## 1

#### Interpretation: The aff must defend that member nations reduce intellectual property protections for all medicines

#### Violation:

#### The upward entailment test and adverb test determine the genericity of a bare plural

Leslie and Lerner 16 [Sarah-Jane Leslie, Ph.D., Princeton, 2007. Dean of the Graduate School and Class of 1943 Professor of Philosophy. Served as the vice dean for faculty development in the Office of the Dean of the Faculty, director of the Program in Linguistics, and founding director of the Program in Cognitive Science at Princeton University. Adam Lerner, PhD Philosophy, Postgraduate Research Associate, Princeton 2018. From 2018, Assistant Professor/Faculty Fellow in the Center for Bioethics at New York University. Member of the [Princeton Social Neuroscience Lab](http://psnlab.princeton.edu/).] “Generic Generalizations.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. April 24, 2016. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/> TG

1. Generics and Logical Form In English, generics can be expressed using a variety of syntactic forms: bare plurals (e.g., “tigers are striped”), indefinite singulars (e.g., “a tiger is striped”), and definite singulars (“the tiger is striped”). However, none of these syntactic forms is dedicated to expressing generic claims; each can also be used to express existential and/or specific claims. Further, some generics express what appear to be generalizations over individuals (e.g., “tigers are striped”), while others appear to predicate properties directly of the kind (e.g., “dodos are extinct”). These facts and others give rise to a number of questions concerning the logical forms of generic statements. 1.1 Isolating the Generic Interpretation Consider the following pairs of sentences: (1)a.Tigers are striped. b.Tigers are on the front lawn. (2)a.A tiger is striped. b.A tiger is on the front lawn. (3)a.The tiger is striped. b.The tiger is on the front lawn. The sentence pairs above are prima facie syntactically parallel—both are subject-predicate sentences whose subjects consist of the same common noun coupled with the same, or no, article. However, the interpretation of first sentence of each pair is intuitively quite different from the interpretation of the second sentence in the pair. In the second sentences, we are talking about some particular tigers: a group of tigers in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), some individual tiger in ([2b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex2b)), and some unique salient or familiar tiger in ([3b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex3b))—a beloved pet, perhaps. In the first sentences, however, we are saying something general. There is/are no particular tiger or tigers that we are talking about. The second sentences of the pairs receive what is called an existential interpretation. The hallmark of the existential interpretation of a sentence containing a bare plural or an indefinite singular is that it may be paraphrased with “some” with little or no change in meaning; hence the terminology “existential reading”. The application of the term “existential interpretation” is perhaps less appropriate when applied to the definite singular, but it is intended there to cover interpretation of the definite singular as referring to a unique contextually salient/familiar particular individual, not to a kind. There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. Consider our examples above. In ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)), we can replace “tiger” with “animal” salva veritate, but in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) we cannot. If “tigers are on the lawn” is true, then “animals are on the lawn” must be true. However, “tigers are striped” is true, yet “animals are striped” is false. ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) does not entail that animals are striped, but ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) entails that animals are on the front lawn (Lawler 1973; Laca 1990; Krifka et al. 1995). Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al. 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in ([1a](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1a)) (e.g., “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in ([1b](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#ex1b)) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g., “tigers are usually on the front lawn”). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually” to mark off the generic reading.)

#### It applies to “Medicines” –

#### 1] upward entailment- “member nations of the wto ought to reduce intellectual property protections on medicines” does not entail that member nations ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines because it doesn’t prove that we should reduce intellectual property protections for vaccines.

#### 2] adverb quantification -- adding “generally” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because the res never specified further

#### Vote negative:

#### Voters:

#### Precision o/w – anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### Use competing interps – a) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter, b) collapses to competing interps – we justify 2 brightlines under an offense defense paradigm just like 2 interps.

#### Evaluate T before 1AR theory – a) norms – we only have a couple months to set T norms but can set 1AR theory norms anytime, b) magnitude – T affects a larger portion of the debate since the aff advocacy determines every speech after it

## 2

#### CP: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to 1] reduce intellectual property protections for COVID-19 medicines except for dual-use biotechnologies and 2] offer a 3 year patent extension on dual use biotechnologies conditioned on accompanying countermeasures.

