# 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: the affirmative may not specify a specific country

#### By means:

Oxford dictionary <https://www.google.com/search?q=by+definition&oq=by+definition&aqs=edge..69i57l2j69i59l2j69i60j69i64j69i60l3.1219j0j1&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>

identifying the agent performing an action. 2. indicating the means of achieving something.

#### Countries are not private entities:

#### Lawinsider

[https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/private-entity //](https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/private-entity%20//) ella

**Private entity** means **any entity other than a State,** local government, Indian tribe, or foreign public entity, as those terms are defined in 2 CFR 175.25. Includes:

Entities is plural

https://www.wordhippo.com/what-is/the-plural-of/entity.html

What is the plural of entity? The plural form of entity is entities.

#### Violation: they specify China

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Limits and ground – they justify speccing any country in the world like Luxembourg, China, Monaco, Peru, Russia, etc. exploding limits and making neg prep impossible

#### 2] Precision - topic wording is the basis of all prep since it’s the only thing we have to prep off of pre-round, so jettisoning it creates a lack of stable ground- its also a voter for jurisdiction because judges are constrained by the ballot to vote on the topic

#### Competing interps on T – you can’t be reasonably topical

#### DTD – T indicts the entire aff

#### No RVIs - 1] encourages good theory debaters to bait theory and always go for it

## 2

#### Mining is now in China – private companies key to launching new spacecraft

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A slew of activities amongst China’s private and state-owned aerospace companies this year are a testament to China’s growing ambitions for economic and military domination of space. On October 19, the Academy of Aerospace Solid Propulsion Technology (AASPT) – which belongs to the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) – test fired “the most powerful solid rocket motor with the largest thrust in the world so far.” The 500 tons of thrust is designed to propel the next iteration of China’s heavy-lift rockets, which would meet various demands for space missions like crewed Moon landings, deep space exploration, and off-world resource extraction. Exploration of space-based natural resources are on the Chinese policy makers’ mind. The question is, what Joe Biden thinks? In April of this year, China’s Shenzen Origin Space Technology Co. Ltd. launched the NEO-1, the first commercial spacecraft dedicated to the mining of space resources – from asteroids to the lunar surface. Falling costs of space launches and spacecraft technology alongside existing infrastructure provides a unique opportunity to explore extraterrestrial resource extraction. Current technologies are equipped to analyze and categorize asteroids within our solar system with a limited degree of certainty. One of the accompanying payloads to the NEO-1 was the Yuanwang-1, or “little hubble” satellite, which searches the stars for possible asteroid mining targets. The NEO-1 launch marks another milestone in private satellite development, adding a new player to space based companies which include Japan’s Astroscale. Private asteroid identification via the Sentinel Space Telescope was supported by NASA until 2015. As private investment in space grows, the end goal is to be capable of harvesting resources to bring to Earth. According to Shenzen Origin Space Technology company website: “Through the development and launch of the spacecraft, Origin Space is able to carry out low-Earth orbit space junk cleanup and prototype technology verification for space resource acquisition, and at the same time demonstrate future asteroid defense related technologies.” In the end, it will come down to progressively lowering the cost of launched unit of weight and booster rocket reliability – before fundamentally new engines may drive the launch costs even further down. The April launch demonstrates that China is already succeeding while the West is spinning its wheels. The much touted Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries (DSI) DSI -0.9% were supposed to be the vanguard of extra-terrestrial resource acquisition with major backers including Google’s GOOG -0.1% Larry Page. But both have since been acquired, the former by block chain company ConsenSys and the latter by Bradford Space, neither of which are prioritizing asteroid mining. This is too bad, given that that supply chain crunches here on Earth – coupled with the global green energy transition – are spiking demand for strategic minerals that are increasingly hard to come by on our environmentally stressed planet. And here China currently holds a monopoly on rare earth element (REE) extraction and processing to the tune of 90%. REE’s 17 minerals essential for modern computing and manufacturing technologies for everything from solar panels to semi-conductors. Resource-hungry China also has major involvement in global critical mineral supply chains, which include cobalt, tungsten, and lithium. As I’ve written before, the Chinese hold of upstream and downstream markets is staggering. Possessing 30% of the global mined ore, 80% of the global processing facilities, and an ever increasing list of high dollar investments around the world, China boasts over $36 billion invested in mining projects in Africa alone. Beijing’s space program clearly indicates that the Chinese would also like to tighten their grip on space-based resources as well. According to research, it is estimated that a small asteroid roughly 200 meters in length that is rich in platinum could be worth up to $300 million. Merrill Lynch predicts the space industry — including extraterrestrial mining industry – to value $2.7 trillion in the next three decades. REEs are fairly common in the solar system, but to what degree remains unknown. The most sought after are M-type asteroids which are mostly metal and hundreds of cubic meters. While these are not the most common, the 27,115 Near Earth asteroids are bound to contain a few. This – and military applications – are no doubt a driving factor of China’s ever increasing space ambitions. A new goldrush in space based resource extraction has sparked a new age of miners looking to find their fortunes. In reality, the industry cannot get off the ground without further innovation in deep space observation, on-board power, extraction processes, and logistical support in low earth and high earth orbit. As Uberization of space looms closer, the prices of space launches are falling rapidly. Privately funded satellites like the NEO-1 or Sentinel are the first of many novel economic ventures deploying technologies essential to the viability of solar system mining projects. Private launches by SpaceX and Blue Origin will provide low cost satellite deployment for further testing craft and classification telescopes.

#### Terrestrial mining causes environmental destruction and inevitable resource shortages, but space mining solves.

MacWhorter 16 [Kevin; J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, "Sustainable Mining: Incentivizing Asteroid Mining in the Name of Environmentalism", William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, Vol 40, Issue 2, Article 11, <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1653&context=wmelpr>] brett

A. Rare Element Mining on Earth

In the next sixty years, scientists predict that certain elements crucial to modern industry such as platinum, zinc, copper, phosphorous, lead, gold, and indium could be exhausted on Earth. 12 Many of these have no synthetic alternative, unlike chemical elements such as oil or diamonds.13 Liquid-crystal display (LCD) televisions, cellphones, and laptops are among the various consumer technologies that use precious metals.14Further, green technologies including wind turbines, solar panels, and catalytic converters require these rare elements. 15 As demand rises for both types of technologies, and as reserves of rare metals fall, prices skyrocket.16 Demand for nonrenewable resources creates conflict, and consumerism in rich countries results in harsh labor treatment for poorer countries.17

In general, the mining industry is extremely destructive to Earth’s environment.18 In fact, depending on the method employed, mining can destroy entire ecosystems by polluting water sources and contributing to deforestation.19 It is by its nature an unsustainable practice, because it involves the extraction of a finite and non-renewable resource.20 Moreover, by extracting tiny amounts of metals from relatively large quantities of ore, the mining industry contributes the largest portion of solid wastes in the world.21 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) describes the industry as the source of more toxic and hazardous waste than any other industrial sector [in the United States], costing billions of dollars to address the public health and environmental threats to communities. 22 Poor regulations and oxymoronic corporate definitions of sustainability, however, make it unclear as to just how much waste the industry actually produces.23

Platinum provides an excellent case study of the issue, because it is an extremely rare and expensive metal—an ore expected to exist in vast quantities in asteroids.24 Further, production of platinum has increased sharply in the past sixty years in order to keep up with growing demand for use in new technologies.25 In fact, despite their high costs, platinum group metals are so useful that [one] of [four] industrial goods on Earth require them in production. 26 Scholars do not expect demand to slow any time soon.27 Among other technologies, industries use platinum in products such as catalytic converters, jewelry production, various catalysts for chemical processing, and hydrogen fuel cells.28 While there is no consensus on how far the Earth’s reserves of platinum will take humanity, many scientists agree that platinum ore reserves will deplete in a relatively short amount of time.29

With the rate of mining at an all-time high,30 it is increasingly clear that historical patterns of mineral resources and development cannot simply be assumed to continue unaltered into the future. 31 The platinum mining industry, however, has a strong incentive to increase its rate of extraction as profits grow with the rate of demand. Without any alternative, this destructive practice will continue into the future.32

So-called platinum-group metal (PGM) ores are mined through underground or open cut techniques.33 Due to these practices, all but a very small fraction of the mined platinum ore is disposed of as solid waste.34 The environmental consequences of platinum production are thus quite significant, but like the mining industry in general, the amount of waste is typically under-reported.35

While this is due to high production levels at the moment, those levels will only increase given the estimated future demand of platinum.36 In spite of the negative consequences, mining continues unabated because it is economically important to many areas.37 The future environmental costs provide a major challenge in creating a sustainable system. Relegating at least some mining companies to near-Earth asteroids would reduce the negative effects of future mining levels on Earth. The economic benefits of mining need not be sacrificed for the sake of the environment.38

#### Chinese environmental destruction spills over

Larson-Robin, 2016 Leah, Dissertation for acquiring a Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science), “Risking Poison to Quench a Thirst: Political Engagement Choices for Citizens and the State in China’s Environmental Crisis” University of Wisconsin - Madison, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2016.

China’s environmental and political future are significant for the world: simply as a matter of scale, the state’s ability to control, halt or reduce pollution will affect climate change, air quality, and ecological balance in the Pacific and South China Sea. Therefore, understanding the motivations, policies and functional effectiveness of those efforts must be better understood. This project seeks to make contributions to our knowledge of these dynamics. First, this project demonstrates the need to look more closely at the role of individual decision-making and its impact on politics and governance present even in the authoritarian context. Second, it raises questions about the relationship between the expansion and reform of regulatory institutions, specifically the legal system, and the impact those changes can have on politically and economically vulnerable groups. Third, it highlights how environmental policy theory can be informed by the failures and successes of environmental governance in China. The uncertainties of environmental policy are extensive as a result of unknown dynamics within and among whole ecosystems. Then there are the structural uncertainties intrinsic to both the complexity of the science-policy theory hybridization, and to coordinating among institutions and actors involved in implementing even the most effectively designed policy. The risk of failure is high, and risk from failure and success is unpredictable. Nevertheless, the state of the environment globally, and within China is bad and growing worse. These chapters explore the political and environmental dimensions of public participation through the perspective of villagers, the role of legal institutions in supporting and shaping environmental governance, and implications of political trust and institutional confidence for environmental policy efficacy. On the whole, China’s environment is in dire straits. It is not clear if it is irrecoverable, but at this time, there exist no magic pills, no advanced technological fixes that can pull the environment back from the brink. In theory, preventing further pollution might allow the ecological systems to recover themselves, but not enough is understood about environmental science, even among the experts, to determine this probability. In the meantime, China continues to pollute, even as the government pours billions of dollars into remedies. As examined here, China’s environmental challenges are largely a story of politics, but also one of environmental policy and the role of legal development as an institutional tool. As such, the questions posed require an interdisciplinary analysis and the contributions are similarly interdisciplinary. The human and institutional behaviors we study as political scientists are not governed by the limits we place on academic disciplines; this project is therefore designed as an argument for greater flexibility across disciplines so as better to tell the stories meant to contribute to knowledge.

