## Anthro K Aff

#### Outer Space as a private sector is growing significantly right now

Weinzierl 21, 2-12-2021, "The Commercial Space Age Is Here," Harvard Business Review, <https://hbr.org/2021/02/the-commercial-space-age-is-here> PM

There’s no shortage of hype surrounding the commercial space industry. But while tech leaders promise us moon bases and settlements on Mars, the space economy has thus far remained distinctly local — at least in a cosmic sense. Last year, however, we crossed an important threshold: For the first time in human history, humans accessed space via a vehicle built and owned not by any government, but by a private corporation with its sights set on affordable space settlement. It was the first significant step towards building an economy both in space and for space. The implications — for business, policy, and society at large — are hard to overstate. In 2019, [95%](https://brycetech.com/reports) of the estimated $366 billion in revenue earned in the space sector was from the space-for-earth economy: that is, goods or services produced in space for use on earth. The space-for-earth economy includes telecommunications and internet infrastructure, earth observation capabilities, national security satellites, and more. This economy is booming, and though [research shows](https://hbsp.harvard.edu/product/716037-PDF-ENG) that it faces the challenges of overcrowding and monopolization that tend to arise whenever companies compete for a scarce natural resource, [projections for its future](https://hbsp.harvard.edu/product/720027-PDF-ENG) are optimistic. Decreasing costs for launch and space hardware in general have enticed new entrants into this market, and companies in a variety of industries have already begun leveraging satellite technology and access to space to drive innovation and efficiency in their earthbound products and services. In contrast, the space-for-space economy — that is, goods and services produced in space for use in space, such as mining the Moon or asteroids for material with which to construct in-space habitats or supply refueling depots — has struggled to get off the ground. As far back as the 1970s, [research](https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19780004167) commissioned by NASA predicted the rise of a space-based economy that would supply the demands of hundreds, thousands, even millions of humans living in space, dwarfing the space-for-earth economy (and, eventually, the entire terrestrial economy as well). The realization of such a vision would change how all of us do business, live our lives, and govern our societies — but to date, we’ve never even had more than [13 people](https://www.space.com/6503-population-space-historic-high-13.html) in space at one time, leaving that dream as little more than science fiction. Today, however, there is reason to think that we may finally be reaching the first stages of a true space-for-space economy. SpaceX’s [recent achievements](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-s-spacex-crew-1-astronauts-headed-to-international-space-station/) (in cooperation with NASA), as well as upcoming efforts by [Boeing](https://www.nasa.gov/feature/boeing-s-starliner-makes-progress-ahead-of-flight-test-with-astronauts), [Blue Origin](https://www.blueorigin.com/news/nasa-selects-blue-origin-national-team-to-return-humans-to-the-moon), and [Virgin Galactic](https://spacenews.com/virgin-galactic-prepares-to-transition-to-operations) to put people in space sustainably and at scale, mark the opening of a new chapter of spaceflight led by private firms. These firms have both the intention and capability to bring private citizens to space as passengers, tourists, and — eventually — settlers, opening the door for businesses to start meeting the demand those people create over the next several decades with an array of space-for-space goods and services. Welcome to the (Commercial) Space Age In our [recent research](https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/jep.32.2.173_Space,%20the%20Final%20Economic%20Frontier_413bf24d-42e6-4cea-8cc5-a0d2f6fc6a70.pdf), we examined how the model of centralized, government-directed human space activity born in the 1960s has, over the last two decades, made way for a new model, in which public initiatives in space increasingly share the stage with private priorities. Centralized, government-led