## 1

#### Interpreation – The Aff must defend theory interpretations and arguments unconditionally as presented in the 1ac. In other words, the aff may not run cx checks or their spike in the advocacy text

#### Violation –

#### [1] Theory recourse – CX checks (a) causes sidestepping, encouraging you to have hidden abusive args since I either call you out on it in cx and you kick it or I concede it and you win, which makes debates innocuous and is empirically confirmed with Jake Steirn, (b) causes ambiguity – what constitutes a sufficient “check” is unclear. Even if we isolate the abusive practice in CX, the aff can still go for the arg and establish new parameters for checking, and (c) prep skew – even if you don’t kick the abuse, you get extra time to prep my interp since you know what I’ll indict. That gives you nearly double the time to prep and creates irreciprocal burdens. Theory recourse is key to any voter since it ensures I can check back abusive strategies.

#### [2] Value of CX – There’s a big difference between cross-examining a position and clarifying what the aff is. The point of CX is to do former. Your norm encourages debaters to not work at becoming good at questioning their opponents. Also no reason we need to use CX as clarification – you had 6 minutes to clarify what you defended. That’s key to education since CX and the ability to ask good questions is one of the most unique skills garnered in LD. Key to fairness because it allows aff to waste negative CX time and keeps the neg from gaining concessions.

#### Voters:

#### Fairness – a) intrinsic to a competitive activity like debate b) all arugments presuppose fair evaluation

#### DTD –

#### a) Deters future abuse

#### b) Rectifies time loss

#### c) The judge cannot determine a winner if there has been a skew; your abuse skewed the entire round

#### CI – a) Reasonability is arbitrary since idk your BS meter b) It fosters the best norms through encouraging the fairest rule c) Reasonability collapses by debating the brightline No RVI – a) It’s illogical to vote for you for being fair b) It incentivizes you to bait theory and win off a scripted CI c) people will be scared to read theory against good theory debaters and will never be able to check abuse

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#### Neg theory first – 1) the only reason the 1NC was abusive is because of the 1AC; you can’t evaluate the fairness of the 1NC if I win neg theory 2) outweighs on scope – I’m indicting actions earlier in the round, which means the round was skewed for longer by your abuse

#### Evaluate the theory debate after the 2NR, not the 2AR: [1] I have no 3NR, so evaluating the theory debate after the 2AR puts me at a structural disadvantage since I can’t point out 2AR argument shifts or extrapolations and to respond to new 2AR arguments. [2] Time skew: the aff has 7 minutes of speech time between the 3 minute 2AR and 4 minute 1AR, while I only have a 6 minute 2NR.

#### No new 1ar paradigm issues - A] the 1NC has already occurred with current paradigm issues in mind so new 1ar paradigms moot any theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested which o/w’s on time frame since we can set higher quality norms.

## 2

#### Permissibility and presumption negate:

#### [1] Resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove a proactive obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation

#### [2] Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true.

#### [3] Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false.

#### Moral internalism is true:

#### [1] Disagreement – Externalist theories fail to explain why some agents have the differing motivation for actions – internalism solves by showing how agents’ motivations are dictated by internal desires. Markovitz

[Markovits 14, Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. https://philpapers.org/rec/ROCJMM Oxford University Press, 2014.//Scopa] SHS ZS

Relatedly, internalism about reasons seems less presumptive than externalism. **We should not assume** that **some of us have** special **epistemic access to what matters**, **especially in the absence of any criterion for making such a judgment**. **It’s better to start from the assumption**, as internalism does, **that everyone’s ends are equally worthy of pursuit** – **and correct this assumption** only **by appealing to standards that are** as **uncontroversial** as possible. **According to externalism** about reasons, **what matters normatively** – that is, what we have reason to do or pursue or protect or respect or promote – **does not depend in** any fundamental way on **what** in fact **matters to us** – that is, what we do do and pursue and protect and respect and promote. **Some of us happen to be motivated by what actually matters**, **and some** of us **are “wrongly” motivated**. **But externalists** can **offer no explanation for this supposed difference** in how well we respond to reasons – **no explanation of why some of us have the right motivations and some of us the wrong ones** – **that doesn’t** itself **appeal to the views about what matters** that they’re trying to justify. (They can explain why some people have the right motivations by saying, e.g., that they’re good people, but that assumes the truth of the normative views that are at issue.22) **A comparison to the epistemic case** helps **bring out what is unsatisfactory** in the externalist position. **We sometimes attribute greater epistemic powers to some people than** to **others** **despite not being able to explain why they’re more likely to be right** in their beliefs about a certain topic. **Chicken-sexing is a popular example** of this among philosophers. **We think some people are more likely to form true beliefs about the sex of chickens than others even though we can’t explain why they are better at judging the sex of chickens.** But in the case of chicken-sexing, **we have independent means of determining the truth, and so we have independent verification that chicken-sexers usually get things right**. **Externalism seems to tell[s] us that some of us are better reasons- sensors than others**, but **without providing the independent means of determining** which of us are in fact more reliably motivated by genuine normative reasons (or even that some of us are).

