### T

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must defend EITHER all member nations of the World Trade Organization or reduce all intellectual property protections for medicines. The negative may not read plan inclusive counterplans.

#### Violation: The affirmative defends ONLY Jordan and ONLY data exclusivity. They can read either Jordan OR data exclusivity but not both.

#### Vote neg for limits -- there are 164 members[[1]](#footnote-1), which means their interp justifies reducing any IP protection in any WTO member, creating hundreds of potential AFFs to prep out. This kills negative ground because different countries can have different economic situations that affect the Innovation debate and we lose all disads to global action. Two impacts:

#### 1 -- Fairness -- an unlimited topic makes neg engagement impossible because there’d be tons of new AFFs to prep out every tournament. Uniquely kills small schools because they’d be unable to keep up with the prep burden.

#### 2 -- Research -- the neg loses any incentive to do targeted research when the prep burden is so high so debaters would resort to stale generics and lose topic specific education. That outweighs because we only have 2 months to debate the topic and COVID is uniquely important to many debaters’ lives.

#### Paradigms:

#### Drop the debater to deter future abuse.

#### Competing interps because reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

#### No RVIs:

#### 1] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair,

#### 2] baiting – the best theory debaters would read abusive advocacies to go for the RVI,

#### 3] substance – any initiation of theory ensures the 2NR and 2AR are theory, crowding out substance.

#### Neg theory 1st – 1AC abuse shaped NC construction so if anything we did was bad it was just to get back in the game.

### CP

#### Text: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan should enter into prior, binding, and genuine consultation with the United States over whether they should reduce data exclusivity for medicines.

#### Their solvency advocate recommends the CP and the US says yes.

1AC Barqawi 19 “The access to medicine puzzle: scaling back the negative effects of the Jordan–US Free Trade Agreement” Laila Barqawi [Lecturer of University of Central Lancashire, Preston (UCLAN)]. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, Volume 14, Issue 9, September 2019, Pages 678–686, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpz080> SM

The author contends, however, that a more robust exercise of overhauling Jordan’s IP system and updating all of Jordan’s national laws will happen as a result of a consultation with the USA. The USA seems to be the catalyst for Jordan’s IP decisions. For example, Jordan JFDA partnership agreement with USAID, which reduces the registration time by twelve months, was forecasted to ‘boost pharmaceutical exports by as much as JD 17 million, yielding an additional JD21.6 million in revenue over the same period’.77 The partnership also streamlined the process of drug testing and building of JFDA staff so that drugs reach the Jordanian market.78 This partnership ensures that the USA’s agenda remains prominent but, at least, it increases access to medicine without impairing Jordan’s relationship with the USA.

#### Lack of consultation kills Jordan’s relationship with the US.

1AC Barqawi 19 “The access to medicine puzzle: scaling back the negative effects of the Jordan–US Free Trade Agreement” Laila Barqawi [Lecturer of University of Central Lancashire, Preston (UCLAN)]. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, Volume 14, Issue 9, September 2019, Pages 678–686, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpz080> SM

The Jordanian government should implement the recommendations in this article with backing from the USA, because the USA is the main financer to Jordan’s economy.12 Furthermore, defying the USA means that countries such as India, which challenge the USA on IP, feature regularly on the USA’s ‘Priority Watch List’ in its 301 Reports. For example, the USTR’s 2018 Special 301 Report clearly states that India has ‘Longstanding IP challenges facing US businesses in India’.13

#### US-Jordan alliance key to solve war -- weakening ties ensures the US will shift focus from stability and

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Only weeks before Kabul’s fall, King Abdullah of Jordan discussed U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, telling CNN: “Knowing its culture, knowing that empires have bled there for centuries, to try and get a western democracy in the shortest amount of time… may have been a bridge too far.” Abdullah’s downplaying the importance of Afghan democracy as ill-fitting for the country’s culture is not too different from his own unwillingness to significantly cede power over his 22-year reign. Abdullah’s advice on Afghanistan was perhaps not heeded by U.S. presidents over the past two decades, but it seems that after the Taliban’s conquest that resulted in scathing Congressional and media criticism of its Afghanistan evacuation, Biden administration officials will look to prioritize stability in its relations with Jordan and other longtime U.S. allies regardless of whether Abdullah advances democracy in his country.

While on the campaign trail, then-candidate Joe Biden vowed to center his foreign policy on defending human rights overseas, insisting that “strengthening democracy” would return to the global agenda on his watch. In February, Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted that the U.S. would ensure that “those who commit human rights abuses are held accountable.” Accordingly, some members of Congress have called on the Biden administration to condition U.S. aid to Jordan’s neighbors – Egypt and Israel – based on those countries’ abuses of human rights. As the issue received greater emphasis, some questioned how Jordan, deemed “not free” by Freedom House, would fit into the new U.S. administration’s priorities on democratization since Amman receives the third-largest amount of U.S. annual aid worldwide.

Although the Hashemite Kingdom found greater agreement with Biden on the Palestinian cause compared to Trump’s presidency, meeting Biden’s human rights agenda inside Jordan poses a challenge. Parliament holds few tangible powers with King Abdullah maintaining a dominant role in governing, which includes appointing and dismissing premiers. In a 2020 report on Jordan, the State Department said that "significant human rights issues included: cases of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as punishment, arbitrary arrest and detention of activists and members of the press." Concerned about even mild forms of criticism, Jordanian authorities dissolved the teachers’ syndicate last year and sentenced five of its leaders to prison after the group protested poor teachers’ pay. With Washington providing Amman nearly $1.5 billion in annual aid, Jordan has much to lose should ties decline, given the country faces a record public debt of $45 billion.

A senior Biden administration official has, however, presented an alternative set of foreign policy priorities in an August 25th briefing. “We’re not trying to transform the Middle East. We’re not trying to overthrow regimes. We are pursuing a very steady course, centered on achievable aims; alignment of ends and means; and, first and foremost, support to our partners,” said the official. Stability will be prioritized in its decades-long relationship with Jordan, as the Biden administration can not afford the appearance of abandoning another close ally. Jordan hosts around 3,000 U.S. troops as part of Washington’s counter-terrorism efforts, and Amman has maintained a peace treaty with Israel since 1994, an important U.S. priority in the region.

Although King Abdullah has struggled to democratize Jordan, he is largely able to present the Hashemite Kingdom as an island of stability bordering Iraq and Syria, both plagued by years-long conflicts. Jordan has suffered from a relatively small number of deaths from terrorism in the past two decades by regional standards, as well as thwarted the alleged April sedition “plot” involving Prince Hamzah. After Kabul’s fall, Biden implementing Amnesty International’s July demand of strong U.S. pressure against Abdullah on human rights appears increasingly unlikely, along with moves to reduce Amman’s nearly $1.5 billion aid package. Washington will avoid actions that may provoke Abdullah’s collapse, regardless of how improbable.

The Taliban takeover also highlights how Jordan’s main opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood, lies in stark opposition to U.S. interests. In response to the Afghan government’s collapse, the political wing of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood offered its “congratulations” to the Taliban for the “defeat of the brutal American occupation.” Indeed, Abdullah, who maintains a difficult relationship with the Islamist group, once called the Brotherhood a “masonic cult… run by wolves in sheep’s clothing.” Last year, Jordan’s top court dissolved the country’s branch of the Brotherhood, citing legal challenges, even as the group maintains strong grassroots support. With the Muslim Brotherhood so forcefully taking the side of the Taliban, Abdullah will likely face few repercussions from the Biden administration for continuing to clamp down on the organization, despite its implications for Jordan’s democracy.

Jordan may also benefit from international attention to the difficulties in absorbing refugees after the Taliban’s conquest. A decade after the 2011 Syrian war began, the Hashemite Kingdom continues to host over 600,000 Syrian refugees, despite the fact that 25 percent of Jordanians face unemployment. On August 23, Jordan’s Foreign Ministry announced it would accept 2,500 Afghans on transit to the United States as a humanitarian gesture. While some European nations look to avoid accepting Afghan refugees, Abdullah can point to Jordan as a responsible country shouldering the burden of regional conflicts.

The ISIS-K bombing at Kabul's airport on August 27 that killed 13 U.S. troops along with at least 170 others will serve as a lasting image of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. It appears that after the Taliban conquest – and perhaps because of it – Biden will be reluctant to pressure Abdullah on democratization. As both Jordanian officials and the Biden administration are concerned with Islamist parties praising jihadists, it seems likely that the two countries' interests will converge in stabilizing the Hashemite Kingdom's rule.

#### US-Jordan partnership turns econ and healthcare.

JFDA ND, Jordanian Food and Drug Administration. Jordan Food and Drug Administration Partners with USAID to Boost Competitiveness of Pharmaceutical Industry. Likely 2018 -- cited by the Barqawi article. <http://www.jfda.jo/DetailsPage/Ar/NewsDetails.aspx?PID=388>

The Jordan Food and Drug Administration today signed a partnership agreement with the U.S. Agency for International Development to boost the competitiveness of the Kingdom’s pharmaceutical sector. The activities listed in the Project Implementation Letter aim to expedite and streamline all procedures related to the drug registration and testing process to reduce the time to market for Jordanian medicine, including through completing the automation of procedures and processes by instituting an Electronic Common Technical Document system at the JFDA next year.

Speaking at the signing, JFDA Director Dr. Hayel Obeidat called the agreement a continuation of his organization’s longstanding efforts to benefit the pharmaceutical industry and, through it, the Jordanian economy. “The JFDA has established an excellent partnership with the pharmaceutical industry,” Dr. Obeidat said. “Our partnership with USAID will assist us in extending that work and sustaining it for the long term.”

The USAID-supported activities, which are scheduled to run through September 2018, will include automation of the drug registration process and capability building of JFDA staff—interventions that will improve workflow. According to the JFDA and a USAID impact assessment, reducing the registration time by 12 months could boost pharmaceutical exports by as much as JD 17 million, yielding an additional JD 21.6 million in revenue over the same time period.

USAID Mission Director Dr. Jim Barnhart stressed that the agency’s work with the JFDA will ultimately benefit the wider Jordanian economy. “With pharmaceutical companies selling 80 percent of their production to 60 countries worldwide,” said Dr. Barnhart, “pharmaceutical products already represent nine percent of Jordan’s total exports.”

