I negate the resolution

# Value: Morality because the word ought implies morality

**Hoban 12**

Hoban, Jack. “What Are Values, Morals, and Ethics?” *Managementhelp.com*, 2 Jan. 2012, managementhelp.org/blogs/business-ethics/2012/01/02/what-are-values-morals-and-ethics/.

Moral values are relative values that protect life and are respectful of the dual life value of self and others. The great moral values, such as truth, freedom, charity, etc., have one thing in common. When they are functioning correctly, they are life protecting or life enhancing for all. But they are still relative values. Our relative moral values must be constantly examined to make sure that they are always performing their life-protecting mission. Even the Marine Corps core values of “honor, courage and commitment” require examination in this context. Courage can become foolish martyrdom, commitment can become irrational fanaticism, honor can become self-righteousness, conceit, and disrespect for others. Our enemies have their own standard of honor, they have courage, and they are surely committed. What sets us apart? Respect for the universal life value sets us apart from our enemies.

## My Value Criterion is consequentialism

#### **O*nly* pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure.**

**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, **Research Fellow in Philosophy** at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” **Journal of Value Inquiry** (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281]

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27

# Define objective

Cambridge

[**based**](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/based) **on** [**real**](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/real)[**facts**](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/fact) **and not** [**influenced**](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/influence) **by** [**personal**](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/personal)[**beliefs**](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/belief) **or** [**feelings**](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/feeling)**:**

# Contention 1: Objective journalism lacks morality

## a. Objective journalism can create a false sense of balance between two unequal ideas

**Stroud and Williams 20**

Stroud, Scott R., and Kat Williams. “Objectivity in Journalism.” *Media Ethics Initiative*, Scott R. Stroud, 24 July 2020, https://mediaethicsinitiative.org/2020/07/28/objectivity-in-journalism/.

Moreover, the professional objective model is said to be problematic on a practical level as well. The expectation to only report facts essentially reduces a journalist to a stenographer and may even deprive the audience of additional knowledge they need to make an informed judgement (Pressman, 2019). Even professional practices concerning opinions and accounts runs into trouble when it reaches for objectivity because it can “give false equivalence to ideas that do not deserve equal amounts of time” (Driftwood, 2016). As Christopher Meyers notes. Truthful journalism establishes the context that makes accurate facts meaningful by discerningly providing multiple perspectives and by recognizing that a strict adherence to balance – in the sense of giving equal weight and credence to all sides on a contentious issue – can mislead more than inform. See, for example, coverage of climate change in which equal space is given to deniers (Meyers, 2020).

## b. Objectivity allows journalists to take a place of privilege above the people who are suffering

**Levi 21**

Levi, Gabriel. “Column: Why Objectivity in Journalism Does More Harm than Good to Marginalized Communities.” *The Maneater*, 30 Apr. 2021, https://themaneater.com/column-why-objectivity-in-journalism-does-more-harm-than-good-to-marginalized-communities/.

The second issue with objectivity is the sense of privilege it accompanies. For people of color and marginalized communities, we don’t get to strip ourselves of these identities for the news. No matter if the story runs, at the end of the day, I am still a Black, queer person living in America who faces the threats reported during the news in my daily life. To be objective about that is to have the privilege to say, ‘I can take a step back from this’ when others do not have that luxury. So when journalists preach objectivity, they need to check their privilege, because some of us can’t be objective when our wellbeing is at stake.On the other side of the argument, some journalists argue that without objectivity, there is no difference between a journalist and a common person, because journalism loses its standards. I don’t think there should be a difference. The only difference between a journalist and a common person is a couple journalism classes and a platform. To even assume there is a difference makes journalism pretentious, and once again inhibits us from doing our primary jobs: representing the people. Doing away with objectivity puts journalists and average citizens on a level playing field, which is more important than upholding outdated journalism standards.

# Contention 2: objectivity exists within advocacy journalism

## a. Objectivity and advocacy are not mutually exclusive

**Caceres 19**

Cáceres, Ingrid Bachmann. “Advocacy Journalism.” *Oxford Research Encyclopedias*, 25 June 2019, https://oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228613-e-776.

A contested term with defenders and critics, advocacy journalism refers to a genre of journalism that combines reporting with a point of view. With roots as far as the origins of journalism itself, as a contemporary practice it can be found—to varying degrees—in all kinds of media outlets across the globe. Its key premise is that journalists participate in the mass-mediated public sphere and that their work deliberately and transparently stands for specific perspectives, with stories actively championing for certain ideas and values. While some authors have labeled advocacy as the binary opposite of objective (factual) reporting, in recent decades several journalism scholars and practitioners have argued that this is not the case, and that advocacy and informing are not necessarily mutually exclusive. At the core of this discussion are normative considerations of how journalism should be, the role of objectivity in news reporting, and professional models shaping news cultures and news content in different regions. Ethical concerns are also common arguments in this debate. Advocate journalists do not necessarily dismiss objectivity—although some do—and insist they adhere to professional standards nonetheless, since they still do journalism rather than propaganda. Promoters of advocacy also argue that having a situated viewpoint is more transparent, whereas critics argue against what they deem news reporting with an agenda or promoting an ideological campaign. More recently, advocacy journalism has been adopted—and adapted—by nongovernmental organizations and civic movements, which highlights the constant redefinitions of journalism practice outside of legacy media and traditional contexts.