# 1AC R2 GBX

## \*Spikes are on bottom\*

## 1AC : FW

#### TJFs first,

#### A] substance begs the question of a framework being good for debate---fairness is a gateway issue to deciding the better debater and education is the reason schools fund debate

#### Util is the best theoretically justified framework

#### 1] Ground – Util cares about all impacts which ensures link and impact turn ground for both sides. Util impacts are easy to contextualize and allows for all types of ground with work debaters have to do.

#### 2] Novice Accessibility – Util is fairer and more educational for novice debaters since contention/LARP ground is what they learn you crowd out novice debaters by debating up and guts accessibility for trad debate. B] Encourages tricking novices and preventing clash and engagement on your offense. OW on participation to the activity

#### 3] Topic Ed – LARP authors mutually agree upon consequentialism when talking oppression and big stick impacts. That’s key for predictability within the resolutional stasis point.

#### Moral realism must start by being mind-independent –realism wouldn’t make sense if our moral laws were based on an agent’s cognitive thinking because then moral truths wouldn’t exist outside of the ways we cohere them. Thus, the meta-ethic is substantive moral naturalism.

#### That outweighs on moral disagreement – ethics are regressive in principle since controversy prevents acting on moral laws. Prefer naturalism since there is no philosophical controversy on the correlation between moral facts and natural facts. Only a naturalistic explanation can solve.

#### 2. Evolutionary Skepticism – only a naturalistic understanding of the world provides a coherent answer to debunking objections.

**Lutz**, Matthew **and Lenman**, James, "Moral Naturalism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(Fall **2018** Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/naturalism-moral/>. //Massa

The second argument against moral non-naturalism concerns moral epistemology. **According to evolutionary** **debunking** **arguments, our moral beliefs are products of evolution**, and this evolutionary etiology of our moral beliefs serves to undermine them. Exactly why evolution debunks our moral beliefs is a matter of substantial controversy, and the debunking argument has been interpreted in a number of different ways (Vavova 2015). Sharon Street, whose statement of the evolutionary debunking argument has been highly influential, holds that debunking arguments make a problem for all versions of moral realism—her paper is entitled “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” But according to another popular line of argument, these debunking arguments are only problems for moral non-naturalism. **The fundamental worry is that our moral beliefs are the product of evolutionary facts rather than moral facts**. If this is so, **this would serve to debunk our moral beliefs, either because it is a necessary condition on justified belief that you take your beliefs to be explained by the facts in question** (Joyce 2006, Ch. 6; Bedke 2009; Lutz forthcoming) **or else because the non-naturalist is left with no way to explain the reliability of our moral beliefs** (Enoch 2009, Schechter 2017).

**But if moral naturalism is true, the realist needn’t grant the skeptic’s premise** that our moral beliefs are the product of evolutionary facts rather than moral facts. **If moral facts are natural, then we needn’t see moral facts as being contrary to natural, evolutionary facts.** The **moral facts might be among these evolutionary facts that explain our moral beliefs.** If, for instance, **to be good** just **is** to be **conducive to social cooperation, then an evolutionary account** that says that we judge things to be good only when they are conducive to social cooperation **would not debunk any of our beliefs about goodness. This** account **would**, instead, **provide a deep vindication of those beliefs** (Copp 2008).

It is open to naturalists to say that the moral facts are wholly or partly responsible for us having the moral beliefs that we have. This allows them to address any number of different epistemic objections that the moral non-naturalist seems ill-equipped to answer. If these objections do succeed against only the non-naturalist, that’s a good reason to think that moral properties, if they exist, must be natural properties.

#### Pleasure is an intrinsic good.

Moen 16 Ole Martin, PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Oslo. "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50(2). 2016. https://www.academia.edu/26656561/\_An\_Argument\_for\_Hedonism\_by\_Ole\_Martin\_Moen. PeteZ

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2

The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask what her~~is~~ end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad.

If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

#### Thus, moral naturalism prima facie justifies hedonism as the only ethical theory that can guide action. Naturalism demands empirical facts that are explained and physically verified from science which only a theory of pain and pleasure can provide since there is a psychological grounding for why they are good and bad. Thus, the standard is consistency with hedonic act utilitarianism

## 1AC: Plan

#### Plan: The Republic of India ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### Right to Strikes solves rampant inequality by empowering collective bargaining.

Rai 20 Diva Rai 1-2-2020 "Right to Strike: Proposed Amendment in the Indian Constitution" <https://blog.ipleaders.in/right-to-strike-proposed-amendment-in-the-indian-constitution/#Strike_as_a_Fundamental_Right> (Writer at Intelligent Legal Solutions)//Elmer

