## 1

#### CI: New affs are a voting issue – having no idea what the debate will be about makes being neg impossible – the aff gets plan text choice and infinite prep to craft the most strategic case.

#### Vote on substantive engagement: otherwise we’re speaking without debating and there’s nothing to separate us from dueling oratory. It alsos creates the most valuable long-term skills since we need to learn how to defend our beliefs in any context, like politics.

#### Competing interps since reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

#### No RVIs:

#### They incentivize debaters to go all in in theory and bait it with abusive practices, killing substantive clash on other flows. B. They can run theory on me too if I’m unfair so 1) theory is reciprocal because we’re both able to check abuse and 2) also cures time skew because they can collapse in the 2ar to their shell.

## 2

#### Our interpretation is that the resolution should determine the division of affirmative and negative ground.

#### “Resolved” means enactment of a law.

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

#### Medicine is scientific practice of helping others

**Google definitions**

the science or practice of the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease (in technical use often taken to exclude surgery).

#### First, competitive equity –

#### A] Ground: they get to pick the topic ex post facto which incentivizes vague argumentation that’s not grounded in a consistent, stable mechanism – they’re playing dodgeball with hand grenades – caselists are concessionary, unpredictable, beaten by perms, and don’t justify their model.

#### B] Limits: their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months. Cutting negs to every possible aff is a commitment even large squads can’t handle. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution

#### C] Causality- debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer “I think x is good for me” that aren’t negateable.

#### D] Fairness is an impact – [1] it’s an intrinsic good – some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity – if it didn’t exist, then there wouldn’t be value to the game since judges could literally vote whatever way they wanted regardless of the competing arguments made [2] probability – your ballot can’t solve their impacts but it can solve mine – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but can rectify skews [3] internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education [4] comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. This means they don’t get to weigh the aff.

#### Second, switch-side debate –

#### A] the reason debate is a unique process is because it demands rigorous testing of advocacy skills through not getting to pick and choose what to defend – it’s the only plausible explanation for the form of the activity – it also solves their offense.

Poscher 16 Ralf Poscher, Diat the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law at the University of Freiburg “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement”, Metaphilosophy of Law, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki/Adam Dyrda/Pawel Banas (eds.), Hart Publishing. 2016.

Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits **the idea of negation**. It **is** a **central** feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls **the “labour of the negative”**103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema **points to** yet another feature of **disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes**.104 This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. **Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive** in various ways. **The first phenomenon** Postema draws attention to **is** the **group polarization** effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 **The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups**106 **can be countered** at least in some settings **by the inclusion of dissenting voices**. In these scenarios, **disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases**.107 **A second** deliberative **dysfunction** mitigated by disagreement **is superficial agreement**, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. **Disagreement can help** to police such distortions of deliberative processes **by challenging superficial agreements**. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. **Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”.** These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. **Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning**, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, **entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs**, attitudes and dispositions, **we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs**, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea. **In hard cases we must** – in some way – **lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves** in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, **until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions**. In these cases **it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the view towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement**. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case. **It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of** legal **disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases**, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. **Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading** him: **to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others**. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena. f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, **the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate**, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, **our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements** that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. **Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts** even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? **The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean** and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But **what was wrong with** District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly **flipping a coin**?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, **why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered?