# 1NC R4 Emory

## 1

#### Japan’s space industry is driven by private actors.

Jaxa 18 2-8-2018 "Focal Point on commercial space exploration in Japan" https://media.nature.com/full/nature-cms/uploads/ckeditor/attachments/8865/00\_Editorial\_UK.pdf (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency is the Japanese national aerospace and space agency. Through the merger of three previously independent organizations, JAXA was formed on 1 October 2003.)//Elmer

“The world’s space industry is in the throes of a major transformation,” says Masayasu Ishida. An energetic Tokyoite, Ishida is a principal at the management consulting firm A.T. Kearney and co-founder and president of the Spacetide Foundation, an organization dedicated to promoting space businesses globally. Historically, space has been the exclusive domain of government and multinational projects, but increasingly private enterprises are venturing above in a movement dubbed ‘new space’. Entrepreneurs such as Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk and Richard Branson have captured the headlines, but this movement is not restricted to famous entrepreneurs or huge corporations. Increasingly, small to medium-sized businesses are becoming involved. Ishida, who has written a book on promoting the space industry to the private sector, is excited about Japan’s involvement in new space. “I think Japan has the potential to be one of the world’s new-space industry hubs,” he says. “Future space exploration needs innovative technologies like robotics, artificial intelligence, advanced communication, and new materials, which will be brought by non-space industries,” he explains. “Japan is home to many of the world’s leading industries, and has a variety of technological assets. Their involvement could be of help in the global space exploration effort.” Yasuhiro Yukimatsu, deputy director-general of the National Space Policy Secretariat, Cabinet Office, notes that Japanese companies and universities have developed micro-, nano- and even pico-satellite technology, which allows countries that have yet to join the space community affordable access to space. Ishida concurs: “Japanese space-related business players have unique technologies and are working on projects such as small launchers, space debris removal, and space resource mining.” JAPAN IN SPACE Japan has a proud history of ‘old space’ government-funded exploration. It was the fourth country to venture into space, and the third one to send spacecraft to both Mars and the Moon. It has the distinction of being the only country to have brought a sample back from an extraterrestrial body besides the Moon, when Hayabusa landed in the Australian outback in 2010 with a sample collected from the surface a deep-space asteroid. But times are changing. “For the industry to realize sustainable growth, a shift from the government to the private sector is urgently needed,” says Masanori Tsuruda from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). This shift is driven in part by shrinking government budgets for big projects as well as the many emerging possibilities for enterprises to profit from space.

#### Japan space commitment re-vitalizes and modernizes the US-Japan Alliance.

Wright 20 John Wright 2-4-2020 "Where No Alliance Has Gone Before: US-Japan Military Cooperation in Space" <https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/where-no-alliance-has-gone-before-us-japan-military-cooperation-in-space/> (Major John Wright is a U.S. Air Force officer, pilot, and a Mike and Maureen Mansfield Fellow. He is a Foreign Area Officer who specializes in Japan, and recent author of the book “Deep Space Warfare: Military Strategy Beyond Orbit.” The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and not necessarily those of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Government, Mansfield Foundation, or any other government or government entity.)//Elmer