Strike as a Fundamental Right **No fundamental right status has been given to the right to strike**. It is still a legal and statutory right. Article 51(c) of the Indian Constitution says that the state shall have to respect for international law and treaties and Article 253 of the Constitution says that such international laws and treaties should be ratified by the Indian parliament. All the international laws and conventions such as the International Labour Organization and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 has adopted in its very basic structure the right to strike. Although **it is the essence of collective bargaining** which all the international conventions regarding workers talk about but no heed has been paid to these conventions by India. Even **the judiciary has failed to consider the dynamic transformation of right to strike**. **There is a dire need of right to strike to be given as a fundamental right**. Because **the right to form associations and** trade **unions** **will have no effect if right to strike is not given as a fundamental right.** Such rights will become hollow and illusory. **Right to strike is** **very important in the modern economic transactions.** It is **the** **ultimate weapon in the hands of** the **workers to get** their **demands satisfied** from the employer. **Giving** fundamental States to **the right** to strike **will** not only **improve** the economic structure of the country but will also improve the **economic well-being of workers, proper wages,** health and hygiene etc. In the modern civilised world, right to strike should be inalienable and inherent right to be given to the workers. The argument that the strike can lead to economic laws by virtue of dysfunctioning of the industries can be negated by the fact that if the right to strike is not given as a fundamental right, it will anyway disrupt the economic structure. The membership of the trade unions and associations will decrease resulting in economic losses to industries and eventually to the country. Recommendations In the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council vs A.K. Chopra, Supreme Court held that international covenants such as ICESCR etc are like an obligation on India to be fulfilled. It is the duty of the courts to interpret and incorporate the principles of these covenants in their judgements. The international laws clearly ask for the strike as a fundamental right of the workers. ILO, UDHR and ICESCR have in its basic structure adopted this right. India except right to strike, has adopted almost all the principles of these conventions. The need is to look at the industrial adjudication in India. In order to increase the membership of trade unions and associations formed in these industries, the collective bargaining forms a vital part which even judiciary has recognized. But such collective bargaining is only possible if the right to strike is made as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c). The restriction can also be attached to such right such as the strike to be peaceful and legal etc. It is a very important weapon for the employees which will help them to negotiate for their demands with employer. It will also **reduce** the **employer-employee domination** in the industries. There are **still** a large **number of industries** **in India** especially in the rural areas **which don’t provide even minimum wages to the workers**. The working environment is also in dismal state and exploitation is the ultimate result. In these circumstances, **strike becomes the ultimate remedy** to these workers. The right to strike also has some social aspects. The workers come from families. They have to earn for better livelihood. **If not adequate wages are provided** to them, it will harm their livelihood. If there is no concern for their health and hygiene**, it will** **impact their social needs**. Also mentioned in Part IV of the Constitution, it is the duty of the State to provide better working environment to workers. It can be concluded that in a country like India, strike should be made the fundamental right so that its industrial and economic sector flourish. Conclusion In a large democratic society like India with a huge number of economic transactions and well developed industrial sector, it is very much required to bring about policies for the welfare of people engaged as mentioned in Article 38 of the Constitution. Article 19(1)(c) may be able to provide them the right to form association and trade unions, but it is not enough. Sometimes, the circumstances require the workers to go one step beyond and start strike by stopping the work to push the employer to get the demands fulfilled. Right to strike is a statutory right in India guaranteed by Section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There are certain conditions, which only if satisfied can the workers go on to strike. The right is an important weapon in the hands of workers for seeking redressal and safeguarding their liberties. The international laws mandates strike to be given as a fundamental right to workers. ILO, UDHR and ICESCR have in its basic structure adopted this right. India except right to strike, has adopted almost all the principles of these conventions. The need is to look at the industrial adjudication in India. Collective bargaining is the essence of trade unions and associations but it is only possible if right to strike is given the fundamental right status. Considering the dismal conditions of industries, employer domination, minimum wage issues and social aspects of the strike, it casts a legal and constitutional obligation on the State to made strike as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c).

## 1AC: Econ/Leadership

#### The Advantage is the Indian Economy:

#### Lack of Indian Right to Strike cements low wages.

Lobo 21 Darren Lobo 1-8-2021 "By prohibiting strikes, India’s new labour codes will make employees powerless" <https://www.thenewsminute.com/article/prohibiting-strikes-india-s-new-labour-codes-will-make-employees-powerless-141083> (Lawyer with experience in contract drafting, negotiation, general corporate advisory, private equity and venture capital work.)//Elmer