According to statistics at the JFDA, the pharmaceutical sector is a key factor in achieving the trade balance in ratio of Jordanian exports to imports; this is due to the fact that it is a net exporter and generator of the most impressive earnings of the Jordanian economy. The sector is also a key driver of employment. Reports indicate that the pharmaceutical sector’s workforce is 99 percent Jordanian. Its growth, therefore, means more jobs for the Kingdom’s graduates.

Support to the JFDA will be managed by the USAID Jordan Competitiveness Program, a five-year activity that works economy-wide to stimulate exports and investments, ultimately creating more jobs for Jordanians.

Since its establishment, the JFDA has taken on the responsibility to ensure food safety, quality, and suitability for human consumption, in addition to ensuring drugs safety and effectiveness as being the reference authority responsible for medicine at all stages and the main supporter for pharmaceutical industries, while being hard at work to overcome challenges facing this sector in line with the core functions of JFDA represented in achieving drug security and providing a list of essential medicine at affordable prices.To view the pictures please click here

### Cap K

#### Capitalism locks in existential climate change -- only transition can achieve the absolute decoupling necessary to solve.

Reese 20 - author of Socialism or Extinction and The End of Capitalism: The Thought of Henryk Grossman (Ted, https://grossmanite.medium.com/socialism-or-extinction-is-a-fact-not-a-slogan-3cb97b198c50, emuse)

Socialism or extinction is not just a slogan, though; it is a statement of scientific fact. If XR does not stand for socialism, then it must necessarily stand for extinction, rendering its own alleged purpose redundant. In short: capitalism is a profit-dependent system, and must therefore continue to expand production in order to keep investment flowing and profits rising (in absolute terms). And since profit arises from capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour, the intensity of the production based on fossil fuel and toxic, fuel-intensive metal mining is (increasingly) necessary. To flesh this out a bit more: capital’s exploitation of commodity-producing labour is the [sole source of profit](http://gesd.free.fr/kliman99.pdf) — the capitalist appropriates surplus value (surplus labour time) from the worker, i.e the worker keeps less value than they create, covering their living costs (necessary labour time), and surplus value is then realised through commodity sales. This social relation is obscured by the money-wage relation. Therefore, capital’s evermore demanding need to accumulate is based on the continual expansion of intensive production, i.e. the extraction of fossil fuel and metals, deforestation, intensive farming, etc., that is releasing carbon and other ‘greenhouse’ emissions — not to mention that they are fuel-intensive practices in the first place and toxic to the local environment — trapped in nature into the atmosphere, making the planet warmer and threatening runaway global heating that, according to numerous scientific studies, will make the planet uninhabitable for humans, probably before the end of the present century. (Capital’s exploitation of labour is therefore also the root cause of [alleged plummeting sperm counts](https://grossmanite.medium.com/declining-sperm-counts-polluted-breast-milk-autoimmune-disorders-the-diabolical-legacy-of-53462aa1245d) (down a reported 59% from 1973 to 2011), further threatening extinction. The microplastics, nanoparticles and toxic chemicals sourced from fossil fuels and metal mines and consumed in everyday products penetrate and damage human cells.) Although extractive industries are usually now very capital-intensive — the source of capitalism’s ([now existential) economic crisis](https://grossmanite.medium.com/with-hyperinflation-looming-and-capitalism-dying-socialism-is-becoming-an-economic-necessity-a031f9a746e0) — the rate of exploitation of the remaining workers is very high. It is not capitalism’s need for ‘infinite growth on a planet of finite resources’, as most leftists seem to put it, that is the central or immediate problem; rather, it is the pace of production and its expansion — determined by the size of an ever-larger total capital and its need to expand yet further by feeding off labour — relative to nature’s ability to replenish itself (something capitalism’s dependence on intensive extraction obviously hinders). Just as surplus value is converted into capital faster than it is produced — resulting in (on average) decennial recessions and, eventually, a historical limit to capital accumulation — so nature is converted into capital faster than it can be replenished. Compound accumulation Fossil fuels (petroleum, coal, natural gas and orimulsion) would shrink to roughly half of total primary energy supply in 2050, from about 77% in 2020 — [down from 81% in 2010](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-total-primary-energy-demand-by-fuel-2010-2019) — if the world meets the ‘minimum’ internationally agreed target of 2 degrees Celsius warming, [according to S&P Global Platts Analytics](https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/062320-fossil-fuels-energy-mix-infographic-interactive). (Even 1C has already seen a reported [400,000 people (and counting) a year dying from climate-related causes](https://www.inquirer.com/philly/blogs/public_health/Death-toll-from-climate-change-estimated-at-400000-In-2010.html); while the Arctic permafrost — containing 1.8 trillion tonnes of carbon, more than twice as much as is currently suspended in Earth’s atmosphere — is, we are told,[2] melting [70 years sooner than previously expected](https://bigthink.com/surprising-science/canada-permafrost). While fossil fuel may fall to 50% of the mix of energy production, its absolute production may rise, since economic output under capitalism tends to double every 20 years.[3] As Jason Hickel writes in his book Less Is More, there was “a steady rise of material use in the first half of the 1900s, doubling from 7 billion tons per year to 14 billion tons per year. But then, in the decades after 1945, something truly bewildering happens… material use explodes: it reaches 35 billion tons by 1980, hits 50 billion tons by 2000, and then screams up to an eye-watering 92 billion tons by 2017… This increase in material use tracks more or less exactly with the rise of global GDP. The two have grown together in lockstep. Every additional unit of GDP means roughly an additional unit of material extraction. “There has been a radical acceleration of fossil fuel use since 1945, rising along with the explosion in both GDP and material use. And carbon emissions have gone up right along with it. Annual emissions more than doubled from 2 billion tons per year to 5 billion tons per year during the first half of the 1900s. During the second half of the century they rose fivefold, reaching 25 billion tons by the year 2000. And they have continued to rise since then, despite a string of international climate summits, reaching 37 billion tons in 2019. Of course, there is no intrinsic relationship between energy use and CO2 emissions. It all depends on what energy source we’re using. Coal is by far the most carbon-intensive of the fossil fuels. Oil — which has grown much more quickly than coal since 1945 — emits less CO2 per unit of energy. And natural gas is less intensive still. As the global economy has come to rely more on these less polluting fuels, one might think that emissions would begin to decline.… [But] because GDP growth is driving total energy demand up at such a rapid pace … these new fuels aren’t replacing the older ones, they are being added on top of them. The shift to oil and gas hasn’t been an energy transition, but an energy addition. “The same thing is happening right now with renewable energy… To keep energy flowing when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing will require enormous batteries at the grid level. This means 40 million tons of lithium — an eye-watering 2,700% increase over current levels of extraction… It takes 500,000 gallons of water to produce a single ton of lithium. Even at present levels of extraction this is causing real problems. In the Andes, where most of the world’s lithium is located, mining companies are burning through the water tables and leaving farmers with nothing to irrigate their crops. Many have had no choice but to abandon their land altogether. Meanwhile, chemical leaks from lithium mines have poisoned rivers from Chile to Argentina, Nevada to Tibet, killing off whole freshwater ecosystems. The lithium boom has barely started, and it’s already a catastrophe… “Today the world is producing 8 billion more megawatt hours of clean energy each year than in 2000. That’s a lot — enough to power all of Russia. But over exactly the same period, economic growth has caused energy demand to increase by 48 billion megawatt hours. “There’s also something else going on. With every year that goes by, it becomes more and more difficult to extract the same amount of materials from the earth. Today, three times more material has to be extracted per unit of metal than a century ago.”[4] There is no such thing as ‘green capitalism’. The ‘Green New Deal’ proposed by social democrats — which actually involves privatising the last areas of common land — is species suicide. Socialism and non-intensive production Under capitalism, commodities are only produced if they are profitable, i.e. if labour is exploitable enough to expand capital. They are use-values/utilities and exchange-values. Under socialism, goods (having been decommodified) are produced if we deem them to be useful, via democratic regulation and demand. They are just use-values and socially owned, so no exchange of ownership takes place, i.e. exchange value and profit are abolished. If we deem that a good is not useful since it is damaging the environment or contributing to climate change too much, we can decide not to make it. Or we can find a way of making it that does not damage or exhaust nature. Rather than fossil fuel (which disappears into thin air and so has to be extracted anew by exploited labour, making it perfect for the needs of capital) or metals (which are finite), we could use non-labour-intensive renewables — sunlight, wind and especially (for physical products) fibrous plants ([especially hemp](https://medium.com/@Grossmanite/the-green-new-deal-is-species-suicide-only-a-hemp-based-industrial-revolution-can-save-earths-f9c3dc29c4e3), which can replace steel, concrete, graphene, lithium and fossil fuel) and [mycelium](https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-mycelium-revolution-is-upon-us/) (from which we can even make [computers](https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsfs.2018.0029)). And because socialism can plan and co-ordinate production as a whole on a break-even basis, instead of having to bow to the demands of capital accumulation and anarchic competition between private producers, we can grow economic output at the rate nature replenishes (or slower) — something that socialism could help instead of hinder. Achieving the abundant material wealth for all promised by communism (as it develops into its higher stage, when production becomes fully automated and, eventually, free) is part of the solution. Fibrous plants like hemp [quickly draw down and sequester CO2](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hemp-and-lots-of-it-could_b_328275?guccounter=1) while reviving the soil, reversing desertification; and the products made from them (including bioplastic that is 10 times stronger than steel; batteries that [outperform lithium and graphene](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-28770876); and highly-insulating [carbon-negative hempcrete](https://www.ukhempcrete.com/services/better-than-zero-carbon-buildings/)) keep that carbon sequestered indefinitely. Abundant material wealth for all includes abundant vegetation, permaculture, afforestation, etc. There is also the potential for micro-organisms to supply a near-infinite source of energy. In 2018, scientists in the US confirmed a theory first proposed by Soviet geologists when they found [huge populations of bacteria living in the extreme temperatures of Earth’s crust](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/deep-life-microbes-underground-bacteria-earth-surface-carbon-observatory-science-study-a8677521.html), despite the lack of photosynthesis and nutrients, living solely from chemical reactions fuelled by geothermal energy. They estimated that up to 23 billion tonnes of micro-organisms live in this “deep biosphere”, making it the largest ecosystem on the planet and accounting for nearly 400 times the amount of carbon found in all living humans. Here lies a potential source of abundant energy (although we will have to assess whether the benefits outweigh the impacts of drilling). Other scientists have even found that the Geobacter bacteria found in human waste can convert sewage into fresh water and [produce electricity in the process](https://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/technologies/18may_wastenot.html). It is now thought that one day [microbial fuel cells](https://www.nasa.gov/feature/ames/could-electricity-producing-bacteria-help-power-future-space-missions/) could power our phones, household appliances — and even spaceships. Investment in microbial fuel cells will remain seriously limited, however, until value-creation is based solely on utility instead of exploitation and profit, since capital cannot exploit the labour time of microbes! Modern science — which is looking more and more ‘presocialist’, i.e. systematic, holistic and dialectial-materialist (the Marxist method of assessing history as moving forward through material and social interactions)— has proven that humans depend on plants and bacteria for everyday life, [smashing the myth of The Individual](https://aeon.co/essays/science-and-metaphysics-must-work-together-to-answer-lifes-deepest-questions) — the world is powered by collectivism. Indeed, trees, plants and bacteria are our relatives. The world is one interconnected whole. The socialisation of the means of production, whereby the means of production are owned by humanity instead of capital, will thus be a ‘naturalising’ humanisation, plantification and microbiolisation of production. Other forms of existing carbon-negative production that could be scaled up include ‘sky mining’ for diamonds that are chemically identical to earth diamonds, another industry that only exists on a small scale under capitalism because of the lack of labour exploitation involved. Emissions-free, energy-dense nuclear power, is also an option. The initial impact of mining uranium on the environment must be re-assessed by an independent socialist state, but to prove our earlier point, nuclear has not been abandoned because of safety fears, but because its capital-intensity has become unprofitable as ever-growing total capital becomes harder and harder to expand by the relatively diminishing pool of human labour. In terms of worker safety, nuclear is [the safest form of energy production](https://amp.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/nov/04/why-eco-austerity-wont-save-us-from-climate-change). There is also the prospect of space-based solar power and associated wireless transmission, without the intermittency of night time or winter suffered by solar panels and wind turbines on Earth. This, too, however, has proven too expensive for investors who won’t invest without the prospect of a higher return. Reverting to overly local, small-scale production—which would make everything more expensive — is not an option. Sea levels are rising and we probably need to build incredibly vast dikes on every continent. Rising temperatures will also massively increase the demand for air conditioning, which will have to be powered by something abundant and emissions-free, like nuclear. But socialism never works? Clearly, we need world socialism. Countries that are arguably ‘semi-socialist’ or that are supposedly ‘working towards’ socialism, like China and Venezuela, still work to some extent on the basis of commodity-production. But even ‘fully’ socialist countries still have to trade with capitalist countries, and that means having to make concessions to capital, working within a world capitalist system and having to maintain military defences at the expense of the civilian economy. Nor can they fully plan their economies due to fluctuating, unpredictable foreign prices. The need to build up foreign currency also incentivises black markets. Again, because socialist production is based on utility, socialism will also be able to invest in things like mineralising CO2 (turning it permanently into basalt rock). This is not a silver bullet since it is water-intensive, but it could certainly be scaled up significantly where water scarcity is not an issue (or if [water can be ‘artificially’ produced](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071031125457.htm)). That we are not doing this is a travesty — but where it would be a productive industry under socialism, it is an unproductive industry under capitalism, since it does not offer a commodity that can be sold for profit (unless it is sold to the state using public debt, thereby creating no new value and contributing to money devaluation that [will eventually (imminently) cause hyperinflation](https://grossmanite.medium.com/with-hyperinflation-looming-and-capitalism-dying-socialism-is-becoming-an-economic-necessity-a031f9a746e0)). It would therefore have to be funded by taxes that eat into already thinning profit margins, and so these taxes are resisted by capitalists, who anyway run the capitalist state. They are incapable of changing the system, even as it threatens to produce an ecocidal holocaust. Capitalism is now effectively an extinction cult and can only continue to steer Earth into the sun. Socialism — which is anyway [becoming an economic necessity](https://fleetworld.co.uk/road-test-hyundai-i30/) for the first time — gives humanity the chance of steering Earth to safety, in the nick of time.