With the United States’ December 21, 2019 creation of a separate and sovereign branch of its military completely devoted to space, the U.S. Space Force, the global race to emancipate a portion of national military power from terrestrial shackles and place it firmly into orbit is on. The announcement also unleashed a somewhat unexpected cascading effect: the increased attention paid to military space activities by U.S. allies and partners, who have no choice but to follow where the U.S. military moves its gravitational pull. In particular, Japan has made announcements in recent days that indicate its intention to remain in lockstep with the United States, at least in terms of defense. On January 5, 2020, scarcely two weeks following the U.S. Space Force announcement, the Japanese government indicated it plans to rename the Japan Air Self Defense Force to the Japan Aerospace Defense Force. Not coincidentally, on January 21, during a speech given on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe vowed to make the alliance “a pillar for safeguarding peace and security in both outer space and cyberspace.” While words are good, actions are better. In a less-noticed but more consequential move, the Ministry of Defense is finalizing a bill to be placed before the Diet that asks to craft a space operations-exclusive military unit staffed with 20 personnel. While this paltry number of people can barely be expected to efficiently run their task of monitoring space debris and “suspicious satellites,” the move is a significant step for a nation that often struggles with global defense developments due to Japan’s unique domestic restrictions and legal concerns. In many ways, it is surprising to see Japan, a nation that still sorties 1960s-era F-4 aircraft (though there are plans to replace them with F-35s), and is fielding their very first military Remote Piloted Aircraft (a model the United States has been flying for nearly 20 years) in 2021, take its defense posture in space seriously. These initiatives have several implications. First, the Japanese government’s attitude toward space and its place in the U.S.-Japan alliance reflects what’s at stake during the next major conflict, which will surely involve space. As an increasing number of government and commercial systems depend on space assets and space support, space can no longer be ignored as a future theater; the time is now to incorporate space into alliance strategy. This strategy, however, needs to catch up. Currently, Japan refers to space as a “new domain” in the 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines and briefly discusses space defense in the annual 2019 Defense of Japan white paper. Space is completely left out of the now-outdated 2015 Guidelines for U.S.- Japan Defense Cooperation. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. Second, Japan’s emphasis is a good move for the alliance as a whole, and enhances its survivability. If Japan takes measurable steps to join its ally and if Japan meaningfully contributes to space security, space is less likely to become another seam where the alliance could come undone. Further, there is a strategic advantage to taking a stance on both position and form when it comes to space. While other nations will struggle to “get serious” about space, and will need to decide between size, scope, and capability of their forces, Japan has confirmed its political and defensive outlook toward space, which means it has also acknowledged space’s effect on combined alliance defense. This is good, since the political dangers posed in space are very real. Despite the existence of the well-intentioned but toothless Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which prohibits use of force activities in space, the obvious future is that space will act as yet another stage upon which the political games of earthbound nation-states will play out. Nation-state competition will not disappear as states found and fund forces to travel, explore, and exploit the inky blackness of space; rather, competition will intensify, as discoveries with both economic and defense applications are made, and as states better understand how vulnerable they are without proper space defense and deterrence. This is the political reality of space, and the fact that both members of the U.S.-Japan alliance understand this means the alliance has much less danger of breaking apart upon first contact with space-centric competition. If anything, mutual interest in the same environment will lead to cooperative efforts and a strengthened alliance here on Earth. Notably, the odds of military confrontation in space have also increased. By funneling U.S. military space power into the highest echelon of military independence and funding (an independent service), escalation and competition is not far behind. It will not be surprising if we see several other competitors forming their own service-level forces by year’s end, though their actual forms will likely vary greatly. The fact that the United States has “jumped” to a service-sized solution to military space competition, and not a smaller organization like a corps or geographic command, means other nations have no real strategic options but to match the U.S. precedent as close as they can in size and capability. The U.S.-Japan alliance must prepare for this eventuality. Japanese government decisions to strengthen its space defense capabilities thus come from a mix of terrestrial strategy, political realities, and prudent alliance management. However, significant challenges remain. For one thing, today’s nation-states (including the United States) are understandably gun-shy about sharing space defense capabilities and space-centric technology, which means alliance military space activity will naturally move at the speed of the slowest member. For another, we do not yet know just what space-on-space conflict will look like between combatants who possess similar space-based strength, which makes warfare difficult to plan for and will present an immediate challenge to alliance coordination should such a conflict occur. Despite these doubts, recent Japanese government announces are positive and will help usher both the alliance and U.S.-Japan relations through its current comparatively rocky period of trade spats and quibbles over military basing. Without a doubt, the political impact of allied space defense could easily result in the U.S.-Japan alliance extending its prerogatives beyond Earth’s territorial confines.

#### Re-vitalized and updated US-Japan Alliance preserves US LIO against a revisionist China.

Fujisue 21 Kenzo Fujisue (Kenzo Fujisue is a member of the House of Councillors in Japan. He is also the director of the Multi-partisan Economic Security Policy Study Team. Previously, he was the chair of the Committee of Information and Telecommunication and the senior vice minister of Internal Affairs and Communications. He received an MS from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management, an MPA from Harvard Kennedy School, and two Ph.D.s in Industrial Management and in International Relations from Tokyo Institute of Technology and Waseda University, respectively.), 9/8/21, "Rebooting the Japan-US Alliance," <https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/rebooting-the-japan-us-alliance/> mvp