#### That spirals globally and causes extinction

Dr. Glen Barry 13, Ph.D. in "Land Resources" and Masters of Science in "Conservation Biology and Sustainable Development” from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, “ECOLOGY SCIENCE: Terrestrial Ecosystem Loss and Biosphere Collapse,” Forests.org, February 4, 2013, pg. http://forests.org/blog/2013/02/ecology-science-terrestrial-ec.asp

Blunt, Biocentric Discussion on Avoiding Global Ecosystem Collapse and Achieving Global Ecological Sustainability Science needs to do a better job of considering worst-case scenarios regarding continental- and global-scale ecological collapse. The loss of biodiversity, ecosystems, and landscape connectivity reviewed here shows clearly that ecological collapse is occurring at spatially extensive scales. The collapse of the biosphere and complex life, or eventually even all life, is a possibility that needs to be better understood and mitigated against. A tentative case has been presented here that terrestrial ecosystem loss is at or near a planetary boundary. It is suggested that a 66% of Earth's land mass must be maintained in terrestrial ecosystems, to maintain critical connectivity necessary for ecosystem services across scales to continue, including the biosphere. Yet various indicators show that around 50% of Earth's terrestrial ecosystems have been lost and their services usurped by humans. Humanity may have already destroyed more terrestrial ecosystems than the biosphere can bear. There exists a major need for further research into how much land must be maintained in a natural and agroecological state to meet landscape and bioregional sustainable development goals while maintaining an operable biosphere. It is proposed that a critical element in determining the threshold where terrestrial ecosystem loss becomes problematic is where landscape connectivity of intact terrestrial ecosystems erodes to the point where habitat patches exist only in a human context. Based upon an understanding of how landscapes percolate across scale, it is recommended that 66% of Earth's surface be maintained as ecosystems; 44% as natural intact ecosystems (2/3 of 2/3) and 22% as agroecological buffer zones. Thus nearly half of Earth must remain as large, connected, intact, and naturally evolving ecosystems, including old-growth forests, to provide the context and top-down ecological regulation of both human agroecological, and reduced impact and appropriately scaled industrial activities. Given the stakes, it is proper for political ecologists and other Earth scientists to willingly speak bluntly if we are to have any chance of averting global ecosystem collapse. A case has been presented that Earth is already well beyond carrying capacity in terms of amount of natural ecosystem habitat that can be lost before the continued existence of healthy regional ecosystems and the global biosphere itself may not be possible. Cautious and justifiably conservative science must still be able to rise to the occasion of global ecological emergencies that may threaten our very survival as a species and planet. Those knowledgeable about planetary boundaries—and abrupt climate change and terrestrial ecosystem loss in particular—must be more bold and insistent in conveying the range and possible severity of threats of global ecosystem collapse, while proposing sufficient solutions. It is not possible to do controlled experiments on the Earth system; all we have is observation based upon science and trained intuition to diagnose the state of Earth's biosphere and suggest sufficient ecological science–based remedies. If Gaia is alive, she can die. Given the strength of life-reducing trends across biological systems and scales, there is a need for a rigorous research agenda to understand at what point the biosphere may perish and Earth die, and to learn what configuration of ecosystems and other boundary conditions may prevent her from doing so. We see death of cells, organisms, plant communities, wildlife populations, and whole ecosystems all the time in nature—extreme cases being desertification and ocean dead zones. There is no reason to dismiss out of hand that the Earth System could die if critical thresholds are crossed. We need as Earth scientists to better understand how this may occur and bring knowledge to bear to avoid global ecosystem and biosphere collapse or more extreme outcomes such as biological homogenization and the loss of most or even all life. To what extent can a homogenized Earth of dandelions, rats, and extremophiles be said to be alive, can it ever recover, and how long can it last? The risks of global ecosystem collapse and the need for strong response to achieve global ecological sustainability have been understated for decades. If indeed there is some possibility that our shared biosphere could be collapsing, there needs to be further investigation of what sorts of sociopolitical responses are valid in such a situation. Dry, unemotional scientific inquiry into such matters is necessary—yet more proactive and evocative political ecological language may be justified as well. We must remember we are speaking of the potential for a period of great dying in species, ecosystems, humans, and perhaps all being. It is not clear whether this global ecological emergency is avoidable or recoverable. It may not be. But we must follow and seek truth wherever it leads us. Planetary boundaries have been quite anthropocentric, focusing upon human safety and giving relatively little attention to other species and the biosphere's needs other than serving humans. Planetary boundaries need to be set that, while including human needs, go beyond them to meet the needs of ecosystems and all their constituent species and their aggregation into a living biosphere. Planetary boundary thinking needs to be more biocentric. I concur with Williams (2000) that what is needed is an Earth System–based conservation ethic—based upon an "Earth narrative" of natural and human history—which seeks as its objective the "complete preservation of the Earth's biotic inheritance." Humans are in no position to be indicating which species and ecosystems can be lost without harm to their own intrinsic right to exist, as well as the needs of the biosphere. For us to survive as a species, logic and reason must prevail (Williams 2000). Those who deny limits to growth are unaware of biological realities (Vitousek 1986). There are strong indications humanity may undergo societal collapse and pull down the biosphere with it. The longer dramatic reductions in fossil fuel emissions and a halt to old-growth logging are put off, the worse the risk of abrupt and irreversible climate change becomes, and the less likely we are to survive and thrive as a species. Human survival—entirely dependent upon the natural world—depends critically upon both keeping carbon emissions below 350 ppm and maintaining at least 66% of the landscape as natural ecological core areas and agroecological transitions and buffers. Much of the world has already fallen below this proportion, and in sum the biosphere's terrestrial ecosystem loss almost certainly has been surpassed, yet it must be the goal for habitat transition in remaining relatively wild lands undergoing development such as the Amazon, and for habitat restoration and protection in severely fragmented natural habitat areas such as the Western Ghats. The human family faces an unprecedented global ecological emergency as reckless growth destroys the ecosystems and the biosphere on which all life depends. Where is the sense of urgency, and what are proper scientific responses if in fact Earth is dying? Not speaking of worst-case scenarios—the collapse of the biosphere and loss of a living Earth, and mass ecosystem collapse and death in places like Kerala—is intellectually dishonest. We must consider the real possibility that we are pulling the biosphere down with us, setting back or eliminating complex life. The 66% / 44% / 22% threshold of terrestrial ecosystems in total, natural core areas, and agroecological buffers gets at the critical need to maintain large and expansive ecosystems across at least 50% of the land so as to keep nature connected and fully functional. We need an approach to planetary boundaries that is more sensitive to deep ecology to ensure that habitable conditions for all life and natural evolutionary change continue. A terrestrial ecosystem boundary which protects primary forests and seeks to recover old-growth forests elsewhere is critical in this regard. In old forests and all their life lie both the history of Earth's life, and the hope for its future. The end of their industrial destruction is a global ecological imperative. Much-needed dialogue is beginning to focus on how humanity may face systematic social and ecological collapse and what sort of community resilience is possible. There have been ecologically mediated periods of societal collapse from human damage to ecosystems in the past (Kuecker and Hall 2011). What makes it different this time is that the human species may have the scale and prowess to pull down the biosphere with them. It is fitting at this juncture for political ecologists to concern themselves with both legal regulatory measures, as well as revolutionary processes of social change, which may bring about the social norms necessary to maintain the biosphere. Rockström and colleagues (2009b) refer to the need for "novel and adaptive governance" without using the word revolution. Scientists need to take greater latitude in proposing solutions that lie outside the current political paradigms and sovereign powers. Even the Blue Planet Laureates' remarkable analysis (Brundtland et al. 2012), which notes the potential for climate change, ecosystem loss, and inequitable development patterns neither directly states nor investigates in depth the potential for global ecosystem collapse, or discusses revolutionary responses. UNEP (2012) notes abrupt and irreversible ecological change, which they say may impact life-support systems, but are not more explicit regarding the profound human and ecological implications of biosphere collapse, or the full range of sociopolitical responses to such predictions. More scientific investigations are needed regarding alternative governing structures optimal for pursuit and achievement of bioregional, continental, and global sustainability if we are maintain a fully operable biosphere forever. An economic system based upon endless growth that views ecosystems necessary for planetary habitability primarily as resources to be consumed cannot exist for long. Planetary boundaries offer a profoundly difficult challenge for global governance, particularly as increased scientific salience does not appear to be sufficient to trigger international action to sustain ecosystems (Galaz et al. 2012). If indeed the safe operating space for humanity is closing, or the biosphere even collapsing and dying, might not discussion of revolutionary social change be acceptable? Particularly, if there is a lack of consensus by atomized actors, who are unable to legislate the required social change within the current socioeconomic system. By not even speaking of revolutionary action, we dismiss any means outside the dominant growth-based oligarchies. In the author's opinion, it is shockingly irresponsible for Earth System scientists to speak of geoengineering a climate without being willing to academically investigate revolutionary social and economic change as well. It is desirable that the current political and economic systems should reform themselves to be ecologically sustainable, establishing laws and institutions for doing so. Yet there is nothing sacrosanct about current political economy arrangements, particularly if they are collapsing the biosphere. Earth requires all enlightened and knowledgeable voices to consider the full range of possible responses now more than ever. One possible solution to the critical issues of terrestrial ecosystem loss and abrupt climate change is a massive and global, natural ecosystem protection and restoration program—funded by a carbon tax—to further establish protected large and connected core ecological sustainability areas, buffers, and agro-ecological transition zones throughout all of Earth's bioregions. Fossil fuel emission reductions must also be a priority. It is critical that humanity both stop burning fossil fuels and destroying natural ecosystems, as fast as possible, to avoid surpassing nearly all the planetary boundaries. In summation, we are witnessing the collective dismantling of the biosphere and its constituent ecosystems which can be described as ecocidal. The loss of a species is tragic, of an ecosystem widely impactful, yet with the loss of the biosphere all life may be gone. Global ecosystems when connected for life's material flows provide the all-encompassing context within which life is possible. The miracle of life is that life begets life, and the tragedy is that across scales when enough life is lost beyond thresholds, living systems die.