#### Their positioning of capitalist competition as intrinsic good driven by IP reform acts to maintain the stability of capital accumulation.

* AT: Capitalism is when monopoly

Christophers 16 [Brett Christophers, Professor in the Department of Social and Economic Geography at Uppsala University, “The Great Leveler: Capitalism and Competition in the Court of Law,” 2016, Harvard University Press, pp. 8-15, EA]

The aforementioned argument that capitalism has historically migrated from a state of competitiveness to a state of monopoly or oligopoly is deficient in four primary respects, both empirical and conceptual in nature.

First, there is something deeply misleading about the either/or nature of this historical narrative. One of the most important—although rarely acknowledged—of Marx’s insights was that capitalism always, everywhere, requires both. It needs competition, assuredly, not least to drive technological innovation and the reinvestment of profits, and thus growth. But it also needs monopoly—not merely to enhance visibility within and control over otherwise potentially chaotic business environments, but also to underwrite capitalist, market-based trade per se. Not for nothing does David Harvey argue, after Marx, that the “monopoly power of private property” is “both the beginning point and the end point of all capitalist activity.”20 For the legal institution of private property does confer monopoly: the exclusive power to dispose of said property as the owner alone sees fit.

Capital’s seemingly paradoxical need for both competition and monopoly is explored in Chapter 1, which extracts from Marx a conceptualization of capitalism that critically informs the remainder of the book: that of capitalism always, necessarily, teetering on a knife edge, balanced precariously between the contradictory forces of competition and monopoly, and perennially in danger of lapsing too far to one side or the other. “The problem,” Harvey shrewdly observes, “is to keep economic relations competitive enough while sustaining the individual and class monopoly privileges of private property that are the foundation of capitalism as a political-economic system.”21

And it is here that our economic laws crucially enter the picture. In metaphorical terms, the law acts as a powerful leveler: a pincer of sorts on the critical, combustible nexus of monopoly and competition, applicable from one side of the knife edge, the other, or both. Antitrust (competition) law, meaningfully enforced, serves to constrain monopoly power where it coheres too readily, thus boosting competition; IP law acts from the other side, allowing a degree of monopoly power where none “naturally” coheres, and limiting competition in the process. This conceptualization of economic law is sketched out in Chapter 3. Together, such laws help to ensure that over the long term, market-based capitalism is not too competitive (driving down prices and profits) but, in Harvey’s terms, remains competitive enough (avoiding stagnation and rent-seeking). In the process, the laws in question historically have contributed substantially to keeping capitalist accumulation regimes broadly in balance.

At the pivot of this overall mechanism sits the phenomenon of profit. Following the lead of scholars such as Robert Brenner, this book places front and center the relationship between profitability and the interrelated dynamics of competition and monopoly.22 As, indeed, did the classicals: Profit rates were, as Chapter 1 will show, fundamental to their theorization of competition. But it is vital to recognize, as writers such as Keith Cowling have done, that this relationship does not assume a simplistic less-competition-means-more-profit form, isolated as it were from other contributory factors.23 Indeed, the book shows that excesses neither of competitive intensity nor of monopoly power support long-term stability of profit-making and accumulation.

Instead, it leans more toward the type of argument proffered by Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, which is that the dynamics of profitability strongly influence the state’s attempts to regularize regimes of accumulation, and that stabilizing capitalism is thus in no small part a question, ultimately, of stabilizing profitability.24 Or, as David Gordon and coauthors have written, the reproduction of capitalism is “fundamentally conditioned by the level and stability of capitalist profitability. As profits go, in short, so goes the economy.”25 The book’s particular slant on such conceptions is to consider corporate profits more in relative than absolute terms—and relative to, especially, labor and wages. While a comparable focus has recently been adopted by Thomas Piketty in his much discussed Capital in the Twenty-First Century, the inspiration underlying the approach taken here lies much further back in time, in the work in particular of Michal Kalecki.26 For as Kalecki showed both historically and conceptually, the relation of capital with labor, and profit with wages, is centrally implicated in the monopoly-competition relation and the balance that capitalism requires of it. Kalecki, it is fair to say, would have had some very interesting things to say about the Apple wage-suppression antitrust lawsuit.

A second and related problem with the linear historical narrative of from-competition-to-monopoly is its positing of monopoly and competition not only as mutually exclusive alternatives, but as separable ones. Once more, we can turn to Marx for an effective disabusal of this figuring. Monopoly and competition, he argued, are much more closely related, and much more closely connected, than is typically recognized. “Monopoly produces competition, competition produces monopoly,” he maintained, somewhat aphoristically, in a letter he wrote to Pavel Annenkov in 1846.27 Capital not only requires both but is in fact the expression, inter alia, of their synthesis—a synthesis that Marx, in trademark dialectical fashion, described not as a “formula” but as a “movement,” specifically “the movement whereby a true balance is maintained between competition and monopoly.”28 Such movement comprises opposing but connected economic dynamics of centralization and decentralization. When one or the other dynamic becomes disproportionately powerful, Marx argues, the “counteracting tendency” kicks in to return capital to a balanced configuration of monopoly and competition.

This balanced organization of productive forces—always inherently unstable and always prone to knife-edge slippages—is very close to what Edward Chamberlin would later call “monopolistic competition.”29 Such monopolistic competition internalizes monopoly and competition in dialectical relation with one another and is the capitalist norm—and always has been. “The notion of a bygone ‘competitive’ stage of capitalism where firms were price-takers is,” as Duménil and Lévy insist, “a fiction derived from the neoclassical analytical apparatus.”30 Equally fictional, albeit a fiction usually emanating from a very different analytical source, is the notion of a contemporary “monopoly” stage of capitalism absent meaningful competition.31

The historical, U.S.- and U.K.-based narrative related in this book therefore turns on precisely this dialectical, restless synthesis of monopoly and competition, and its ever-evolving, historically and geographically specific forms. In recent years, it is Harvey who has provided the most provocative reading of this dialectic and of its centrality to capitalism. It is, Harvey argues, one of numerous “moving” contradictions that plague the capital form, and with which capital constantly wrestles as it enters into and out of crisis.32 Harvey repeats Marx’s observation that capital requires a balance of competitive and monopolistic forces. He then derives from this postulate the propositions that crisis occurs when such forces become imbalanced—although this is not the only cause of crisis—and that such crisis can only be “fixed” once balance is restored. The result is that capital historically “oscillates” between relative excesses of monopoly and competition, always finding balance hard to achieve, let alone sustain.33 Understanding capital and its historical development in this particular regard, Harvey insists, requires us to recognize “how successful capital has generally been in managing the contradictions between monopoly and competition” and that “it uses crises to do so.”34

Such success, and the role played by crises or by threats thereof, are two of this book’s central, recurring themes. However, Harvey’s framing raises two vital questions that he fails, in his admittedly brief account of monopoly and competition, to answer.

