# 1AC R1 TFA State

#### The Meta-Ethic is Moral Pluralism; Clashing viewpoints does not require the

#### exclusion of one over another but instead the acceptance that both can be valuable ethical tools. Prefer

#### 1] There are infinite worlds, the aff is logical in one which is sufficient.

**Vaidman 2** Vaidman, Lev, 3-24-2002, "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/>

-MWI: Multiple Worlds Interpretation

**The reason for adopting the MWI is that it avoids the collapse of the quantum wave.** (Other non-collapse theories are not better than MWI for various reasons, e.g., nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics; and the disadvantage of all of them is that they have some additional structure.) **The collapse postulate is a physical law that differs from all known physics in two aspects: it is genuinely random and it involves some kind of action at a distance**. According to the collapse postulate the outcome of a **quantum experiment is not determined by the initial conditions** of the Universe prior to the experiment: **only the probabilities are governed by the initial state**. Moreover, Bell 1964 has shown that there cannot be a compatible local-variables theory that will make deterministic predictions**. There is no experimental evidence in favor of collapse and against the MWI.**

#### 2] Dogmatism Paradox

Sorensen Sorensen, Roy, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. "Epistemic Paradoxes.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 21 June 2006. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemic-paradoxes/>. PeteZ

Saul Kripke’s ruminations on the surprise test paradox led him to a paradox about dogmatism. He lectured on both paradoxes at Cambridge University to the Moral Sciences Club in 1972. (A descendent of this lecture now appears as Kripke 2011). Gilbert Harman transmitted Kripke’s new paradox as follows:

If I know that h is true, I know that any evidence against h is evidence against something that is true; I know that such evidence is misleading. But I should disregard evidence that I know is misleading. So, once I know that h is true, I am in a position to disregard any future evidence that seems to tell against h. (1973, 148)

#### Negative arguments presuppose the aff being true since they begin with a descriptive premise about the affirmative such as the aff does x, and then justify why x is bad. However, if the aff does not have truth value, that entails the descriptive premise would also not have truth value, which is contradictory.

#### 3] Empirics- Quantum superposition proves different ethics can exist simultaneously.

MIT ’19 (Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page; Covers latest ideas from blog post about arXiv; 03/12/2019; “Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page”; <https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/03/12/136684/a-quantum-experiment-suggests-theres-no-such-thing-as-objective-reality/>; *MIT Technology Review*; accessed: 11/19/2020; MohulA)

Back in 1961, the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Eugene Wigner outlined a thought experiment that demonstrated one of the lesser-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics. The experiment shows how the strange nature of the universe allows two observers—say, Wigner and Wigner’s friend—to experience different realities. Since then, physicists have used the “Wigner’s Friend” thought experiment to explore the nature of measurement and to argue over whether objective facts can exist. That’s important because scientists carry out experiments to establish objective facts. But if they experience different realities, the argument goes, how can they agree on what these facts might be? That’s provided some entertaining fodder for after-dinner conversation, but Wigner’s thought experiment has never been more than that—just a thought experiment. Last year, however, physicists noticed that recent advances in quantum technologies have made it possible to reproduce the Wigner’s Friend test in a real experiment. In other words, it ought to be possible to create different realities and compare them in the lab to find out whether they can be reconciled. And today, Massimiliano Proietti at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh and a few colleagues say they have performed this experiment for the first time: they have created different realities and compared them. Their conclusion is that Wigner was correct—these realities can be made irreconcilable so that it is impossible to agree on objective facts about an experiment. Wigner’s original thought experiment is straightforward in principle. It begins with a single polarized photon that, when measured, can have either a horizontal polarization or a vertical polarization. But before the measurement, according to the laws of quantum mechanics, the photon exists in both polarization states at the same time—a so-called superposition. Wigner imagined a friend in a different lab measuring the state of this photon and storing the result, while Wigner observed from afar. Wigner has no information about his friend’s measurement and so is forced to assume that the photon and the measurement of it are in a superposition of all possible outcomes of the experiment. Wigner can even perform an experiment to determine whether this superposition exists or not. This is a kind of interference experiment showing that the photon and the measurement are indeed in a superposition. From Wigner’s point of view, this is a “fact”—the superposition exists. And this fact suggests that a measurement cannot have taken place. But this is in stark contrast to the point of view of the friend, who has indeed measured the photon’s polarization and recorded it. The friend can even call Wigner and say the measurement has been done (provided the outcome is not revealed). So the two realities are at odds with each other. “This calls into question the objective status of the facts established by the two observers,” say Proietti and co. That’s the theory, but last year Caslav Brukner, at the University of Vienna in Austria, came up with a way to re-create the Wigner’s Friend experiment in the lab by means of techniques involving the entanglement of many particles at the same time. The breakthrough that Proietti and co have made is to carry this out. “In a state-of-the-art 6-photon experiment, we realize this extended Wigner’s friend scenario,” they say. They use these six entangled photons to create two alternate realities—one representing Wigner and one representing Wigner’s friend. Wigner’s friend measures the polarization of a photon and stores the result. Wigner then performs an interference measurement to determine if the measurement and the photon are in a superposition. The experiment produces an unambiguous result. It turns out that both realities can coexist even though they produce irreconcilable outcomes, just as Wigner predicted. That raises some fascinating questions that are forcing physicists to reconsider the nature of reality. The idea that observers can ultimately reconcile their measurements of some kind of fundamental reality is based on several assumptions. The first is that universal facts actually exist and that observers can agree on them. But there are other assumptions too. One is that observers have the freedom to make whatever observations they want. And another is that the choices one observer makes do not influence the choices other observers make—an assumption that physicists call locality. If there is an objective reality that everyone can agree on, then these assumptions all hold. But Proietti and co’s result suggests that objective reality does not exist. In other words, the experiment suggests that one or more of the assumptions—the idea that there is a reality we can agree on, the idea that we have freedom of choice, or the idea of locality—must be wrong. Of course, there is another way out for those hanging on to the conventional view of reality. This is that there is some other loophole that the experimenters have overlooked. Indeed, physicists have tried to close loopholes in similar experiments for years, although they concede that it may never be possible to close them all. Nevertheless, the work has important implications for the work of scientists. “The scientific method relies on facts, established through repeated measurements and agreed upon universally, independently of who observed them,” say Proietti and co. And yet in the same paper, they undermine this idea, perhaps fatally. The next step is to go further: to construct experiments creating increasingly bizarre alternate realities that cannot be reconciled. Where this will take us is anybody’s guess. But Wigner, and his friend, would surely not be surprised.