** One reason lies in the mixed nature of our reasons in actual legal disagreements. The different second order reasons can be held apart analytically, but not in real life cases. The hope of coming to terms will often play a role at least for some time relative to some participants in the debate. A second reason is that **the objectives listed above could not be achieved by a non‐argumentative procedure**. Flipping a coin, throwing dice or **taking a gut vote would not help us to explore our communalities or our inferential commitments nor help to scrutinize the positions in play**. A third reason is the overall rational aspiration of the law that Dworkin relates to in his integrity account111. In a justificatory sense112 the law aspires to give a coherent account of itself – even if it is not the only right one – required by equal respect under conditions of normative disagreement.113 Combining legal argumentation with the non‐argumentative decision‐ making procedure of counting reasoned opinions serves the coherence aspiration of the law in at least two ways: First, the labor of the negative reduces the chances that constructions of the law that have major flaws or inconsistencies built into the arguments supporting them will prevail. Second, since every position must be a reasoned one within the given framework of the law, it must be one that somehow fits into the overall structure of the law along coherent lines. It thus protects against incoherent “checkerboard” treatments114 of hard cases. It is the combination of reasoned disagreement and the non‐rational decision‐making mechanism of counting reasoned opinions that provides for both in hard cases: a decision and one – of multiple possible – coherent constructions of the law. **Pure non‐rational procedures** – like flipping a coin – **would only provide for the decision part. Pure argumentative procedures – which are not geared towards a decision procedure – would undercut the incentive structure of our agonistic disagreements**.115 In the face of unresolvable disagreements endless debates would seem an idle enterprise. **That the debates are about winning or losing helps to keep the participants engaged. That the decision depends on counting reasoned opinions guarantees that the engagement focuses on rational argumentation**. No plain non‐argumentative procedure would achieve this result. **If the judges were to flip a coin** at the end of the trial in hard cases, **there would be little incentive to engage in an exchange of arguments. It is specifically the count of reasoned opinions which provides for rational scrutiny in our legal disagreements** and thus contributes to the rationales discussed above. 2. THE SEMANTICS OF AGONISTIC DISAGREEMENTS The agonistic account does not presuppose a fact of the matter, it is not accompanied by an ontological commitment, and the question of how the fact of the matter could be known to us is not even raised. Thus **the agonistic account** of legal disagreement is not confronted with the metaphysical or epistemological questions that plague one‐right‐answer theories in particular. However, it **must** still **come up with a semantics that explains in what sense we disagree about the same issue and are not just talking at cross purposes**. In a series of articles David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have reconstructed legal disagreements in semantic terms as metalinguistic negotiations on the usage of a term that at the center of a hard case like “cruel and unusual punishment” in a death‐penalty case.116 **Even though the different sides in the debate define the term differently, they are not talking past each other, since they are engaged in** a metalinguistic **negotiation on** the use of **the same term.** The metalinguistic negotiation on the use of **the term serves as a semantic anchor for a disagreement on the substantive issues** connected with the term because of its functional role in the law. The “cruel and unusual punishment”‐clause thus serves to argue about the permissibility of the death penalty. This account, however only provides a very superficial semantic commonality. But the commonality between the participants of a legal disagreement go deeper than a discussion whether the term “bank” should in future only to be used for financial institutions, which fulfills every criteria for semantic negotiations that Plunkett and Sundell propose. Unlike in mere semantic negotiations, like the on the disambiguation of the term “bank”, there is also some kind of identity of the substantive issues at stake in legal disagreements. A promising route to capture this aspect of legal disagreements might be offered by recent semantic approaches that try to accommodate the externalist challenges of realist semantics,117 which inspire one‐right‐answer theorists like Moore or David Brink. Neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics provide for the theoretical or interpretive element of realist semantics without having to commit to the ontological positions of traditional externalism. In a sense they offer externalist semantics with no ontological strings attached. The less controversial aspect of the externalist picture of meaning developed in neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics can be found in the deferential structure that our meaning‐providing intentions often encompass.118 In the case of natural kinds, speakers defer to the expertise of chemists when they employ natural kind terms like gold or water. If a speaker orders someone to buy $ 10,000 worth of gold as a safe investment, he might not know the exact atomic structure of the chemical element 79. In cases of doubt, though, he would insist that he meant to buy only stuff that chemical experts – or the markets for that matter – qualify as gold. The deferential element in the speaker’s intentions provides for the specific externalist element of the semantics. In the case of the law, the meaning‐providing intentions connected to the provisions of the law can be understood to defer in a similar manner to the best overall theory or interpretation of the legal materials. Against the background of such a semantic framework the conceptual unity of a linguistic practice is not ratified by the existence of a single best answer, but by the unity of the interpretive effort that extends to legal materials and legal practices that have sufficient overlap119 – be it only in a historical perspective120. **The fulcrum of disagreement** that Dworkin sees in the existence of a single right answer121 **does not lie in its existence, but in the communality of the effort – if only on the basis of an overlapping common ground of legal materials, accepted practices, experiences and dispositions. As two athletes are engaged in the same contest when they follow the same rules, share the same concept of winning and losing and act in the same context, but follow very different styles** of e.g. wrestling, boxing, swimming etc. **They are in the same contest, even if there is no single best style** in which to wrestle, box or swim. **Each**, however, **is engaged in developing the best style to win against their opponent, just as two lawyers try to develop the best argument to convince** a bench of **judges**.122 **Within such a semantic framework even people with radically opposing views about the application of an expression can still share a concept, in that they are engaged in the same process of theorizing over roughly the same legal materials and practices. Semantic frameworks along these lines allow for adamant disagreements without abandoning the idea that people are talking about the same concept. An agonisti**c account of legal disagreement can build on such a semantic **framework**, which **can explain in what sense** lawyers, judges and **scholars engaged in agonistic disagreements are not talking past each other. They are engaged in developing the best interpretation of roughly the same** legal **materials, albeit against the background of diverging beliefs, attitudes and dispositions that lead them to divergent conclusions** in hard cases. Despite the divergent conclusions, **semantic unity is provided by the largely overlapping legal materials that form the basis for their** **disagreement. Such a semantic collapses only when we lack a sufficient overlap in the materials**. To use an example of Michael Moore’s: If we wanted to debate whether a certain work of art was “just”, we share neither paradigms nor a tradition of applying the concept of justice to art such as to engage in an intelligible controversy.