#### Mineral scarcity turns every war scenario---we outweigh on timeframe, just the prospect of shortages triggers escalation.

---ev literally cites China, talks about expansion in SCS and ECS

Klare 13 [Michael T., The Nation’s defense correspondent, is professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C. His newest book, All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change, will be published this fall. 2013. “How Resource Scarcity and Climate Change Could Produce a Global Explosion,” <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-resource-scarcity-and-climate-change-could-produce-global-explosion/>] brett

Brace yourself. You may not be able to tell yet, but according to global experts and the US intelligence community, the earth is already shifting under you. Whether you know it or not, you’re on a new planet, a resource-shock world of a sort humanity has never before experienced.

Two nightmare scenarios—a global scarcity of vital resources and the onset of extreme climate change—are already beginning to converge and in the coming decades are likely to produce a tidal wave of unrest, rebellion, competition and conflict. Just what this tsunami of disaster will look like may, as yet, be hard to discern, but experts warn of “water wars” over contested river systems, global food riots sparked by soaring prices for life’s basics, mass migrations of climate refugees (with resulting anti-migrant violence) and the breakdown of social order or the collapse of states. At first, such mayhem is likely to arise largely in Africa, Central Asia and other areas of the underdeveloped South, but in time, all regions of the planet will be affected.

To appreciate the power of this encroaching catastrophe, it’s necessary to examine each of the forces that are combining to produce this future cataclysm.

Resource Shortages and Resource Wars

Start with one simple given: the prospect of future scarcities of vital natural resources, including energy, water, land, food and critical minerals. This in itself would guarantee social unrest, geopolitical friction and war.

It is important to note that absolute scarcity doesn’t have to be on the horizon in any given resource category for this scenario to kick in. A lack of adequate supplies to meet the needs of a growing, ever more urbanized and industrialized global population is enough. Given the wave of extinctions that scientists are recording, some resources—particular species of fish, animals and trees, for example—will become less abundant in the decades to come, and may even disappear altogether. But key materials for modern civilization like oil, uranium and copper will simply prove harder and more costly to acquire, leading to supply bottlenecks and periodic shortages.

Oil—the single most important commodity in the international economy—provides an apt example. Although global oil supplies may actually grow in the coming decades, many experts doubt that they can be expanded sufficiently to meet the needs of a rising global middle class that is, for instance, expected to buy millions of new cars in the near future. In its 2011 World Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency claimed that an anticipated global oil demand of 104 million barrels per day in 2035 will be satisfied. This, the report suggested, would be thanks in large part to additional supplies of “unconventional oil” (Canadian tar sands, shale oil and so on), as well as 55 million barrels of new oil from fields “yet to be found” and “yet to be developed.”

However, many analysts scoff at this optimistic assessment, arguing that rising production costs (for energy that will be ever more difficult and costly to extract), environmental opposition, warfare, corruption and other impediments will make it extremely difficult to achieve increases of this magnitude. In other words, even if production manages for a time to top the 2010 level of 87 million barrels per day, the goal of 104 million barrels will never be reached and the world’s major consumers will face virtual, if not absolute, scarcity.

Water provides another potent example. On an annual basis, the supply of drinking water provided by natural precipitation remains more or less constant: about 40,000 cubic kilometers. But much of this precipitation lands on Greenland, Antarctica, Siberia and inner Amazonia where there are very few people, so the supply available to major concentrations of humanity is often surprisingly limited. In many regions with high population levels, water supplies are already relatively sparse. This is especially true of North Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East, where the demand for water continues to grow as a result of rising populations, urbanization and the emergence of new water-intensive industries. The result, even when the supply remains constant, is an environment of increasing scarcity.

Wherever you look, the picture is roughly the same: supplies of critical resources may be rising or falling, but rarely do they appear to be outpacing demand, producing a sense of widespread and systemic scarcity. However generated, a perception of scarcity—or imminent scarcity—regularly leads to anxiety, resentment, hostility and contentiousness. This pattern is very well understood, and has been evident throughout human history.

In his book Constant Battles, for example, Steven LeBlanc, director of collections for Harvard’s Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, notes that many ancient civilizations experienced higher levels of warfare when faced with resource shortages brought about by population growth, crop failures or persistent drought. Jared Diamond, author of the bestseller Collapse, has detected a similar pattern in Mayan civilization and the Anasazi culture of New Mexico’s Chaco Canyon. More recently, concern over adequate food for the home population was a significant factor in Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and Germany’s invasions of Poland in 1939 and the Soviet Union in 1941, according to Lizzie Collingham, author of The Taste of War.

Although the global supply of most basic commodities has grown enormously since the end of World War II, analysts see the persistence of resource-related conflict in areas where materials remain scarce or there is anxiety about the future reliability of supplies. Many experts believe, for example, that the fighting in Darfur and other war-ravaged areas of North Africa has been driven, at least in part, by competition among desert tribes for access to scarce water supplies, exacerbated in some cases by rising population levels.

“In Darfur,” says a 2009 report from the UN Environment Programme on the role of natural resources in the conflict, “recurrent drought, increasing demographic pressures, and political marginalization are among the forces that have pushed the region into a spiral of lawlessness and violence that has led to 300,000 deaths and the displacement of more than two million people since 2003.”

Anxiety over future supplies is often also a factor in conflicts that break out over access to oil or control of contested undersea reserves of oil and natural gas. In 1979, for instance, when the Islamic revolution in Iran overthrew the Shah and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Washington began to fear that someday it might be denied access to Persian Gulf oil. At that point, President Jimmy Carter promptly announced what came to be called the Carter Doctrine. In his 1980 State of the Union Address, Carter affirmed that any move to impede the flow of oil from the Gulf would be viewed as a threat to America’s “vital interests” and would be repelled by “any means necessary, including military force.”

In 1990, this principle was invoked by President George H.W. Bush to justify intervention in the first Persian Gulf War, just as his son would use it, in part, to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Today, it remains the basis for US plans to employ force to stop the Iranians from closing the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean through which about 35 percent of the world’s seaborne oil commerce passes.

Recently, a set of resource conflicts have been rising toward the boiling point between China and its neighbors in Southeast Asia when it comes to control of offshore oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea. Although the resulting naval clashes have yet to result in a loss of life, a strong possibility of military escalation exists. A similar situation has also arisen in the East China Sea, where China and Japan are jousting for control over similarly valuable undersea reserves. Meanwhile, in the South Atlantic Ocean, Argentina and Britain are once again squabbling over the Falkland Islands (called Las Malvinas by the Argentinians) because oil has been discovered in surrounding waters.

By all accounts, resource-driven potential conflicts like these will only multiply in the years ahead as demand rises, supplies dwindle and more of what remains will be found in disputed areas. In a 2012 study titled Resources Futures, the respected British think-tank Chatham House expressed particular concern about possible resource wars over water, especially in areas like the Nile and Jordan River basins where several groups or countries must share the same river for the majority of their water supplies and few possess the wherewithal to develop alternatives. “Against this backdrop of tight supplies and competition, issues related to water rights, prices, and pollution are becoming contentious,” the report noted. “In areas with limited capacity to govern shared resources, balance competing demands, and mobilize new investments, tensions over water may erupt into more open confrontations.”

## 3

#### CP Text:

#### The People’s Republic of China should:

#### --- ratify and enact into all relevant domestic legislation the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects.

#### --- establish a treaty banning ASAT testing.

#### --- end the policy of Civil-Military-Fusion.

#### Plank 1 bans weaponization and ensures China can’t develop dominance thru space leadership.

Jaramillo 09 [Cesar, In 2013 he earned a B.A. in Catholic Studies from Seton Hall University. Father Jaramillo earned the S.T.B. (Theology) and the J.C.L. (Canon Law) degrees from the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome in 2016 and 2019 respectively. He also earned a Diploma in Administrative Canonical Praxis from the Vatican’s Congregation for the Clergy in 2018. Fr. Jaramillo is a member of the Canon Law Society of America. The Ploughshares Monitor Winter 2009 Volume 30 Issue 4, “In Defence of the PPWT Treaty: Toward a Space Weapons Ban” <https://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/in-defence-of-the-ppwt-treaty-toward-a-space-weapons-ban/>] brett

The existing legal regime that tackles the potential weaponization of outer space is outdated, inadequate, and insufficient. Moreover, the rapidity with which space-related technologies are being developed seems to be widening the gap between military applications that may affect space assets and the precarious normative architecture that should regulate them. The fact that space will inevitably become more complex and congested each year underscores the need for a comprehensive space security treaty that builds on what little international law exists in this realm and not only reflects current threats to space security, but also tackles the emerging legal questions that inevitably arise as space becomes a more convoluted domain.

The PPWT—while not perfect and subject to revisions—represents what is undoubtedly the most substantive effort thus far to embed the oft-expressed desire to maintain a weapons-free outer space in international treaty law. It is true that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty specifically bans signatory states from placing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit and calls for the peaceful exploration of outer space. However, it does not explicitly refer to the placement or use of other types of weapons in outer space or the use of earth-based weapons against space targets—activities which clearly need regulation, if not outright prohibition.

It is often said that the perils inherent to the indiscriminate weaponization of space are perhaps only comparable to those posed by nuclear weapons, although much of this assessment rests on speculation, since outer space has not yet seen a scenario of direct military confrontation. Indeed, it is assumed that there have been no weapons placed in space to date as there have been neither claims nor denunciations of such behaviour by any state, and considerable efforts are being made in diverse governmental and nongovernmental circles to ensure that this delicate threshold is preserved. To be sure, a distinction must be made between militarization and weaponization: while the former has arguably already happened, given the widespread use of satellites for military applications such as reconnaissance and intelligence, it is the latter that is the primary focus of proponents of a space security treaty.