In fact, such a lingering legacy is a major impediment to the evolution of the Japan-U.S. alliance as it faces off an increasingly bellicose China. The sober reality is that Beijing is at war with the world. The U.S.-led liberal international order, of which post-war Japan is a direct beneficiary, is under ceaseless assault by China’s unrestricted warfare, seeking to replace it with a new world order under Beijing’s mandate. The retired Chinese Major General Qiao Liang, one of the co-authors of the 1999 treatise, “Unrestricted Warfare,” ominously advocated that “the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden.” Indeed, from artificial islands in the South China Sea to global cyber espionage, China has transformed all of society into a battlefield by “using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.” While the former commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip Davidson, correctly denounced China as the “greatest long-term strategic threat of the 21st century” earlier this year, Tokyo has yet to reciprocate Washington’s renewed perspective, merely expressing “grave concerns.” Given Tokyo’s enduring disinclination to recognize the Chinese threat, the current bilateral alliance suffers a perilous perception gap and is fundamentally lagging in effectively countering China’s post-Clausewitzian challenges. The upshot is the growing prospect of a Chinese geoeconomic suzerainty engulfing Japan before shots are even fired. China’s unrestricted offensives against Japan are most palpable in the emerging field of economic security. Ironically, Japan’s long-standing economic-centric approach to national security has scarcely inspired thinking about the country’s own economic security, let alone its economic statecraft. Instead, Japan has long allowed itself to wallow in the poisoned chalice of virtually unfettered access to an ascendant communist economy. As a result, blithe ignorance and unmitigated avarice have blinded Japan to the Marxist-Leninist nature of the Chinese Communist regime and its authoritarian agenda, culminating in Tokyo’s willful embrace of the Beijing-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) earlier this year. In other words, Japan has sold China the rope with which it is to be hanged, to the ultimate detriment of the Japan-U.S. alliance. This has profound operational implications for the U.S. military assets forward deployed in Japan. For example, special operators in the U.S. forces in Japan could come under the constant risk of leaving digital footprints in a telecommunications environment increasingly compromised by Chinese providers, such as Huawei. Such information could lead to major vulnerabilities in operational security, endangering mission assurance in future operations. Unlike the United States, Japan has yet to exclude Huawei and other Chinese 5G technologies from its domestic market. Business viability is no excuse for being a liability if the alliance itself is at risk. Equally important, Japan’s decades-long economic engagement with China has ironically led to the erosion of the country’s industrial base, the very piece that supported Japan’s post-war prosperity as well as the rules-based order. Indeed, the advent of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 exposed Japan’s severe supply chain risks as the country scrambled to procure masks and other medical equipment, only to discover its entrenched national reliance on Chinese producers. Such dependency is a crippling vulnerability of geopolitical significance, exploitation of which could subdue an entire society without firing a single bullet. Moreover, the revelation of the popular LINE messenger app’s suspicious ties to Beijing earlier this year also underscores fundamental flaws in Japan’s digital transformation (DX) process. Indeed, despite its tremendous innovation potential, Japan has yet to witness a homegrown alternative to LINE, largely due to the country’s lingering systemic constraints on entrepreneurship. According to the 2019 Inc. magazine survey, Japan was ranked the fourth least entrepreneurial country in the world. As a result, Japan has largely failed to leverage the technological prowess it once boasted during the Cold War and yielded its coveted place as the world’s leading technology powerhouse to China in the age of DX. As China looks to become the “Saudi Arabia of data,” Japan’s DX dependence on China is tantamount to aiding and abetting Beijing’s globalizing digital authoritarianism and is incompatible with the democratic world order. As the China-U.S. geopolitical competition increasingly turns into another Cold War, Japan finds itself at a historic crossroads that will determine the country’s future. As a member of the House of Councillors, Japan’s upper house, leading the country’s economic security policy, I argue that Japan must fully realign itself with the United States in fighting China’s unrestricted war against the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. To do so requires first and foremost a system upgrade in the Yoshida Doctrine, explicitly recognizing that economic security is national security. To this end, Japan must accelerate the process of targeted decoupling from China in the fields of essential goods and advanced technologies. The present degree of Japan’s economic dependence on China is so profound that total disengagement would be mutually destructive. Therefore, Tokyo must design its own economic statecraft based on a calculated balance between economic incentives and economic security. In implementing targeted decoupling from China, Japan’s economic statecraft must pursue strategic autonomy and strategic indispensability in key basic industries so as to ensure the country’s control over chokepoints in economic security.

