# Loyola dubs 1nc

## 1

#### Interpretation: debaters may not read multiple reasons to substantively auto affirm the the resolution. To clarify apriori bad

#### Reciprocity: mutltiple aprirois put the neg at least at a 3-1 skew if not infinite skew which severely skews rhe neg time. Reciprocity key to fairness cuz it key to balanced burdens

#### Ableism: multiple aprioris are ableist cuz it forces debaters to minesweep find small game over issues while also trying to answer a full aff fwk anf theory args. They creates an epistemic skew on everything the aff says cuz it’s only true cuz I couldn’t minesweep it in time and also key to fairness ensuring th equity of all people in debate

#### Fairness first –

#### A] Inescapable – all arguments presuppose fair evaluation because otherwise the judge could just hack for the other side.

#### B] The judge has to indicate who won the round, fairness best coheres with this since if one debater had ten minutes to speak and the other had three there would be incongruence that alters ability to judge the truth value of the K so cross-applications don’t work.

#### DTD –

#### a) Deters future abuse

**b) I had to invest time on theory which skews the round irreparably so dtd is the only recourse**

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#### CI – a) It fosters the best norms through encouraging the fairest rule b) Reasonability collapses to an offense defense paradigm by debating the brightline c) reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention since there’s never a clear brightline

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#### No RVI – a) Illogical – you shouldn’t win for proving that you’re fair or edication because it’s a prima facie burden – logic outweighs  because it determines what args count as valid b) It incentivizes you to bait theory and win off a scripted CI c) people will be scared to read theory against good theory debaters and will never be able to check abuse

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## 2

#### Permissibility and presumption negate – a.  the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove an obligation, permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation b. Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false. C. we don’t presume everything true, that’s why we don’t believe in conspiracy theories

#### I defend the squo. Moral internalism is true:

#### [1] Epistemology – There is no universal character of moral judgements that is epistemically accessible since every argument for its existence presumes the correct normative starting point.

**Markovits 14**. [Markovits, Julia. Moral reason. https://philpapers.org/rec/ROCJMM Oxford University Press, 2014.//Scopa] BHHS AK

Relatedly, internalism about reasons seems less presumptive than externalism. We should not assume that some of us have special epistemic access to what matters, especially in the absence of any criterion for making such a judgment. It’s better to start from the assumption, as internalism does, that everyone’s ends are equally worthy of pursuit – and correct this assumption only by appealing to standards that are as uncontroversial as possible. According to externalism about reasons, what matters normatively – that is, what we have reason to do or pursue or protect or respect or promote – does not depend in any fundamental way on what in fact matters to us – that is, what we do do and pursue and protect and respect and promote. Some of us happen to be motivated by what actually matters, and some of us are “wrongly” motivated. But externalists can offer no explanation for this supposed difference in how well we respond to reasons – no explanation of why some of us have the right motivations and some of us the wrong ones – that doesn’t itself appeal to the views about what matters that they’re trying to justify. (They can explain why some people have the right motivations by saying, e.g., that they’re good people, but that assumes the truth of the normative views that are at issue.22) A comparison to the epistemic case helps bring out what is unsatisfactory in the externalist position. We sometimes attribute greater epistemic powers to some people than to others despite not being able to explain why they’re more likely to be right in their beliefs about a certain topic. Chicken-sexing is a popular example of this among philosophers. We think some people are more likely to form true beliefs about the sex of chickens than others even though we can’t explain why they are better at judging the sex of chickens. But in the case of chicken-sexing, we have independent means of determining the truth, and so we have independent verification that chicken-sexers usually get things right. Externalism seems to tell[s] us that some of us are better reasons- sensors than others, but without providing the independent means of determining which of us are in fact more reliably motivated by genuine normative reasons (or even that some of us are).

#### Next, every agent takes their ability to act on their ethical system as instrumentally valuable. Only self interest bridges relativism to provide a universal principle.

**Moore** Margaret Moore, Queens University professor in the Political Studies department, cross-appointed (as a courtesy) in Philosophy, Reviewed Work(s): Morals by Agreement. by David Gauthier, Noûs, Vol. 25, No. 5 (Dec., 1991), pp. 707-714 ///AHS PB /BHHS AK recut

On Gauthier's view, morality is a sub-set of self-interest (he calls it preference-fulfillment), which is instrumentally necessary, not absolutely, but given features of the human situation which are almost certain to ob- tain. By taking as his starting-point the agent's subjective motivational set, whatever its content, Gauthier can claim that the requirements of morality escape none who fall under its ambit, for each person necessarily acts on his or her desires and aims. If Gauthier's project is successful, he will have refuted the moral skeptic: by demonstrating that morality is self-interestedly rational, he can claim that the principles are justified and that they apply to everyone. He does not need to presuppose a feeling such as sympathy to explain moral action, or appeal to a process of moral education and socialization within communities which shape the individual's desires and beliefs in accordance with a specific moral conception. Gauthier's agents simply maximize their utility and in the process find that they need to co-operate with others and that the dynamics of co- operation make it rational in self-interested terms to constrain their utility- maximization. By considering in this way the principles and constraints which it would be rational for co-operating self-interested agents to adopt, Gautheir claims to be able to deduce a system of moral constraints and Principles.