Not surprisingly, a resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) has been introduced at both the CD and the First Committee of the UN General Assembly and has garnered near-unanimous support year after year—with the notable exception of the United States and Israel.1 In this context, the PPWT draft treaty introduced at the CD in February 2008 has been touted as a practical way to “nip the problem of PAROS in the bud” (UNIDIR 2008, p. 147). If there is a ban on space weapons, the rationale goes, there will be no arms race to prevent.

The PPWT draft treaty

What, then, makes the PPWT proposal worthy of serious consideration by the international community? In other words, why is it an appealing alternative to the status quo? The PPWT is the first draft treaty on outer space ever presented at the UN Conference on Disarmament, which is the quintessential international forum for addressing multilateral disarmament agreements. In fact, the PPWT builds upon elements contained in a 2002 Working Paper presented at the CD by a group of countries that also included Russia and China. Technically speaking, though, the PPWT Treaty focuses not on disarmament but prevention, as outer space is currently considered to be weapons-free and, thus, there is nothing to disarm. Still, the CD seems to be the obvious repository for such a proposal and most member states have welcomed its introduction.

Specifically, as implied in the name of the treaty, the PPWT seeks to ban two different yet interrelated conducts:

the placement of weapons in outer space and

the threat or use of force against outer space objects.

The first initiative sensibly eliminates the fundamental prerequisite for the actual utilization of space weapons: their placement in space. The PPWT treaty defines weapon in outer space in a thorough and comprehensive manner as:

Any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, which has been specially produced or converted to destroy, damage, or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth’s atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the biosphere which are important to human existence or to inflict damage on them. (Article 1C)

Clearly, if the Treaty enters into force, such a broad definition would contribute decisively to the goals of PAROS and preventing space from becoming an arena of military confrontation. Notably, it encompasses weapons placed in space that can be used not only against other space objects, but also against Earth-based objects. Thus, it seems apparent that the framers of the PPWT strove to minimize the room for ambiguity and interpretation with regard to the conditions under which a device in space can be considered a weapon. Again, a weapon in space need not be used against an adversary for there to be a violation of the treaty, as its mere placement in space would be considered a breach of the treaty.

Similarly, the second focal point of this treaty, against the threat or use of force against outer space objects, provides a comprehensive ban on any aggressive action against objects in space, defined as:

Any hostile actions against outer space objects including, inter alia, actions aimed at destroying them, damaging them, temporarily or permanently disrupting their normal functioning or deliberately changing their orbit parameters or the threat of such actions. (Article 1E)

#### ASAT ban specifically accesses their internal links.

Forden 20 Geoffrey Forden, a research associate with the Science, Technology, and Society Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as chief of the multidisciplinary analysis section of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)., 8-9-2020, "After China's Test: Time For A Limited Ban On Anti-Satellite Weapons," Arms Control Association, [https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-04/features/after-chinas-test-time-limited-ban-anti-satellite-weapons //](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-04/features/after-chinas-test-time-limited-ban-anti-satellite-weapons%20//) ella

A Treaty Banning ASAT Testing Other analysts have attempted to make progress with proposals banning the testing, development, and deployment of ASAT systems above some threshold altitude.[19] Such methods certainly avoid the missile defense problems that have stymied previous treaty attempts, but they also leave open the development of these weapons at lower altitudes, even if combined with a code of conduct for lower altitudes. It would, unfortunately, be a relatively minor step to move an ASAT weapon that had been developed for lower altitudes and mount it on a more powerful rocket, especially for countries such as China or India that have already orbited geostationary satellites. A better approach might be simply to ban one spacecraft from approaching another orbiting spacecraft[20] at excessive speeds. A technical annex to the treaty, one that could be adjusted by a standing committee of experts, might define these as closing speeds greater than 100 meters per second if they are within 100 kilometers of each other. These speeds and distances are great enough not to interfere with much of the normal operating procedures in space and yet would still obstruct the development of the tracking, guidance, and control of any ASAT weapon. At the same time, they do not prevent the testing and deployment of ground-based missile defenses because the target is not in orbit. Space is far from empty, however. For instance, within a single 100-minute orbit, an equatorial satellite “violated” the proposed treaty limits several times by passing closer than 100 kilometers (at closing speeds of more than 100 meters per second) to 18 cataloged space objects, including two functioning satellites. Of the 16 pieces of debris, six were from the satellite destroyed in China 's ASAT weapons test, which, for this orbit, increased by 50 percent the risk of collision with a large piece of debris. To prevent such false violations, the treaty should be limited to cases where spacecraft were maneuvering within this region, which is the essence of the tracking-guidance-control system. Thus, although it would still be possible to develop individual components of an ASAT system such as the optical tracker with in-orbit tests under this proposed treaty, it would not be possible to gain enough confidence in the complete system to deploy a weapon. Space-based satellite surveillance, which has already been implemented on a single satellite, could be used to detect spacecraft maneuvering in close proximity to other satellites by observing the exhaust plumes from the interceptor's jets.[21] The satellite tracking system at present, however, could not verify this ban because it does not have the space-based surveillance assets necessary for such continuous coverage. The United States would need to implement a complete constellation of satellites dedicated to tracking other satellites, as proposed by the Congressional Budget Office in 2000.[22]

#### Ending Civil-Military-Fusion ensures space tech isn’t developed for militaristic or revisionist aims but rather towards private development -- solves militarization and heg.

1AC Curcio 8/24 [(Blaine, an Affiliate Senior Consultant for Euroconsult, based in Hong Kong. Since joining Euroconsult in 2018, he has contributed to a wide range of consulting missions and research reports, primarily covering the satcom sector globally, and broader space industry in China.) “Developments in China's Commercial Space Sector” The National Bureau of Asian Research, 8/24/2021. https://www.nbr.org/publication/developments-in-chinas-commercial-space-sector/] BC recut BC

The second type is the broader policy impact. Because the central government makes Military-Civil Fusion a significant policy objective, there will be industrial bases that are built to support related technologies. More money and resources will be available for a startup that will support China’s strategic and tech ambitions. Because of the money and resources that are available, the development of the space industry will change as companies adapt their activities to what the government is emphasizing and to what kind of support they can get from different stakeholders in order to survive.

China does not currently have a huge commercial space sector. The only real way that these companies can grow is either by selling products to the existing space sector—which is not particularly easy at this stage—or by raising money from existing shareholders and trying to guess where the market is moving.

# Case (China heg good)

### Sino-Russia coop good

#### Sino-Russian alliance is key to solve NoKo prolif and war.

Choo ’19 (Jaewoo, Professor of Foreign Policy in the Department of Chinese Studies at Kyng Hee University, Korea, “The China-Russia Entente and the Korean Peninsula”, the National Bureau of Asian Research, <https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr78_china_russia_entente_march2019.pdf>)

Beijing sees rapprochement between the United States and North Korea as an opportunity to advance its interests on both the Indochina Peninsula and Taiwan. Previously critical and non-negotiable interests are now expendable and negotiable. At the first summit in Singapore, Trump agreed to suspend all joint military exercises with South Korea due to his distrust in the efficacy of extended deterrence. He is also reportedly contemplating the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea because of economic reasons.11 However coincidental it may be, Trump’s plan offers China an opportunity to pursue its long-sought goal of neutralization of the Korean Peninsula through a perpetual peace settlement facilitated by the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces and the dissolution of the U.S.-ROK alliance. At this critical juncture, China needs Russia’s political and diplomatic support more than ever. Since its participation in the six-party talks, Russia has been accommodating of China’s efforts to work toward North Korea’s denuclearization. China needs Russia’s continued support for three reasons. First, their cooperation is needed to press North Korea to denuclearize. Second, policy coordination with Russia is vital for not only sustaining sanctions on North Korea but also keeping the country from collapsing. Third, Russia’s political support is critical to the realization of both a perpetual peace settlement founded on a peace treaty and the neutralization of the peninsula. Hence, it would be a mistake to view cooperation between China and Russia from any rationale other than a geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geostrategic one. Their cooperative relationship is not bound or driven by ideology. Instead, their interests converge from a shared outlook on world affairs and common concerns about the governance structure and practices of the current U.S.-led liberal international order. At the regional level, the two countries’ interests converge for the same reasons. At the national level, since 2000, Russia has worked to regain the influence and status in Korean affairs that it lost when it adopted a “two-Koreas policy” in the late 1980s and subsequently as a consequence of the first nuclear crisis in 1993.12 At the time, post-Soviet Russia was struggling to establish a national identity that could fit its geographic stretch from Europe to Asia. The country sought to restore a balance and independence to its foreign policy that had been skewed toward the West. This pursuit of a balanced foreign policy was facilitated by NATO’s eastward expansion. Amid these external developments, the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2003 offered an opportunity for Russia to re-establish its national identity as an eastern power. Ironically, it was at North Korea’s invitation that Russia joined the six-party talks.13 Beijing was cognizant of Moscow’s foreign policy objectives and thus undertook a proactive approach to induce its cooperation in order to counter potential collective pressure from the United States and its allies. In particular, China’s embrace of a security partnership with Russia followed from its recognition of Russia’s aforementioned geopolitical desires and dissatisfaction with the U.S.-led world order and governance. This partnership was heightened by both countries’ concerns about the prospective consequences of the U.S. rebalancing strategy toward Asia under the Obama administration. As a result, Russia’s and China’s relationships with the United States will likely continue to be characterized by mistrust, misperception, and misunderstanding, which could cause a security dilemma to arise.