#### Collapse of the LIO causes Extinction – Nuclear War, Warming, Emerging Tech.

Harari 18 Yuval Noah Harari, Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “We need a post-liberal order now,” The Economist, <https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/09/26/we-need-a-post-liberal-order-now>

For several generations, the world has been governed by what today we call “the global liberal order”. Behind these lofty words is the idea that all humans share some core experiences, values and interests, and that no human group is inherently superior to all others. Cooperation is therefore more sensible than conflict. All humans should work together to protect their common values and advance their common interests. And the best way to foster such cooperation is to ease the movement of ideas, goods, money and people across the globe. Though the global liberal order has many faults and problems, it has proved superior to all alternatives. The liberal world of the early 21st century is more prosperous, healthy and peaceful than ever before. For the first time in human history, starvation kills fewer people than obesity; plagues kill fewer people than old age; and violence kills fewer people than accidents. When I was six months old I didn’t die in an epidemic, thanks to medicines discovered by foreign scientists in distant lands. When I was three I didn’t starve to death, thanks to wheat grown by foreign farmers thousands of kilometers away. And when I was eleven I wasn’t obliterated in a nuclear war, thanks to agreements signed by foreign leaders on the other side of the planet. If you think we should go back to some pre-liberal golden age, please name the year in which humankind was in better shape than in the early 21st century. Was it 1918? 1718? 1218? Nevertheless, people all over the world are now losing faith in the liberal order. Nationalist and religious views that privilege one human group over all others are back in vogue. Governments are increasingly restricting the flow of ideas, goods, money and people. Walls are popping up everywhere, both on the ground and in cyberspace. Immigration is out, tariffs are in. If the liberal order is collapsing, what new kind of global order might replace it? So far, those who challenge the liberal order do so mainly on a national level. They have many ideas about how to advance the interests of their particular country, but they don’t have a viable vision for how the world as a whole should function. For example, Russian nationalism can be a reasonable guide for running the affairs of Russia, but Russian nationalism has no plan for the rest of humanity. Unless, of course, nationalism morphs into imperialism, and calls for one nation to conquer and rule the entire world. A century ago, several nationalist movements indeed harboured such imperialist fantasies. Today’s nationalists, whether in Russia, Turkey, Italy or China, so far refrain from advocating global conquest. In place of violently establishing a global empire, some nationalists such as Steve Bannon, Viktor Orban, the Northern League in Italy and the British Brexiteers dream about a peaceful “Nationalist International”. They argue that all nations today face the same enemies. The bogeymen of globalism, multiculturalism and immigration are threatening to destroy the traditions and identities of all nations. Therefore nationalists across the world should make common cause in opposing these global forces. Hungarians, Italians, Turks and Israelis should build walls, erect fences and slow down the movement of people, goods, money and ideas. The world will then be divided into distinct nation-states, each with its own sacred identity and traditions. Based on mutual respect for these differing identities, all nation-states could cooperate and trade peacefully with one another. Hungary will be Hungarian, Turkey will be Turkish, Israel will be Israeli, and everyone will know who they are and what is their proper place in the world. It will be a world without immigration, without universal values, without multiculturalism, and without a global elite—but with peaceful international relations and some trade. In a word, the “Nationalist International” envisions the world as a network of walled-but-friendly fortresses. Many people would think this is quite a reasonable vision. Why isn’t it a viable alternative to the liberal order? Two things should be noted about it. First, it is still a comparatively liberal vision. It assumes that no human group is superior to all others, that no nation should dominate its peers, and that international cooperation is better than conflict. In fact, liberalism and nationalism were originally closely aligned with one another. The 19th century liberal nationalists, such as Giuseppe Garibaldi and Giuseppe Mazzini in Italy, and Adam Mickiewicz in Poland, dreamt about precisely such an international liberal order of peacefully-coexisting nations. The second thing to note about this vision of friendly fortresses is that it has been tried—and it failed spectacularly. All attempts to divide the world into clear-cut nations have so far resulted in war and genocide. When the heirs of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Mickiewicz managed to overthrow the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, it proved impossible to find a clear line dividing Italians from Slovenes or Poles from Ukrainians. This had set the stage for the second world war. The key problem with the network of fortresses is that each national fortress wants a bit more land, security and prosperity for itself at the expense of the neighbors, and without the help of universal values and global organisations, rival fortresses cannot agree on any common rules. Walled fortresses are seldom friendly. But if you happen to live inside a particularly strong fortress, such as America or Russia, why should you care? Some nationalists indeed adopt a more extreme isolationist position. They don’t believe in either a global empire or in a global network of fortresses. Instead, they deny the necessity of any global order whatsoever. “Our fortress should just raise the drawbridges,” they say, “and the rest of the world can go to hell. We should refuse entry to foreign people, foreign ideas and foreign goods, and as long as our walls are stout and the guards are loyal, who cares what happens to the foreigners?” Such extreme isolationism, however, is completely divorced from economic realities. Without a global trade network, all existing national economies will collapse—including that of North Korea. Many countries will not be able even to feed themselves without imports, and prices of almost all products will skyrocket. The made-in-China shirt I am wearing cost me about $5. If it had been produced by Israeli workers from Israeli-grown cotton using Israeli-made machines powered by non-existing Israeli oil, it may well have cost ten times as much. Nationalist leaders from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin may therefore heap abuse on the global trade network, but none thinks seriously of taking their country completely out of that network. And we cannot have a global trade network without some global order that sets the rules of the game. Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its dangerous lead for fear of being left behind. An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself. For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse. Consider, for example, conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.” Similarly, consider developing autonomous-weapon systems, that can decide for themselves whether to shoot and kill people. Again, every country will say: “This is a very dangerous technology, and it should be regulated carefully. But we don’t trust our rivals to regulate it, so we must develop it first”. The only thing that can prevent such destructive arms races is greater trust between countries. This is not an impossible mission. If today the Germans promise the French: “Trust us, we aren’t developing killer robots in a secret laboratory under the Bavarian Alps,” the French are likely to believe the Germans, despite the terrible history of these two countries. We need to build such trust globally. We need to reach a point when Americans and Chinese can trust one another like the French and Germans. Similarly, we need to create a global safety-net to protect humans against the economic shocks that AI is likely to cause. Automation will create immense new wealth in high-tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, while the worst effects will be felt in developing countries whose economies depend on cheap manual labor. There will be more jobs to software engineers in California, but fewer jobs to Mexican factory workers and truck drivers. We now have a global economy, but politics is still very national. Unless we find solutions on a global level to the disruptions caused by AI, entire countries might collapse, and the resulting chaos, violence and waves of immigration will destabilise the entire world. This is the proper perspective to look at recent developments such as Brexit. In itself, Brexit isn’t necessarily a bad idea. But is this what Britain and the EU should be dealing with right now? How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? How does Brexit help prevent climate change? How does Brexit help regulate artificial intelligence and bioengineering? Instead of helping, Brexit makes it harder to solve all of these problems. Every minute that Britain and the EU spend on Brexit is one less minute they spend on preventing climate change and on regulating AI. In order to survive and flourish in the 21st century, humankind needs effective global cooperation, and so far the only viable blueprint for such cooperation is offered by liberalism. Nevertheless, governments all over the world are undermining the foundations of the liberal order, and the world is turning into a network of fortresses. The first to feel the impact are the weakest members of humanity, who find themselves without any fortress willing to protect them: refugees, illegal migrants, persecuted minorities. But if the walls keep rising, eventually the whole of humankind will feel the squeeze.