#### [3] Externalism collapses to internalism.

**Joyce 1**, Richard (Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand). The Myth of Morality. 2001. [Bracketed for grammatical clarity]

Back to the [Suppose] external reason[s]. Suppose it were claimed, instead, that I have a reason to refrain from drinking the coffee because it is tapu and must not be touched. This reason claim will be urged regardless of what I may say about my indifference to tapu, or my citing of nihilistic desires to tempt the hand of fate. [r]egardless of my desires (it is claimed) I ought not drink - l have a reason not to drink. But how could that reason ever explain any action of mine? Could the external reason even explain my [action] from drinking? Clearly, in order to explain it the external reason must have some causally efficacious role [in] among the antecedents of the action (in this case, an omission) — l must have. in some manner. "internalized" it. The only possibility, it would seem, consistent with its being an external reason, is that I believe the external reason claim [but] : I believe that the coffee is tapu. There's no doubting that such a belief can play a role in explaining actions - including my refraining from drinking the coffee. The question is whether the **belief alone can[not] produce action**, to which the correct answer is “No.” A very familiar and eminently sensible view says that **in** order to explain an action the belief must couple with desires (such that those same desires had in the absence of the belief would not have resulted in the action). And this seems correct: if I believe that the coffee is [bad] tapu but really just don’t care about that, then I will not refrain from drinking it. So in order for the belief to explain action it must couple with [desire] elements - but in that case the putative external reason collapses into an internal one.3

#### This entails a system of mutual self restraint: Contracts are the only standard capable of generating normativity since each agent rationally chooses to protect their self-interest by entering the contract.

**Gauthier** [David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998], ///AHS PB /BHHS AK recut

I shall not rehearse at length an argument that is now familiar to at least some readers, and, in any event, can be found in that book. But let me sketch briefly those features of deliberative rationality that enable it to constrain maximizing choice. The key idea is that in many situations, if each person chooses what, given the choices of the others, would maximize her expected utility, then the outcome will be mutually disadvantageous in comparison with some alternative – everyone could do better**. 14 Equilibrium, which obtains when each person ’ s action is a best response to the others ’ actions, is incompatible with (Pareto-) optimality, which obtains when no one could do better without someone else doing worse. Given the ubiquity of such situations,** each person can see the benefit, to herself, of participating with her fellows in practices requiring each to refrain from the direct endeavor to maximize her own utility, when such mutual restraint is mutually advantageous. No one**,** of course**,** can have reason to accept any unilateral constraint on her maximizing behavior; each benefits from, and only from, the constraint accepted by her fellows. But if one benefits more from a constraint on others than one loses by being constrained oneself, one may have reason to accept a practice requiring everyone, including oneself, to exhibit such a constraint. We may representsuch a practiceas capable of gaining unanimous agreement among rational persons who were choosing the terms on which they would interact with each other. And this agreementis the basis of morality**.** Consider a simple example of a moral practice that would command rational agreement. Suppose each of us were to assist her fellows only when either she could expect to benefit herself from giving assistance, or she took a direct interest in their well-being. Then, in many situations, persons would not give assistance to others, even though the benefit to the recipient would greatly exceed the cost to the giver, because there would be no provision for the giver to share in the benefit. Everyone would then expect to do better were each to give assistance to her fellows, regardless of her own benefit or interest, whenever the cost of assisting was low and the benefit of receiving assistance considerable**.** Each would thereby accept a constraint on the direct pursuit of her own concerns, not unilaterally, but given a like acceptance by others. Reflection leads us to recognize that those who belong to groups whose members adhere to such a practice of mutual assistance enjoy benefits in interaction that are denied to others**.** We may then represent such a practice as rationally acceptable to everyone.This rationale for agreed constraint makes no reference to the content of anyone ’ s preferences**.** The argument depends simply on the structure of interaction, on the way in which each person ’ s endeavor to fulfill her own preferences affects the fulfillment of everyone else**.** Thus, each person ’ s reason to accept a mutually constraining practice is independent of her particular desires, aims and interests, although not, of course, of the fact that she has such concerns**. The idea of a purely rational agent, moved to act by reason alone, is not, I think, an intelligible one.** Morality is not to be understood as a constraint arising from reason alone on the fulfillment of nonrational preferences. Rather, a rational agent is one who acts to achieve the maximal fulfillment of her preferences, and morality is a constraint on the manner in which she acts, arising from the effects of interaction with other agents

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with contractarianism. Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Actor specificity – states are not moral entities but derive authority from the contracts that allows them to constrain action. This outweighs - states aren’t bound by moral obligations, but they are by their contracts to other entities. - 7 secs

#### [2] Both debaters debate to win the round but we are still restricted by agreed on constraints like 4 mins of prep, speech times, etc. Their very performance justifies the NC framework and proves the AC collapses to the NC

#### Negate:

#### [1] Employees and companies have agreed-upon contracts that are broken in a strike since workers are not upholding their end of it – this is intrinsically bad under the framework and violates the principle of mutual self-restraint

#### [2] No aff offense – a] even if some strikes are legal they are still by definition contradicting their side of the contract which is exactly what the fw condemns b] the res is about an UNCONDITIONAL right which means the aff permits always breaking contracts so arguments about strikes sometimes being justified under the fw fail

## Case