area. Such a challenge is the most direct form of what we term “counter-hegemonic institutional statecraft.” The creation and early operations of the AIIB have received significant attention. The AIIB offers the opportunity to extend Chinese commercial interests throughout the region, bolster Beijing’s influence over recipient countries, enhance Chinese regional and perhaps **global leadership status**, and may well offer the Chinese government leverage to push for reforms of existing multilateral institutions. But does the AIIB presage a “potential vanguard of an alternative economic world order”? OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITS From the perspective of the United States, China’s institutional statecraft poses three challenges. In a narrow sense, China’s record of bilateral development lending suggests the AIIB may build pressure for changes to the rules, practices, and norms of development finance that are at odds with the standards developed within the Bretton Woods framework. The AIIB could also alter the institutional balance of power within this issue area if existing institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank recede in importance. In a broader sense, the AIIB could alter the balance of power between the United States and China if it is able to raise real doubts among the international community regarding whether the U.S.-created system is best able to meet states’ needs—or whether a Chinese model of international political economy (some kind of “Beijing consensus”) can do better**.** Yet early evidence already highlights the constraints China faces in building new institutions. Non-coercive regimes require buy-in from participating states, and the price of legitimacy is multilateralism. The rush of European governments to join the AIIB came with their assurances that they would preserve best practices, and further saw Beijing agree to reduce its formal voting authority. Global financial markets are another constraint—like the World Bank, the AIIB is funding its loans by itself selling debt. Loans for projects that are opaque, politically motivated, or fall short of best practices are less likely to be repaid, and would raise AIIB’s future cost of financing. Finally, at the broadest level, the entrenched nature of liberal internationalism means that, short of major war, alternative orders must “out-compete” by providing states with greater functional benefits and/or enhanced legitimacy. It is far from clear how either could be achieved. Perhaps most importantly, **it simply is not in China’s interests to radically upend an order that has**, to a significant extent, **served its interests so well** in recent decades. Indeed, Beijing typically positions itself as a stout defender of Westphalian sovereignty and the United Nations. Furthermore, amid Trump’s nationalist economic rhetoric, Xi has personally defended the free trade system. Trump’s seeming hostility to liberal internationalism may require China to become one of the biggest champions of the status quo over the next few years. **This would be leadership**, though perhaps not what one might have predicted prior to the 2016 US election. Nevertheless, where Beijing views the existing institutional framework as harmful to its interests, strategies of institutional statecraft designed to modify, undermine, or avoid the current order will now have greater prospects for success.

#### Chinese-led world order solves global peace. Specifically, waves of secessionist conflict.

Griffiths 16 Ryan, Senior Lecturer, University of Sydney, Phd Columbia, “States, Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why Chinese Hegemony Would Be Better for International Order” Security Studies Volume 25, 2016 - Issue 3