First, how has this success been achieved? “Capital,” Harvey writes, “has organically arrived at a way to balance and rebalance the tendencies towards a monopolistic centralisation and decentralised competition through the crises that arise out of its imbalances.”35 Again, there is no objection here, except to press: “organically,” how? This book fashions an answer. This answer rests on the role of the law. When capital has become sufficiently overcentralized and monopolistic to threaten its own successful, profitable reproduction, antitrust law has been called upon to help restore the necessary degree of balance. This balance will never be perfect and at rest; in a dialectical relation, such as that between monopoly and competition, it never can be. When the dangerous excess has been of competition, by contrast, IP law has come to the rescue. Such laws, needless to say, have not effected this work of rebalancing by themselves, and this book documents their interaction with other pertinent dynamics; but their role has been paramount.

The other problematic question raised by Harvey’s framing brings us directly to our third point of divergence with the Baran and Sweezy or Foster and McChesney reading of capitalist development. Consider here the agency behind the successful, crisis-based management and rebalancing of monopolistic and competitive forces envisioned by Harvey: “capital has been successful . . .”; “capital has arrived at . . .” But what, or who, is this capital, and has its form remained constant? For Harvey, clearly, capital is the capitalist class: those that own the means of production. Yet this singularization of responsibility for regulating and reregulating the core dynamics of the capitalist economy raises all manner of questions that Harvey fails to address. Is this capitalist class homogeneous? Does it share consistent objectives in terms of economic development and management? And even if it does (and of course, it does not), what is its relation with the state and with the different tools of economic regulation, the law among them, that the state uses to govern and shape economic conduct?

If Harvey’s stimulating propositions call for circumspection on account of their simplifying structural abstractions, the connection to the “monopoly capital” thesis is that it too tends to rely upon just such totalizing, even reified, concepts. “Monopoly capital” is itself one such. One of the consistent themes of the tradition renewed by The Endless Crisis—one extending back through Baran and Sweezy’s Monopoly Capital to Rudolf Hilferding’s Finance Capital (1910) and even Lenin’s Imperialism (1917)—is its tendency not only to associate potent monopoly powers with a new stage or phase of capitalism but to depict the latter in terms of a consciously regulated and (centrally) planned system in which market-based competition largely disappears from view.36 For Lenin, this system fused the interests of capital and state (state monopoly capitalism); for Hilferding the fusion was tripartite, with finance capital also integral. But Marx, for all the stereotypes to the contrary, never saw capitalism as such. It was a totality, to be sure, but one that needs to be continually reproduced and reconstituted. This process occurs in and through the disparate actions of government, workers, consumers, businesses, and so on; when such reconstitution occurs in ways that imperil accumulation, crisis looms.

The point of saying all this is not simply to oppugn a totalizing view of “monopoly capital,” but to contrast with it the approach taken in this book, particularly to the law and its mobilization. There is not, and has not been, a single hand on the tiller, for all the obvious importance of the state as the law’s formal originator; there is no single, homogeneous entity pulling the levers, so to speak, of political-economic regulation— no consistent regime of conscious, systematic control. As with other modalities of economic regulation or governance, the law, in practice, does not “work” like that.

For one thing, there is an important difference between the written law and its interpretation. Two courts can interpret and apply the same law or laws in markedly different ways and with very different consequences. Perhaps the clearest example of this, at least in this book (Chapter 6), concerns U.S. antitrust law in the second half of the twentieth century: The nature and degree of enforcement of this law underwent a dramatic transformation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but the law itself did not materially change. Intellectual training, social and political context, even judicial personality: These variables, and more, all matter to the law’s practical materialization. As such, we must remain constantly alive to the simple fact that, as Peter Carstensen has put it, “court doctrine is not the whole of the law in practice.”37 Relatedly, much of the enforcement of IP rights occurs at a significant remove from courts—specifically in, as argued by William T. Gallagher, the everyday practices of IP owners and their lawyers, whose “negotiations” with alleged infringers take place largely in the “shadow” of IP law.38

For another thing, just as the state never enacts new economic laws in total isolation from the influence and interests of capital, so both capital(s) and state—and indeed other economic agents—use the law to their own ends, and these ends are far from necessarily commensurate. Think, once again, about our two Apple cases. Who, in each case, instigated the legal action? Who put the law to work in their own interests? In the IP case it was Apple itself. In the class-action suit it was labor. But the latter suit was in fact itself based upon a prior government investigation launched by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division in 2010.39 Three legal cases, then, all driven by different actors with different motivations, but all revolving around the same political-economic locus: the knotty complex of profit generation and accumulation constituted by Apple Inc. And if the law, together with its agents, is so palpably nonsingular at the scale of the political economy of just one company, on what reasonable grounds could we ever envision it thus—as a vehicle of conscious, unified control—in relation to the political economy of capitalism more widely? The “great leveler” indicated in the book’s title, in short, is not some omnipotent regulator in charge of the law; it is the law per se.

How, then, might we more accurately characterize the human and institutional agency analyzed in the following pages in relation to the law, its mobilization, and its political-economic effects? At a general level, the conclusion reached by Paul David in his examination of the history of IP law fits particularly well: “The complex body of law, judicial interpretation, and administrative practice that one has to grapple with in this field was not created by some rational, consistent, social welfare-maximizing public agency. What one is faced with, instead, is a mixture of the intended and unintended consequences of an undirected historical process on which the varied interests of many parties, acting at different points (some widely separated in time and space), have left an enduring mark.”40 More specifically, however, we will see that although IP and competition laws have indeed performed their work under the influence of varied individuals and groups, the vast majority of the latter are ultimately committed to, and institutionally invested in, the reproduction, in as smooth a fashion as possible, of capitalism in more or less its existing form. And even more specifically, the “smoothness” here alluded to means the reproduction of capitalism especially without the kinds of problems—identified in Chapter 3—that tend to emerge when the necessary balance between monopoly and competition is substantially disrupted.

On all the above grounds, therefore, this book’s argument diverges from that which we find in the all-too-common narrative of competitive capitalism historically segueing into monopoly capitalism. Of course, none of this is to suggest that nothing has changed historically in the capitalist constellation of monopoly-competition structures and dynamics. Far from it. But the book’s fourth and final quarrel with the conventional narrative is that what has substantively, perhaps irrevocably, changed is not the relative levels of competitive intensity and monopoly power—as in, that era had more competition, this one has more monopoly—so much as the source of monopoly powers and the degree of defensibility thereof.

Capitalism, this argument runs, is always characterized by competitive undercurrents; were it not, it would not be capitalism. Meanwhile, and arising partly out of these competitive dynamics (the Marxian argument), there is an endemic drive to fashion monopoly powers. Yet the means of assembly of such powers do not remain constant, and neither does the ability of monopolistic capitalists to defend the powers thus amassed. Capitalists—and indeed the states committed to stabilizing capitalism, with the law one obvious apparatus at their disposal—must constantly find new ways of putting monopoly in place and keeping it there. “As monopoly privileges from one source diminish,” Harvey observes, “so we witness a variety of attempts to preserve and assemble them by other means.”41 Mindful, thus, of Marx’s dictum that the monopoly-versus-competition dualism is a red herring that confuses a dialectical relation for an oppositional one, this book focuses instead on the ways in which the unstable balance between the two forces is maintained—and it posits the law as the primary, necessarily mutable, instrument of such maintenance.

#### Vote negative for proletarian internationalism -- only an organized global revolutionary struggle can overcome the destruction of capitalism.

Anastasi et al, 18 (editorial collective of Viewpoint Magazine, a militant research collective working to dialectically bring theory and practice into dialogue by studying cycles of struggle. Alphabetically, members of the editorial collective are as follows: Andrew Anastasi, graduate student in Sociology at CUNY; Cinzia Arruzza, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research; Robert Cavooris, UC Santa Cruz graduate student and union representative, History of Consciousness Department; Maya Andrea Gonzalez, communist and revolutionary feminist in the Bay Area, graduate student in the Department of History of Consciousness at UC Santa Cruz; Asad Haider, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ The New School, founding editor of Viewpoint Magazine, PhD in History of Consciousness Department @ UC Santa Cruz; Shuja Haider, widely-published writer and musician based in Brooklyn; Bue Rübner Hansen, writer and activist researcher in the Britain, Barcelona, and in migrant and refugee solidarity movements, PhD from Queen Mary University; Patrick King, graduate student at UC Santa Cruz; Rosa Lee, communist organizer and member of the Viewpoint editorial collective; Ben Mabie, managing editor at Viewpoint and editorial assistant at Verso Books, UCSC graduate; Sarah Mason, member of the Viewpoint editorial collective; Liz Mason-Deese, Assistant Professor, Department of Geography and Geoinformation Science, George Mason University; Dave Mesing, PhD student in Philosophy @ Villanova University; Magally Miranda-Alcazar, Eugene Cota-Robles Fellow and a Ford Foundation Predoctoral Fellow, PhD student in Chicana/o Studies @ UCLA; B.A. from the University of California, Santa Cruz (magna cum laude) with a double major in Community Studies and Feminist Studies, and has been published in The Nation, Verso and the New Left Review; Salar Mohandesi, Assistant Professor of History @ Bowdoin; Gavin Mueller, Lecturer in Media Studies at the University of Amsterdam, former contributing editor @ Jacobin; Evan Calder Williams, writer, translater, and artist, teaches theory at the Center for Curatorial Studies at Bard College and film production at Cooper Union, PhD in Literature from the University of California Santa Cruz and was a Fulbright Fellow in Italy for his research on cinema, industry, and revolt. “Internationalism against Imperialism,” *Viewpoint Magazine*, Issue 6, February 1, 2018, <https://www.viewpointmag.com/2018/02/01/internationalism-against-imperialism/>)