space programs will inevitably focus on space-for-earth activities that are in the public interest, such as national security, basic science, and national pride. This is only natural, as expenditures for these programs must be justified by demonstrating benefits for citizens — and the citizens these governments represent are (nearly) all on earth. In contrast to governments, the private sector is eager to put people in space to pursue their own personal interests, not the state’s — and then supply the demand they create. This is the vision driving SpaceX, which in its first twenty years has entirely upended the rocket launch industry, securing 60% of the global commercial launch market and building ever-larger spacecraft designed to ferry passengers not just to the International Space Station (ISS), but also to its own promised [settlement on Mars](https://www.spacex.com/media/making_life_multiplanetary_transcript_2017.pdf). Today, the space-for-space market is limited to supplying the people who are already in space: that is, the handful of astronauts employed by NASA and other government programs. While SpaceX has grand visions of supporting large numbers of private space travelers, their current space-for-space activities have all been in response to demand from government customers (i.e., NASA). But as decreasing launch costs enable companies like SpaceX to leverage economies of scale and put more people into space, growing private sector demand (that is, tourists and settlers, rather than government employees) could turn these proof-of-concept initiatives into a sustainable, large-scale industry. This model — of selling to NASA with the hopes of eventually creating and expanding into a larger private market — is exemplified by SpaceX, but the company is by no means the only player taking this approach. For instance, while SpaceX is focused on space-for-space transportation, another key component of this burgeoning industry will be manufacturing. [Made In Space, Inc.](https://madeinspace.us/capabilities-and-technology/archinaut/) has been at the forefront of manufacturing “in space, for space” since 2014, when it 3D-printed a wrench onboard the ISS. Today, the company is exploring other products, such as high-quality fiber-optic cable, that terrestrial customers may be willing to pay to have manufactured in zero-gravity. But the company also recently received a [$74 million contract](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-funds-demo-of-3d-printed-spacecraft-parts-made-assembled-in-orbit) to 3D-print large metal beams in space for use on NASA spacecraft, and future private sector spacecraft will certainly have similar manufacturing needs which Made In Space hopes to be well-positioned to fulfill. Just as SpaceX has begun by supplying NASA but hopes to eventually serve a much larger, private-sector market, Made In Space’s current work with NASA could be the first step along a path towards supporting a variety of private-sector manufacturing applications for which the costs of manufacturing on earth and transporting into space would be prohibitive. Another major area of space-for-space investment is in building and operating space infrastructure such as habitats, laboratories, and factories. Axiom Space, a current leader in this field, recently [announced](https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/26/22250327/space-tourists-axiom-private-crew-iss-price) that it would be flying the “first fully private commercial mission to space” in 2022 onboard SpaceX’s Crew Dragon Capsule. Axiom was also [awarded](https://spacenews.com/nasa-selects-axiom-space-to-build-commercial-space-station-module/) a contract for exclusive access to a module of the ISS, facilitating its plans to develop modules for commercial activity on the station (and eventually, beyond it). This infrastructure is likely to spur investment in a wide array of complementary services to supply the demand of the people living and working within it. For example, in February 2020, Maxar Technologies was awarded a [$142 million contract](https://www.builtincolorado.com/2020/02/03/maxar-technologies-142m-nasa-contract) from NASA to develop a robotic construction tool that would be assembled in space for use on low-Earth orbit spacecraft. Private sector spacecraft or settlements will no doubt have need for a variety of similar construction and repair tools.