#### B] topical version of the aff solves – they can still have all their advantages under TVA

They read and opensourced an india aff just defend that

#### Vote negative – A] this procedurally evaluates whether their model is good, which is a prior question B] they can’t get offense: we don’t exclude them, only persuade you that our methodology is best. Every debate requires a winner and loser, so voting negative doesn’t reject them from debate, it just says they should make a better argument next time.

# 2

#### The 1AC is a presentation sentimental politics which promises that empathetic identification will reshape not only debate, but the world and actualize an ethics of care. That produces pain as a prophylactic from our violence toward otherness reliant on an economy of victimization.

Berlant 98

(Lauren, Department of English, University of Chicago, “Poor Eliza,” *American Literature*, Vol. 70, No. 3, *No More Separate Spheres!* (Sep., 1998), Duke University Press, pg. 635-668)

What distinguishes these critical texts are the startling ways they struggle to encounter the Uncle Tom form without reproducing it, declining to pay the inheritance tax. The postsentimental does not involve an aesthetic disruption to the contract sentimentality makes between its texts and readers -that proper reading will lead to better feeling and therefore to a better self. What changes is the place of repetition in this contract, a crisis frequently thematized in formal aesthetic and generational terms. In its traditional and political modalities, the sentimental promises that in a just world a consensus will already exist about what constitutes uplift, amelioration, and emancipation, those horizons toward which empathy powerfully directs itself. Identification with suffering, the ethical response to the sentimental plot, leads to its repetition in the audience and thus to a generally held view about what transformations would bring the good life into being. This presumption, that the terms of consent are trans- historical once true feeling is shared, explains in part why emotions, especially painful ones, are so central to the world-building aspects of sentimental alliance. Postsentimental texts withdraw from the contract that presumes consent to the conventionally desired outcomes of identification and empathy. The desire for unconflictedness might very well motivate the sacrifice of surprising ideas to the norms of the world against which this rhetoric is being deployed. What, if anything, then, can be built from the very different knowledge/experience of subaltern pain? What can memory do to create conditions for freedom and justice without reconfirming the terms of ordinary subordination? More than a critique of feeling as such, the postsentimental modality also challenges what literature and storytelling have come to stand for in the creation of sentimental national subjects across an almost two-century span. Three moments in this genealogy, which differ as much from each other as from the credulous citation of Uncle Tom's Cabin we saw in The King and I and Dimples, will mark here some potential within the arsenal that counters the repetition compulsions of sentimentality. This essay began with a famous passage from James Baldwin's "Everybody's Protest Novel," a much-cited essay about Uncle Tom's Cabin that is rarely read in the strong sense because its powerful language of rageful truth-telling would shame in advance any desire to make claims for the tactical efficacy of suffering and mourning in the struggle to transform the United States into a postracist nation. I cited Baldwin's text to open this piece not to endorse its absolute truth but to figure its frustrated opposition to the sentimental optimism that equates the formal achievement of empathy on a mass scale with the general project of democracy. Baldwin's special contribution to what sentimentality can mean has been lost in the social-problem machinery of mass society, in which the production of tears where anger or nothing might have been became more urgent with the coming to cultural dominance of the Holocaust and trauma as models for having and remembering collective social experience.20 Currently, as in traditional sentimentality, the authenticity of overwhelming pain that can be textually performed and shared is disseminated as a prophylactic against the reproduction of a shocking and numbing mass violence. Baldwin asserts that the overvaluation of such redemptive feeling is precisely a condition of that violence**.** Baldwin's encounter with Stowe in this essay comes amidst a general wave of protest novels, social-problem films, and film noir in the U.S. after World War Two: Gentleman's Agreement, The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Best Years of Our Lives. Films like these, he says, "emerge for what they are: a mirror of our confusion, dishonesty, panic, trapped and immobilized in the sunlit prison of the American dream." They cut the complexity of human motives and self-understanding "down to size" by preferring "a lie more palatable than the truth" about the social and material effects the liberal pedagogy of optimism has, or doesn't have, on "man's" capacity to produce a world of authentic truth, justice, and freedom.21 Indeed, "truth" is the keyword for Baldwin. He defines it as "a devotion to the human being, his freedom and fulfillment: freedom which cannot be legislated, fulfillment which cannot be charted."22 In contrast, Stowe's totalitarian religiosity, her insistence that subjects "bargain" for heavenly redemption with their own physical and spiritual mortification, merely and violently confirms the fundamental abjection of all persons, especially the black ones who wear the dark night of the soul out where all can see it. Additionally, Baldwin argues that Uncle Tom's Cabin instantiates a tradition of locating the destiny of the nation in a false model of the individual soul, one imagined as free of ambivalence, aggression, or contradiction. By "human being" Baldwin means to repudiate stock identities as such, arguing that their stark simplicity confirms the very fantasies and institutions against which the sentimental is ostensibly being mobilized. This national-liberal refusal of complexity is what he elsewhere calls "the price of the ticket" for membership in the American dream.23 As the Uncle Tom films suggest, whites need blacks to "dance" for them so that they might continue disavowing the costs or ghosts of whiteness, which involve religious traditions of self-loathing and cultural traditions confusing happiness with analgesia. The conventional reading of "Everybody's Protest Novel" sees it as a violent rejection of the sentimental.24 It is associated with the feminine (Little Women), with hollow and dishonest capacities of feeling, with an aversion to the real pain that real experience brings. "Causes, as we know, are notoriously bloodthirsty," he writes.25 The politico-sentimental novel uses suffering vampirically to simplify the subject, thereby making the injunction to empathy safe for the subject. Of course there is more to the story. Baldwin bewails the senti- mentality of Richard Wright's Native Son because Bigger Thomas is not the homeopathic Other to Uncle Tom after all, but one of his "children," the heir to his negative legacy.26 Both Tom and Thomas live in a simple relation to violence and die knowing only slightly more than they did before they were sacrificed to a white ideal of the soul's simple purity, its emptiness. This addiction to the formula of redemption through violent simplification persists with a "terrible power": it confirms that U.S. minorities are constituted as Others even to themselves through attachment to the most hateful, objectified, cartoon-like versions of their identities, and that the shamed subcultures of America really are, in some way, fully expressed by the overpresence of the stereotypical image.

#### That collapses into western liberal deathmaking as bodies are constructed as objects of libidinal investment for a larger structure of liberalized violence.

Berlant 99

(Lauren, Department of English, University of Chicago, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and Politics” in Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law ed. Sarat & Kearns, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Pg. 49-54)