On December 12 last year, thousands of workers ransacked machinery worth crores at a plant near Bengaluru run by Wistron India. Wistron, which set up the plant in 2019 amid much fanfare from the Karnataka Government, is a major contract manufacturer of Apple products. Naturally, this fiasco deeply worried the Union government. Its main concern, as noted in a statement put out by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), was to “ensure that the investor sentiment is not affected due to such one-off incidents”. In addition to voicing this concern, the DPIIT went on to direct the Karnataka government to “look into the wages and labour related matters there”. But that query smacks of an afterthought. A more pertinent question might be “What sort of systemic failure resulted in thousands of workers deciding that ransacking their “place of work is a viable option?” Initial reports suggest that Wistron had promised engineering graduates a salary of Rs 16,000 per month, which was then cut to Rs 12,000. They also allegedly changed working hours from 8 hours to 12+ hours without overtime pay, violating several other labour laws in the process. It is also alleged that Wistron did not even pay these diminished salaries on time due to what they have termed a “software glitch”. Fortunately, the wheels of justice seem to be rolling along smoothly. In accordance with DPIIT instructions, over 150 of these dastardly workers running around hurting investor sentiment are now in jail. Wistron, on the other hand, has asked one VP in charge of India operations to look for alternate employment. It may also need to pay a small fine for its alleged labour law violations. While violence cannot be condoned, the Wistron incident shows that all is not well with **serious underlying problems affecting labour** in sunny, investor-friendly India. Looking to the future, a crucial question to ask is: “Are we fixing our labour grievance redressal systems so that these sorts of events do not happen again?” The **new I**ndustrial **R**elations **C**ode, 2020 (IRC) has **made** **drastic alterations** to this labour grievance redressal process. This law was passed by Parliament in September after just three hours of debate, over deafening opposition from nearly all stakeholders and pan India protests. The Union government intends to enact into law with effect from April 01, 2021. While the IRC contains several deeply problematic provisions, this piece focuses solely on how it **effectively nullifies** labour’s most powerful grievance redressal tool – **the strike**. How existing law on strikes works Individual employees normally have a weak bargaining position. Collective bargaining, a collective strike, or the threat of a strike which can shut down production has the potential to strengthen their negotiating ability significantly. The present law on strikes, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA), places restrictions on striking only on industries that are “public utility services” since public utilities are crucial for societal functioning. For those that aren’t employed with a public utility service, the strike process under the IDA is relatively straightforward. Here’s a simplified flowchart on how it works: As the chart illustrates, the main challenge that an employee would face is in persuading her colleague that going on strike is the best available option. Once this is accomplished, the IDA allows employees to proceed with a strike. In case the government believes that the issue would be better resolved through other means, it can order the parties to approach a government-appointed conciliation officer, or litigate their issue before a labour court, during which time striking is not allowed. By going on strike, employees risk upsetting their relationship with management. But this is precisely the point - employees take this risk only when their employment situation is difficult enough that going on strike is their only viable option. The IDA at the very least gives employees the freedom to make this decision. Because there is a legitimate possibility of production halting due to a strike, companies also have the incentive to come to a compromise when employees have major issues. Needless to say, this framework isn’t fool-proof; employers have identified several neat loopholes in the IDA to minimise this risk. For example, instead of directly hiring employees, employers can go through a contractor, who acts as a middleman. In such a situation, employees are less likely to unionise or go on strike (as they don’t directly work for the employer), and contractors are more willing to act unscrupulously when dealing with errant employees. Reportedly, our friends at Wistron had contracted nearly 85% of their total workforce of 10,000 through a contractor. Despite the existence of such loopholes, an employee’s right to strike is more or less protected under the IDA. How the IRC effectively prohibits strikes The IRC has not technically banned the strike. What it has done instead is made the process so mind-bogglingly complicated that most people would not be able to understand the procedure, let alone follow it. The (again, simplified) **process of going on strike now is as follows**: The chart above shows how the IRC has made the striking process considerably more convoluted. First, striking employees need to send at least 14 days’ clear notice to the employer and three separate governmental authorities. However, since the draft rules framed under the IRC permit only members of a trade union to send this notice, these employees need to either be a part of a trade union or form their own trade union before they can send the aforementioned notice. Forming a trade union is a long and complicated process with no fixed maximum time frame. Once the notice period has elapsed, employees are mandatorily required to attempt conciliation with the employer. While the conciliation process is required to be completed in 14 days, the IRC prescribes no consequences whatsoever if this period is exceeded. In effect, this gives employers a major incentive to delay conciliation indefinitely and **thereby stall a potential strike**. If, during or after conciliation, 60 days have passed since the notice of strike was originally sent, the IRC requires a fresh notice to be sent and the entire process must be repeated. If conciliation fails, the employer can apply for formal adjudication of the dispute before the Industrial Tribunal to be created under the IRC. The (presumably) underpaid employees, now have to hire and pay lawyers to fight their case. Bear in mind that they are also not permitted to strike either during the notice period, the conciliation period, the adjudication period, or for two months after the adjudication is complete. The IRC has both made the procedure of