#### Colonial space rhetoric is rooted in anthropocentrism—the desire to explore posits nature as a disposable resource in order to spread the ideology of human-centered values.

Monbiot 10 — George Monbiot, Columnist for the *Guardian*, has held visiting fellowships or professorships at the universities of Oxford (environmental policy), Bristol (philosophy), Keele (politics), Oxford Brookes (planning), and East London (environmental science), 2010 (“After this 60-year feeding frenzy, Earth itself has become disposable,” *Guardian*, January 4th, Available Online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/04/standard-of-living-spending-consumerism, Accessed 07-26-2011)

Who said this? "All the evidence shows that beyond the sort of standard of living which Britain has now achieved, extra growth does not automatically translate into human welfare and happiness." Was it a) the boss of Greenpeace, b) the director of the New Economics Foundation, or c) an anarchist planning the next climate camp? None of the above: d) the former head of the Confederation of British Industry, who currently runs the Financial Services Authority. In an interview broadcast last Friday, Lord Turner brought the consumer society's most subversive observation into the mainstream. In our hearts most of us know it is true, but we live as if it were not. Progress is measured by the speed at which we destroy the conditions that sustain life. Governments are deemed to succeed or fail by how well they make money go round, regardless of whether it serves any useful purpose. They regard it as a sacred duty to encourage the country's most revolting spectacle: the annual feeding frenzy in which shoppers queue all night, then stampede into the shops, elbow, trample and sometimes fight to be the first to carry off some designer junk which will go into landfill before the sales next year. The madder the orgy, the greater the triumph of economic management. As the Guardian revealed today, the British government is now split over product placement in television programmes: if it implements the policy proposed by Ben Bradshaw, the culture secretary, plots will revolve around chocolates and cheeseburgers, and advertisements will be impossible to filter, perhaps even to detect. Bradshaw must know that this indoctrination won't make us happier, wiser, greener or leaner; but it will make the television companies £140m a year. Though we know they aren't the same, we can't help conflating growth and wellbeing. Last week, for instance, the Guardian carried the headline "UK standard of living drops below 2005 level". But the story had nothing to do with our standard of living. Instead it reported that per capita gross domestic product is lower than it was in 2005. GDP is a measure of economic activity, not standard of living. But the terms are confused so often that journalists now treat them as synonyms. The low retail sales of previous months were recently described by this paper as "bleak" and "gloomy". High sales are always "good news", low sales are always "bad news", even if the product on offer is farmyard porn. I believe it's time that the Guardian challenged this biased reporting. Those who still wish to conflate welfare and GDP argue that high consumption by the wealthy improves the lot of the world's poor. Perhaps, but it's a very clumsy and inefficient instrument. After some 60 years of this feast, 800 million people remain permanently hungry. Full employment is a less likely prospect than it was before the frenzy began. In a new paper published in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Sir Partha Dasgupta makes the point that the problem with gross domestic product is the gross bit. There are no deductions involved: all economic activity is accounted as if it were of positive value. Social harm is added to, not subtracted from, social good. A train crash which generates £1bn worth of track repairs, medical bills and funeral costs is deemed by this measure to be as beneficial as an uninterrupted service which generates £1bn in ticket sales. Most important, no deduction is made to account for the depreciation of natural capital: the overuse or degradation of soil, water, forests, fisheries and the atmosphere. Dasgupta shows that the total wealth of a nation can decline even as its GDP is growing. In Pakistan, for instance, his rough figures suggest that while GDP per capita grew by an average of 2.2% a year between 1970 and 2000, total wealth declined by 1.4%. Amazingly, there are still no official figures that seek to show trends in the actual wealth of nations. You can say all this without fear of punishment or persecution. But in its practical effects, consumerism is a totalitarian system: it permeates every aspect of our lives. Even our dissent from the system is packaged up and sold to us in the form of anti-consumption consumption, like the "I'm not a plastic bag", which was supposed to replace disposable carriers but was mostly used once or twice before it fell out of fashion, or like the lucrative new books on how to live without money. George Orwell and Aldous Huxley proposed different totalitarianisms: one sustained by fear, the other in part by greed. Huxley's nightmare has come closer to realisation. In the nurseries of the Brave New World, "the voices were adapting future demand to future industrial supply. 'I do love flying,' they whispered, 'I do love flying, I do love having new clothes … old clothes are beastly … We always throw away old clothes. Ending is better than mending, ending is better than mending'". Underconsumption was considered "positively a crime against society". But there was no need to punish it. At first the authorities machine-gunned the Simple Lifers who tried to opt out, but that didn't work. Instead they used "the slower but infinitely surer methods" of conditioning: immersing people in advertising slogans from childhood. A totalitarianism driven by greed eventually becomes self-enforced. Let me give you an example of how far this self-enforcement has progressed. In a recent comment thread, a poster expressed an idea that I have now heard a few times. "We need to get off this tiny little world and out into the wider universe … if it takes the resources of the planet to get us out there, so be it. However we use them, however we utilise the energy of the sun and the mineral wealth of this world and the others of our planetary system, either we do use them to expand and explore other worlds, and become something greater than a mud-grubbing semi-sentient animal, or we die as a species." This is the consumer society taken to its logical extreme: the Earth itself becomes disposable. This idea appears to be more acceptable in some circles than any restraint on pointless spending. That we might hop, like the aliens in the film Independence Day, from one planet to another, consuming their resources then moving on, is considered by these people a more realistic and desirable prospect than changing the way in which we measure wealth.