Ravaged wages and ravaged bodies saturate the global marketplace in which the United States seeks desperately to compete “competitively,” as the euphemism goes, signifying a race that will be won by the nations whose labor conditions are most optimal for profit? In the United States the media of the political public sphere regularly register new scandals of the proliferating sweatshop networks “at home” and “abroad,” which has to be a good thing, because it produces feeling and with it something at least akin to consciousness that can lead to action.3 Yet even as the image of the traumatized worker proliferates, even as evidence of exploitation is found under every rock or commodity, it competes with a normative/utopian image of the U.S. citizens who remains unmarked, framed, and protected by the private trajectory of his life project which is sanctified at the juncture where the unconscious meets history: the American Dream.4 in that story one’s identity is not borne of suffering, mental, physical, or economic. If the U.S. Worker’s lucky enough to live at an economic moment that sustains the Dream he gets to appear at his least national when he is working and at his most national at leisure, with his family or in semipublic worlds of other men producing surplus manliness (e.g., via sports). In the American dreamscape his identity is private property, a zone in which structural obstacles and cultural differences fade into an ether of prolonged, deferred, and individuating enjoyment that he has earned and that the nation has helped him to earn. Meanwhile, exploitation only appears as a scandalous nugget in the sieve of memory when it can be condensed into an exotic thing of momentary fascination, a squalor of the bottom too horrible to be read in its own actual banality. The exposed traumas of workers in ongoing extreme conditions do not generally induce more than mourning on the part of the state and the public culture to whose feeling based opinions the state is said to respond. Mourning is what happens when a grounding object is lost, is dead, no longer living (to you). Mourning is an experience of irreducible boundedness: I am here, I am living, he is dead, I am mourning. It is a beautiful, not sublime, experience of emancipation: mourning supplies the subject the definitional perfection of a being no longer in flux. It takes place over a distance: even if the object who induces the feeling of loss and helplessness is neither dead nor at any great distance from where you are? In other words, mounting can also be an act of aggression, of social deathmaking: it can perform the evacuation of significance from actually-existing subjects. Even when liberals do it, one might say, are ghosted for a good cause.6 The sorrow songs of scandal that sing of the exploitation that is always "elsewhere" (even a few blocks away) are in this sense aggressively songs of mourning. Play them backward, and the military march of capitalist triumphalism (The Trans-Nationale) can be heard. Its Lyric, currently creamed by every organ of record in the United States, is about necessity. It exhorts citizens to understand that the "bottom line" of national life is neither utopia nor freedom but survival, which can only be achieved by a citizenry that eats its anger, makes no unreasonable claims on resources or controls over value, and uses its most creative energy to cultivate intimate spheres while scrapping a Life together flexibly in response to the market world’s caprice8. In this particular moment of expanding class unconsciousness that looks like consciousness emerges a peculiar, though not unprecedented, here: the exploited child. If a worker can be infantilized, pictured as young, as small, as feminine or feminized, as starving, as bleeding and diseased, and as a (virtual) sieve, the righteous indignation around procuring his survival resounds everywhere. The child must not be sacrificed to states or to profiteering. His wounded image speaks a truth that subordinates narrative: he has not “freely” chosen his exploitation; the optimism and play that are putatively the right of childhood have been stolen from him. Yet only "voluntary" steps are ever taken to try to control this visible sign of what is ordinary and systemic amid the chaos of capitalism, in order in make its localized nightmares seem uninevitable. Privatize the atrocity, delete the visible sign, make it seem foreign. Return the child to the family, replace the children with admits who can look dignified while being paid virtually the same revoking wage. The problem that organizes so much feeling then regains livable proportions, and the uncomfortable pressure of feeling dissipates, like so much gas. Meanwhile, the pressure of feeling the shock of being uncomfortably political produces a cry for a double therapy—to the victim and the viewer. But before "we" appear too complacently different from the privileged citizens who desire to caption the mute image of exotic suffering with an aversively fascinated mooning (a desire for the image to be dead, a ghost), we must note that this feeling culture crosses over into other domains, the domains of what we call identity politics, where the wronged take up voice and agency to produce transformative testimony, which depends on an analogous conviction about the self-evidence and therefore the objectivity of painful feeling. The central concern of this essay is to address the place of painful feeling in the making of political worlds. In particular, I mean to challenge a powerful popular belief in the positive workings of something I call national sentimentality, a rhetoric of promise that a nation can be built across fields of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy. Sentimental politics generally promotes and maintains the hegemony of the national identity form, no mean feat in the face of continued widespread intercultural antagonism and economic cleavage. But national sentimentality is more than a current of feeling that circulates in a political field: the phrase describes a longstanding contest between two models of US. citizenship. In one, the classic made}, each citizen’s value is secured by an equation between abstractness and emancipation: a cell of national identity provides juridically protected personhood for citizens regardless of anything specific about them. In the second model, which was initially organized around labor, feminist, and antiracist struggles of the nineteenth-century United States, another version of the nation is imagined as the index of collective life. This nation is peopled by suffering citizens and noncitizens whose structural exclusion from the utopian-American dreamscape exposes the state's claim of legitimacy and virtue to an acid wash of truth telling that makes hegemonic disavowal virtually impossible, at certain moments of political intensity. Sentimentality has long been the means by which mass subaltern pain is advanced, in the dominant public sphere, as the true core of national collectivity. It operates when the pain of intimate others burns into the conscience of classically privileged national subjects, such that they feel the pain of flawed or denied citizenship as their pain. Theoretically, to eradicate the pain those with power will do whatever is necessary to return the nation once more to its legitimately utopian order. Identification with pain, a universal true feeling, then leads to structural social change. In return, subalterns scarred by the pain of failed democracy will reauthorize universalist notions of citizenship in the national utopia, which involves in a redemptive notion of law as the guardian of public good. The object of the nation and the law in this light is to eradicate systemic social pain, the absence of which becomes the definition of freedom. Yet, since these very sources of protection—the state, the law, patriotic ideology—have traditionally buttressed traditional matrices of cultural hierarchy, and since their historic job has been to protect universal subject I citizens from feeling their culture} and corporeal specificity as a political vulnerability, the imagined capacity of these institutions to assimilate to the affective tactics of subaltern counterpolitics suggests some weaknesses, or misrecognitions, in these tactics. For one thing, it may be that the sharp specificity of the traumatic model of pain implicitly mischaracterizes what a person is as what a person becomes in the experience of social negation; this model also falsely premises a sharp picture of structural violence's source and scope, in tum promoting a dubious optimism that law and other visible sources of inequality, for example, can provide the best remedies for their own taxonomizing harms. It is also possible that counterhegemonic deployments of pain as the measure of structural injustice actually sustain the utopian image of a homogeneous national metaculture, which can look like a healed or healthy body in contrast to the scarred and exhausted ones. Finally, it might be that the tactical use of trauma to describe the effects of social inequality so overidentifies the eradication of pain with the achievement of justice that it enables various confusions: for instance, the equation of pleasure with freedom or the sense that changes in feeling, even on a mass scale, amount to substantial social change. Sentimental politics makes these confusions credible and these violences bearable, as its cultural power confirms the centrality of inter-personal identification and empathy to the vitality and viability of collective life. This gives citizens something to do in response to overwhelming structural violence. Meanwhile, by equating mass society with that thing called "national culture," these important transpersonal linkages and intimacies are too frequently serve as proleptic shields, as ethically uncontestable legitimating devices for sustaining the hegemonic field.9

#### We must refuse the politics of liberalism and the economization of injury and suffering. Our politics does not ignore the violence of the world but instead refuses a particular set of representations and values which enframe violence within spheres of so-called activism

Abbas ’10

(Asma, Professor and Division Head in Social Studies, Political Science, Philosophy at the Liebowitz Center for International Studies at Bard College at Simon’s Rock, Liberalism and Human Suffering: Materialist Reflections on Politics, Ethics, and Aesthetics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. Pg. 183 - 187)