#### The counterplan incentivizes development into countermeasures and removes terrorist access to biotechnologies.

Million-Perez, H. (2016). Addressing duel-use technology in an age of bioterrorism: Patent extensions to inspire companies making duel use technology to create accompanying countermeasures. AIPLA Quarterly Journal, 44(3), 387-436. Rachael Million-Perez is an associate with Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & Scinto and a graduate of the George Washington University Law School. //sid

Although previous congressional proposals, Acts, and committees aimed to fund and incentivize countermeasures, each failed to target dual-use technology countermeasure development. This article proposes, therefore, that the USPTO offer a patent-term extension for patents directed to dual-use technology on the condition that the patent owner creates an accompanying countermeasure. This article argues for an extension of three years 251 for patent owners who meet this condition in addition to any patent-term adjustments afforded to the patent owner pursuant to Title 35 of the U.S. Code or legislative acts. A. Patent Extension for Dual-Use Technologies in Exchange for an Accompanying Countermeasure is an Appropriate and Realistic Incentive that Could Yield Significant Benefit The conditional patent-term extension proposed here provides an incentive that will: (1) reduce unbridled accessibility to dual-use technologies, (2) make countermeasure development an attractive and cost-effective business investment, and (3) take advantage of companies and individuals who currently specialize in the dual-use technology field, and who possess the necessary resources to create accompanying counter-measures. The conditional patent-term extension proposed here provides an incentive that will reduce unbridled accessibility to dual-use technologies. Although accessibility to dual-use technology is essentially ungovernable in the Internet age, providing a three-year patent-term extension to a dual-use technology will motivate companies to collaborate with the U.S. Government to identify and enjoin individuals infringing their patented dual-use technology. As a result, biohackers and terrorist organizations will have diminished access to these technologies. Dissimilar to previous and current countermeasure incentives, the conditional patent-term extension proposed here will make countermeasure development an attractive and cost-effective business investment, because it will be easily applicable, lower the financial risk of countermeasure development, and potentially lead to profits. Unlike previous incentives, a patent-term extension on a dual-use technology in exchange for creating a countermeasure to that technology presents a simple and easily-applicable business model. Private companies need not contort themselves to meet the demands of legislation, like Project BioShield. Rather, a patent-term extension on the dual-use technology will be granted when the company identifies a dual-use quality of one of its innovations and opts to develop a countermeasure to the dual use of that specific innovation. Upon successful development of a countermeasure, the USPTO will then extend the company's dual use technology patent. Because the company likely has already received approval of the dual-use technology, it need not worry about whether the extension is affected by the countermeasure's approval time. The simplicity of this proposed regime would attract companies and individuals frustrated with other complicated or inapplicable incentives. In addition, the length and specificity of this proposed extension renders it a strong incentive that will lower the financial risk of countermeasure investment. The length of patent-term extension incentive must be able to generate participation by virtually guaranteeing a return on the company's investment in countermeasure production. As discussed above, the risk of countermeasure development is incredibly high, and thus the promise that a company may recoup or even profit from developing a countermeasure will entice companies who had previously avoided countermeasure investment.253 For these reasons, this article proposes a three-year patent term extension. Recent studies showed an increase in domestic R&D investment and new pharmaceutical product development when the patent-term extension changed from seventeen years to twenty years in both the United States and Canada.254 A similar surge may occur for dual-use technology countermeasure investment under the proposed extension. Over the additional three years of the patent term, companies are likely to receive the benefit of extending their monopoly on a profitable dual-use technology such that the company will likely recoup countermeasure development costs and, potentially, profit. As a result, dual-use technology countermeasure production is likely to increase. Additionally, proponents of patent extension, like Dr. Josh Bloom, Director of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Sciences at the American Council on Science and Health, contend that three-year patent extensions are likely appropriate for patents related to the company's portfolio.255 Unlike previous and current countermeasure incentives, the extension proposed here would neither under- nor over-compensate companies. For example, the six-month to two-year extension- offered in S. 975 and S. 3-are too short in length to ensure both that small and large companies find the incentive desirable.25 6 A three-year extension, however, would further assure that any size company would recoup its investment. Furthermore, unlike a wild card patent extension, which would permit a company to extend the life of any blockbuster product and thus accrue arguably unwarranted financial gain, under this proposal a company can only extend the life of a narrowly defined dual-use technology. A dual-use technology may or may not be a blockbuster. The chances that a dual-use technology has blockbuster status, however, are slim, considering only around 30 percent of newly-introduced pharmaceutical drugs have profits that exceed average R&D costs.257 As a result, large companies do not have an unfair advantage, nor do small companies have an unfair disadvantage. Rather, if a dual-use technology is not a blockbuster, both smaller biotechnology companies, with less than $500 million in annual revenue, and large companies will need a patent extension lengthy enough to guarantee cost recoup.258 Therefore, unlike the previously proposed extensions, three-year extensions to a dual-use technology patent will afford companies a considerable, yet fair, return on their investment in countermeasure development. A conditional patent-term extension like the one proposed here will also leverage companies' expertise and resources. Because a countermeasure to a dual-use technology will likely require the same expertise and resources used to develop the dual-use technology, a company may avoid some R&D costs when it develops both. Furthermore, tapping into a company's foundation of expertise and resources may expedite production of countermeasures to dual-use technology. Unlike acquiring separate countermeasures via mergers or acquisitions, using this expertise and resources springboard for countermeasure 259 The Monsanto herbicide, Roundup@, and the Roundup Ready@ crops genetically modified to be resistant to Roundup illustrates when a patent owner could be taking advantage of her expertise and resources. In the 1970s, Monsanto created the Roundup herbicide farmers use today.260 By the mid-90's, Monsanto neared the expiration date on its patent of Roundup and faced the possibility of losing the production rights of the blockbuster.261Yet Monsanto was able to use genetic engineering to create Roundup-Ready crops resistant to Roundup in 1996.262 In particular, Monsanto was able to create these plants after working on its herbicide when one of its scientists accidentally discovered Roundup-resistant bacteria. 263 Exploiting this discovery, the company worked diligently to splice the 26 resistant gene into a working plant model. 4 Because these crops were resistant to Roundup, a farmer used the herbicide in the fields to eliminate unwanted foliage while not harming the main crop. 265 Notably, Monsanto did not make a countermeasure to its herbicide, but similar to Monsanto's ability to create two technologies from a single concept, companies producing dual-use technologies can exploit discoveries made in their pursuit of creating a dual-use technology to eventually create an accompanying countermeasure. In sum, unlike previous countermeasure incentives, the conditional patent-term extension proposed here provides an incentive that reduces terrorist or biohacker accessibility to dual-use technologies, makes countermeasure development an attractive investment, and takes advantage of companies' resources and expertise.