The challenge of reactivating an effective proletarian internationalism is made even more urgent by the aggressive rise of right-wing nationalisms, which have taken a range of organizational and ideological guises. The clarified ideological form of this rightward shift is an emboldened “possessive nationalism” in the North, which revolves around restrictive immigration and trade policies, as responses to the perceived erosion of territorial logics of sovereignty, and the hybridization of the ethno-national community.10 Any prolonged combat against these nativist impulses – especially as they seep into social-democratic or left-liberal parties in Europe and the United States – will need to reinforce the link between migration and imperialism, the former in many ways constituting the reflux of the latter. Here we might center the rich legacy and actuality of migrant struggles for communist politics, and how questions of mobility, control, and dispossession are now at the core of imperialist dynamics. The political and social, informal and formal spaces of migration remain an open field for investigation. As Etienne Balibar noted over 40 years ago, “the concrete knowledge of the causes and effects of immigration is a two-way guiding thread towards an understanding of imperialism,” a methodological linkage which “renders internationalism, more than ever, the very condition of struggles for workers’ liberation.”11 This raises the practical necessity of reconsidering the tactical repertoire and strategic horizons of anti-imperialism. The nearly two-decades-long “War on Terror” – a euphemism for a war on human welfare in the Middle East and a war against Muslims at home – has proven to be a difficult nub for anti-war and anti-militarist activism in “the belly of the beast,” particularly as U.S. violence, amidst ever-shallower domestic hegemony, takes forms other than that of U.S. boots on the ground. The fading – or destruction – of the anti-war movement after 2005, following massive demonstrations against the invasion of Iraq which featured considerable grassroots mobilization, is a critical episode to reflect upon. The ubiquity of manned and unmanned aerial bombardment, the diffuse and often cloaked nature of counterinsurgency operations, the multiplication of U.S. proxies, and dense financial ties have rendered the military conflicts of U.S. empire, perhaps the most visible manifestation of imperialism, an asymmetrical yet constant presence. Any sustained fight against it must be coordinated around several fronts. Recent experiences of mass protest show that a powerful anti-war movement, if it is to reappear, would do so in an altered shape and in close relation to other insurgent forces in society, an extension of their discursive and strategic reach. The high level of organized resistance to militarized border security and repressive immigration policies, the environmentalist/anti-extractivist campaigns around Standing Rock and elsewhere, and the nascent coalitions and activist milieus that have been fortified through the International Women’s Strike initiatives (resonant with calls from Latin America for a new feminist international) indicate a real potential to build a “popular anti-imperialism” from grounded social struggles, connecting the sites of contestation across neo-colonial and imperial frontiers. One can see how this changes the aims and targets of alter-globalization movements, exemplified in the militancy of summit-hopping demos that directly confront leading economic and financial bodies, or in the parallel institution-building and transnational networking of civil society organizations involved in the World Social Forums.12 A more adequate approach to questions of coordination and solidarity across borders would have to probe how political organization is tied to material practices of translation, and recognize that even localized concerns often involve the commonalities and divisions of the global labor force.13 The mutations of class struggle, where the wage-earning proletariat has given way to more diverse social alliances and associations of what Göran Therborn calls the “plebeian strata” or “popular classes,” has provided glimpses of what anti-imperialist mobilization could look like: new strategies of threading upsurges of disruption, combination, and antagonism as they extend over an unstable terrain.14 Today, it is necessary to re-situate the concept and question of imperialism. We agree with Lenin when we recognize that no revolution, even a national one, is possible without grasping the effects of imperialism on any local articulation of the working class. And we further agree that, of course, no national revolution would be sufficient for the goal of communism. In short, we see imperialism as both an obstacle to and enemy of internationalism and we in turn view internationalism as a position to be composed in working class struggle itself. Thus, at the risk of simplifying our approach, we propose that to examine imperialism today is to bring it into the realm of class composition. This can involve no disavowal of the complicated history of Marxism and popular struggle with regard to imperialism, nor a simple repetition of any one of its moments. In our sixth issue of Viewpoint, we instead seek out the possibility of an encounter, bringing together historical accounts, artefacts of struggle, and theoretical interventions past and present. Thus we neither “endorse” all of the positions represented here nor reject those that might be absent from this issue, which is a situated engagement with the problem of opposing imperialism from within American empire; we are proud to offer these contributions as material for the long-term work of thinking and struggling against imperialism in the 21st century.

## Case

### Economy

#### Jordan Pharma high now – that’s 1AC Salih – flips Uniqueness negative – either a] Jordan pharma isn’t enough and can’t solve your impacts or b] Jordan pharma is already solving – it’s high even with Data Exclusivity which disproves your causal analysis.

#### AT Wolf 21 - Multiple Alt Causes to Instability – coups, COVID econ issues, refugees, water scarcity – zero reason Pharma can overcome – your ev

1AC Wolf 4-14 “A Hashemite Family Reunion Can’t Hide Jordan’s Woes” Albert B. Wolf, an associate research fellow at Johns Hopkins SAIS and an assistant professor of political science at the American University of Central Asia. April 14, 2021 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/14/jordan-abdullah-hamzah-hashemite-family-reunion-cant-hide-economic-woes/> SM //Re-cut by Elmer

­­A Hashemite Family Reunion Can’t Hide Jordan’s Woes Making nice after an alleged coup attempt obscures serious challenges, including **water scarcity, a refugee crisis, and unhelpful neighbors**. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is no stranger to royal intrigues and attempted coups. The first 20 years of the late King Hussein’s rule was wracked with coup plots, assassination attempts, and **a civil war** with the country’s large Palestinian population. Most recently, the former crown prince and half-brother of King Abdullah II, Prince Hamzah, was accused of engaging in sedition and placed under the “protection of the king” (i.e., house arrest) until the two made a joint appearance on Sunday. On Monday, the prince pledged his allegiance to the incumbent monarch and seemingly defused the latest royal tempest. But his display of deference doesn’t mean the end of instability in Jordan.This episode is a symptom of the challenges Abdullah has faced since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, not the problem itself. It is unlikely to be the last challenge the king faces to his rule unless Jordan’s economy undergoes significant economic reforms—quickly. Jordan has experienced multiple bouts of protests that were brought on by economic downturns (including **during the Arab Spring and** the **COVID**-19 pandemic) and were met with a combination of changes in economic tactics and giveaway programs, repression, and government reshuffles. This plot supposedly came from within the royal court, giving a tabloid quality to a security threat, especially after the **prince** made his **house arrest** all the more unusual by issuing a personal statement online. However, Hamzah’s alleged plan to overthrow Abdullah is a distraction from Jordan’s ongoing strategic and economic problems that do not have readily apparent solutions. Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, described the latest royal feud as the “most serious political crisis” Jordan has faced in 50 years. Regional experts have heard these warnings before. However, Abdullah’s combination of political savvy and luck in negotiating the challenges he has faced since the outbreak of the Arab Spring does not mean he will continue be lucky in the future. Domestic stability cannot be taken for granted. Tourism, Jordan’s biggest industry, ground to a halt after the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic. It had accounted for $5.8 billion in revenues in a $43 billion economy in 2019, but Jordan could not allow tourists back into the country as COVID-19 spread. Furthermore, remittances, which had accounted for $3.7 billion in 2018, were estimated to drop by nearly 20 percent for the entire region in 2020. Two weeks ago, protests broke out in Amman along with other cities because of the deaths of six people from COVID-19 at government hospitals. The cause was low oxygen supplies. However, the literature on comparative authoritarianism shows that protests may provide elites with opportunities to reveal their preferences and split from the incumbent regime. Should more protests occur due to the worsening economic situation, water shortages, the coronavirus crisis, or the strains of hosting a large refugee population, a window of opportunity may open for Prince Hamzah or another opportunistic contender for the throne. (According to Jordan’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 34 percent of the population are refugees, most of whom are Palestinian. The U.N. refugee agency counts 663,210 Syrians who have registered as refugees—while the Jordanian government counts more than 1.3 million.) Many commentators and Jordan watchers have expressed shock and surprise at Hamzah’s open criticism of Abdullah. However, the more shocking display has been the public outpouring of criticism of the incumbent monarch. Popular radio programs have reported regular call-ins criticizing Abdullah, blaming him for the country’s poor economic performance and corruption. Prior to the pandemic, the country had less than 2 percent annual growth, and nearly 1 in 4 adults were unemployed. Some Jordanians who have been left behind economically felt that Hamzah used the language of the Arab street to speak to people’s needs in order to advance his own interests. Even Jordanian Finance Minister Mohamad al-Ississ reportedly said, “Unemployment is this country’s greatest problem.” Official figures put unemployment at 24 percent currently. Jordan’s supposed regional allies are not helping. The kingdom is surrounded by “frenemies” like Israel and Saudi Arabia, which, despite benefiting from the stability and cooperation of the Hashemite royal family, tend to engage in behaviors that undermine its steadiness. These frenemies’ behaviors exacerbate Jordan’s domestic political tensions. One of the most significant issues is water. Access to water is a problem for many Jordanians—and water theft is a big business that the state has failed to address. While water consumption continues to rise, an agreement with Israel’s government over providing an additional 8 million cubic meters remains elusive. Because of these problems, ordinary Jordanians are at the mercy of water thieves who drill untapped reservoirs without the permission of the state and charge what they want to people currently unserved and underserved by the state. Jordan has made clear it hopes to build a canal to the Red Sea or Dead Sea to ameliorate these problems, but, so far, it has been unable to cut a deal with Israel. There are rumors—and this time they are just that, rumors—that Saudi Arabia was involved in the alleged plot to overthrow Abdullah. It is important to note that once details of the arrests of Hamzah and others had leaked, most countries issued statements of support for Abdullah. However, some in Jordan fear that the Saudis are interested in a peace deal with Israel in order to displace the Hashemites as the guardians of Al-Aqsa Mosque and take over custodianship of Jerusalem’s holy places. The royal family’s latest feud is an allegory for Jordan’s ongoing economic and strategic problems. Should they continue, it is highly likely that this moderate ally of the United States and the West will find itself convulsed by domestic challenges again in the future. This could come in at least two forms: The first is another civil conflict with Jordan’s large Palestinian population. The second could be another challenge for the throne, possibly from Hamzah or from another royal rival who has yet to reveal himself.