#### This entails a system of mutual self restraint: Contracts are the only standard capable of generating normativity since each agent rationally chooses to protect their self-interest by entering the contract.

**Gauthier** [David Gauthier, Canadian-American philosopher best known for his neo-Hobbesian social contract theory of morality, Why Contractarianism?, 1998], ///AHS PB /BHHS AK recut

I shall not rehearse at length an argument that is now familiar to at least some readers, and, in any event, can be found in that book. But let me sketch briefly those features of deliberative rationality that enable it to constrain maximizing choice. The key idea is that in many situations, if each person chooses what, given the choices of the others, would maximize her expected utility, then the outcome will be mutually disadvantageous in comparison with some alternative – everyone could do better**. 14 Equilibrium, which obtains when each person ’ s action is a best response to the others ’ actions, is incompatible with (Pareto-) optimality, which obtains when no one could do better without someone else doing worse. Given the ubiquity of such situations,** each person can see the benefit, to herself, of participating with her fellows in practices requiring each to refrain from the direct endeavor to maximize her own utility, when such mutual restraint is mutually advantageous. No one**,** of course**,** can have reason to accept any unilateral constraint on her maximizing behavior; each benefits from, and only from, the constraint accepted by her fellows. But if one benefits more from a constraint on others than one loses by being constrained oneself, one may have reason to accept a practice requiring everyone, including oneself, to exhibit such a constraint. We may representsuch a practiceas capable of gaining unanimous agreement among rational persons who were choosing the terms on which they would interact with each other. And this agreementis the basis of morality**.** Consider a simple example of a moral practice that would command rational agreement. Suppose each of us were to assist her fellows only when either she could expect to benefit herself from giving assistance, or she took a direct interest in their well-being. Then, in many situations, persons would not give assistance to others, even though the benefit to the recipient would greatly exceed the cost to the giver, because there would be no provision for the giver to share in the benefit. Everyone would then expect to do better were each to give assistance to her fellows, regardless of her own benefit or interest, whenever the cost of assisting was low and the benefit of receiving assistance considerable**.** Each would thereby accept a constraint on the direct pursuit of her own concerns, not unilaterally, but given a like acceptance by others. Reflection leads us to recognize that those who belong to groups whose members adhere to such a practice of mutual assistance enjoy benefits in interaction that are denied to others**.** We may then represent such a practice as rationally acceptable to everyone.This rationale for agreed constraint makes no reference to the content of anyone ’ s preferences**.** The argument depends simply on the structure of interaction, on the way in which each person ’ s endeavor to fulfill her own preferences affects the fulfillment of everyone else**.** Thus, each person ’ s reason to accept a mutually constraining practice is independent of her particular desires, aims and interests, although not, of course, of the fact that she has such concerns**. The idea of a purely rational agent, moved to act by reason alone, is not, I think, an intelligible one.** Morality is not to be understood as a constraint arising from reason alone on the fulfillment of nonrational preferences. Rather, a rational agent is one who acts to achieve the maximal fulfillment of her preferences, and morality is a constraint on the manner in which she acts, arising from the effects of interaction with other agents

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with contractarianism.

#### Negate:

#### [1] IP rights are included in multiple international contracts – the aff violates that.

**WIPO** (WIPO, 11-9-1998, accessed on 8-25-2021, World Intellectual Property Organization, "Intellectual Property and Human Rights", https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo\_pub\_762.pdf)

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) take pleasure in issuing the proceedings of the Panel Discussion on "Intellectual Property and Human Rights" which took place in Geneva on November 9, 1998, to mark the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Intellectual property rights are enshrined as human rights in the UDHR. Article 27 of the Universal Declaration provides that: "(]) Everyone has the right.freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits; (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author." These rights are further emphasized by Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR), Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civii'and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR), the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 1993 (VDPA), and other international and regional instruments.

#### [2] Consent – the aff disregards the consent of medicine producers and allows it to be violated by removing patents - negates because violating a party’s consent is an act of violating a hypothetical contract since their side of the contract isn’t accounted for