#### Goes nuclear.

Ward 17 (Alex, associate director of the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he works on US foreign policy, national security strategy, and military affairs, “The North Korean military threat to America and its allies, explained,” 4/19, <http://www.vox.com/world/2017/4/19/15355494/north-korea-nuclear-threat-missiles-weapons>)

First, and most critically, North Korea has nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles that when reliably combined could strike US allies in the region, like South Korea and Japan, where US troops are stationed. Thankfully, it still has some work to do before those nuclear-tipped missiles could reach American territory. Second, North Korea has a vast array of artillery — that is, large guns usually used in land warfare — that could be used to attack South Korea. It also has a substantial chemical weapons stockpile, as well as elite special operations forces that could prove challenging for South Korea’s own forces to handle. Finally, if North Korea does decide to use any of those weapons against its enemies, the aftereffects would pose their own significant, worldwide problems. Let’s dig deeper. North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs This is the most obvious threat, but probably the most complicated. Last year, Kim told other North Korean leaders that his country would conduct a nuclear strike if it was threatened by “invasive hostile forces with nuclear weapons.” It’s a pretty vague intimidation — nothing new when it comes to the North Korean leadership — but the implication is clear: If North Korea feels like its sovereignty or an important national interest is threatened, it will seriously consider using a nuclear weapon to respond. To do that successfully, North Korea needs two things: a functioning nuclear weapon, and a way to deliver that weapon to a specific location. North Korea has both — but caveats apply. There is currently no evidence that North Korea can place a nuclear warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and reliably hit any part of the US mainland or its territories. So when Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, claims Kim “can press a button and hit Chicago,” he’s jumping the gun. That said, North Korea has the potential to put a nuke on a medium-range missile that could reach South Korea and Japan — two allies that host US military installations. Simply put, if North Korea wanted to strike South Korea and Japan with a nuclear weapon, it could likely do so. Making matters worse, any nuclear strike on those countries would put American troops stationed there directly in harm’s way. This is partially why the United States has decided to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea to defend against certain missile strikes and why America is conducting missile interception tests with Japan. And the situation is likely to get worse. Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia nonproliferation program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told me in an interview that he thinks North Korea will have intermediate- to long-range missiles capable of carrying a nuke to American soil ready for launch in about five years. That will soon put Guam, and potentially Hawaii and other parts of the United States, within North Korea’s nuclear reach. Let’s just stop for a second to let that sink in: Experts believe that in about five years, North Korea will be able to hit US territory with a nuclear weapon. And they think it can probably already hit Japan, South Korea, and US troops stationed there with a nuke right now. That is the core of what we mean when we talk about “the North Korean threat.” It’s why this crisis feels so immediate, and why it seems to have been getting more and more frightening as time goes by. It’s also because North Korea has dramatically ramped up the pace of its missile testing in recent years: In 2017 alone, the country conducted three successful missile tests — count ’em: one, two, three — and suffered two setbacks, including the one over the weekend. That’s on top of the five nuclear tests it’s conducted since October 2006, as the chart from the BBC below shows. The country currently claims to be “primed and ready” to carry out a sixth nuclear test any day now. BBC Despite stiff competition, Kim continues to vie for the title of most bombastic and overly confident world leader. He boasts his country can “wipe out Manhattan” if he so orders. He’s also threatened to reduce the United States “to ashes” if it strikes North Korea first. For now, these are laughably melodramatic statements, but if North Korea’s nuclear and missiles programs continue to improve at the same pace, those proclamations will quickly stop seeming like empty boasts. Many important questions remain. For one, the size of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is a mystery, although estimates put it somewhere between 10 and 16 weapons. Second, it’s unclear if Pyongyang has what is known as a “second-strike capability” — that is, if North Korea were struck by a nuke, could it still retaliate with a powerful nuclear strike of its own? The jury is still out, but it is definitely trying to secure that capability. This matters a lot: If it has that ability, the stakes for any country thinking about attacking the North become exponentially higher, because they would then be susceptible to being hit by a North Korean nuke in response. In other words, it makes North Korea more dangerous and therefore gives them more leverage. Finally, Kim claims he has a hydrogen bomb, a far more powerful type of nuclear weapon than the run-of-the-mill atomic bomb we know he already has. His assertion has not been proven — he more likely has a boosted atom bomb, which uses a radioactive form of hydrogen that makes it more powerful than a normal atom bomb but not nearly as powerful as a true hydrogen bomb. But if he does have a true hydrogen bomb, North Korea’s enemies have an even bigger threat on their hands than previously thought. Artillery, chemical weapons, and special forces While the nuclear and missile programs get all the attention, a seriously underappreciated threat comes from North Korea’s arsenal of conventional weapons, including the world’s largest artillery force. A third danger comes from the country’s elite special operations forces that could magnify the impact of a North Korean strike on South Korea. South Korea’s capital city, Seoul, is a so-called “megacity” with a whopping 25.6 million residents living in the greater metropolitan area. It also happens to be within direct firing range of thousands of pieces of North Korean artillery already lined up along the border, also known as the demilitarized zone. Around 70 percent of North Korea’s ground forces are within 90 miles of the DMZ, presumably ready to move south at a moment’s notice. Simulations of a large-scale artillery fight between the North and South produce pretty bleak results. One war game convened by the Atlantic back in 2005 predicted that a North Korean attack would kill 100,000 people in Seoul in the first few days alone. Others put the estimate even higher. A war game mentioned by the National Interest predicted Seoul could “be hit by over half-a-million shells in under an hour.” Those results don’t bode well for one of Washington’s closest allies, or for the tens of millions of people living in Seoul. And that’s not all. A report from Stratfor, a private intelligence analysis firm, found that a large-scale North Korean artillery attack would likely mean that the northern half of Seoul would get hit the most. Depending on where North Korea placed some of its rocket launchers, southern portions of Seoul — including the Gangnam District of “Gangnam Style” fame — would also be within range. The Stratfor report further notes than just “a single volley” of North Korean artillery could deliver “over 350 metric tons of explosives” into greater Seoul, “roughly the same amount of ordnance dropped by 11 B-52 bombers.” As if that were not enough, North Korea has a robust chemical weapons program. South Korea’s Ministry of Defense estimates that its northern neighbor has between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, including sarin and VX nerve agents. (Sarin is thought to be the chemical agent used in the Assad’s regime’s recent attack in Syria, which killed 72 people and left children gasping for breath as they choked on the poisonous gas.) Should North Korea attack, it might use chemical weapons early on in South Korea’s urban areas to increase the death toll. At the same time, conventional munitions could rain down on the South. After that barrage, North Korea’s 200,000-strong special operations forces should have an easier time arriving via tunnels, mini-submarines, or Russian biplanes. Surely Pyongyang would find a way to employ its growing cyber capabilities, too, because why not? Granted, North Korea is not expected to win a full-blown war with South Korea, should that come to pass. For one, America has the ability to stop a North Korean missile launch before it even happens with cyber capabilities. But even if a launch did take place, the THAAD system being deployed in South Korea should be able to take it down. If that missed, Aegis ships in the Pacific could shoot the missile; and if that failed, Patriot batteries could also stop the flight. And if all that failed … well, you know. The bottom line is that there are lot of defenses in place designed to stop North Korean missiles, but nothing is perfect. North Korea has far more troops than South Korea (1.19 million versus 655,000), but should a conventional fight break out, US and South Korean air power would help balance the scales. But, again, nothing is guaranteed. Either way, North Korea could cause a lot of damage and harm a lot of countries — and people — as it goes down. The aftermath of a conflict with North Korea “would be fundamentally disruptive” to the region — and the world If there is a conflict where North Korea deploys many of its deadly weapons, what happens when the dust settles? Robert Manning, a Koreas expert at the Atlantic Council, said in an interview that a North Korean attack on South Korea or any other of its neighbors “would be fundamentally disruptive” to the region and the world. He’s not kidding. Marine Col. Jeff Vandaveer, who spent a year serving in Asia and was a former faculty member at the Marine Command and Staff College, has thought a lot about the potential regional and global effects of a war with North Korea. In an interview, he told me that such a conflict could lead to a big slump in the global economy, cause humanitarian suffering, and pit great powers against one another. The economic consequences of Japan and/or South Korea, respectively the third and 11th biggest world economies, reeling from a big attack would impact the world’s financial future. The humanitarian consequences would also be dire, Vandaveer said. Millions of hungry, displaced people would be trapped on a small peninsula during a brutal war. Meanwhile, tensions would rise as great powers like China, Russia, and the United States would likely be drawn further into the fray. That’s already happening, in a way, as Russian and Chinese ships tail America’s carrier strike group in the region. They both call for “restraint” in these tense times between America and North Korea.

### China rise good

#### China rise inevitable – clingon upsets the balance and triggers mass conflict

Muggah and Tiberghien 18 – (Robert Muggah — Co-founder, Igarape Institute and SecDev Group. Yves Tiberghien — Associate Professor of Political Science, Director Emeritus of the Institute of Asian Research at UBC, and Founding Chair of Vision20. “The future global order will be managed by China and the US - get used to it,” February 12, 2018,https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/02/the-future-global-order-will-be-managed-by-china-and-the-us-get-used-to-it/)//sy rc ella