#### Vulnerabilities exposed by COVID have invigorated availability and interest in bioterror, but technical challenges remain as barriers to acquisition.

Koblentz and Kiesel 7/14 [Gregory D. Koblentz (Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program and Assistant Professor of Government and Politics in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University) and Stevie Kiesel (Biodefense PhD Student, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University). “The COVID-19 Pandemic: Catalyst or Complication for Bioterrorism?”. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Published online 14 Jul 2021. Accessed 7/22/21. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1944023?journalCode=uter20> //Xu]

Since COVID-19 was declared a pandemic in March 2020, there has been no major bioterrorist incident that challenges or validates the core beliefs of the optimists, pessimists, or pragmatists. Extremists with violent apocalyptic or accelerationist ideologies—chiefly jihadists and far-right extremists—have sought to capitalize on the pandemic, but they still rely on conventional weapons. Based on available open-source information, terrorist interest in weaponizing SARS-CoV-2 seems limited. While some individuals and groups who subscribe to violent apocalyptic or accelerationist ideologies have shown some interest in crudely spreading the virus, most terrorists have sought to exploit the conditions the pandemic created rather than the virus itself. An increase in the risk of bioterrorism cannot be completely discounted as the equipment, knowledge, and expertise to work with high-risk pathogens is increasingly available and there are a small number of groups with the ideologies and objectives consistent with the use of biological weapons. Still, important technical barriers to acquiring and using a biological weapon capable of causing mass casualties, even far below the effects of a pandemic pathogen, will remain even after the pandemic is contained. While COVID-19 graphically demonstrated the vulnerability of modern societies to infectious diseases, the lessons learned from this experience, if properly implemented, should significantly improve the capability of governments around the world to detect and respond to future pandemics as well as deliberate disease outbreaks. Counterterrorism and biodefense efforts should not be dictated by the latest “‘risk of the month’ policies crafted in the wake of visible or highly publicized events.”117 Instead, strategies for reducing the likelihood and consequences of bioterrorism in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic should be based on a realistic appraisal of the risk and investments should be optimized to strengthen preparedness against the full spectrum of biological threats.

#### IP protections are the only limit on proliferating dual-use biotech – losing patents puts financial pressure on companies to outsource R&D, which skyrockets bioterror acquisition.