How would a future period of Chinese hegemony compare with the current international order or orders of the past? I have argued that Chinese hegemony would privilege territorial integrity at the expense of self-determination. The result would be an international order that would resemble earlier periods in some ways and be unique in others. Sovereign norms would once again be dominant and liberal norms would be subordinated to the right of states. One result of this shift would be a decline, if not disappearance, in nonconsensual secession. However, since a Chinese hegemon is likely to hold on to the territorial integrity norm, conquest would also remain rare. The overall result would be a surprisingly stable international order, a Pax Sinica. To consider this argument it is useful to place this Pax Sinica in historical perspective (See Table 1). Given its emphasis on sovereignty and its internal fragmentary pressures, China would shift the normative balance to a point where secession is only legal in the presence of sovereign consent. Importantly, that move would jettison the constitutive process of statehood, since self-determination would be elevated to a positive right only in the presence of consent. The difficult decision of choosing who counts would be simplified by effectively allocating that choice to sovereign states. Not unlike the pre-Napoleonic era, sovereignty would prevail and the arc of history would bend back toward the right of states. Importantly, this would not simply be a return to the 1800s. The politics of recognition in the 19th century possessed a liberal undercurrent and, as Fabry argues, the United States and UK would often disregard the sovereignty of states when recognizing breakaway regions that had prevailed over their central governments. In truth, Chinese hegemony would resemble the 18th century more than the 19th, when states hewed closely to the sovereign principle that recognition should only be given in cases of consent. The notion that minority nations should be able to self-determine, that individuals selecting into a group should have rights, was not yet on the map. The liberal tradition was only just emerging and the sovereign tradition was relatively unchallenged. The Pax Sinica would bear those same conservative features. However, Chinese hegemony would also bear modern features. The main difference is the very conception of sovereignty and the corollary development of the norm of territorial integrity. Should the norm of territorial integrity be supported by a Chinese power, state death would remain a rare occurrence. Unlike the 18th and 19th centuries where the number of states was gradually reduced through conquest and accession, very few states would exit the system unless they voluntarily chose to unify with other states. Thus the Pax Sinica would be rather stable. The number of states may gradually increase, but it would be limited to those cases where the sovereign gave its consent—that is, controlled proliferation. This anticipated focus on territorial stability under Chinese hegemony is consistent with both contemporary and historical political doctrine. The Confucian emphasis on a strong and stable state is echoed in recent political slogans like “Stability and Harmony.” There are conservative, statist overtones in China's policies without any commensurate emphasis on liberal norms. Unlike the United States, Chinese exceptionalism does not promote a set of universal values in its foreign policy. Meanwhile, recent scholarship has looked into the past to examine what previous periods of Chinese regional dominance say about patterns in international order. One common finding is that imperial China tended to emphasize patterns of informal rule where other polities remained sovereign, yet informally subordinate. Indeed, David C. Kang finds that the China-centered international order that existed in East Asia from the 14th to the 19th centuries—the so-called Tribute System—was characterized by stable borders and infrequent wars of conquest, at least where recognized political units like Vietnam and Korea were concerned. The hegemon showed little tolerance for unrecognized, tribal, and/or institutionally dissimilar groups, especially on the western and northern frontiers. Of course, past behavior is not a perfect indicator of future performance, but that approach to international order privileges recognized states and emphasizes the sovereign territorial grid in a manner where the hegemon can exert power and influence without formal conquest. Essentially, there is continuity between China's imperial past and what this paper predicts for the future should it become a hegemon. I began the article by claiming that the Pax Sinica would be better for international order. In making this claim I define “better” in narrow terms emphasizing territorial stability, which can be assessed in several ways. How often do either external aggressors or internal separatists shift sovereign borders through violence? What is the frequency of secessionist civil war? How much international discord is there on the topic of secession and recognition? This is the ledger I use when comparing the Pax Sinica with the post-1945 American-led order. There are many other factors, to be sure, and critics might point to a number of ways in which Chinese hegemony would be worse. For example, they may question the support for human rights under Chinese leadership. I do not argue that Chinese hegemony would be better in all ways—there are pros and cons to any order—but I contend that there are net benefits where territorial stability is concerned. Analyzed under these terms the key differences between the American order and the imagined Chinese order have to do with the politics of secession and sovereign recognition. International order matters because it determines diplomatic practices and shapes behavior. It sets the rules of the game. The American-led order over the last seventy years has