In Martha Nussbaum’s celebration of cosmopolitanism, the familiar move of the invocation of the worst sufferings of mankind is bound to shut up and line everyone else in submission, not to the pain of others (as it may appear), but more fundamentally to iterations of who I am as one who suffers, as one who responds to suffering, and as one troubled by each of those questions rather than having settled them.47 Nussbaum or Shklar, in their philosophical commitments to different metaphysics (even in explicit noncommitments to metaphysics), do not even consider that their invocation of events of unimaginable suffering as cautionary tales for all of humanity is beholden to the sublime in ways complicit with liberalism’s political economy of suffering. In being so, they inadvertently evacuate the political in favor of some formalistic ethical certitude that may carry its own violent obliterations, dysfunctionalizing political judgment in submission to ethical judgments already made for us. The ethicization of discourse on suffering, and the submission to the violence of violence, is a parallel to the death of the political. Similarly, as long as the aesthetic follows this logic—that representation is unethical and violent in nature and that we must somehow leave it behind—it will be limited in its vision, unable to see the deep and necessary ontological connection between suffering and representation. Beyond considering aesthetics at play in the artistry of rights and interests that privileges the Western scopic and rhetoricist regimes, the aesthetic must be seen as more closely derived from aisthesis (perception from the senses). The resulting essential, ontic, and experiential proximity to suffering may allow us to radically reimagine our subjection to injuries, interests, and rights. The elements of a historical materialism of suffering introduced over the course of this chapter—necessity, hope, and a materialist sensuous ethos—reconsider woundedness and victimhood in order to illuminate the multiplicity of relations that are, and can be, had to our own and others’ suffering. They expose the presumptions and certainties regarding the imperatives suffering poses for sufferers that codify a basic distance from suffering and an inability to insinuate the question of suffering in our comportments, orientations, and internal relations of simultaneity to the world. A righteous or tolerant pluralism of sufferings, enacted wounds, and relations to our own and others’ suffering is not my objective here. One only has to consider, to build to a different end, how the judgments, actions, and reactions of many among us cannot help but reject consolations that come from codified knowledges and certitudes, such as those pertaining to what suffering is, how we must despise it, and how we must fix it. Then, one only has to question the imperatives these knowledges and certitudes pose for all of us, and examine the utilitarian charm of the beguiling tragedy of “powerless” institutions and other conscriptions of sympathy, empathy, voice, and desire for a markedly different world. This may involve not giving liberal institutions or fervent recruiters of various marginalities the power to set the terms of honoring the suffering and hope of others, and not giving them the power to corner our pathos, in a moment of ethical noblesse, by emphasizing how another’s suffering is impenetrable and unknowable. As much as this ethical noblesse upholds the letting be of the other, it is a preservation, first and foremost, of oneself—perversely reminiscent of the confusing touch-me-not of the Christ back from the dead, a Christ whose triumph over death ironically inspires entire cultures built on surplus fear, suffering, and death as offerings for those with terminal senses but endless lives (often the courtesy of the same historical cryogenics). It is imperative to reject both the righteous or tolerant pluralism of sufferings and the touch-me-not version of seemingly other-centered politics in favor of seeing our sufferings and our labors as coconstitutive of the world we inhabit. What would it mean, as Louis puts it to the Rabbi, to “incorporate sickness into one’s sense of how things are supposed to go,” to convoke a politics that is “good with death” but asks for “more life”? Perhaps the sufferer not be incidental to the suffering when suffering is defined as a problem only in the terms we can pretend to solve, only to fail at that, too. Perhaps liberal politics should accept that statistics of diseases, mortalities, and morbidities, calculated in terms of the loss in human productivity, on the one hand, and those of prison populations and philanthropic gifts, on the other, are not graceful confessions of its mastery of suffering or death. It is not that there are no sufferings to be named, interpreted, and tended to. However, it is important to remember that this is not a random, altruistic, or unmediated process, and it benefits those with the agency and position to act on another’s suffering. Perhaps politics should be able to speak to, and for, the reserve army of those with abject, yet-to-be-interpreted-and-recompensed sufferings, and those who have no ability to be injured outside of the terms native to liberal capitalist discourse. Perhaps politics can diverge from its reliance on certain frames of suffering in order to address the ubiquity and ordinariness of human tragedy and suffering. Perhaps, still, if politics is concerned with the creation and maintenance of forms of life, then the activities of this making, when they negotiate with the past, present, and future, necessitate a look at the way old and new wounds are enacted in order to yield forms that are different. Ultimately, perhaps liberalism’s colonization of suffering, and its moral dominion over it, needs to be resisted and loosened. Questioning the forms in which we suffer and are told to do so is not the same as altogether questioning the reality or centrality of suffering and our responsibility to it. The ways in which we suffer tell us what we need and do not need, what our bodies can and cannot bear. Politics must be pushed to engineer the passing of certain forms of suffering, not the passing of suffering altogether. The claim to having nailed the problem of suffering becomes suspect when politics learns from suffering not via the question of justice but, more immediately, as it responds to the suffering that is life; when it is urgent to understand those ways of suffering that do not follow liberal logics; when attending to bodies who suffer, remember, and act out of their wounds differently is extremely necessary; when the question of the suffering of action is inseparable from the actions of the suffering; when our experience of the world and its ethical, political, and aesthetic moments is not prior to or outside of justice, but constitutive of it; and when the need to understand necessity, the lack of choice, and the ordinariness of tragedy is part of the same story as the clumsiness of our responses to grand disaster. This is an offering toward a politics that is not modeled on the liberal, capitalist, and colonizing ideals of healthy agents who are asked to live diametrically across from the pole of victimhood. Such an approach would factor in the material experiences of destruction, tragedy, violence, defeat, wounds, memory, hope, and survival that risk obliteration even by many well-meaning victim-centered politics. The imagining of such a politics is not merely premised on suffering as something to be undone. Rather, it holds on to the ability to suffer as something to be striven for, grasped anew, and salvaged from the arbitrary dissipations imposed on it by global powers who not only refuse to take responsibility for the plight that they have every role in creating and locating but also shamelessly arbitrate how the wounded can make their suffering matter. Modern schemes for solving the problem of human suffering succumb to their own hubris, even as they set the terms of joy and sorrow, love and death, life and hope, salvation and freedom, that those subject to these schemes ought to have a role in determining. Maybe these schemes have no relevance to those who suffer abjectly, or maybe the latter have lost their senses living among the dead who tyrannize us and the dead who beseech us. It is time that we confront the nauseating exploitations and self-affirming decrepitude of Western liberal capitalist arbitrations of where suffering must live and where it must die—these moralities keep themselves alive and ascendant by always invoking their choice exceptions, fixating on those marginal relations to suffering and life signified in the savage acts of, say blowing up one’s own and others’ bodies, often regarded as savage for no other reason than their violation of some silly rational choice maxim. There are many other exceptions that confront these dominations, not the least of which are the forms of acculturations, past and present, that see the realm of ethics as deeper and richer than the space of individual moralities acted out. Similarly, some of these exceptions to learn from hold and honor suffering as an inherently social act, as a welcome burden to carry with and for each other. If it is indeed the case that the world is so because the colonized have not stopped regurgitating, then the incipient fascisms in the metropoles today ought to make us wonder whether our problem as people of this world is not that there is not enough liberalism, but that, at best, liberalism is insufficient, and, at worst, it is complicit. Perhaps the majority of the world needs a politics that is material enough to speak to, and with, their silences, their pain, their losses, their defeats, their victories, their dispensabilities, their mutilations, their self-injuries, their fidelities, their betrayals, their memories, their justice, their humor, and their hope. At stake in such an imagining is nothing less than the possibility of newer forms of joy, desire, hope, and life itself.