#### AT Younes 18:

#### 1] The fact that Pharma is high now disproves their ability to access 1AC Younes since Econ instability is happening despite thriving Pharma – no quantification of why some more generics would solve – U/Q overwhelms the Link – multiple Alt Causes – here’s your ev.

1AC Younes 18 “Jordan’s economic crisis threatens political stability” Ali Younes, 14 Feb 2018 <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2018/2/14/jordans-economic-crisis-threatens-political-stability> SM//re-cut by Elmer

Jordan’s economic crisis threatens political stability **Anger simmers after** the **government hiked taxes** between 50-100 percent **on** key food staples such as **bread**. Angry at the decision to **increase food prices** last month, restive Jordanians are demanding the government’s resignation and the dissolution of parliament. Last month, the government implemented a tax rise of between 50-100 percent on key food staples such as bread, in order to decrease its $700m budget deficit. Jordan’s **debt has now reached $40bn** and its debt-to-gross-domestic-product ratio has reached a record 95 percent, up from 71 percent in 2011.

#### 2] The line about Jordan Econ being connected w/ Middle East is mis-highlighted – it says Middle East issues cause Jordan Instability NOT the other way around.

#### AT Al-Shami – No I/L – the Economic Instability they’ve identified comes from the Crown Prince trying to start a coup – it’s perception-based which domestic production from Pharma can’t solve – here’s your ev

1AC Al-Shami et al 4/13 “Jordan’s Thorny Spring Spells Trouble for the Middle East” Farah Al-Shami, Research Fellow, Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), Tuqa Nusairat, Deputy Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East - Atlantic Council, Paolo Maggiolini, Associate Researcher, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) and Lecturer in History of Islamic Asia, Catholic University of Milan, Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Director - The Intelligence Project, Brookings, April 13, 2021 <https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/jordans-thorny-spring-spells-trouble-middle-east-30024> SM//Re-cut by Elmer

**Jordan's** image, painstakingly built by the country’s authorities as an oasis of relative **stability** within a turbulent Middle East, **took a hit** on April 3, **when** former **Crown Prince** Hamzah bin Hussein was **accused of cooperating with** “**foreign entities” to destabilize the state.** The incident, widely presented as a family disagreement, resulted in the arrest of eighteen people and Hamzah's oath of allegiance to the Crown and the Constitution two days later. While investigations are still ongoing, the recent controversy comes as an unexpected novelty for the country. Since the Hashemite kingdom's origins, Jordan has always been seen as an island of stability in an otherwise unstable neighbourhood. At the same time, King Abdullah II has long been held in high regard in the United States, as Washington has relied on his steadying influence and views him as a highly reliable partner. Today, Amman remains one of the United States’ closest allies in the region, especially in counterterrorism operations and intelligence-sharing in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Nevertheless, despite its apparent stability, the country faces substantial socio-economic challenges. Jordan has been hard hit by the coronavirus (it ranks among the highest COVID-19 infection and death rates per capita in the region), while its unemployment rate reached one-fourth of the population in 2020. Furthermore, the country is currently home to over 660,000 Syrian refugees while also hosting a large community of Palestinian refugees. Hence, coming at a particularly uncertain moment for the country and combined with pre-existing structural problems, the tensions within the ruling family risk detracting attention from long-needed socio-economic reforms. Jordan’s uneasy geopolitical position “The kingdom of Jordan has so far been spared a visit by the Arab Spring, apart from several random and discontinuous waves of protests. For years now, **economic** demands have been growing and calls for less **corruption**, and more **transparency** have been rising. Against this backdrop, the ruling family is not only facing challenges on the economic front but also subtle opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been very active in other countries visited by the Arab Spring as well. Moreover, Iran and its hegemony over Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon puts Jordan in a difficult geopolitical position that requires close collaboration with GCC countries to counterbalance, especially that these countries are also ruled by monarchies. Thus, at the moment, the ruling family is trying to avoid having these geopolitical challenges spill into the local political scene and cause a serious threat to its rule via a combination of chaos and uprisings.” Farah Al-Shami, Research Fellow, Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) Amman’s economy needs less foreign loans and more support for structural reforms “One positive spill-over from the incident might be bringing Jordan back to the radar of its foreign allies, who tend to take the stability in the country for granted and have been ignoring quieting of Jordanians dissatisfied with dire economic situation in the country, further exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. What Jordan needs, however, is not more loans – its foreign debt already amounts to over 90% of its GDP – but development aid and technical assistance in implementation of wise economic reforms that would not further harm the already impoverished population. Austerity is not an answer at a time when the cost of living is growing, remittances – falling, and officially one in four (and realistically more) Jordanians is out of work.” Katarzyna Sidło, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Department, Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE) Jordan’s social mobilization limbo and the risk of a security clampdown “Jordan, a resource-poor country that was initially lauded for containing COVID-19, has struggled to manage the economic fallout. Remittances and tourism have declined as has assistance from neighboring Gulf countries. With many businesses in ruins due to COVID-19 lockdowns, the government has to do more to ensure social safety net programs help vulnerable populations climb out of economic despair. The government is also struggling to support the nearly one million refugees in the country. While Jordanians have been protesting for months, recent events involving Prince Hamzah are likely to make Jordanians think twice before going out into the streets. The government must act fast to address economic challenges while avoiding a security clampdown that could make matters worse.” Tuqa Nusairat, Deputy Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East - Atlantic Council Jordan-Israel relations must refocus on shared interests and avoid political calculus “While it is still difficult to establish the extent of the alleged coup plot in Jordan, what seems particularly intriguing are the allegations of foreign meddling. Ten years ago, while protests and dissents were mushrooming, Amman was counting on Saudi aid and Israel’s implicit support. Today, while regional powers, including both countries, are voicing support for the king, Amman is becoming increasingly concerned that the Tel Aviv can be to the detriment of its legitimacy. The recent incident at the Israeli-Jordan border and the rapprochement between Riyadh and allegations pointing to Israel and Saudi Arabia are only the most recent episodes in a stream of tensions developing since 2017. These are like a wake-up call. Jordan-Israel relations have always been based on solid shared interests and not on political calculus. It is of utmost importance to recognize this for the future of the region and the security of both countries.” Paolo Maggiolini, Associate Researcher, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) and Lecturer in History of Islamic Asia, Catholic University of Milan The US and international support for Amman is essential to preserve the region’s stability “The Biden administration is facing an unexpected crisis in Jordan where King Abdallah faces unprecedented divisions within the **ruling family exacerbated by foreign meddling**, the pandemic and recession. **At risk is the stability of the lynchpin of the region**. Saudi support for Prince Hamzah’s challenge to the King raises serious questions about the reckless and dangerous behaviour of the Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman. Biden has moved quickly to signal support for Abdallah. He needs to rally international help for Jordan’s weak economy and deep structural problems. Keeping Jordan stable is critical to survival of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty which is deeply unpopular.”

#### AT Lazaroff – This is not about the Plan OR collapse of Israel-Jordan – it’s about Netanyahu’s plan to annex the West Bank – zero Internal Link since it’s not causal – here’s your ev.

1AC Lazaroff 20 “Will annexation destroy Israeli-Jordanian peace, set kingdom aflame?” Tovah Lazaroff is the Deputy Managing Editor of The Jerusalem Post May 1, 2020 <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/will-annexation-destroy-israeli-jordanian-peace-set-kingdom-aflame-626104> SM //Re-cut by Elmer

The possible **collapse of the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty** and potential destruction of a stable regional ally, the Hashemite Kingdom, **is** one of the **stronger** **arguments** **against** Prime Minister Benjamin **Netanyahu’s plan to annex West Bank settlements** this year. The 1994 peace treaty with Jordan, as well as the 1979 treaty signed with Egypt, have been a foundation cornerstone of Israeli regional security and gateway to the Arab world. The value of the two treaties, in an otherwise hostile region, has only increased in relation to the growing threats from Iran and ISIS and other Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. So **the idea of an Israeli plan**, either unilateral or in conjunction with the US, that **would risk those treaties** and the stability of Israel, after a decade of regional turmoil, has to give one pause. “Unilateral annexation will damage stability in the Middle East” and harm Israel, said former Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) director Ami Ayalon. “The peace treaty with Egypt and the peace treaty with Jordan are in a way the two cornerstones of our [regional] policy and our security for the last 30 to 40 years,” he said. A retired admiral, Ayalon is among a group of more than 220 former security officers who have embarked on a campaign against the move through the group Commanders for Israel’s Security. Last week, he and two other high-level former security officials, Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Gadi Shamni and former Mossad director Tamir Pardo, published an article in US-based Foreign Policy magazine, warning about the implications to Jordan and Egypt. There are many rational reasons for the two countries to maintain ties with Israel, Ayalon told The Jerusalem Post. Egypt relies on Israel for intelligence and security cooperation when it comes to fighting al-Qaeda and ISIS in Sinai. Jordan has water and gas deals with Israel. Both countries also rely heavily on financial assistance from the United States, which is tied to the peace deals. Still, those factors would not be enough to offset the danger to the Kingdom from the street, Ayalon said. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, however, regional leaders cannot afford to ignore public opinion, particularly on a topic where emotions run high, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he said. Rulers in both Egypt and Jordan “have to listen to the voices of the street because they understand that power,” he said. Egyptian President Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has more flexibility than Jordan’s King Abdullah, Ayalon said. Jordan is home to a large number of Palestinians, and there are also many young people who are radicalized, Shamni said. “They will never accept Jordanian silence with regards to annexation,” he said. “To survive, the king will have to take extreme steps that might even severely damage the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement.” Throughout the years, **Israeli actions in the West Bank**, Jerusalem and **Gaza have had a destabilizing influence**, Ayalon said. “But there is a huge difference between incremental change” and a large unilateral act, such as **annexation**, particularly one that is against the declared will of all Arab leaders, he said. Shamni, who was also Israel’s former military secretary to the US and a military adviser to former prime minister Ariel Sharon, said the plan **creates unnecessary turmoil and security problems**. At issue is Israel’s eastern border, which is its calmest out of the five borders, he said. There are hostilities along the Lebanese, Syrian and Gaza borders, and even the Egyptian border can be problematic because of terrorist groups in the Sinai Desert, he said. But the combined efforts of Israeli and Jordanian security forces have kept violence at bay, Shamni said. Jordan acts as an additional security buffer for Israel and provides a strategic safeguard against terrorism and other security threats, he said. Jordan’s location, bordering Iraq on the other side, makes peaceful relations with Israel particularly significant, he added. Coordination with Jordan is crucial for Israel’s safety along this critical stretch, Shamni said.