Finlay 10 [Brian Finlay (President and Chief Executive Officer of the Stimson Center, M.A. from the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, a graduate diploma from the School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University and an honors B.A. from Western University in Canada). “The Bioterror Pipeline: Big Pharma, Patent Expirations, and New Challenges to Global Security”. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 2010), pp. 51-64. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45289504?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents> //Xu]

Until recently, these investment risks were frequently mitigated by income generated from past drug development successes. In most markets, that income was guaranteed by strict patent protections that closed the window to outside competition for a set period of time. More recently, however, the uncertainty of R&D investments has been complicated not only by the global economic downturn, but more importantly by looming patent expirations that will open many of big pharma's patent-protected drugs to generic competition. Between 2007 and 2012, more than three dozen drugs will lose patent protection, removing an estimated $67 billion from big pharma's annual sales.33 With existing drug development pipelines unable to fill the gaps, biopharmaceutical companies are under intense pressure not only to cut costs - which would provide only temporary relief to the bottom line - but also to rapidly replenish their development pipelines. Some industry analysts have described this "perfect storm" as an "existential" moment for big pharma.34 Many pharmaceutical companies have approached this challenge by accelerating and widening the outsourcing and off-shoring of both R&D and manufacturing, and by aggressively buying promising assets from small biotech companies through acquisitions and strategic alliances. Interestingly, these partnerships are less frequently linked with American or even Western-owned and-operated companies than in the past. Many pharmaceutical giants like Indiana-based Eli Lilly are turning to alliances with firms in Asia and elsewhere around the world, outsourcing key technical operations. Instead of functioning as fully integrated firms, big pharma companies have found value in networked relationships with independent small to large firms, universities, and non-profit biotechnology laboratories around the globe.35 The net result has accelerated technology proliferation - for both beneficial and nefarious uses - far beyond the traditional hubs for biotech innovation. Pharma's increasingly desperate search to seed and ultimately acquire innovative new biotechnologies means that foreign (non- Western) markets are pulling ahead in biotech innovation. Indeed, the quantity of biotech companies outside the United States has grown remarkably in recent years: in Israel, the number grew from 30 in 1990 to about 160 in 2000; in Brazil, from 76 in 1993 to 354 in 2001; and remarkably, in South Korea, from one in 2000 to 23 in 2003. 36 More generally, the Asia-Pacific region has emerged as one of the world s fastest-growing biotechnology hubs, with the growth of publicly traded companies handily outpacing growth in the United States and Europe over recent years.37 As fruitful partnerships lead big pharma to increasingly generate resources, technologies, and knowledge, these capacities spin off new competitor firms in a self-executing multiplier effect. With the number of facilities and highly trained individuals increasing, the likelihood of a serious biological accident or nefarious incident will similarly rise, which will be particularly risky when dual-use technologies are introduced into insufficiently regulated markets. CONCLUSIONs In statements, U.S. officials continue to cite several countries believed to have or to be pursuing a biological weapons capability.38 But globalization exports the challenge of bioproliferation far beyond these geographic boundaries and transcends multiple societal layers well beyond government actors. As a result, it is increasingly clear that states no longer have a monopoly on dual-use biological R&D. Recent evidence suggests a growing threat of terrorist acquisition of biological weapons. As technological advancement in the life sciences is progressively pushed into countries of the Global South, some of which are also potential hotbeds for terrorist activity, the nexus of science and terrorism becomes especially acute. While far from perfect, the current system of stringent controls levied by Western governments over the biopharmaceutical sector has proven remarkably effective, especially given the diffusion of technologies and the ease of their redirection for hostile purposes. As the biotech revolution continues to widen, however, advanced industrialized governments are increasingly playing catch-up with changing technological realities. As these technologies proliferate, security analysts have become uneasy with the lack of controls in many states. The dearth of legal controls, the lack of rigor in their enforcement, and the growth in private-actor involvement in dual-use activities has sobering implications for global security.