We are living in abnormal times. The global liberal order is in an advanced state of meltdown. And as the world rapidly shifts from a uni-polar to a multi-polar reality, the international system itself is exposed to profound instability. If not handled with extreme care, the potential for a major collapse is real. The question is whether our world leaders are capable of fully understanding what is happening in real time and can muster the collective action to set new rules of the road. The old global liberal order served as the bedrock of peace and stability since 1945. It was purposefully designed by the US and its western allies to prevent armed conflict and the economic nationalism giving rise to it. It is composed of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the G20 and a thicket of treaties and agreements. While experiencing its ups and downs, it set the rules for a stable positive-sum game. While virtually everyone agrees that a rules-based system is essential to managing security and trade, a power struggle is underway over who writes and enforces them. The spectacular rise of China over the past two decades and the relative decline of the US mean that sparks are bound to fly. Yet most westerns are only dimly aware of what’s occurring since the rug was so quickly pulled out from under them. The potential for catastrophic miscalculations - including US trade actions against China - are rising with potentially devastating cascading effects to the global economy. To get to grips with the seismic shifts underway, consider these five facts. First, China is in the process of surpassing the US economically. By one measure, 35 per cent of world growth from 2017 to 2019 will come from China, 18 per cent from the US, 9 percent from India, and 8 per cent from Europe. By 2050, the top five largest global economies are most likely to be China, India, the US, Brazil, and Indonesia. Is the west even remotely prepared for this kind of world? Second, China is leading the largest urbanization and infrastructure development scheme on earth. Already in its fifth year, the $900 billion "One Belt and One Road" (OBOR) project includes new roads, shipping lanes and building projects stretching to over 65 countries. The idea is to literally rewire global trade from China throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. While details are hazy, OBOR is being financed by Chinese state banks, with a modest strategic contribution by a new Chinese-backed AsianInfrastructure Investment Bank in partnership with other institutions Third, China is set to become a global green powerhouse. China signalled its intention to take the lead on climate change reduction after signing the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. By 2025, most new cars in China will be fully electric vehicles. China is aggressively cutting coal usage. Already, over 60 per cent of high speed rail in the world is in China (10 times the length in Japan, for example). China also recently committed to achieving blue skies in all of its major cities within three years. The changes are already being felt: Beijing air is 30 per cent cleaner this winter than last winter. Fourth, China is also setting the global pace on a digital economy, including cashless payments. In major cities, up to 90 per cent of all commercial and retail transactions in convenience stores and cafes are occurring through Alipay and Wechat. E-commerce delivery in large Chinese cities through Alibaba is the currently the fastest in the world. One company, Alibaba, racked up sales of $25 billion in just one day - dwarfing the returns of so-called Black Friday and Cyber Monday in the US. Finally, Chinese universities are also vaulting to the top of the international rankings. Two schools - Peking University and Tsinghua University - just leapfrogged from well below the top 200 to the top 30 within five years. There are anther 40 universities that are not far behind and set to enter the elite universities in the coming years. While Chinese are still seeking out educations in elite schools in North America and Western Europe, soon they won't have to. All the while, the west seems to be asleep at the wheel. There is a certain irony in our current predicament. On the one hand, the world is experienced unparalleled levels of prosperity and connectivity, due in no small part to the US-backed global liberal order. Yet these advances are associated with ever greater complexity and systemic risks, increasing the liberal order's vulnerability to collapse. The world's global and national institutions are increasingly incapable of managing stresses to the system. Democracies, it turns out, lack the incentive systems to address higher-order and longer-term imperatives. Faced with threats ranging from climate change to massive technological change, the world is in desperate need of stable and able global governance. And yet there is surging opposition to precisely liberal governance due to rising inequalities and frustration with the perceived failures of the liberal order. Francis Fukuyama and Jan-Werner Muller view populism and the rise of parochial economic nationalism as among the gravest threats to future stability. The risk of a disorderly collapse of the system is more real than ever. If we are to survive the global geopolitical transition, we must first accept that the era of US hegemony is over. Instead, the world is shifting to a new multi-polar order with the US and China at its center. We need to restore and rebuild stable institutions and rules that acknowledge the changed context. They will need to be more inclusive, representative, and legitimate. The role of international mechanisms of cooperation (i.e. G20), regional organizations, non-state actors - especially financial and philanthropic actors - will also need to be elevated. What's more, cities are claiming their place - witness the U20 of the world's largest cities to be formally launched in October 2018. All of this will be hard to swallow for stalwarts of the global liberal order. It will also need to be explained to a public that is accustomed to linear change. The current transformations are both non-linear and increasingly exponential, processes that are hard for humans to grasp. We are fixated to the forward march of democracies and the underlying principles on which they are based, yet we must learn to compromise and accommodate multiple value systems. The next order will be more complex and potentially more precarious, but that is the brave new world we face.

#### No impact to China’s rise- it’s peaceful and best political analysis proves China will cooperate with the United states, but that’s foreclosed by the aff’s assertive response.

Shifrinson, PhD, ‘19

(Joshua, PoliSci@MIT, AsstProfGlobalStudies@BostonUniversity, “Should the United States Fear China’s Rise?”, Volume 41, Issue 4, January) BW

This article refines and challenges this emerging policy consensus by placing China’s rise and U.S. decline in the context of other power shifts.5 Not only is it wrong to assume that rising states such as China tend to invariably challenge existing great powers but, relative to what China might be doing, China’s recent assertiveness is far from a clear-cut challenge to the United States. In fact, rising great powers across time and space often (1) support declining great powers to a greater or lesser degree in a bid to obtain their assistance against other threats, and/or (2) limit the scope of their strategic challenge until declining states have fallen far down the great power ranks. Along the way, declining states can affect whether and to what degree rising states pursue a cooperative or competitive course. The key to doing so is not—as policymakers sometimes suggest—simply engaging or deterring rising states directly, but rather manipulating security threats and opportunities rising states face in their own geopolitical environment. Applied to the rise of China and resulting U.S. strategy debate, this framework implies that concerns with a predatory rising China are overblown. Though currently problematic, China is far from issuing an outright challenge to the United States and is likely to continue avoiding such a course for some time. As importantly, current and future developments in China’s strategic environment may help push the PRC toward greater cooperation with the United States. To catalyze and capitalize on such possibilities, however, U.S. strategists themselves need to recognize that an overly assertive response to China’s rise—one that foregrounds U.S. threats, asserts U.S. power in and around East Asia, and forecloses the possibility of U.S.-China cooperation—is counterproductive. Under certain conditions, a less activist American foreign policy may do more than most pundits expect to encourage Chinese cooperation.

#### **China demonstrates defensive realism, not revisionism --- it’s increasingly integrated in multilateral institutions and engages in norms-building**

Jalil 19 – Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad with an emphasis in Nuclear and Arms Control Issues

Ghazala Yasmin, April. “China’s Rise: Offensive or Defensive Realism.” <http://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/3-SS_Ghazala_Yasmin_Jalil_No-1_2019.pdf>

The test of the offensive realism theory would be to determine whether China displays the revisionist tendencies, acts aggressively towards its neighbours and shows power maximising behaviour. In sum, it would entail determining whether China displays revisionist tendencies or acts like a status quo power.

Under Mao (1949-1976), China had the policy of overturning all the imperialist regimes in Asia and the world. During this period, China actively supported revolutions in many developing countries that it considered imperialist or saw them as imperialist proxies. This threatened China’s neighbouring states especially the US allies.28 China essentially wanted to export its socialist ideology to other states. During this time, China’s policy can be described as operating under the principles of offensive realism. At the same time, during this era, China was operating with limited capabilities in an international environment characterised by bipolarity. It was operating within an environment where global politics was driven by the intense Cold War rivalry of the two great powers ─ the US and the former Soviet Union.29

However, since the 1970s China’s policies have shown less revisionist tendencies. The country has increasingly become a state that is embracing defensive realism. One thread of this evidence is that China has toned-down its revolutionary rhetoric. It is also not supporting insurgencies in other countries. The second thread of evidence is that since the late 1970s China has increasingly pursued a cooperative security approach in its relations with regional neighbours and in the international arena. By and large, China has tried to forge friendly relations with its neighbours. It includes ameliorating relations with states like India which is traditionally a rival. Their relations did become strained in 2017 when there was a standoff between the Indian and the Chinese forces on the Doklam plateau. Dhoklam is a territory claimed both by Bhutan (aligned with India) and China.

However, Indo-China relations improved as the two countries held an informal summit in China in April 2018.30 The two countries even held a joint military exercise in December 2018, called Hand-in-Hand.31 Over the years, China has also managed to resolve border issues with so many neighbouring states. It has settled border disputes with countries like Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan initially and recently with Russia, bordering the Central Asian States and Vietnam.32 Moreover, China has territorial disputes with India and Japan but it has never made these disputes a hurdle in forging friendly ties with these two countries. Avery Goldstein dubs it a neo-Bismarckian grand strategy of China whereby it is pursuing its interests by reassuring those who may feel threatened and may form anti-China alliances.33 This, in his opinion, has resulted in a security environment that is conducive for China as well as for the region as a whole.

Another indication that China does not show aggressive behaviour in its policies is that China has increasingly engaged and integrated with the international community. Over the past 30 years, China has amply demonstrated this by its increasing membership of international organisations and institutions as well as membership of treaties since the 1980s.

China has increasingly participated in the regional multilateral institutions over the years. In the last few decades, East Asia has seen a number of regional institutions being formed. Topmost among those are the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); ASEAN plus 3 and the East Asia Summit. China is part of most of these multilateral institutions as well as an active member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). China was also a key player in the sixparty-talks in getting North Korea to halt and roll back its nuclear and missile programmes.

On the global front, China sought participation in global institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO). China is also playing a very active role in the UN. According to one figure, China’s membership of international governmental organisations doubled (from 21 to 52) during the years 1977-1997. In the same time period, its membership of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) increased from mere 71 to an impressive 1,163.34 Similarly, according to another account, China signed less than 30 per cent of the arms control accords it was eligible to join in the 1970s compared to 80 per cent by mid-1990s. 35 China has actively taken part in the treaties of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as those of aimed at non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. It has also become a part of the voluntary non-proliferation groups like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004 and exercises strict export control policies. Since 2004, China has also shown interest in joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

This is an indicator of China’s willingness to participate in international institutes and regimes, increasing comfort towards norms of interdependent behaviour among states. It has also exhibited the desire to somewhat shape the rules of the game for regional cooperation. This is definitely an indication of its tendency towards the status quo. It also advances China’s national interests and helps dispel concerns about its increasing economic and military power.36 This is also an indicator that China is willing to work in the existing Western-dominated systems of international institution and regimes rather than challenge the system or seek to break it up.

Moreover, China consciously pursued a good neighbour policy. The pursuit of good relations with its neighbour is the foundation of its strategy for economic development. It has the dual benefit of attracting foreign trade and investment while, at the same time, it reassures its neighbours that it does not present a threat for them. Deng Xiaoping laid two paths for China’s foreign policy in 1990 ─ anti-hegemonism and establishment of a new multi-polar international order of politics and economics. This meant that China adopted a policy of active defence of China’s interest ─ of minding its own business and be neither a leader nor a challenger but a participant or co-builder of the westerns international order.37 This remains the foundation of China’s foreign policy today.

Many analysts, however, argue that participation in the international institutions is not an adequate indicator but compliance with the norms, rules and goals of these institutions is a better indicator of whether a country is a status quo state or not. Along these lines, Alastair Johnston considers China’s compliance with five global normative regimes: these include sovereignty, free trade, non-proliferation and arms control, national selfdetermination and human rights.38 As far as sovereignty is concerned he writes: “Today China is one of the strongest defenders of a more traditional absolutist concept (of sovereignty).”39

Similarly, free trade is another international norm that is seen as an indicator of status quo behaviour. China has moved to support the norms of global free trade. China’s membership of WTO in 2001 is a testament to its support for free trade. China’s tariff rates have declined from over 40 per cent in 1992 to less than 20 per cent in 1997.40 In 2015, the tariff rate was 3.4 per cent.41 China has gradually embraced global capitalist institutions and system. In the Belt and Road Forum that China held in May 2017, hosting 30 world leaders, it released a communiqué, which was signed by all 30 world leaders present on the occasion that emphasised the need to “build an open economy, ensure free and inclusive trade (and) oppose all forms of protectionism.”42 However, the ongoing trade war with the US has forced China to increase its tariffs. Since 2017, the US had imposed three rounds of tariff on the Chinese products worth US$250 billion. China has retaliated by imposing US$110 billion on the US goods. Beijing has accused the US of starting the “largest trade war in economic history.” 43 This damages the global free trade regime.