#### Anthropocentrism causes extinction—it divorces our relationship with the natural world and makes ecocide on a cosmic scale inevitable.

Gottlieb 94 — Roger S. Gottlieb, Professor of Humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Brandeis University, 1994 (“Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology,” *Crosscurrents: A Journal of Religion and Intellectual Life*, Summer, Available Online at http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm, Accessed 07-26-2011)

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But only if we see that world not as an other across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love; neither for our selves nor for the other, but for us all.

#### The advocacy is to embrace a deep ecological ethical framework – it’s a prerequisite to policymaking

Katz and Oechsli 93 (Eric, Vice President of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, and Lauren, Biology at Columbia, *Environmental Ethics*, vol 15 no 1, 1993 “Moving beyond Anthropocentrism: Environmental Ethics, Development, and the Amazon”)

Can an environmentalist defend a policy of preservation in the Amazon rain forest without violating a basic sense of justice? We believe that the mistake is not the policy of preservation itself, but the anthropocentric instrumental framework in which it is justified. Environmental policy decisions should not merely concern the trade-off and comparison of various human benefits. If environmentalists claim that the Third World must preserve its environment because of the overall benefits for humanity, then decision makers in the Third World can demand justice in the determination of preservation policy: preservationist policies unfairly damage the human interests of the local populations. If preservationist policies are to be justified without a loss of equity, there are only two possible alternatives: either we in the industrialized world must pay for the benefits we will gain from preservation or we must reject the anthropocentric and instrumental framework for policy decisions. The first alternative is an empirical political issue, and one about which we are not overly optimistic. The second alternative represents a shift in philosophical world view. We are not providing a direct argument for a nonanthropocentric value system as the basis of environmental policy. Rather, our strategy is indirect. Let us assume that a theory of normative ethics which includes nonhuman natural value has been justified. In such a situation, the human community, in addition to its traditional human-centered obligations, would also have moral obligations to nature or to the natural environment in itself. One of these obligations would involve the urgent necessity for environmental preservation. We would be obligated, for example, to the Amazon rain forest directly. We would preserve the rain forest, not for the human benefits resulting from this preservation, but because we have an obligation of preservation to nature and its ecosystems. Our duties would be directed to nature and its inhabitants and environments, not merely to humans and human institutions. From this perspective, questions of the trade-off and comparison of human benefits, and questions of justice for specific human populations, do not dominate the discussion. This change of emphasis can be illustrated by an exclusively human example. Consider two businessmen, Smith and Jones, who are arguing over the proper distribution of the benefits and costs resulting from a prior business agreement between them. If we just focus on Smith and Jones and the issues concerning them, we will want to look at the contract, the relevant legal precedents, and the actual results of the deal, before rendering a decision. But suppose we learn that the agreement involved the planned murder of a third party, Green, and the resulting distribution of his property. At that point the issues between Smith and Jones cease to be relevant; we no longer consider who has claims to Green’s wallet, overcoat, or BMW to be important. The competing claims become insignificant in light of the obligations owed to Green. This case is analogous to our view of the moral obligations owed to the rain forest. As soon as we realize that the rain forest itself is relevant to the conflict of competing goods, we see that there is not a simple dilemma between Third World development, on the one hand, and preservation of rain forests, on the other; there is now, in addition, the moral obligation to nature and its ecosystems. When the nonanthropocentric framework is introduced, it creates a more complex situation for deliberation and resolution. It complicates the already detailed discussions of human trade-offs, high-tech transfers, aid programs, debtfor-nature swaps, sustainable development, etc., with a consideration of the moral obligations to nonhuman nature. This complication may appear counterproductive, but as in the case of Smith, Jones, and Green, it actually serves to simplify the decision. Just as a concern for Green made the contract dispute between Smith and Jones irrelevant, the obligation to the rain forest makes many of the issues about trade-offs of human goods irrelevant. 12 It is, of course, unfortunate that this direct obligation to the rain forest can only be met with a cost in human satisfaction—some human interests will not be fulfilled. Nevertheless, the same can be said of all ethical decisions, or so Kant teaches us: we are only assuredly moral when we act against our inclinations. To summarize, the historical forces of economic imperialism have created a harsh dilemma for environmentalists who consider nature preservation in the Third World to be necessary. Nevertheless, environmentalists can escape the dilemma, as exemplified in the debate over the development of the Amazon rain forest, if they reject the axiological and normative framework of anthropocentric instrumental rationality. A set of obligations directed to nature in its own right makes many questions of human benefits and satisfactions irrelevant. The Amazon rain forest ought to be preserved regardless of the benefits or costs to human beings. Once we move beyond the confines of human-based instrumental goods, the environmentalist position is thereby justified, and no policy dilemma is created. This conclusion serves as an indirect justification of a nonanthropocentric system of normative ethics, avoiding problems in environmental policy that a human-based ethic cannot. 1 Policy makers and philosophers in the Third World may not be pleased with our conclusions here. Indeed, Ramachandra Guha has recently criticized the focus on biocentrism (i.e., nonanthropocentrism) and wilderness preservation that per-vades Western environmentalism. These Western concerns are at best, irrelevant to, and at worst, destructive of Third World societies. According to Guha, any justifiable environmental movement must include solutions to problems of equity, “economic and political redistribution.” 14 We agree. Thus, as a final note, let us return from the abstract atmospheres of axiological theory and normative frameworks to the harsh realities of life in the non-industrialized world. If our argument is sound, then any destructive development of the natural environment in the Third World is a moral wrong, and a policy of environmental preservation is a moral requirement. Recognition of this moral obligation to preserve the natural environment should be the starting point for any serious discussion of developmental policy.

### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best deconstructs anthropocentric ethics

#### Anthro is perpetuated by a lack of education – educational spaces must condemn anthro to start prevention – this has tangible impacts.

McKelvie 15 (Seeking to Increase Awareness of Speciesism and Its Impact on All Animals A Report on Animal Ethics \* Leah McKelvie Co-founder “Animal Ethics”, http://www.stafforini.com/txt/McKelvie%20-%20Seeking%20to%20increase%20awareness%20of%20speciesism%20and%20its%20impact%20on%20all%20animals.pdf) //AK

Although there is a worldwide movement advocating greater respect for nonhuman animals, there is a need for more antispeciesist education and research. While animal advocates often draw attention to particular ways nonhuman animals are harmed, the root cause – speciesism – is not usually stressed and is sometimes overlooked. As a result, some of the greatest harms animals suffer are under-addressed and there is little challenge to the speciesist beliefs and institutions that drive the lack of respect for animals in so many ways. The core issue in animal ethics is not that animals are callously treated and used as resources in particular circumstances. The real problem is that nonhuman animals are commonly disregarded in general, primarily due to speciesism. Speciesism is the discrimination against individuals or a group based on species membership and is the most widespread form of discrimination in the world today. Like other forms of discrimination, speciesism is unjustified because it disregards relevant factors such as whether the individuals in question can be harmed by our actions or inactions. Once the spurious assumptions of speciesism are rejected, it becomes clear that we should give nonhuman animals the same consideration we give to humans. Respecting animals means not just avoiding causing them harm, but also helping them where and when we can. Just as racism and sexism are embedded in people’s unexamined beliefs and in society’s institutions, speciesism appears to most people as part of the natural order of things. It seems obvious to many that humans are inherently more important than other animals, and that some nonhuman animals matter more than others. For example, it is often taken for granted that it would be wrong to treat dogs the way pigs are treated. In order for societies to change, their members must first recognize that there is a problem. That is why education about speciesism is crucial.