going on strike unnecessarily complex and expensive and has extended this procedure to every industry, as opposed to just public utilities under the IDA. Nobody is sure why this has been done. The Parliamentary Standing Committee set up to look into the IRC found “no plausible reason for expanding the ambit of this provision indiscriminately to all the industrial establishments as restrictions should not apply to all strikes and demonstrations which are meant to assure freedom of industrial actions”. **Individuals with the courage to try** and follow this process **would** soon **find** themselves in **a web of notices**, **conciliation procedures**, **and litigation** before they ever have the opportunity to actually go on strike. Since there is **no real threat of a strike which can halt production of a company**, **collective bargaining loses most of its effectiveness**. **In a country with** **as much of a labour surplus as India**, **nullifying the possibility of a strike,** the foundation of collective bargaining also **removes** **incentives for companies to improve working conditions.** If employees choose to ignore this convoluted process and strike anyway, they will have committed an "illegal strike", which attracts a minimum fine of Rs. 10,000 which may go up to Rs. 50,000, and potentially imprisonment. Besides these consequences, there is a **very real loss of legitimacy with committing “illegal strikes**”. Regardless of how valid the grievances of employees are; the IRC has made it that much easier to treat anyone who does not follow this process as a miscreant breaking the law. Red tape - A death knell for collective action? **Employers will** likely **use** the **excessive red tape** brought about by the IRC to their advantage, and experiences regarding labour rights from the United States has supported this view. Professor Jake Rosenfeld, an expert on economic inequality, in his book “What Unions No Longer Do” notes how US companies found it cheaper and simpler to delay the formal processes and skirt the rules governing employee disputes. They then priced the resulting fines imposed on them simply as a cost of fighting unionisation. Coincidentally, the fine that can be imposed on employers under IRC for “unfair labour practices”, such as threatening employees who try and join a trade union ranges from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 2,00,000. **From the perspective of an employer**, the **cost of** engaging lawyers, delaying **legal proceedings, and** **paying** meagre **fines** **is** pitifully **insignificant** compared **to** the **costs of paying fair wages** and providing adequate work conditions and benefits to employees. The fines are also a meagre percentage of the turnover of most companies, so it is unlikely to affect the sentiment of investors either. It is also far lower than the loss of profit and output that they could suffer during a strike, which could have otherwise acted as the incentive to reach an agreement with their employees. Looking at the bigger picture, there are **massive threats against** the **goal of every working-age Indian being able to obtain fair** and dignified **work**. Rising levels of automation, lack of proper education and training, and increasing employer expectations all pose a threat to adequate employee rights. The **only weapon** that employees have in their arsenal to counteract these forces **is** their **ability to negotiate with their labour**. **By denying them** the right to withhold this labour, **the IRC will** inevitably **make them powerless**. Regardless of what investor sentiment may be, employees must have this power. **Studies** by both the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development have **noted** the **strong correlation between bargaining power and the** rise or **decrease of inequality**. The weaker the bargaining power, the higher the inequality in the country. For collective bargaining to have any hope in India, it is crucial that the strike, a cornerstone of bargaining power and the collective bargaining process, not be brushed aside by an inveterate and insidious bureaucracy.

#### Loss of Strike Protection effects 90% of India’s workers who work with little to no pay.

Srivastava 20 Roli Srivastava 9-23-2020 "'Historic' labour law raises fear Indian workers will pay price" <https://www.reuters.com/article/india-economy-labour/historic-labour-law-raises-fear-indian-workers-will-pay-price-idUSL5N2GK1A6> (Correspondent at Thomas Reuters Foundation)//Elmer

MUMBAI, Sept 23 (Thomson Reuters Foundation) - **India’s parliament** on Wednesday **passed** “historic” labour laws that the government says help workers and business alike, but activists fear a **loss of labour rights** in a push for profits. Experts said the laws - aimed at protecting workers and streamlining labyrinthine regulation - exempt tens of thousands of smaller firms, and **rob workers of a right to strike** or receive benefits. Almost **90 percent** **of India’s workers** **operate** **in the informal sector with no security, low pay and little or no benefits.** The new laws, in the works for years, carry measures to meet the new challenge of COVID-19, which has seen millions lose jobs under lockdown and forced many to walk thousands of miles home where they struggled to find work.

#### Stopping rampant inequality is key to long-term economic growth

**Ghosh 10/21** [Nilanjan Ghosh, Dr. Nilanjan Ghosh is Director, ORF’s Kolkata Centre, and heads the Inclusive Growth and SDG programme across the various centres of the Foundation. His previous positions at various points in time include Senior Fellow and Head of Economics at ORF Kolkata, Senior Vice President & Chief Economist at MCX (I) Limited in Mumbai, and Professor of Econometrics at the TERI School of Advanced Studies in New Delhi. He had been a Visiting Fellow at the Linnaeus University, Sweden, in 2008 and 2015, and has visited Uppsala University (Sweden), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (USA), and Stanford University (USA), at various points in time. One of the leading ecological economists and development analysts of south Asia, he is considered a pioneer in the application of neoclassical and heterodox economics in water governance. A natural resource economist and econometrician by training, Dr. Ghosh obtained his PhD from the Indian Institute of Management (IIM) Calcutta. Till recently, Dr Ghosh advised WWF India for setting up their Ecological Economics practice. Dr. Ghosh was Vice President of The Indian Society for Ecological Economics (INSEE)"Is increasing wealth inequality coming in the way of economic growth in India?," ORF, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/is-increasing-wealth-inequality-coming-in-the-way-of-economic-growth-in-india/> Accessed 11/4/21] Adam