#### Unnerve yourself. Refuse to take that last hit of the prophylacticism presented by the 1ac. Instead, engage in an analysis of the 1ac in order to unsettle and dismember the violent assumptions of sovereignty that overdetermine the political. The solution to our problems is not “well we just haven't found the right kind of debate-centric activism to make everything ok”, but instead we should start with the question of why the 1ac, why debate activism at all?

**Berlant and Edelman 14**

(Lee, Professor of English at Tufts, Laura, Professor of English at the University of Chicago, “Sex, or the Unbearable,” Page vii-x, sr)

The following chapters approach the scene of relationality by focusing on the “negativity” that can make it so disturbing. Negativity for us refers to the psychic and social incoherences and divisions, conscious and unconscious alike, that trouble any totality or ¶ fixity of identity. It denotes, that is, the relentless force that unsettles the fantasy of sovereignty. But its effects, in our view, are not just negative, since negativity unleashes the energy that allows for the possibility of change. So too “nonsovereignty,” a term to which we’ll return, invokes the psychoanalytic notion of the subject’s constitutive division that keeps us, as subjects, from fully knowing or being in control of ourselves and that prompts our misrecognition of our own motives and desires. At the same time, nonsovereignty invokes a political idiom and tradition, broadly indicating questions of self-control, autonomy, and the constraints upon them. To encounter ourselves as nonsovereign, we suggest, is to encounter relationality itself, in the psychic, social, and political senses of the term. For that reason, this book attends to those moments when negativity disturbs the presumption of sovereignty by way of “an encounter,” specifically, an encounter with the estrangement and intimacy of being in relation. Sex is exemplary in the way it power- fully induces such encounters, but such encounters exceed those experiences we recognize as sex. ¶ These dialogues explore such encounters while simultaneously recording and performing one. It could be no other way. Relationality always includes a scenic component, a fantasmatic staging. It puts into play reaction, accommodation, transference, exchange, and the articulation of narratives. Just what an encounter entails, however, remains for us unresolved. As it must. For an encounter refers to an episode, an event, its fantasmatic scene, and the myriad misrecogni- tions that inform the encounter and define its limit. Our various ways of theorizing such encounters with relation shape our different views of the political and affective consequences of social embeddedness. We are constantly asking, What do our distinctive responses to each other and our cases tell us about the structural conditions that pro- duce the encounter with nonsovereignty in the first place? ¶ Though the negativity inseparable from the sexual encounter comes to the fore most insistently in the final chapter of this book, it makes itself felt repeatedly in the dialogues that follow. For en- counter in all its ambiguity shapes the experience of sex, giving rise to various forms of response, including, as the first two chapters suggest, optimism and reparativity. We wonder throughout these dialogues whether it is possible to endure the experience of rela- ¶ tion in the absence of optimism for bearing or surmounting what overwhelms us in ourselves and in each other. Is optimism, in fact, invariably at work in negativity? Or, conversely, is optimism a dis- avowal of what’s unbearable in negativity? Do we even mean the same thing by optimism? This book attempts to hold such ques- tions steadily in view. Even where we disagree with each other in the ways that we address them, though, we proceed together through the breaks and divisions that enable conversation, politics, and the creation of new social forms. ¶ Sex, or the Unbearable is thus an experiment in the forms of theo- retical production. It proceeds from the belief that dialogue may permit a powerful approach to negativity, since dialogue has some of the risk and excitement we confront in the intimate encounter. Not for nothing does the oed list “communication” and “conver- sation” as the primary meanings of intercourse. In its dialogic struc- ture, then, this book takes shape as collaboration, argument, and exploration at once. It belongs to an experimental genre in which theory, politics, and close textual analysis encounter the pedagogical necessity of responding to the provocations of otherness. Dialogue commits us to grappling with negativity, nonsovereignty, and social relation not only as abstract concepts but also as the substance and condition of our responses—and our responsibilities— to each other. ¶ Reimagining forms of relation entails imagining new genres of experience. These chapters try to extend the generic contours of theoretical writing by making exchange, dialogic give-and-take, a genuine form of encounter. By that we mean that throughout this book we try to attend not only to what we can readily agree upon but also to what remains opaque or unpersuasive about the other’s ideas, what threatens to block or stymie us. Resistance, miscon- struction, frustration, anxiety, becoming defensive, feeling mis- understood: we see these as central to our engagement with each other and to our ways of confronting the challenge of negativity and encounter. Far from construing such responses as failures in the coherence or economy of our dialogues, we consider them indis- pensable to our efforts to think relationality. An academic culture in the United States still dominated by the privilege of the monograph only rarely affords occasions for critics to converse with each other ¶ in print. That may reflect conversation’s low place in the hierarchy of literary genres. Structurally determined by interruption, shifts in perspective, metonymic displacements, and the giving up of con- trol, conversation complicates the prestige of autonomy and the fic- tion of authorial sovereignty by introducing the unpredictability of moving in relation to another. One never can know in advance to what one’s interlocutor will respond or what turns the conversa- tion may take through the associations of a single word. We are aware that what we’re saying here sounds a lot like what we say about sex—and that, of course, is the point. As the book proceeds, the structural resonances among sex, politics, and theory become ever more insistently the focus of our analysis.