China has gone even a step further and initiated projects like the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is envisaged as a journey towards economic regionalisation. The CPEC is a framework of regional connectivity which is expected to be beneficial for China and Pakistan as well as the regional states like India, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Its primary aim is to promote geographical linkages and improve infrastructure connectivity. It would also result in a higher flow of trade and businesses in the region.44 Its ultimate aim is to have a well-connected region, promote harmony and accelerate economic development. This is also a clear indication that China is focused on economic development and regionalisation instead of displaying aggressive hegemonic behaviour.

As far as China’s non-proliferation record is concerned, it has a fair record, with no blatant violations of international nuclear non-proliferation norms. The prevailing concerns mostly centred on the transfer of missile technology and components to Pakistan in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, China has not signed the 1987 MTCR, so it does not amount to any violations of China’s treaty obligations. On the positive side, in 1996, China signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which a major nuclear non-proliferation proponent like the US has not done till date.45 It has been cooperating with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) and has installed four new International Monitoring System (IMS) stations, bringing the total number of certified stations in China, to five.

Furthermore, it is also a part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since the time that it was signed. Moreover, along with Russia, China has long been trying to get a treaty negotiated to ban the stationing of offensive weapons in outer-space. For nearly two decades, now there have been the Chinese and Russian efforts to negotiate a treaty for Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Many proposals have been put forward including the two Chinese working papers and a joint China-Russia working paper in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). However, PAROS remains blocked due to the US refusal to negotiate any such treaty because it goes against its missile defence and space plans.46

China has also played a stabilising role in the North Korean nuclear issue. It acted as a lynchpin in hosting and conducting the six-party talks, which were meant to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. Even after the breakdown of the six-party talks in 2009 and the recent high tensions on the Korean Peninsula in 2017 with the US, China played the role of a stabiliser, urging both sides to show restraint and emphasising that war was not an option for any country. China has, thus, helped strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation norms.

Also, China’s growing soft power47 or its “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is another indicator that it is not an aggressive, power maximising state. Its economic progress has been accompanied by its increasing cultural and diplomatic influence around the globe. Its growing soft power is not only evident in Southeast Asia but also in Beijing’s economic partnerships in Latin America and Africa.48 The fact that China is able to attract and appeal the states in the region through its soft power is an indicator that its neighbours are increasingly viewing China as less of a threat.

However, this has stirred the concerns of waning the US influence in the region. In many parts of Asia, Africa and the Latin America, the “Beijing Consensus” which advocates a mix of authoritarian government and market economy, is overtaking the “Washington Consensus” of market economics and democratic government which was popular in the past.49 With signs that the US is placing emphasis on hard power under President Donald Trump, China seems to be positioning itself as a champion of globalisation and economic integration. It seems to be placing an emphasis on soft power.

#### The risk of entrapment for a hegemon is very high

Edelstein & Shifrinson 18 [David M. Edelstein - Associate Professor of International Affairs in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Center for Security Studies, and Department of Government at Georgetown University; Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson - BA Brandeis University, PhD Massachusetts Institute of Technology, He has special expertise in great power politics since 1945 and U.S. engagement in Europe and Asia; *U.S. Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case for Restraint*; “Chapter 2: It’s a Trap”; pg. 19-21; Published by *Routledge* // Brower]

In this chapter, building on the foundational work of Jack Snyder and Thomas J. Christensen (Snyder 1984; Christensen and Snyder 1990), we contend that the risks of entrapment for the contemporary United States are significant. More specifically, we make two arguments. First, much of the entrapment debate thus far has been a game of shadow boxing. As elaborated below, current efforts to study the frequency and risks of entrapment have virtually defined the problem away by treating entrapment as solely occurring when one ally goes to war for the sake of a partner when the first ally would prefer to avoid conflict. Although this is indeed the most concerning form of entrapment, it misses that entrapment does not necessarily manifest in an either/ or choice in which a state clearly takes a step it avowedly prefers to avoid. Instead, entrapment can also manifest in critical decisions states make when confronting an adversary that involve the timing of confrontation, the relative resources contributed to the effort, and the objectives involved. These different decisions on the road to deterrence and reassurance - and war - are crucial, as they help explain why states can be entrapped even if they agree that confronting an opponent is generally in their "national interest."

Second, all forms of entrapment are more likely to occur in today's unipolar world, and to be especially prevalent if and when unipolarity begins to wane. This is significant because evidence that entrapment is uncommon - and thus current US grand strategy sustainable - has almost exclusively been drawn from the bipolar world of the Cold War. Yet, because the two great powers in bipolar systems do not need allies to establish a workable balance, the Cold War is among the least likely of all situations for entrapment to occur (Waltz 1979).

Instead, alliances in multipolar and unipolar systems are likely to carry greater entrapment risks. Multipolar entrapment is easily understood (and much studied) - needing allies for a workable balance of power, states are entrapped into costly foreign adventures out of fears of being isolated and left strategically vulnerable. Studies of Europe's pre-World War I system make this point (Snyder 1984: 471-483; Schroeder 1972; Van Evera 1984: 96--101). Unipolarity, on the other hand, is less determinant but, on balance, we argue that it generates entrapment risks falling between unipolar and bipolar systems. Here, and although unipolarity limits a great power's need for allies for balance-of-power reasons, it reifies the need for allies to forestall the emergence of new great powers. In the process, unipolar alliances make moral hazard - the tendency for allies to adopt progressively riskier policies in contravention of the formal or informal terms of an alliance with a Stronger actor- particularly likely (Kuperman 2008). Unipolar alliances thus carry real entrapment risks, as a hegemon may need to go to war for allies to sustain its current dominance in the international system. The net result, therefore, is a situation where the United States' large power advantages over allies and prospective rivals may make it especially vulnerable to entrapment.

Together, these dynamics bolster the case for a more restrained US grand strategy and help undercut a key prop used by those advocating for primacist or "deep engagement" strategies. Alliances are not a free lunch for the United States. Although the United States' alliances may be good for many things, helping the United States avoid conflicts is not one of them. Alliances carry greater entrapment risks than often appreciated. Ultimately, even if some crises are deterred or foreclosed, the process of doing so creates new potential conflicts.

#### Unipolarity is specifically responsible for the globalization of extremism – that makes heg unsustainable.

Ibrahimi 18 (2/19/18; S. Yaqub Ibrahimi, [researcher and instructor of political science. PhD @ Carleton University] “Unipolar politics and global peace: a structural explanation of the globalizing jihad”; taylor and francis <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17467586.2018.1428763?needAccess=true)>

* JSG = Jihadi-Salafi Groups

Three conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the peacefulness of the contemporary unipolar system could be discussed beyond the interstate conflict and the likelihood of great powers competition debate. The new forms of asymmetric warfare, particularly the emergence of JSGs and their violent activities at different levels of the global order, could be assessed as another variable in debates on the peacefulness of the system. These actors DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 59 emerged and operate under the unipolarity conditions. Unipolarity, in this sense, has generated conflict-producing mechanisms and nonstate actors that drove sovereign states in lengthy wars against JSGs. This argument makes a significant contribution to the unipolarity-peace puzzle, which is conventionally addressed from the interstate conflict perspective. Second, unipolarity transformed Islamist-oriented terrorism from domestic to global. In addition to other conflict-generating conditions produced under unipolarity, the United States’ unipolar policies in Muslim regions transformed the traditional near-enemy-centric narrative of jihad into a far-enemy-centric ideology. As a result of the transformation of this doctrine, new forms of JSGs emerged that posed a threat to peace and security at all levels. Finally, because of the unipolarity of the system, global peace depends largely on the sole great power’s foreign and military policies. The US interventionism, due to the absence of a challenging great power, might not generate interstate conflict. However, it would engage the US in asymmetric warfare with nonstate actors that would emerge independently or on behalf of states to disrupt the US hegemony through insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of violence at different levels. These all might not challenge the durability of unipolarity, drastically, but they would disrupt peace and security at all domestic, regional, and global levels.

# Case (other)

## T/L

### Inherency

#### They have a singular uniqueness card from over a year ago – prefer ours on recency

- Politically incentivized – Kennedy proves

- US 7x as many sats as China

- Last year China funding reduced

Grieco 1-19 Kelly A. Grieco, a senior fellow at the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She received her PhD in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology., 1-19-2022, "The China-US Space Race Is a Myth," The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/the-china-us-space-race-is-a-myth/> // ella