#### Bioterrorism causes Extinction – overcomes any conventional defense.

Walsh 19, Bryan. End Times: A Brief Guide to the End of the World. Hachette Books, 2019. (Future Correspondent for Axios, Editor of the Science and Technology Publication OneZero, Former Senior and International Editor at Time Magazine, BA from Princeton University)//Elmer

I’ve lived through disease outbreaks, and in the previous chapter I showed just how unprepared we are to face a widespread pandemic of flu or another new pathogen like SARS. But a deliberate outbreak caused by an engineered pathogen would be far worse. We would face the same agonizing decisions that must be made during a natural pandemic: whether to ban travel from affected regions, how to keep overburdened hospitals working as the rolls of the sick grew, how to accelerate the development and distribution of vaccines and drugs. To that dire list add the terror that would spread once it became clear that the death and disease in our midst was not the random work of nature, but a deliberate act of malice. We’re scared of disease outbreaks and we’re scared of terrorism—put them together and you have a formula for chaos. As deadly and as disruptive as a conventional bioterror incident would be, an attack that employed existing pathogens could only spread so far, limited by the same laws of evolution that circumscribe natural disease outbreaks. But a virus engineered in a lab to break those laws could spread faster and kill quicker than anything that would emerge out of nature. It can be designed to evade medical countermeasures, frustrating doctors’ attempts to diagnose cases and treat patients. If health officials manage to stamp out the outbreak, it could be reintroduced into the public again and again. It could, with the right mix of genetic traits, even wipe us off the planet, making engineered viruses a genuine existential threat. And such an attack may not even be that difficult to carry out. Thanks to advances in biotechnology that have rapidly reduced the skill level and funding needed to perform gene editing and engineering, what might have once required the work of an army of virologists employed by a nation-state could soon be done by a handful of talented and trained individuals. Or maybe just one. When Melinda Gates was asked at the South by Southwest conference in 2018 to identify what she saw as the biggest threat facing the world over the next decade, she didn’t hesitate: “A bioterrorism event. Definitely.”2 She’s far from alone. In 2016, President Obama’s director of national intelligence James Clapper identified CRISPR as a “weapon of mass destruction,” a category usually reserved for known nightmares like nuclear bombs and chemical weapons. A 2018 report from the National Academies of Sciences concluded that biotechnology had rewritten what was possible in creating new weapons, while also increasing the range of people capable of carrying out such attacks.3 That’s a fatal combination, one that plausibly threatens the future of humanity like nothing else. “The existential threat that would be most available for someone, if they felt like doing something, would be a bioweapon,” said Eric Klien, founder of the Lifeboat Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to helping humanity survive existential risks. “It would not be hard for a small group of people, maybe even just two or three people, to kill a hundred million people using a bioweapon. There are probably a million people currently on the planet who would have the technical knowledge to pull this off. It’s actually surprising that it hasn’t happened yet.”

## 3

#### CP: Member nations of the World Trade Organization should enter into a prior and binding consultation with the World Health Organization over reducing intellectual property protections for covid-19 medicines. Member nations will support the proposal and adopt the results of consultation.

#### WHO says yes – it supports increasing the availability of generics and limiting TRIPS

Hoen 03 [(Ellen T., researcher at the University Medical Centre at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands who has been listed as one of the 50 most influential people in intellectual property by the journal Managing Intellectual Property, PhD from the University of Groningen) “TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Essential Medicines: Seattle, Doha and Beyond,” Chicago Journal of International Law, 2003] JL

However, subsequent resolutions of the World Health Assembly have strengthened the WHO’s mandate in the trade arena. In 2001, the World Health Assembly adopted two resolutions in particular that had a bearing on the debate over TRIPS [30]. The resolutions addressed:

– the need to strengthen policies to increase the availability of generic drugs;

– and the need to evaluate the impact of TRIPS on access to drugs, local manufacturing capacity, and the development of new drugs

#### Consultation displays strong leadership, authority, and cohesion among member states which are key to WHO legitimacy

Gostin et al 15 [(Lawrence O., Linda D. & Timothy J. O’Neill Professor of Global Health Law at Georgetown University, Faculty Director of the O’Neill Institute for National & Global Health Law, Director of the World Health Organization Collaborating Center on Public Health Law & Human Rights, JD from Duke University) “The Normative Authority of the World Health Organization,” Georgetown University Law Center, 5/2/2015] JL

Members want the WHO to exert leadership, harmonize disparate activities, and set priorities. Yet they resist intrusions into their sovereignty, and want to exert control. In other words, ‘everyone desires coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated.’ States often ardently defend their geostrategic interests. As the Indonesian virus-sharing episode illustrates, the WHO is pulled between power blocs, with North America and Europe (the primary funders) on one side and emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and India on the other. An inherent tension exists between richer ‘net contributor’ states and poorer ‘net recipient’ states, with the former seeking smaller WHO budgets and the latter larger budgets.