#### 4] Decision Making Paradox- in order to judge we need a decision-making procedure to determine it is a good decision. But to chose a decision-making procedure requires another meta level decision making procedure leading to infinite regress so just vote aff to break the paradox.

#### 5] Liar’s Paradox – the resolution is always true

**Camus** [Albert Camus (existentialist). “The Myth of Sisyphus.” Penguin Books. 1975(originally published 1942). Accessed 12/11/19. Pg 22. Copy on hand. Houston Memorial DX]

The mind’s first step is to distinguish what is true from what is false. However, as soon as thought reflects on itself, what it first discovers is a contradiction. Useless to strive to be convincing in this case. Over the centuries no one has furnished a clearer and more elegant demonstration of the business than Aristotle: “The often ridiculed consequence of these opinions is that they destroy themselves. For by asserting that all is true we assert the truth of the contrary assertion and consequently the falsity of our own thesis (for the contrary assertion does not admit that it can be true). And if one says that all is false, that assertion is itself false. If we declare that solely the assertion opposed to ours is false or else that solely ours is not false, we are nevertheless forced to admit an infinite number of true or false judgments. For the one who expresses a true assertion proclaims simultaneously that it is true, and so on ad infinitum.”

#### **Only an agonistic deliberative model accepts ongoing confrontation as legitimate rather than oppositional.** Thus, the standard is promoting agonistic deliberation.

#### Additionally prefer

#### 1] Performativity- Responding to our framework concedes the validity of agonism since that in and of itself is a process of contestation that agonism would say is valuable and necessary for spaces like debate to function.

#### 2] TJFS- A] Inclusion – Agonism definitionally is a procedural for allowing almost any argumentation in the debate space which controls the internal link to inclusion which is an impact multiplier B] Resource Disparities- Discursive frameworks ensure big squads don’t have a comparative advantage since debates become about quality of arguments rather than quantity and require a higher level of analytic thinking that small schools have.

#### 3] Rule Following Paradox- There is nothing inherent to a rule that tells us how we ought to follow it, regardless of how correct the rule is. Only deliberation accounts for the diversity of interpretations of our norms.

#### **4]** Resolves Skepticism- a) Discussion between many bodies means that moral uncertainty can be deliberated and resolved. b) Truth only makes sense in groups of people so only they can prescribe action

### 1AC – Offense

#### The negative and I affirm the resolution Resolved: Resolved: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

#### Objectivity in the press is consistent with the pragmatic theory of truth via rigorous inquiry and pluralist decision-making.