The United States is not falling behind China in space – quite the contrary. The politics of fear sells. In his successful 1960 campaign for president, then Senator John F. Kennedy seized on the dangers of the missile gap – a presumed Soviet superiority in the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Kennedy exploited anxiety all the way to the White House. Yet the missile gap was a myth. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara admitted as much to Kennedy in 1962, claiming “emotionally guided but nonetheless patriotic individuals in the Pentagon” were responsible. McNamara then warned Kennedy, “There are still people of that kind in the Pentagon. I wouldn’t give them any foundation for creating another myth.” Seventy years later, it is happening again. Pundits, politicians, and senior military officers alike now warn the United States is losing a space race to China. “We are absolutely in a strategic competition with China and space is a part of that,” Gen. David D. Thompson, vice chief of space operations for the U.S. Space Force, warned recently. “The fact, that in essence, on average, they are building and fielding and updating their space capabilities at twice the rate we are means that very soon, if we don’t start accelerating our development and delivery capabilities, they will exceed us.” Space alarmism makes great headlines. But the United States is not falling behind China in space – quite the contrary. The United States remains the most advanced space power in the world. Of the more than 4,500 satellites in orbit today, the United States accounts for more than half of them, some 2,700 satellites and nearly seven times as many as the next competitor, China. True, the Chinese hold the record for the most space launches in 2021 – a total of 55 launches to the United States’ 51. But the number of launches only tells part of the story, because the United States has more powerful rockets, able to deliver more payloads – satellites, space probes, and spacecraft – into orbit. China’s space funding has increased markedly in recent years, to $8.9 billion in 2020, but it still spent a mere fraction of the United States’ $48 billion. The U.S. also boasts a booming commercial space industry, with hundreds of startups joining leading firms like Blue Origin and SpaceX, and investors pouring billions of dollars into the U.S. space economy. Meanwhile, China’s private space industry lags behind American companies and, last year, funding trended in the wrong direction. China’s space program has made significant advances in recent years, from completing its own global satellite navigation system and collecting lunar samples to landing a spacecraft on Mars and sending astronauts to its own space station. But these milestones should serve as a reality check: The United States is not falling behind in the space race, so much as China is steadily catching up after having started so far behind. Likewise, China’s space ambitions are impressive, with plans to develop satellite mega-constellations and further explore the moon and deep space, but each of these Chinese space endeavors will need to first clear significant technical and other obstacles. For example, in June, Beijing released a roadmap for an International Lunar Research Station to be developed jointly with Russia. This plan requires China to field the Long March 9, a super heavy-lift rocket that has been in the research-and-development phase since 2011. The Chinese expect it to make its first test flight around 2030, but their troubles with other heavy rockets suggest that ambitious goal could well be pushed back. Even then, China landing its astronauts on the moon hardly constitutes a great victory. After all, the United States won that race back in 1969. Still, the China space-race narrative has helped to stoke fears in Washington. The alarm associated with “falling behind” in the space race is invariably paired with calls for the U.S. to spend more on new space military capabilities, space exploration, and the commercial space industry. Steve Kwast, a retired Air Force lieutenant general, warns “there won’t be many prizes for second place” and urges Washington to act with greater “urgency and excitement.” But much like the missile gap of the late 1950s, such “calls to arms” encourage a massive militarization of space and risk misallocating limited defense resources.

## Scenario 1

### AT Sino-Russia coop

#### Limited Russia/China co-op is inevitable, but have no impact.

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So, now everybody wants to be Bismarck. They see themselves shaping history by artfully moving big pieces on the geostrategic chessboard. And one gambit they just can’t resist is moving to snip the growing bonds of Sino-Russian cooperation.

My advice to them: Just stop.

Fears of an allied China and Russia running amok around the world are overblown. Indeed, there is so much friction between these “friends,” any attempt to team up would likely give both countries heat rash.

Siren’s Cat Call

Here’s the lame narrative that’s animating the Bismarck wannabes: The United States is pushing back against Moscow and pressing Beijing. This is driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. Beijing and Moscow will then gang-up on the United States. To prevent this, the United States should make nice with Moscow (undermining the incipient Sino-Russian détente) and then focus on beating back against China.

Yes, China and Russia are going to work together to some degree. They have important things in common. For example, both are unaccountable authoritarian regimes that share the Eurasian continent. Other indicators of compatibility: they like doing business with each other, and both like to make up their own rules. Heck, they don’t even have to pretend the liberal world order is a speed-bump in their joint ventures. Both happily engage with the world’s most odious regimes, from Syria to Venezuela. And, of course, neither has any compunction about playing dirty when it serves their interests.

They already play off of each other to frustrate foreign-policy initiatives from Washington. For example, if the United States pressures Russia to vote a certain way on a measure before the UN Security Council, Russia will often don the white hat and vote as we desire, knowing that Beijing will veto the measure for them. Similarly, if the United States leans on Beijing stop giving North Korea some form of aid and comfort, Beijing can go along with the request, knowing that Moscow will pick up the baton for them.

What the neo-Bismarcks need to ask themselves is: Why would Russia or China ever consider giving up these practices? Why would they make the ongoing great power competition easier for the United States? That makes no sense. That is not in their self-interest.

Any notion that the United States could somehow seduce Russian president Vladimir Putin from playing house with Beijing is fanciful. Putin doesn’t do something for nothing; his price would be quite high. He could demand a free hand in Ukraine, or lifting sanctions, or squelching opposition to Nordstream II, or giving Russia free rein in the Middle East. Any of these “deals” would greatly compromise American interests. Why would we do that? And what, exactly, is Putin going to deliver in return? What leverage does Russia have on Beijing? The answer is not near enough to justify any of these concessions.

On the other hand, what leverage would a Russia-China alliance have on the United States? They wouldn’t jointly threaten Washington with military action. A central element of both their strategies is that they want to win against the United States “without fighting.”

Moscow might be happy if the United States got distracted in a military mix-up with China. Conversely, Beijing could okay with the Americans have an armed confrontation with the Russians. But, neither of them will be volunteering to go first anytime soon.

Even if they linked arms to threaten the United States in tandem, the pain would not be worth the gain. As long as America maintains a credible global and strategic deterrent, a Sino-Russian military one-two punch is pretty much checkmated. Peace through strength really works.

If direct military confrontation is out of bounds, then what can Beijing and Moscow do using economic, political, and diplomatic power or tools of hybrid warfare? The answer to that question is easy: exactly what they are already doing.

We have plenty of evidence of on-going political warfare aimed at the United States, its friends, allies, and interests. Some of these activities are conducted in tandem; some are instances of copy-catism; and some are independent and original.

The political warfare takes many forms—ranging from corrosive economic behavior to aggressive diplomacy to military expansionism and more.

All these malicious efforts are a problem. What they don’t add up to is an existential threat to vital U.S. interests. In other words, we can handle this without sucking up to Putin and undermining our own interests. In fact, we already have a national-security strategy that adequately addresses these concerns.

One more thing inhibiting a Sino-Russian hookup. Russian and Chinese power is largely asymmetrical. They have very different strengths and weaknesses. In coordinating their malicious activities against the United States, they don’t line out very well. China, for example, can’t really do anything substantive to help Russia in Syria. Putin doesn’t have much to offer in the South China Seas or in brokering a U.S.-China trade agreement.

There are also limits to the Sino-Russia era of good feelings. Other than trying to take America down a notch, their global goals are not well aligned. Indeed, the more they try to cooperate, the more their disparate interests will grate on the relationship.

For example, China is meddling more in Central Asia and the Arctic—spaces where Russia was dominant. Moscow has to ask itself: Why is Beijing elbowing in? There is an argument that rather than looking for a strategic partnership, China is just biding its time till Russia implodes, and Beijing steps in and sweeps up the choice pieces.

And, as much as Putin likes to tweak Trump about Moscow’s ties with Beijing, it is becoming more apparent to Washington that Russia is ever more the junior partner. Can Putin really continue to play Robin to a Chinese Batman? As for China, they have to ask: What does Robin really bring to the dynamic-duo?

## Scenario 2

#### Heg sucks – their authors are hacks and imperialists, Covid killed it, history concludes neg, they ignore stuff it can’t explain, and overstretch makes it unsustainable – it incentivizes aggressive interventionism and causes, not prevents, rising challengers like China.

**Roussinos ‘21** – Aris Roussinos is a former war reporter and a contributing editor at UnHerd

Aris Roussinos, ”Twilight of the American Empire” Unherd, March 3rd, 2021 <https://unherd.com/2021/03/twilight-of-the-american-empire/> // sam + pat

When Joe Biden announced to the Munich Security Conference last week that “America was back” at the centre of the Atlantic alliance, his European virtual audience responded with a collective shrug. For all their protestations of fealty, Europe’s leaders, defiantly pushing ahead with trade and energy deals with America’s rivals, are not interested in any great ideological crusade on the hegemon’s behalf. As Nathalie Tocci, chief advisor to EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell Fontelles, notes in a recent paper, “the European project developed under… an order made up of international organisations, laws, norms, regimes and practices premised on US power”. Yet today, “that world is fast fading”. While the US remains the only state able to project power globally, it “no longer represents the undisputed hegemon of the international system”. Indeed, as Tocci observes, China’s rise “suggests that we can no longer claim with confidence that economic prosperity and political freedoms can only go hand in hand”. Moreover, our dramatically different experiences of Covid “suggests that the jury is out on which governance system is perceived as best addressing the pandemic crisis, prompting questions about the management of other global challenges too”. To his credit, Biden squarely addressed these pressing questions. Summoning up the ghosts of past confrontations, he declared that “we’re at an inflection point” between those who believe that “autocracy is the best way forward… and those who understand that democracy is essential to meeting those challenges”. For the President, “Democracy will and must prevail… We have to prove that our model isn’t a relic of our history.” Yet this justificatory emphasis on democracy as the foundation of empire is a relic of a very specific moment in world history. As the historian Stephen Wertheim observes in his book Tomorrow the World, following the fall of France in 1940, American foreign policy elites feared that a Nazi victory would see the United States hemmed into the Western Hemisphere. But the British victory in the Battle of Britain opened up a new prospect, hitherto undreamed of by American politicians: first of an Anglo-American imperial condominium, dividing up the post-war world between them; and then, as Britain’s relative decline became apparent, a vision of total global hegemony. “Americans ever since, from experts to ordinary citizens, have considered world dominance to be their nation’s natural role,” Wertheim notes. It is an ideology which “holds that the superior coercive power of the United States is required to underwrite a decent world order” — one which “assumes that in order to prevent the international realm from descending into chaos or despotism, a benign hegemon must act as the world’s ordering agent,” with that onerous burden falling upon themselves. To turn its wary populace into eager participants in this imperial project, American intellectual and foreign policy elites framed global expansion as the establishment of a universal liberal-democratic order, guided and protected rather than ruled by Washington. As Wertheim notes in a passage that is as true of American liberal commentators today as those of the 1940s, “anything less [than global supremacy] would be an abdication, tantamount to inactivity, absence, and head-in-the-sand disregard for the fate of the world.” America’s pursuit of global hegemony was not a sordid, self-aggrandising imperial project like that of the fading European powers; instead, it was a moral duty, a noble sacrifice undertaken for the benefit of the rest of the world. In such a way, Wertheim writes, “the country jumped from ‘isolationism’ to ‘imperialism’, acquiring a taste for unilateral intervention everywhere in order to remake the world in the image of the United States”. In doing so, they constructed the global order whose waning days we now inhabit. Yet by making the Second World War the founding myth of the American-led order, certain pathologies were built into the system which now threaten its survival. As a useful myth became liberal dogma, the neurotic belief that the end of American hegemony would mean the