The Indian growth (or the lack of it on recent counts) story over the last three decades has been a consumption-led one. This has been [argued time and again](https://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/india-has-a-model-of-consumption-led-growth-says-arun-jaitley/story-rh2bTMbjoTGv7yPHpNyMFK.html) in policy circles, in [empirical analysis](http://www.ashwinanokha.com/resources/1328945436--10.pdf) drawing on the causal relation between growth and private consumption, and also in a [recent paper by Abhijit Mukhopadhyay](https://www.orfonline.org/research/post-pandemic-economic-recovery-seven-priorities-india/) of the Observer Research Foundation. On recent counts, the deceleration of the Indian economy, and then negative growth during 2020-21 have been attributed to the decelerating private consumption expenditure growth, and then to lack of consumption demand, respectively (Fig. 1).

As such, the “consumption-led-growth” strategy has often been resorted by many emerging economies as one of the ways to spur investment and production within the economy. For example, China explicitly acknowledged promoting “consumption-led-growth” in their 14th five-year plan through increases in wages and salaries so as to increase purchasing powers of their citizens. This paradigm shift from “export-driven-growth” to “consumption-led growth” was compelled by the global economic slump that mostly affected the US and EU after 2008, thereby, denting demand for Chinese exports. China realised that such unpredictabilities in the external sector emerging from the risks embedded in international trade and finance cannot sustain Chinese growth ambitions. Under such circumstances, China had to resort to boosting domestic consumption demand to provide impetus to their growth. However, for India, the force of consumption demand as a driver of growth emerged organically rather than as a policy intervention. Therefore, though one may talk of the fiscal packages announced in the 2020 pandemic year as the driver of the apparent revival of the Indian economy (as Asian Development Bank (ADB) projects that the [Indian growth will be 10 percent in 2021-22](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/indias-gdp-growth-to-rebound-to-10-2021-22-moderate-to-7-5-next-year/articleshow/86418149.cms)), the force of private consumption should not get blurred in the visions of the policymakers. This is especially true for constantly feeding and sustaining economic growth in the medium and long-run.

The story of an “unequal India” is neither simple nor comfortable for New Delhi, being treated as a maverick field of research and a normative concern for policy, thereby, making it lurk somewehere in the background in the development policy discourse. In that sense, inequality, despite being a problematic developmental issue, it hardly got mainstreamed in policymaking, with the concern of high growth taking the limelight

 It is here that the story of inequality enters. The story of an “unequal India” is neither simple nor comfortable for New Delhi, being treated as a maverick field of research and a normative concern for policy, thereby, making it lurk somewehere in the background in the development policy discourse. In that sense, inequality, despite being a problematic developmental issue, it hardly got mainstreamed in policymaking, with the concern of high growth taking the limelight. The argument made here is that the increasing inequality is going to be a critical deterrent for long-term growth. The seminal and celebrated paper by Simon Kuznets in the American Economic Review in 1955 exposed the Kuznets phenomenon or the Kuznets’ curve (KC): An inverted-U or bell-shaped relation between economic growth and inequality. This implies that at the initial stages of growth, the economic inequality increases, and it starts declining after growth reaches a threshold. The Kuznets’ hypothesis has not only received empirical support, but also empirical and theoretical dissent, especially from those who began citing the East Asian Miracle in the 1980s. Yet, if the Kuznets’ hypothesis is true, India is still on the rising side of the KC conforming to its “developing nation” status.

       Be that as it may, there is no doubt that economic inequality in India is increasing, as evident from the data from [World Inequality Database](https://wid.world/country/india/). This is true for both income and wealth inequalities. Rather interestingly, wealth inequality increased at a much faster rate than income inequality, and more importantly, wealth inequality increased at a much faster rate between 1991 and 2020—i.e. in the post-liberalisation phase—as compared to its movement between 1961 and 1991. This is evident from Table 1. While the possession of wealth of the top 1 percent of the population increased from 11.9 percent in 1961 to 16.1 percent in 1991, the same proportion of population owned 42.5 percent of the wealth in 2020. On the other hand, the proportion of wealth of the bottom 50 percent of the population declined from 12.3 percent in 1961 to 2.8 percent in 2020, thereby, indicating on the increasing chasm in wealth possession amongst the population.

On the other hand, though income inequality was initially declining between 1961 and 1991 (as can be made out from Table 2), it started increasing after 1991. Hence, it won’t be incorrect to infer that the liberalisation and the high growth phase of the Indian economy have been associated with increasing income and wealth inequalities.

Reiterating fig. 1, it can be seen that the periods of high GDP growth rates of the Indian economy converge with periods of high growth in final consumption, especially after 1991. While inequality has also increased after 1991, any further increase in inequality will have serious consequences on promoting and sustaining high growth in the longer run. In order to do that, we go back to the fundamental definitions of income and wealth inequalities. Though income and wealth are related, they are conceptually distinct: Income is the flow of financial resources for an economic entity—household, firms, etc.—from wages and salaries, profits, investments, government transfers, and various other sources in a particular year. On the other hand, wealth is a stock, and is comprised of the entity’s total savings and assets from the past with additions to assets and savings in the present year. In that sense, wealth provides a metric of an entity’s net worth—total assets minus total liabilities. As such, both income and wealth are important for household financial well-being, and holding of wealth helps the households or economic agents to finance their consumption needs even when incomes dry out during economic crisis.

As per table 1, there has been an increase in the total proportion of wealth in the hands of the top 1 percent though the income inequality has not increased by the same proportion. This implies that a large portion of the incomes earned historically by the top 1 percent (or even top 10 percent) have gone into savings or asset creation rather than moving through the consumption route. On the other hand, [empirical studies](https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/202932/1/1663557349.pdf) in various parts of the world go on to show that the marginal propensity to consume (or increase in consumption expenditure with a unit increase in income or wealth) of the lower income groups is much higher than the higher income groups. This implies that an increase in income or wealth of the lower income groups has a higher chance of getting into the consumption channel of the economy than an increase in income of the higher income groups (for whom the chances are higher of getting into the savings or asset creation channel). In other words, the phenomenon of “rich getting richer” will go against the fundamental goal of achieving fast yet sustained growth, however communistic the idea might sound!