Ward 17 [Stephen J. A. Ward (Distinguished Lecturer in Ethics at the University of British Columbia, Courtesy Professor at the School of Journalism and Communication at the University of Oregon, and founding director of the Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin). “ENGAGEMENT AND PRAGMATIC OBJECTIVITY”. Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. March 27, 2017. Accessed 2/26/2022. <https://ethics.journalism.wisc.edu/2017/03/27/engagement-and-pragmatic-objectivity/> //Xu]

In the first article in this series, I argued for a radical rethink of ethics to respond properly to the challenge of journalism in a time of Trump. We need to practice democratically engaged journalism, which views journalists as social advocates. But they are advocates of a special kind: objective advocates for plural democracy. Here, I’ll examine the method of objective engagement, what I call pragmatic objectivity. Journalists of this ilk are neither partisans nor neutral reporters of “just the facts.” Objective engagement sounds strange to some ears; it runs against a strong strain of dualistic thinking in journalism ethics: I can be a disinterested journalist or an interest-driven advocate but not both. Facts versus opinion, facts versus values, neutrality versus engagement. These dualisms are the trouble-making heritage of a journalism ethic from a different media era a century ago. Pragmatic objectivity rejects the dualisms, but not objectivity. It redefines it. But how can journalists be engaged and objective? OBJECTIVITY AS TESTING What does it mean to be objective, and why be objective? Since philosophy in antiquity, objectivity has been an ideal of inquiry. Objectivity in this tradition is ontological, i.e., it is knowledge of the world as it exists independent of mind. Objective beliefs map the world. Subjective beliefs fail to map. To be concerned about objectivity is to ask: Which beliefs, reports, and theories are reliable representations of the world? Humans make mistakes. The sources of error are known: our desires, ideologies, prejudices, faulty logic, and interests. How decide which beliefs map the world? There is only one way. We examine how we formed a belief. We evaluate its reasons and its methods. Objectivity becomes epistemological. Objective belief is supported by evidence. Subjective belief lacks support. Objectivity comes down to testing beliefs by the methods and criteria of good inquiry. For example, we test beliefs to see if they follow valid statistical methods. The most familiar modes of testing are the methods of science. But criteria for objective inquiry populate philosophy, logic, critical thinking, social science, law, and journalism. Objectivity is an ideal. Even if never fully realized, it is a target at which to aim. Being objective is not easy. It requires mental discipline and a willingness to critique one’s views. So “Why be objective?” becomes, “Why value well-evidenced belief?” For two reasons. We need objective beliefs to guide actions. And, we need objective methods for adjudication: Teachers need to mark exams objectively; judges need to adjudicate disputes by law and fact. Too much time has been wasted of late on the flabby, unfocused question as to whether objectivity exists, or whether it is valuable. Of course objectivity exists, if we mean there are people capable of reasonably objective judgments. That happens every day. And, it is clear that objective judgment has value in many domains of life. So what is the debate over objectivity in journalism about, anyway? The real issue is what type of objective testing is appropriate for journalism? OLD AND NEW OBJECTIVITY Historically, journalism objectivity has been reductionist. Testing for objectivity is reduced to testing for facts and neutrality. The conception, adopted in the early 1900s for professional newsrooms, is that a report is objective if and only if it neutrally reports only observable facts. The sphere of objective belief is reduced to beliefs derived from the senses. Traditional objectivity is dualistic: it draws a firm line between observation and interpretation of fact, neutral reporting and advocacy. It is exclusive: Reporter’s opinions and interpretations are to be excluded from good reporting. This is the old objectivity. It makes objective engagement ‘sound strange.’ This way of thinking continues to haunt debates, even if people doubt objectivity. Reporters still balk at the suggestion they interpret events. They worry about losing neutrality when covering Trump. Too many commentators reject objectivity because they think of it as strict neutrality, as if there was not some other conception. Pragmatic objectivity is a new objectivity. It is plural and holistic. It evaluates beliefs with a variety of standards. It is inclusive, open to the evaluation of many kinds of writing. It denies dualisms, viewing journalism as both factual and interpretive, an engaged chronicling. For pragmatic objectivity, the sphere of objective belief is larger than the sphere of fact. What we know depends not only on observation but on our perspectives—webs of belief and values. Knowledge is an interpretation, in which fact and theory are entangled. Even what we consider a fact is determined by our webs of belief. Hence, expert analysis of political events and scientific theories of unobservable forces in nature can be objective, even if not reducible to observable fact. They are objective to the extent that they are reliable indicators of the world and guides to action. Journalism stories are web-dependent interpretations. They are not pure observations of fact. Even apparent facts-only reporting, e.g., reporting a news conference, require the journalist to select salient statements, decide on quotations, and make sense of the conference for a public. Salience, choosing content, and creating meaning are interpretive functions. If this view is true, then we need a notion of objectivity that disciplines and tests our interpretive tendencies, rather than tries to eliminate them. We need appropriate standards of evaluation. Pragmatic objectivity provides a list for journalism. They are: Standards of attitude: Journalists should adopt the objective stance, step back from their beliefs, display a passion for truth and give reasons that others could accept. Standards of empirical validity: What is the empirical evidence for the story? Are the facts carefully collected, verified, complete and placed in context? Are counter-facts treated seriously? Standards of clarity, logic, and coherence: Does the story cohere with existing knowledge in the field? Is the interpretation logically consistent? Are the concepts clear? Are fallacious arguments or manipulative techniques used? Standards of diverse and trusted sources: Are important sources taken into account and fairly assessed? Standards of self-consciousness: In constructing a story, are we conscious of the conceptual frame we use to understand the topic? Are there other frames? Standard of open, public scrutiny: Have we subjected our views to the views of others? Are we prepared to alter our views? The standards apply to many forms of journalism from ‘straight’ reporting to editorial commentary and advocacy journalism. It is a flexible, platform-neutral method.