## Case

#### Capitalism provides a myriad of social and economic benefits – net good for society

**Skarbek ’10** (Emily Skarbek, research fellow at Independent Institute, Capitalism and Economic Growth, 15 April 2010, https://www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=2769) - NR

Recent events and the words of our politicians have popularized the idea that while markets can be important to economic growth and prosperity, they can also undermine it. It is fashionable to give a nod to the forces of entrepreneurship but in the same breath assert that the power of markets must be tamed by regulation. It is complacently accepted that somehow, these regulators—the men and women in Washington—know what’s best for American consumers. When the current administration talks of entrepreneurship, they speak of politically favored businesses and privileged recipients of the taxpayers’ dollars. To be clear, that is not entrepreneurship. It has become conventional to say that those who openly embrace capitalism, free markets and free trade are dogmatic, ideologues, idealistic, or market fundamentalists. And if you look to the media and our leaders, you get the impression that being in favor of free markets is somehow an unreasonable position. Unless one is ashamed of unprecedented increases in income, rising life expectancy, greater education, and more political freedom, there is no reason to be a fair-weather fan of capitalism. Sprawling free markets in countries that became more capitalist over the last 25 years have meant many more people enjoy improvements in well being and opportunities to advance human capabilities.

There is no evidence that countries that eschewed freer markets and embraced substantially greater state control performed better on any of these major indicators. On the contrary, those countries that adopt increased taxation, increased regulation, fiscal mismanagement and enormous public debt have performed demonstrably worse. From a global perspective, we have witnessed remarkable progress of mankind through the increased acceptance of free market policies in both rich and poor countries. Before the industrial revolution, 80% of the world’s population lived in abject poverty. By 1980, that number has fallen to 34.8% and by 2000, less than 20% of the population lives on less than $1 a day. In five years, the number is expected to fall to 10% if free trade is allowed to flourish. In just the past 25 years increased private ownership, increased free trade, and lower taxes all came at the hands of politicians like Deng Xiaoping in China, Margaret Thatcher in England, and Ronald Reagan in United States. In the years following the adoption of these policies by these global leaders, per capita income nearly doubled from 1980 to 2005; Tariffs fell and trade increased; Schooling and life expectancy grew rapidly, while infant mortality and poverty fell just as fast. In the average country that became more capitalist over the last 25 years, the average citizen gained a 43% increase in income, nearly half a decade in life expectancy, and a 2-year increase in the average years of schooling. In my lifetime alone, freer markets have improved the lives of billions of people from all walks of life. When we look back at our own history, the tremendous economic growth that Americans experienced from the time of the original Tea Party up to 1914 was the result of economic freedom from government regulation, open boarders for free immigration, and very few trade restrictions on the global flow of goods, services, and capital. Anyone could get on a boat, land on Ellis Island and become an immigrant and this benefited both domestic Americans and the immigrant alike. Business and labor were free to be entrepreneurial—and entrepreneurship created wealth. But we don’t want wealth for wealth’s sake. Wealth allows for the improvement of the human condition. For example, in 1905, our average life expectancy in the U.S. was 47. Today it is 78. A hundred years ago only 14% of homes had a bathtub; 8% had a phone; 95% of all births took place at home; most women washed their hair once a month; and the average worker made about $300 per year. As recent as 1984, it took the average American wage earner 456 hours of labor to earn enough to purchase a cellphone. Today, it takes the average American 4 hours. A computer has fallen from costing 435 hours of labor to less than 20. None of this accounts for the tremendous improvements in technological capacity. There are several reasons that the costs of goods have dropped so drastically, but perhaps the biggest is increased international trade. Simply put, the free market means the poor are less poor. Globalization extends and deepens a capitalist system that has for generations been lifting American living standards—for high-income households, of course, but for low-income ones as well. When the world embraces free market reforms, the world economy expanded greatly, the quality of life improves sharply for billions of people, and dire poverty was substantially scaled back. This is not a coincidence. It is a well-established fact that when people are free to buy from, sell to, and invest with one another as they choose, they can achieve far more than when governments attempt to control economic decisions. Widening the circle of people with whom we transact—including across political borders—brings benefits to consumers in the form of lower prices, greater variety, and better quality, and it allows companies to reap the benefits of innovation, specialization, and economies of scale that larger markets bring. Free markets are essential to prosperity, and expanding free markets as much as possible enhances that prosperity. Voluntary economic exchange is inherently fair and does not justify government intervention. When two free people come together on terms they have agreed upon to exchange peacefully, both benefit. Government intervention in voluntary economic exchange on behalf of some citizens at the expense of others is inherently unfair. One person is coerced in order to privilege another. It really is that simple. When goods, services, labor and capital flow freely across U.S. borders, Americans can take full advantage of the opportunities of the international marketplace. They can buy the best or least expensive goods and services the world has to offer; they can sell to the most promising markets; they can choose among the best investment opportunities; and they can tap into the worldwide pool of capital. Study after study has shown that countries that are more open to the global economy grow faster and achieve higher incomes than those that are relatively closed. This is capitalism. Growth is not guaranteed. It seems obvious that the central challenges facing America have to do with the with predatory regulatory and tax policies conducted by governments domestic and abroad. From an economic perspective, then, the case for unilateral trade liberalization—that is reducing our own trade barriers and subsidies without preconditions or reciprocal commitments from other countries—is the best policy to promote peace and prosperity globally. Politically, however, the concentrated and organized beneficiaries of protectionism are powerful relative to the much larger, disorganized, beneficiaries of free trade. Politicians tend to be most responsive to the loudest interest groups and are therefore inclined to view free trade unfavorably. But we as Americans must be clear—capitalism is not evil. It has done more good for more people than any acts of state, any stimulus spending, any health program or welfare initiative. Americans can no longer afford to fear freedom. Finally, acknowledging the relationship between free markets and economic prosperity does not make someone “dogmatic”. It is unreasonable to continue to ignore these facts. Capitalism’s superiority for economic growth and development deserves the unqualified support of everyone who believe that wealth is better than poverty, life is better than death, and liberty is better than oppression.