attempted to balance the norms of territorial integrity and self-determination by establishing rules for what nations are eligible for independence. But, as Fabry notes, that is an enormously challenging project because developing clear rules that separate the lucky from the unlucky requires that states derive agreed-upon criteria in a constitutive process. Given the politics and conflicting principles of international life (and the evolving nature of normative arguments), inconsistency, ambiguity, and accusations of hypocrisy are unavoidable. The resulting political space creates uncertainty for states and nationalist movements over when self-determination applies and when it should be subordinated to territorial integrity. Incidents like the Ukrainian crisis cast a shadow over separatist crises elsewhere. The leadership in Azerbaijan detects double standards in American policy, wondering why it “punishes Russia for annexing Crimea, but not Armenia for similar behavior in Karabakh.” Such uncertainly can makes states feel vulnerable, as it has in Azerbaijan, change the incentives for key actors, and increase the chance of conflict. Secessionist civil war is a common feature of contemporary times. Scholars estimate that at least half of the civil wars since 1945 have involved secessionism, and Barbara F. Walter argues that secessionism is the chief source of violence in the world today. Erica Chenowith and Maria Stephan find that secessionism is one of the few (if only) forms of political protest where violent tactics are more effective than nonviolent. Meanwhile, Tanisha Fazal and I identify fifty-five secessionist movements as of 2011 and record that many of these movements feel they have a reasonable chance of gaining independence in light of the somewhat flexible practices surrounding recognition. Given the strategic environment in which secessionists operate, where violence can be effective and where sovereignty is thought to be obtainable, it should come as no surprise that conflict is common. In regard to territorial stability, the concern of contemporary times is not traditional territorial conquest, but the threat posed by state fragmentation. This is where Chinese hegemony ought to improve international order. That is not to say secessionist conflict would completely disappear during the Pax Sinica. Some committed groups may fight the state because they hope to pressure the government into giving concessions ranging from full sovereign recognition to lesser forms of local autonomy to increased political participation. Some disillusioned groups may even redirect secessionist efforts toward regime change. Many of the causes of civil war would remain. The difference is that secessionists would no longer perceive that they could bypass the central government and convince the international community that they meet one of the criteria for recognition. This possibility has very real implications. For example, a secessionist conflict on the island of Bougainville during the 1990s resulted in the deaths of an estimated twenty thousand people (ten percent of the population). During that period the secessionist leadership networked with other secessionist movements like the East Timorese and explored different ways to secure international recognition that would circumvent the government of Papua New Guinea (PNG). They first highlighted their imperial/administrative history, trying to make the case that they were eligible for independence via the rules surrounding decolonization. When that failed they mounted a publicity campaign that aimed to win international sympathy, especially in Australia, by documenting civilian casualties. That campaign, and the international pressure it brought to bear on the PNG government, helped Bougainville to win a peace agreement in 2001 that promised autonomy and a future referendum on independence. Although every conflict has a local dimension, the strategies and tactics employed, and the very willingness of groups to continue fighting, are shaped by the possibilities inherent in the international recognition regime. Relative to a consent-based order, the current constitutive regime creates incentives to challenge the state in ways that can yield both wanted and unwanted violence. One could argue that I undervalue the merits of flexibility and ambiguousness, and that from a design perspective the ideal international recognition regime ought to temper a clear set of rules with a degree of latitude to cover exceptional cases. After all, every independence movement is unique in its own way and it will be difficult if not impossible to develop a decision rule that is fair to all. I concede that the ideal regime would balance clarity with flexibility, but the contemporary regime does not meet this ideal. The current order is not the design of some normative architect, but the product of the push and pull of politics and diplomacy. Ultimate recognition is not bestowed by some overarching legal body; it rests in the hands of individual sovereign states with diverse interests. The Chinese order I forecast is far from ideal, but it has advantages over the current order. By necessity this is a somewhat conjectural argument because gross comparisons of international orders, especially orders in the future, do not permit tight counterfactual analysis. In that sense, mine is a thought experiment not unlike Fabry's comparison between a recognition regime based on de facto statehood and one built on a constitutive process. I advance a plausible argument by highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of different international orders, and argue for the superiority of one over the other given a specified ledger of comparison. A strengthening of the territorial integrity norm, and a clear, unambiguous set of rules that removes the constitutive process of recognition, and permits independence only in cases of sovereign consent, would make for a better international order.