## 2

#### **Interp: Debaters must not defend the hypothetical implementation of an explicit actor or action**

#### Resolved in LD means statement of values

UPitt ND University Of Pittsburgh Communications Services Webteam, copyright 2015-21, "Basic Definitions," Department of Communication , <https://www.comm.pitt.edu/basic-definitions> CHO

Affirmative/Pro. The side that “affirms” the resolution (is “pro” the issue). For example, the affirmative side in a debate using the resolution of policy, Resolved: The United States federal government should implement a poverty reduction program for its citizens, would advocate for federal government implementation of a poverty reduction program. Argument. A statement, or claim, followed by a justification, or warrant. Justifications are responses to challenges, often linked by the word “because.” Example: The sun helps people, because the sun activates photosynthesis in plants, which produce oxygen so people can breathe. Constructive Speech. The first speeches in a debate, where the debaters “construct” their cases by presenting initial positions and arguments. Cross-examination. Question and answer sessions between debaters. Debate. A deliberative exercise characterized by formal procedures of argumentation, involving a set resolution to be debated, distinct times for debaters to speak, and a regulated order of speeches given. Evidence. Supporting materials for arguments. Standards for evidence are field-specific. Evidence can range from personal testimony, statistical evidence, research findings, to other published sources. Quotations drawn from journals, books, newspapers, and other audio-visuals sources are rather common. Negative/Con. The side that “negates” the resolution (is “con” the issue). For example, the negative side in a debate using the resolution of fact, Resolved: Global warming threatens agricultural production, would argue that global warming does not threaten agricultural production. Preparation Time. Debates often necessitate time between speeches for students to gather their thoughts and consider their opponent's arguments. This preparation is generally a set period of time and can be used at any time by either side at the conclusion of a speech. Rebuttal Speech. The last speeches in a debate, where debaters summarize arguments and draw conclusions about the debate. Resolution. A specific statement or question up for debate. Resolutions usually appear as statements of policy, fact or value. Statement of policy. Involves an actor (local, national, or global) with power to decide a course of action. For example, Resolved: The United States federal government should implement a poverty reduction program for its citizens. Statement of fact. Involves a dispute about empirical phenomenon. For example, Resolved: Global warming threatens agricultural production. Statement of value. Involves conflicting moral dilemmas. For example, Resolved: The death penalty is a justified method of punishment. Topic. A general issue to debate. Topics could be “The Civil War,” “genetic engineering,” or “Great Books.”