Hence, the governmental response has to be Keynesian in nature with spurring up of transfers (or providing for basic incomes whether univeral or targeted) in the short run, but also be an enabler of the market forces in the longer run. In a recent article, [Maitreesh Ghatak](https://www.theindiaforum.in/article/does-india-have-inequality-problem) suggests the government to resort to greater wealth taxation and using the money to invest in education, health, and infrastructure to create a robust human capital base for long-term growth. Yet, the governmental interventions into such systems should not be taken as the permanent solution. Rather, the governments need to enable markets to generate forces so as to create jobs and concomitantly create human capital that can live up to the challeges of the future economy. This, therefore, needs a much more integrated approach to the problems of development rather than looking at development through the reductionist lens of economic growth only.

#### Economic collapse ensures Modi puts all his eggs in the nationalist basket - the COVID blame won’t save him again.

Gupta 21 (, S., 2021. It isn't the economy, genius. India proves it by voting for Modi again and again. [online] ThePrint. Available at: <https://theprint.in/national-interest/it-isnt-the-economy-genius-india-proves-it-by-voting-for-modi-again-and-again/633329/> [Accessed 25 October 2021] Shekhar Gupta is an Indian journalist and author. He is the founder and the current editor-in-chief of ThePrint. He is also a columnist for the Business Standard and pens a weekly column which appears every Saturday. He has had long stints at The Indian Express and India Today. Shekhar Gupta has received assorted awards: the 1985 Inlaks award for young journalist of the year,[10] G. K. Reddy Award for Journalism,[11] and the Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed Memorial Award for National Integration.[12] He was awarded Padma Bhushan by the then UPA Government in 2009 for his contribution to journalism.[13] Under his leadership, The Indian Express won the Vienna-based International Press Institute's Award for Outstanding Journalism in the Public Interest thrice: The first time for its coverage of the Gujarat riots of 2002, the second time for uncovering the Bihar flood relief scam in 2009 and the third time for its sustained investigation into the Malegaon and Modasa blasts of 2008 and the alleged role of extremists and organisations.[14].)-rahulpenu

It isn’t the economy, genius. India proves it by voting for Modi again and again Flurry of economic reform suggests Modi realises his muscular nationalism script is getting jaded. Chances are he'll try for economic recovery but stick to what's worked. In his 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton immortalised the line, “It’s the economy, stupid”. Does this work in Narendra Modi’s India? In election after election, across democracies in the world, the line has been repeated. The transnational appeal of the idea was also understandable because James Carville, the famous political “consultant” who coined it for Clinton, also advised dozens of leaders across the world. A kind of globalised, American Prashant Kishor. And, whatever the language or idiom, the logic passed the test of time. Or it did, until lately. For almost a quarter century, a leader who promised or delivered a better economy won, or was re-elected. In 2016, this was the promise that brought Donald Trump to power, as also Modi in 2014. But that seems to have changed worldwide now. Let’s look at India. After Modi’s first two years, the economy has stalled, and then declined. The stall began with demonetisation in 2016-17. Lately, India has had at least 7 out of 8 quarters of growth decline. Negative growth is rightly blamed on the pandemic, but it isn’t as if this patient was in the pink of health before the virus struck. On almost every economic and even social indicator, India has been posting a decline. It shows in our crashing rankings on all key global indices. Now, we know that Modi won power in 2014 on the promise of massive economic growth, jobs and development on the ‘**Gujarat** **Model’**. But barring, say, the first 24 months to some extent, he has **never** **delivered** on that promise. If the concept of “It’s the economy, stupid” worked, he should not have swept the Uttar Pradesh elections of 2017. By that time, demonetisation had already deflated India’s economy; job losses, and trade, rural and farmer distress had set in. It didn’t bother anybody but his hapless opposition and marginalised editorialists like us. By the summer of 2019, our economy had already been in a tailspin. Worse, joblessness was already reaching a high that would be alarming in a democracy. Some of the data was so embarrassing that the Modi government had to either hide it, rewrite it, or change the formula and produce friendlier data, as on GDP numbers. Every economic indicator had gone wrong except one: Inflation. And yet, Modi returned with a larger majority in that election. It is still exactly a month before we will know what the voters decide in these five assembly elections. The numbers obviously won’t be what Amit Shah is counting after each phase in West Bengal. But whatever these are, one thing they won’t reflect is the state of India’s economy. It will be the first year of **negative** — double-digit negative — **growth** in our independent history. And while this **may** be **blamed** **on** the **pandemic**, it destroyed so many lives, jobs and savings because it came on top of three lousy years. **In** **normal** **politics**, this **would** **have** **made** these **elections** a **walkover** **for** the **opposition**. They will be anything but that. Which will make us question that 1992 Clintonism. So, what is it that works for Modi, if not the economy? Or, how does he keep winning in spite of the economy? The fact is, it isn’t an India-specific phenomenon. Donald Trump, whatever else was wrong with him, lost in spite of the economy being in a pretty good place. It helped him retain and increase his voters. But other considerations weighed on the minds of a larger number of voters. The issues of identity, colour and class, and the virus, for example. Biden’s promise wasn’t an economic boom. At the other extreme is the Putin phenomenon. In fact, this week’s National Interest was sparked by this Ruchir Sharma column in the FT, where he talks about how Putin has not only made Russia sanctions-proof, but continues to keep winning despite insignificant economic growth. We record all the qualifications on Russia’s electoral process — ours still is much cleaner in spite of some vote-filled EVMs hitching a ride in a candidate’s car in Assam. Yet, there is no denying that he’s widely popular and will win a fairer election as well. How is he able to do this without growth? Putin is **riding** the **deep** **insecurities** **of** a **people** **scarred** **by** much **instability**, political and economic, **preceding** **his** **rise**. For them, therefore, **stability** becomes the **first** **priority**. The economy can wait. If we were to build on this, **stability** **brings** **nationalistic** **self**-**esteem**. Putin fought off many separatist or religiously inspired forces, insurgency and terrorism, “taught the upstart Ukrainians a lesson” by grabbing Crimea, stood up to America, and probably even played it in the Trump period. Under him, Russia is back to being a power that enough of the world still holds in awe. How does it matter that its economy has shrunk relative to the rest? Even compared to the emerging markets. For comparison, it is just about **60** **per** **cent** **of** **India**’s at $1.7 trillion (in 2019), **with** **no** **hope** **of** **catching** **up**. **But**, **if** the **nation** **is** **together**, **can** **punch** **above** its **economic** **weight** in its neighbourhood and in the global balance of power, it is because of stability and leadership. The economy is about my self-interest. I can sacrifice it for some time. **Apply** **the** **same** **parallel** **to** **India**. By 2014, **India** still **had** the **scars** **of** 20**08** (26/11) and much **terrorism** that **preceded** **and** **followed** it, going right back to the early Vajpayee years. It was like **two** **decades** **of** **humiliation** with a much weaker neighbour hurting us often, at will. All India would do, from Vajpayee to Manmohan Singh, was to go complaining to America and the rest. On top of it, we had a prime minister so weakened by his own party that he had been reduced to a caricature of that high office. Plus, the discourse across the board was all about corruption from the opposition, and inequality even by the ruling party. Between 2003 and 2009, India had built enormous pride and optimism with a booming economy. That optimism brought the UPA back to power. In the following years, it was fully reversed. It was an incredible election where the ruling party also campaigned complaining about inequality and poverty instead of its economic successes. For the Modi proposition, if the promise of taking the ‘**Gujarat** **Model’** nationwide **was** **the** **engine**, this widespread negativity provided a 200-knot tailwind. Through these seven years, he’s mostly failed to deliver on the first promise, the economy. **But**, on the second, **national** **pride**, **standing** **up** **to** **terrorism** from the neighbourhood, on **restoring** the **majesty** **of** **the** prime minister’s **office**, **he** **scores** 10 upon 10. May be even **11** **upon** **10**. Remember, we are only talking about his voters. The belated flurry of **economic** **reform** would **suggest** **Modi** has **figured** that **his** **script** **is** getting **jaded** **and** that he **needs** **a new one**. He will try for an economic recovery but still **stick** **to** **what** **has** **worked** for him so far: The three-pronged offering of massive, efficient welfarism for the poorest; hard, visible infrastructure-building; and harder, cast-in-Hindutva **nationalism**. The engines of the economy, left to idle for long, take time gathering pace. It is likely that India will get a great year anyway on the back of a terrible one. Some equivalent of the stock markets’ dead cat bounce will come in. The larger, more widespread economic gains take time. They also, inevitably, increase inequality first. Usually, it’s some successor who will benefit from this. So, can’t count on it. **Modi** **gets** **this**. The question is, do his challengers get it? Much of their attack is still over economic distress under Modi. Two large areas, **identity** (which includes religion and culture) **and** **national** **pride**, they’ve **ceded** **to** **him** altogether. Check out the Congress and Left parties’ flip-flop on Sabarimala to understand the point on identity. Or the manner of questioning over Uri, Balakot and Galwan. These **underline** their faltering on **nationalism**. **Economic** **distress** **brings** **insecurity**, **but** it **isn’t** a **fraction** **of** **the** **visceral** **emotion** a **perceived** **threat** **to** **identity** **or** **national** **pride** **brings**. This is why demagogues across the democratic world keep winning. The reason we’d prefer to say at this point: It isn’t the economy, genius.