#### Multitude of alt causes affect Israel-jordan relations

**Zeevi,** Dror**. 2020** “Israel and Jordan: A Peace in Ruins.” *Dror Zeevi is a full professor in the Department of Middle East Studies at BenGurion University of the Negev* https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/101-200/meb133.pdf

The advantages of the peace treaty for Israel are clear. Since the treaty was signed there have been almost no clashes between Jordanians and Israelis, or between Palestinians and Israelis, across the Israel-Jordan border and almost no successful attempts by militants to infiltrate Israeli territory from Jordan. The IDF is therefore able to defend this long border with a tiny force of a few hundred soldiers. But the peace soon lost its steam, and a cold wind swept away hopes of wider benefits. There were many reasons for this: Quite a few were the result of policy choices, others emanated from regional security tensions, and still others had to do with bilateral issues. Exactly one year after the signing of the treaty, Prime Minister Rabin—King Hussein’s personal friend and a co-architect of the treaty—was assassinated. Soon afterwards, the Oslo process with the Palestinians sputtered to a halt. Palestinian suicide bombers blew themselves up in buses and malls in Israel, and the Israeli army responded with a heavy hand. After a failed attempt by Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat to find a permanent solution to the conflict at the Camp David summit in the summer of 2000, a second Palestinian uprising erupted, more violent than the first. Witnessing the daily clashes between Palestinians and Israeli security forces and the killing of Palestinians on their television screens, the Jordanian public’s feelings about peace soured. One part of the peace that has shown signs of success and remains alive is the joint attempt to create special “Qualifying Industrial Zones” (QIZ) that take advantage of the free trade agreements between the U.S. and Israel. Such zones, in which mostly Israeli entrepreneurs employ cheap local and imported labor, were established in several Jordanian towns. In 2018, work began on another such zone on the border between the two countries, which is projected to employ some 10,000 workers, mostly Jordanian.7 In order to make QIZ projects work, both sides have attempted to maintain a low profile.8 But even this aspect of the peace, which is to both sides’ advantage, has encountered many problems and never reached its expected potential. Israel’s attempt to move textile production to Jordan was threatened by the allure of cheap labor in East Asia. QIZ projects were also subject to boycotts and strikes by Jordanians, sometimes supported by Jordanian labor unions. In 2003, this was given further impetus by a fatwa published by the influential cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who called on Muslims to refrain from purchasing Israeli and American products. There were other cooperative projects that did not materialize because Israel failed to comply with commitments that were mentioned in general terms in the treaty and elaborated and agreed upon in subsequent bilateral talks. In other cases, Israel carried out such commitments only grudgingly. The most important one was the plan to connect the Red Sea to the Dead Sea by a canal and water pipeline, an idea enthusiastically embraced by Jordan. Nicknamed “Red-Dead,” this project had several aims. First, it would use the altitude difference between the Red Sea and the Dead Sea (a salty lake approximately -1400 feet below sea level, the lowest point on land) to generate electricity. It would also replenish the supply of briny water to the Dead Sea, which was (and still is) rapidly drying up as a result of irrigation upriver and years of drought. Another part of the “Red-Dead” project was using electricity generated by hydroelectric power to operate a large-scale desalination plant that would supply the water needs of Amman and its vicinity. A related cooperative project also envisioned building a joint airport for Aqaba and Eilat, thereby creating a joint tourism venture. But a combination of Israel’s skepticism about whether cooperation with Jordan could be maintained in the long run (including the question of whether the Hashemites would remain in power) and potential environmental impacts raised concerns about the entire Red-Dead venture.9 Moreover, economic estimates performed 4 by Israel’s Ministry of Finance found that a pipeline from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea that ran solely through Israeli territory would be less costly and more profitable. The Red-Dead project was, accordingly, quietly abandoned. Even the desalination plant and the proposed joint airport, so crucial for Jordan’s economy, did not materialize. Israel finally decided to build a new international hub—now called Ramon Airport—on its own soil, rather than a shared one on the border. Another article of the peace treaty recognized Jordan’s historic role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites on the Noble Sanctuary (al-Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem (Al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock, in an area which Israel refers to as the Temple Mount—Har HaBayit) and implied that Jordan should have a function in overseeing these shrines in any agreement on the permanent status of the city.10 This was in the interest of both sides. For the Hashemite family, Jerusalem was a kind of consolation prize for losing Mecca and Medina to the Saudis seventy years earlier: The former custodians of the Kaaba could still keep one major Islamic holy site under the family’s control. For Israel, this was insurance against Palestinian claims to sovereignty over what came to be known as “the Holy Basin” in Jerusalem. As long as Jordan controls this area, Israel can claim that it is bound by a treaty with a Muslim-majority country. Today, Jordan is still officially in charge of the Noble Sanctuary area, but its control is challenged on all sides. Although Israel recognizes Jordan’s role, it has allowed archeologists to excavate the foundations of the compound without Jordanian consent, asserting its right to archeological study of the ancient Temple site. It has also attempted several times to monitor the entrances to the compound. Finally, Israel allows members of an Orthodox Jewish movement known as the Temple Mount and Land of Israel Faithful to enter the area in groups and pray on the platform of the holy shrines, sometimes provoking both guards and Muslim worshippers. The Palestinian Authority (PA) also strives to wrest that role from Jordan, precisely in order to claim it as part of the Palestinians’ heritage and, therefore, their responsibility. It has taken over from Jordan the appointment of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem— currently Muhammad Ahmad Hussein—who regularly preaches at Al-Aqsa Mosque. The PA also organizes crowds to demonstrate against Israeli conduct on related matters, and in its negotiations with Israel it demands sovereignty over the compound. Lately, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has joined the fray, seeing involvement in Jerusalem as a way for Turkey to carve another niche as the champion of Sunni Islam and patron of the Palestinians. Finally, Saudi Arabia has suggested several times that control of the holy shrines should be entrusted to an international oversight body— which, in practical terms, would be led by the Saudis.

### Public Health

#### AT OECD –

#### 1] This is about Healthcare Infrastructure – that goes far beyond Medicines which the plan can’t effect since lack of hospitals, medical equipment, doctors, and medical personnel all thump the Aff’s ability to solve to zero – here’s your ev.

OECD 20 OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] “COVID-19 crisis response in MENA countries”, 06 November 2020 <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=129_129919-4li7bq8asv&title=COVID-19-Crisis-Response-in-MENA-Countries&_ga=2.237304256.1316433697.1631849561-29263471.1631849561> SM //Re-cut by Elmer

The revival in COVID-19 cases that followed the gradual easing of restrictions and reopening of the economy in several MENA countries, similarly to elsewhere in the world, is putting to the test the capacity of healthcare systems throughout the region to deal with a second wave of the pandemic. Two main trends are emerging, with on the one hand, a number of countries where precautionary measures and enforcement seem to have succeeded in flattening the curve, and, on the other hand, countries where limited capacity to enforce physical distancing and overstrained healthcare systems are making it increasingly challenging for governments to control the situation. Challenges to health systems and health sector resilience MENA countries’ containment efforts have proved particularly important in light of the region’s varying levels of health system preparedness. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the extent of the healthcare sector’s resilience across MENA economies. Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries and Jordan GCC economies have undertaken substantial investments in healthcare infrastructure, alongside efforts to increase the number of doctors and nursing personnel. While the GCC remains behind the global average in healthcare expenditure, budget allocations have been increasing significantly. This has considerably improved the quality of healthcare services in the region. In an assessment of COVID-19 preparedness published mid-March by the WHO, which ranked countries on a scale of 1 (no capacity) to 5 (sustainable capacity), all GCC countries except Qatar scored either 4 or 5. Despite accounting for close to half of the COVID-19 regional cases, GCC governments have succeeded in bringing the outbreak under control in their countries, displaying recovery rates significantly higher than the global average5. This results from a strategy based on prevention, strict control measures adopted and effectively enforced early on, and important means allocated to case detection and tracking. The UAE and Bahrain are among global leaders in terms of testing, ranking respectively first and third for the number of new tests per 1,000 people as of late September.6 Countries have also made available significant financial and material resources for COVID-19 treatment to avoid overwhelming health services, including by building dedicated treatment facilities, such as in the UAE. Jordan, which has an overall weaker health system and lower level of COVID-19 preparedness, managed to adopt a strategy similar to that of GCC countries. This has so far proved to be effective, although at high economic and societal cost. As a result of a swift government reaction and effective implementation of lockdown measures enabled by the state’s high enforcement capacity, COVID-19 infection and mortality rates in Jordan have remained consistently low. The government has also significantly scaled up its testing capacity to reach 70,000 tests per 1 million inhabitants in August, more than three times the test ratio recommended by the WHO. As of October 14, cases are on the rise again and curfews are being re-introduced. Developing MENA economies (Maghreb, Egypt) Developing MENA economies have been suffering from low health expenditures, human resource shortages in the health care sector and lack of medical equipment. Total health expenditure per capita in most MENA countries is significantly below averages for countries in similar income categories. Furthermore, the number of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants in the region is much below the WHO recommended threshold of 4.45 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 1,000 population, and as low as 0.72 and 0.79 in Morocco and Egypt respectively.7 The limited capacity of health systems to handle a large-scale outbreak prompted governments to adopt strict containment measures. However, while these measures contributed to limit the number of COVID-19 infections and related deaths in the first few months following the outbreak, the progressive de-confinement was accompanied by a rapid rise in cases, further straining countries’ health systems. In most countries, this is largely due to large religious gatherings, wedding celebrations and other social events where control measures were not sufficiently applied.8 Loosening compliance with preventive measures and difficulty to enforce physical distancing in large, densely populated cities (e.g. Cairo) have raised concerns over the evolution of the situation. As of October, international and social media, as well as NGOs reported that hospitals were struggling to manage the growing influx of COVID-19 patients, with some reaching full capacity, while healthcare professionals have pointed out to the lack of necessary medical equipment, doctors, medical personnel and ICU beds to deal with a second wave of such magnitude. This also challenging the massive testing strategy, as testing sites are becoming increasingly saturated. In some countries, observers have pointed to an ill-managed re-opening of international borders, while emerging social movements within the medical personnel risks adding pressure to an already tense health sector. Fragile and conflict-affected countries Lebanon had initially managed to contain the first COVID-19 wave by adopting strong containment measures early on with high levels of compliance from the population. However, following the explosion in the port of Beirut on 4 August, which destroyed half of the city’s medical centres and left three of its hospitals “non-functional” according to the WHO, the health situation has gotten largely out of control. Reported numbers of COVID-19 cases and related deaths have been rising at unprecedented speed, sparking worries regarding the capacity of ICU and dedicated facilities to absorb the second wave, as many are already at capacity treating those wounded in the blast. In the current emergency setting, with adherence to public health measures being compromised, the rise in cases shows no sign of slowing down. At the same time, possibilities for re-implementing strict containment measures are constrained by the economic crisis. Indeed, the two-week lockdown which had been announced after the explosion was eased prematurely due to economic pressures. In other fragile and conflict-affected countries, the COVID-19 outbreak poses a major challenge given damages to health systems.9 In emergency settings, where availability of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services is scarce, applying preventive measures to limit the spread of the disease has proved difficult. Countries where healthcare facilities have been partially destroyed during the war and governance remains extremely fragile and uncoordinated in certain areas, and lack the necessary capacity to respond to the crisis in terms of medical facilities, equipment and personnel. In Syria, the WHO10 estimates that 70% of health care workers have left the country as migrants or refugees, while only 64% of hospitals and 52% of primary health care centres remain fully operational. One possible explanation for the low number of COVID-19 cases reported in these countries at the beginning of the pandemic is the fact that, due to lack of bed capacity or difficulty to reach hospitals, people often die at home.11 In addition, the lack of testing capacity has resulted in months of under-reporting, in particular in Syria and Yemen. The situation has worsened over the summer, with numbers of COVID-19 cases and related deaths rapidly growing. At the same time, enforcement of containment measures has proved difficult in the context of already fragile economic situations, which cannot afford the necessary restrictions to limit the spread of the virus. Developments in the MENA health systems and health policies In some MENA countries, COVID-19 vaccine developments are likely to rapidly boost the supply and infrastructure of the healthcare industry. For example, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Morocco have partnered with foreign countries (notably China and Israel) and private companies alike to support vaccine research, and have engaged into advanced trial phases. Phase III trials started in the UAE in July12 and in Saudi Arabia in August for vaccines developed by two Chinese companies, respectively Sinopharm and CanSino Biologics. Egypt has also engaged in a partnership with China for the development and distribution of two COVID-19 vaccines developed by Sinopharm. This could lead to a reinforced China-MENA collaboration in this field13. With more investment (both public and private) in healthcare provision, opportunities for the private sector to support the development of health systems will increase14. In the Gulf, the surge in demand – driven by ageing populations, mandatory health insurance and high levels of lifestyle-related diseases such as diabetes – along with new government strategies and regulatory reforms are propelling private investment in the healthcare industry. In particular, a recent report produced by Mashreq and Frost & Sullivan found that the COVID-19 crisis had considerably boosted investments in digitisation and telehealth. The research estimates annual investment in digital infrastructure in the GCC to grow by 10% to 20% over the next two years, while teleconsultations are expected to be multiplied by four by Q4 2020.15 In Morocco, a HealthTech startup of the research and development centre MAScIR is now capable of producing 1 million RT-PCR tests per month, and a public-private partnership between the Ministry of Industry and various private sector actors has allowed to develop a locally produced ICU bed, massively cheaper than those imported from abroad.