Overall, national politics drive self-interest, with states resisting externally imposed obligations for funding and action. Some political leaders express antipathy to, even distrust of, UN institutions, viewing them as bureaucratic and inefficient. In this political environment, it is unsurprising that members fail to act as shareholders. Ebola placed into stark relief the failure of the international community to increase capacities as required by the IHR. Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone had some of the world's weakest health systems, with little capacity to either monitor or respond to the Ebola epidemic.20 This caused enormous suffering in West Africa and placed countries throughout the region e and the world e at risk. Member states should recognize that the health of their citizens depends on strengthening others' capacity. The WHO has a central role in creating systems to facilitate and encourage such cooperation.

The WHO cannot succeed unless members act as shareholders, foregoing a measure of sovereignty for the global common good. It is in all states' interests to have a strong global health leader, safeguarding health security, building health systems, and reducing health inequalities. But that will not happen unless members fund the Organization generously, grant it authority and flexibility, and hold it accountable.

#### WHO is critical to disease prevention – it is the only international institution that can disperse information, standardize global public health, and facilitate public-private cooperation

Murtugudde 20 [(Raghu, professor of atmospheric and oceanic science at the University of Maryland, PhD in mechanical engineering from Columbia University) “Why We Need the World Health Organization Now More Than Ever,” Science, 4/19/2020] JL

WHO continues to play an indispensable role during the current COVID-19 outbreak itself. In November 2018, the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine organised a workshop to explore lessons from past influenza outbreaks and so develop recommendations for pandemic preparedness for 2030. The salient findings serve well to underscore the critical role of WHO for humankind.

The world’s influenza burden has only increased in the last two decades, a period in which there have also been 30 new zoonotic diseases. A warming world with increasing humidity, lost habitats and industrial livestock/poultry farming has many opportunities for pathogens to move from animals and birds to humans. Increasing global connectivity simply catalyses this process, as much as it catalyses economic growth.

WHO coordinates health research, clinical trials, drug safety, vaccine development, surveillance, virus sharing, etc. The importance of WHO’s work on immunisation across the globe, especially with HIV, can hardly be overstated. It has a rich track record of collaborating with private-sector organisations to advance research and development of health solutions and improving their access in the global south.

It discharges its duties while maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between such diverse and powerful forces as national securities, economic interests, human rights and ethics. COVID-19 has highlighted how political calculations can hamper data-sharing and mitigation efforts within and across national borders, and WHO often simply becomes a convenient political scapegoat in such situations.

International Health Regulations, a 2005 agreement between 196 countries to work together for global health security, focuses on detection, assessment and reporting of public health events, and also includes non-pharmaceutical interventions such as travel and trade restrictions. WHO coordinates and helps build capacity to implement IHR.

## Case

The problem is resources not IP  
Garde et al 21 Damian Garde [national biotech reporter for STAT], Helen Branswell [writer at STAT covering infectious diseases and global health], Matter Herper [senior writer at STAT covering medicine], May 6, 2021, “Waiver of patent rights on Covid-19 vaccines, in near term, may be more symbolic than substantive " <https://www.statnews.com/2021/05/06/waiver-of-patent-rights-on-covid-19-vaccines-in-near-term-may-be-more-symbolic-than-substantive/> //kangu