#### The Aff resituates humans in ecological terms and non-humans in ethical terms- this is key to deconstruct our masculinized culture which is a pre-req to effective political action. Only the Aff’s starting point allows us to analyze anthropocentrism from “below” rather than from “above.”

Plumwood 2 (Val, Australian Research Council Fellow at the University of Sydney. She is an environmental activist, bush-walker, and a pioneer of environmental philosophy.) (Environmental Culture: The ecological crisis of reason) pg. 8-11 Accessed: 7/9/16 LGF

This book addresses two historic tasks that arise from the rationalist hyperseparation of human identity from nature: they can be summed up as the tasks of (re)situating humans in ecological terms and non-humans in ethical terms. The ﬁrst is apparently the more urgent and self-evident, the task of prudence, the other is presented as optional, as supererogation, the inessential sphere of ethics. But this is a major error; the two tasks are interconnected, and cannot be addressed properly in isolation from each other. To the extent that we hyper-separate ourselves from nature and reduce it conceptually in order to justify domination, we not only lose the ability to empathise and to see the non-human sphere in ethical terms, but also get a false sense of our own character and location that includes an illusory sense of autonomy. The failure to see the non-human domain in the richer terms appropriate to ethics licences supposedly ‘purely instrumental’ relationships that distort our perceptions and enframings, impoverish our relations and make us insensitive to dependencies and interconnections – which are thus in turn a prudential hazard. When we take account of such standpoint considerations, we can see that our ethical failures and our prudential failures are closely and interactively linked, casting doubt on any attempt to polarise or treat as sharply discontinuous human and non-human interests and ethics. One of the problems in standard ways of thinking about the crisis is precisely this rationalist divorce between male-codedrational prudence and female-coded ethics, as if they were separate and non-interacting spheres. This is one of the legacies of rationalism that resonates strongly in the contemporary organisation of life under global capitalism, increasingly monological and insulated from corrective feedback. Rationalist distortions appear especially clearly in the global economic system and its identiﬁcation of rationality with egoism, and in the dualism of reason and emotion in its many variants. The economic rationalist culture of contemporary capitalism draws on many of the classical rationalist narratives and dualisms of the past, such as reason/emotion dualism, nuanced to ﬁt new contexts and institutions such as the commodity form, which requires the splitting of use from respect. Reason/emotion dualism divorces prudence from ethics, codes the former as rational, and sees the opposing sphere of ethical and ecological concern as dispensable, mere subjective sentiment. The divorce between prudence and ethics (reﬂecting also a ‘pure self’ versus ‘pure other’ split) has been especially strongly stressed for the nonhuman sphere in the person/property dualism of capitalism and the associated subject/object dualism of its knowledge systems, in science. These normalise instrumental or ‘purely prudential’ approaches that treat the non-human, with few exceptions, as property, exempt from ethical concern except of most marginal and precarious kinds. Tough monological stances towards nature based on the identiﬁcation of rationality with disengagement and egoism, as I argue in Chapters 1 and 2, are thus able to draw on historically-established cultures of reason/emotion dualism and the still-powerful traditional male-coding of reason in contrast to emotion in order to masquerade as rational. Taking account of the role and history of human/nature dualism in dominant culture means then that change is not just a matter of adding to our stock of knowledge a ‘new’ area of scientiﬁc ecology, but is also a matter of changing culture by countering long-standing insensitivities and rationalist distortions in a wide range of areas, including knowledge itself. For reasons deriving from the subject/object knowledge structures I discuss in Chapter 2, science is usually seen as the appropriate place to locate ecological concern and discussion. To supplement scientiﬁc studies demonstrating global warming scenarios and scientiﬁc models indicating a potential for collapse of basic systems and services, many scientists appeal to methodological and decision-theory considerations of precaution and risk (the so-called ‘Precautionary Principle’). These principles have many problems. If, as Haller (2000) argues, such narrowly rational mathematical risk arguments are rather more ambiguous and less conclusive as logical reasons for changing course than they are often taken to be, this does not mean, contra Haller, that we have no other intellectual resources for decision and must rely on such bases for decision as pure emotion, intuition, tradition or simple self-interest. None of these will provide adequate guidance in the future we face, individually or collectively. The ecological ‘humanities’ enable us to bring to bear a whole further range of considerations that are hardly ‘non-intellectual’, including arguments of a more historical, self-reﬂective and self-critical cast which consider the limitations and failures of correctiveness in dominant forms of rationality and the illusions of anthropocentric culture. These standpoint considerations are the basis for the arguments I advance here, and they are I think the sorts of considerations that inform the better kinds of social and personal decision-making. We should not be persuaded to think of decisions as the dilemmas of stripped-down actors in rational choice scenarios, prisoners of the ‘purely rational’, abstract constructs assumed to know nothing of the social forces and past trajectory which have produced their problems. Our capacity to gain insight from understanding our social context, to learn from self-critical perspectives on the past and to allow for our own limitations of vision, is still one of our best hopes for creative change and survival. This book investigates some standpoint sources of our ecological blindspots, including, in Chapters 5 and 6, the anthropocentric perspectives and culture that make us insensitive to our ecological place in the world. The centric analyses of anthropocentrism, I argue, unlike the many rationalist-inspired accounts given by philosophers, extend and illuminate the major counter-hegemonic critiques of our time and provide useful guidance for ecological activists. The analysis of anthropocentrism presented in Chapters 5 and 6 draws on the analysis of centrism suggested by several liberation movements. It has major implications for activism, theory and philosophy, and supports a counter-hegemonic program in philosophical methodology, ethics and the philosophy of mind, which is discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. As outlined in Chapter 9, activists interested in countering human-centredness can also draw usefully on theorisations offered by other liberation movements of the concept of solidarity, for example through the cultivation of the ‘traitorous identity’. The Otherisation of nature bears on a key question of justice – the concern with obstacles to justice, especially forms of partiality and self-imposition that prevent us from giving others their due.9 One important approach to justice suggested by the analysis of anthropocentrism is methodological, one of studying up rather than studying down, shifting the onus of proof from inclusion to exclusion and moving the ethical focus from the evaluated item and the dubious question of their ‘qualiﬁcations’ for ethical inclusion and attention (studying down) to the different and largely neglected question of the ethical stance of the human evaluator (studying up) and their own moral status. What requires critical philosophical engagement in the context of anthropocentric culture is self rather than other, the limits imposed by the human rather than the nature side of the ethical relationship, the ethical stance of closure rather than the ethical stance of openness.