#### Secessionism goes global and nuclear—the western model makes it worse.

Fearon 4- Department of Political Science Stanford University (James, “Separatist Wars, Partition, and World Order” <https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Separatist-Wars-Partition-and-World-Order.pdf>)

Civil wars of separatist nationalism raged around the globe in the 1990s, in the Balkans, India, Russia, Azerbaijan, Sudan, Indonesia, Britain (Northern Ireland), Turkey, Georgia, the Philippines, and Burma, to name only some of the more prominent examples. These wars have caused considerable loss of life, massive refugee crises, economic devastation, significant strains on great power relations and important international institutions like NATO and the United Nations, and a significant risk of nuclear war in South Asia. What should be done? Thus far, the western powers’ approach has been ad hoc, with little public discussion of the broader implications of particular cases and the problems for the international system posed by separatist nationalism.1 At least five sorts of ad hoc responses can be identified: 1. The imposition of weak international protectorates by stronger states through international organizations, as at Dayton, over Kosovo, Northern Iraq, and, earlier, Cyprus. 2. Disapproval but little or no direct action, either due to lack of interest (Kurds in Turkey, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Southerners in Sudan, Tuaregs in Mali, and many other such cases) or due to the power of the states involved (Russia/Chechnya, China/Tibet, India/Kashmir). 3. Weak international attempts to facilitate partition when this is by mutual consent of some sort (East Timor, Eritrea, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the West Bank in a halting way). 4. Stable cease-fires and de facto partitions, as in Nagorno-Karabagh and Somaliland. 5. Some efforts to help negotiate power-sharing agreements, as in Northern Ireland and Angola (the latter with a largely ethnic but not separatist war). That international responses to wars of separatist nationalism have been ad hoc is not surprising. International relations is the realm of the ad hoc, and even if it were possible it is hard to imagine a general, one-size-fits-all approach that would make sense. But the lack of discussion about the broader implications of different possible policies in particular cases is surprising. Here is a possible explanation. For the western powers, separatist nationalism is so perplexing and fundamental a problem that it has to be ignored as a general phenomenon. The problem is that the overwhelmingly accepted diagnosis of the cause of separatist nationalism implies a policy remedy no major power can stomach. In brief, the standard diagnosis is Wilsonianism, the theory that separatist nationalism stems from bad borders and incompatible cultures. Wilsonianism holds that violent separatism arises when state borders are not properly aligned with national groups, which are fixed, preexisting entities. Separatism is due to the injustice of depriving proper nations of proper states. If one accepts this, then the remedy for nationalist wars is obvious. Just redraw the borders. Impose partitions. And indeed with each nationalist war foreign policy analysts in the U.S. and elsewhere have called for partition as the obvious and proper solution.2 In the wake of the intense killing and brutality in Bosnia and Kosovo, partition has often seemed, reasonably, “inevitable.” Even if these people lived together once, analysts say, how can they live together now? If one accepts the general diagnosis, the argument for partition seems inescapably strong. So why not do it? Why aren’t the major powers leaping on partition as the obvious solution, rather than setting up costly and ineffectual protectorates? Are there any good reasons to oppose partition, or are the western powers just misguided, cowardly, or transfixed by a naive and dangerous commitment to multiculturalism (Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1995; Mearsheimer and Pape 1993)? I argue in this paper that there are indeed good reasons to be skeptical of partition as a general solution to nationalist wars. The most important of these, and the least explored, are two types of incentive effects. First, ad hoc partition applied to one trouble spot may help produce more violent separatist nationalist movements elsewhere, in addition to making existing nationalist wars more difficult to resolve. The Wilsonian diagnosis is wrong. The world is not composed of a fixed number of true nations, so that peace can be had by properly sorting them into states. Rather, there is literally no end of cultural difference in the world suitable for politicization in the form of nationalist insurgencies. As long as controlling a recognized state apparatus is a desirable thing and “nationhood” is understood to ground claims to a state, ambitious individuals will try to put together nationalist movements to claim statehood. A (de facto) policy of partition that says, in effect, “You may get a state if you can get a bloody enough nationalist insurgency going” provides the wrong incentives. The more general point is that whether partition is good idea depends in part on one’s theory of what causes separatist nationalism. I will argue that the dominant theory of Wilsonianism is misleading, and implies ad hoc “solutions” that states are right to shy away from.

#### Chinese leadership solves existential threats.

Yamei 18 Shen Yamei 18, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, <http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491>

As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional governance concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese solution. A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. The “shortcomings” of the existing global governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant forces are seriously imbalanced*.* The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance system have been beset with structural problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation. These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into an interference factor to global governance. Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind. Over the years of development, the strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically, which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic growth. These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun policy coordination among themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but the traditional governance mechanisms such as the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness. Third, the global governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas. With the diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated. As relevant efforts are usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of “diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions. Since the beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous statein such key areas as global economic governance and climate change*.* Such emerging issues as nuclear security and international terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics*.* The governance areas in deficit, such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily*.* All of these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently for a clear direction of advancement. B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political dejection. Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world and is an exclusive “circle club”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the transformation of the global governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics in international relations, but also is an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the framework of international order. C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing international system guided by the “Western-Centrism”, the Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing peacefully and harmoniously with other *civilizations.* So to speak, many problems of today, including the growing gap in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background of globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to “integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and integration among civilizations.

Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”, etc. China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world order so as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual learning, integration and encouragement. D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. Today, China has **become a source of stability** in an international situation full of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively great pressure of its own economic downturn. Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third, the Chinese solution is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation, as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system”, and “providing a brand new option for the nations and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”. II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and “sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational end. It has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound way. A. To Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative. The Chinese solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and having widened the road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the international community. B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. **Currently, the international political practice in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent, centralized and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance systemcharacterized as both extensive and unbalanced.** China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and method with Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of global governance, which should act as the leader of global governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO, perfecting them through practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”, which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms. Thus, in leading the transformation of the global governance system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability. C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. Many of the problems facing global governance today are deeply rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to pursue its political goals. Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance system. On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future “will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and more precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the world listen to its voice more attentively. With regard to the subject of global governance, China has advocated that what global governance system is better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and differences through consultation. Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by all countries concerned. China has also proposed international public security views on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global village into a “grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we cannot “set up a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on a grand show”. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international issues, China abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries. D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened. As the biggest developing country and fast growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began policy coordination with them, as China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. **To this end, China has pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching importance to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership network, while making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice, including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization; promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and representation of the emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.**

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