Experts suggested the earliest the world could expect to see additional capacity flowing from the waiver — if it’s approved at the World Trade Organization — would be in 2022. Prashant Yadav, a supply chain expert and senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, said the biggest barrier to increasing the global vaccine supply is a lack of raw materials and facilities that manufacture the billions of doses the world needs. Temporarily suspending some intellectual property, as the U.S. proposes to do, would have little effect on those problems, he said. “My take is: By itself, it will not get us much benefit in increased manufacturing capacity,” Yadav said. “But as part of a larger package, it can.” That larger package would include wealthy nations like the U.S. mounting an Operation Warp Speed-style effort to invest in manufacturing in low-income countries, he said, using their vast financial resources to actually produce vaccine doses rather than solely targeting patents. Lawrence Gostin, director of the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown Law, said the waiver is necessary but hardly sufficient. It will likely take months of international infighting before the proposal would take effect, he said, months during which would-be manufacturers would not have the right to start producing vaccines. “We’re not talking about any immediate help for India or Latin America or other countries going through an enormous spread of the virus,” Gostin said. “While they’re going to be negotiating the text, the virus will be mutating.” Even James Love, director of the nonprofit Knowledge Ecology International and a longtime advocate of intellectual property reform, acknowledges a patent waiver would be a valuable first step, not a panacea. The fairly narrow proposal would mostly allow countries to issue compulsory licenses, essentially allowing third-party manufacturers to make and sell other companies’ patented products, while also helping free up some information about how that manufacturing is done. But that, at least, could provide a financial incentive for those third parties to invest in vaccine production. “In our experience, when the legal barriers disappear and there’s a market, capacity increases faster than you would think,” he said. In October, Moderna vowed not to enforce its Covid-19-related patents for the duration of the pandemic, opening the door for manufacturers that might want to copy its vaccine. But to date, it’s unclear whether anyone has, despite the vaccine’s demonstrated efficacy and the worldwide demand for doses. That underscores the drug industry’s case that patents are just one facet of the complex process of producing vaccines. “There are currently no generic vaccines primarily because there are hundreds of process steps involved in the manufacturing of vaccines, and thousands of check points for testing to assure the quality and consistency of manufacturing. One may transfer the IP, but the transfer of skills is not that simple,” said Norman Baylor, who formerly headed the Food and Drug Administration’s Office of Vaccines Research and Review, and who is now president of Biologics Consulting. While there are factories around the world that can reliably produce generic Lipitor, vaccines like the ones from Pfizer and Moderna — using [messenger RNA technology](https://www.statnews.com/2020/10/26/mrna-vaccines-face-their-first-test-in-the-fight-against-covid-19-how-do-they-work/) — require skilled expertise that even existing manufacturers are having trouble sourcing. “In such a setting, imagining that someone will have staff who can create a new site or refurbish or reconfigure an existing site to make mRNA [vaccine] is highly, highly unlikely,” Yadav said. There are already huge constraints on some of the raw materials and equipment used to make vaccines. Pfizer, for instance, had to appeal to the Biden administration to use the Defense Production Act to help it cut the line for in-demand materials necessary for manufacturing. Rajeev Venkayya, head of Takeda Vaccines — which is not producing its own Covid vaccine but is helping to make vaccine for Novavax — said supply shortages are impacting not just Covid vaccine production but the manufacture of other vaccines and biological products as well. “This is an industry-wide … looming crisis that will not at all be solved by more tech transfers,” Venkayya said. He suggested many of the people advocating for this move are viewing the issue through the prism of drug development, where lifting intellectual property restrictions can lead to an influx of successful generic manufacturing.

#### No US-China war – their card is underhighlighted to have none of the warrants and doesn’t give a reason to actually nuke each other

#### plan increases price of scarce materials and results in costly, ineffective facilities

Mcmurry-Heath 8/18 (Michelle Mcmurry-Heath, [physician-scientist and president and CEO of the Biotechnology Innovation Organization.], 8-18-2021, “Waiving intellectual property rights would harm global vaccination“, STAT, accessed: 8-19-2021, https://www.statnews.com/2021/08/18/waiving-intellectual-property-rights-compromise-global-vaccination-efforts/) ajs

Covid-19 vaccines are already remarkably cheap, and companies are offering them at low or no cost to low-income countries. Poor access to clinics and transportation are barriers in some countries, but the expense of the shot itself is not. In fact, if the World Trade Organization grants the IP waiver, it could make these vaccines more expensive.

Here’s why. Before Covid-19 emerged, the world produced at most [5.5 billion doses](https://www.barrons.com/articles/a-plan-to-break-the-vaccine-manufacturing-bottleneck-51621952245) of various vaccines every year. Now the world needs an additional [11 billion doses](https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-g7-summit---12-june-2021) — including billions of doses of mRNA vaccines that no one had ever mass-manufactured before — to fully vaccinate every eligible person on the planet against the new disease.

Even as Covid-19 vaccines were still being developed, pharmaceutical companies began retrofitting and upgrading existing facilities to produce Covid-19 vaccines, at a cost of $40 to $100 million each. Vaccine developers also licensed their technologies to well-established manufacturers, like the Serum Institute of India, to further increase production. As a result, almost every facility in the world that can quickly and safely make Covid-19 vaccines is already doing so, or will be in the next few months.

The cutting-edge mRNA vaccines from Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech face an even bigger capacity issue. Since the underlying technology is new, there are no mRNA manufacturing facilities sitting idle with operators just waiting for licensing agreements to turn on the machines. Nor are there trained personnel to run them or ensure safety and quality control. Embedding delicate mRNA vaccine molecules inside lipid nanoparticle shells at temperatures colder than Antarctica isn’t as easy as following a recipe from Bon Appetit.