#### Is means is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE **dialectal present tense** first-person and third-person singular **of BE** dialectal present tense plural of BE

Webster ND Definition of IS," Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is> IS

#### Dialectical present tense means logical coherence which implies no implementation

Your Dictionary ND, "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### “BE” is a linking verb, not an action verb so implementation is incoherent

Grammar Monster ND "Linking Verbs," Grammar Monster, <https://www.grammar-monster.com/glossary/linking_verbs.htm> CHO

What Are Linking Verbs? (with Examples) A linking verb is used to re-identify or to describe its subject. A linking verb is called a linking verb because it links the subject to a subject complement (see graphic below). Infographic Explaining Linking Verb A linking verb tells us what the subject is, not what the subject is doing. Easy Examples of Linking Verbs In each example, the linking verb is highlighted and the subject is bold. Alan is a vampire. (Here, the subject is re-identified as a vampire.) Alan is thirsty. (Here, the subject is described as thirsty.)

A picture containing text, sign

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#### Unjust means unjust adjective US /ʌnˈdʒʌst/ **not morally right; not fair**: New laws will protect employees against unjust dismissals. (Definition of unjust from the Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary © Cambridge University Press)

That’s Cambridge Dictionary ND [“Meaning of unjust in English” Cambridge Dictionary, [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust]](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust%5d)

#### Violation: They defend “\_\_\_\_\_\_\_” as the actor and implement an \_\_\_\_\_\_ which isn’t resolutional OR they are extra T

#### 1] Limits and Ground - justifies infinite unpredictable aff advantage ground and extra topical enforcement mechanisms which wreck research burdens while spiking core generics.

#### 2] Precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks ground and prep because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### 3] Clash - the resolution serves as a predictable stasis point to enhance accessible research and equitable ground, removing that makes negative preparation impossible since any ground we receive is self-serving and concessionary, ---the impact is resolutional clash. Generics don’t check since affs use their advocacy and enforcement to get a competitive edge

#### 4] Phil Ed – creates better ethical subjectivity and critical thinking that o/ws on uniqueness to LD, switch to policy and LARP on the water topic – solves all your offense

#### TVA: Read a phil aff that affirms that private appropriation is unjust with a util FW and don’t defend implementation

#### Education is a voter since it is the only portable and durable skill that influences our subject formation. Fairness is a voter since a] debate is a game, competition equity matters proven by desire for wins, b] is worthless without rules and equal access.

#### Drop the debater – a] deters future abuse through a loss and b] set better norms for debate since you are less likely to repeat a practice you can lose for

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear model of debate, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate through offense [c] offense defense paradigm is the best method for evaluation since you can compare benefits under both interps easier.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, if logic isn’t true then you should hack against them, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

## 3

#### Interp: If the affirmative defends anything other than “Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.” then they must provide a counter-solvency advocate for their specific advocacy in the 1AC. (To clarify, you must have an author that states we should not do your aff, insofar as the aff is not a whole res phil aff)

#### Violation

#### Prefer

#### 1. Limits – there are infinite things you could defend outside the exact text of the resolution which pushes you to the limits of contestable arguments, even if your interp of the topic is better, the only way to verify if it’s substantively fair is proof of counter-arguments. Nobody knows your aff better than you, so if you can’t find an answer, I can’t be expected to. Our interp narrows out trivially true advocacies since counter-solvency advocates ensure equal division of ground for both sides.