#### Greenlights diversionary war - overwhelming evidence.

Humayun et al. 20 (, F., Walt, Quinn, Tatar, Katerji, Crabtree, Agrawal, Maqsood, Walt, Gao and Moody, 2020. After India’s Skirmish With China, Is Pakistan Next?. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/29/india-skirmish-china-modi-pick-fight-pakistan/> [Accessed 25 October 2021] Yale University, Ph.D., Political Science 2022 Dissertation: “Democratic Institutions & International Crisis Behaviour” Committee: Steven I. Wilkinson (Yale), Alexandre Debs (Yale), Vipin Narang (MIT) Yale University, M.A., Political Science 2019 University of Cambridge, M.Phil, International Relations 2013 London School of Economics, B.Sc, International Relations & History 2011. Research is supported by the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies, the Yale South Asian Studies Council, and International Security Studies at Yale)-rahulpenu

After India’s Skirmish With China, Is Pakistan Next? **Looking** **to** **reinvigorate** **support** at home, **Modi** could **pick** a **fight** **with** his country’s **traditional** **enemy**. The worst border skirmish between India and China in the Himalayas in decades has abated for now, but the **potential** **for** **crisis** still **looms** **large** **over** a **nuclear**-**armed** **South** **Asia**. Last week, India announced it was formally downgrading relations with its other adversary and neighbor, Pakistan, by reducing the staff at its High Commission by 50 percent. The last time India asked for a similar reduction of embassy staff was in 2001, following an attack on the Indian Parliament. Bilateral ties between the two states have been shunted since New Delhi unilaterally revoked the special status of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir on Aug. 5, 2019, and intensified a heavy-handed crackdown in the valley. So what exactly does the dust-up with China have to do with Pakistan’s relationship with India? In short, there are five reasons why this month’s Himalayan standoff increases the likelihood of a fresh India-Pakistan crisis. First: India’s muted response to China in the aftermath of the Galwan Valley skirmish has raised difficult logistical questions and reputational concerns about New Delhi’s much-touted role as counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific. Although New Delhi adopted a position of nonalignment for much of the Cold War, its potential as a regional diplomatic and military bulwark against a rising China took on new significance after U.S. President George W. Bush sought to enlist it as a strategic partner and approved the sale of U.S. nuclear technology to the country. More recently, New Delhi and Washington announced an expanded defense partnership, including $3 billion in arms sales. Yet hostile encounters with China in both 2017 and again this year have underscored for Indian policymakers the need to get along with Beijing if only to sustain a mutually feasible cohabitation; informal summits such as those in 2018 and 2019 were driven by this strategic necessity. In the aftermath of the most recent crisis, corps commander-level talks and diplomatic negotiations between Beijing and New Delhi mean India is likely to prioritize a minimum-working engagement with China over an unambiguous geopolitical rivalry that would come with fully partnering with the United States. Meanwhile, the political compulsion to demonstrate military capability—especially in the face of a conventional balance of forces that has shifted in China’s favor—may impel India to look elsewhere to offset suggestions of strategic impotency. If military capabilities drive policy choices, then the theater with Pakistan is a suitable foil for perceived Indian weaknesses compared to China. Second, since coming to power in 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra **Modi** has **demonstrated** both a **willingness** **and** a **capability** **to** **deliver** **on** **nationalistic** **pledges** at home, **especially** **when** his government’s **ability** **to** **deliver** **on** the **economic** **front** has **hit** **snags**. Although India has seen its GDP growth fall to its lowest rate in the last 11 years, Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has sought to **consolidate** its political **base** **by** **doubling** **down** on its **nationalist**ic pledges—from revoking the special status for Jammu and Kashmir (disputed between India and Pakistan since 1947) to building a Hindu temple to the god Ram on a disputed holy site where the Babri Masjid once stood. Research shows that **leaders** looking to **divert** **attention** tend to **target** **traditional** **enemies** and enduring rivals (as conflict against such persistent adversaries is most likely to promote in-group solidarity), and **diversionary** **conflicts** are particularly **likely** to **take** the **form** **of** **territorial** **disputes**. Since the controversial measures in Kashmir last year, India’s politicians have systematically upped the bilateral ante with Pakistan by declaring intent to “secure” the Pakistani administrative areas of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. Earlier this year, India’s new Army chief said the Indian Army was “**ready** **to** **seize** **control**” of Pakistan-administered Kashmir if directed by the Indian government; the same month, **Modi** **said** India needed **seven** **to** **10** **days** **to** **defeat** **Pakistan** **in** **war**. Two weeks ago, India’s defense minister reiterated that taking Pakistani Kashmir was now a “stated goal of India’s Parliament.” **Ordinarily**, **such** **statements** **might** **be** **put** **down** to cheap talk—**except**, **in** **this** **case**, the **BJP’s** own track **record** of **follow**-**through** **suggests** these **threats** should be **taken** **seriously**. Operationally, the Indian **Army** has **begun** to **set** **up** **artillery** **strikes** deep into Kashmiri villages to launch **long**-**distance** **fire** into Pakistan-administered territory. In May, after months of deliberation, the India Meteorological Department began to list several areas on the Pakistani side of the border, in its own internal weather reports—an unprecedented development. Third, while tempers and temperatures arguably cool on the Sino-Indian front, memories of a short but tense air duel between India and Pakistan last February are still fresh in both Islamabad and New Delhi. While Pakistan shot down an aging, Soviet-era Indian MiG-21 Bison and captured and returned an Indian pilot in the dogfight, India claimed it had downed a Pakistani F-16. The air duel over Kashmir quickly escalated into a war of narratives: Pakistan rejected India’s allegations and asserted it had lost no jets. In the days after the dogfight, the New York Times ran a story about the implications of India losing a plane to a country whose military was half the size and received a quarter of the funding. India’s right-wing Shiv Sena has since called for more “**surgical** **strikes**” on Pakistan to consolidate the BJP’s grip on Kashmir. Furthermore, when Indian papers ran headlines of India having killed “300-400 terrorists” in an airstrike on Balakot last February, Pakistan countered that the targets had been “little more than rocks and trees.” Since last year, India’s opposition too has on various occasion taken swipes at Modi for the Balakot episode; pollsters meanwhile have disputed the extent to which the Balakot strikes actually buoyed the BJP in its 2019 electoral victory. The “decider’s dilemma” for Modi is that the **unfinished** **business** from the Balakot standoff needs a less ambiguous final chapter, short of which the BJP risks being domestically perceived as having backed away prematurely from a weaker enemy. This leads to a fourth and crucial point: Successive **regional** **crises** **under** the **BJP** mean that the domestic costs for India’s leaders to not be seen as backing down against external adversaries are growing, not diminishing. In the standoff with China, losses incurred by the Indian Army have been a shot in the arm for India’s opposition politicians, who have been quick to condemn the BJP for its lack of preparation and in some cases for surrendering entirely. **Conflict** **with** **Pakistan** could be a **much**-**needed** **salve** **for** a **disheartened** Indian **media** that is largely controlled by the Indian ruling party: According to analysis conducted after an attack on a military convoy in Kashmir last February, **Modi** got **near**-**total** media **coverage** despite energetic campaigning by India’s opposition at the same time. Bringing up the threat of a salient out-group could help the BJP reenergize its patriotic and supportive base and paper over divisions in its coalition. A final factor that explains why the China-India **standoff** may **spill** **over** **into** **tensions** with Pakistan has to do with the White House’s current occupant: President Donald Trump. Proponents of a strong Indo-U.S. relationship have lobbied hard to present a positive image of bilateral ties, buoyed largely by symbolic spectacles. On the critical economic front leading up to the COVID-19 crisis, however, both the Indian economy and U.S.-Indian economic relations were on a downward trajectory. Trump has at least thrice offered to mediate the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, the highest U.S. official to do so since President Bill Clinton after the two sides fought a short war over Kargil. New Delhi has traditionally been allergic to the idea of third-party mediation, referring to the 1972 Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan under which both sides agreed to bilaterally resolve outstanding disputes. Ironically, the same Simla Agreement also held that neither party would unilaterally alter the situation in Jammu and Kashmir—a position India itself compromised by revoking Kashmir’s special status last August. Ties between the United States and Pakistan, meanwhile, have seen a steadying in recent years, in part because of Pakistan’s facilitation in helping the United States reach a truce with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The absence of guaranteed validation from Washington on New Delhi’s position toward Pakistan thus makes India less, not more, secure and likely more convinced that it will need to rely on its own strength and power to clearly delineate its territorial and political interests for the foreseeable future. While an India-Pakistan crisis so soon after India’s standoff with China is by no means a forgone conclusion, current trends suggests it could. In the past, **troubled** **leaders** have rationally **pursued** risky, **high**-**variance** **strategies** of **initiating** another **conflict** to gloss over the failings of earlier scrambles. With the domestic and regional environment ripe for the taking, South Asia’s next crisis may happen **sooner than we expect.**

#### Escalates to nuclear war - extinction.

Roblin 19 (Sébastien, master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University, National Interest, “Why a So-Called ‘Limited’ Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan Would Devastate the Planet,” <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-so-called-limited-nuclear-war-between-india-and-pakistan-would-devastate-planet-46532>, 3/9/2019, 9/19/2019) DG