#### 2] No Jordan key to Middle East Health card – 1AR will spin “Drug Exports” as a warrant – a] They can’t solve Patent issues that prevent export/production of COVID Vaccines – their I/L is about Drug Prices of medicines whose Patents have worn off NOT COVID vaccines which still have patent protection and b] Their ev is about generics exports – no ev about generics being key to solve COVID pandemic.

#### AT Alaadin –

#### 1] No COVID Impact on Conflict

Salemi 20 Colette Salemi 10-15-2020 "Does COVID-19 raise the risk of violent conflict? Not everywhere" <https://archive.is/h591O#selection-309.0-312.0> (Colette Salemi is a PhD student in applied economics at the University of Minnesota. Her research focuses on conflict, forced displacement, environmental degradation and their intersections.)//Elmer

How we did our research We **used** the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (**ACLED**), a **database** **that counts** the **number of conflict events daily around the world**. For 2019 and 2020, ACLED includes more than 100 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe — and tracks three categories of violent conflict: battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence. We examine trends in the number of conflict events over time. To see whether the trend changes in response to covid-19, we look at what happened after the World Health Organization declared a global pandemic (March 11) or the country declared a lockdown. [Don’t miss any of TMC’s smart analysis! Sign up here for our newsletter.] The **relationship between pandemics and conflict is theoretically unclear.** In some countries, job losses from the covid-19 pandemic mean people have fewer income-generating options — that can make participation in violence seem a more viable alternative. But if **market disruptions** and reduced global demand are **driving down** the **value of natural resources** such as oil wells, then **we** may **see less conflict** over control of such resources. We then **conducted** case **studies** based **on** our knowledge of countries with high rates of violent conflict before **covid**-19. These include countries with active civil wars (such as Syria) as well as countries with violent militia groups (such as the Philippines). Conflict during the coronavirus pandemic varies greatly **Worldwide**, **we didn’t observe an increase in violent conflict**. **If anything, conflict has decreased**, as the figure below shows. **Violent conflict** between March and August 2020 **was 23 percent lower** than violent conflict during the same period in 2019. Comparing these time periods, battles are down 20 percent and remote violence and bombings are down 40 percent. But violence against civilians — the deliberate attack of unarmed noncombatants by armed groups — continued at similar rates globally.

Chart, line chart

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#### 2] If their Internal Link is exporting Drugs – Alaaldin turns this since militants steal those drugs – your ev.

1AC Alaaldin 20 “COVID-19 will prolong conflict in the Middle East” Ranj Alaaldin [visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and nonresident fellow in the Foreign Policy program. He's also the director of a Carnegie Corporation project on proxy warfare in the Middle East.], April 24, 2020 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/24/covid-19-will-prolong-conflict-in-the-middle-east/> SM //re-cut by Elmer

CONFLICTS AROUND THE REGION In Libya, as Frederic Wehrey and others have pointed out, the pandemic has provided a boost to militias, providing an opportunity for them to channel medical aid to their fighters and instrumentalize the crisis to reward and reinforce patronage networks and favored communities. Troublingly, Libya’s hospitals are routinely targeted by rocket attacks, exacerbating the situation. In Yemen, militias loyal to the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) stormed into the southern port of Aden and stole medical aid donated by the World Health Organization (WHO), including nine ambulances destined for the health ministry. The conflict in Yemen has involved indiscriminate attacks that have devastated medical facilities and water supplies, contributing to what the international community has described as the world’s greatest man-made humanitarian crisis, including the worst cholera outbreak in modern history. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has reinforced its status as an alternative to the Lebanese state by committing close to 5,000 doctors, medics, and nurses to fight the pandemic. In Iraq, ISIS has ramped up its attacks in northern Iraqi villages and is moving to exploit Baghdad’s growing list of crises — ranging from the escalation between the U.S. and Iran, the decline in oil prices, and country-wide protests. During a public health crisis, ISIS can revive itself and expand its influence by catering to the needs of local communities in ways other authorities — like the Baghdad government — have not. At a minimum, Baghdad’s failures allow ISIS to position itself as a viable alternative. Combined with its current campaign of fear and intimidation, targeted assassinations, and extortion, this provides it with a patchwork, under-ground infrastructure of influence that establishes a launching pad from which to seize towns and cities in the manner it did in June 2014. In Syria, the civil war has shattered formal governing structures, and the Assad regime and Russia have moved to obliterate hospitals from the outset of the nine-year conflict. Syria is effectively three countries: regime-controlled territories, the Kurdish northeast, and Idlib in the northwest, which has 1.4 doctors per 10,000 people and only 100 ventilators. COVID-19 increases the prospects of another refugee wave that stretches the capacity of neighboring countries like Turkey and Lebanon to meet the humanitarian needs of these refugees. It also puts increased pressure on Western-aligned groups like the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), on which the West depends to maintain combat operations against ISIS and manage prison cells for detained ISIS combatants. The SDF also hosts refugee camps like Al-Hol, which houses 70,000 refugees, including ISIS combatants and their families.

#### AT Silverstein –

#### 2] It’s about Israel-Iran miscalc – an internal link the Aff doesn’t resolve since it’s structural past pandemics.

#### 3] Says Netanyahu treats Iran as existential – makes Middle East War instability and escalation either a] inevitable or b] all-hype so no impact.

#### AT Hour – No Mid East escalation

Imran 19 2/6/19 [Myra Imran, writer for The News International. Citing the international seminar on “Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East”. Seminar on ‘Strategic dimensions of peace and conflict in South Asia, Middle East’. 2/6/19, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/428298-seminar-on-strategic-dimensions-of-peace-and-conflict-in-south-asia-middle-east]

Islamabad : There is a need to study the causes of proxy wars, and what are the potential impacts of such wars on the overall conflict. These thoughts in a daylong international seminar on ‘Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East,’ organised by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), an Islamabad-based think tank, participated by prominent national and international scholars. Prof. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Deakin University, Australia, argued there is significant gap in the literature on non-state actors. He called for empirical research, along with concrete policy suggestions, on the topic, so as to mitigate the conflicts in the region, in particular South Asia and Middle East. Speakers grappled at the notion of non-state actors and proxy wars: PIPS director Muhammad Amir Rana said non-state actors often evoke memories of violent elements. This despite that as per definition, non-state actors include organizations working for human rights. Prof. Syed Rifaat Hussain, Department of Government and Public Policy, NUST, said the term “proxy wars” is a contested notion. There is no universal agreement on its definition, nor on the set of circumstances behind such wars. Interestingly, he said, proxy wars are as old as the phenomena of conventional war itself. Speakers noted proxy wars are instruments of state power. As to why states go for it, it was argued, it is because they are often cheap undertaking to change the status quo. Participants noted over the decades, much of the conflict involves non-state actors. Interstate conflict, on the other hand, has declined. In recent times, he said tit-for-tat tactics on behalf of such actors have reduced their appeal.

1. World Trade Organization, “Members and Observers” <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> brett [↑](#footnote-ref-1)