#### 2. Research – Forces the aff to go to the other side of the library and contest their own view points, as well as encouraging in depth-research about their own position. Having one also encourages more in-depth answers since I can find responses. Key to education since we definitionally learn more about positions when we contest our own.

## 4

#### Interp: Debaters must have recordings of their speeches and send them if requested


#### Violation: They didn't record, that was cx

#### A] Cheating – debaters can fake internet drop offs and then steal prep which decks reciprocity. O/Ws since it destroys competitive incentives and educational value since they are structurally ahead

#### B] Accidents possible, external conditions like power going out, wifi dropping off, or excessive background noise make it impossible to hear in real time, recordings ensure that a speech isn’t given twice, which allows them to remodify and change their strat or incite judge intervention which is the worst violation of procedural fairness

#### C] Key to check clipping cards and make cheaters lose with literal proof

#### No regress, its disclosed on my wiki



#### CSA as well

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## 5

#### Interpretation: Debaters must read a framework in the 1AC

#### Violation they don’t

#### A] Sandbagging

#### -skews 1NC time investment

#### -outweighs, no recourse

#### B] Phil clash

#### C] Affs lose every single time

## 5

#### Reject 1AR Theory arguments – 1) double bind – either you can put minor ink next to answer of my responses and extend your arguments to auto-win or the judge has to intervene to see if the 2ar answers to the 2n are good enough. Intervention o/w since it takes the round out of debater’s hands 2) they have 2 speeches on theory while I have 1 which means they can structurally preempt my answers and respond to them and I can’t do either 3) they have 1 more minute on the theory debate due to a 7-6 skew which o/w since theory is mainly about substance

#### Resolvability OW infinite abuse

#### 1] Jurisdiction- If the judge can’t resolve an argument they don’t have the jurisdiction to vote on it because there is a risk of an incorrect decision

#### 2] Magnitude- resolvability means judge intervention which is worse than a shell with reasonability on it

#### 3] Probability- Judge intervention is 100% likely because no matter what 2NR responses don’t get answered to but you can resolve the theory debate with DTA

#### All theory paradigm issues the aff thinks are good must be in the 1ac since they have 1 more speech than me on theory so they should take a stance sooner so I don’t have to answer all of them in one speech while they can go for them in multiple – 2n issues are reciprocally answered by the 2ar.

## Case

### Debris

#### Low risk of collisions – it’s overhyped

Albrecht 16 [Mark Albrecht, chairman of the board of USSpace LLC, head of the White House National Space Council from 1989 to 1992, and Paul Graziani, CEO and founder of Analytical Graphics, a company that develops software and provides mission assurance through the Commercial Space Operations Center (ComSpOC), Congested space is a serious problem solved by hard work, not hysteria, 2016, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-congested-space-is-a-serious-problem-solved-by-hard-work-not-hysteria/]

Popular culture has embraced the risks of collisions in space in films like Gravity. Some participants have dramatized the issue by producing graphics of Earth and its satellites, which make our planet look like a fuzzy marble, almost obscured by a dense cloud of white pellets meant to conceptualize space congestion. Unfortunately, for the sake of a good visual, satellites are depicted as if they were hundreds of miles wide, like the state of Pennsylvania (for the record, there are no space objects the size of Pennsylvania in orbit). Unfortunately, this is the rule, not the exception, and almost all of these articles, movies, graphics, and simulations are exaggerated and misleading. Space debris and collision risk is real, but it certainly is not a crisis. So what are the facts? On the positive side, space is empty and it is vast. At the altitude of the International Space Station, one half a degree of Earth longitude is almost 40 miles long. That same one half a degree at geostationary orbit, some 22,000 miles up is over 230 miles long. Generally, we don’t intentionally put satellites closer together than one-half degree. That means at geostationary orbit, they are no closer than 11 times as far as the eye can see on flat ground or on the sea: That’s the horizon over the horizon 10 times over. In addition, other than minute forces like solar winds and sparse bits of atmosphere that still exist 500 miles up, nothing gets in the way of orbiting objects and they behave quite predictably. The location of the smallest spacecraft can be predicated within a 1,000 feet, 24 hours in advance. Since we first started placing objects into space there have been 11 known low Earth orbit collisions, and three known collisions at geostationary orbit. Think of it: 135 space shuttle flights, all of the Apollo, Gemini and Mercury flights, hundreds of telecommunications satellites, 1,300 functioning satellites on orbit today, half a million total objects in space larger than a marble, and fewer than 15 known collisions. Why do people worry?