Between February 26 and 27 in 2019, Indian and Pakistani warplanes launched strikes on each other’s territory and engaged in aerial combat for the first time since 1971. Pakistan ominously hinted it was convening its National Command Authority, the institution which can authorize a nuclear strike. The two states, which have retained an adversarial relationship since their founding in 1947, between them deploy nuclear warheads that can be delivered by land, air and sea. However, those weapons are inferior in number and yield to the thousands of nuclear weapons possessed by Russia and the United States, which include megaton-class weapons that can wipe out a metropolis in a single blast. Some commenters have callously suggested that means a “limited regional nuclear war” would remain an Indian and Pakistani problem. People find it difficult to assess the risk of rare but catastrophic events; after all, a full-scale nuclear war has never occurred before, though it has come close to happening. Such assessments are not only shockingly callous but shortsighted. In fact, several studies have modeled the global impact of a “limited” ten-day nuclear war in which India and Pakistan each exchange fifty 15-kiloton nuclear bombs equivalent in yield to the Little Boy uranium bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Their findings concluded that spillover would in no way be “limited,” directly impacting people across the globe that would struggle to locate Kashmir on a map. And those results are merely a conservative baseline, as India and Pakistan are estimated to possess over 260 warheads. Some likely have yields exceeding 15-kilotons, which is relatively small compared to modern strategic warheads. Casualties Recurring terrorist attacks by Pakistan-sponsored militant groups over the status of India’s Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir state have repeatedly led to threats of a conventional military retaliation by New Delhi. Pakistan, in turn, maintains it may use nuclear weapons as a first-strike weapon to counter-balance India’s superior conventional forces. Triggers could involve the destruction of a large part of Pakistan’s military or penetration by Indian forces deep into Pakistani territory. Islamabad also claims it might authorize a strike in event of a damaging Indian blockade or political destabilization instigated by India. India’s official policy is that it will never be first to strike with nuclear weapons—but that once any nukes are used against it, New Dehli will unleash an all-out retaliation. The Little Boy bomb alone killed around 100,000 Japanese—between 30 to 40 percent of Hiroshima’s population—and destroyed 69 percent of the buildings in the city. But Pakistan and India host some of the most populous and densely populated cities on the planet, with population densities of Calcutta, Karachi and Mumbai at or exceeding 65,000 people per square mile. Thus, even low-yield bombs could cause tremendous casualties. A 2014 study estimates that the immediate effects of the bombs—the fireball, over-pressure wave, radiation burns etc.—would kill twenty million people. An earlier study estimated a hundred 15-kiloton nuclear detonations could kill twenty-six million in India and eighteen million in Pakistan—and concluded that escalating to using 100-kiloton warheads, which have greater blast radius and overpressure waves that can shatter hardened structures, would multiply death tolls four-fold. Moreover, these projected body counts omit the secondary effects of nuclear blasts. Many survivors of the initial explosion would suffer slow, lingering deaths due to radiation exposure. The collapse of healthcare, transport, sanitation, water and economic infrastructure would also claim many more lives. A nuclear blast could also trigger a deadly firestorm. For instance, a firestorm caused by the U.S. napalm bombing of Tokyo in March 1945 killed more people than the Fat Man bomb killed in Nagasaki. Refugee Outflows The civil war in Syria caused over 5.6 million refugees to flee abroad out of a population of 22 million prior to the conflict. Despite relative stability and prosperity of the European nations to which refugees fled, this outflow triggered political backlashes that have rocked virtually every major Western government. Now consider likely population movements in event of a nuclear war between India-Pakistan, which together total over 1.5 billion people. Nuclear bombings—or their even their mere potential—would likely cause many city-dwellers to flee to the countryside to lower their odds of being caught in a nuclear strike. Wealthier citizens, numbering in tens of millions, would use their resources to flee abroad. Should bombs beginning dropping, poorer citizens many begin pouring over land borders such as those with Afghanistan and Iran for Pakistan, and Nepal and Bangladesh for India. These poor states would struggle to supports tens of millions of refugees. China also borders India and Pakistan—but historically Beijing has not welcomed refugees. Some citizens may undertake risky voyages at sea on overloaded boats, setting their sights on South East Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. Thousands would surely drown. Many regional governments would turn them back, as they have refugees of conflicts in Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar in the past. Fallout Radioactive fallout would also be disseminated across the globe. The fallout from the Chernobyl explosion, for example, wounds its way westward from Ukraine into Western Europe, exposing 650,000 persons and contaminating 77,000 square miles. The long-term health effects of the exposure could last decades. India and Pakistan’s neighbors would be especially exposed, and most lack healthcare and infrastructure to deal with such a crisis. Nuclear Winter Studies in 2008 and 2014 found that of one hundred bombs that were fifteen-kilotons were used, it would blast five million tons of fine, sooty particles into the stratosphere, where they would spread across the globe, warping global weather patterns for the next twenty-five years. The particles would block out light from the sun, causing surface temperatures to decrease an average of 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit across the globe, or 4.5 degrees in North American and Europe. Growing seasons would be shortened by ten to forty days, and certain crops such as Canadian wheat would simply become unviable. Global agricultural yields would fall, leading to rising prices and famine. The particles may also deplete between 30 to 50 percent of the ozone layer, allowing more of the sun’s radiation to penetrate the atmosphere, causing increased sunburns and rates of cancer and killing off sensitive plant-life and marine plankton, with the spillover effect of decimating fishing yields. To be clear, these are outcomes for a “light” nuclear winter scenario, not a full slugging match between the Russian and U.S. arsenals. Global Recession Any one of the factors above would likely suffice to cause a global economic recession. All of them combined would guarantee one. India and Pakistan account for over one-fifth world’s population, and therefore a significant share of economic activity. Should their major cities become irradiated ruins with their populations decimated, a tremendous disruption would surely result. A massive decrease in consumption and production would obviously instigate a long-lasting recessionary cycle, with attendant deprivations and political destabilization slamming developed and less-developed countries alike. Taken together, these outcomes mean even a “limited” India-Pakistan nuclear war would significantly affect every person on the globe, be they a school teacher in Nebraska, a factory-worker in Shaanxi province or a fisherman in Mombasa. Unfortunately, the recent escalation between India and Pakistan is no fluke, but part of a long-simmering pattern likely to continue escalating unless New Delhi and Islamabad work together to change the nature of their relationship.

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

## 1AC: UV

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite incentivized NC abuse – drop the debater – 1AR is too short to make up for the time trade-off, deters future abuse through a loss and set better norms for debate since you are less likely to repeat a practice you can lose for -- CI- reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear model of debate, we race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate through offense - no RVIs – 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time.

#### 2] New 1AR paradigm issues – key to being reactive to the specifics of the 1NC – o/w – only way to have contextual theory debates.

#### 3] Only AFF gets RVIs on counter interps, I meets, and bidirectional shells:

#### Four minute 1AR needs to be able to collapse to the highest layer—if I undercover theory they can spend six minutes on it but if I overcover they can kick it and I’m behind on substance