## AR

### Their call to mine (the moon/asteroids/Mars) is rooted in anthropocentrism.

Sadeh 11 (Eligar, American political scientist and academic Assistant Professor, Department of Space Studies University of North Dakota, Ch. 13 Space Power and the Environment, Toward a Theory of Spacepower, June 13, 2011, http://www.opensourcesinfo.org/journal/2011/6/13/toward-a-theory-of-spacepower-selected-essays.html)

In the anthropocentric view, humans are treated as ends in and of themselves and act as moral agents in relation to the environment. Nature is of instrumental value in that it contributes to human life. Anthropocentrism is rooted in the principle of nature as a utility for human ends. In this vein, the environment can be both exploited and protected to safeguard and further human interests and the persistence of human civilization. The exploitation-of-nature argument is based on the exploitation of the environment to enhance human well-being. This view allows humans to extract resources from space and planetary bodies and to create human-supported biospheres in space and on planetary surfaces and terraform celestial bodies. In the realm of national security, such a view suggests spacepower projection without regard for the contamination of the space environment. This is the unregulated view that can lead to a tragedy of the commons of space. The perpetuation of the human species that is linked to spacepower considerations suggests that extending a human presence in space takes place without regard for environmental protection. 48 The exploitation-of-nature argument underlies the view on spacepower discussed in chapter 9 in this book, which examines the use of the Moon's resources for national economic development. Indicative of this is the new U.S. policy "to incorporate the Solar System in our economic sphere," with the fundamental goal of exploration being to advance scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration program.

### We meet disclosure

A screenshot of a computer

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