#### Uncertainty from debris collisions creates restraint not instability.

MacDonald 16, B., et al. "Crisis stability in space: China and other challenges." Foreign Policy Institute. Washington, DC (2016). (senior director of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Project with the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention)//Elmer

In any crisis that threatens to escalate into major power conflict, political and military leaders will face uncertainty about the effectiveness of their plans and decisions. This uncertainty will be compounded when potential conflict extends to the space and cyber domains, where weapon effectiveness is largely untested and uncertain, infrastructure interdependencies are unclear, and damaging an adversary could also harm oneself or one’s allies. Unless the stakes become very high, no country will likely want to gamble its well-being in a “single cosmic throw of the dice,” in Harold Brown’s memorable phrase. 96 The novelty of space and cyber warfare, coupled with risk aversion and worst-case assessments, could lead space adversaries into a situation of what can be called “hysteresis,” where each adversary is restrained by its own uncertainty of success. This is conceptually shown in Figures 1 and 2 for offensive counter-space capabilities, though it applies more generally. 97 These graphs portray the hypothetical differences between perceived and actual performance capabilities of offensive counter-space weapons, on a scale from zero to one hundred percent effectiveness. Where uncertainty and risk aversion are absent for two adversaries, no difference would exist between the likely performance of their offensive counter-space assets and their confidence in the performance of those weapons: a simple, straight-line correlation would exist, as in Figure 1. The more interesting, and more realistic, case is notionally presented in Figure 2, which assumes for simplicity that the offensive capabilities of each adversary are comparable. In stark contrast to the case of Figure 1, uncertainty and risk aversion are present and become important factors. Given the high stakes involved in a possible large-scale attack against adversary space assets, a cautious adversary is more likely to be conservative in estimating the effectiveness of its offensive capabilities, while more generously assessing the capabilities of its adversary.

Thus, if both side’s weapons were 50% effective and each side had a similar level of risk aversion, each may conservatively assess its own capabilities to be 30% effective and its adversary’s weapons to be 70% effective. Likewise, if each side’s weapons were 25% effective in reality, each would estimate its own capabilities to be less than 25% effective and its adversary’s to be more than 25% effective, and so on. In Figure 2, this difference appears, in oversimplified fashion, as a gap that represents the realistic worry that a country’s own weapons will under-perform while its adversary’s weapons will over-perform in terms of effectiveness. If both countries face comparable uncertainty and exhibit comparable risk aversion, each may be deterred from initiating an attack by its unwillingness to accept the necessary risks. This gap could represent an “island of stability,” as shown in Figure 2. In essence, given the enormous stakes involved in a major strike against the adversary’s space assets, a potential attacker will likely demonstrate some risk aversion, possessing less confidence in an attack’s effectiveness. It is uncertain how robust this hysteresis may prove to be, but the phenomenon may provide at least some stabilizing influence in a crisis. In the nuclear domain, the immediate, direct consequences of military use, including blast, fire, and direct radiation effects, were appreciated at the outset. Nonetheless, significant uncertainty and under-appreciation persisted with regard to the collateral, indirect, and climatological effects of using such weapons on a large scale. In contrast, the immediate, direct effects of major space conflict are not well understood, and potential indirect and interdependent effects are even less understood. Indirect effects of large-scale space and cyber warfare would be virtually impossible to confidently calculate, as the infrastructures such warfare would affect are constantly changing in design and technology. Added to this is a likely anxiety that if an attack were less successful than planned, a highly aggrieved and powerful adversary could retaliate in unanticipated ways, possibly with highly destructive consequences. As a result, two adversaries facing potential conflict may lack confidence both in the potential effectiveness of their own attacks and in the ineffectiveness of any subsequent retaliation. Such mutual uncertainty would ultimately be stabilizing, though probably not particularly robust. This is reflected in Figure 2, where each side shows more caution than the technical effectiveness of its systems may suggest. Each curve notionally represents one state’s confidence in its offensive counter-space effectiveness relative to their actual effectiveness. Until true space asset resilience becomes a trusted feature of space architectures, deterrence by risk aversion, and cross-domain deterrence, may be the only means for deterrence to function in space.

#### No Escalation over Satellites, their ev just says that the US would lose military power, but that isn’t a credible escalation scenario

#### Planning Priorities don’t’ care about sats

Bowen 18 Bleddyn Bowen 2-20-2018 “The Art of Space Deterrence” <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/> (Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester)//Elmer

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.