### Cap Good – War

#### Capitalist peace theory proves capitalism solves war

(Zack Beauchamp & Steven Pinker, 6/4/15, Steven Pinker is an experimental psychologist who conducts research in visual cognition, psycholinguistics, and social relations. He grew up in Montreal and earned his BA from McGill and his PhD from Harvard. Currently Johnstone Professor of Psychology at Harvard, he has also taught at Stanford and MIT. He has won numerous prizes for his research. Zack Beauchamp is a senior correspondent at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, He has an MSc from the London School of Economics in International Relations, 6-4-2015, "Steven Pinker explains how capitalism is killing war," Vox, https://www.vox.com/2015/6/4/8725775/pinker-capitalism, date accessed 6/25/19, dulbat)

The idea that war is on the decline — that is, that there are fewer wars today and fewer people are dying from them than ever before — is hard for a lot of people to believe (including Republican presidential candidates). And yet the data makes a very compelling case that that's true: battle deaths chart (Joe Posner/Vox) Those numbers were put together by Steven Pinker, a Harvard psychologist whose book The Better Angels of Our Nature makes the strongest case yet that the world is getting progressively more peaceful. Pinker's argument has come under fire recently, with some arguing that it's way too soon for anyone to say we've turned the corner from an era of war. I spoke with Pinker this week to discuss some of the reasons why, specifically, he thinks the world has gotten so much safer, especially in the past 70 years. We talked about the idea that war just isn't as profitable as it used to be, why Vladimir Putin and ISIS seem to think differently, and what world leaders should do if they actually want to make sure the unprecedented peace of the past 70 years holds. What follows is a transcript of our conversation, lightly edited for length and clarity. Zack Beauchamp: One story you hear from political scientists for why there's been less war recently that it's just less profitable —countries don't gain very much, economically or politically, from taking over new land anymore. Does that seem right to you? Steven Pinker: Yes, it's one of the causes. It's the theory of the capitalist peace: when it's cheaper to buy things than to steal them, people don't steal them. Also, if other people are more valuable to you alive than dead, you're less likely to kill them. You don't kill your customers or your lenders, so the arrival of the infrastructure of trade and commerce reduces some of the sheer exploitative incentives of conquest. This is an idea that goes back to the Enlightenment. Adam Smith and Montesquieu extolled it; it was on the minds of the founders when they built incentives for free trade into the Constitution. I don't think it's the entire story of the decline in war. But I do think it's part of the story. There was a well-known study from Bruce Russett and John Oneal showing statistically that countries that engage in more trade are less likely to get into militarized disputes, and countries that are more integrated into the world economy are less likely to get into trouble with their neighbors.

#### Critiques of CPT lack in depth analysis on trade relations before and after conflicts – only CPT is all encompassing

Weede ‘ 19 (Erich- Professor of sociology at the University of Bonn, Germany, “Peace,” The Bonn Handbook of Globality, pp. 1129-1136)/ly

One may summarize the following propositions under the label “capitalist peace.” According to them, economic freedom or capitalism, foreign trade and investment, open financial markets, or the avoidance of government ownership of enterprises contribute to the prevention of war. The capitalist peace also includes a democratic component. Since democracy requires economic freedom and the prosperity coming with it, one may regard the democratic peace—wherever it works at all (among democracies)—as a component of the capitalist peace. Then capitalism, free trade, and economic interdependence contribute in two or three ways to the avoidance of war: directly or indirectly via democracy and possibly also via common memberships in international organizations. Admittedly, this argument rests on a compilation of heterogeneous empirical evidence, some of which still is debatable. Without capitalism and the prosperity made possible by it, democracy could not be viable. But capitalism does not only contribute to democracy because of prosperity. Private ownership of the press, radio, and TV stations generates sources of information for citizens which are not directly controlled by ruling politicians. Moreover, a prosperous private economy makes it possible for politicians who have been voted out of office to find well-paid work, whereas the losers of elections would depend on the mercy of the winners in socialist economies. Attractive opportunities for losers who have to give up offices contribute to the fortification of democracy, because it becomes easier than otherwise for them to accept a loss of power. “Peace by free trade” has been the precursor of the encompassing idea of a capitalist peace. A large number of studies confirmed that the risk of conflicts decreases, if two countries trade a lot with each other. Studies which question war avoidance by free trade suffer from at least one of the following defects: (1) They do not sufficiently control for what enables states to wage war against each other, such as neighborhood or big armed forces. For purely geographic reasons, one should not assume that the risk of war between Sweden and Switzerland is comparable to the one between Armenia and Azerbaijan. (2) They do not distinguish between those conflicts which remain exchanges of threats and those where people are killed. (3) Unfortunately, trade between countries is not standardized by gross domestic product but by the foreign trade volume. (4) Trade has not been measured ahead of conflict. Wherever these defects are avoided, peace is promoted by free trade. Moreover, trade (standardized by GDP) is no longer the only or even indisputably the best predictor of those characteristics of capitalism or the invisible hand which promotes peace. New measures for free markets or the avoidance of state-owned enterprises or protectionism have established stronger pacifying effects of economic than of political freedom. Even foreign direct investment contributes to the avoidance of war. Openness of financial markets and economic freedom as such—where free financial markets, free trade, and secure property rights are components of the index—have a similar impact.