#### A pragmatically objective press is a necessary component of a pluralist and deliberative democracy.

Ward 17 [Stephen J. A. Ward (Distinguished Lecturer in Ethics at the University of British Columbia, Courtesy Professor at the School of Journalism and Communication at the University of Oregon, and founding director of the Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin). “ENGAGEMENT AND PRAGMATIC OBJECTIVITY”. Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. March 27, 2017. Accessed 2/26/2022. <https://ethics.journalism.wisc.edu/2017/03/27/engagement-and-pragmatic-objectivity/> //Xu]

OBJECTIVITY WITHIN ENGAGEMENT How is pragmatic objectivity compatible with journalism as engaged? Objectivity and engagement are compatible because there is a difference between methods and goals. Goals are the aims of engagement in life and society. We are partial about our goals, favoring them over others. But our methods of achieving goals can be objective or subjective. The value of objectivity is that it helps us to be engaged, to achieve certain goals or perform certain functions. Scientists follow objective methods to create new technology to solve a problem. Judges follow the objective methods of law to pursue their goal of justice. Democratically engaged journalists have a dual commitment: they are committed to impartial methods as a means to their partial commitment to plural democracy. They commit themselves to rational and objective methods for deciding what to publish and how to persuade. Their desire for objective belief is part of a desire for reason-based democratic processes. In contrast, there are engaged citizens, such as extreme partisans, who use partial methods for partial goals. They do whatever it takes to advance their cause. Their manipulative strategies exploit the sources of subjective belief such as fears, biases, and stereotypes. Objective engagement does not require an all-encompassing neutrality which precludes expressing a view or coming to a conclusion. Both scientists and judges are impartial in method but they rightly come to conclusions and take sides in conflicts. Objectively engaged journalists are impartial or disinterested because they do not let their partialities or interests undermine objective judgment and inquiry. They do not prejudge the story before fairly weighing all relevant evidence. But after such inquiry, journalists are free to draw an informed conclusion. Such is the method of investigative journalism. Objectivity is not a value-free zone. TRUMP AND PRAGMATIC OBJECTIVITY How might pragmatic objectivity shape our response to journalism in a time of Trump? It would open up the space in which we think about journalism, refusing to reduce the options to a forced choice between neutral stenography and biased partisanship. Calling for a return to traditional objective journalism is like proposing that we go backward in time. Not only do many journalists not practice traditional facts-only reporting but the public sphere that once justified such an ethic has greatly disappeared. The situation is too serious for outdated solutions. Evidence, fact, and truth are ideas increasingly defined by politics, power, and manipulative persuasion. What is a fact is too often what someone claims is a fact, for self-interested reasons. Partisans and leaders, including Trump and his advisers, tweet unsubstantiated claims for political reasons: to galvanize their base of support, to maintain their ideology; and to distract the media. One strategy is to insert fake news into the infosphere knowing it will be there forever, influencing someone, diluting the influence of other interpretations. This insouciance toward objective reasons and disciplined thinking is disturbing. We face the end of the ideal of informed and reasonable democratic publics. In this corrupted media sphere, journalists should not be passive or neutral. Such a climate needs an active journalism with a method that resists subjective claims. Pragmatic objectivity encourages journalists to do the things that need to done: There is no better antidote to fake news than real news, objectively tested. Fake news and alternate facts are just other terms for biased, subjective belief. There is no better antidote to a passive, manipulatable press than a press objectively engaged as watchdogs for plural democracy, who fact-test political claims and investigate conflicts of interest among Trump’s family and advisers. There is no better antidote to illiberal and intolerant media than an objectively engaged journalism that performs the political explanatory journalism noted in the first article. Finally, news media that follow pragmatic objectivity, aimed at protecting plural democracy, can justifiably take legal and other action against a presidential decision, law, or policy that violates a constitutional principle, such as free expression, or the rights of minorities.