Another big barrier to producing more shots is a shortage of raw materials. Suspending intellectual property protections and allowing any manufacturer to try to produce these vaccines, regardless of preparedness or experience, would increase the demand for scarce raw materials, driving up prices and impeding production.

Nor could all companies that suddenly get a green light due to suspended intellectual property rights produce vaccines as cheaply or quickly as existing manufacturers. Building a new vaccine manufacturing facility costs about $700 million, takes many months — if not years — to build and, once opened, requires another [four to six months](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/reports/2020/07/28/488196/comprehensive-covid-19-vaccine-plan/) to start producing vaccine doses. And because negotiations surrounding the WTO waiver, which began this summer, could take until December before they are completed, it wouldn’t be until well into 2023 or later that any additional doses would become available.

That’s slower than our current production rate. According to a report from Duke University’s [Global Health Innovation Center](https://launchandscalefaster.org/covid-19/vaccinemanufacturing), companies are on track to manufacture enough shots in 2021 to fully vaccinate at least 70% of the global population against Covid-19 — the level required to achieve herd immunity.

Covid-19 vaccines are saving millions of lives and protecting trillions of dollars of economic activity for an exceptionally low cost. Israel, for example, which has one of the world’s highest vaccination rates, paid [$23.50 per dose](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-said-to-be-paying-average-of-47-per-person-for-pfizer-moderna-vaccines/) for early shipments, for a total of about $315 million. That’s approximately equal to the gross domestic productivity losses incurred during [just two days of shutdowns](https://www.bmj.com/content/372/bmj.n281) in the country.

Many countries are buying shots for under $10 per dose. India and South Africa — the two countries leading the petition to gut IP rights — are paying just $8 and $5.25 per dose, respectively. For reference, a regular flu shot costs about $14 in the United States, and pediatric vaccines average about $55 per dose.

Meanwhile, low-income countries that can’t afford even modest prices are getting their vaccines at no charge. [COVAX](https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax), the international nonprofit vaccine distributor, aims to deliver 2 billion doses to developing nations by the end of the year.

President Biden vowed to make America the world’s [“arsenal of vaccines.”](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/05/17/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-covid-19-response-and-the-vaccination-program-4/) The U.S. has already committed $4 billion to COVAX, has donated more than 100 million vaccine doses abroad, and is on track to donate [500 million more](https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/08/03/1023822839/biden-is-sending-110-million-vaccines-to-nations-in-need-thats-just-a-first-step) by the end of summer. Other countries are following the administration’s leadership and ramping up their donations.

#### The US has structurally undermined WTO legitimacy

Baschuk 2/22 [(Bryce, reporter for Bloomberg Economics based in Geneva, Switzerland, has been published in Bloomberg, the Washington Times, United Press International and National Public Radio) “Biden Picks Up Where Trump Left Off in Hard-Line Stances at WTO,” Bloomberg, 2/22/2021] TDI

President Joe Biden’s administration dashed hopes for a softer approach to the World Trade Organization by pursuing a pair of his predecessor’s strategies that critics say risk undermining the international trading system.

The U.S. delegation to the WTO, in a statement Monday obtained by Bloomberg, backed the Trump administration’s decision to label Hong Kong exports as “[Made in China](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-30/hong-kong-takes-formal-wto-action-on-u-s-made-in-china-order)” and said the WTO had no right to mediate the matter because the organization’s rules permit countries to take any action to protect their “essential security interests.”

“The situation with respect to Hong Kong, China, constitutes a threat to the national security of the United States,” the U.S. delegation said. “Issues of national security are not matters appropriate for adjudication in the WTO dispute-settlement system.”

Prior to 2016, WTO members generally steered clear of defending their trade actions on the basis of national security because doing so could encourage other nations to pursue protectionist policies that have little or nothing to do with hostile threats.

That changed in 2018, when the Trump administration triggered a cold war-era law to justify tariffs on foreign imports of steel and aluminum. In response, a handful of U.S. trade partners, including Canada, the EU, and China filed disputes at the WTO and a ruling in those cases is expected later this year.

Since then, more nations -- including Saudi Arabia, India, Russia and others -- have cited the WTO’s national-security exemption in regional trade fights, leading trade experts to warn that such cases could erode the organization’s ability to mediate disputes